ML25218A228
| ML25218A228 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/2025 |
| From: | Blind A - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Dennis Galvin | |
| References | |
| OEDO-25-00290, EPID L-2025-CRS-0000 | |
| Download: ML25218A228 (0) | |
Text
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 1
17 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of the Executive Director for OperationsWashington, DC 20555-0001 PETITION UNDER 10 CFR § 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST HOLTEC PALISADES, LLC FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NTTF RECOMMENDATION 2.1 AND NRC-ACCEPTED NEI SEISMIC GUIDANCE Submitted by:
Alan Blind 1000 West Shawnee Road Baroda, MI 49101 a.alan.blind@gmail.com 269-303-6396 I. INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
OF LICENSING BASIS AND HOLTECS REQUEST On December 18, 2014, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. submitted a formal response to the NRCs March 12, 2012 10 CFR § 50.54(f) information request regarding NTTF Recommendation 2.1 for seismic
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 2
17 hazard reevaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML14357A165). That response incorporated NRC-endorsed guidanceincluding EPRI Report 3002000704 and NEI 12-06, as endorsed by NRC in ML13106A331into the licensing basis for Palisades.
As part of this submittal, Entergy made five new regulatory commitments, formally documented in the letter's Attachment titled List of Regulatory Commitments:
1.
Performance of ESEP seismic walkdowns and generation of High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations for inaccessible items, including the design and implementation of necessary modifications identified through that process.
2.
Modification of safety-related Tanks T-53A, T-53B, and T-81, such that each tank's seismic anchorage or structure achieves HCLPF capacity greater than the Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM).
3.
Submittal of a final report to the NRC summarizing the results of the above evaluations and confirming implementation of plant modifications.
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 3
17 4.
Completion of all commitments no later than the end of the second refueling outage after December 31, 2014.
5.
Retention of supporting documentation for NRC inspection.
These commitments were made pursuant to the NRCs March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter, and in accordance with NRC-endorsed guidance in ML13106A331. As such, they became enforceable elements of the Palisades licensing basis.
Holtec, as the successor licensee, is bound by these commitments unless and until they are formally revised through an NRC-approved process under 10 CFR § 50.90.
Holtecs July 28, 2025 letter (PNP 2025-026, ML25209A479) proposes to reinstate and extend all unfinished commitments. Notably, it also fails to address the required structural modifications to safety-related Tanks T-53A, T-53B, and T-81.
Instead, Holtec proposes to complete remaining seismic hazard reevaluation activitiesincluding the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA), ESEP walkdowns, and procedural updatesby March 27, 2026, several months after resuming reactor operations in late
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 4
17 2025. Hotels letter is silent on Tanks T-53A, T-53B, and T-81. Holtec claims it will follow the implementation approach described in NEIs April 9, 2013 letter titled Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations (ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379),
which was subsequently endorsed by the NRC in its May 7, 2013 letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331) and incorporated into the licensing basis for Palisades., which was accepted by the NRC and forms part of the Palisades licensing basis.
This petition argues that Holtecs proposal violates the substantive obligations, timing requirements, and NRC approval prerequisites established by the NEI guidance and the 2014 licensing basis. Holtec is preparing to return the reactor to service without completing the required seismic risk assessments and structural modifications, and without seeking NRC approval for the proposed deferraldirectly contradicting the NRCs post-Fukushima regulatory framework. The omission of the tank modifications in particular further highlights the licensees failure to implement all safety measures committed to under 10 CFR § 50.54(f).
II. Admissibility Statement (for 10 CFR § 2.206):
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 5
17 The petitioner alleges that Holtec Palisades, LLC is in violation of 10 CFR § 50.54(f), its established licensing basis, and NRC-endorsed implementation guidance by proposing to restart the Palisades Nuclear Plant without completing seismic hazard reevaluation commitments originally submitted by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. on December 18, 2014 (ML14357A165). These commitmentsmade in accordance with NRC-endorsed NEI guidance (ML13101A379 and ML13106A331)include completion of the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA), ESEP walkdowns with HCLPF evaluations, and structural modifications to safety-related Tanks T-53A, T-53B, and T-81. Holtec has neither fulfilled these obligations nor requested and obtained NRC approval for deferral under 10 CFR § 50.90. Therefore, Holtecs proposed restart schedule constitutes a material noncompliance with applicable regulatory requirements and licensing commitments, warranting enforcement action under 10 CFR § 2.206 III. ACTIONS REQUESTED Petitioner respectfully requests that the NRC:
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 6
17 1.
Reject Holtecs proposed schedule for deferred completion of post-Fukushima seismic reevaluation activities unless and until NRC Staff formally reviews and approves that schedule as compliant with the 10 CFR 50.54(f) process and the NEI April 9, 2013 guidance.
Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations.
The NRC has stated that schedule extensions or deviations from the NEI path forward require NRC approval. Specifically:
Licensees who propose an alternative schedule must provide a basis for that alternative and obtain NRC approval.
NRC Staff Endorsement of NEI 13-01, External Flooding and Seismic Hazard Reevaluations Implementation Plan, ML13106A331 (May 7, 2013), p. 6
Holtec has not submitted a formal schedule change request or provided a technical justification for deferring required safety evaluations until after restart for NRC evaluation.
2.
Issue an order prohibiting Holtec from entering Mode 6 or loading fuel at the Palisades Nuclear Plant unless one of the following conditions is met:
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 7
17
- a. Holtec has completed all required seismic reevaluation actions under NTTF Recommendation 2.1, including:
Completion of the full Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA);
Use of SPRA insights to determine and implement required plant modifications, procedural changes, or compensatory strategies;
Completion of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) walkdowns and associated High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) evaluations for inaccessible components;
Submission of a final seismic reevaluation response to NRC addressing Enclosure 1 of the March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter.
3.
OR NRC Staff has formally reviewed and approved an alternative milestone schedule that includes justification based on Holtecs submitting required information, for deferring these safety activities beyond fuel loading and startup.
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17 4.
Require Holtec to revise its licensing basis or restart schedule to reflect timely compliance with these requirements, consistent with NRC expectations for sites classified as Category 4 under the NRCs July 3, 2019 letter (ML19140A307) (i.e., sites whose reevaluated seismic hazards exceeded their design basis but were allowed to defer SPRA submittals solely because they were expected to permanently shut down prior to the SPRA due date) and the obligations set forth in the NEI April 9, 2013 implementation guidance.
IV. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH NRC-ACCEPTED IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE A. SPRA Must Be Completed Before Restart The NEI guidance requires that plants with reevaluated seismic hazards exceeding their original design basis complete a full Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) prior to continued operation. The SPRA must be used to determine whether seismic risk remains acceptable and whether modifications are needed.
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 9
17 Holtec proposes to complete its final SPRA and submit it to the NRC by March 27, 2026months after its intended return to operation in late 2025. Restarting prior to SPRA completion violates the requirement that seismic risk be quantified and reviewed before operation resumes. (See Section IV-A for supporting analysis showing Palisades reevaluated hazard exceeds its original design basis.)
B. SPRA Insights Must Be Applied Before Restart NEIs April 9, 2013 letter states that the results of the SPRA must be used to identify what modifications, procedural changes, or strategy changes are needed to maintain defense-in-depth. Holtec has deferred completion of this process until March 2026 under its Commitment 3 (Attachment 3 to Letter PNP 2025-026, ADAMS Accession No. ML25209A479), which states that the company will use insights from the SPRA to determine modifications, procedure changes, or strategy changes by March 27, 2026. This means that committed safety decisions based on seismic risk insights will not occur until after Palisades has resumed operation without prior NRC review or approval.
This deferral undermines the intent of NTTF 2.1 and NRC-approved guidance. The plant will operate with no assurance that seismic
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 10 17 vulnerabilities have been properly mitigated, evaluated, and approved by NRC.
C. Seismic Walk-downs Must Be Completed Prior to Fuel Loading As part of the ESEP (Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process) process, walk-downs and HCLPF (High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure) evaluations for inaccessible items are required to verify the integrity of components credited for safe shutdown during a seismic event. Holtecs current plan (Commitment 2) schedules these actions to be completed after full power operations, by March 27, 2026.
Deferring these evaluations until after restart creates a scenario where safety-significant vulnerabilities in as-built plant conditions could go unaddressed during reactor operation. This directly contradicts the purpose of the ESEP and the NEI guidance, which assume walk downs will be completed before fuel load.
D. Final NRC Submittal Must Precede Restart Under the NEI approach, licensees must submit a final report documenting the seismic reevaluation process and demonstrating the plants ability to meet safety requirements under the updated hazard. This report must
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 11 17 address all elements of Enclosure 1 of the NRCs March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter.
Holtecs plan places this final submittal at the end of March 2026, even though the NRCs licensing decisions regarding Palisades restart are expected in late 2025. This sequence bypasses the final decision-making checkpoint envisioned by the NRC after Fukushima and removes a key safety verification step.
V. APPLICABILITY OF NEI GUIDANCE AND SEISMIC HAZARD CLASSIFICATION FOR PALISADES Holtecs July 28, 2025 submittal cites NEIs April 9, 2013 guidance as the basis for resuming its seismic reevaluation process. The NEI letter was accepted by the NRC as the implementation path for responding to the agencys March 12, 2012 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, and Palisadesunder Entergycommitted to following it (PNP 2013-033, ADAMS Accession No. ML13116A341).
The NEI guidance specifies:
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 12 17 Plants whose reevaluated hazard exceeds their design basis will perform a seismic risk evaluationeither a SPRA or seismic margin assessment (SMA)to demonstrate that core damage and containment failure frequencies remain acceptably low.
(NEI April 9, 2013 letter, Enclosure, p. 3)
The seismic risk evaluations are intended to support regulatory decision-making and ensure the plant can continue safe operation.
(NEI April 9, 2013 letter, Enclosure, p. 4)
Palisades was classified by the NRC as a Category 4 (Deferred) site in the July 3, 2019 NRC letter (ML19140A307), which states:
Sites binned in Category 4 had reevaluated seismic hazards that exceeded the design basis and were allowed to defer SPRA submittals because they were expected to permanently shut down prior to the SPRA due date.
Holtec acknowledges this classification in its July 2025 submittal.
Therefore, the decision to allow deferral was conditional on permanent shutdown. Now that Holtec seeks to restart the reactor, the SPRA and related evaluations must be completed, or receive NRC approval, before
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 13 17 operation resumes, consistent with the NEI implementation path and NRCs regulatory intent.
Note: This regulatory history supports the petitioners statement that:
The NEI guidance specifies that the full SPRA is to be developed before returning to power operations, especially in cases where the plants reevaluated hazard exceeds its design basis (which Palisades does)."
IV-A. PALISADES REEVALUATED SEISMIC HAZARD EXCEEDS ITS DESIGN BASIS The NRCs July 3, 2019 letter to power reactor licensees (ML19140A307) explicitly placed Palisades in Category 4 (Deferred). This classification is reserved for plants where the reevaluated seismic hazard exceeds the plants original licensing/design basis but which were allowed to defer SPRA submission only because they were expected to permanently shut down:
Sites binned in Category 4 had reevaluated seismic hazards that exceeded the design basis and were allowed to defer SPRA
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 14 17 submittals because they were expected to permanently shut down prior to the SPRA due date.
(NRC Letter, ML19140A307, p. 3)
Holtecs July 28, 2025 submittal acknowledges this classification, stating:
PNP was binned as a Category 4 plant due to the impending closure of the plant With the docketing of the certifications for permanent cessation of operations the remaining 50.54(f) letter seismic activities were no longer necessary.
(Holtec Letter PNP 2025-026, ML25209A479, p. 2)
Thus, the only reason Palisades was exempted from submitting a full SPRA prior to cessation of power operations was the NRCs expectation that the plant would not return to service. That condition is no longer valid.
Holtec is now actively seeking to reverse the 50.82(a)(1) certifications and return Palisades to full power operations. As a result, the original trigger for SPRAexceedance of the design basis seismic hazardagain applies.
The NEI April 9, 2013 guidance requires that plants exceeding their design basis complete the SPRA and apply its results before operation resumes. As shown above, both the NRC and Holtec have
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 15 17 explicitly confirmed that Palisades is one such plant. Therefore, Holtecs current plan to resume reactor operations without completing the SPRA or applying its insights is in direct conflict with the applicable regulatory framework.
VI. HOLTEC HAS NOT OBTAINED NRC APPROVAL FOR ITS PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE SCHEDULE Holtecs submittal includes a milestone schedule that delays completion of the SPRA and associated activities until after the plant resumes operation.
However, Holtecs letter to NRC has not sought NRC approval for this alternative schedule, nor has it provided a technical justification as required by the NRCs regulatory framework and the Palisades Licensing Basis.
The NRC Staffs endorsement of NEI 13-01 (ML13106A331) makes this obligation explicit:
Licensees who propose an alternative schedule must provide a basis for that alternative and obtain NRC approval.
(ML13106A331, Enclosure, p. 6)
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 16 17 By omitting this request, Holtec is proceeding on an unauthorized, not NRC approved, schedule for safety-critical evaluations. This is a clear procedural defect under the NRCs 50.54(f) process and undermines the credibility and enforceability of the post-Fukushima seismic hazard reevaluation framework.
implementation and the licensing basis trail for Palisades.
VII. CONCLUSION Holtecs proposal to restart Palisades prior to completing its SPRA and seismic safety evaluations violates the NRC-accepted NEI framework, undermines regulatory transparency, and circumvents necessary NRC approvals. The 50.54(f) process requires that updated hazard information be used to verify plant safety and determine whether continued operation is justified. Holtecs current schedule bypasses this requirement.
I respectfully request that the NRC take immediate enforcement action under 10 CFR § 2.206 and prohibit fuel loading and entry into Mode 6 at Palisades until Holtec demonstrates full compliance with NTTF
August 5, 2025 Docket 05000255 of 17 17 Recommendation 2.1, as defined by NEIs April 9, 2013 guidance and NRCs post-Fukushima safety framework.
Respectfully submitted, Alan Blind