NOC-AE-05001951, Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, Item Number 2 Based on the Plant 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results

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Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, Item Number 2 Based on the Plant 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results
ML053460289
Person / Time
Site: South Texas STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 12/01/2005
From: Mcburnett M
South Texas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
BL-04-001, NOC-AE-05001951, STI: 31962022
Download: ML053460289 (3)


Text

Nuclear Operating Company South Tern Projec Ekedc GencmfnSthon PO. B 2839 H*smwI Ter 77483 A..

December 1, 2005 NOC-AE-05001951 10CFR50.54(f)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 South Texas Project Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50499 Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, Item Number 2 Based on the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results

References:

Letter, Thomas J. Jordan to NRC Document Control Desk, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors" dated July 27, 2004 (NOC-AE-04001762, ML042160011)

In accordance with 10CFR50.54(f), STP Nuclear Operating Company submits the following response to Requested Information Item No. 2 in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Bulletin 2004-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors," dated May 28, 2004.

NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Requested Information Item No. 2 requests the results of inspections be provided to the NRC within 60 days of plant restart following the inspection of the Alloy 82/182/600 pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections. The requested information is provided as an attachment to this letter for Unit 2, which completed the 11th Refueling Outage on October 31, 2005.

There are no commitments included in this report. If there are any questions regarding this additional information, please contact Mr. Scott Head at (361) 972-7136 or me at (361) 972-7206.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on G AG . r, /, zoos, M. A. McBurnett Manager of Nuclear Safety Assurance jcy/jal

Attachment:

Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Item Number 2, Based on the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results J (\ D STI: 31962022

NOC-AE-05001951 Page 2 of 2 cc:

(paper copy) (electronic copy)

Bruce S. Mallett A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Regional Administrator, Region IV Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Mohan C. Thadani Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard A. Ratliff Jack A. Fusco Bureau of Radiation Control Michael A. Reed Texas Department of State Health Services Texas Genco, LP 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 Jeffrey Cruz C. Kirksey U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City of Austin P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN116 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Jon C. Wood Cox Smith Matthews C. M. Canady J. J. Nesrsta City of Austin R. K. Temple Electric Utility Department E. Alarcon 721 Barton Springs Road City Public Service Austin, TX 78704

NOC-AE-05001951 Attachment Page 1 of 1 Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Item Number 2, Based on the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results NRC Request:

Within 60 days ofplant restartfollowing the next inspection of the Alloy 82/182/600pressurizer penetrationsand steam spacepiping connections, the subject PWR licensees should either:

(a) submit to the NRC a statement indicatingthat the inspectionsdescribed in the licensee's response to item (1)(c) of this bulletin were completed and a descriptionof the as-found condition of the pressurizershell, anyfindings of relevant indicationsof through-wall leakage,followup NDE performed to characterizeflaws in leaking penetrationsor steam space piping connections, a summary of all relevant indicationsfound by NDE, a summary of the disposition of anyfindings of boric acid, and any corrective actions taken and/or repairsmade as a result of the indicationsfound, or (b) if the licensee was unable to complete the inspections described in response to item (1)(c) of this bulletin, submit to the NRC a summary of the inspectionsperformed, the extent of the inspections, the methods used, a descriptionof the as-found condition of the pressurizershell, anyfindings of relevant indicationsof through-wall leakage, followup NDE performed to characterizeflaws in leaking penetrationsor steam space piping connections, a summary of all relevant indicationsfound by NDE, a summary of the disposition of anyfindings of boric acid, and any corrective actions taken and/or repairs made as a result of the indicationsfound. In addition, supplement the answer which you provided to item (1)(d) above to explain why the inspections that you completed were adequatefor the purpose of maintainingthe integrity of yourfacility's RCPB andfor meeting all applicable regulatory requirements which pertain to yourfacility.

Forlines attacheddirectly to the pressurizer, with the exception of the surge line, the information requested in (1) and (2) above should be providedforany locations, including those remotefrom the pressurizershell, which contain Alloy 82/182/600 materialswhich are exposed to conditions similarto those of the pressurizerenvironment.

Response

STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) completed the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage (2RE11) on October 31, 2005 and submits the information below describing the results of the Alloy 82/182 pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections inspections.

STPNOC performed bare metal visual inspections on all steam space nozzles during the Unit 2 refueling outage (2RE1 1) in the Fall of 2005. There was no evidence indicating any pressure boundary leakage from these nozzle safe ends of the pressurizer, nor was there any evidence of corrosion or wastage. A complete bare metal visual examination was achieved at each of the nozzle safe ends. A VT-I visual examination method was performed by a certified Level II visual examiner using a flashlight and an 18% neutral gray card with 1/32" width black line for assuring adequate lighting for resolution of any indications. A written nondestructive examination report was used to document these examinations. Similar inspections are scheduled for subsequent refueling outages.

Text

Nuclear Operating Company South Tern Projec Ekedc GencmfnSthon PO. B 2839 H*smwI Ter 77483 A..

December 1, 2005 NOC-AE-05001951 10CFR50.54(f)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 South Texas Project Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50499 Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, Item Number 2 Based on the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results

References:

Letter, Thomas J. Jordan to NRC Document Control Desk, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors" dated July 27, 2004 (NOC-AE-04001762, ML042160011)

In accordance with 10CFR50.54(f), STP Nuclear Operating Company submits the following response to Requested Information Item No. 2 in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Bulletin 2004-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors," dated May 28, 2004.

NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Requested Information Item No. 2 requests the results of inspections be provided to the NRC within 60 days of plant restart following the inspection of the Alloy 82/182/600 pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections. The requested information is provided as an attachment to this letter for Unit 2, which completed the 11th Refueling Outage on October 31, 2005.

There are no commitments included in this report. If there are any questions regarding this additional information, please contact Mr. Scott Head at (361) 972-7136 or me at (361) 972-7206.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on G AG . r, /, zoos, M. A. McBurnett Manager of Nuclear Safety Assurance jcy/jal

Attachment:

Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Item Number 2, Based on the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results J (\ D STI: 31962022

NOC-AE-05001951 Page 2 of 2 cc:

(paper copy) (electronic copy)

Bruce S. Mallett A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Regional Administrator, Region IV Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Mohan C. Thadani Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard A. Ratliff Jack A. Fusco Bureau of Radiation Control Michael A. Reed Texas Department of State Health Services Texas Genco, LP 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 Jeffrey Cruz C. Kirksey U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City of Austin P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN116 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Jon C. Wood Cox Smith Matthews C. M. Canady J. J. Nesrsta City of Austin R. K. Temple Electric Utility Department E. Alarcon 721 Barton Springs Road City Public Service Austin, TX 78704

NOC-AE-05001951 Attachment Page 1 of 1 Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Item Number 2, Based on the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage Inspection Results NRC Request:

Within 60 days ofplant restartfollowing the next inspection of the Alloy 82/182/600pressurizer penetrationsand steam spacepiping connections, the subject PWR licensees should either:

(a) submit to the NRC a statement indicatingthat the inspectionsdescribed in the licensee's response to item (1)(c) of this bulletin were completed and a descriptionof the as-found condition of the pressurizershell, anyfindings of relevant indicationsof through-wall leakage,followup NDE performed to characterizeflaws in leaking penetrationsor steam space piping connections, a summary of all relevant indicationsfound by NDE, a summary of the disposition of anyfindings of boric acid, and any corrective actions taken and/or repairsmade as a result of the indicationsfound, or (b) if the licensee was unable to complete the inspections described in response to item (1)(c) of this bulletin, submit to the NRC a summary of the inspectionsperformed, the extent of the inspections, the methods used, a descriptionof the as-found condition of the pressurizershell, anyfindings of relevant indicationsof through-wall leakage, followup NDE performed to characterizeflaws in leaking penetrationsor steam space piping connections, a summary of all relevant indicationsfound by NDE, a summary of the disposition of anyfindings of boric acid, and any corrective actions taken and/or repairs made as a result of the indicationsfound. In addition, supplement the answer which you provided to item (1)(d) above to explain why the inspections that you completed were adequatefor the purpose of maintainingthe integrity of yourfacility's RCPB andfor meeting all applicable regulatory requirements which pertain to yourfacility.

Forlines attacheddirectly to the pressurizer, with the exception of the surge line, the information requested in (1) and (2) above should be providedforany locations, including those remotefrom the pressurizershell, which contain Alloy 82/182/600 materialswhich are exposed to conditions similarto those of the pressurizerenvironment.

Response

STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) completed the Unit 2 11th Refueling Outage (2RE11) on October 31, 2005 and submits the information below describing the results of the Alloy 82/182 pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections inspections.

STPNOC performed bare metal visual inspections on all steam space nozzles during the Unit 2 refueling outage (2RE1 1) in the Fall of 2005. There was no evidence indicating any pressure boundary leakage from these nozzle safe ends of the pressurizer, nor was there any evidence of corrosion or wastage. A complete bare metal visual examination was achieved at each of the nozzle safe ends. A VT-I visual examination method was performed by a certified Level II visual examiner using a flashlight and an 18% neutral gray card with 1/32" width black line for assuring adequate lighting for resolution of any indications. A written nondestructive examination report was used to document these examinations. Similar inspections are scheduled for subsequent refueling outages.