ML26033A097

NEI Comments on Draft Arcop Inspection Manual Chapters

ML26033A097
Person / Time
Site:	99902028, Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date:	01/28/2025
From:	Mccallum J Nuclear Energy Institute
To:	Grieves J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
Download: ML26033A097 (0)

Text

Julianne McCallum Project Manager, New Nuclear Phone: 202.815.6640 Email: jgm@nei.org January 28, 2025 Mr. Jonathan Greives Acting Director Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

NEI Comments on Draft ARCOP Inspection Manual Chapters Project Number: 689

Dear Mr. Greives:

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),1 on behalf of its members, appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) draft Inspection Manual Chapters (IMCs) for the Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight Program (ARCOP).

NEI supports the NRCs initiative to modernize its oversight framework for advanced reactors and recognizes the significant work that has gone into developing the ARCOP IMCs. NEI appreciates the NRCs significant stakeholder engagement, including white papers and a series of public workshops, while working toward an ARCOP program that is consistent with the principles of being technology-inclusive, risk-informed, performance-based (TIRIPB), and scalable. We believe that continued refinement of the draft IMCs is necessary to ensure both clarity and predictability, as consistent with TIRIPB principles and the modern, transparent and predictable oversight process mandated by the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act of 2024, Section 507, Improving oversight and inspection programs.

1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry

Mr. Jonathan Greives January 28, 2026 Page 2 Nuclear Energy Institute We respectfully request that the NRC address the following comments to achieve the high levels of clarity and predictability needed to support large-scale new nuclear deployments:

1. Clarify the scope and requirements of the IMCs to aid applicants and inspectors in developing materials to adhere to ARCOP, and align understanding in the operationalization of ARCOP, including:

a. Use Risk-Significance instead of Safety-Significance: NEI recommends a return to the originally proposed risk-significant scope from the current safety-significant scope of inspections, alongside clear definitions of these significance levels within the IMCs via reference to existing guidance established in RG 1.233 and NEI 18-04. In the absence of a change to a risk-significant scope, non-risk-significance should factor into SDP determinations and result in less significant findings for non-risk-significant SSCs.

b. Distinguish Between Project and Traditional Vendor Inspection Scope: IMC 2570 notes that coordination between ARCOP and the Vendor Inspection Program (VIP) will occur, but additional detail, including clearly articulated boundaries and interactions between ARCOP and VIP, should be included to prevent duplicative inspections and undue burden on applicants, licensees, and project vendors.

c. Align Operational Readiness Requirements to Reporting Requirements: The table in of IMC 2574 on Operational Readiness applies to Construction Permits (CPs) based on the NRC draft but many of the operational programs listed are not applicable to the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and not developed until Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The table should be revised to clearly communicate which programs would be required for which licensing phase, as seen in Attachment 2 of this letter.

d. Include Inspection Scope Development and Stakeholder Involvement: The IMCs should include explicit steps for timing and scope of dialogue with applicants, licensees, and project vendors during the development of inspection scopes and schedules, including during the licensing process if desired by the applicant, to ensure balanced and informed oversight planning. Additionally, explicit steps should be added to ensure alignment with the NRCs Baseline Inspection Plan (BIP) and an applicants plans to meet 10 CFR 50.57, their Part 52 ITAAC program, or future Part 53 construction verification plans.

e. Create Options for Incorporation of Risk Assessments: NEI recommends including optional provisions across the IMCs to incorporate such risk analyses, along with pre-established risk thresholds, to improve consistency and regulatory flexibility.

Mr. Jonathan Greives January 28, 2026 Page 3 Nuclear Energy Institute

2. Improve predictability and transparency of ARCOP inspection and finding determinations to increase the effectiveness of oversight and construction safety outcomes, including:

a. Use Conditions in Licensing Documentation: Provide the flexibility to include the approved scoping and specific conditions of NRC inspection activities in a Construction Permit (CP) or Combined Operating License (COL) to support predictability and transparency in inspection and significance determination processes, should an applicant elect to provide inspection program details in their application.

b. Apply a Risk-Informed Significance Determination Process (SDP): IMC 2571 describes the SDP as a risk-informed tool using Fundamental Safety Functions (FSFs) as proxies for risk.

However, the NRC should provide the licensees the option of utilizing risk analysis in determining finding significance to better align with the intent of a risk-informed approach.

c. Ensure Non-FSF Findings and Engineering Judgment is Predictable: While engineering judgment is a component of oversight, relying on it for significance determinations for findings not involving FSFs without objective metrics undermines the predictability required by the ADVANCE Act. NEI recommends that where objective analytical methods are insufficient, findings should default to the lowest significance category (green), unless clearly justified otherwise.

d. Incorporate New Technologies and Performance Monitoring to Inform Regulatory Oversight: The ARCOP framework should allow flexibility for adoption of new technologies, including remote monitoring, artificial intelligence-enhanced video recording, and an accessible digital database for construction monitoring, as an equal input to the performance assessment program and action matrix for licensees to inform regulatory oversight and reduce regulatory burden. Long term, NEI recommends that performance monitoring be an acceptable alternative to inspection to verify safe construction, assembly and installation.

Guidance should be developed to support this effort.

These proposed changes refer to the five parts of the IMCs published in August 2025, listed below. More detailed comments on these proposed changes are available in Attachments 1 and 2.

IMC 2570 Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight Program Basis Document (ML25210A583),

IMC 2571 Dispositioning Advanced Power Reactor Construction Noncompliances (ML25210A579),

IMC 2572 Assessment of Advanced Reactor Construction Projects (ML25210A580),

IMC 2573 Inspection of the Advanced Power Reactor Quality of Reactor Plant Construction Strategic Performance Area (ML25210A581), and

Mr. Jonathan Greives January 28, 2026 Page 4 Nuclear Energy Institute IMC 2574 Inspection of the Operational Readiness Strategic Performance Area of the Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight Program (ML25210A582).

NEI appreciates the NRCs commitment to enhancing regulatory effectiveness while supporting innovation in reactor technologies. We stand ready to collaborate further and provide additional input as needed. Please direct any questions to Julie McCallum at jgm@nei.org or 202-815-6640.

Thank you for considering our input.

Sincerely, Julianne McCallum Project Manager, New Nuclear Nuclear Energy Institute : Consolidated Comments on Draft ARCOP IMCs. Application Applicability for Operational Programs Listed in IMC 2574, Attachment 1 cc:

NRC Document Control Desk Jeremy Bowen, NRC/NRR Mehdi Reisi Fard, NRC/NRR/DANU Phil OBryan, NRC/NRR/DANU, UARP

1 CONSOLIDATED COMMENTS ON DRAFT ARCOP INSPECTION MANUAL CHAPTERS IMC Comment Proposed Resolution 1 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573 Specific language in IMC 2570 (and other of the draft IMCs) makes use of safety-significant and risk-significant in specifying the approaches to be used in developing the risk-informed, performance based inspection scope.

Examples include 07.02.a and 04.03.i.

Both safety-significant and risk-significant are defined in NRC guidance as exceeding predetermined significance levels, yet such levels are neither identified nor discussed in the IMCs.

However, the levels of significance are not specified in the NRCs definitions of these terms in the ARCOP IMCs. Absent a clear statement of the significance and risk levels to be used in the IMCs, the scope of the inspections is uncertain.

This significantly degrades the transparency and predictability of the overall ARCOP.

Include specific statements regarding the significance levels used in determining safety-significance and risk-significance or provide clear statements on how these levels are to be determined either generically or on a design-specific basis. NEI recommends referencing existing regulatory guidance where risk-and safety-significance are defined, including NEI 18-04 as endorsed in RG 1.233, RG 1.200, RG 1.247.

If the scope remains extended to safety-significance, non-risk-significance should factor into SDP determinations and result in less significant findings for non-risk-significant SSCs.

2 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573 The IMCs should, ideally, be executed against the approved license application for that licensee or permit holder. Having the IMCs point to specific guidance on processes is helpful generically, but ensuring specific conditions on the approved safety significance approach and levels are encapsulated in a licensing action would support predictability and transparency in inspection and significance determination processes. To support this, it would be important for an applicant to provide inspection program details in their application and resulting license in order to inform the scoping of NRC inspection activities.

Engage with pre-applicants to determine the scope and frequency of inspections and the SDP that inform the ARCOP for the project and reactor design. Include specific conditions in the licensing documents for the project.

3 2570 The definition of project vendor does not include the noted explanation of the difference between a project vendor inspected under the ARCOP and a The IMC should be revised to include clear descriptions of the purpose and scope of ARCOP versus the VIP, making use of or repeating the language in IMC

. Consolidated Comments on Draft ARCOP IMCs 2

IMC Comment Proposed Resolution traditional vendor inspected under the VIP in 04.01. However, IMC 2571, 07.01 Application of the NRC Enforcement Policy and Enforcement Manual to ARCOP Noncompliances, 2nd and 3rd paragraphs do provide useful information in this regard.

03.03 states This IMC shall be coordinated with the vendor inspection program (VIP) to ensure inspection scopes do not overlap and that both licensed manufacturers (ML holders) and non-licensed project vendors are clearly scoped into the ARCOP.

It is important that a clear and consistent demarcation of these inspection scopes be established prior to the implementation of ARCOP to ensure clarity. Absent a clear explanation of the purpose and scope of the two inspection programs there is potential for inadvertent overlap, resulting in conflicting inspection findings and increased burden on the vendors, applicants, and licensees.

2571, 07.01. Specifically, we request that IMC 2570 explicitly state that SSCs inspected under the VIP are exempt from duplicate inspection and noncompliance dispositioning under ARCOP unless a specific performance deficiency is identified. The definitions of different parties involved in ARCOP, such as project vendors, should also be revised for clarity.

4 2570 In 04.01, the definition of Advanced Reactor Construction Project states in part and reactor construction at its final resting place, as applicable (emphasis added).

The term final resting place also appears in IMC 2572 and IMC 2573 and is not an appropriate characterization of the operating site for the IMCs.

Replace final resting place with a more appropriate term, such as operating site.

5 2570 The discussion in 07.02.c. describes in-situ factory oversight which would occur in either the ML factory location or in the project vendors location. It is not clear if this oversight would be accomplished by Regional Inspectors that would visit the specific factory Revise the IMC to add detail on how in-situ observation is expected to be implemented, e.g., periodic inspection by Regional Inspectors, resident inspectors, or some new process.

. Consolidated Comments on Draft ARCOP IMCs 3

IMC Comment Proposed Resolution location or if resident inspectors would be assigned. Clarity on how NRC anticipates accomplishing in-situ observation is needed as this affects the overall burden on the ML holder or project vendor.

6 2570 07.04 ARCOP Elements, a.3. Baseline inspections during the fabrication, manufacturing, and construction of advanced reactors, 2nd paragraph.

The discussion of revisions to the ITAAC inspection process (for example, not identifying targeted ITAAC or SSCs to inspect) is a positive to the process.

It would be useful to describe the interaction between changes during construction and inspections of affected ITAAC. Does NRC expect to use the processes used during the construction of Vogtle Units 3 & 4 or some other process?

Expand the discussion of ITAAC inspections, particularly regarding inspection of ITAAC and changes during construction.

7 2570 07.04 ARCOP Elements, a.3. Baseline inspections during the fabrication, manufacturing, and construction of advanced reactors, 3rd paragraph.

In the 2nd sentence of the 3rd paragraph, it is stated ARCOP will provide a range of inspection opportunities from which the staff can select, informed by risk insights and availability during the scheduled inspection.

To improve transparency and predictability, it would be useful to provide more explanation of how this new process would be implemented. For example, would the source of risk insights be a formal risk assessment or would it rely on a less formal risk assessment such as expert judgement.

Additionally, while NRC would make the Expand the discussion of the new ARCOP process involving a range of inspection opportunities and include a specific step to involve the licensee or project vendor in discussion of the planned inspection.

. Consolidated Comments on Draft ARCOP IMCs 4

IMC Comment Proposed Resolution final decisions on the inspections to be performed, a specific step involving discussion with the licensee or project vendor would be useful to both the inspectors and the licensee or project vendor to improve collective understanding of the reactor design and inspection options.

8 2570 In 07.04.c.2, ARCOP Finding Response Table, the draft IMC states: The construction SDP is a risk informed approach to significance determination that assigns a color of green, white, or yellow to inspection findings based on increasing risk significance. There is no reference to the discussion in IMC 2571 and its attachments, nor definition of the risk levels associated with determining risk significance, which leaves significant unclarity.

Revise the IMC to provide a reference to IMC 2571 and its attachments rather than duplicating specific aspects of the SDP. This will avoid the potential for conflicting implementation guidance for the SDP.

9 2571 0.7.10.b.2., ARCOP safety or significance of the noncompliance, directs staff to use Attachment 3 of IMC 2571 to determine the ARCOP safety or security significance of the finding, if possible.

As noted in Comment 8, The construction SDP is a risk informed approach to significance determination that assigns a color of green, white, or yellow to inspection findings based on increasing risk significance. Table 1 in IMC 2571 Attachment 3 provides guidance on assigning a color determination to inspection findings informed by ability to fulfill FSF functions. While the FSFs are tied to the risk-informed approach in NEI 18-04, the SDP determination should more explicitly provide the option to be informed by a risk assessment.

The significance determination in Table 1 should provide applicants with the option to use a PRA to determine risk significance or a risk ranking using a formal risk-assessment method for flexibility.

. Consolidated Comments on Draft ARCOP IMCs 5

IMC Comment Proposed Resolution 10 2571 As stated in Note 2 to IMC 2571 Table 1 when the ARCOP construction significance determination process guidance is not adequate to provide a reasonable estimate of the significance of an inspection finding, the safety significance should ultimately be determined by using engineering judgement and regulatory oversight experience, which is acceptable in a risk-informed process. While use of engineering judgement and regulatory oversight experience can be part of a risk-informed process, they do not lead to a transparent or predictable process.

The reliance on human input necessarily makes this determination uncertain and open to debate.

The use of engineering judgement and regulatory oversight experience should be deemphasized. If a determination cannot be made using objective analytical methods, then, absent conclusive and objective evidence to the contrary, the finding should be reduced to the lowest significance level of green.

11 2571 Descriptions of the overall SDP and SERP processes in IMC 2571 Attachments 3 and 4 appear to rely heavily on qualitative assessment for determining the significance of findings that do not involve the FSFs. There is no provision to make use of applicant or licensee formal risk assessments or pre-existing NRC risk assessments, which could provide a better assessment of the significance of the finding. The emphasis in the draft IMC to not require detailed analysis in making the significance findings is noteworthy. However, the draft IMC should be revised to include an option to address risk-analysis results and to have established acceptable risk-levels (per the NRCs definition of risk-significance) which would offer a more transparent and predictable significance determination process.

Revise the draft IMC to include an option to address risk-analysis results and to have established acceptable risk-levels (per the NRCs definition of risk-significance).

12 2573 The discussion in Attachment 2, Design-Specific Inspection Scoping Matrix, on developing the design and project specific matrices is generally predicated on designs that use the LMP Expand the discussion in Attachment 2, 3.b. to include clear guidance on determining safety-significant SSCs and on populating the table for designs that do not make use of LMP.

. Consolidated Comments on Draft ARCOP IMCs 6

IMC Comment Proposed Resolution methodology described in NEI 18-04.

While there is some general discussion of how the matrices should be developed for designs that do not make use of the LMP methodology in 3.b. of, the discussion should be expanded to include clear guidance on determining safety-significant SSCs and on populating the table for designs that do not make use of LMP.

13 2573 In IMC 2573 Attachment 2, topic 1, it is stated NRC personnel with some combination of expertise in reactor plant design, construction, inspection, and risk assessment should populate the design-specific matrices. Given the number of different advanced reactor technologies and design features that are expected to be deployed and inspected under ARCOP, having adequate expertise to support populating the inspection matrices could create significant difficulties with inspection scope. In developing the design-or project-specific matrices a specific step should be included to discuss the proposed inspections with the licensee or project vendor. While final inspection scope and schedule will be NRCs decision, the licensee or project vendor should advise and be involved before the scope and schedule are finalized.

Include an explicit step to discuss the proposed inspections with the applicants, licensees, and project vendors during the development of inspection scopes and schedules, including during the licensing process if desired by the applicant, to ensure balanced and informed oversight planning. Additionally, explicit steps for dialogue should be added to ensure alignment with the NRCs Baseline Inspection Plan (BIP) and an applicants plans to meet 10 CFR 50.57, their Part 52 ITAAC program, or future Part 53 construction verification plans.

14 2573 In determining the risk importance rating for each inspection item on design risk importance in IMC 2573, Attachment 2, 4.a., Risk Importance - Design, it is noted that Probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs) may be used to inform the RID if available. This should be explicitly expanded to include other risk-assessment methods as NEI has suggested in comments on Part 53 (ML25051A092).

Expand to include other risk-assessment methods as suggested in NEI comments on Part 53 (ML25051A092).

. Consolidated Comments on Draft ARCOP IMCs 7

IMC Comment Proposed Resolution 15 2574 The third sentence of the second paragraph of 07.02.f, Importance of the preoperational testing portion of the ITP (LWRs) or the PITAP (Non-LWRs) states:

Initial startup testing consists of those test activities that are performed during and following fuel loading. Initial startup tests include activities such as fuel loading, precritical tests, initial criticality, low-power tests, and power-ascension tests. This language does not clearly address activities, such as fuel loading and low-power testing in a factory setting, which is an important consideration for many advanced reactor licensees.

Expand discussion of initial startup testing to address activities conducted in a factory setting as discussed in SRM-SECY-24-0008 (ML25168A133).

16 IMC 2574 IMC 2574 on Operational Readiness applies to Construction Permits (CPs),

among other applications, based on the IMC 2574 draft. However, many of the operational programs listed in IMC 2574 are not applicable to the PSAR and not developed until the FSAR.

As detailed in this letters Attachment 2, current regulations (e.g., 10 CFR 50.34) do not require full development of some operational programs such as Inservice Testing or Fire Protection at the PSAR stage. Applying IMC 2574 to a CP creates a regulatory conflict with Part 50 licensing requirements. Please see for a detailed analysis of which operational programs are included in which licensing phase.

Revise IMC 2574 Attachment 1 to include the Applicability column detail on operational program inclusion in this letters Attachment 2.

1 APPLICATION APPLICABILITY FOR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS LISTED IN IMC 2574, ATTACHMENT 1 Note: Additional information to include is highlighted in italics.

Program Requirement Applicability PSAR for Construction Permit FSAR for Operating License and Combined Operating License Preservice Inspection / Inservice Inspection 50.55a(g)

Yes Yes Inservice Testing 50.55a(f)

No Yes Environmental Qualification 50.49 No Yes Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance 50.60, App. H No Yes Preservice Testing 50.55a(f)

No Yes Containment Leak Rate Testing 50.54(o)

No Yes Fire Protection 50.48 No Yes Process and Effluent Monitoring 50.34(b)(3),

Part 50, App. I No Yes Radiation Protection Part 20, Subpart B No Yes Non-licensed Plant Staff Training Program 50.120, 52.79(a)(33)

No Yes Reactor Operator Training 52.79(a)(33),

55.13, 55.31, 55.41, 55.43, 55.45 No Yes Reactor Operator Requalification 52.79(a)(34),

50.34(b),

50.54(i),

55.59 No Yes Emergency Preparedness 50.34(b)(6)(v),

50.47, 50.54(q),

50.54(t)

Yes Yes Security (including training, vehicle and personnel access control, FFD, safeguards contingencies, cyber security, SNM Material Control and Accounting, and Part 37) 50.34(c),

50.34(d),

50.34(e),

50.54(p)(1),

50.54(v),

Part 26, Subpart K, 73.54(b),

Part 74, Subpart B Part 37 No Yes

. Application Applicability for Operational Programs Listed in IMC 2574, Attachment 1 2

Quality Assurance (Operation)

Part 21, 50.54(a),

Part 50, Appendix B No Yes Maintenance Rule 50.65 No Yes Motor-Operated Valves 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)

No Yes Startup Testing portion of Initial Test Program 50.34, 52.79(a)(28)

Yes Yes