ML25260A558
| ML25260A558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/02/1978 |
| From: | James Shea NRC/OIP |
| To: | Commissioners NRC/OCM |
| References | |
| SECY-78-71 | |
| Download: ML25260A558 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED ST A TES
- ucLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO~
February 2, 1978 WASHffllBENllAt.!a SECY-78-71 INFORMATION REPORT For:
From:
Thru:
Subject:
Purpose:
Discussion:
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NATlONAL SECURIT't1 INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject To r.rfminal Sanctions.
The CoTT11lissioners James R. Snea, Director Office of International Programs Executive Director for Operations,,"J;\j~*
EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND REPROCESSING QUESTIONS To infonn the Commission of Executive Branch response to questions posed by Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford.
In connection with their concurrences in the issuance of licenses for the export of low enriched uranium to Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford requested information from the Executive Branch on several international safeguards and repro-cessing matters (see Mr. Chilk's memorandum at Appendix C and my letter to State at Appendix B).
State's response to the questions is at Appendix A.
The response incr~des, as attachments, copies of Stateis December 5 and December 19 memoranda dealing with re-transfers for reprocessing, a summary of reprocessing retransfer approvals since October 1976, and the approval letters setting forth the conditions on the disposition of recovered plutonium.
Some main points of the Executive Branch's response are summarized below:
SIJBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF' EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRAGED' AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS ANO DECLASSIFIECI ON DEC. 31-1984 (Insert year~
ClD!flDEHTIAL i
o The Executive Branch knows of no significant problems in implementation of IAEA safeguards and consequent corrective steps which are specific to these countries (as distinct from generic problems for given facility types and related improvement programs).
o State believes that the effectiveness to date of IAEA safeguards must be viewed within the main conclusion of the SSIR:
namely that in none-of the 41 States in which inspections were carried out was there any diversion of a signifi-cant quantity of safeguarded mater*ial. "--- --
o In the Executive Branch's view and from an over-all standpoint, the generic aspects of the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system
- and generic desirable improvements are particu-larly important.
o The Japanese-IAEA NPT Safeguards Agreement and a new national system of nuclear material accountancy and control have recently been approved by the Diet and are expected to alter substantially the interaction between the IAEA and.Japan's national system in this area.
o IAEA safeguards in Switzerland are also expected to change substantially when an NPT-type safe-guards agreement is brought into force either -.
this year or in 1979.
With respect to retransfers for reprocessing matters, the Executive Branch response (1) forwards its under-standings with respect to the reprocessing contracts between these countries (Japan, Sweden and Switzerland) and COGEMA and BNFL and (2) notes Sweden's recent announcement on restricting exports for reprocessing during the INFCE.
The :response also notes that:
o It is not known whether any of the material to be exported under Licenses XSNM-462 (Amendment 1),
1112, 1146, 1148 and 1152, would be subject to
~
u reprocessing contracts between these countries and BNFL and COGEMA.
o The generic approach of the Executive Branch in responding to retransfer requests for reprocessing, as outlined in the attached memo-randa, has been substantively approved by the Executive Branch agencies concerned with non-proliferation issues (including the NSC staff).
o The US has made clear to all parties involved in long-term reprocessing contracts with COGEMA and BNFL that the US will continue to consider retransfers for reprocessing on a case-by-case basis and that there should be no presumption of such approvals over the life of these contracts.
NMSS has reviewed the State response and has provided the views below:
o NMSS does not believe the Executive Branch has provided the information requested concerning the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in Japan, Switzerland and Sweden.
The Executive Branch has simply stated that it is aware of no signifi-cant implementation problems but has not provided information to support a conclusion that no problems exist in these countries.
To our knowl-edge the US is not receiving, on a current basis, information that would permit the Executive Branch to r~ach a conclusion that no implementa-tion problem exists in any particular country.
o Although the SSIR concluded that there has not been any diversion of any significant quantity of safeguarded material from a facility subject to IAEA safeguards, NMSS believes that it is apparent from other information in the SSIR that the IAEA did not have sufficient quantitative safeguards information to technically support this conclusion.
-&ONf IBENTIAt -
u I have thanked Mr. Nosenzo for his response and indicated that it will be forwarded for tne Commission's information promptly~
Enclosures:
-Vh ~
- l. Appendix A - State letter with attachments dtd 1/20/78
- 2.
Appendix B - Shea letter to State dtd 12/20/77
- 3.
Appendix C - Chilk memorandum to EDO dtd 12/14/77 DISTRIBUTION Corrrnissioners Connnission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations Secretariat nn~IBBfflA{
bU.1
-e -
I I I APPENDIX A STATE LETTER WITH ATTACHMENTS OTO 1/20/78
DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, O.C.
20520 BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS January 20, 1978 Mr. James R. Shea Director Office of International Programs United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Shea:
In your letter of December 20, 1977, you raised six questions related to Executive Bra*nch recommendations for the issuance of slightly-enriched uranium export licenses to Japan, Switzerland and Sweden.
The first two of these covered the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and the latter four dealt with reprocessing matters.
I believe that it would simplify my response if the questions were consolidated into these two categories.
Safeguards The Executive Branch knows of no significant problems in implementation of IAEA safeguards and consequent cor-rective steps which are specific to these countries (as distinct from generic problems for given facility types anarelated improvement programs).
In broad prospective,
- I believe that the effectiveness to date of Agency safe-guards must be viewed within the main conclusion of the IAEA's Special Safeguards Implementation Report (GOV/1842) that ... the Secretariat has concluded that in none of the 41 states in which inspections were carried out was there any diversion of any significant quantity of safeguarded material... "
Although this conclusion is based on IAEA inspection efforts during 1_~76, the conclusion also is supported by experience in previous years.
From an overall standpoint, the generic aspects of effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system in facility types or fuel cycle operations, and generic desirable im-provements, related to these facilities, are of particular 0~JPIDEN'fI.P:..,
GDS
2 -
importance.
For example, effectiveness at any specific type of facility will be determined primarily by the basic safeguards approach for that facility type in-cluding, among other things, the state of the relevant safeguards technology and the availability of competent manpower and of instrumentation capable of carrying out its designed task.
It should also be noted that past experience is not necessarily a particularly useful indicator for the future.
In a general context, GOV/1842 indicates that by far the greater part of the IAEA's safeguards experi-ence to date has been for research facilities and light-water power reactors.
The Agency recognizes that it will increasingly be faced in the future with safeguarding bulk handling facilities, such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants, which present significantly more challenging safeguards problems.
. It is in these latter areas that US and IAEA safeguards research and develop-ment efforts are being increasingly focused.
More specifically, the Japanese-IAEA NPT Safeguards Agreement has recently been ratified by the Diet and is just entering into force.
A complete set of facility attachments for its implementation is now in preparation, which are expected to result in *substantially different safeguards measures beinq applied at some Japanese faci-lities than those under the prior INFCIRC/66-type pro-visions.
Relatedly, the Diet also has approved a new national system of nucl~ar material accountancy and control so that the interaction between the IAEA and Japan's national system in this area probably will be substantially altered.
Because of Japan's extensive nuclear program, the complexity of applying IAEA safe-guards is considerably greater than for Sweden or Switzer-land.
Sweden and Switzerland, as well as Japan, are parties to the NPT.
However, IAEA safeguards in Switzer-land still are being carried-out under INFCIRC/66-type safeguards arrangements; these measures also are expected to change substantially when an NPT-type safeguards agree-ment is brought into force either this year or in 1979.
- COHFIBEN'fIAb-Reprocessing It is not possible to directly relate these export licenses to "recent reprocessing contracts between these countries" (Japan, Switzerland and Sweden) and the British (BNFL) and French (COGEMA).
It is our understand-ing that relatively short-term contracts for the repro-cessing of the Muehleberg and Oskarsharnn-I fuel were executed with COGEMA and BNFL, respectively, some time ago.
It is not known whether any of the material to be transferred under these applications would be subject to such contracts,. however.
The generic approach of the Executive Branch in responding to retransfer requests -for reprocessing, including those from Japan, Sweden and Switzerland, during the INFCE period is outlined in my multiple addressee memoranda of December 5 andl9, 1977.
(Although copies of both of these memoranda previously were made available to you, they are also enclosed [Annex A and B, respectively]
for your convenience.)
This approach has been substantively approved by the Executive Branch agencies concerned with non-proliferation issues, including NSC staff. _As you are aware, under existing procedures the Executive Branch con-sults with the NRC prior to taking action on any MB-10 reprocessing retransfer request.
The Japanese utilities recently have completed the negotiation of long-term reprocessing contracts with BNFL and COGEMA, covering the period 1982-1990.
It is our understanding that the contract with COGEMA has been signed but will not formally enter into force until (a)
Notes Verbale have been exchanged between the French and Japanese Governments and (b) the utilities and COGEMA have obtained the necessary approvals from the Govern-ments.or Japan and France, respectively.
These actions were to have taken place within ninety days after contract execution, but we are not aware whether they have been com-pleted.
It is our unders~anding that the parallel repro-cessing contract with BNFL will not be signed until after the fprmal report of the U.K. Board of Inquiry on the Windscale reproc~ssing expansion has been issued.
This is expected to take place in the early spring of this year.
-0~1FIOEH'l'L\L
~Nli'IQi:WTI..7\L We also understand that certain Swedish utilities have entered into long-term contracts with COGEMA and, possibly, BNFL, in order to meet requirements of Swedish
- law that firm commitments must be made for disposition of spent fuel in order for these nuclear power plants to continue operation.
We have made clear to all of the parties involved in such long-term reprocessing contracts that the United States will continue to consider retransfers for repro-cessing on a case-by-case basis and that there should be no presumption of such anprovals over the life of these contracts.
We believ~ the parties fully understand, therefore, that the financial commitments implied by entering into such contracts are at the risk of the participants.
Relatedly, the Government of Sweden re-cently has announced that in deference to U.S. policy no license for export of spent fuel for reprocessing will be granted during the INFCE period "unless *compelling reasons come up.
11 These developments, we believe, show that our efforts to discourage reprocessing and utilization of plutonium are well understood by the countries involved and that these efforts are having an impact on the reprocessing policies and plans of other nations.
A summary of MB-10 reprocessing retransfer approvals since October 1976, including the conditi ons on disposi-ti9n of recovered plutonium, is ' enclosed as Annex C.
I hope that you find this information responsive to your inquiry.
Enclosures As stated.
Sincerely,
,,.I I;'>.;; (.,.:;_.'7.,,-[}
L I
Louis V. Nosenzo Deputy Assistant Secretary CONEIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF OCEANS AND I1JTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS 5
Of.C 1977 0MPI b.ldl'IAL MEMORl\NDUM TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
ACDA -
C. Van Doren PM/NPP -
G. Oplinger L/OES -
R. Bettauer EUR/RPE -
W. Salisbury DOE/IA -
N. Sievering DOE/ISA -
V. Hudgins NSC - J. Tuchman
'\ *..
OES/ NET - Louis V > Nosenzo Pending Retransfers to the UK or France for Reprocessing Current Situation Three MB-10 applications are currently pending for United States approval of retransfer of US-origin irradiated fuel elements for storage and ev~ntual reprocessing in the UK.
- 1.
Zorita (Spain):
Twenty-two assemblies to the UK; req~est dated September 22, 1977.
- 2.
Beznau I (Switzerland):
Twenty-seven assemblies to UK; request dated January 11, 1977.
- 3.
Oskarshamn I (Sweden):
Ninety-seven assemblies to the UK; request dated January 7, 1977.
- 4.
In addition, we anticipate that we will soon receive another request for _-t;b,e transfer of up to 127 irradiated fuel assemb l ies from the Santa Maria de Garona Nuclea~ Power Plant in Spain to the UK in order to meet the requirenent for storage capacity to permit a full-core discharge.
Each of the three countries involved have regulations requiring sufficient s t orage capacity at each site to accommodate a full-core discharge.
Other pertinent data "eO~le'IDFVTI AL,
@~IF I Di:N'I' Ii'>t!r on these requests is attached.
Table I summarizes the current and anticipated future spent fuel situation at all four facilities.
The following should be noted:
(a)
The Beznau pool currently cannot accommodate a full-core discharge.
In addition, the Swiss have indicated, last spring, that a full-core discharge is necessary to repair the reactor's emergency cooling system; (b)
Without United States approval of pending MB-10s, none of the reactor pools will be capable of meeting their state regulations to accommodate a full core after the next reactor discharge--three of which occur in the spring of 1978.
All would still have room, however, to accommo-date two to four additional scheduled reactor discharges; (c)
United States approval of pending MB-lOs would accommodate the next discharge at all four sites, and meet the requirement to ~aintain space for a full-core discharge, but fall short of accommodating a subsequent discharge; and, (d)
The Spanish and Swiss have indicated plans to expand pool capacity at the Zorita, Garona and Beznau facilities.
With the exception of Zorita, United States approval of pending MB-lOs should provide sufficient space to allow for expansion at the other three sites.
At Zorita, the Spanish have indicated the pool would have to be emptied (this would require transfer of an additional 20 assemblies beyond the current request, resulting from the next discharge scheduled for February 1978).
United States Policy/Strategy Considerations In i -ts partial response of April 5, 1977 to PD/NSC-8, the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation recommended, with respect to retransfer requests for reprocessing in France and UK of US-orfgin spent fuel, that US approval be granted only when:
- both the fuel own~~-and reprocessor are generally cooperative in non-proliferation and evaluation efforts; the United States is provided a veto on retransfer of produced plutonium; a need exists, e.g., in terms of requirement for fuel movement due to fuel storage capacity limitations; and,
-eONPIDEN l IAL
4':0MF I DEUq? IAL no commitment is implied for long-term continua-tion of approvals.
In his consideration of this recommendation, the President... decided that a clear showing of need should be a strict prerequisite to granting United States approvals,"
and "with a stronger presumption against approval of such requests" than was implied in the recommendation.
Based on this and subsequent de~isions, our longer-term strategy with regard to disposit~on of foreign spent fuel has been to:
- 1.
Seek funding in the* FY-1978 and 1979 budget to allow for an assessment of spent fuel requirements and to initiate a program to assist countries in expanding interim storage capacity.
Status:
Monies have been appropriated and autho-rized for FY-1978 and assessment teams are in the process of visiting United States customers abroad to ascertain spent fuel requirements.
Technical teams will then be sent (as was done at Tarapur) to assist United States customers in expanding existing pool capacities and in building additional capacity (e.g., Spain's plan for interim centralized storage of spent fuel);
- 2.
Expand United State~ interim storage capacity and provide for a limited amount of long-term storage to accoD-moctate needs of foreign customers as well as domestic utilities until international repositories could be estab-lished.
Status:
The US policy on storage of foreign spent fuel in the United States has been announced.
Required environmental impact statements are being written and DOE is taking steps, working with in-dustry; to expand in.te_~!m storage and has a major program underway for development of long-term storage facilities by 1985;
- 3.
Work through INFCE to develop, over the long-term international regional repositories.
Status:
This is part of the work under INFCE Group 7 and United States efforts will be used to support early development -of international reposi-tories.
-0~+F I DEN'l' IAL
- GQWE I OEW'I' L\f. _, 4.
In the interim, approve MB-l0s only when there is a clear showing of need.
Status:
In conformance with this strategy, two requests for reprocessing approval have been approved:
-- Garona (Spain):
Eighty-one assemblies to UK.
(An extension to the original approval was granted for 63 assemblies as noted in the attachment};
-- Tsuruga (Japan):
Forty-two assemblies to UK.
In both cases, a clear need was established based on the need to ensure sufficient storage capacity at each reactor site to accommodate a full-core discharge as required by regulations in both countries.
Recommended Action In view of the above, approval of the pending MB-l0s for Switzerland and Spain (including the anticipated ~lB-10 for Garona) appears justified and consistent with previous actions on Garona and Tsuruga; therefore, thei~ prompt approval by the DOE is recor.unended.
With regard to the Swedish request, there is not the same operational urgency for its approval as is the case for Spain and Switzerland.
Thus, we recommend that action on it be deferred until at least the spring of ~978 unless future political events dictate earlier reconsideration.
There is a sense of urgency, particularly with regard to the Spanish and Swiss cases, if we are to permit them to comply with their safety regulations.
Clear need for these actions has been reinforced by strong political approaches by all three countries seeking US approval. In the case of Switzerland, -~ demarche was made to Ambassador Smith in September.
In the* -case of Spain, the Ambassador raised_ this matter with the Secretary in mid-November.
In support of the overall United States strategy, however, the United States should, in approving the re-quests, strongly urge both countries to implement their plan~ for expansion of current pool capacities.
This
-C OUF I DE~l':I? I.AI,- would include, in the case of Zorita, a willingness on the part of the United States to approve a subsequent MB-10 for transfer so as to empty the pool shortly after the next discharge to permit emplacement of high-density racks.
We should also offer to send technical teams, in the near future, to the three reactor sites to assist them in plan-ning _and expediting expansion of existing capacity.
The Swedish case is less urgent from an operational point of view.
The next discharge that would result in violation of Swedish requirements for space for a full-core discharge is not scheduled until September 1978.
The urgent need, if one exists, in this case is the linkage between US action on the MB-10 and continued operation of the Swedish power reactor program.
As noted in the attach-ment, Swedish law requires that utilities be able to demon-strate environmentally-sound plans for long-term disposition of spent fuel resulting from reactor operations.
A US decision not to approve the pending MB-10 would very likely cause the shutdown of existing facilities and block con-struction of any new plants, pending resolution of the waste disposition question.
We have had a number of bi-lateral conversations with the Swedes on this matter, who generally wish to support US policies and we have offered some potential solutions.
The Government has been unable to respond because of internal disputes concerning appro-priate solutions within the coalition Government over the nuclear issue.
Because there is no operational urgency in this case, I recommend that we delay a <lecision until next spring and, in the interim, attempt to work a solution whereby we informally suggest to the Swedish Government to expand capacity at the Oskarshamn I site to buy more time to permit other solutions to emerge--in particular, long-term disposal of Swedish spe.,,nt fuel in US repositories pending establishment of international repositories.
As in the case of Spain and Switzerland, we would, df course, offer to send a technical team --to._qssist them in pool expansion plans.
A similar approach would be followed, where appropri-ate, with regard to other foreign reactor sites identified by the current DOE assessment effort as having near-term spent fuel storage problems and/or where us technical support teams can assist recipient countries in expanding existing storage capacities.
~
COHFIDe'NTil.I.i
~NE I"OEN'l'IAC-Your clearance/comments on the above recommended approach is requested by COB December 8.
Please contact Dixon Hoyle at 632-4101.
Attachment As stated.
cc:
T/D -
L. Scheinman S/ AS -
G. Smith
- "~\.i
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PERTINENT DATA Zorita (Spain):
Twenty-two assemblies to the UK; re-1est dated September 22, 1977.
In a memorandum from the
,anish Energy Counselor dated September 28, the following
>ints were made regarding -this case:
(a) because of cask availability, these fuel elements n be moved only in November 1977 or will have to be trans-rred in April or May 1978; (b) the next scheduled discharge is February 1978.
If
~l elements are not removed, there will not be enough room the pool for the discharge of the full core in case of irgency; (c) Spanish regulations require sufficient room in the ctor pool to provide for discharge of a full core at all es; (d) ~tudies are being carried -out to increase the capa-
, of the pool.
If the capacity is to be increased, it
.d be necessary to empty the pool prior to increising capa-Beznau I (Switzerland):
T'wenty-seven assemblies to the request dated January 11, 1977.
Pertinent data on this includes:
(a) at present, there is insufficient space in the spent
"'e9NF ICi~l':PL'\L -
-CO~iF I DEN!' IAL 2 -
- uel pool for the emergency discharge of the entire core.
- wiss regulations require sufficient room in the reactor pool
- o provide for discharge of a full core at all times; (b) problems which have developed *with the reactor mergency cooling system will probably require full-core ais-harge.
The Swiss had hoped to perform this work over the umrner of 1977.
United States failure to approve the MB-10 as prevented performance of this repair; (c) the Swiss indicated plans to expand the pool capa-ity in late summer following repair of the cooling system.
~is has been held up pending completion of the repair of the Joling system; (d) the.next scheduled discharge is the spring of 1978.
1 lieu of US approval of the current MB-10, the pool storage
~oblem will be further aggravated.
Oska-rshamn I (Sweden) :
Ninety-seven assemblies to the
~; request dated January 7, 1977.
Pertinent data on this
. tua tion is:
(a) Swedish regulations also require sufficient room in
!actor pools at all times to.p~~~it a full-core discharge; (b) the next discharge is scheduled for September 1978.
the absence of US approval of the MB-10 request, the anti-pated discharge will leave insufficient room for a full-core scharge;
- CONFID:E:MT!lm-
~WF ICli:~lTI n Is 3 -
(c) current Swedish regulations require that utilities lemonstrate plans for long-term disposition of spent fuel re-
- ulting from reactor operations.
United States failure to ap-
>rove the current pending MB-10 would very likely effectively 1lock any further operations of existing plants or construction
,f new plants, pending resolution of the waste disposition uestion.
Garona (Spain):
Pertinent data on this situation includes:
(a) in August 1977 we received a request to approve the etransfer for eventual reprocessing of 191 irradiated fuel ssemblies for that reactor; (b) we approved retransfer of 81 assemblies earlier this year.
n extension was granted in November with regard to 63 assemblies
~ich remained unshipped upon expiration of the period of the riginal approval, largely because shipping casks were not
,ailable; (c) the next reactor discharge is scheduled for April 1978 1d, even if the above 63 assemblies are transferred, the next
.scharge would not leave sufficient space in the reactor pool
>r a full-core discharge.
We, therefore, anticipate request for retransfer of the imaining 127 assemblies of the original request for retransfer
- 191 assemblies.
The Spanish have also indicated plans for
-tONE IEJEN'PI:il.L
"e9MPIDBNg?IAL 4 -
pansion of the Garona pool to increase spent fuel capacity.
like Zorita, this would not requ~re that the pool be emptied.
(
-DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNA.TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL HE.MORA1'JDUM TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
December 19, 1977 ACDA -
C. Van Doren PM/NPP -
G. Oplinger L/OES -
R. Bettauer EUR/RPE -
W. Salisbury DOE/IA -
N. Sieverin~
DOE/ISA -
V. Hudgins NSC - J. Tuch:Jtan OES/NET -
Louis V. Nosenzo Pending Retransfers to the UK or France for Reprocessing Based on corrments received,
- the general approach to reprocessing retransfer requests proposed in my memorandum of December 5 on the above subject appears to be acceptable.
The purpose of this memorandum is to clarify certain de-tails and to describe our action plan for proceeding.
It is the consensus that U.S. willingness to approve retransfers for reprocessing should not only be based on a showing of clear need ~u~ also upon a demonstrated and -
serious effort by the requestor and/or his Government to implement relatively near-term spent fuel disposition plans which are dependent neither on reprocessing nor return of fuel to the United States.
Such plans may include (a) reracking of storage bas i ns with high-density, neutrori._absorbing racks, (b) movemen t of fuel amo*ng storage basins of various reactors to optimize overall utilization, or (c) provision of new ~uel storage capacity, including away-from-reactor central ' storage.
Generally, these plans cannot be implemented irnnediately, but we should expect to obtain* some sort 9f commitment tq proceed and steady pro-gress toward completion or an explanation which is accept-able to us as to why this is *not possible.
iQONFI DEH'fIAL GOS
CONFI0EN'fIAL Further, it appears to be the overall feeling that having obtained such a commitment or acceptable explana-tion, it would be preferable for us to give such approvals as may be required prior to the time that alternative spent fuel disposition plans can be implemented in a manner which minimizes the appearance of continued U.S.
acquiescence in requests for reprocessing retransfers.
This will be done by having the approvals cover justified retransfer requirements within the framework of the mutually agreed upon spent fuel disposition plan and in a way which minimizes the possible need for extensions or reapprovals in the event that changes in fuel discharge or transport plans make it impossible to make the actual spent fuel retransfer at the time originally contemplated.
With respect to the question of increasing capabilities for spent fuel disposition, the.following situation exists with regard to MB-10 retransfer requests presently under consideration:
Beznau -- In order to perform work on the emergency core cooling system, the entire core must be dis-charged, which requires the transfer of 27 elements to BNFL in order to provide sufficient space.
Following this work, the Swiss have indicated that new racks would be installed provided that the licens-ing authorities issued the necessary permit.
- However, a thorough evaluation of seismic risks must be under-taken before authorization can be considered.
Zorita -- Studies are being carried out to install a new high-density storage system; however, it will be necessary to have the pool completely empty (22 assemblies presently in pool plus 20 to be discharged fro~ reactor in February 1978) before the installation of these new racks could begin.
Garona ~- The reactor, operator has gone out for inter-national tenders for reiacking the pool, which would increase its capacity (over and above a full-core d{scharge cap~bility) by over 200 percent.
- However, there is no indication of the time required to accom-plish such reracking.
Oskarshamn-I -- There appears to be no need to authorize spent fuel retransfers from this reactor until at least mid-1978.
In facb, although we have received no MB-10 request to date, the spent fuel storage situation at Oskarsharnn-II (which has a small basin) probably will
-SONFID&ti'I IAL become critical first -- perhaps by the spring of 1978.
We have been informally advised that pool reracking is planned at both Oskarshamn reactors, although the schedule for such reracking presently is not clear.
Further, the. utility's management is participating in a group preparing and submitting for Swedish Government approval plans for a large, central spent fuel storage facility which would be completed by late 1983, at the earliest.
At the same time, we have been informed that transfers between the two Oskarshamn reactor storage basins are not feasible, since there are no casks available to the utility for such transfers.
With this background in mind, we plan to take the following actions in each of the present cases:
Beznau -- Approve the present retransfer request for 27 assemblies upon obtaining a commitment that the reactor operator will proceed expeditiously with pool reracking upon obtaining the necessary Swiss licensing authorization.
Hopefully, we could agree upon a tentative schedule to complete this reracking following the time that such autho-rization is'granted.
Zorita -- Approve the present request for retransfer of 22 assemblies, with the clear understanding that subsequent approvals will be contingent upon specific steps being taken by the utility to rerack its s~orage basin.
If the utiJity is able and prepared to do so at the time of the scheduled February 1978 discharge, we would be willing to approve now re-transfer of the additional 20 assemblies to be dis-charged so that firm arrangements can be made in the near future for clearing the pool to permit reracking to begin as soon as these assemblies have been adequately cooled for shipment.
Garona -- As indicated-in--my memorandum of December 5, we do not actually have at present a specific request for retransfer; however, since the prior request was only approved iri part, we expect such a request for the unapproved balance momentarily.
In this situation, we would advise the utility, through the Spanish Government, that our favorable consideration of the anticipated request is contingent upon receiving firm plans for early implementation of a program to augment existing spent fuel storage capabilities. *If such a plan is received, we would be prepared to approve re-transfer of the number of soent f'n.::> 1
..corn? I DEM'f L\L are essential to successful completion of the program (presumably if plans for reracking could be implemented in early 1978, this could vary between 68 assemblies, if only full core discharge capability is needed following the April 1978 discharge, and 188 if the pool must be completely emptied for reracking).
Oskarshamn-I -- We have informally advised a senior official of the Swedish Embassy that we plan no immedi-ate action on this retransfer since there appears to be no urgent need, but will consider it on the same basis as Zorita and Beznau when such need arises.
We also asked whether this position would pose any serious political problems for the Swedish Government.
The Swedish official has promised to solicit his Govern-ment's reactions.
In the interim, we will try to obtain additional information on plans for reracking the Oskarshamn reactors' storage pools.
In each case any approvals will, of course, be con-tingent upon meeting all other U.S. criteria for reprocess-ing retransfers, including the U.S. right of approval over transfers of recovered enriched uranium and plutonium.
As requests for reprocessing retransfers are received in the future, they will be analyzed within the context of both need and the requester's longer-term plans for spent fuel disposition and a recommendation will be made for appro-priate action, subject to the concurrence of your agency.
In view of the urgency of the Zorita and Beznau requests, would you please provide any comments on the action plan to Dixon Hoyle (632-4101) by December 22.
cc:
T/D -
L. Scheinman S/AS -
G. Smith NRC - J. Shea Drafted:
OES/NET/EIC:DHoyle:pab
""GNP I DEN'f IAb
UWTEO ST/\HS ENERGY RESEARCH Ai*W OEVELUFr.;Eia ADMINISTRATION
\'JASlilrJGTON, U.C. 2iJ5<'.;5 December 30, 1976 Mr. Fernand Spaak, Head Delegation of the Comr.1ission of the European COITL~unities Suite 707 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037
Dear Mr. Spaak:
Your letter of October 13, 1976 to M=. James Garrett r~quested approval of the transfer of one-hundred twenty-three (123) irradiated fuel elements from the r.luhleberg Reactor in-Switzerland to France for reprocessing.
The U.S. Government is currently in the process of developing plans and procedures for implementation of the Nuclear Policy Statement of October 28, 1976.
As you know, this statement expresses our concern about the p=oliferation risks of rep:~ocessing and the accwr.u-latio~1 of separated pluto:1ilh'11 ::esulting from such operations.
The statec~nt fcr~sees early and broad cons~ltaticns on a bilateral and multilateral basis to address these and related questions, including importantly the provision of fuel assurances to countries sharing out non-proliferation objectives and policies.
It is possible that prior to ~1e actual reprocessing of the fuel th~t is the subjec~ of your October 13 lette=, the consultat~ons, we anticipate will lead, in part, to new fuel supply-~rrangements including appropriate means for dealing ~ith irradiated fuel and could also establish an ir.ternational storage regime for reactor products.
These arrangements could be appropriate for the dispositicn of the irradiated fuel which is the subject of your z2quest.
I 2 -
Nevertheless, we recognize the urgent need for approval of the request in your letter of October 13 in order to avoid serious consequences for the operation of the Muhleberg Reactor.
Accordingly, and without prejudice to U.S. action on future requests of this nature, we are approving this particular request with the understanding that the conditions set out in your letter of December 2, 197G pertaining to the fuel elements from the J. Cabrera Reactor in Spain are equally applicable to this request, namely, that any use or transfer of recovered special nuclear moterial shall require U.S. approval.
We would appreciate your confirmation to this effect.
In the event, however, that the consultations referred to above lead to international agreement on new fuel supply arrange~ents including reprocessing or oth~r disposition of irradiated fu2l we would expect to consult with the parties concerned to determine whether these new arrangements should be applicable to the fuel which we have ap7
.,oved-for trans f e:r.
~'.,
/ //
S~p L.;,~lyf~/
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- 0
Enclosures:
- l. RTD/EU(SD)-19
- 2. SER-1 (4cys}
cc w/encl. 1:
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Nelson~. Sieverrng, Jr. 1 Assistant Administrator International Affairs
( 2 cys}
C. Favre, Scientific Counselor Embassy of Si.-.1i tzarla.nd M. Chauvin, Atomic Energy Attache, Er.-tbas sy. of P ranee
( OF SWITZERLAND
~RISCHE BOTSCHAFT 5SADE DE SUISSE WASHINGTON D. C. 20008;
- ~u Cathedral Aveaue N. W.
T~lepbone 46:?-lSll/7
. 513 BKW
,r Nelson Sievering, Jr.
. stant Administrator for International Affairs-Energy Research and Development Administration ington, D.C.
20545
- fer of irradiated fuel elements Bernische Kraftwerke AG (BKW),
- erland, to United Reprocessors,
.a-Hague, France l-lr. Sievering:
September 22, 1977 BY HAND ence is made to your approval dated December 30, 1976, e transfer from Bernische Kr_af twerke AG (BKW), Switzer-to Un ited Reprocessors of 123 irradiated fuel assemblies
~hleberg BWR Power Plant for r eprocessing at the plant of.
l-Hague, France.
i MB-10 from RTD/EU(SD)-19 i~d1cates, the Uranium and ium recovered.by reprocessing have been ~old by BKW to Essen (FRG). The contract mentioned on the MB-10 r indi cates that STEAG, Essen, may use this special r material in the SNR and THTR *reactors (FRG), or, in E construction delays, possibly for recycling in other
(
2 -
1ropean reactors. Since the form was initiated in Septe:~* ber 176, the concerned research and development programs h :..1t-e
- olved, and BKW has informed the Swiss Federal Office a.r: Energy at STEAG has sl_ightly modified its utilization plan. As of day, the situation appears to be the following:
According to the computations of the reactor oper*ator, the 119 irradiated assemblies actually transferred to Cap-la-Hague under the authorization form MB-10 RTD/EU(SD)-19 contain 117,9 kg Plutonium. Considering a 3% reprocessing loss, 114,35 kg Plutonium remain.
The following use of the Plutonium is foreseen:
a) 12 kg Plutonium+/- 5% to the Swiss Federal Institute for Reactor Research *(EIR), Wuerenlingen, to be used in the framework of its research project on develop-ment-- of a high -temperature gas cooled reactor. The recovered Plutonium will be converted into PU 02 and stored at Cap-la-Hague, France, pending shipment* to AEE, Winfrith (UK), for fabrication into coated particles.
Then it will be transferred to EIR, Wuerenlingen, for use there. This later transfer will be subject to U.S.
transfer approval under the usual MB-10 procedure and Euratom export authorization.
./.
3 -
b) 70 kg Plutonium+/- 10% to ENEL (Rome). The Plutonium will go from Cap-la-Hague to the CEA facilities at Cadarache (France~ for conversion.and fabricati6n.
Then it will be used for the fast breeder reactor in Creys-Malville (;uper Phenix).
c) The remaining amount, estimated to be 32-35 kg Plutonium will be used by RWE, Essen, in the SNR fast breeder in Kalkar (FRG). The Plutonium will be processed by Alkern, Hanau (FRG), or by Belgonucleaire, Dessel (Belgium).
Sincerely yours, The Scientific Counselor:
C T~
Dr. Christian Favre Copy to:
Ambassador Fernand Spaak, Head, Delegation of the Commission of the European Community Washington, O.C.
20037 for his files concerning the MB-10 RTD/EU(S0)-19
- hristian Favre Ltif ic Counselor 1sy of ~.litzerland Cathedral Avenue. N.U.
ngton, D.C.
20008 D1:'. Favre:
DEC 2 3 1977 pt 13 ackncr.a,ledged of your letter of September 22. 1977, describing roposed disposition of the plutonium recovered from the 119 irr~diated assecblies which were the subject of the U.S. authorization on tim-10 n::m/ro(SU)l9, issued in December, 1976.
our understand~ that the caterial in question is notJ physic.ally ad in France. to which it was transferred pur3u.a.nt to the tization raferred to abovo.
the circ:u::ist..inces, va have decided to consent to the plutonium titian described in your letter, which we are gratified to note no
~ i.:icludes use for recycle in light ~"':lter reactors.
Uc understand
,ou will notify us if it appears that the situation set forth in Latter :i.ay ch.mga. Alao. ve note that you understand that tha
- er of the 12 k0 cf recovered plutonium for uae at Wuerenlingen,
!rl.ind. vill be subject to U.S. approval under th3 HB-10 procedure.
ler to avoid difficulties in the future, it is.uggested th.at the t8 consulted before any cocmitt:ents are entered into with respect
- reproc~ssinn of U.S.-origin spent uucle.ar fuel,nd tho disposition
!
- recovered materials.
,. Hoyle, State Dept.
I. Shiller Sincerely, Nels~n F. Sievering. Jr.
Deputy Assista~t Secretary for International Affairs
December 30, 197G Mr. Fernancl Spaak, Head Dele~;ation of t11e C-:::>rr.r:1ission
~ f c '. :.:: ::;ur:;::(~~ n Cor:-:..r.:nni tic3
~....
2Q rJJ7
Dear *,
c;:...... a1, *
. ~. '-!:"'....
Your letter of August 24, 1976, to r-!r.,Janes Garr.. ~tt re"Iui2st~,..:. aziproval of t~H~ tr,'.lnsfer of th.irty-t~,.-o (32) irr~Ji~t~i fu~l el~ncnts fro~ the J. Cabrer~ ?c~ctor in Spain to the United Kingdom for reprocessing.
The U.S. Governr:-.cnt is currGntly in the process of developing plans and procedures for ir.1plernentation of t.~e i*~uclaar Policy S'tate:!Iient of October 23, 1976.
As you know, t~is stat~r.:ent e.:i:.presscs our concern.:ibc'.lt the proliferation risks of re9rocessing anc.l the accum1Jlation of s~paratr..:d pl ;..ltonit!r.l resulting fror:1 such operatio.:i.s.
The statement fore3eas early a~d br~aJ ccnsul~~~ion~ 0n a bilateral and ~ultilat~ral l:asi5 to adcress these r?nd r~lateJ ~uestions, including i~portantly the provision of fuel assurances to conntries sharing our non-prolif-eration objectives and policies. It is possible that prior to the actual reprocessing of t~e fuel that i~
the*subject of your August 24 latter, the consultations we antici?a.te will lead, in part, to neu fn~l s,1 :_:.-;-:-ly*
arrang~!"lcnts incluc.ing anpropriate means for dealin'J t*:i t:i irradiated fuel a."ld could -als.Q establish andinternational storc1.ge re~irr.e for reactor products..
These a*rrancr~~E:nts coul:1-be ~;--*-::-,;;-1ri.-1"t..~
~I")!:' t he <'isna'.::itio:1 o:: t::c i.:-::-,:-:.: i:--'-:-'"'~:
J '
" 1 *,.......
2
- ieverthe le:ss, we recognize: the urg,:n t ne;~;.: for
,approval of the rcqu,~*st in your l:!tter o~ i\ucu3t 21!
ir: or,>*-~r tc,'"!~.roi~ :.; ::~r.i*;)US :.;c-":1 :..i ':.-:-,H::r1c:~.3 C,...r
~L,P. 0~cr::it.ic-:i
- raj-...
- :.:icc to C. ~. ac-+:io:: or. fut:.1r,2 r~cu~st~ of t. ~i:3 nat.ur.-::i, w~ -'lrl:? a"."lprovi:'l-:; this !'art:i-:ular re:,:;w~:t
'.=; 111.::j(;,=t to the un<lerst3n<linq set out in your letter oi D~cerrber 2.
19 7 6 that i'L"lY use or transfer of rccovt:~r~<l special nuclear material sh~ll re~uira C.3. approval.
In.the event, howavcr, that t.'1c consultations referred to above lead to international agr0.e~er.t on new fuel sunr,ly c1rranner.12nt~ L.:c!.u:1irn re~r0c~:3s~r~q or ot~er cispozition a£ irr~di3.t,"'u fu:21 w~ would ~::~:::~ct to consi.llt with the p.:irtirs cc.r.ccrncd to defcr;r.ine \-.,:1f~t!1F?r t..liesa n<:::w arrango;,cnt3 st,.:,ulc~ De ~-r'L'liccble to t:!e tL-;.t~l which we have approved for transfer.
Enclosures:
Sincerely, C**r'.,:: ~-:.: ! ~-\:~"-=<: 2~-'
i'r--.:!~-J;~ ;:. :_ :..:*..--.~.-;;-: _1 ~r.
Nelson F. Sieverinq, Jr.
As~istatt ~n~i~i~tratcr International Affairs
- 1. RTD/EU (SP)-5 (2 cys)
- 2. SER-1 (4 cys) cc w/e-ncl l:
Industrial Counselor, Embassy of Spain J. Gaunt, Atomic Energy Attache British Err.bassy Seen and Cleared by:
Redraf tEtl AIA NFSievering, Jr.
NSC -
Dr. Elliott 1/2/77 OES/DOS - Mr. Kratzer 1/2/77 Read to£ Cleared: DA - Mr. Fri
~.,
.1 _____ _
DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN. COMMUNITIES I
February 11, 1977 MG/aks Mr. Nelson F. Sievering, Jr~
Assistant Administrator for International Affairs Energy Research and Development Administration Washington, o. C. 20545
Subject:
Transfer of irradiated fuel elements from third countries to the Community for reprocessing.
Dear Mr. Sievering:
On the above subject, I refer to your letters of December 30, 1976. They deal with three different cases in which, according to the terms and conditions of the EURATOM-US Agreement for Cooperation and the Additional Agreement for Cooperation as amended, the foreign govern-ments and Community have applied for the US transfer authorization to the Community under the normal MB-10 t.=,>rocedure.
These cases are:
- l.
-AG/1129 for a transfer _from the Union Electrica (Spain) to BNFL of 32 fuel elements of the Cabrera Power Station.
- 2.
AG/1168 for a transfer by Japan Atomic Power Company to BNFL of irradiated fuel elements con-taining approximately 7000 kg of U with an enrich-ment of 1.2% and -42 kg of Pu containing 74% of fissile Pu of the Tsurug~_ Power Plant.
- 3.
AG/1074/1 for a transfer from Bernische Kraftwerke to United Reprocessors of 123 fuel elements of the Muehleberg Power Station containing 23,114.906 kg of U with 266.182 kg U-235 and 159.087 kg Pu to be reprocessed by COGEMA {France).
2 -
Mr. Nelson F. Sievering, Jr.
February 11, 1977 MG/aks In these cases, the US authorization for transfer and reprocessing has been granted on December 30, 1976 by MB-10 forms:
RTD/EU(SP)-6 for Cabrera AG/1129
- RTD/EU(JA)-16 for Tsuruga AG/1168 RTD/EU(SD)-19 for Muehleberg AG/1074/1.
The Commission of the European Communities is fully aware of the concern of the US Administration, expressed already in the nuclear policy statement of October 28,1976, about the proliferation risks of reprocessing, and the accumulation of separated plutonium resulting from such operations.
In implementing the agreement with the IAEA, the Commission of the European Communities has adopted and published new safeguards regulations; furthermore, the individual Member States apply strict measures of physical protection to their facilities appropriate to the specific circumstances.
It is our understanding that any transfer of the recovered materials from the Community to a third country is subject, in accordance with the terms of the EURATOM-US Agreement for Cooperation, to prior US authorization.
The Japanese and Spanish -customers, to which the fuel belongs, have not yet decided upon the final use they want to make of the uranium and plutonium recovered after reprocessing. Pending their final instructions, the recovered materials will be stored in the Community; in the specific cases of the Cabrera and Tsuruga fuel it
~ill be the facility where the fuel is reprocessed.
Your particular atten-tioti_ is, however, invited to
~he case AG/1074/1 of the Muehleberg fuel. As the MB-10 Eorm RTD/EU(SD)-19 indicates, the uranium and plutonium
~ecovered after reprocessing have been sold already by 3ernische Kraftwerke to STEAG (Germany). The contract,
- oncluded on June 30, 1975, specifies that the recovered 1ranium will be used for re-enrichment and the plutonium
- or the fueling of the SNR project at Kalkar (German,
~elgian, Dutch breeder prototype); it covers the materials
~ecovered in the years 1977-1983.
Mr. Nelson F. Sievering, Jr.
February 11,1977 MG/aks As the Additional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, provides in Article I-E that the Community has the right to retain after reprocessing special *nuclear materials of US origin delivered by third countries, it is the understanding of the Commission of the European Communities that your letters of December 30, 1976 do not intend to restrict Community rights and consequently the use and transfer of such materials within the Community.
Finally, it is the understanding of the Commission of the European Communities that any new policy in the field of reprocessing the US government might establish after the consultations anticipated in your letter, would not impair commercial transactions entered into previously.
Sincerely yours, Fernand Spaak Head of Delegation
- rr. ?c:~1::*:1d Spaak, H.2ad re let~ U Gn of th~ Crn::.nission of t':1:::: "nrof.'eun Co-::nunities Suit,~ 7,-, 7 2100 :~ ::.: ~ i:-c-et, n:-r i-:ashil*e;::cn, D.C.
20037 MAY 19 1977 T!'lis J.<: irr rci'lY to your letter of Febr*uary 11, l'J 77, concerning cv t~tc~ letters to you of Dcce~ber 30, 1976, in rcl3tion r'Sf'::c;::'_,.*::-ly to t h e ;,pain/Uni t~d Iangdcm, J ;:.pan/United ;,:inr,doc,
.:md ~-~r.t~ ;~~rlr,nd/frzmce transfcr5 of irradiated fu~l elc.,.,1cnt3 for reprccc-s.::;tr,g.
,\s !.t-"lt.~;; in my l~tter3 nf ~c-.e~!ler 30, 197,;, the U.S. r.o,,ernme~t
'!,_as 't: '.!-:..:~~ '..:.
!.rJ c:-,:: ~:: 1 ~;-; l:,~
c::J&tC<.! 1~~ l ~*,1 cibou t t )-t~~
n ro l.i ~* e~.1 t:1 :'~ ris ~"".~
0{ :r-::~Jj.,:.::.*~*Jir,z, ::md 6l~ accU!'!.Jl.--lti,:n of :3E~e.r.Tted nlut,1:1.!nm r~su~:_t~ :--. *. t~crefrom.
.4.s you l:ro*,1, 011r r,olicy-in thi:-
r.c~r*..:trd is still *ii.::'.~r rcviEw.
However, t-:c *reco~i::ed the ur~~nt n'!ed for a ~ol *.~t i.r.;, to i:hC! i~cdiate proh1 e:':!s f :icecl by the thrr-e nuclear
, power r ! :*.,t~ in question and endeavored to rcgolve their problehls
- -?ithout :.,_bo prej11dicin6 our !)Oeition on future requests of a simfL,.r 11~ture.
l~-~cord i.n ;~ j?, ua cfoc:f.ded that tt!)proval of the tranRfe~s and re,;,roco~.s1.n~ ~.Jould rc~olve t:hc ~roblem for the thr.ea pololer plant:: i.:volved ~md the rc!'rocrissors, and t~n t es tablist,n~nt of a 9pecl~l ~0ndition relating to the reccv~red special nuclear r.:ate:-..:.a.l -~,ould rrotect tl1c inte~ri.ty of the U.S. pos:i.t:1.oo durir.p t 1~<.1 vr~qent rcr'iod and prior to final es tab lichn~nt of o~r fut"..:. t*? policie!l.
':'herc-.:ori~, the condition "that Q.ny use or transfer of recovered sr~ci~l,,1:.~le.1r r,atl3.rinl 9~311 require U.s. aDrrov:il" vas inclii(~::-d,13 p.:irt of the thre..e tr~nsf~r at,proval~.
The intant of t~1i!S c:-:;ndi tio~, uhich *Jas srellcd out in ny J.etcer of :!arch 17, 19 77. cc*"-'~"?"!ling fhe C:arona po,:.:-~r reactor.., ":ms to reC'Juirc prior U.S. :!'Y':."r,... *,ul ui th rP.spect to f ~cili ties in which nnv nul.!":nn",:,,"t-
Reactor Reprocessing Date of Facility__ ~roval
- 1. Muhleberg COGEMA 12/30/76
~witzerland) (France)
- 2. J.Cabrera (Spain
- 3. Tsuruga (Japan)
- 4. Garona (Spain)
- 5. Tsuruga (Japan)
- 6. Garona (Spain)
BNFL (UK) 12/30/76 BNFL (UK) 12/30/76 BNFL (UK) 3/17/77 BNFL (UK) 9/16/77 BNFL (UK) 10/23/77 h !'H'-4.1:.i\
L.
REPROCESSING RETRANSFERS Number of Assemblies 123 32 7 (M'l'U) 81 42 191 requested 63 approved Disposition of Recovered Plutonium Use or transfer requires U.S.
approval (A). Subsequently, specific approval granted for certain fast breeder research and development use within European Commµnity (B).
Use or transfer requires U.S.
approval (C).
Use or transfer requires U.S.
approval (F).
Requires U.S. approval of facilities where any alter-ation, use or storage. of plutonium might occur (G),
(E).
Japan's intention is for return to Japan when avail-able; any such transfer would have to be approved by USG at that time (II).
See prior Garona approval (Item 4).
General Footnote:
No recovered ' plutonium will be available from BNFL reprocess inc, 1,, *. I
- 1
)
Other Comments U.S. approval rights over intra-Community retrans-fers not accepted by European Community (D),(E)
Currently in process of clarification. (J)
Same a~ for J. Cabrera Verbally, EC has advised that disposition of ~his plutonium--as well as that from Cabrera and Tsuruga--
should be decided within the context of internationa deliberations in the INFCE.
Approval was granted only for extension in time of assemblies which remained unshipped upon expiration of the prior approval (I).
-2**
l.11\Y J., - " J:)77.
In t~c last p.!lro~rsph of *,our J ctter, you r3ised t.he iasu~ of whether, if th~ consultati('):1!1 ref erre,I to in r:iy letter of Daccmber 30,. 1976, lP.ad to internr.1tional ~r.,~ement on nm-.7 fuel sup!)ly arrnn~em?nts includi11.c; re~roccsoi~r, or C"!thcr rltar,o!';f tion of irr.!di.ited fucl 1 auch ne,:.J nrrRn:;e,11.:.*nt::; uoulu be ;:1tmdatortly ap'Plicablc to the fncl approv1:?d for tra!l:1f~r on r:*~ce,:1hor 30.
Plec.se be assured
- t:iat the ir. S. will nc,t r~vo!ce th~~.TJec(?m.hcr 30 appro\*~13, nlthour.:;h it ~muld be po3sibJc, of com... ~~, for the U.S. and the p:1r.ti~'3 c11nc".:rned to. a~r<.!e th.:it n,:r,1 nrr,1:1z:cr.1entB should become 3ppJ.icable.
Sincerely, 0 *
- I c-io""orl by ngti1Z
~* *..;..** -"'
Neisen F. Sic::ve; ing, Jr.
Nelson P. Sicvcrin~, Jr.
Assistr:nt,\rJnin.tstr.t..tor.
- t:nter::ational Af f;_1i-rs
oo Od December 30. 1976 nr. F~rn.J.r.d,Sp.:lc::~<, Head Del-::tJa.tion of the Co~ission of the l:uro::*ean Cc:i.::~ni ties Suit0 707 M Street, ~-1.W.
~a~~inqton, D.C.
20037
- -:enr !*!r. Spaak:
Your letter of Decerr..!)-::r 17, 19 'JG to :-~r. James Garr~tt rcquest~d apprcval of the tra~sfcr of sRvcn tonnes of irradiated fu~l from the Tsuruga Reactor in Japan to t:ie C~i ted ~i~q::::o~ for re;;>rcc:;ss ing.
As you k~ov, chi3 stats~cnt ex~r0$Ses cu~ concern about th,-. nro 1 i :=,-:,--*-1.tior* ri.,,,_,.. o~ *r12uro,....,,... -ir.c;,.,~d t'1 **
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con~ulta~ions on a bil~tcr~l an~ multilateral b~sis to adC:.ress t:--:.t!3 ~ anc rr-;latec1 questions, including
. - ~,
t' f
1
/
.1rr.portan.... y
,1-~ prov.1.,:;.1on o:: -U~
as~~1ra11cc-s to cc.untr10s s~aring our non-prolif~ration objectives and policies.
It is ~o::;sible eia t 2ricr to t:ie actual ~"~~racessi11cJ*
of tha f.ue:l t:1at i.5 t!1.c sur..*ject of 'tour I:ccc;::hc.r 17 l~:ttcr, t112 cor:.s ul tn tions,.-e c!ll tic:i. :)ate -:-,i 11 lcn.d, in oa1:'t, to r.t:!'.*i fuel :3u~::-,ly.:::.rr:1.1-;0:i:(:r1t~ ir:cl.i(:.:.~1s-c1r~ropri.:1tc :..c~r.s* £er d.:::.:J.liY-1~ \ii t!1 irr.:1.ilia-::~:~ *f~el
- i:1r1. coul:1.:113 o GS c<l.Lli s:1.:!r, in b.. ~rr...:i ticr:-11
~ tn:::'.::.t~*:*
~C(7 iw:~
for r2.:tctcr i::roc.:~ct:;.
'7lh."l:';1:? arr.::.:-ir~:,:!f'.".1;:-.t1 cc,i1lcl bo a0~ro~riata fort~~ dis~ositicn o~ t~c irr~t i~~cd !u8l
- ""!1ic'.1 i:; thG :;ubjcct of your r:2,.;u-.:st.
uu UD
- ' '~*7r.r.._,.,..,.... -,..
C t*
- . t..-.,c
_a,.;;.1*:...,..,,
~*-'*=
r'.".'C
- jnJ '.'.".C*
'. l~,:r*.:<:l :-or
.1;-:,nrc,v.:.l n: tl>~ re:*:u*~:3t L, '/Ollr. letter of r.*,~.!C<:!r1):;~r-17 C:
ti t.
.in orccr t() avca:::. s::-r.1ou3 co:1s::.-:t~.:>nc,~s 1.or
.1-::: OD~ra J.0!'1
~th~ T3urug~ ~~ctor.
Accordingly, an~ wit~out
- ?r~j.16.ic-~ to U.S. action on future rcqui"*3ts of t:iis naturi?, w~ u.rc a?provinq this oarticnl.ir =-~c:ucst ~,i th the umlf.:rs t -,n,.!.in~1 t~1a t t!H? cond.i tions set cut in your l~tter of Geco~b~r 2, 1g75 pertainitg to th~ fuel ele~3nts from th~ J. Cabrera Reactor in Spain are equally a:.::plic~hl~ to this r*3(~n~st, na!"cly, t:hat £1~:1 use or tran3f~r of rccovernd s~ecial ~ucl~ar materi~l shall rc~uirc U.S. a9?rov~l.
~s would a~9reciate your conf irr.c:?.ticn to ti1is ~ffcct.
In t;1e ~,}en t, however, t.1ia t tl1.e consul t.J. tions referred to ~bove lead to intern~tional n1r~a~~nt on new £u~l SU?PlY arra~se~~nts inclurling rcprocGssing or other C:is"9os i tion of irr"1c ic:: tr:d fu~l ~-.. r~ ~-:ou 1(1. a;-::oect to con~ult with tha p3rti-~s conc~r~eJ to det~r~ine whether tlicse nc~.. : arr~n,-,,~r:1.:::r:*..:.::. s;,-:ould r..-~ a'!');~licat,1... 1 to the fuel wliici we havn anorov~d for transfer.
I:nclosur~s=
- 1.
- 2.
RTD/2U(J.:\)-ln SE?.-1 (4 cyz) cc w/encl 1:
c::*
l
... 1.nccrc y, 11.7el"'o,.., P C"i' =--v*.,,-1.* 7",-:-r Jr
~
.l4
~-
tJ
~ -
-1:., t Assist~nt Ad~inist=Ator I~tcrr.~ticn3l ~f~~irs
( C cy;:;)
~azuo Suzuki, E~ba~sy of Ja~~n J. Gaunt, Atcnic ~n~rc_t, Att~chb~
Bri tL;h I::.IT'.bassy Redrafted:
OIPI-~
GHelffich AIA NFSievering
Mr. !-'c~;:n<l Spa.:;!: _
1 ;:,_,:id
- Dele~;~ti~o:1 of t!H' :.o:~,.~isGi.on of t!i~ :~ll:!:Ope:m (C:*~-~r., 1.mitJ.sJ3 Suite T)7 210n :r :? t!'ce t, !'!:i tYashir1r; to:\. Ji. C.
Z0~J37
<'n J.~t:u~:.7 12, l'.~7,, 7CU.1.**::~F1 :;st.:~:J.1r,1n*nvc1l for the tr:.nsfer of ei:::):::-:.7-cn~ (31).L:-.:-,-:di.:-.:.:c: :i-:::1 elt:1:!!nt:; from the r.2ro:1a power. t'!' 0:ctor in ~-- '.,;~*:.~ to th r: ;*;-: fnr i::v2t:t;_i:,l r.2proccssit1g not.1 scl1eC:trL....J for 7!;:irc:1 l :JrJ by ;*,.;-;:-1, nt Hi.ru1-.;c.:i1e.
\s "'t"'t'"' *1 -;~ r--** le. '"t 0 r
.,.,,t:
'l(J 1~"':-, to von "pn-ov"nrr f,;J C:
- -'I.\.
...,.J
.1:,:
~ - -
J ~
~
(,..
..L.
~
tne tr.J,~sfur frc,~ ::::, :d.n to t;,,~ *,:K of irr~,~i.:-,tcri fuel 0.lc>;n.,:,nts from t!~ \-=;.T. f'~b\*~r.:1 ~'.-::.:?etc:.-
f.:: ""!:
,.-~~~cc-::.:-;5i..;~J_.:;,
t!1c:! (; -~. t~(iVf!rt1~c?1t r~.;;.;; l;..:; ;,;; ~ 7:... :
-L.~1,::r.;~.; *~:::;.Ly
(;f)I ic.: 1 r:.a~~! C:D Ol!~ t1: *~
rrc;lf f :.::.i* i~ tio*\1 ri~ l~s associ:1.t::><l,-:i th rr-!:,l"**,r;~s::;Jn'.~ :::-:} the l.'.Ccu:,11.-.lation of.:-~n.1.rated plutoni.1.!,i rcsultLi ~ ::1,:-*L"cfrc.. ~.
- ._::,r pcli c~* in thi~ r~r-~rd is still u,1cler rcvi,!~-1 eu that :-;:,.'o :1ot yet hav~ tt d~finit:ive positic.n as to th,.: cc-:.riit:L:-:u t!:l~er,,1hic!1 tbe U.S. t:oulJ appro*J"e requcs~:, fr1r tran:--;f:::.: o[ f~c.::::r_,,.,t:.!d fuel for reproct~ssing.
However, ~;:?. reco~.ni::,~ the ttn:ent n~~d for !lPi'!'oval of t!ie transfer reque~t:cd :f.n your.Tai:*.1:,.ry 1::!, 1')7~ !ette1: to avoid sc,rinus con-scqu12nc,,.,, fer the 0;1,: r,~ tio:-i c,;;: t:1,1 reactor n!. delin~a t~cl in :he lett~r of U1~ s~~:t~ d0tc f1:c.-: i ;r. Gallego of the Sptittii:.h Emba~s~,
to :-!r. :Icl!:17:!ch.
,\cr:or,Un;~l::-, \:l'.!.ire n;-1ri:-cvlng thi:'3 tr::m~fer of the 81 :!.rr.:1ciate,l C =: :-')nil fut:!l el.;;~~:1ts to the. GK for reprocessing on the concttio:J t 1
- i.-!: ~rior E.S..:1,r,rov.:21 will be obtair.i:;d with respect to facilitic::; in '.J!1ic:-. ony subsc(!uent alteration, us<? or s tor:-i~e (oti1-~r th,'l:1
~~ t11r::i.g:: c1 ~: t.!tndscale) o~ any resulting sepa-rated ~lutonlu:n 1:"Li::-,:1 c occur.
'~-- t!-,,!~ rerarJ I note your l".?tt~r of Februa-ry 11, 19 77.l.n \:liic!-1 yr1u ~~d.sed c~rtain 11uestion:; 3bout t!u2 rcst).*iction::t cont.--:.1.~t"'d in ::-.y letter cf Decl:nber 30, 1~'76 applvin~
to the dis;_:.o~itic-:-. ;1 t -r:cccvc:::-,:i,,1 p1uton:1u.-:i.
'!'his m.'.ltter 1.s unr:!et" review and 'I-le uill h~ r~spon 'i i!1!?, Lo it l7 Gl'?parate correspondencs..
_;'0; *- ii t\L tl~~'.!! i,':.. H.. ~
~ We would li!<.c to strer,s that thVr apprny~J. is intended aG an int<?ri-;i\ accot:J:Tiodation *11ending a fliial decL:iJ.on on thP. ovcr.:ill U.S. p,':'licy aFJ to c?in!)o:.ition cf trr.:i<!ic'.l tcd fur~l end is r-lf thont prejudice to t;1at dcd.sion.
.'\Ko, in tid:1 lnstnucP. a.<1 t:~11 as in tha C3se of the.~ Cn.brcr.:i fuel r,:*proc~s::-!11:~ 4'-pprovnl, s11ould futur~ broa<l consult=~tions laaci to intcrn:it:i.on3.l ~:~r~(~u1:nt on nc':.7 f.t:cl ~ilrr,ly nrr~:!z.c;-;1~nts 1.:1cL.1*.li.n~ r<::::_.irocl!3'.3i:if',1!.* oUrnr disposition of irradlat~d fuel we would exrect to consult ~ith the partle!J conc2rr.i:?d to con~i.dcr. Htiethcr t:1csu n~\7.r:r,,n::i;c::~ntq should be npr,licable tc;> the fu~l t,hich wa ~1:,.vc ar,pr.ovPd for transfer.
Enclosures:
- 1.
Dept. of State Action !*femo dtd 3-3-77
- 2.
Dert. of State Tclc~r~ra
<ltd 2-26-77
- 3.
Dept. of State TQJ.egram dtd 2-9-77
- 4.
Dept. of State Tele~ram clt~ 1-24-77
- 5.
Dept. of Stat~ Telegram
!!els on F. SJcv.-~rin1...Jr.
A1sigtant /.(~wi:1i;:;ti:-,,tor Intcrn~tio:1~!1 !-.ffa.iT3
&, ;7)6-,D Fo£iJS *_ ~Tb/G'U (51')*1
- 1. ::5E. IE-I Fct,/J-5 dtd 1-14-77
~
cc: M. Gallego, Embassy of Spain bee:
A. Giambusso, D/ AJ.A
- G. H~lfrich, OIPI:DIR J. Vanderryn, OIRDP:DIR N. Sievering, Jr. (2 cys)
R. Fulner, OROO OIP!: HS ISA JC OIPI: DIR I
D/ AIA
- f~ 1**** *****************
...... 3/1~ **************** *.,. lds,,ov-J *****~*-******...... lt'l,;-,-**************
UNITED 'STATES
- ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.
20545 Kazuo Suzuki
- st Secretary (Scientific) assy of Japan 0 Massachusetts Avenue, NW.
hington, D.C.
20008 r Mr. Suzuki:
- SEP 16 1977 1 i ', *
- is in reference to the MB-10 retransfer approval document which you 1ed on July 25, 1977, for the transfer of 42 spent fuel bundles (con-1ing 8.3 MTR) from JAPC0 1s Ts~ruga Power Station to British Nuclear s Ltd.
(BNFL).
- ou are aware, it is current U.S. policy to approve retransfers of
-origin spent fuel for reprocessing only on a case-by-case basis upon ear showing of vital need for such retransfer.
In this instance, we prepared to approve the retransfer based ~pon the statement contained 1,-.
1-..L...1...-...._,
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~ -""':~-
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~
t-
- 1,-\LJl-..o t 1:;
- .;.;;;
- j vi
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1;11/,
1t*u1111*ir *
.J, JOlmoyana O Ul"\r\.,
0
- 3. F. Helfrich indicating that removal of this spent fuel is necessary iintain 'operation of the Tsuruga Power Station and the detailed analysis
!nted in support of this conclusion.
The present approval should not
)nsidered in any way to set a precedent for U.S. action on future Lnsfer requests for reprocessing; each must be considered on its
, i du a 1 mer i ts.
ermore, this approval is conditioned upon the following understandings:
That if prior to actual reprocessing the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation leads to international agreerr.ent on new fuel supply arrangements including reprocessing or other disposition of irradiated fuel, the parties will consult to determine whether the new arrangements should be applicable to this Tsuruga Fuel.
Please be assured that the U;~. will not revoke this approval, although it would be possible, of course, for the parties concerned to agree that new arrangements s*hou 1 d become app 1 i cable.
That this spent fuel is to be retained by BNFL until such reprocessing and that, thereafter, the produced plutonium will be returned to Japan and the recovered uranium either returned to Japan or sent ta t.be U.S. for reenri chment.
In accordance with applicable agree~ents~for cooperation, such transfers would, at that tio.e, have to be approved by the Government of the United States.
- azuo.Suzuk1 2
SEP 1 6 1977 That JA?CJ is prepared to expeditiously examine and to advise ERDA of its conclusions on oossiole m~asures for expanding t:1~ pool stora,;*: ca~~city for T<;uruga fu~l.
!quest your confirwation of t~,e above understandinrJS; it 1s our
,f t.;c1t t; i :? latt:::r t,o ar~ con~istc.:nt.dt!1 th,1 infor::1ation furnis~1ed
,~CO.
Llµ0n r~ceipt of your confirmat1on we will sign and return an t~d co;;y of t1,~,iL-lj.
Eurato~ Washington L1~1son Office
~K ~nbassy - J. Gaunt Sincerely, Original signed by Nelson F..;,*_vering, Jr.
Nelson F. Sievcr1ng, Jr.
Assistant Ad::iinistrator International Affairs *
- r. Martin Gallego ncustrial Counselor mbassy of Spain 700-lSth Street, N.N.
ashington, o.c.
20009 ear Hr. Gallego:
OCT 2 8 1977
~is is in reference to the MB-10 retransfar approval
- >cument which was signed by Dr. !1. L. Rodriguez of P.N-Spain on June* 30, 1977 and by you on.".trgust 30, 1977 transmitted to this office with your letter of l\ugu;~t 2, 1977) for the transfer of 191 spent fu~l asserr.l)li,::s
- ontaining 3G, 320,666 grams of urc1nium ~.:i th 1% enr.:L.~h-
- nt in U-235) from the Garona power plant in Spain to
....; t.; eh '1.;,,,..1~ar Fiue1 s T.~r,
( ~1'.T'l";'L\
~-
--1*
---~*
I*
3 you are aware, the current U.S. policy j_.3 to ap[)ruve
~trctnsfers of u.s.-origin s9ent fuel for rcpro~~ssing 11~, on a casa-by-case basis upon a clear :1hc*:1ing of Ltal need for such retran~far.
In this i~stance, it is been concluded that on review of your letter of 1gust 22, 1977, and discussions with ENFL the i:m-:n;2di.at~
- oblarns in which the Garona power station finds it~clf
- \n b:J -cen:porarily alleviated through the e::.-:t.8nsion frcr:i
~ptember 17, 1977 to Barch 17,- 1978 of thG previously
>proved MB-10 (RTD/EU (SP) -7) of 81 spent fuel asser:1b:i.ies
> BNFL.
It is noted that 63 spent fuel asse~blies f~om 11s approval still remain to be shipped to Rl!FL.
j\ccorc:-
igly, the U.S. h~reby apr,roves this extension.
This
>proval for extension is not to be considered in an~r....,,ay
> set a precedent for U.S. action on future retransfcr
!quests for reprocessing; eaqh must be considered on its 1dividual merits.
1rthcrr.1ore, this ext~nsion of approval is conditioned
>on the following understandings:
,ppy_::,~~~-.:.=\t t! ! :. *
~
~- ~
. Martin Gallego OCT 2 8 1977
> That if, prior to actual reprocessing, the Inter-national Fuel Cycle Evaluation leads to inte.rnational agreement on new fuel oupply arrangements, the parties will consult to see whether such arrangements should be applicable to this Garona fuel.
Please be assured that the U.S. will not revoke this approval, although it would be possible, of course, for the parties con-ccrce<l to agree that new arrangements should become applicable.
- That prior U.S. approval will be required with respect to facilities in which any subsequant alteration, use or ::Jtorage* (other than at the r~processing site) of any resulting plutonium might occur.
That JEN of Spain is prepared to expeditiously examine and to advise the U.S. Depart~ent of Energy of its conclusions on possible measures for expanding the pool storage capacity for Garona fuel.
r.ecn,,~~-t vnur r.nn f i rma tion of t!le a!J,::.v~ uncer~t:1:n~ j !1!'!~ ~
~
~
are also request~d to provide this office with completed i~s of the SER-1 forr.i (attached) within 30 days after
~al shipment of the spent fuel ass~~~lies.
Please note in~tructions provided on the back of the SER-1 form.
to the remainin~ 128 spent fuel assemblies included in
~ mo~t recent r~trnnsfer request, it is suggested that 1fter furthi:?r review of your situation concerning these
- ,n.i spent fuel nssernblies you find it necessary that r alr;o be retran!';fcrrcd to rn-ITL, that a new :-m-10
~an~fer request be submitted to -DOE.
Please be assured
- we will continue to consider requests for retransfers ipent fuel for re~rocessing on the ~ame basis as outlined
,e.
You ar~ reminded that such requests should be 1itted to this office no later than three (3) months
~. Martin Gallego OCT 2 8 1977
,efore actual trans~cr is to be made in order that we 1ay have sufficient time to ~8Vicw the Matter and, if ecessary, further r.0~*1snlt *
....;ith you.
Sinccr~ly, Odginal signed ty Nelso:1 F. Sie11cring, Jr.
~cl~on F. Si~v~ring, Jr.
01fic~ of the Assist~nt Secretary fc~ Int2rn~tion~l Affairs ncloGurc:
CR-1 Fo~1
- c :
Hr. F. Spaak, :-3I::"-AT0?*1 Liriison Of£ic~
I-.-t.r. J. G i:! un t,
1~ r i ti n h N. Sicvering, Il\
( 2 )
A. Giambusso, IA P. Brush, GC
- v. Hudgins, IS.Z\
J. Haycock, DSS R.-Fulner, OROO
- EI IA:,)(... ~,'
- .. 1
,?_::~_/ __
J....;:r:;...;. s;..:.1~-\._* __,_
---1..l...::r:....;;1~-\.....,..1-1 ---=-=- I r~
IA,..,-
BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS January 10, 1978 tr. Nelson Sievering leputy Assistant Secretary
- nternational Programs 1epartmen t of Energy rashington, D.C.
ear Mr. Sievering:
It is my understanding that the issue of U.S. approval ights over the retransfer and/or utilization within the uropean Community (EC) of recovered enriched uranium and lutonium remains unresolved with the EC and the UK with espect to spent fuel retransfers for the Japanese Tsuruga nd Spanish J. Cabrera reactors (.MB-l0's approved December 30, 977) and the Spanish Garona reactor (MB-10 approved March 17, J 7 7).
Subsequently, this issue appears to have been prag-1tically resolved, insofar as retransfers to BNFL are
- ,ncerned, in the September 1977 retransfer approval for 1e Japanese Tsuruga reactor.
Further, a similar approach 1d been found acceptable for the Spanish Garona reactor 1 its Au.gust 1977 request for the transfer of 191 spent 1el assemblies.
(This approach apparently was not imple-
!nted by DOE; however, when it was decided only to grant L extension of the original approval for transfer of 81
- sernblies.)
In these cases, the generic _approach has been to
.ve the transferor and/or the EC advise us that, ln effect, e former retains control over the fuel and the recovered oducts and, concurrently, to have the transferor inform that he will authorize no subsequent disposition of the el or products without explicit U.S. approval.
The acceptance of this pragmatic approach by the U.K.
d by Japan and Spain in eac~of these latter cases appears open the way for resolution 6f-this same issue with re-ect to t~e earlier MB-10 approvals (i.e., initial Tsuruga, Cabrera, and Garona retransfers).
We therefore suggest
~t the DOE now approach the Japanese and the Spanish and CONF.IDeN'PI.itL GDS
~est a "clarification" of the earlier record to show it in each of these earlier cases they also have the rht to determine the ultimate disposition of recovered 1nium and plutonium from the spent fuel involved and it they will obtain U.S. approval prior to exercising LS right.
Since in all of these cases the fuel is to reprocessed by BNFL -- from whom recovered material Ll not be available prior to 1987 at the earliest anticipate that there should be no difficulty in taining such undertakings.
In this regard, we believe that agreement on 1guage along the following lines should be sought:
"The u.s.-origin spent fuel for ~hich U.S.
approval for retransfer to BNFL has been obtained and any uranium or plutonium derived from its ultimate reprocessing will be retain-ed by BNFL unless otherwise mutually agreed by BNFL and the transferor with the prior consent of the United States."
/D -
L. Schienman UR/RPE -
W. Salisbury
/OES - - R. Sloan CDA -
C. Van Doren I" * ~;..;
- 1 I " *
, Sincerely, Louis V. Nosenzo Deputy Assistant Secretary afted:
OES/NET/EIC:DH6yle:pab ext: 24101 COWi'IDe:NTl:~t.-
APPENDIX B SHEA LETTER TO STATE OTO 12/20/77
- CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Louis V. Noscnzo Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs Room 7830 Department of State Washington, D.C.
20520
Dear Mr. Nosenzo:
Dtr, :J (1 D I~*TR I BUT I ON:
Jr!.)hea IPEI (CLASSIFIED)
LVGossick WJDircks TRehm CVSmith, Jr.
~--
HKShapar
- 1 GE rt ter EDO 2982 SChil k, SECY Jtlelson, OGC KPedersen, OPE The ColllTiission recently completed its review of proposed exports of low enriched uranium to Japan, Switzerland, and Sweden, as listed below, and concurred in the staff's recorrrnendations that the licenses be issued:
~SNM-462, Amendment No~ l (S-712); XSNM-1112 (S-658); XSNr-1-1152 (S-729);
KSNM-1146 (S-721); and XSNM-1148 (S-723).
[n connection with their concurrences in issuance of these export licenses,
- 0IT111issioners Gilinsky and Bradford have requested the following:
I.
Any significant information the Executive Branch may have on the effectiveness of past or prospective implementation of IAEA safeguards in Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland.
~-
Any 1nfonnation on steps being taken by the Executive Branch, the IAEA, and Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland to correct deficiencies, 1f any.
- 3.
The v1ews of the Executive Branch on recent reprocessing contracts between these countries and the British or French, the status of such contracts, and their relationship to U.S. efforts to discourage repro~essing and the utilization of plutonium.
~-
A surrmary of all MB-10 decisions on spent fuel from these countries since October 1976 with special regard to conditions fmpcs~d in each case on future disposition of plutonium der1ved from that fuel.
,. A statement of the policy of the Executive Branch with regard to future MB-10 requests from these countries and with regard to subsequent disposition of plutonium after reprocessing in the U.K. or France.
r,...
-CONf iU.ENJIAI:
.. \
- J
!In,,.,'
- I I )
Cl ~~ :~~;:. I :. ~ 'l *... ______
_...( 'l...
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~DNFIDENTW:
-1
" nll (J
I 2
- 6.
Any 1nfonnat1on on current plans for the storage and ultimate disposal of the spent fuel resulting from these exports.
It is recognized that some of the points raised in items 3, 4j 5, and 6 may be covered in the draft memorandum you *recently supplied on pending retransfers to the ll.K. or France for reprocessing, which is still under* review.
The NRC staff has been asked to provide a paper on the above matters for the Con-missioners by January 6, 1978. It would be appreciated ff the requested information could be provided 1n time to enable us to meet this date.
Sincerely, Original signed by __
James R. Shea /
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs
APPENDIX C CHILK MEMORANDUM TO EDO OTO 12/14/77
UNITED ST ATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 14, 1977 CE OF THE
- RETARY
'EMORANDUM FOR:
Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations
) '!
ROM:
Samuel J. Chil k, Secretar~Y~)
UBJECT:
INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS ~F\LOW ENRICHED URANIUM (LEU) EXPORTS eference is made to the following Commission staff papers pertaining to the xport of LEU and the recent Commissioner approval thereof:
SECY-77-541 XSNM-462, Amendment No. l), SECY-77-562 (XSNM-1112), SECY-77-577 (XSNM-1152),
ECY-77-597 (XSNM-1146), SECY-77-599 (XSNM-1148).
n connection with his concurrence in issuance of the export licenses contained n the reference staff papers, Commissioner Gilinsky provided the following
- >mments:
11Recent information on IAEA safeguards implementation made available to the Commission (the SSIR) together with the ONMSS qualification as to its ability to attest to the adequacy of international safe-guards have put the Commission in an awkward position in regard to their review of export license applications.
I think the Commission has got to look into the safeguards situation further.
Nevertheless, with respect to certain countries, including Japan, I am reluctant to defer action on the license applications ~resently before us, which are part of a continuing series of individual license applications, while the Staff is obtaining information from the Executive Branch which I regard as important to our.evaluation of nuclear fuel exports.
As I have requested in several previous concurrences on LEU exports, the Executive Branch should provide the Commission with a statement on the effectiveness of safeguards, a subject which they have not dealt with heretofor.
With respect to exports of low enriched fuel to Japan, I would specifically like to have the following:
(a) any significant information the Executive Branch may have on the effectiveness of past-~r _prospective implementation of IAEA safeguards in Japan;_. __
(b) any information on steps being taken by the Executive Branch, the IAEA, and Japan to correct deficiencies, if any; (c) the views of the Executive Branch on recent Japanese reprocessing contracts with the British and French: the status of such contracts, the relationship to U.S. efforts to discourage reprocessing and the utilization of plutonium; (d) a summary of all MB-10 decisions on spent Japanese fuel since October 1976 with special regard to conditions imposed in each case on future disposition of plutonium derived from that fuel; (e) a statement of the policy of the Executive Branch with regard to future MB-10 requests from Japan and with regard to subsequent disposition of plutonium after reprocessing in the U.K. and France.
Some of the points raised in (c), (d) and (e) may be covered in a recently supplied State memorandum, Pending Retransfers to the U.K.
or France for Reprocessing, which I am reviewing."
(NOTE:
All of the foregoing comments apply identically to Switzerland and Sweden.:
In connection with his concurrence in issuance of the same export licenses,
- ommissioner Bradford agreed with Commissioner Gilinsky's comments and added the following item to the aforementioned request for information:
"(f) Current plans for the storage and ultimate disposal of the spent fuel resulting from this export."
30th Cammi ss ioners assume* "that a response wi 11 be forthcoming soon.
11 It is requested that a paper which addresses the Corrmissioners' comments be forwarded through the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. January 6, 197i.
. man Hendrie
\ssioner Gilinsky
\Ssioner. Kennedy r, Policy Evaluation
\
ioner Bradford Counsel
\
International Programs
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