NRC-2016-0233, Comment (4) of Anonymous Individual on Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents

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Comment (4) of Anonymous Individual on Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents
ML17109A359
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 04/14/2017
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch
References
81FR83288 00004, NRC-2016-0233
Download: ML17109A359 (1)


Text

Page 1of1 As of: 4/17/17 10:28 AM

'Z>l7 Received: April 14, 2017 PUBLIC SUBMISSIONt ti.r~  ! 7 i.tt 10:  :,o Status: Pending_Post Tracking No. lkl-8vtu-n8fj Comments Due: April 21, 2017 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2016,-0233

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Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents Comment On: NRC-2016-0233-0003 Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents; Extension of Comment Period Document: NRC-20 l 6""023 3-DRAFT-0005 Comment on FR Doc# 2017-02073

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Name: Anonymous Anonymous General Comment 0 / ,f-.

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 is providing the following comments concerning its review of Draft Regulatory Guide (DG) 1327.

Section 2.1.3: Please clarify what kind of manufacturing tolerances are referred to here. Does this require a statistical analysis with 95/95 uncertainty?

Section 2.2.3: Given that a large majority of the time each reactor spends at power is near 100%, can low power conditions be excluded from the analysis? Many transient analyses are perfofll1ed at zero power .and full power based on probability. It would be very time-consuming to determine if intermediate power levels are more limiting at each bumup interval. It would seem that even for a load-following plant, examinations of 0, 80%, 90%, and 100% would be sufficient to cover 99% of the probability distribution.

Section 2.5.1: For control rod ejection (CRE), since.the reactivity-initiated accident (RIA) transient is caused by the pressure boundary breach, the analysis should be able to credit the pressure boundary breach in the peak RCS pressure analysis.

Section 4: This section should be removed from DG-1327. Information related to the performance of radiological consequence analyses should remain in RG 1.183.

Section 6: The reactor coolant peak pressure acceptance criterion is already defined in a plant's Final Safety Analysis Report and may differ from the limit defined in DG-1327. The Regulatory Guide should not override existing license~ limits._ _ ~-~=?>S-:::::- /}!JiLt-tJ 3 Su.UST ~:1e~~c=;~ ~<--~/!t!/~C/N~ 3)

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https://www.fdms.govIfdms/getcontent?objectld=09000064825 56dce&format=xml&showorig=false 04/ 17/2017