ML26049A208
| ML26049A208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nuclear Energy Institute |
| Issue date: | 02/17/2026 |
| From: | Uhle J Nuclear Energy Institute |
| To: | Carrie Safford NRC/SECY |
| References | |
| NRC-2024-0045, RIN 3150-AL06, 90FR59402 00001, PR-50 | |
| Download: ML26049A208 (0) | |
Text
Jennifer Uhle, Ph.D.
Vice President Technical & Regulatory Services Phone: 202.247.5717 Email: jlu@nei.org February 17, 2026 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Submitted via Regulations.gov Project Number: 689
Subject:
Nuclear Energy Institute Comments on Proposed Rule, Incorporation by Reference of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 603-2018 [Docket ID NRC-2024-0045]
Dear Adjudications and Rulemakings Staff:
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),1 on behalf of its members, appreciates the opportunity to submit comments as requested by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 90 Fed. Reg. 59402 on the Proposed Rule, Incorporation by Reference of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 603-2018.
This rulemaking in combination with parallel ongoing rulemakings proposed by the NRC represents an important opportunity to achieve a more safety-focused regulatory framework that is also flexible, deployment-oriented and efficient. This outcome is essential to enable the next era of U.S. nuclear innovation that will help meet the nations surging energy demand and strengthen American energy security.
We appreciate the NRCs stated intent to modernize its regulatory framework consistent with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. However, this rulemaking falls well short of that objective. It reflects an outdated regulatory position that fails to account for four decades of technological advancement and operating experience from safety-critical industries.
For decades, the industry has sought to deploy digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems to enhance safety and reliability, address obsolescence, and enable long-term operation of the fleet. Achieving 1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry.
Secretary of the Commission February 17, 2026 Page 2 Nuclear Energy Institute these benefits requires a regulatory process that is flexible, focused on credible risks, and efficient. Instead, the NRC staff has remained anchored to a position developed in the 1980s that DI&C sources of common cause failure (CCF) are more credible than other sources of CCF.
This 40-year-old position ignores fundamental advancements in software development processes, hardware reliability, system architecture, system design, and quality assurance methods. Modern functional safety standards and lifecycle controls provide robust, demonstrable means to prevent and mitigate CCFwithout mandating diversity. These approaches are not theoretical; they are proven. In a May 2019 Commission Meeting, EPRI testified that they reviewed approximately 2 billion hours of equipment runtime operating experience and found no instances of platform CCF in digital platforms used in other critical safety industries using functional safety standards like what the industry is recommending.2 The NRC staffs resistance to modernizing its approach is particularly frustrating given that the industry and the NRC have spent more than 20 years attempting to establish an efficient and predictable regulatory pathway for DI&C modernization. This effort has included extensive engagement, repeated NRC reviews of an industry-developed guidance document over a six-year period and NRC staff training on the industrys methods. After two decades of sustained work, the result should not be a rule that expands requirements and narrows flexibility.
Instead of modernizing its approach, the NRC staff proposes to codify CCF into regulationeffectively elevating a Commission policy that treats digital CCF as a beyond-design-basis consideration into a vague regulatory requirement, without sufficient technical justification. This represents a clear expansion of requirements, not a clarification.
The practical effect is to erect new barriers to deploying safety-enhancing DI&C technologies at the very moment they are most needed. It reduces regulatory flexibility, increases burden without commensurate safety benefit, and disregards Congressional and Administration direction to promote efficiency and focus on credible, realistic risks.
In short, the proposed rule moves the agency backward. It does not reflect modern engineering, global operating experience, or two decades of joint effort to develop a workable path forward for DI&C modernization.
2 Briefing on Digital Instrumentation and Control, May 14, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2019/index
Secretary of the Commission February 17, 2026 Page 3 Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Recommendations:
Given that this rulemaking is driving regulatory requirements in the wrong direction, NEI repeats our recommendations previously submitted to the NRC3 including:
- 1. Remove 10 CFR 50.55a(h),
- 2. Endorse the IEEE standards for safety system design criteria by updating Regulatory Guide 1.153, and
- 3. Modify regulatory guidance to explicitly enable the use of special treatments beyond diversity to address CCF in DI&C systems.
These recommendations, further described in the Attachment, will enhance safety and provide a clearer regulatory framework for DI&C.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide our perspectives on this important regulatory matter. If you have questions or require additional technical information, please contact Alan Campbell at adc@nei.org.
Sincerely, Dr. Jennifer Uhle Vice President, Technical & Regulatory Services CC:
Michael King, EDO, NRC David Taggart, Office of the General Counsel, NRC Jeremy Groom, NRR, NRC Chairman Ho Nieh Commissioner David Wright Commissioner Bradley Crowell Commissioner Matthew Marzano Commissioner Douglas Weaver 3 NEI provided recommendations to modernize the regulatory framework for DI&C in its October 28, 2024, letter, NEI Input on Improvements to Licensing and Oversight Programs, in response to the ADVANCE Act and its report, Accelerating NRC Reform, issued July 31, 2025, in response to EO 14300. Central to these recommendations is a call to refocus the NRC on credible, realistic risks.
Attachment:
NEI Comments on Proposed Rule, Incorporation by Reference of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 603-2018 [Docket ID NRC-2024-0045]
Page 1 Comment # Applicable Text Industry Comment Suggested Resolution 1
90 FR 59402 NRC-2024-0045 Despite directions in the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300, the NRC has proposed a rulemaking that reduces flexibility and does not focus on credible, realistic risk. It appears that the NRC staff did not consider industry recommendations specifically addressing this rule in NEI's Accelerating NRC Reform report, as described in the comments below. Specifically, NEI's comments demonstrate that 10 CFR 50.55a(h) includes unnecessary duplication of requirements, unnecessarily increases regulatory requirements related to Common Cause Failure (CCF), and reduces clarity by intermixing regulatory guidance on digital instrumentation and control (DI&C).
Address industrys input to the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300 to produce a flexible infrastructure that considers credible risk.
2 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3)(i) 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3)(ii) 10 CFR 50.69(b)(v) 10 CFR 50, Appendix E NRC Draft Regulatory Analysis, Section 3.5 The industry recommends the NRC not incorporate by reference (IBR)
IEEE 603-2018, since it duplicates provisions of the GDC. Instead, the NRC should use regulatory guidance to endorse the IEEE standards as one acceptable means of meeting NRC requirements, as is the case with all other IEEE safety criteria standards (e.g., IEEE 308 is endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.32).
Proposed Rulemaking The currently incorporated revision of IEEE 603 is 35 years old, and the industry supports NRC endorsement of the standard. However, future revisions will likely address new technologies (e.g., remote or autonomous operation) and new evaluation methods (e.g., performance-based methods). Therefore, to promote flexibility in the future the NRC should endorse the standard in guidance. This would allow the NRC to endorse revised standards in a more efficient and timely way so as not to impose barriers to the adoption of technologies that could increase plant safety.
Furthermore, IBR of IEEE 603 and IEEE 279 in regulation hampers the use of systems meeting other standards that may be of commensurate safety (e.g., IEC 61513). This complicates approval of Eliminate the IBR of IEEE 279 and IEEE 603 standards.
Instead, revise Regulatory Guide 1.153 to endorse these standards as one means of complying with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A GDCs as demonstrated by NUREG-0800, Chapter 7, Appendix 7.1-A.
Attachment Page 2 Comment # Applicable Text Industry Comment Suggested Resolution DG-1251, Section B
nuclear safety systems by other countries regulatory regimes and unnecessarily increases costs for vendors wishing to market new plant designs in both the U.S. and other countries. This imposition of unnecessary costs is not aligned with the NRCs efficiency mandate.
NUREG-0800 Chapter 7, Appendix 7-1-A directs the NRC staff to use these IEEE standards in their reviews to ensure compliance with the GDCs. As a result, the industry believes this proposed rule is an unnecessary duplication of requirements making the regulatory framework more complex, contrary to the direction in the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300.
Regulatory Guide 1.153, Rev. 1 states that IEEE 603-1991 is an acceptable approach to comply with the GDC. Therefore, the standard does not need to be required in 10 CFR 50.55a(h).
Furthermore, SRM-SECY-98-0144 directs the NRC staff to transition to risk-informed, performance-based regulations. The IEEE safety criteria provide prescriptive requirements better suited for regulatory guidance, rather than performance-based rules.
NRC Draft Regulatory Analysis Alternative 5 in NRCs draft regulatory analysis appears to overstate the scope the industrys recommendation. The industry recommends removal of the explicit IBR of IEEE 603 and IEEE 273 from 10 CFR 50.55a(h). In this NRC analysis, Alternative 5 is expanded to "remove all endorsement of IEEE standards." This expansion of scope leads to a summary conclusion of "considerable regulatory costs" without any analysis. The NRC typically endorses standards in regulatory guidance and the industry recommendation is to continue this practice and eliminate the IBR of IEEE 603 and IEEE 273 through the elimination of 10 CFR 50.55a(h). This task would likely involve the same or less regulatory effort/cost as IBR of IEEE 603-2018 in the rule.
Attachment Page 3 Comment # Applicable Text Industry Comment Suggested Resolution The NRC concluded that the benefits of the industrys recommendation are "unclear" because the analysis does not distinguish between IBR in a rule versus endorsement in regulatory guidance, which enhances flexibility, and provides one acceptable means of complying with the GDC.
Due to the misunderstanding of key issues (IBR instead of endorsement in regulatory guidance) and the subsequent decision to not consider Alternative 5, multiple factors in section 4.1 are incorrectly or incompletely evaluated. A correct understanding and evaluation of Alternative 5 would likely result in a different outcome.
DG-1251 B. Consideration of International Standards - This section substantiates why we do not need to codify the IEEE standards into the rule. The IEEE standards are not the only way to meet the GDC for a Reactor Protection System or other safety systems. Therefore, endorsement of standards should be in regulatory guidance.
3 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3)(i) 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3)(ii)
DG-1251, Section B
90 FR 59402 This NRC concern regarding CCF in DI&C systems that do not incorporate diversity stems from a longstanding position established in the 1980s. At that time, the NRC staff concluded that a latent software defect or hardware failure represented a credible event that could cause the DI&C system to fail. However, this perspective does not appear to fully account for the significant advancements made over the past 40 years in software development processes, hardware reliability, system architecture, and quality assurance processes.
These improvements provide alternative special treatments beyond diversity alone to prevent or mitigate CCF. Moreover, four decades of operating experience across numerous safety-critical industries worldwide further support the effectiveness of these approaches.
Rather than updating its position to reflect these developments and enabling the deployment of safety-enhancing DI&C systems, the NRC staff has proposed codifying CCF into a rule - elevating the The following recommendations are ONLY proffered if the NRC does not accept comment 2, above.
Remove the proposed CCF text and IEEE 603, Section 5.16 from the proposed rule.
Update Regulatory Guide 1.152 to appropriately describe digital CCF as beyond design-basis, consistent with SRM-SECY 0076 and SRM-SECY-93-087 that may be addressed
Attachment Page 4 Comment # Applicable Text Industry Comment Suggested Resolution Commission policy that digital CCF is a beyond design-basis event that should be considered to a regulatory requirement without justification. In doing so, the NRC has effectively added new barriers to the deployment of DI&C and reduced flexibility at a time when the industry is seeking to deploy the technology to increase safety and address obsolescence.
Executive Order 14300 directs the NRC to "Adopt revised and, where feasible, determinate and data-backed thresholds to ensure that reactor safety assessments focus on credible, realistic risks." EPRI has stated in a recent Commission meeting [ML19137A336] that in over approximately 2 billion hours of equipment runtime operating experience, no instances of platform CCF occurred in digital platforms used in other safety-critical industries using functional safety standards (IEC 61508). Based on this, and other extensive operating experience research performed by EPRI, the industry concludes that modern approaches to special treatments, including design, system development, testing, and installation processes have significantly reduced the risk of CCF below the level of "credible, realistic risks." The NRC has not presented any data that CCF concurrent with a design basis event is a "credible, realistic risk" when modern approaches to special treatment are applied.
Therefore, the regulatory framework should enable the use of all forms of special treatments. The industry may choose to use diversity, but diversity should not be required.
DG-1251/ 90 FR 59402 Section B, Addressing Common Cause Failure, appears to be increasing the regulatory requirements of CCF in the rule language.
Digital CCF is by direction of the SRM a beyond design-basis consideration and is considered by the industry in the design of DI&C systems. The proposed language makes it unclear whether CCF is beyond design-basis nor does it address risk informed approaches.
through special treatments beyond just diversity.
Attachment Page 5 Comment # Applicable Text Industry Comment Suggested Resolution SRM-SECY-93-087 and SRM-SECY-22-0076 are focused on digital CCF. IEEE 279 and IEEE 603 are technology neutral standards.
Federal Register Notice 90 FR 59402 and DG-1251 state the guidance in IEEE 603-2018, Section 5.16 is consistent with the CCF policy, but neglect to differentiate the fact that IEEE 603-2018 is not specifically addressing digital CCF; rather it addresses all types of CCF for safety systems. The scopes of IEEE 603-2018, Section 5.16 and the CCF policies are not aligned as described in 90 FR 59402 and DG-1251.
4 DG-1251, Section B, Data Communications Independence DG-1251, Section C.1 DG-1251, Section C.2 DG-1251, Section C.3 DG-1251, Section C.4 DG-1251 intermixes digital specific considerations that are addressed in other Regulatory Guidance. DG-1251, Section B, Data Communications Independence, states: "Section C of this RG provides guidance on addressing data communications independence for DI&C." IEEE 279 and 603 are the technology neutral safety criteria standard for protection and safety systems. IEEE 7-4.3.2 (endorsed by RG 1.152) provides supplemental criteria for digital I&C technology. The clarifications provided in this draft regulatory guide are inappropriate for application to the IBRed standards. This creates confusion between the role of 10 CFR 50.55a(h), RG 1.153, RG 1.152, and many other IEEE standards that are endorsed through Regulatory Guides. The draft Regulatory Guide should reference the appropriate Regulatory Guides that address relevant topics.
DG-1251, Section C.1 provides a definition of "predictable and repeatable" which differs from the definitions of these terms in RG 1.152 Section C.1(b)(1). This is confusing. NEI suggests relying on the existing RG 1.152 definitions.
DG-1251, Section C.2 refers the reader to RG 1.152 for independence requirements then provides additional guidance starting with the phrase "In addition..." This guidance appears to be duplicative to the guidance in RG 1.152, Section C.1(b)(2) and should be removed.
Remove digital specific clarifications C.1 through C.4.
They should be endorsed in an applicable Regulatory Guide.
Attachment Page 6 Comment # Applicable Text Industry Comment Suggested Resolution DG-1251, Section C.3 repeats guidance provided in RG 1.152. This guidance is already in RG 1.152, Section C.1(b)(3) and is unnecessary and duplicative.
DG-1251, Section C.4 addresses CCF. Refer to the previous comment on CCF. Additionally, much of this section refers specifically to the CCF policies (SRM-SECY-93-087 and SRM-SECY-22-0076) and RG 1.152 both of which are specific to digital technology. This draft guide should remain technology neutral.
5 DG-1251, Section A
DG-1251, Section A, states: "The applicability of each of these standards to a given nuclear power plant depends on the plants licensing date and other criteria."
The "...and other criteria does not describe these other criteria. This is confusing and should be removed.
Remove vague language such as "and other criteria."
6 DG-1251, Table 1 8.3, Maintenance bypass; RG 1.32, Criteria for Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants" Neither RG 1.32 nor the endorsed standard IEEE 308-2020 provide criteria for maintenance bypass. It is unclear why this regulatory guide is associated with this clause.
Remove the associated content from Table 1.
1 Chairman Resource From:
Jennifer Uhle <jlu@nei.org>
Sent:
Tuesday, February 17, 2026 4:47 PM Cc:
Mike King; David Taggart; Jeremy Groom; CMRMarzano Resource; CMRCrowell Resource; CMRWright Resource; CMRWeaver Resource; Chairman Resource
Subject:
[External_Sender] Nuclear Energy Institute Comments on Proposed Rule, Incorporation by Reference of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 603-2018 [Docket ID NRC-2024-0045]
Attachments:
02-17-26_NRC_IEEE603_Rulemaking_Comments.pdf THE ATTACHMENT CONTAINS THE COMPLETE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Submitted via Regulations.gov Project Number: 689
Subject:
Nuclear Energy Institute Comments on Proposed Rule, Incorporation by Reference of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 603-2018 [Docket ID NRC-2024-0045]
Dear Adjudications and Rulemakings Staff:
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), on behalf of its members, appreciates the opportunity to submit comments as requested by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 90 Fed. Reg. 59402 on the Proposed Rule, Incorporation by Reference of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 603-2018.
This rulemaking in combination with parallel ongoing rulemakings proposed by the NRC represents an important opportunity to achieve a more safety-focused regulatory framework that is also flexible, deployment-oriented and efficient. This outcome is essential to enable the next era of U.S. nuclear innovation that will help meet the nations surging energy demand and strengthen American energy security.
We appreciate the NRCs stated intent to modernize its regulatory framework consistent with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. However, this rulemaking falls well short of that objective. It reflects an outdated regulatory position that fails to account for four decades of technological advancement and operating experience from safety-critical industries.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide our perspectives on this important regulatory matter. If you have questions or require additional technical information, please contact Alan Campbell at adc@nei.org.
Sincerely,
2 Dr. Jennifer L. Uhle l Vice President, Technical & Regulatory Services Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street NW, Suite 1100 l Washington, DC 20004 P: 202.739.8164 nei.org This electronic message transmission contains information from the Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. The information is intended solely for the use of the addressee and its use by any other person is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient, you have received this communication in error, and any review, use, disclosure, copying or distribution of the contents of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by telephone or by electronic mail and permanently delete the original message. IRS Circular 230 disclosure: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS and other taxing authorities, we inform you that any tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties that may be imposed on any taxpayer or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.