ML25260A583

SECY-78-403: Proposed Licenses to Export High Enriched Uranium to the Republic of Korea (Application XSNM-1173 and XSNM-1207)

ML25260A583
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/24/1978
From:	James Shea NRC/OIP
To:	Commissioners NRC/OCM
References
SECY-78-403
Download: ML25260A583 (1)

Text

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July 24, 1978 SECY-78-403 Docu~ent Mo. SECY/78-7 This document consists of 52,41 pages.

No. 3 5 of ~ cojji a4fi COMMISSIONER A 5 e A N For:

From:

T-hru:

Subject:

Discuss ion:

Contact:

The Commissioners James R. Shea, Director Office of Internationa 1 Programs

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Executive Di rector for Operations l'r. 1/.i:Ji ~-'. C:

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PROPOSED LICENSES TO EXPORT HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (APPLICATION XSNM-1173 AND XSNM-1207)

Background

In July 1977, General Atomic filed application XSNM-1173 for a license to export 2.3 kilograms of uranium enric~to 70o/o--<~nd 5.3 grams of U-235 contained in 5.7 grams enriched to 90%,to the Republic of Korea (ROK).

A second application, XSNM-1207, for the export to the ROK of 15.6 ki1ograms of uranium enriched to 70% U-235, was received in October, 1977.

All of the material covered by these two licenses would be used in the KORR-2 research reactor at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), a 2 MWt TRIGA reactor which was supplied by the U.S. to Korea under license XR-73 (5/11/70).

The two applications are being submitted for the Commission's consideration because together they consti-tute a single reload of the reactor, and because the same issues and considerations are invoived for each.

This reactor was initially fueled with standard 20%

enriched material. General Atomic subsequently G.G. Opling:r (492-7856)

J.G. Dunn (492-7984)

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J developed 70% enriched TRIGA fuel elements (known as FLIP elements), which permit operation of the reactor at a higher power level and a higher duty cycle, with much less frequent refueling and consequent signifi-cant savings in fuel cycle and spent fuel storage costs.

Korea undertook an upgrading program to replac the 20% core of the KORR-2 reactor gradually with 70%

FLIP elements, in order to take advantage of these savings.

The U.S. provided about 6 kilograms of 70%

material in the period from 1975 to 1977 for this up-grading program.

The fuel elements requested in application XSNM-1173 were ori gi na lly ordered to carry out the next stage of the upgrade.

Beginning in March 1977, the KORR-2 began to experienc severe fuel failures, and by February 1978 the number of damaged fuel elements had risen to 33, including 19 FLIP elements installed in the reactor and 14 standard 20% elements.

In November 1977 General Atomic shipped 15 additional FLIP elements. These were later install, and the reactor was operated for a short time at very low power, until further failures of the older element!

forced a complete shutdown.

These 15 irradiated elements are believed to be undamaged.

Following the shutdown of the reactor, General Atomic recommended immediate conversion of the entire core to 70% fuel, and application XSNM-1207 was submitted to supplement application XSNM-1173 and to complete the core.

The cause of the fuel failures is believed to be a faulty cooling water purification system, which has now been corrected.

Issues The central issue raised by these applications is wheth, the provision of the relatively large amounts of high (70%) enriched material involved meets the general test of non-inimicality, given the particular circumstances which surround this case.

Of paramount relevance to th*

issue are the following considerations:

-, Korea is requesting further U.S. assistance in up-grading the reactor to 70% enriched fuel at a time when recent U.S. policy has attempted to reduce enrichment levels whenever technically and econom-ically feasible.

Refusal to extend such assistance would probably mean that the reactor, which has been shut down since January 1978, could not resume operation for another year because of the unavailability of 20%

fuel.

More broadly, and of central importance, there have been significant proliferation concerns regarding the Republic of Korea in the recent past. Consider ation should be given to the probable effect of approving or denying these licenses on future Korean attitudes and activities in this area.

Executive Branch Views In its memoranda of March 23 and May 9 (Appendix 8),

the Executive Branch notes that:

1. KORR-2 is Korea's principal nuclear research facility and provides radioisotopes for medical applications throughout Korea.

2. In accordance with current U.S. policy to encourage the use of lower-enriched uranium whenever techni-cally and economically feasible, this reactor desigr and its proposed use were examined in detail by Argonne National Laboratory, which concluded that, while it would be technically feasible to operate the reactor on 20% enriched fuel, operation on 70%

fuel is expected to be on the order of three times less costly than operation on standard, low-density, 20% fuel. Argonne therefore concurs in General Atomic's recommendation that the core be repaced with 70% fuel.

3. If the reactor were required to use a full or partia 20% core loading, it would be forced to remain inoperable for at least a year, since General Atomic does not have any standard 20% enriched fuel availab l

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4. The Executive Branch has also noted that the quantity of HEU involved in this license, together with that under XSNM-1207 and the current total of in-country unirradiated HEU, would be below 15 effective kilograms of U-235, "below the threshold of proliferation concern."

5. Few, if any, of the fuel assemblies now in the reactor could be used for operation at any but the lowest power levels.

In any event, because of the gross failure of the core, it is practically imposs ble to isolate individual assemblies to determine the extent of their damage.

6. In the view of the Executive Branch, the export criteria of Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act are met, and the proposed export will not be inimical to the common defense and security. The Executive Branch recommends prompt approval of these applications.

Staff Observations Although the Executive Branch submission does not include any general information concerning the reactor and its end-use, the staff has determined that the KORR-2 is one of two research reactors operated by the Korean Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI).

The reactors are used for research in neutron physics and nuclear structure, irradiation experiments, isotope production and training of reactor operators. Although the KORR-~

reactor is designed for a 2 MW thermal output, it has a pulsing capability up to 2,000 MW and is modified by the Institute members to meet the various research requirements and the requirements for the production of relatively high-level isotopes.

General Atomic has also informed us that the other rese reactor, a TRIGA Mark II, is not suitable for producing the type and quantity of isotopes needed in Korea and has been relegated to primarily training applications.

When operating, the KORR-2 is expected to be utilized at least two work shifts a day in the production of

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Many short-lived isotopes, such as Silver 198 colloid, Iodine 131 and Technetium 99m are produce for speedy supply to domestic end-users. These isoto~

contribute to research and development in the diagnosi and treatment of cancer patients and in agriculture, engineering and basic sciences and because of their sh half-life, cannot be practically imported from abroad.

Also produced are other industrial radiation sources, such as Iridium 192 and Cobalt 60 which had previousl) been entirely imported.

The staff further notes that the Executive Branch submission does not include any technical or prograrnma justification for moving to the higher power 1evels or higher duty cycle available with the use of 70% FLIP fuel.

In response to our inquiries on this point, Executive Branch personnel stated that the only appare motivation for the KORR-2 upgrading program is to achieve the substantial fuel cycle economies of 70%

operation. While the staff does not consider that exceptions to current U.S. HEU policy would necessaril be warranted solely on fuel cycle cost considerations, it gives important weight to the fact that the upgradi program, and the contracts for purchasing 70% fuel, we undertaken before the current U.S. policy was adopted, and at a time when the use of HEU to achieve such economies was widely accepted.

By the time the U.S.

adopted its current more restrictive policy, these contracts had been signed and the FLIP fuel fabricated and paid for.

An improved high-density 20% fuel (involving a higher ratio of uranium to zirconium in the fuel meat) is being developed by General Atomic in response to recen-U.S. policies to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium.

The staff has investigated the possibility of fueling the KORR-2 reactor with this new fuel.

While General Atomic anticipates that the improved 20%

fuel may be commercially available within 6 months to one year, Argonne National Laboratory personnel believ1 that further testing and analysis would be required before a reduction to 20% can be assured. Additional time could well be required to obtain regulatory approval for operation with the new fuel.

In sum, it does not appear that the use of high-density LEU would avoid a substantial delay in restarting the reactor.

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.. The possibility of substituting some of this new fuel for the 70% material requested in XSNM-1173 and XSNM-1207 has been the subject of recent diplomatic exchanges between the US and the ROK (see cables at Appendix F).

General Atomic has indicated that it would agree to substitute 6 high density LEU elements for 6 of the HEU elements on order, if Korea agrees, and provided that the U.S. Government will compensate General Atomic for any additional costs and any addi-tional uranium.

The ROK appears willing to cooperate in a joint program to test and demonstrate a limited number of the new rods, which it would purchase, in some of the blank fuel channels available in KORR-2.

It does not, however, wish to see refueling of the reactor delayed, and does not wish to substitute the unproven new fuel for the 70% elements covered by these applications.

Preliminary reactions of Executiv Branch personnel to the GA substitution proposal are negative because of the financial compensation condi-tion, although they are actively negotiating specific arrangements for the demonstration program with new fuel rods noted above.

On balance, the staff does not favor pursuing the GA substitution proposal, since it does not substantially reduce the amount of HEU desired, and could jeopardize Korea's willingness to cooperate in a voluntary joint program to demonstrate the new fuel.

Based upon its independent analysis (Attachment A),

the staff has concluded that the ROK currently meets the specific criteria of Section 127 of the NNPA.

The Inimicality Issue The Commission will recall the circumstances surroundir the successful efforts of the United States to prevent the sale of a French-supplied pilot reprocessing plant to Korea in 1976.

The staff has investigated currently available infonnation concerning current South Korean nuclear activities and intentions. A recent CIA study, 11South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decision Making" (RP 78-10250) examines this question i depth.

Copies of this study have been made available t the Commissioners.

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.. While the staff does not believe it likely that the material covered by this application could be easily diverted to non-peaceful uses, nevertheless it considers that a finding of non-inimicality would not be justified if there were evidence giving rise to significant doubts about Korea's current intentions.

On the basis of the recent CIA study and other inform, tion available to it, the staff does not find such evidence, and therefore concludes that the export of the material covered by these applications meets the test of non-inimicality. It recalls, moreover, that following Korea's agreement to cancel the reprocessini project, the U.S. agreed to participate in a Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear and Other Energy Technology, under which U.S. assistance to Korea in these areas was expanded, in part as a compensatory gesture for the cancellation. The staff considers that continued support for legitimate ROK nuclear activities is an important element in avoiding renewed Korean interest in activities of proliferation concern In view of the importance of this questions, the staff has made arrangements for a classified briefing on July 27 on the current South Korean nuclear program, s that Commissioners may ask any additional questions on the subject.

Physical Security The Executive Branch has concluded that the US has assurance that the ROK is committed to providing

~dequate physical security for its nuclear program, including a level of protection compatible with that envisioned by the recommendations in IAEA INFCIRC/225 (State letter at Attachment E).

While the staff considers that the physical security program in the ROK is adequate to protect the material covered under the proposed license, the written assurance [required by 10 CFR 110.43(a)], relating to physical protection has not been obtained from the Government of the ROK.

(The Commission will recall that a proposed exemption from this requirement was discussed in SECY 78-291 for licen~e applications received prior to May 19, 1978.

As Commissioner Bradford requested, we will forMard separately a detail statement of how the physical security elements outline in NRC's regulations are fulfilled in this case.)

SECRET Recommendation:

That (1) the Commission approve the issuance of an exemption from that portion of 10 CFR 110.43(a) which requires written assurances from the recipient country with respect to physical security, (2) the proposed licenses be issued to General Atomic Company, (3) the Commission, in approving the licenses, express its expectation that future reloads for the KORR-2 (not anticipated for at least 4 years) will be confined to an enrichment level of 20%, whether of standard or high-density type.

Coordination:

ELD believes that no staff recommendations should be made since information disclosed at the July 27, 1978 briefing may affect th~ recommendation and decision.

NMSS wishes to inform the Commission that it has not received country-specific information which permits it to make an independent conclusion as to the effective-ness of IAEA material control and accounting safeguards to deter and detect diversion in the ROK.

With respect to physical security, NMSS has reviewed the program in the ROK and found it adequate for the purposes of the export.

'--.______, James R. Shea, Director Attachments:

1. Attachment A Staff review and conclusions dtd 6/22/78 and 6/23/78 1 Office of International Programs

2.

Attachment B - Executive Branch views dtd 3/23/78 and 5/9/78

3.

Attachment C - Application of 7/19/77 (XSNM-1173) and applica-tion dtd 9/30/77 (XSNM-1207)

4. Attachment D - Copies of proposed 1 i censes

5.

Attachment E - State ltr dtd 3/23/78

6.

Attachment' F - Cable exchange between US and ROK (LOU) *- __ _ _

Commissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, August 4, 1978.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT July 31, 1978, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires addi time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec. Dir. for Opers.

Secretariat

ATTACHMENT A

UNITED ST.l.TES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON.. C. 20555 Memorandum to the File PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT HIGH-ENRICHED URANIUM TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (APPLICATION XSNM-1173) 10 In July 1977, General Atomic filed an application for a license to export 2.3 kilograms U-235 contained in 3.28 kilograms uranium enriched to 70%,

an~ 5.3 grams U-235 contained in 5.7 grams uranium enriched to 93% to the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The 70% enriched material (in the form of 13 flip-t~pe fuel elements, 2 instrumented flip fuel elements, and 2 flip fueled follower control rods and the 93% enriched material in the form of 3 TRIGA fission chambers) will be used in the KORR-2 research reactor at the Korea Atomic Energy Research I n s t i tu t e ( K,A. E R I ).

The KORR-2 is a 2 MWt TRIGA Mark III pool-type reactor which provides radioisotopes for hospitals throughout the ROK.

As noted in the Execut ive Branch analysis of the proposed export, this reactor (1) has operated at a greatly reduced power level since March 1977 due to damage to the cladding of numerous fuel elements in the core, and (2) has been shut down since January 197.

The fuel elements being requested in thi~

ex~ort license application are required to run the -reacto~

In response to our August 1, 1977 request for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the US, including the common defense and security~

and (2) confirrned;that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the.Agreement for Cooperation between the US and the ROK.

These views and

• license application analyses by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department analyses of March 23 and May 9, 1978.

Confirmation of the applicability of the US-ROK Agreement for Cooperation was also set forth in the letter of September 2, 1977 from the Atomic Energy Bureau-Ministry of Science and Techrrology of the ROK.

11 Memorandum to the File In its May 9 memorandum, the Executive Branch noted that, in accurdance with current US policy to encourage use of lower-enriched uranium whenever technically and economically feasible, the KORR-II reactor design and its proposed use were examined i~ detail by Argonne National LJboratory.

Their conclusion was that, while it would technically feasible for the reactor to be operated on _LEU (20% U-235), it would be three times more costly than operating on 70% enrichid fuel.

Moreover, if the KORR-II was required to use a full or partial 20% U-235 core loading, it would remain inoperable for at least a year due to.the unavailability of such fuel.

Whil~ 20% fuel is being developed by General Atomic, they expect that an additional year of develo~nent work will be required before it becomes commercially available.

Due to the extensive damage of most of the fuel assemblies in the reactor and the gross failure of the core, General Atomic has recommended replace-ment of most of the core and Argonne concurs in this view.

The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considera-tions below:

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0 Safeguards.

The ROK is a party to the NPT and IAEA safeguards pursuant to that treaty are in force.

Also, as a party to the NPT, the ROK has undertaken an obligat~on to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the ROK, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

No Nuclear Explosive Use.

As a non-nuclear weapon state party _

to the NPT, Korea has undertaken the obligations not to receiv~ the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nucleai weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ot of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Physical Security. During July 1975 and March 1978, a team of US Government experts, visited the ROK for an exchange of views on physical security including visits to those facilities at which this high-enriched uranium will be stored and utilized.

Based on these reviews and pursuant to 10 CFR 110.42(a) and 110.43, the ROK 1s physical protection program is considered adequate for the purposes of this export.

As noted in the State Department analysis, the US has assurance that the RJ~ is committed to maintaining adequate physical security for its nuclear program, incl uding a level of protection comparable to that set forth in IAFA INFCIRC/225, Rev. 1., "The Physical Protection of Nuclea ; Materials."

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Retransfer. The US-ROK Agreement prohibits the retransfer of any material supplied by the US. beyond the jurisdiction of the ROK without US approval to such retransfer, and then only if it is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the US and the other nation or group of nations.

Similarly, it prohibits the transfer of special nuclear material produced through the u~~ of -US-suppli~d material without US approva 1.

Reprocessing.

The US-ROK Agreement stipulates that the reprocessing of US-supplied material may be performed only in facilities acceptable to both parties. The State Department analysis notes that:

1.

The ROK has explicit_ly confirmed thaf this prov1s1on calls for two separate and distinct steps on the part of the parties. First, there must be a mutuGl accord that adequate safeguards can apply.

Second, the facilities must bi agreed by both parties to be acceptable

2.

The right to determine whether reprocessing facilities are acceptable gives the US the authority to determine, in any specific case, the location where the reprocessing maY occur and flexibility to agree with the ROK on other terms designed to assure that the reprocessing and handling of the separated plutonium occurs under prudent conditions.

3.

These conditions reinforce and supplement the rights pertaining to storage that already appear in paragraph 8(3) of Article XI of the Agreement for Cooperation.

Sensiti1e Technology.

The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology.

As more fully developed in its memorandum dated May 9, 1978, the Executive Branch has determined that the ROK currently meets all the criteria of P.L.95-242, including the requirements of Section 126(a)(l) and the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128 and that the ROK has adhered to all the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the US.

The staff has concluded that issuance of the proposed license would be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, including the specific criteria of Section 127.

Memorandum to File In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has concluded that the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US and the ROK, and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and saf~tY:

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R. Neal Moore Senior Licensing *Reviewer Office of International Programs 13

UNITED '.,1 ATES NUCLEAR REGULAl URY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 JUN 2 3 117n MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT HIGH-ENRICHED URANIUr1 TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (APPLICATION XSNM-1207) 14 In September 1977, General Atomic filed an application for a license to export 10.9 kilograms U-235 contained in 15.6 kilograms uranium enriched t9 70%, to the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The 70% enriched material (in the form of 70 flip-type fuel elements, 5 instrumented flip fuel elements, and 5 flip fue}ed follower control rods) will be used in the KORR-2 research reactor *at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI).

The KORR-2 is a 2 MWt TRIGA Mark III pool-type reactor which provides radioisotopes for hospitals throughout the ROK.

As noted in the Executive Branch analysis of the proposed export, this reactor (1) has operated at a greatly reduced power level since March 1977 due to damage to the cladding of numerous fuel elements in the core, and (2) has been shut down since January 1979.

The fuel elements being requested in this export license application are required to run the reactor.

In response to our October 14, 1977 request for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the US, including the common defense and security; and (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US and the RO K.

These views and license application analyses by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department analysis of May 9, 1978.

Confirmation of the applicability of the US-ROK Agreement for Cooperation was also set fort~ in the letter of December 5, 1977 from the Atomic Energy Bureau-Ministry of Science and Technology of the ROK.

APPENDI X A 15 Memorandum to File In its May 9 memorandum, the Executive Branch noted that, in accordance with current US policy to encourage use of lower-enriched uranium whenever technically and economically feasible, the KORR-11 reactor design and its proposed use were examined in detail by Argonne National Laboratory.

Their conclusion was that, while it would technically be feasible for the reactor to be operated on LEU (20% U-235), it would be three times more costly than *ripefating on 70% enriched fuel.

Further financial liabilities would accrue to Korea if already fabricated 70% fuel were to be replaced with 20% fuel at US insistence.

Moreover, if the K0RR-II was required to use a full or partial 20% U-235 core loading, it would remain inoperable for at least a year due to thP.

unavailability of such fuel.

While 20% fuel is being developed by General Atomic, they expect that an additional year of development work will be required before it becomes commercially available.

Due to the extensive damage of most of the fuel assemblies in the reactor and the gross failure of the core, General Atomic has recommended replace-ment of most of the core.

Argonne concurs in this view.

The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considerations below:

0 0

0 Safeguards.

The R0K is a party to the NPT and IAEA safeguards pursuant to that treaty are in force.

Also, as a party to the NPT, the R0K has undertaken an obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear ~ctivities within the territory of the R0K, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

No Nuclear Explosive Use.

As a non-nuclear \\'1eapon state party to the NPT, Korea has undertaken the obligations not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear

\\veapons 019 other nuc-1 ea..r_ exp 1 os i ve devices.

Physical Security.

During July 1ci75 and March 1978, a team of US Government experts, visited the R0K for an exchange of views on physical security including visits to those facilities at which this high-enriched uranium will be stored and util iLed.

Based on these reviews and pursuant to 10 CFR 110.42(a) and 110.43, the R0K's physical protection program is considered adequate for the purposes of this export.

As noted in the State Department analysis, the US has assurance that the R0 ~

is committed to maintaining adequate physical security for its nuclear erogram, in\\ luding a level of protection comp~rable t0 that s~t forth 1n Ir.tA INFCIRC/225, Rev.I., "Tt1e Physical Protection of Nucle,, r Materials."

16 Memorandum to File 0

0 Retransfe~. The US-ROK Agreement prohibits the retransfer of any material supplied by the US *beyond the jurisdiction of the ROK without US approval to such retransfer, and then only if it is within the scope of an agreement for cooperatiDn between the US and the other nation -0r group of nations.

Similarly, it prohibit_s_:the transfer of special nuclear material produced through the use of US-supplied material vlithout US approva 1.

Reprocessing.

The US-ROK Agreement stipulates that the reprocessing of US-supplied material may be performed only in fac i 1 it i es acceptab 1 e to both pa rt i es.

• The State Department analysis notes that:

1.

The ROK has explicitly confirmed th~t this provision calls for two separate and distinct steps on the part of the parties.

First, there must be a mutual accord that adequate safeguards can apply.

Second, the facilities must be agreed by both parties to be acceptable.

2.

The right to determine whether reprocessing facilities are acceptable gives the US the authority to determine, in any specific case, the location where the reprocessing may occur and flexibility to agree with the ROK on other terms designed to assure that the reprocessing and handling of the separated plutonium occurs under prudent conditions.

3.

These conditions reinforce and supplement the rights pertaining to storage that already appear in paragraph B(3) of Article XI of the Agreement for Cooperation.

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~ensitive Technology.

The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology.

As more fully developed in its memorandum dated May 9, 1978, the Executive Branch has determined that the ROK currently meets all tl1e criteria of P.L.95-242, including the requirements of Section 12G(u)(l) and the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128 and that the ROK has adhered to all trie provisions of its Ag,reement fo..r C.99peration vlith the US.

The staff has concluded that issuance of the proposed license \\<1ould be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, including the specific criteria of Section 127.

17 Memorandum to File In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has concluded that the export -to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US and the ROK, and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and sa!~ty.

1. ~CUtHu-R. Nea 1 Moore Senior Licensing Reviewer Office of International Programs

ATTACHMENT B

19 DEPARTMENT OF STATE 7806114 Washington, D.C.

20S20 March 23, 1978 XS Aid!- I I '7}

7 IJ -J 1, 1, r 5 - 7, f MEMOR2\\NDUM FOR LEE V. GOSS ICK NUCLEAR REGULATORY COC"lMISSION This export license application was being processed

-at the time of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, P.L.95-242.

While our ~nalysis deals, in substance, with the extent to which the criteria in new section 127 (and section 128, if applicable) of the Atomic Energy Act are met; the analysis is in the old format and is not specifically keyed to these criteria.

The Executive Branch, in consu 1 ta tion with tJRC staff, is currently developing new procedures pursuant to P.L.95-242 which, after they come into effect, will be applied to license applications.

In view of the enactment of P.L.95-242, the Department*has reviewed this license application to ensure that the requirements of section 126 a. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act are met.

In this regard, as indicated in the analysis, the export criteria in section 127, or their equivalent, e met.

Further, Korea has adhered to the provision f i:5ra0reement for cooperation with the United St ts.(

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE Wa shi n~ ton. D,.

,.-ic,20 March 23, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR LEE V. GOSSICK

~~UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Subject:

Comments to NRC on Nuclear Export License Application 5j Your letter of August 1, 1977 requested the views of the Executive Branch on the issuance of a proposed license for the export to the Republic of Korea Qf 2.30 kilograms of U-235 contained in 3.280. kilograms of uranium enriched to 70 percent U-235 in* the form of fabricated fuel elements.

On the basis of the tactors covered by the attached analysis, the Executive Branch has concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the in-terests of the United States including the common defense and security and that the United States Government has the assurance thdt the recipient country is committed to pro-viding adequate physical security for its nuclear program, including a level of protection compatible with that en-visaged by IAEA INFCIRC/225.

The supply of this highly e~-

riched uranium will be subject to all of the terms and con-ditions of the Agreement for~operation between the United States o.nd the Republic of K

a.

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t ~L Attachments:

Peter Tarn Executive Secretary

1.

License Application Analysis

2.

Letter from the Atomic Energy Bureau of the Republic of Korea dated September 2, 1977

Transaction:

LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSIS The export to the Republic of Korea of 2.30 kilograms of uranium enriched to 70% U-235 in the form of fabricated fuel elements.

Applicant:

General Atomic Company Applicant's

Reference:

'IEL-834 Date of Appiication:

July 19, 1977.

1.

What is the purpose of the export?

21 These thirteen Flip-type fuel elements,, two Instrumented Flip fuel elements and two Flip Fueled Follower Control Rods containing uranium enriched to 70 percent_U-235 and three TRIGA fission chambers containing uranium~enriched to 93 per-cent U-235 will be shipped to Seoul, Korea and will be used in the KORR-2 TRIGA Mark III Research Reactor at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute.

This reactor provides radioisotopes for hospitals through-out the Republic of Korea.

Since March 1977 this reactor has operated at a greatly reduced power level as a result of damage to the cladding of numerous fuel elements within the 104 fuel element core.

According to a report from the General Atomic Company, it is believed that damage to the fuel elements is a result of a combination of stress chloride corrosion cracking due tc poor moderating water quality* and further cracking because of severe vibrations in the operation of the reactor.

Since January 1977 the-reactor has been shut down.

The fuel elements:being requested in this export license applica-tion are required to run the reactor in order to test the fuel presently in the core at progressively higher power levels.

2.

Does the recipient country have an Agreement for Co-operation with the United States under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and, if so is the export in q~estion ~~v~ied by the Agr~ement?

The supply of this highly enriched uranium is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and Korea, which en-tered into force on March 19, 1973.

This was confirmed i~

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a letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea dated September 7, 1977.

This agreement, inter alia, prohibits the retransfer of any material supplied by the United States to another nation except as the United States agrees to such retransfer and then only if it is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the United States and the other nation or an international organization.

Similarly, it prohibits the transfer of special nuclear material pro-duced through the use of U-~ -S. -

supplie'd material without U. s.

approval.

Article VIII, F of the Agreement provides that (a} when any special nuclear material received from ~he United States requires reprocessing or (b) when irradiated fuel elements containing fuel supplied by the United St~tes requires al-teration, such reprocessing or alteratio~ shall be performed in facilities acceptable to, both parties upon a joint deter-mination of the parties that the safeguards called for by the Agreement may be effectively applied.

The Republic of Korea has explicitly confirmed that this provision calls for two separate and distinct steps on the part of the parties.

First, there must be a mutual accord that adequate safe-guards can apply.

Second, the facilities must be agreed by both parties to be acceptable.

The right to determine whether reprocessing facilities are acceptable to the United States gives us the authority to determine, in any specific case, the location where the reprocessing may occur.

The clause also gives us flexibility to agree with Korea on other *terms designed to as sure that the reprocessing and handling of the separated plutonium occurs under prudent conditions.

For example, in determining the acceptability of a facility the United States would be able to stipu~ate reasonable conditions of a security nature regarding storage of the separated plutonium.

These con-ditions reinforce and supplement the rights pertaining to storage that already appear in paragraph B(3) of Article XI of the Agreement for Cooperation.

3.

Has the recipient country accepted and implemented IAEA safegu~rds andl._or other appropriate supplementary

• bilateral conditions (i~cluding, where applicable, understandings regarding reexport) imposed by the U.S. ?

A safeguards Agreement with the IAEA pursuant to the NPT entered into force November 14, 1975.

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4.

Does the recipient country have adequate physical security arrangements to deal with threats of sub-national diversion of significant quantities of nu-clear weapon materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium)?

During April 1976 and July 1977, a team of U.S. Govern-ment experts visited the Republic of Korea for an exchange of views on physical security-including visits to those facilities at which this highly enriched uranium will be stored and utilized The fixed site reviews included:

(1) security forces, (2) physical barriers, (3) detection and alarm apparatus, (4) com-munication and response capabilities, (5) access and exit controls, (6) accountability and reporting procedures, and (7) physical security organization.

In the area of transpor-tation, procedures and equipment for prot~cting nuclear materials while in transit were also examin~d.

The team judged the Republic of Korea's physical pro-tection system, equipment.and procedures and equipment for transportation security adequate to physically protect the Qaterial requested in this license application.

5.

What is the position of the recipient country with re-gard to non-proliferation?

Korea is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deposited its instrument of ratifica-tion on April 23, 1975.

The Korean Government has also signed a comprehensive safeguards ag~eement with the IAEA under Article III of the Treaty.

6.

What understandings does the United States have with the recipient country with - respect to the use of U.S.-

supplied ;material or equipment to acquire or develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose, and as to the recipient country's policies and actions as to such development using equipment and material from any source?

As a non-nuclear weapon state Party to the NPT, Korea is precluded from acquiri-ng_, ___ developing

• or manufacturing nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.

7.

In cases in which the recipient country is not required by the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards, does the recipient

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country or organization have accounting and inspection procedures such as to assure compliance with the re-quirements of the relevant U.S. Agreements?

A safeguards Agreement with the IAEA pursuant to the NPT entered into force November 14, 1975.

Korea has rati-fied the NPT.

8.

What other factors are there which bear on the issuance of the export license, such as further U.S. understand-ings with the recipient country, other supplier countries or interested regional countries?

I As already noted, our Agreement for Cooperation includes a provision which requires U.S. approval of any arrangements for reprocessing.

Another application for 10 kilograms of uranium enriched to 70 % in the form of fabricated FLIP type fuel elements for this reactor is currently.under review in the Executive Branch.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF OCEANS P..~-10 It~TERNATIONAL R['.':'.[iV~O LL~.~. r ! F: C ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFA);J~S," (H

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May 9, 1978 MEMOl{l\\t~DUM POR Jl\\MES R. SIIEA_.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Enclosed is an Executive Branch analysis covering three liGense applications for the export of highly-enriched and low-enriched uranium to Korea.

In accordance wjth P.L.95-242, the analysis explicitly addresses how the requiremen ts of Section 126 a. (1) of the Atoraic Energy fct are met, in-cluding the specific criteria of Sections 127 an c! 128, as well as certain additional factors, envisaged by Section 126 a. (1).

The Executive Branch, on the basis of its review of this application, has concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and P.L. 95-2~2 have been met and that th ~

proposed export would not be inimical to the common defense and security Cl f the United States.

t1oreover, Korea has ad-hered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.

Therefore the Executive Branch recom-mends issuar.ce of the requested export licenses.

As covered in detail in the analyses, the KORR-2 re-search reactor, to which fuel export license applications XSN'.1-1173 and XSNM-1 207 apply, has been shut down since January 1978 as the result of a major fuel failure.

It is our untlerstanding that it will be necessary to keep this reactor shut down until the material covered b~* ~hese two license applications can be exported.

Since KORR-2 is Korea's principal nuclear research facility and provides radioisotopes for medical applications throughout Korea, we would urge prompt consideration and issuance of these licenses.

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Louis V. Noscnzo Deputy Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

1.

Applicable Agreement for Cooperation The proposed export is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-ment of Korea concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which entered into force on March -19, --_1973.

This was confirmed in letters from the Repubiic of Korea's Atomic Energy nurcuu to the Energy Rcseurch and Development Administration copies of which are attached.

Korea has adhered to all provisions of its agreement with the United States.

2.

Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met A.

Section 127 Criteria As provided in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production-or-utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:

Criterion (1) 11 IAEA safeguards as required by Article' I I! ( 2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be ex~orted, to anyfsuch material or facilities previously exported and subject' to the applica-ble Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof."

27 Korea is a Party to the Treaty on the ~on-Proliferatior of Nuclear i*leapons and deposited its instrument of ratifica-tion on April 23, 1975.

The Korean Government has also signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA under Article. III of the Treaty, which entered into force November 14, 1975.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that cri-terion (1) is met.

Criterion (2) nNo such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use o f such mu v~ r i. a 1 s, f u c i 1 it i es, or sens i ti v e nu cl c~ a r tech -

nology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development bf any nuclear explosive device."

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• As a non-nuclear weapon state Party to. the NPT, Korea is. precluded from acquiring, developing or manufacturing nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (2) is met.

Criterion (3)

"Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilites proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or pro-duced through the use thereof.

Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physicul security measures shµll be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regulations."

The Commission has not, as yet, promulgated new regula-tiqns pursuant to Section 304(d) of P.L. 95-~42.

During i.!:'H.:.l 197g :::.nil. July 1975, a team of U.S. Govern-

~ment experts visited the Republic of Korea~for an exchange of views o n physical security including visits to those fa-

_cilities at which

• this highly-enriched uranium will be stored and utilized.

The fixed site reviews included:

(1) security f o r~:es, (2 ) physical barriers, (3)° detection and alarm ap-paratus, ( ~} communication and response capabilities, ( 5) ac-cess and exit controls, (6) accountability and reporting prc-cedJres, a nd (7) physical security organization.

In the area ot transportation, procedures and equipment for protecting nuclear materials while in transit were also examined.

The team judged the Republic of Korea's physical pro-tection system, equipment and procedures and equipment for transportation security adequate to physically protect the material requested in this license application.

~herefore, it is the I~xecutive Branch view that criterion (3) is met.

Criterion (4)

"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.

In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or grou~ of nations des-ignated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section."

Article X (3) of the 1973 U.S.-Korea Agteement for Cooperation stipulates that:

"No material, including equip-ment and devices, transferred to the Government of Korea or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be trans-ferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Korea, except as the Commission may agree to such a transfer to the jurisdiction of another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commission, the transfer is within the scope o~ an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of ~he United States.... and the other nation or group of nations."

Article XI B. provides inter alia that:

"... the Gover:1-ment of the United States of America, notwithstc;inding any other provisions of this Agreement, shall have the following rights:

11 (2)

With respect to any source material or special nuclear material made available to the Government of the Rerublic of Korea or to ~ny ~erson under its jurisdiction under this Agreement or the superseded Agreement by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction and any source material or special nuclear materi~l utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of any of the following materials, equipment or devices so made available:

"(a) source,materia*l--; -special nuclear material, mod-erator matcric1l, or other material designu.ted by the Com-

mission,

"(ii) to require that any such material in the custody of the Government of the Republic of Korea or any person

under its jurisdiction be subject to all of the safeguards provided for in this Article and the guarantees set forth in Article X;"

JI These articles give the U.S. an unqualified approval right over the retransfer of material from Korea supplied by the U.S. or produced through the use of such material and allow rctransfers only if it is determined to be within the scope of an agreement for cdoperation with the recipient country.

This right would apply to irradiated fuel be-cause it contains U.S.-supplied material and material produced through the use of U.S. material.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch v1ew that criterion

( 4) is met.

Criterion (5)

"No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the us e of such m~Lerial will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel ele-ments containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or al-teration."

Article VIII C. of the U.S. -

Korea Agreement for Co-operation provides that:

"When any special nuclear material received from the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or to the superseded Agreement requires re-processing, or any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material r e ceived from the United States o{ America pursuant to this Agreement or to the superseded Agr~ement are to be removed from a reactor and are to be altered in form or content, such reprocessing or alteration may be performed in facilities acceptable to both parties upon a joint de-termi nation of the Parties that the provisions of Article XI may be effectively applied."

As no joint determination under Article VIII C. can be made without the agreement of the United States, and since the facilities to be used must be acceptable to the U.S.

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one of the Parties, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (5) is met.

Criterion (6)

"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nu-clear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclecJ.r technology."

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The proposed export does not involve sensitive nuclear technology.

criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.

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B.

Section 128 Criterion Section 128 a. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:

"l\\s a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclcur-wcapon states, no such export shall__be, made unless It\\El\\ safeguards 34 are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the con-trol of such state at the time of the export."

It should be noted that this criterion 9nly applies to exports to take place after March 10, 1980 or pursuant to an application submitted after September 10, 1979.

We anticipate that this recommended export wiil occur before March 10, 1980.

In any case, as a Party to the NPT, Korea has accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities thereby satisfying this criterion.

B.

Special Non-Proliferation and Othe~ Foreign Policy Considerations Related to XSNM-1173 and XSNM-1207

• The KORR-II research reactor is the principle research tool of the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute and is used for production of medical radioisotopes as well as nuclear training in reactor operation and research.

In ac-cordance with current US policy to encourage use of lower-enriched ur,rnium whenever technically and cconomicc1lly feasible, this reactor design and its proposed use has been examined in detc1il by Argonne National Laboratory, which concluded that, while it would be technically feasible to operate the reactor on low-enriched uranium* ( 20 percent U-235}, the operation on more highly-enriched fuel (e.s.,

70 percent U-235}, is expected to be on the brder of three times less costly than operation on current technology 20 percent enriched fuel.

~

t1ore importantly, if the KORR-II were required to use 35 a full or r~ rtial 20 percent U-235 core loading. it would be forced to r emain inorerable for at least a year since General Atomic coes not have any 20 percent enriched fuel available and its current schedule of fuel deliveries to other customers

\\*.1ould not pe rmit it to start fabrication of tv1cnty percent fuel for KORR-II fo r at least nine months.

(This is uside from any finaccial liabilities which would be incurred if already fabricated 70 percent fuel under the existing General Atomic-Korean contract were to be replaced with 20 percent fuel at our insistence.)

While an improved 20 pe rcent fuel is being developed by General Atomic, it is expected to re-quire at least an additional year of development work before it become s commercially available.

It is believed that fewJ if any, of the 20 percent fuel asseml)lies now in KORR-II could be used for reactor operation at any but the lowest power levels.

In any event, because o f the ~l r o s s fa i 1 u re of this core, i t is pr act i ca 11 y i mpo s -

sible to isolate individual assemblies to determine the ex-tent of their damaae.

Therefore, General Atomic has recom-mended repl<1cement of most of the core and Argonne concurs in th i. s vi *~w.

Issuance of both of t-hes*~-- licenses would permj t the export of 97 fuel c1sscmblies for KORR-JT, cont,,inj nn ct totc1l of 13.2 kiloc.rrc1ms of U-235.

It should be noted that t he quantity of highly-enriched uranium involved under the two licenses as well as the total in-country unirradiated highly-

enriched uranium is below the 15 Kg. of V-235, and the ef-,

fectivc Kg. at the 70 percent enrichment is well below the threshold of possible proliferation concern.

In light of the foregoing factors, we believe that approval of XSNM-1175 and XSNM-1207 is justified and is consistent with US policy to meet existinq commitments to supply hiqhly-cnrichcd uranium 1t1hile cncouruging use of 36 lower CJ-235 enrichments whenever technically and economically feasible.

Further' since the* KORR.-II is Korea Is principal nuclear research tool and also provides radioisotopes for use in medical applications throughout Korea, we would urge prompt consideration and issuance of the license to permit earcliest possible startup of this reactor.

3.

Additional Factors A.

Safeguards Implementation -- Significant infor-mation the Executive Branch possesses bearing on the effectiveness of implementation of IAEA safe-guards in the recipient country, including any such information on steps bcjny taken to correct ilny identified deficiencies in the application of IAEA safeguards*i~-.that country:

The I~EA Secretariat has concluded in its Special Safe-guards Implementation Report that with rega1d to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some deficiencies exist in the system, "in none of the 41 stati2s in which in-spections were carried out was there any diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material".: Although r~c-ognizing the need to correct existing deficiencies in safe-guards implementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's conclusion is not a valid one.

In the light cf this and other factors associ-ated with he proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the frame*,\\*ork of commitments, assurances and safeguards is adequate for the purposes of these exports.

37

4.

Inimicality Judgment Based on review of the proposed export, it is the judgment of the Executive Branch that the proposed export will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and that the license should be issued.

38

ATOMIC ENEi<GY BUREAU MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

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_J9~eph - ~l. __ Hendrie

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ATTACHMENT C

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(2*6n 10 CF R 30,,o DATE OF APPLICATION July 19, 1977 NAME OF APPLICANT STREET, ADDRESS U.S. ATOMIC ENERG ~* COMMISSION Washington, D. C.

20545 APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO EXPORT BYPRODUCT, SOURCE, OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Submit in Triplicate Car<!/ully Read Instructions on Back 41 Fo,m ai,pn,ved Budget Bureau Mo.

3S-R0007.

XSN~.. I\\, ?> u 70-JJ~lt,,

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2 APPLICANT'S REFERENCE NO. 13 COUNTRY OF ULTIMATE DESTINATION (i/any)

IEL-834 KOREA GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY ATTN:

W. R. Mowry P. 0. Box 81608 S ' ULTIMATE CO~SIGNE*E IN FOR!':IGN COUNTRY (NamP. and address)

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute P. 0. Box 7, Cheong Ryang c1TY. suTe:..a.ND z1P coDe: San Di ego, CA 92138 Seoul, Republic of Korea INTERMEDIATE CONSIGNEE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY (GiVE' name and ad,:frpss. 1/ same as ul trmaJe CT)r..<rgne<', stat<! "Same...,

7 IF PURCHASER IN FOREIGN COUNTRY IS OTHER THAN UL TIM.ATE CONSIGNEE, GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS.

None I aJ OU A "I TI TY TO 8 E SH IP PE 0 fSee ll'!<ln,ctron,- on ba.citi 2.30 Kg U-235 Total See Attachment.

(If same. stale.. Same.:*)

None lb) COMM 00 IT Y OESCR I PT ION (/nc/w;ip ch<!mrcal and physical form; for 5Pt'cial nuc/pa, matl!'1'*al and b,n,odru:-t mataial also specif y isotopic c o,,tenl; if in a d<'vic<', ide,iti/y thP dn,,c,,, manufacture,,

and mod Pl mr-'"'hPY.)

See Attachment.

lei 5"' IPPING AN() <>AC KING PROCEDURES (~equrred /or special '7Llci<'<ZT mal<'Tral. See instructions on bacit..)

See.Attachment.

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• c O F C0 MM ~::>1T1c:; COVERED ev THI'; APPLICATION : lflpscnh(' /,Jlv. stallnl{ uf>12tu1 II ht> p,..,,,J,.c-pti,.. """"" rtlJl'd. uhat s,-, *,rF Th~ hrt*r'ii'IGA Fi"s ~'{'~'n" 1c'h~;;ben;.c; 1~hal'l bPb~PT1usej) { ;;.. KffRR~2ntfr/'{G~

10r~arT:'r 111"'a 1a/'KXER I.

The 13 Flip Fuel Elements (Cat. N9. 110), 2 Instrumented Flip Fuel Eleme~ts (Cat. No. 210) arid 2 Flip Fueled-Follower Control Rods (Cat. No. 310) shall be used 1n KORR-2 (TRIGA Mark-III) at KAER! also.

, The ap;,li,*an t, an,! any official CXf!Ctf!in~ this certificate on hehalf of the applicant named in Item *i. certify 1ha1 rhis *applicat 'o~

i~ prf'parcd in conlnrmi1y with Title 10, C ode of Ff'deral HrFulations, Parts 30 and.'\\(, (if for b,-prod11cr material) or Pare 10 (if for sourcf' marc-rial). _or Part 7_0 (if for ~peci:11 nu_clc:ir matcr1al), and Part 71 (for rrnn,port of rad1oac1ive matf'rial, if arplicsble) and rhar all infomiacron conr:uned herein, 1pduding any su..rplcments attached hereco,,s crue one! correct to the best o their knowlc,lge ancl belief.

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY (Applicant named in ft,.m 4)

William R. Mowry Licensina Administrator (Titlr n/ cert t/)1n,: of/1c,al au1honzrd to act on bet-al / o/ t hP

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• 749; makes it a crim inal offense to l'T'Oke o willfully fol.., Slole*

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FORM ;;RC-7 A TT ACll:'lEIJT 7/19/77 IEL-234 KOREA

8. (a)

8. ( c) 2.30 Kg U-235 Total (1) 1.78 Kg U-235

( 2) 0.27 K9 U-235 (3) 0.23 Kg U-235 (4) 5.3 g~ U-235 I

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.\\ r 13 each, TRIGA Flip F,u~l,.EJei~t.s_,J~odel #110, each element contains'*' Uz'rh" ~n~taV'a--Pl oy, the uranium (196 gm) is enriched to 70% in U-235.

2 each, Instrumented Flip Fuel Elements, Model #210, each element contains UZrH metal alloy, the uranium (196 gm) is enriched to 70% in U-235.

(3) 2 each, Flip Fueled-Follower Control Rods, Model #310, each el~ment contains UZrH metal alloy, the uranium (166 gm) is.enriched to 70% in ~-235.

(4) 3 each, Fission Chambers, each chamber contains 1.9 gm uranium enriched to 93% U-235.

All the materials will be packaged at General Atomic Comrany, San Diego, California.

The fuel elements/

rods will be packaged in TRIGA shipping containers (NRC Certificate of Compliance #9034 and #9037).

The fission chambers will be packaged in DOT Spec 7A or equivalent packaging.

'I,..,

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43 KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE TELEX

• KAER! 2:34 IS CABLE KAER!

Mr. 'iii ll i :u:1 1-iowry P. 0. BOX 7, CHEONG RYA.~G SEOUL, KOREA Mana~er, Licensin~ Administration Gen~ral Atomic Compsny P.O. Box 81608 San Diego, California 92138 Sub_iPct: ~r.d T}se Statement of Consignee 1971 JUL 26 N,~ 8 5 S TELEPHONE. 96- 01 81

'fie r cque:.;t th*1t this statement be considered a p:1rt of be '1pp1 ic1.ti on filed by Gener9.l Atomic Company for its license to export soeci~l nucle.<J.r material.

1:/e 1P.sire to r<:?ceive tre followin~ r.i-'.l.teriA.l i.n the (]w.rntit:, indi.~::i.t -, d be 1 o*.,:

TTr-:rnium '{('!}~

f-..'nriched in U-235 Form U-SrZrH in 17 TRIGA fuel elements

~, 2t~O ~am3 of U o'."lnt'!.i.ning 2, -:-*6 gll~:J of U-~'3 5

\\l'e will u;e t hP. specb.l nuclear r:ia~erial

• li3ted 1.hovP. for the following These 13 flio fuel clements (C1.t. No. 110), 2 instrumeted flip fuel oleri1;nts (C*1t. !lo. 2 1(!) and 2 flip fueled follo*,1er control rod ( 1_;*1t. ilo. '3 10) sh:111 be used in i{Oll.R -

2 (THIGA Mark-III) at K.AEiU.

We certify that all the facts contained in this statement arc tnie and '

co1*rect to the best of our knowledge and belief,ind we do not know of any.

addition.*11 fact3 that, *1re inconsi::itent with the ahove abtemf)nt.

By C.:Ct:~

'ritle Reactor 0p~rntion Di.vision Date M'.l.v 12 1 n77

KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE P. 0. BOX 7, CHEONG R¥:jtf Jl JL ~6

/.t ! t 44 TELEX:* KJIERI 2341 S CJIBLE.

KJIERI SEOUL, KOREA 1" 1 TELEPHONE: 96- 0 I 81 Hr. William Howry Mana~er, Licensing Administration General Atomic Company P.O-. Box 81608 San Diego, Cnlifornia 92138

Subject:

End Use St3tement of Consignee We request that thi3 statement qe co~idered a p9.rt of the applic<J.tion filetl by General Atomic Company for its license to export speciql nucle9.r material.

We desire to receive the following material in the quantity indicated below:

Ea terial l'yn0 Ur4nium - 93% Enriched in U-235 Form TRIGA Neutron Detcctoz:s Qu<J.ntity 5.7 gr:irr:s of U containing 5. 3,,rr:ims of U-235 We will use the special nuclear material listed above for the followir..g purpose:

_l Thefle 3 TRI'.iA neutron detectors shall be used in :CORR-2 (TRIG,\\ '.:-. rk-III) at KA En I.

We certif y that all the facts contained in this statement are true and correct to the best of our knowlcdee and belief and we do not know of any additional facts that are inconsiBtent with the above statement.

~~'f0~e__*

By CHANG h<~

of Dat e_---'1_

1b.~y'---'-1~2~,-:..1,97~7-'--

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY PO BOX 81608 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92138 (7 14) ~55-3000

'1917 JUL 26 f-l;\\ R 513 July 19, 1977 Dr. Michael A. Guhin, Assistant Director Exrort/ Import anrl I nternati ona 1 Safeguards Office of International Programs U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Application for Export; Korea

Dear Dr. Guhin:

In Reply Refer To:

IEL-834

.Enclosed is General Atomic Company's application for export of special nuclear material to the Atomic.Energy Research Institute, Seoul, Korea.

This application made under 10CFR70 requests the export of 13 TRIGA Flip Fuel Elements, t\\'10 (2) Instrumented Flip Fuel Elements, two (2) Flip Fueled-Follower Control Rods, and three (3) Fission Chambers.

The fuel e iements and fuel-follower control rods contain a Uranium-Zirconium-Hydride Alloy in which the uranium is enriched in U-235 to 70%.

The Fission Chambers contain small amounts* of uranium enriched to 93% in U-235.

The components listed ahove will be used in the Institute 1 s research programs.

Also enclosed are originally-signed letters representing the consignee's End-Use Statements concerning the above materials.

General Atomic Company, whose main office.is located at 10955 John Jay Hopkins Drive, San Diego, California, is the firm exporting the material.

The material packaging will be accomplished at the main office location.

The shipment of the fuel elements and the fuel-follower control rods will be in accordance with the provisions of NRC Certificate of Compliance #9034 and

• #9037, respectively, with their corresponding Certificates of Competent Authority, as well as applicable regulations concerning such overseas shipment.

The Fission Chambers will be rackaged in DOT Spec 7A or equivalent packaging suitable for an overseas shipr1ent.

We anticipate shipment of the described materials upon re~eipt of the required licenses and other appropriate documentation.

The initial sh'irment is expected to be made no later than l December 1977.

We reqL1est issuance of the material export license at your earliest convenience and further request that the license have a validity period of one year.

\\,/l<f~: ts EnclosurP.s:

Form ~lRC-7**, '

End-Use Statements Very truly yours, 1 1, /

,,n _;; J

{. {_ /* Li_ (.,'. * ~,. I

• C /) / L't...,.'7 l< I William R. Mowry

_//

Licensing Admini strator nuclear f1ateri als Control Di vis ion

I'- AEC*7 (2-67) 10 CFR 30, -40 U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIOI~

Washington, D. C.

20545 P'orm ~proved Budget Bureau Ho, 3S-R0007, APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO EXPORT BYPRODUCT, SOURCE, OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL XS lfl/7!-l :u,'1 __

7d' ;)7/:;

5

• f / f' Submit in Trip l icate 1t 1<1...5 Caref ully Read Ins/ruction s on Back 71*.J 7/.

DATE O J: APPLICAT I ON 9/30/77 APPLICANT'S REFERENCE NO. 13. COUNTRY OF U LTIMATE DES TI NATION (if any !

IEL-84 7 Korea NAME OF APPLICANT GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY ATTN:

William R. Mowry 5 *-ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE IN FORE IGN COUNTRY (i-. ame and address)

STREET ADDRESS p.o. Box 81608 KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE P.O. Box 7, Cheong Ryang c1TY, STATE, A"'o ZIP cooE San Diego, CA 92138 Seoul, Republic of Korea f

i. INTERMl::DIATE CO N SI GNEE ni J:OREIGN COUNTRY (C:i,-e n,:,n('

and a,j.Jr,.ss. I/ saric as ult,matt' n,,.,s 111n r c. s tat,* "'Same. ")

7 IF PURCHASER IN FOREIGN COUNTRY IS OTHER THAN ULT IMATE CONS I GNe:E. GI VE NAME AND ADDRESS.

Same (a) OU ANTITY " O BE SHIPPED

( 5,.,. instructions o n bade) 10,9 kg U-235 in 15.6 kg Uranium

/If same, state "Same:")

Same (b ) COMMODITY DESCRIPTION (ln.clu...le chemical,md physical /orrr-; /or sp,-cial n,,cl ear mat,..,.,al and b, p,oduct material also specify isotopic concern; 1/ in a dev ice,,denJ i/y the device,,..anu/ actl.4',..,,

and model ntr.r.b£"T. )

70 Model 110 TRIGA FLIP Fuel Elements 5

210 instrumeHtal FLIP fuel elements

• 5 310 fueled follower control rods Each element contains up to 196 gm Uranium enriched to 70% in TTre>..,i11m

?1c;

- - ~+--1-,.;~

TT T"'r?r T I "-+---'

C

.... -- --.I (c) SHl?Pl~G,lNQ PACKING P ~ OC E OU? 'ES ( Required /or special nuclear mate-rial. See instructions on baclt..)

The elements will be packaged by GAC at its main office location in NRC approved shipping containers CDC 9034 & 9037.

Multiple shipments are anticipated under the 9. ENO U~'E OF C O MMODIT I ES COV'ERED ey THI~ APPLICAT I ON Describe /1,l/ y, s tat ing tLliat wt/I be prod1'ced o r ma,rufactured, what s,..,.*,c,

us/I b<' r,:r,drred.,,, the nnt,_,,,. of !he re search that will be pnf,,rmed. ) (See,,,structiu ns on back fo, spec 1aJ nuclem matf"f'tal.)

These 70 FLIP fuel elements (Cat. No, llb), 5 instrumeted FLIP f11el elements (Cat. no. 210) and 5 FLIP fueled follower control rods (Cat. No. 310) s hall be used in KORR-2 (TRIGA Hark-Ill) at KAERI.

• o The applicant, and any offi c ial execurin g rhis cert i fi c ate o n behalf o f the appli c ant nam':d in lrrm,j. C<'rt i fy chat th i s applicat i,..

is rrr1 ared in conformity with T i_cle JO, Co'.te of f'ed('ral Re,.:ulation s, Parts rn and,(, ( d for 1-,ypro <l u_c c material) o_, Part _40 1, 1,

for ~.,11rce material),_or Part 70 ( d for ~r.c<;1al nuclear -f!l_,ucr1al), an d Part 71 Uor trnn:oport of r;\\.J1oac r1vc mat('r,al, ti arplicahle

• and 1ha1 all 1n formac1on c on tained herein, including any s ur,pl:-emen1s atta ched hereto, IS true and correct to the best o_ their knowle d ge and belief.

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.Li cens ing Administra t or (Ti t le of c ertif>1ng o/j1nal "1,t /xm zed to act on ° ch,il/ of the applicant!

APPENDIX C Stat. 749 ; mok('s it o criminal oflens f' to moke a willfully false stat,

KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE P. 0. BOX 7, CHEONG RYANG 4/

KAEA! 2341 S KAERI SEOUL, KOREA TELEPHONE:

96- 0 I 8 I r!r.

'illi ~m IiO\\rry L*rn *'.,:,,r, Li -~0n3in:; \\Jr,inj~;tr*t tion r.,.,n : r"1 l \\ t or'.1ic C,,mp'1.ny l'.. ~. I',ox :-11 r.1.~e.

~;;rn 1li*~,~:o,...:*tlifon1i*t 921 jG Do*.'..r t:r. roury:

• ,:l-. 1-*0qu0st th1.t tl!i:J.:;t1.tc1::cnt be considc!' d n. 1n1*t o:* ~::,.;.1.ppli~'ltion f i 18 l b*,r 0:,r,,*:r.'.ll \\ tonic ~or.11nny for i t:J lic 11n:;c to cxpor ',:pcci '. l :1uc1°,ir r.-.'1: -~i *~l.

• ,:,;,ie:;i.:*.1 tc :ccoiv,: t h1 : follo*:in:; r..3.t:::ri1.ls in : he ":li'!.. *,;,.1t_~, in ' i::::1t,: '

Le LL* :

u-::;:r::dT in GO l]I~\\ fuel clc~ents L

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con b.ir. i,:;

of U-2Y 1:".1.:, *:

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• It' fti-:l ;l C!'Y:n t~ (; L._I;o. 11 0), ':i in:;trimo L ;."Lir ;';1~1 r; _> * *nt '.~

( *:,.:. r:0. :10) u'.d. 5 /LIF f *.181,~cl :'ollo*.::~:-- conti* ~.t rods (>.t. :~o. j10)

,. 1:* ll tY~ G:::,,t in I:01~::-? (i':lIC:\\ ihrk-III),t lCc :.~I.

~:rtil'y l:ho.t.<1.ll t 110 f,ct: --. *~ont.'lin.,J in ~hi; ~~1'.;r.:mcr:f; *\\:*o trc *.,nJ.

corr -- ct l; o ~ho hr.:, t; of onr kno !leJ1_;e *:ind 1rlicf, ~,ntl 1;*0 i ;-) not ~:no*.-: of my

1J 1;tion,l '.'1.cl;~; tin!; 1.re incon:;ictcnt,-:~th L11C,hove st,l.cmcnt.

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• nn OCT 3

: '1 n *:-.. ~;~: r o C lt0~1c tor CJTJ t:2.*1. t io:1 ji vi '.j i *.1n

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY PO BOX 81608 SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA 92138 (714) 45>3000 nn OCT 3 Fi,1 I 2~-

Dr. Michael A. Guhin, Assistant Director Export/Import and International Safeguards Office of International Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 t

In Reply Refer To:

IE

Subject:

Application for Special Nuclear Materi~l Export License; Korea Ref:

Sr!r-1 Export License application (IEL-834), dated 7/19/77, for v, h i c h XS W *1-1 l 7 3 i s be i n g i s s u e d.

Dear Dr. Guhin:

Enclosed is General Atomic Company's (GAC) application for export of Special nuclear Material to the Atomic Energy Research Institute, Seoul, r:orea.

This application made under 10CFR70 requests the export of sn TRIGA FLIP Fuel elements containing approximately 10.9 kg U-235, in uraniuri enriched to 70;L Also enclosed is an originally signed letter representing the consignees End Use Statement covering the n1aterials in this arp1ication.

The materials in this application are in addition to the seventeen FLIP elements and three fission* chambers covered under an earlier appli-cation made July 19, 1977, which is still pending with the Cor1mission.

The fuel in this application, together with that previously (Ref a.)

applied for, will make possible the replacement of an entire damaged core, which is of very questionable integrity.

Core rnplacement is required because earlier this year, the quality of

\\'Juter in the K/\\ERI TRIGA Mark III reactor tank deteriorated drastically.

As a res u lt, a l l ex i s t i n g f u e-1.. itl the re a c tor s u st a i n e d very ex ten s i v e

• corrosion damage.

The stainless ste_el cladding on three elements corroded completely through, allowing the elements to break into separate pi~ces, releasing fission products into the reactor building.

The reactor was shut down and has been out of service since March.

Messrs. Louis Nosenzo of the State Deoartment and J.D. Lafleur of NRC have been fully informed on t he problem.

In considering the requirement for replacing the core with new FLIP fuel, please note the following:

1.

The fU\\ERI TRIGA Mark III, a 2000 KH steady state/2,000,000 K~*J pulsing reactor, was started up in April 1972.

Although the initial core was composed of 20% U-235 enriched 11 standard" ur-aniu1i1 fuel, all subs*e*quent replacements for this reactor have 70% enriched FLIP fuel.

GAC recommends the use of FLIP fuels for all TRIGAs of similarly high power and high duty cycle, because the short reactivity life of a 11 standard 11 fueled core would require frequent refueling, resulting in extremely high fuel cycle costs and a very much larger tommittment to irra-diated fuel storage.

Technical advantages, in addition to allowing a higher U-235 content such that core life is extended to 7 or 8 times that of a standard car~, are given in Attach-ment 1.

Further, several small routine orders (less than 20 elements) of FLIP replacement fu2l have been filled for V.AE~I.

2.

In addition to the core fuel replacement, extensive repairs to the facilities* heat exchanger are underway.

GAC and Ar g o n n e r

~ a t i o n a l L a b ( All L ) a re c o n t i nu i n g to c o u n s e 1 Ki\\ E R I i n their efforts to overcome this problem, inclurling the improved control of water quality to insure against a recurrence.

General Atomic Company, whose main office is located at 10955 John Jay Hopkin'.; Drive, San Diego, California, is the firm exporting the material.

The material will be packaged at the main office location.

The fuels being exported under the subject.and Ref. (a) export licens~s, are anti-cipated to be shipped in multiple shipments, each shipr.ient less than 5.0 kg, and successive shipments 1*1ill not be riade until th2 arrival of its predece'": <

is confirmed.

The ship1:1ent of the fuel el'=ments and fueled follov;er control rods

\\*1ill bt= in accordance with the provisions of NRC Certificate of Compliance 9034 and 9037 respectively, and their corresponding Certificates of Competent Authority, as well as applicable regulations for such overseas shipments.

In our previous Application, (Ref. a) we indicated our desire to make the initial shipment no later th.an __ Qecember l, 1977.

The fabrication of the materials covered by this new application will be completed hy early December, with shipments to commence med-December 1977, if possible We request issuance of an export license which allows multiple shipment

of the subject fuels at your earliest convenience, and further request that the license have a validity period of one year.

~-JRM: sh Attachment

Enclosures:

Form tlRC End Use Statement Very truly yours, I

• 1 /

/

/) / J; J l_( / <.. --l t t<.-<'""', ( // / L '-( <. '-t: 'j William R. Mowry Licensin9 Administrator rluclear Materials Control Division

GlNUlf,L ATOMIC COMPMY P.O. U:JX Oli:-DB SAN Dil'GO. CALIFOfl~II\\ 92133 (714) 455,-3000

\\

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I

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TIUGA-FLIP--A Long Lifetime Fuel Using a Low Ene*rr;y *Resonance Burnable Poison

._, I With the requirement for high fluxes combined with a high duty factor, it _bec.:ime important economic.:1.lly and from the point of view of operatjng efficiency to develop a fu8l cnpable of a long operating lifetime.

The FLIP* fuel is 8. 5 wt-~~ uranium homogenously mixed with ZrH h as is the standard TRlGA fuel.

However, the uranium in the,-FLIP fuel* is e:nrichcd to 70% U-235 as compared witl1 the 20Z enrichment for stn~dard fuel.

To offset this increase in reaitivity associated with the increased U-235 content, a burn.:1blc poison, erbium, is homogeneously dispe>rsed in the fuel.

The com bi nation of the large U-23 5 loading and l he bu rn.:ible poison allows a hig,h uranium burnup.

The prompt negative temperature coefficient for the TRIGA-FLIP fuel is b~sed on the same core spectrum hardening characteristic that occuts in a standard TRIGA core.

However, rather than possessing a tcmperat l!rc-depcndcnt disadvantage factor (which is ti1e main temperature coefficient co~ponent in a standard TRIGA core), the FLIP fuel uses the temperature hardened spectrum to decrease reactivity through its interaction with the low energy erbium resonances at

0. 5 eV.

(See Figure on reverse side.)

The erbium is used as both a burnable poison and as a material to enhance the prompt negative temperature coefficient.

This is the first desi~n and large scale test of a reactor system depende11t almost entirely on a ther~al spectrum shift into a low-lying resonance for inherent saf~ty nnd control.

The resulting tc ~erature coefficient increases strongly with temperature, and averages out to be compar.:1ble with the more constan*t standard TRIGA fuel value of

-1 x lo-4; 0 c.

For pulsing operation, the shorter neutron*lifetime resulting from the heavier fuel loading gives a higher peak power and a shortened pulse width compart,:

with a stanclnr<l TH.IGA core for the Si1mc rec1ctivily insertion.

TRlGA-FLlP furl is designed to &ive a core life of 7 or 8 HH years.

• Fuel Lifetime Improvement Program

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ATTACHMENT D

ij Punuan! to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,os amended, and the the licensee, a license is hereby issued to the lir.ensee author- ~,j =:~.

9 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the regulations of the izing the export of the materials and/ or production or utilization g,!' HL--:!

~

Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued punuant thereto, and in facilities listed below, subject to the terms and conditions herein. lg ~~*;*-*

~

reliance on statements and representations heretofore mode by 15,., * ~

---

'---,---------------------------------------------1~' ) I,'.-'

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,1 l!CENSEE ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE IN FO~flGN COUNTRY 1il:l. I.-

~

NAME General Atomic Company NAME' Korea Atomic Energy Research i:~Rt'*J i

P.O. Box 81608 Institute l~;ft}~*

=l Aoom'sSan Diego, CA 92138 ADoRmP.O. Box 7, Cheong Ryang I,.,~

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Attn:

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R. Mov1ry Seou 1, Republic of. Korea g'; ;fr*~

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INTERMEOi,>.TE CONSIGNEE IN FORE IGN COUNHY OTHER PARTIES TO EXPORT

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ii A:~~::*1:*.: REF ;E:c~iPTl!::~~,:~iiALS oR FAciums couNTRY oF ULTIMATE DEsT1NATION Korea

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.\\ 2.30 kilograms Uranium-235 Contained in 3.280 kilograms uranium, as fuel ie'; t-~1 elements and control rods, enriched to 70 w/o

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1 maxi mum.

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~ 5.30 grcrms Uranium-235 Contained in 5.60 grams uranium, as fission jti li/i'.j

~

chambers,. enriched to 93 w/o maximum.

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ii Conditicns 3, 4, 5, 6, ari'd 8 on page tv,o of this license apply to this export.

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l Neither )h is license nor any right under this license shall be assign-fH!S LICENSE IS INVALID UNLE SS 51Gt,EO 8ElOW

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~! ed or otherwise transferred in violation of the provisions of the SY AUTHORIZED NRC REPQESENfA! IVE

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JAtom icEnergyActofl954,momendedondtheEnergyReorgan-Michael A. Guhin, Assistan~ Oirector *~~ t ~

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it izolicn A.ct of l 97 4.

Export/Import and In tern at 1 ona 1

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i'l 108 of the Atom ic Energy Act cf 1954, OS amended and to all of the 1 ce O Intern at 1 on a ro grams I~ :if.\\ ~

Ji other provis ions of so id Acts, now o r herea fte r in effect and to all L':! : :- ! ~

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I DATE OF ISSU ANCE _________________ §Pl:

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ru es on regu a1,ons o tne uc1eo r egu otory Commission.

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOR ** COMMISSION EXPORT LICENSE Conditions Page 2 of 2 Pages 5 5 License Number XSNM-1173 Condition 1 -

Licensee shall file with the Customs Officer or the Postmaster two copies, in addi-tion to those otherwise required, of the Shipper's Export Declaration covering each export and mark one of such copies for transmittal to the U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. The following declaration should ac-company or be placed on the Shipper's Export Declarations for such exports:

" This shipment is being made pursuant to specific license number (specific license number) filed at (location of Customs office where license is filed),

on (dote license was filed). This license expires on (expiration date of license), and the unshipped balance remaining on this license is sufficient to cover the shipment described on this declarction."

Co.1dition 2 -

Exports authori2.ed in any country or destination, except C:-oun.try Groups Q, S, V-1, X, Y, and Z in Port 370, Supplement.No. 1, of the Compr~hensive Export Schedule of the U.S. Deportment of Commerce.

Condition 3 -

This license covers only the nuclepr content of the material.

Condition 4 -

The material to be exported under this license shall be shipped in cccordance with the physical protection requirements for special nuclear material in 10 CFR 73.

Condition 5 -

Special nuclear material authorized for export under. thi? _license shall not be transported outside the United States in passenger-carrying aircraft in shipments exceeding ( l) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium 233, or (2) 350 grams of uranium 235.

Condition 6-This license authorizes export only and_ does not authorize the receipt, physical possession, or use of the nuclear material.

, ; Condition 7 -The licensee shall complete and submit on NRC *Form 741 for each shipment of

_ source moteri9 exported under this -license.

Condition 8 -

The licensee shall advise the NRC in the event there is any change in the designa-tion of the tompany who will package the nuclear material to be exported under this license, or any change in the location of the packaging operation, at least three weeks prior to the scheduled dote of export.

Condition 9 - Shipments by air of 5 kgs or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enri~hed to 20% or more in the U-235 isotope) shall be scheduled with no plann-ed intermediate stops after leaving the last terminal in the United States.

In the event such a schedule is not possible, the licensee shall submit an alternative for the consideration and approval of the NRC prior to shipment to the Director, Office of Internationa1 Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ~Jashington, D.C., 20555.

fOit..... "d',

i\\(' JI 11-'11 U.S. :-.ucu:,\\I{ l{t_(;ULATOI( I lOi\\li\\llSSION EXPORT LICE.;'\\SE Conuitio11:-.

Pog* 2 of 2 Poge, 57 License Number XSNM-1207 Condition 1 -

Licensee shall file with the Customs Officer or the Postmaster two copies, in addi-tion to those otherwise required, of the Shipper's Export Declaration covering each export and mark one of such copies for transmittal to the U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. The following declaration should ac-company or be placed on the Shipper's Export Declarations for such exports:

-.:-:---*... *~,

" This shipment is being mode pursuant to specific license number (specific license number) filed at (location of Customs office where license is filed),

on (date license was filed). This license expires on (expiration date of license), and the unshipped balance remaining on this license is sufficient to cover the shipment described on this declaration...

Condition 2 -

Exports authorized in any country or destination, except:Country Groups 0, S, W, X, Y, and Zin Port 370, Supplement No. 1, of the Comp.rehens,ve Export Schedule of the U.S. Deportment of Commerce.

Condition 3 -

This license covers only the nuclear content of the material.

Condition 4 -

The material to be exported under this license shall be shipped in accordance with the physical protection requirements for special nuclear material in l O CFR 73.

I Condition 5 -

Special nucl_eor material authorized for export under this license shall not bE:

transported outside the United States 1n passenger carry ing aircraft in sh,prnents exceeding ( 1) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium

- - 233, or (2) 350 grams of uranium 235.

Condition 6-This license authorizes export only and does not authorize the rece*pt, phys,col po sses si on, or use of the nuclear material.

Condition 7 -

The li<.ensee shall complete and submit an NRC Form 7 41 for eCJc.h sh1µment of source material exported under this license._

Condition 8 -

The licensee shall advise the NRC in the event there is any cho n'j e in the d,:: si9no-tion of the company who will package the nuclear material to be exported under this license, or any change in the location of the packaging operation, at least three weeks prior to the scheduled dote of export.

Condition 9 - Shipments by air of 5 kgs or mar~ of uranium-~35 (contained ir uranium enriched to 20% or-more in the U-235 isotope) s~all be scheduled with no planned intermediate stops after leaving the last terminal in the United States.

In the event such a schedule is not possible, the licensee shall submit an alt~rnative for ~~e consideration and approval of the NRC pr ior to shipment to the Director, Office of International Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1.Jashington, D.C.

20555.

ATTACHMENT E

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- :- ---7, 7_2 0 2 0 1

/.,, i IJ

. **'*,,. \\...

March 23, 1978 ME~1ORANDUM FOR LEE V. GOSS ICK NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO~

I '. ; '.,: :~, ; I I

1:.i

.,! I.L ~r(;:J3

Subject:

Comments to NRC on Nuclear Export License Application Your letter of August 1, 1977 requested the views of the Executive Branch on the issuance of a proposed licens for the export to the Republic of Korea nf 2.30 kilograms of U-235 contained in 3.280. kilograms of ~ranium enriched to 70 percent U-235 in the form of fabricated fuel elemen On the basis of the fa~tors covered by the attached analysis, the Executive Branch has concluded that issuanc, of the proposed license would not be inimical to the in-terests of the United States including the common defense and security and that the United States Government has th1 assurance that the recipient country is committed to pro-viding adequate physical security for its riuclear program including a level of protection compatible \\vith that en-visaged by IAEA INFCIRC/225.

The supply of this highly e1 riched uranium will be subject to all of the terms and co1 di t ions of the Agreement for ~operation between the Uni tE States 0.11d the Republic of Kc

,a.

/

p~:bT~j}

Executive Secretary Attachments:

l.

License Application Analysis

2.

Letter from the Atomic Energy Bureau of tho Republic of Korea dated September 2, 1977

ATTACHMENT F

. ** r 0

AGE 01 l I MIT1~0 *oi-1* 1 c*1'P,L *H ~E,_

1.Jr?JJ(n*t n ient <~/*:Stale INCOMING TELEGRAM 61 SEOUL 05430 23094~1 Acr:01; OES-07 IHFO OC T-~!

[ A-10 l'.;O-DJ ACOA-12 CIIE-~D 111~-10 10-13 L -eJ IISi;E-CJ 11,C-05 EB-08 ~

SOE-CZ OCOE-C*G DGf-15 SS-15

~P -il2 CEO-ill P:1- ~, Ill* w

---

----027352 23095lZ /10,

P ~ 2)0,111 JUll H FH Atl[MO,;SsY $E0Ul lJ SEC~!A ;E WAS~CG PRIORITY 1157 DOE \\;;',~~nc rn I c~ IT y 00( GER l1i.llf 0'AN FHIQ 0 1 I '/

IHFO ANEna,::;v TOKY0 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEOUL 5130 DEPT FOR OES/IIET /R I~. 0. H. 'COOPER DOE fO, R. \\/ILL IT E.O. 1!652: ti/A TAG~ : TECH Et/RG K, SUBJ:- ~:AOI VIE,*; ' *ti OEMOtlSTRATIO:J Of 2J PERCENT ENRICHED TRIGA fU(L

~EF:

STA TE 151719

1. V.0° '~ HCt!IC [ ! :*.*GY RESEPRCH i 'l '.: TITUTE 11\\AERI! ?RE'.:10£!1T H'flJII, hlU ::G -HO 1:_ 11:'ERE:TED 1:; c,r:c:: ~:R aTICN OF ?R f0nt!,::C E

,1;a EC0:10:1 1c Asr'tCT5 OF IIC:1/L'I GE\\/~LGPEO 2C PERCEtli El1l,ICHEO Flit

. ".E ilTS 1:; f~R TH ERAIIC[*- AS C, :111Pl iFYIIIG RESE J,.?GII

, c['. I IIG -:ltlEI:: ArlU 1,e;:1-P,cLIHF.~ TIOtl GO,Li.

l. Vi ~- ::!JII TE,;r: *. cO:AL TO REFHL

' ' RA.

11 GENERAL AT011IC Sl':OcESliCil TflM ';,, TO EIGHT lie\\;, J p,q~rnT El:RICHED ELE HEllTS bE SUBSTllUTtO FO i< A LIKE *W~6ER OF rl'E iilt:ETY-SE 1!EII 70 PER-Cftli OIRICHEO '.LUIE':I S JlLRUOY 011 O,~E"., HYUII IS ?RE?I.RED TO rll.C, t liE '.I C,:O[, iOR i<N AODITI0:1..L SIX 1,E\\1-T YPE 2a ?(RCEllf

[IIPICi!EO £LE"EIIT: I, GEtlE RAL ATOHI: IS PF.E?AREO TO SUPPL " INSIRUME ~liTICII TO COLLE CT IIECES5ARY PERFORMANCE OAT A.

3. sc :~ 1 1 SUGGESll '1il THA T C[MOiiSTRATIOII IRRAOl~TIOII OF AS I

• I AS Tlicl,', AilD ITICti~L IIE\\/ 2il PERCEIIT EIIRICHEO

£lEl'.Elll, lfOTAl Oi IS llEII lYPE io PERCEIIT ELEHE:i, ; Ill THE CORE) 6819

~OULO ~* EATLY IMPaC ': E STATISTICAL RELIABILITY OF OEMOllSTRATIOtl \\/AS AEGARO( D AS All UN~[ RTA~IHG er JOINT RESE ARCH PRDG~AM PROPOR!IOIIS 1/HICH 1/0UL O IN'!OlVE TIM[ FOR tlEGOTIATIONS C011 CE~l,IN1, COST-SHJ*RIIIG AIIO PROGR AM PLAIINIIIG.

THEY ARE w:L;i111, TO 01 :~uss THIS KIUD er PROGRAM BUT FEEL THE I R INTERESiS AH 8EST SERVtO 110\\1 IF THE !RIGA MARK Ill CA~ FE REF UELE D fcC OPERATICII AS 50011 AS POSSIBLE.

4.

TH, KAERI HA,, 111 iRIGA CORE PLME HAS l21 HOLES IIHICt ARE UTILl.d' ~S FOLLO\\IS: FUEl ELEMEIITS, l l l HOLES; 1011 c, ;MBERS, l,, LES; CEIITRAL THIMBLE, 1 HOL E; IRRAOIAT IOII FACIL 1:Y, I HOLE ; '11£UMATIC IRRAO!ATIOil fACIL ITY, l HOl Pt:EUtiATIC,O*l! ROL ROD ltlOr, REPE~T tlOT A FUEL f clLO~ER CCI, ~,,L RODI,

! HOLE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT TH: REACTOR * :,.~~LL i OPERATES,I TH 4 FUEL-FOLLO\\JER CCtiTRC.,COS Ill liet (.QRE, ALL Of ~~ICH OCCUPY FUEL El EMElll ~OL ES.

>. MAE"

• S RECE NT 7C PE RCENT,~R I CHED FUEL ELE ME~T OROtR;; 1k*: l UDE :, :, *:: cfOER: 10 FUEL ELE~E -HS IFEJ

~NO~ FUEL FOLLCWER co~*RCL RCOS f FCR I. SECOND CROER:

1> f[ "-~ 1 FFC<. f~IRO Cr.DER : 75 Fe a 110 5 Ff'CR.

6Ec,u :c Rf/.CTOR

• Lt OP[R~l[ ',/ I TH ClllY l rrc;;;, l'i CORE SEOUL 05430 23D94SZ AIIO ALL 190 FE Ill CORE, A TOUL CF IOl FUEL ELUl(IIT HOLES ARE FILLED. THIS LEAVl~ 10 CO~E PLATE HOLES oruL EIGHT FFCR ' S WOvlO NOT 6( 1:: iHE C~RE.

6. THE IIEU*IYPE 20 PERCE ii ! EIIRICHED ELE "EN TS WOULD OCCUPY SIX OF THE JEii 1114 IIIIIU'.i 1C:l UllOCGUPIED FUEL ELHIENT HOLES. 11~£RI FEELS TIIERE IS A l l MI TEO ECOIIOMIC RISK (Cosr a, RAOIO ACTIVIT '( '.:cEAr:UP FOLLO\\l lllG FUEL CLAD RUPTURE}

fllVOLVEO Ill orno:1~1-A!IIIG PERFGRl!AIICE OF THE tlt:11-TYPE 20 PERf.fllf E!IRIGi' ED ruu, Pi<RTICULAHLY fOR PULSED OPERATION AIID 1/0UlO AP PRE.CIA7E RECEIVIIIG APPROPRIA'c DATA.

7. KAERI HOPES TO RECEIVE All ORDERED FUEL ASAP.

STERtl U.S. NRC Declassification Revie,:J t------~"\\~..:oto7_ct iSIREVleW-DATE*

35cd

~

0

f (/il I DETEf~MINATION

[CIRCLE NUMRERI

! 1 C.,'\\SSIFICATION RETAINED

,,. -

• c :c,t. l !O Cf <ANGf:0 TO:_

01,),'1F.C r.1 6-SSIFIED IN' j-,_ L-001-<.JINl\\fE WITH __ _ _ _

~-,)ECU\\SSIFIED

6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED

7. OTHER (SPECIFY): la.L,,

'. J A PO~* Nof\\Sf ~r~*N.t1u1t _

r-1:-= 1 m r r t u 81* ~ I L: I P. L 8 S-f-D e1; art nz~nt of' State OUTGOING TELEGRAM

~GE ill ST AT£ 151719 ORIGIII O( S

• 07 11/FO OC: -Ot (A*t O ISO*OO ACOA*12 Cl~E-00 I IIR - I 0 IO* I l L *03 US.1E ~ a:-

IISC *0'>

EE-03 IIRC-05

~OE - 02 OOC1

• 00 DOE* t 5 SS

• I 5

$?*il2 C[O*Ot PM-05

)RAFTED BY OESillET/EIC: 0 B HOYLE:'.iMJ

,PPROVC 8Y OfSll,[i/E IC: D B liOYLE

\\COA:

F; \\lllllAl15C il

)Ot/lA: S CEJA

'A/~ : r ~I SCH

/It\\ R

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0657SI l507J0Z /21 I I 5 0009! JUN 7 S

.H SEC'.iT AI E \\IASHOC 0 AnEM6ASSY S(OUL tr.lTED OFFICIAL USE STATE \\517\\9

. 0. l 1652: II/A AGS:

TECH, EURG, KS

,JBJ tCT: FUEL FC~ KORR-2 RESEARCH REACTOR

F:

,HTE 88681 011 MAY 9 EX[CUT !VE ERArt CH Hco::I1u1GED TO tiRC THAT TIIO

'.PCRT L I ". [I, '.: ES :( ISSUtD FOR TOi*L 0, 107 TRl,A fl IP*TIPE

~riE !lT~ Oi~iCiiED re 7tl U-225 OR U:iE l !I KORI\\-~ REACTOR.

I

• CT I0:I HA'.; 8<1!, T,KE!I 011 TH I, RECCM~c/lOATIOII BY tlRC iO

,ft.

lh LATE M~Y.

CT '."I(1:IIA Mftffl:i; OF 1AtA ADVISORY Gqoup RES[ i, QCH R( AC !CR R Ul[\\IAL AIIJ IJPGR ilD I IIG PROGRAM, GEliERAL OMIC ISSUED ST~l(~OIT THAT IT HAO OEVEL OPEO A:-ID \\/.A'i

[PAR*_c TC "~kE,~*,ro rATELY AVAIL.:.8LE 'JRAIIIUM ZIRCC:IIUM DRIOf I ~l [l;R I C'iEC TO 20 U*:35.*S S!J BSTITUTE FOR !RIGA

[L PRES[:.fly [IIRlt. HEC re EITHER )C OR 93 U-235.

THIS Al;GE 1$ fCSSleLE B'I IIICREAS lllG TH£ UR~NIUM CCIITEUT OF

H F'.'EL fRC~ 1~, PREVI OU S 12 oEIGHT PERCENT 70 EITHER CR 45 \\/EIGH T Pf~crnr.

THE l C'.1EP Eli?ICHEO FUEL SHOUL D i[ ESSc!ITIALLl Tht SA~E COST MIO ff*fOP.MAIIC( A:i PRES:f!T OIRICHED FULL.

GErlER.;L ATOH,C -; OEV[lOPM[ rll OF THIS FUEL ~-s IN

Pnn sE TO USG FS r :R~M ro REDUCE UTILl!ilTIO~ OF HIGHLY

rCH [O URAttlUM AS RAPIDL Y ~s ?CSS*SLE TO LO\\IEST FEASIBLE "El. ~110 \\iOR~ \\IA$ PARTIALLY FUIID[O Bl DOE UIIOER PROGRAM CRISEO IN REFTEL.

AS CHAIRMAII OF liORKIIIG GROUP 8, GROUP C, OF II:,cE Ori,ESBRCH RE~CTOR$, II( en IEVE THAT EA ""OULO HAVE A,ff-lAL I11TEREST 111 THIS 0£1/ELOPNEriT.

GENERAL ATOMIC Ulll BE COUTIIIUING JESTS Of THE IIEM LC\\I ICMEO FUEL Ill :EvER.*L I;;RAOl;HIOll f~CIL I TIES, 9UT \\IE IEV( !HA! FliRl".ER t-'i<l"I DEMOll:TRAT I CII \\IOULD BE HIGHLY IRABLE.

\\/( HAVE l llFORtlALL 1 0I,CU,~EO \\II TH GEIIERAL 1IC THE POSS IBILITY Cr ITS PROVIO lliG SOME Of THESE Ii£\\/

EtlRICHEC ElE MEIITS ltl LI EU :, THE ;cr ELEHENIS COVERED IHE PPESEIIT E~P ORT LICENSE, i'PL ICAT!ONS.

GEIIERAL ATOMIC I EVES THAT, \\IITH KA(RI AGR EE~OH, IT COULD SU BS TITUT E

, ITTLE OR llO AOOITIOIIAL CC'.iT, ~OME SIX TO EI GHT Or TH E TYPE 20 EIIR ICoED EtEMEIHS r f. !J ENRICH[O El(11£flTS 1I0,0 FOR IN !HE CUilREHT COIIIR*CT.

IF IT ~ERE TO DO SO, RAL ATOMIC Ef'.IEVE$ lnA T Ollt OR TIIO OF THE,E ELEMEIHS ILO er ltlST RU~E llltD ro CBT Alli r.:xI~*JM DATA FROM THE TEST.

1R:[P. iO IMPPO !E STAT rsr:c,:L NEL l -o i l l fY, OOE 6ElIE VES IT 1/0ULO SE PHftR~BLE TO lrlCRU SE THE ll 'J~SER OF 20 ErlTS Ill XOP.R-2 ro Al l[A'.iT f,1EI VE

'?'RHAPS l10REI MIO IS A* ' ~ TO EXPL OR E /;(Ar,s BY \\IHICH !Hh[ ~oop.rQtlAL 8419 STATE 1517!9 ELEMEIITS MIGHT SE MADE. AVAILABLE Al C0I1PARABLE COST TO KOREA.

\\IE \\IOULD, CF COIJRSE, \\1I,H TO SEE All OF THESE 20 ELEMENTS IIISERTEO 111 THE REACTOR AT TH E (~RL I EST FEASIBLE DATE.

5.

SEFORE FURTHER (FFCRTS AR E EXPENDED TO DEVELOP SUCH A DENOIISTRATIOII OF 20 EIIRICHEO !RIGA FUEL, l!E \\iOULO L IKE EMBASSY TO SOUIID our KOREANS TO DETERHI IIE MH~THEP THEY ARE PREPAREO TO COOPEilATE 111 PRINCIPLE, :TRESSIIIG i~i'JRTA:H CONTRIBUTIOIIS 1/HICH COL-LADORATIOtl EE!\\/[EU OUR T\\/0 COUIITRIES COULO MAIIE TO\\/ARO ltlFCE.

IF SC, Ii[ CJ~LD THO!

PROCEED TO \\/ORK our COrlTRACIUAL, TECHrllCAL ANO [CCUOM\\C DETAILS.

REQUEST TIIAT KAERI BE APPROACl!EO Otl THIS NF,TT(R ANO ITSREACTIOII REPORTED SOOIIEST.

YOU MAY ASSURE KAERI COi/TACTS THAT THEIR *GREEMEHT TO PARTI CIPATE 11 iUCH A O(MOll~TRATIOII SHOULD IN 110 \\/AV SLOU OOUII DELIVERY OF 10 FUEL IIEEOED FOR OPERATION OF MOilR-2 AUD CO~LD, IN FACT, HAVE A FAVORABLE ltlP.C.CT 011 II~ corISIDE,ATICII OF lhE POIOltlG EXPORT l lCEIISE APPL ICA TIOUS.

CHRISTO?rl(R 1 IMITr-n ni:-r:-1r1~1 II<" i 62