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MONTHYEARNL-15-1421, License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Systems- Operating.2016-10-11011 October 2016 License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Systems- Operating. Project stage: Request ML16326A2542016-11-21021 November 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Joseph M. Farley, Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Regarding TS 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating Project stage: Acceptance Review ML17095A4152017-04-17017 April 2017 Request for Additional Information Project stage: RAI NL-17-0774, Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating2017-05-15015 May 2017 Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating Project stage: Response to RAI NL-17-1124, Clarification to Request to Revise LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating2017-06-30030 June 2017 Clarification to Request to Revise LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating Project stage: Request ML17205A0202017-09-15015 September 2017 Issuance of Amendments to Revise TS 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating Project stage: Approval 2017-04-17
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Category:Letter type:NL
MONTHYEARNL-24-0011, Report of Changes to Emergency Plan and Summary of 50.54(q) Analysis2024-01-11011 January 2024 Report of Changes to Emergency Plan and Summary of 50.54(q) Analysis NL-23-0901, 30-Day 10 CFR 21 Notification - Framatome Supplied Siemens Medium Voltage (Mv) Circuit Breakers2023-12-15015 December 2023 30-Day 10 CFR 21 Notification - Framatome Supplied Siemens Medium Voltage (Mv) Circuit Breakers NL-23-0908, Cycle 30 Core Operating Limits Report2023-12-13013 December 2023 Cycle 30 Core Operating Limits Report NL-23-0877, Request for Exemption from Security Event Notification Implementation2023-11-29029 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Security Event Notification Implementation NL-23-0825, Reply to Notice of Violation EA-23-080 and Readiness for 95001 Inspection2023-11-14014 November 2023 Reply to Notice of Violation EA-23-080 and Readiness for 95001 Inspection NL-23-0739, Response to NRC Inspection Report and Preliminary White Finding2023-09-0808 September 2023 Response to NRC Inspection Report and Preliminary White Finding NL-23-0716, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit2023-08-23023 August 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit NL-23-0713, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit2023-08-23023 August 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit NL-23-0704, Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit2023-08-22022 August 2023 Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit NL-23-0658, Southern Nuclear Operating Company - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Quality Assurance Topical Report Submittal2023-08-11011 August 2023 Southern Nuclear Operating Company - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Quality Assurance Topical Report Submittal NL-23-0542, CFR 50.46 ECCS Evaluation Model Annual Report for 20222023-08-0909 August 2023 CFR 50.46 ECCS Evaluation Model Annual Report for 2022 NL-23-0624, Report of Changes to Emergency Plan and Summary of 50.54(q) Analysis2023-08-0404 August 2023 Report of Changes to Emergency Plan and Summary of 50.54(q) Analysis NL-23-0628, Readiness for Supplemental Inspection EA-22-1012023-07-26026 July 2023 Readiness for Supplemental Inspection EA-22-101 NL-23-0566, ISFSI and Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ISFSI - Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use2023-07-13013 July 2023 ISFSI and Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ISFSI - Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use NL-23-0555, Request for Exemption from Physical Barrier Requirement2023-07-0707 July 2023 Request for Exemption from Physical Barrier Requirement NL-23-0506, to Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request: Technical Specification Revision to Adopt WCAP-17661-P-A, Improved RAOC and CAOC Fq Surveillance Technical Specifications2023-07-0505 July 2023 to Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request: Technical Specification Revision to Adopt WCAP-17661-P-A, Improved RAOC and CAOC Fq Surveillance Technical Specifications NL-23-0444, Quality Assurance Topical Report Submittal2023-06-15015 June 2023 Quality Assurance Topical Report Submittal NL-23-0457, ISFSI, and Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, ISFSI - Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use2023-06-12012 June 2023 ISFSI, and Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, ISFSI - Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use NL-23-0449, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit Renewal Application2023-06-0202 June 2023 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit Renewal Application NL-23-0383, SNC Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01:Preparation And.2023-05-19019 May 2023 SNC Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01:Preparation And. NL-23-0372, Units 1 & 2, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 & 2, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Units 1 & 2, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 20222023-05-10010 May 2023 Units 1 & 2, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 & 2, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Units 1 & 2, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 2022 NL-23-0337, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise the Frequency of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.52023-05-0505 May 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise the Frequency of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.5 NL-23-0295, Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-22-1012023-05-0101 May 2023 Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-22-101 NL-23-0310, Annual Non-Radiological Environmental Operating Reports and Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for 20222023-04-25025 April 2023 Annual Non-Radiological Environmental Operating Reports and Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for 2022 NL-23-0019, GEN-ISI-ALT-2023-01, Request to Use Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI2023-04-12012 April 2023 GEN-ISI-ALT-2023-01, Request to Use Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI NL-23-0263, Southern Nuclear Company Submittal of Drug and Alcohol Testing Errors Identified 10 CFR 26.719(c) 30-Day Report2023-04-0505 April 2023 Southern Nuclear Company Submittal of Drug and Alcohol Testing Errors Identified 10 CFR 26.719(c) 30-Day Report NL-23-0208, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ISFSI, Decommissioning Funding Plan Triennial Update2023-03-29029 March 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ISFSI, Decommissioning Funding Plan Triennial Update NL-23-0014, Southern Nuclear Operating Co Submittal of Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding2023-03-29029 March 2023 Southern Nuclear Operating Co Submittal of Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding NL-23-0213, Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report for Outage 1R312023-03-21021 March 2023 Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report for Outage 1R31 NL-23-0228, Nuclear Property Insurance Coverage as of April 1, 2023 and Licensee Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums (10 CFR 140.21)2023-03-20020 March 2023 Nuclear Property Insurance Coverage as of April 1, 2023 and Licensee Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums (10 CFR 140.21) NL-23-0080, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-05, Version 1.02023-02-0202 February 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-05, Version 1.0 NL-23-0008, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves to Decrease Low Side Setpoint Tolerance Limiting.2023-01-17017 January 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves to Decrease Low Side Setpoint Tolerance Limiting. NL-23-0011, Update to Supporting Documentation Regulatory Conference EA-22-101. Cover Letter Only2023-01-0505 January 2023 Update to Supporting Documentation Regulatory Conference EA-22-101. Cover Letter Only NL-22-0799, License Amendment Request to Revise the Frequency of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.52022-12-20020 December 2022 License Amendment Request to Revise the Frequency of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.5 NL-22-0897, Supplement to Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request: Technical Specification Revision to Adopt WCAP-17661-P-A,2022-12-0909 December 2022 Supplement to Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request: Technical Specification Revision to Adopt WCAP-17661-P-A, NL-22-0887, Cycle 32 Core Operating Limits Report2022-11-21021 November 2022 Cycle 32 Core Operating Limits Report NL-22-0884, Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000348/2022440 and 05000364/2022440 EA-22-1012022-11-17017 November 2022 Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000348/2022440 and 05000364/2022440 EA-22-101 NL-20-0170, Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request: Technical Specification Revision to Adopt WCAP-17661-P-A, Improved RAOC2022-10-14014 October 2022 Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request: Technical Specification Revision to Adopt WCAP-17661-P-A, Improved RAOC NL-22-0756, Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-05, Version 1.02022-09-30030 September 2022 Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-05, Version 1.0 NL-22-0289, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 4.3 Fuel Storage to Correct Tabulated Values from the Associated Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Criticality Analysis2022-09-21021 September 2022 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 4.3 Fuel Storage to Correct Tabulated Values from the Associated Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Criticality Analysis NL-22-0608, Interim 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) Report Regarding Framatome Supplied Siemens Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers2022-08-17017 August 2022 Interim 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) Report Regarding Framatome Supplied Siemens Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers NL-22-0552, Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report for Outage 2R282022-07-28028 July 2022 Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report for Outage 2R28 NL-22-0510, Plants Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS Evaluation Model Annual Report for 20212022-07-14014 July 2022 Plants Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS Evaluation Model Annual Report for 2021 NL-22-0223, License Amendment to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves to Decrease Low Side Setpoint Tolerance Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Value2022-06-30030 June 2022 License Amendment to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves to Decrease Low Side Setpoint Tolerance Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Value NL-22-0361, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.5.17, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to Increase Calculated Peak.2022-06-20020 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.5.17, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to Increase Calculated Peak. NL-22-0362, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. - Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence Five-Year Renewal Filing and NRC Facility Clearance Update2022-06-0101 June 2022 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. - Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence Five-Year Renewal Filing and NRC Facility Clearance Update NL-22-0388, Cycle 29 Core Operating Limits Report2022-05-31031 May 2022 Cycle 29 Core Operating Limits Report NL-22-0344, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 20212022-05-10010 May 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 2021 NL-22-0340, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request for License Amendment to Relocate Augmented Piping Inspection Program Details from Technical2022-05-10010 May 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request for License Amendment to Relocate Augmented Piping Inspection Program Details from Technical NL-22-0240, SNC Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2022-01: Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2022-03-31031 March 2022 SNC Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2022-01: Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations 2024-01-11
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARNL-23-0713, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit2023-08-23023 August 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit NL-23-0716, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit2023-08-23023 August 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request: Technical Specification 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, One-Time Temporary Change to Limit NL-23-0658, Southern Nuclear Operating Company - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Quality Assurance Topical Report Submittal2023-08-11011 August 2023 Southern Nuclear Operating Company - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Quality Assurance Topical Report Submittal NL-23-0337, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise the Frequency of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.52023-05-0505 May 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise the Frequency of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.5 NL-23-0080, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-05, Version 1.02023-02-0202 February 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-05, Version 1.0 NL-23-0008, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves to Decrease Low Side Setpoint Tolerance Limiting.2023-01-17017 January 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves to Decrease Low Side Setpoint Tolerance Limiting. NL-22-0361, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.5.17, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to Increase Calculated Peak.2022-06-20020 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.5.17, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to Increase Calculated Peak. NL-21-1060, Units 1 and 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Allow Elimination of the Encapsulation Vessels Around the First Containment Spray (CS) and Residual Heat Removal .2021-12-13013 December 2021 Units 1 and 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Allow Elimination of the Encapsulation Vessels Around the First Containment Spray (CS) and Residual Heat Removal . NL-21-0020, Final Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-022021-03-23023 March 2021 Final Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02 NL-21-0019, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2021-03-0202 March 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors NL-20-1273, Response to NRC Requests for Information License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan to Change Staffing and Extend Staff Augmentation Times for2020-11-20020 November 2020 Response to NRC Requests for Information License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan to Change Staffing and Extend Staff Augmentation Times for NL-20-0816, Response to Request for Clarification Regarding the Refueling Outage 1R29 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2020-07-17017 July 2020 Response to Request for Clarification Regarding the Refueling Outage 1R29 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report NL-20-0636, Third Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate2020-05-29029 May 2020 Third Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate NL-20-0640, Response to Request for Additional Information for Exemption Request2020-05-27027 May 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information for Exemption Request NL-20-0550, Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Revise Measurement Units Associated with Reactor Trip System Nuclear Instrument Comparison Surveillance and Trip Setpoint2020-05-20020 May 2020 Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Revise Measurement Units Associated with Reactor Trip System Nuclear Instrument Comparison Surveillance and Trip Setpoint NL-20-0538, Second Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate2020-05-0808 May 2020 Second Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate NL-20-0458, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate2020-04-22022 April 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate NL-20-0403, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Update the Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Safety Analysis and Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage2020-04-13013 April 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Update the Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Safety Analysis and Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage NL-19-0676, Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-04, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information2019-06-11011 June 2019 Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-05-04, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information NL-19-0221, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications, SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI)2019-05-0303 May 2019 Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications, SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) NL-19-0343, Relief Request FNP-ISI-RR-03: SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information2019-04-23023 April 2019 Relief Request FNP-ISI-RR-03: SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information NL-19-0307, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Relief Request FNP-ISI-RR-022019-03-27027 March 2019 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Relief Request FNP-ISI-RR-02 NL-18-1514, Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.2.2.g and Update Emergency Plan Minimum On-Shift.2019-01-31031 January 2019 Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.2.2.g and Update Emergency Plan Minimum On-Shift. NL-17-2135, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information2018-02-0909 February 2018 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information NL-17-2015, Response to NRC RAIs Regarding Decommissioning Funding Status Reports2018-01-22022 January 2018 Response to NRC RAIs Regarding Decommissioning Funding Status Reports NL-17-1443, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program Final Response to NRC Requests for Additional Information2017-10-12012 October 2017 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program Final Response to NRC Requests for Additional Information NL-17-1367, Response to the Second Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request2017-09-0707 September 2017 Response to the Second Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request NL-17-0480, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information2017-06-22022 June 2017 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information NL-17-1067, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request2017-06-0808 June 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request NL-17-0643, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request2017-05-23023 May 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request NL-17-0774, Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating2017-05-15015 May 2017 Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating NL-17-0613, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Request FNP-ISI-ALT-20, Version 1.0, Regarding System Leakage Test2017-04-13013 April 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Request FNP-ISI-ALT-20, Version 1.0, Regarding System Leakage Test NL-17-0512, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Request RR-PR-03 Version 1.0 for the Lnservice Testing Program Fifth 1 0-Year Interval2017-03-28028 March 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Request RR-PR-03 Version 1.0 for the Lnservice Testing Program Fifth 1 0-Year Interval NL-16-2513, Response to Follow-up Request for Information Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Threads-in-Flange Examination Requirement2016-11-23023 November 2016 Response to Follow-up Request for Information Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Threads-in-Flange Examination Requirement NL-16-1830, Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to RAI for License Amendment Regarding Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant, Part 1B of 1C2016-11-0303 November 2016 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to RAI for License Amendment Regarding Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant, Part 1B of 1C NL-16-1830, Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to RAI for License Amendment Regarding Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant, Part 1C of 1C2016-11-0303 November 2016 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to RAI for License Amendment Regarding Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant, Part 1C of 1C ML16314A5052016-11-0303 November 2016 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to RAI for License Amendment Regarding Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant, Part 1B of 1C ML16214A0252016-07-25025 July 2016 Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information for TSTF-312 NL-16-0784, Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information for TSTF-312. Enclosure 2 Excerpts from Calculation SM-96-1064-0012016-07-25025 July 2016 Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information for TSTF-312. Enclosure 2 Excerpts from Calculation SM-96-1064-001 NL-16-0870, Units 1 and 2 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information for TS 3.3.5 Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation LAR2016-06-30030 June 2016 Units 1 and 2 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information for TS 3.3.5 Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation LAR NL-16-0628, Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to Third Request for Additional Information Regarding Standard Emergency Plan: Cover Letter, Attachment 1 and Enclosures 1 - 102016-06-0909 June 2016 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to Third Request for Additional Information Regarding Standard Emergency Plan: Cover Letter, Attachment 1 and Enclosures 1 - 10 NL-16-0739, Corrected Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding Standard Emergency Plan2016-05-26026 May 2016 Corrected Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding Standard Emergency Plan NL-16-0572, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding TSTF-432-A, Revision 12016-04-13013 April 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding TSTF-432-A, Revision 1 NL-16-0415, Response to Request for Additional Information for TS 3.3.5 Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation LAR2016-04-11011 April 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information for TS 3.3.5 Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation LAR NL-16-0098, Response to Request for Additional Information for Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler 3122016-03-0303 March 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information for Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler 312 NL-16-0169, Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to First Request for Additional Information Re Standard Emergency Plan. Attachment 1: SNC Response to NRC RAI-1 Fleet Standard Emergency Plan and Enclosure 1: Evaluation of Proposed Changes Encl2016-02-17017 February 2016 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to First Request for Additional Information Re Standard Emergency Plan. Attachment 1: SNC Response to NRC RAI-1 Fleet Standard Emergency Plan and Enclosure 1: Evaluation of Proposed Changes Enclos ML16060A3282016-02-17017 February 2016 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to First Request for Additional Information Re Standard Emergency Plan. Attachment 1: SNC Response to NRC RAI-1 Fleet Standard Emergency Plan and Enclosure 1: Evaluation of Proposed Changes Enclos NL-15-2222, Response to Request for Additional Information for RHR Autoclosure Interlock Function Elimination LAR2016-01-28028 January 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information for RHR Autoclosure Interlock Function Elimination LAR NL-16-0086, Units 1 and 2 - Response to Third Request for Additional Information Regarding SNC License Amendment Request for TSTF-523, Revision 22016-01-28028 January 2016 Units 1 and 2 - Response to Third Request for Additional Information Regarding SNC License Amendment Request for TSTF-523, Revision 2 NL-15-2062, Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding SNC License Amendment Request for TSTF-52, Revision 22015-11-25025 November 2015 Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding SNC License Amendment Request for TSTF-52, Revision 2 2023-08-23
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~ Southern Nuclear J . J . Hutto Regulatory AHa1rs D1rector 40 Inverness Center P..1rJ.."dY Post Office Box I:W5 Bim1ingham. AL 35242 205 992 5872 lei 205 9\12 760 I fax jjhuno@southcmco.mm MAY 15 2017 Docket Nos.: 50-348 NL-17-0774 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems- Operating" Ladies and Gentlemen:
By letter dated October 11, 2016, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) submitted a license amendment request to revise the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Joseph M.
Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
The proposed changes would add new Action Conditions (A, B, and C) to TS 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating" that address inoperable 600 Volt alternating current (AC) load center (LC) 1-2R. The proposed changes include Required Actions and associated Completion Times for the LC 1-2R.
By letter dated April17, 2017, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff requested additional information to complete its review. The Enclosure provides the SNC response to the NRC request.
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Ken McElroy at 205.992.7369.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-17-0774 Page 2 Mr. J. J. Hutto states he is Regulatory Affairs Director for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.
Respectfully submitted, J. J. Hutto Regulatory Affairs Director I' Meur JJH/RMJ Sworn to and subscribed before me this _L__5_ day of 12017.
~~~~~ Notary Public My commission expires: /0 d-ot (
Enclosure:
SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information cc: Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager- Farley Senior Resident Inspector - Farley Director, Alabama Office of Radiation Control RTYPE: CFA04.054
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Response to Request for Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Actions of Technical Specification 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating" I I Enclosure SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information
Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Request for Additional Information CRAll No. 1 Regulatory Basis FNP General Design Criteria, Criterion 17, "Electric Power Systems", states, in part:
An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system are provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) provides sufficient capacity and capability to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
The onsite electric power supplies, including the batteries, and the onsite electric distribution system, have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform
~heir safety function assuming a single failure. I Provisions are included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies.
The licensee has stated on page E1-8 of the LAR:
In the event of a dual unit LOSP [loss of offsite power], this alignment (i.e., 1 C and 1-2A tied to the same unit) would leave the affected unit's (i.e. the unit unable to supply power to the LC 1-2R) A-train de-energized. This is the basis for the affected unit entering [Limiting Condition for Operation] (LCO) 3.8.1 for an inoperable diesel set, since the 1 C DG [diesel generator] may therefore be unavailable to align to the opposite unit as the 1-2A DG (i.e. the unit not experiencing the Sl [safety injection]). Consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY, the 1C DG must be declared inoperable for the affected unit.
If the problem is a failed component i.e., DH08-2, or SSXFMR 2R or EROS or SSCs downstream of the H bus, as shown in Enclosure 5 of the LAR as the cause of Proposed Condition A, then declaring the 1C DG inoperable and aligning the 1C DG selector switch to the non-affected unit appears to make the A-train electrical distribution not available in the affected unit.
Request Would the issue described above be considered a reduction in plant safety? Also, considering the concerns described above, please justify Proposed Condition A or a TS modification.
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Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information SNC Response to RAI No. 1 Proposed Required Action A.1 (Align the 1C DG Unit Selector Switch to the non-affected unit) does not result in a reduction in plant safety. For the 1C DG to be operable, the load center (LC) 1-2R must be energized. As shown in the Figures provided in Enclosure 5 to the October 11 , 2016 license amendment request (LAR), during a design basis dual unit loss of offsite power (LOSP) and single unit safety injection (SI) the 1-2A DG will energize 4160V F bus of the unit experiencing the Sl, which will in turn energize that unit's 4160V K bus. That unit's 4160V H bus, however, will remain de-energized until manually energized by the operator. If the 1C DG aligns to the "affected unit" (the unit whose 4160V H bus is unable to supply power to the LC 1-2R), then LC 1-2R will not be able be energized from either unit. Please consider the matrix below. The starting assumption is the 4160V bus 2H is unable to supply LC 1-2R due to work on breaker DH08-2 or EROS and a dual unit LOSP occurs along with a single unit Sl.
Scenario 1C DG Unit Unit DG Which Ener;:Jizes the Listed Bus Selector Switch Experiencing 1H 1K 1F 2H 2K 2F Aligned to Unit the Sl I 1? (Yes/No) 1 Yes Unit 1 1C 1-2A 1-2A -- -- --
2 Yes Unit 2 1C 1C 1C -- 1-2A 1-2A 3 No Unit 1 -- 1-2A 1-2A 1C* 1C* 1C*
-4 No Unit2 1C 1C 1C -- 1-2A 1-2A
As can be seen above, if the Sl occurs on the "affected" unit (the unit unable to supply power to the LC 1-2R, which in this example is Unit 2}, the net result is the same regardless of whether the unit selector switch is aligned to the affected unit (Scenarios 2 and 4).
Comparing Scenarios 1 and 3, the key difference is that in Scenario 1 the LC 1-2R is energized and in Scenario 3 it is not. As was shown in Enclosure 4 to the LAR, the LC 1-2R supplies necessary louvers and fans for the 1C DG (along with other ancillary functions), as well as for the 1H and 2H buses. In Scenario 1, the LC 1-2R will continue to be able to supply its required loads (including the Unit 1 service water turbine building isolation valves V515 and V517).
Scenario 1 is therefore preferred to Scenario 3 based on an increase in plant safety.
RAI No.2 Regulatorv Basis FNP TS 1.1, "Definitions" state the definition for OPERABLE-OPERABILITY as:
A system, subsystem, train , component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).
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Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information When in CONDITION C of the proposed TS, Load Center 1-2R will be unable to supply power to any of its loads, including Switchgear Room A fans and louver damper motors and heaters.
Loss of ventilation/heating in Switchgear Room A could affect the function of the 1H and 2H busses and their ability to perform their support function, which in turn affect the long term safety function and OPERABILITY of the 1F, 2F, 1K and 2K busses.
Request Considering the mission time of the 1F, 2F, 1K and 2K busses in mitigating a design basis accident (DBA) and with design basis weather conditions, discuss the effect of the loss of ventilation in Switchgear Room A, on the long term function of the 1H and 2H busses and their ability to perform support functions for the Class 1E K and F buses in order for these buses to remain operable throughout their mission time as the buses power safety related loads during a DBA. Please include a discussion regarding how long until the associated electrical busses would be unable to perform their safety function and the basis for such determination. Please identify the affected TS and the associated required actions of the TS and identify any compensatory actions.
SNC Response to RAI No. 2 When offsite power is supplying the electrical train A loads or when the 1-2A DG is supplying the electrical train A loads, both the 1(2)K and the 1(2)H buses are supplied power from the 1(2)F bus. Therefore, in this situation, the 1Hand 2H buses have no effect on the OPERABILITY of the 1F, 2F, 1K and 2K buses. The only time the 1(2)K or 1(2)F buses are supplied power from the 1(2)H bus is when the 1C DG is aligned to this H bus. Since the LC 1-2R is necessary to provide ventilation and heating to the 1C DG, the 1C DG is inoperable while in Condition C. The 1(2)H bus would therefore be unable to supply the 1(2)K or 1(2)F in this situation regardless of the ventilation or heating in switchgear room A. This is the reason the 1H and 2H buses are treated as a DG 1C support system for LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, and why these buses aren't listed as required 4160V buses in LCO 3.8.9. The proposed Required Actions have the 1C DG declared inoperable immediately. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6, which states: 'When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2."
Since the 1C DG is declared inoperable, per LCO 3.0.6 the Conditions and Required Actions of the 1C DG supported systems are not entered unless a loss of safety function is determined to exist per the Safety Function Determination Program (TS 5.5.15). In this case, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exist are required to be entered. Similarly, TS 3.8.1 Required Action B.2 states to declare the required features supported by the inoperable DG set inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.
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Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI No.3 Regulatory Basis Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations {1 0 CFR) 50.36(c)(2)(i), states, in part:
Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met.
The licensee's proposed Required Action A.1 states, "Align 1C DG Unit Selector Switch to non-affected unit." Proposed Condition B is for when Condition A is not met.
Request Describe any situations when the licensee would choose not to perform Required Action A.1 and provided a justification for each situation where Condition B is entered without entry into Required Action A.1 or A.2.
SNC Response to RAI No. 3 FNP's preference will always be to remain in Condition A and not enter Condition B. Please note that while in Condition B, the Required Actions from Condition A (specifically to declare the 1C DG inoperable for the affected unit) still apply. The only reason FNP would enter Condition B would be if the operators felt the unit selector switch was unable to perform its function for any reason.
RAI No.4 Page E1-3 of the LAR in the paragraph beginning with TS 3.8.9 ... " states that the" ... unit(s) must be in MODE 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />." This appears to be in error as the current TS Condition D {TS page 3.8.9-2) requires MODE 4 as the end state (Amendment 202 and 198 for Units 1 and 2, respectively) for Conditions A, B, and not met. Please clarify the apparent error.
SNC Response to RAI No. 4 A few months before this LAR was submitted, the NRC issued Amendments 202 and 198 for Units 1 and 2, respectively. This statement on page E1-3 was inadvertently not updated to reflect this latest Amendment. Based on Amendments 202 and 198, the requirements are to be in MODE 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if the 8-hour completion time for Condition A is not met.
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Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAJ No.5 Regulatory Basis FNP General Design Criteria, Criterion 17, "Electric Power Systems" as described in RAI No. 1.
In the LAR, Section 2.0, the licensee states that the TS Bases Table B 3.8.9-1 lists the LC 1- 2R as one of the required LCs to meet the LCO 3.8.9. This LC is considered shared equipment since it supplies power to loads that affect both units and it also receives power from either units' 4160V bus H (1 H and 2H). Therefore, whenever this LC is inoperable, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 must enter current LCO 3.8.9 Condition A if they are in a Mode of applicability (MODES 1 - 4).
The proposed CONDITION A, Required Action A.1 requires alignment of the 1 C DG selector switch using operator actions in the main control room. FNP Load Diagram, drawing D-173096, shows the Auto Transfer Device (ATD) connecting to both power sources which are independent and redundant from the 1 H and 2H buses feeding LC 1-2R.
In the proposed CONDITION A, LC 1-2R is inoperable due to power supply being unavailable either from buses 1 H or 2H. In the LAR, the licensee did not appear to address the design features and capability of ATD to switch from one source to alternate source for the proposed CONDITION A, Required Action A.1.
Request
- a. The proposed Required Action A.1 states "align 1C DG Unit Selector Switch to non-affected Unit." Explain why Action A.1 is required since ATD will transfer from normal source (affected Unit) to alternate source (non-affected Unit) or vice versa without manual operation. Please explain the terms "affected Unit and "non-affected Unit and the scenarios assumed.
SNC Response to RAJ No.S.a The "affected Unit for Condition A is the unit whose 4160V H bus is unable to supply power to the LC 1-2R. As mentioned in this NRC request, the LC 1-2R ATD will automatically align to the other unit's 4160V H bus if it loses power from the 4160V H bus from which it's being supplied. However, as shown in Scenario 3 of the SNC Response to RAI No. 1, not aligning the DG 1C unit selector switch to the non-affected unit (the 4160V H bus still able to supply power to the LC 1-2R) could result in neither unit's H bus being able to supply power to the LC 1-2R. Therefore, Required Action A.1 will ensure one of the two units' H bus will remain energized (through an OPERABLE DG 1C) such that the ATD will be able to have a source to seek.
- b. The current TS 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems- Operating," Condition A, allows 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to restore the inoperable Alternate Current (AC) electrical power distribution system(s) to OPERABLE status. Since the ATD allows auto transfer to the available power source (alternate), explain why the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time (CT) LCO is not adequate to restore the inoperable AC electrical power distribution system(s) to OPERABLE status.
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Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information SNC Response to RAJ No. S.b While the ATD allows auto transfer to the available power source, there are numerous reasons why the current 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> CT may not be adequate to restore an inoperable LC 1-2R to OPERABLE status. For example, during preventative maintenance (PM) activities, an unplanned discovery may require additional corrective maintenance that challenges the existing 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> CT. As discussed further in the SNC response to NRC RAI S.d. there are various PM activities that must be performed on the LC 1-2R that requires it to be declared inoperable. The current TS requires at least one unit to enter the 8-hour required action statement for this PM (assuming the second unit is in a refueling outage). While FNP has historically been able to perform maintenance on this LC without requiring a dual-unit shutdown, the short CT still unnecessarily challenges the organization based on the insignificance of loads provided by this LC.
- c. If the ATD fails to transfer from its position, how this failure will affect the proposed TS changes. What will be the CT for restoring the ATD to operable status?
SNC Response to RAJ No. S.c For the proposed TS change, if the ATD is unable to perform its function, then the 1C DG unit selector switch would be aligned to the unit currently supplying the LC 1-2R per Required Action A.1, since one unit would be unable to provide power to LC 1-2R. The CT to restore the ATD to OPERABLE status would therefore be consistent with the CT for restoring the 1C DG to OPERABLE status.
- d. In the FNP LAR, the licensee explained that current TS 3.8.9, Condition A has a CT of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the inoperable LC 1-2R, which would appear to indicate a dual unit shutdown is required after the expiration of the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> CT because LC 1-2R is shared between both units. In addition, the CT limits the extent of maintenance that could be performed. The licensee also explained that the new proposed Conditions (A, B, and C) to TS 3.8.9, "Distribution System- Operating," would reduce the likelihood of an unnecessary dual-unit TS required shutdown while also providing more flexibility for maintenance activities. Please provide details of all maintenance to be performed on the LC 1-2R including their frequencies. Also, provide plant specific operating experience that required LC 1-2R to be declared inoperable (failure of both sources or equipment).
SNC Response to RAJ No. S.d The table below lists preventative maintenance (including surveillances) performed that may require entry into Condition A of LCO 3.8.9 based on the LC 1-2R being inoperable.
Maintenance Frequency 1-2R LC Heat Detector PM S years 1-2R LC Cleaning 12 y_ears EROS Breaker PM
- 6 years DH08-1 Breaker PM ** 6 years DH08-2 Breaker PM ** 6 years
- Dependent on breaker cell sw1tch
- Dependent on alignment of 1C DG E-6
Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information A review of recent maintenance shows the time for which the LC 1-2R was declared inoperable ranged from very short durations (less than an hour) to nearly five hours.
While there are no recent instances of the LC 1-2R initially being declared inoperable for reasons unrelated to maintenance, there have been issues that have surfaced during maintenance. For example, during maintenance performed on a Unit 2 supply breaker during the spring 2016 Unit 2 refueling outage, the Unit 1 supply breaker tripped open when control power fuses were restored and would not reclose. This condition was not immediately discovered, and was documented in licensee event report (LER) 2016-001-00.
Although PM affecting the LC 1-2R has not caused any required plant shutdowns to date, the short CT still places undue stress that's not commensurate with the safety significance of this LC. In addition, the proposed changes could allow maintenance of the H buses and supply breakers to be performed with the units on-line. This is preferable from a safety-standpoint versus performing during a refueling outage, as it allows for more focus to be placed on the maintenance activity without the distractions associated with the refueling outage.
RAI No.6 Regulatory Basis 50.36(c)(2)(i) as described in RAI No. 3.
FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.7.2 states that DGs 1-2A and 1Care dedicated to train A, but there are no Design-Basis Events (DBEs) in which DG 1-2A or 1C supplies power to safety loads of both units simultaneously. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 breakers for each of these two diesels are interlocked so as to prevent the diesels from being connected to both units at the same time; therefore, DGs 1-2A and 1C are characterized as "shared" only from the point of view of their capability to align to either Unit 1or Unit 2.
Request Assuming the proposed TS 3.8.9, Condition A, Required Action A.1 is completed, as stated, then the affected Unit will have one diesel (i.e., Set B DG. In Condition A, Required Action A.1, DG 1C will be aligned to the non-affected Unit and DG 1-2A will be aligned to the affected Unit).
Subsequently, if a DBE (Loss Of Offsite Power (LOSP)/Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) or LOSP) occurs in the non-affected Unit, then as per the design 1-2A DG should align with the non-affected Unit. Then both 1C and 1-2A DGs are aligned with the non-affected Unit. What actions will be taken under this scenario? In this case, explain how this requested TS change meet the design basis as specified in accident analysis. In addition, explain the plant response, if a DBE such as LOSP or LOSP/LOCA coincident with a single failure (e.g., loss of Set B DG) occurs on the non-affected Unit.
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Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information SNC Response to RAI No. 6 As stated, in the situation described above, proposed Condition A could result in both the DG 1C and DG 1-2A both being aligned to the same unit (the non-affected unit). The limiting condition for operation (LCO) for that unit would be fully met. As stated in the LAR, the logic associated with the tie breaker between F and H busses (DF13) will ensure that 1C DG and 1-2A DG are never paralleled (i.e., if 1C DG were selected to the unit to which the 1-2A ties, DF13 will remain open while 1C DG energizes the H bus (which in turn energizes the 1-2R LC) while 1-2A DG energizes the F and K bus. The non-affected unit (whose LCO is fully met) will still be able to meet the design basis of the unit assuming a worst-case single failure (e.g. failure of the 1-2A, 1C, or the 1(2)8 DG) because it will have both the train A and train B DGs OPERABLE.
All this would happen automatically, with no additional operator action.
As discussed previously, the affected unit enters the ACTION statement for an inoperable DG 1C. While in a TS Action statement (an LCO not met), it is recognized that the plant is not single failure proof, which is why the Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. Per GL 80-30 (with underline added for effect):
"The NRC's Standard Technical Specifications (STS) were formulated to preserve the single failure criterion for systems that are relied upon in the safety analysis report.
By and large, the single failure criterion is preserved by specifying Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) that require all redundant components of safety related systems to be OPERABLE. When the required redundancy is not maintained, either due to equipment failure or maintenance outage, action is required, within a specified time, to change the operating mode of the plant to place it in a safe condition. The specified time to take action, usually called the equipment out of service time. is a temporary relaxation of the single failure criterion, which, consistent with overall system reliability considerations. provides a limited time to fix equipment or otherwise make it OPERABLE. If equipment can be returned to OPERABLE status within the specified time. plant shutdown is not required."
Although assuming an additional single failure while in ACTION statement is beyond the plant's design basis, FNP also has a station blackout (SBO) DG 2C. This DG is 2850-kW, and is dedicated to SBO events. DG 2C meets all applicable safety-related criteria and thus, it is available for use on either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 load group S-train during design basis events.
RAI No.7 Regulatory Basis FNP TS 1.1 defines OPERABLE-OPERABILITY as described in RAI No. 2.
The proposed TS 3.8.9 Condition A, Required Action A.2 requires to declare DG 1C as inoperable for the affected Unit. Proposed Required Action A.2 would limit operation to 10 days for the affected unit. Also, if the affected unit's DG Set B were to become inoperable during this condition, TS 3.8.1 Condition E would be entered for two DG sets being inoperable.
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Enclosure to NL-17-0774 SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Request Since DG 1C is shared between the Units and the proposed change requires the DG 1C to be declared inoperable even for inoperability resulting from other components on the power paths to maintain power availability to LC 1-2R, provide technical and regulatory basis demonstrating the proposed action is conservative in maintaining plant safety.
SNC Response to RAI No. 7 As previously discussed, LC 1-2R is required for operability of the DG 1C based on supporting required fans, louvers, and other environmental equipment. The definition of OPERABILTY requires that "all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s)." Therefore, it is appropriate to declare the DG 1C inoperable if the LC 1-2R is inoperable. The fact that a particular LCO Condition or Conditions are being entered does not alter the response of the DGs to a design basis event, beyond the effect of the inoperable component.
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