ML25192A125

NEI - Request for Review and Endorsement of NEI 25-05, Fabrication of ASME Code Items Prior to the Identification of an Owner

ML25192A125
Person / Time
Site:	Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date:	07/11/2025
From:	Nichol M Nuclear Energy Institute
To:	Michele Sampson Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
Shared Package
ML25192A124	List: ML25192A125 ML25192A126
References
NEI 25-05
Download: ML25192A125 (1)

Text

Marc Nichol Executive Director New Nuclear Phone: 202.713.8131 Email: mrn@nei.org July 11, 2025 Michelle Sampson Deputy Director for New Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of New and Renewed Licenses U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Request for Review and Endorsement of NEI 25-05, Fabrication of ASME Code Items Prior to the Identification of an Owner Project Number: 689

Dear Ms. Sampson:

On behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 and its members, we are pleased to submit the enclosed guidance NEI 25-05, Fabrication of ASME Code Items Prior to the Identification of an Owner, for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) review and endorsement. This guidance provides a proposed process for a licensee or applicant for a license to accept for use safety-related ASME Code items that were fabricated by an ASME Certificate Holder (ACH) prior to the identification of an Owner.

Historically, the fabrication of safety-related components began after a licensee or applicant established a contract with the ACH. In this traditional model, the licensee or applicant would stipulate in the contract with the ACH that the quality assurance process and component design must satisfy applicable NRC requirements, and the NRC would inspect the ACH and take enforcement action if requirements were not being satisfied. To achieve the pace of construction needed during this Energy Emergency, long-lead safety-related components must be produced by an ACH ahead of time an Owner is identified. Manufacturing safety-related components without a licensee or applicant as an Owner is permitted by the regulations for ASME Code items less than or equal to 4 inches in diameter. The approach proposed in NEI 25-05 would remove that limitation and is based upon ASME Code Case N-883-2, Construction of Items Prior to the Establishment of a Section III, Division 1 or Division 5 Owner. We request that the NRC review ASME CC N-883-2 as part of the review and endorsement of NEI 25-05 to ensure that the NRC will be able to endorse ASME CC N-883-2 without 1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic regulatory and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry.

Ms. Michelle Sampson July 11, 2025 Page 2 exception in a future update of Regulatory Guide 1.84, Design, Fabrication, and Materials Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section III.

The NRC previously reviewed and endorsed ASME CC N-883-1 in Regulatory Guide 1.84, Design, Fabrication and Materials Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section III, Revision 39. However, in that endorsement the NRC took exception to the use of the Code Case in instances when there is not an NRC licensee or applicant as the Owner, making the Code Case effectively unusable. NuScale requested NRC action to enable the fabrication of ASME Code items without an Owner (ML24177A233). While the NRC response to NuScale (ML24204A242) provided some additional information on the rationale for not permitting fabrication without a licensee or applicant as the Owner, it did not articulate the concerns in sufficient detail that industry could propose a solution. In a subsequent NRC public meeting, NEI requested clarification from the NRC on their conclusions and provided information on why the concerns identified by the NRC should not preclude the fabrication of large ASME Code items without an identified owner (ML25059A110 and ML25059A100). Key insights from that meeting were:

1. The NRCs concerns are primarily based on the fact that the NRC does not have regulatory jurisdiction over a supplier unless they are contracted by an NRC licensee, and as such the NRC does not have the ability to perform inspections, issue violations or provide enforcement of these entities.

2. The NRC had not considered the alternative model from the perspective of their jurisdiction and authority over a future licensee that would later take receipt of a large ASME Code component that was fabricated prior to identifying an owner, and the ability at that time to ensure the quality and to establish NRC regulatory jurisdiction.

The NRCs concern appears to be related primarily to the ability of the NRC and an Owner to perform oversight and the NRC to take enforcement action during the fabrication of the components. We performed an evaluation of the NRC Vendor Inspection findings over the past 10 years. Attached is a summary of that evaluation, and several key observations were made. Most notably is that there are very few findings, most of the findings are not significant, and ACHs have fewer and less significant findings than the general population of safety-related suppliers for which the NRC currently permits fabrication without a licensee or applicant as the Owner. While having a Part 50 Appendix B quality assurance program, or ASME Certification, is not a guarantee of compliance with requirements, the deviations were primarily process issues categorized as nonconformances.

Further, these insights align with the NRCs prior statements that vendor inspections are not themselves the foundation for ensuring compliance with requirements, but rather an additional layer that is elective. Thus, in response to recent Executive Orders and the ADVANCE Act to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the NRC regulations, the NRC should consider changes to NRC Vendor Inspections, since they are not necessary to provide reasonable assurance that safety-related components will be capable of performing their safety functions. In addition, we request that the NRC review and endorse NEI 25-05, Revision 0, and that all associated review activities, including meetings and supplemental submittals, be granted a fee waiver pursuant to 10 CFR 170.11(a)(1)(ii).

This guidance supports generic regulatory improvements by enabling consistent application of NRC

Ms. Michelle Sampson July 11, 2025 Page 3 requirements for a new business model that is being pursued by numerous companies, and will result in predictable and consistent regulatory treatment, and avoid the need for case-by-case NRC approvals. This guidance is also an important aspect of the Rapid High Volume Deployable Reactor (RHDRA) framework. The report also supports the goals of the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300, Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This is a high priority for the industry, and we request that the NRC complete the review in a timely manner, preferably within 60 days.

Please contact me or Tom Basso (tbb@nei.org) if you have any questions or require additional information.

Sincerely, Marcus Nichol Executive Director, New Nuclear Enclosures cc:

Greg Bowman, NRR Jeremy Bowen, NRR/DANU Prosanta Chowdhury, NRR/DNRL/UARP NRC Document Control Desk

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 1 An overview of the NRCs Enforcement and Oversight of the supply of safety-related components is discussed in Section 3.3 of NEI 25-05. The NRC performs vendor inspections to evaluate the vendors performance in ensuring the reasonable assurance that safety-related components will satisfactorily perform their intended safety function. The focus of the NRC Vendor Inspections is on the vendor procedures and processes, and the NRC determines compliance with NRCs quality assurance and reporting requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B and Part 21. The NRC documents noncompliance with NRC requirements, and categorizes them as one of the following:

1. Unresolved Item: An issue about which more information is required to disposition it as acceptable, a "nding or a violation.

2. Nonconformance: A vendors failure to meet contractual requirements related to NRC-regulated activities (e.g., Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50), where the NRC has not placed the requirement directly on the vendor.

3. Violation: The failure to comply with any portion of a legally binding regulatory requirement, such as a statute, regulations, order, license condition or technical speci"cation. Note that the NRC may also issue an Apparent Violation in circumstances that do not appear to meet NRC requirements and for which the NRC sta has not made a "nal enforcement determination.

Violations have the following Severity Levels:

I.

Severity Level I II.

Severity Level II III.

Severity Level III IV.

Severity Level IV V.

Minor Violation (Less than Severity Level IV) - Not the subject of formal enforcement action and not usually described in inspection reports.

4. Non-cited Violation: A violation which satis"es the criteria in the NRC Enforcement Policy that allows discretion to the NRC to not issue a violation.

The NRC uses routine and reactive inspections for vendors. Routine inspections are performed to verify that requirements are met. Reactive inspections are in response to reported problems or de"ciencies, typically in response to a problem identi"ed by the NRC or from outside sources.

It is important to note that while the NRC identi"es nonconformances, it is the violations that are most signi"cant to evaluating the ability to comply with NRC requirements.

The following provides insights and conclusions from the NRCs Vendor Inspection "ndings from 2014 through 2025 (to date). The "ndings are summarized on the table A-1.

The inspection data covered vendors involved in supplying components or services to nuclear power plants, including for the AP1000 reactor design. The scope spanned various QA activities, including design, fabrication, testing, commercial-grade dedication, and control of suppliers. Links to the vendor inspection reports and associated documents can be found at Inspection Reports l NRC.gov.

A total of over 200 inspections from 2014 to 2025 were reviewed, encompassing both ASME Certi"cate Holders and non-certi"cate holders. All of these inspections appear to be routine inspections rather than

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 2 reactive inspections. The number of inspections, and "ndings (nonconformance and violations) per year for the period from 2014 through 2025:

Table A-1: Counts of NRC Vendor Inspections and Findings from 2014 to 2025 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Inspections 29 23 28 28 17 14 16 13 9

17 18 3

Inspections with Findings 21 16 14 7

8 4

4 3

8 8

0 Total Nonconformances 43 34 33 21 16 8

5 4

5 7

15 0

Total Violations 3

3 5

2 0

0 0

1 0

5 2

0 The "ndings were predominately process-oriented eciencies, and the procedural issues generally were not directly related to defects in components. These results support the NRC earlier position that vendor inspection provides increased assurance that the products and services provided by unlicensed organizations for use in licensed activities meet NRC requirements. The NRC vendor inspection provides additional assurances, and is not itself the foundation for ensuring compliance with requirements, but rather an additional layer that is elective and applied in a manner appropriate to the safety significance.

The NRC states, The program is based, however, on the premise that licensees have the primary responsibility for the procurement of quality products and services for use in licensed activities..(50 FR 47716)

Based on these insights, it is concluded that NRC vendor inspections are not necessary to provide reasonable assurance that safety-related components will be capable of performing their safety functions. While having a Part 50 Appendix B QA program, or ASME Certi"cation, is not a guarantee of compliance with requirements, the deviations were primarily process issues categorized as nonconformances. The following are key conclusions and recommendations to enhance the vendor inspection eectiveness and eciency:

1. Nearly all of the "ndings were related to process issues and very few were related to end-state quality (e.g., 1). This suggests that a change in NRC focus to end-state quality rather than the details of the process would be more eective and ecient.

2. The majority of "ndings related to recurring topics, e.g, design control, nonconforming materials, corrective actions, Commercial-Grade Dedication (CGD), and Part 21, among others.

This suggests that NRC should reconsider its overall QA compliance inspections to focus on the speci"c quality of components fabricated for used in safety-related applications and invest less resources on process-focused inspections.

3. Given the recurring topics identi"ed in the inspection reports, it would be useful for NRC to publish more clear guidance on their expectations on these topics.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 3 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 1

2025 Southwest Research Institute San Antonio, TX N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated SwRIs quality activities associated with the analysis and testing services for U.S. nuclear power plants.

Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection team included:

• spectrometric testing of sulfur in diesel samples for the Beaver Valley Power Station;

• receipt inspection of a plunger and a cage of a pressurizer power-operated relief valve from Sequoyah Nuclear Plant for testing; and

• irradiation testing of 17 connectors and electrical wire, as well as two mandrels ofvelectrical wire.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

2 2025 Analysis and Measurement Services Knoxville, TN N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated AMS Online Monitoring Technology (OLM) software and services for NRCs regulated facilities.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

3 2025 Framatome Inc.

Lynchburg, VA N

This inspection evaluated Framatomes implementation of activities associated with the protection of Safeguards Information (SGI) associated with the U.S. EPR design certi"cation No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

4 2024 Sulzer Pumps, Inc.

Chattanooga, TN Y

N-stamp and NPT-stamp Certi"cates of Authorization for ASME Section III Classes 1, 2, and

3.

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Sulzers implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, testing, and commercial-grade dedication of ASME and non-ASME safety-related pumps, and replacement parts and/or appurtenances for NRCs regulated facilities. The inspection addressed QA process activities and actual fabrication activities.

The NRC inspection team observed the following speci"c activities:

• Receipt Inspection of 1 Diameter Stainless Steel Bar Stock

• Machining and in-Process Dimensional Check of an Upper Gland Seal Assembly

• Penetrant Testing of a Heat-Treated Shaft Sleeve

• Pump Performance Testing of 38GMCX Model Pump No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 4 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings

• Hydrostatic Test of a Discharge Head Assembly Additionally, the NRC inspection team observed pump performance testing of a 38GMCX model pump and hydrostatic testing of a discharge head for a non-code component.

5 2024 United Controls International Norcross, GA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated UCIs implementation of quality activities associated with the commercial-grade dedication and equipment quali"cation of electrical, electromechanical components/assemblies, control panels, various chemical gases, and other components, and design, repair, refurbish and reverse engineering of various items/assemblies for NRCs regulated facilities.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

6 2024 Conval, Inc.

En"eld, CT Y

N-Stamp and NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Convals implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, testing, and commercial-grade dedication of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and non-ASME safety-related valves, and replacement parts and/or appurtenances being supplied to U.S.

nuclear power plants.

The NRC inspection team observations included:

• Machining of a 1.5 valve disk

• Dedication of a valve body

• Calibration of a caliper, micrometer, and a go/no-go gauge

• Material review board for a nonconforming threaded stem

• Final inspection of 1.5 valve disk

• Walkdown of a material storage area, measuring and test equipment (M&TE) equipment spaces, welding area, and hydrostatic testing No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

7 2024 Framatome Fuel Fabrication Richland, WA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Framatomes implementation of quality activities associated with 1) design, analysis, and No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 5 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings corrective actions associated with burnable poison rod assembly misloading for Oconee; 2) and nonconforming materials, parts, or components.

8 2024 Fisher Controls International, LLC Marshalltown, IA Y

N-Stamp and NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Fishers implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related components (e.g., valves, actuators, actuator accessories, replacement parts and/or appurtenances, etc.) being supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants.

Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection team included:

1. Commercial-grade dedication inspection and test activities for a bearing race thrust, taper pin, and a Type 67C series regulator

2. Hydrostatic testing and seat leakage testing of a 6-inch butter"y valve

3. Receipt inspection for a box of ten 67-CFR-NUC pressure regulators

4. Gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW) of a yoke/lower casing

5. Fluorescent liquid penetrant testing on a 3/4 inch round bar No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

9 2024 Analysis and Measurement Services Knoxville, TN N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated AMS implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, calibration and testing of sensors and detectors, control rod drive motor testing and noise analysis, testing of plant protection system circuit boards, electro-magnetic compatibility, and cables, "eld services and technical training for NRCs regulated facilities.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

10 2024 Bentley Systems Inc.

San Diego, CA, N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated Bentleys implementation of quality activities associated with piping and three-dimensional structural analysis software products used for safety-related applications at U.S. nuclear power plants.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 6 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 11 2024 Energy Steel and Supply Company Rochester Hills, MI Y

N-Stamp NA-Stamp NPT-Stamp NS-Stamp and NR Certi"cate Holder.

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated ESSCs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related components (e.g., pumps, valves, heat exchangers, piping subassemblies, etc.) being supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants.

Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection team included:

• receipt inspection of six long hex socket set screws with cup point per ASTM F912, Standard Speci"cation for Alloy Steel Socket Set Screws, zinc plated per ASTM B633, Standard Speci"cation for Electrodeposited Coatings of Zinc on Iron and Steel;

• tungsten inert gas welding on the Heli"ow letdown coolers for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; and

• calibration of two micrometers using calibration standard blocks.

3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that ESSC was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of identi"cation and control of materials, parts, and components, measuring and test equipment, and corrective action.

12 2024 Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC, Fort Worth, TX Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp NS-Stamp This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated PESs implementation of quality activities associated with the supply of safety-related design, reverse engineering, commercial grade dedication, equipment testing and quali"cation, repair and replacement services to NRC regulated facilities.

The NRC inspection team observed the following speci"c activities:

• Seismic quali"cation testing of a nuclear instrument assembly

• Receipt inspection of electrical breakers

• Walkdown of measuring and test equipment and nonconformance storage lockers

• Acceptance testing for the commercial grade dedication of a pressure regulator valve

• Pre-job brief and factory acceptance test for a charge alarm & load sharing assembly No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 7 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 13 2024 Doosan Enerbility, Ltd.

Republic of Korea Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Doosans implementation of quality activities associated with the construction of safety-related and important to safety components for U.S.

nuclear power plants.

Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection team included:

• Post weld heat treatment of lifting lugs on tubesheet No. F23189-010 for the replacement steam generators (RSGs) for Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2

• Ultrasonic non-destructive examination (NDE) on tubesheet forging No. F231890-030

• Temporary storage rework for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Reactor Closure Vessel Head in accordance with traveler No. 101920517

• Temporary storage of two transportable storage canisters (TSCs) for the NAC MAGNASTOR dry cask storage system.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV NRC cited one Seveity Level IV violation related to a Part 21 process issue. It did not appear that this issue resulted in a de"ciency in the fabricated component.

14 2024 ASCO L.P.

Aiken, SC N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated ASCOs implementation of quality activities associated with the supply of safety-related solenoid valves, temperature, and pressure switches, hydramotors, refurbishment/repairs, and spare parts for U.S. nuclear power plants.

3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that ASCO was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of training, control of special processes, and control of measuring and test equipment.

15 2024 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

This technically-focused inspection evaluated WECs implementation of the quality activities as they pertain to WECs development of the digital Plant Protection System (PPS) for Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Units 1 and 2.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that WEC was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, and Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

16 2024 TE Connectivity Fuquay-Varina, NC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated TECs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, manufacturing, and 2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that TEC was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of control of

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 8 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings testing of safety-related Raychem products for U.S.

nuclear power plants.

TE Connectivitys scope of supply includes safety-related Raychem products such as heat shrink tubing, molded parts, cable sealing kits, jacket repair kits, wire splices, adhesive tapes, and related items for U.S. nuclear power plants.

purchased materials, equipment, and services, and corrective action.

17 2024 Integrated Power

Services, Shreveport, LA N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated IPS implementation of quality activities associated with the repair and refurbishment of electric motors for NRC regulated facilities.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

18 2024 Westinghouse Electric Company Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility Hopkins, SC N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WEC-CFFFs implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of safety-related fuel design and fabrication for U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

19 2024 Consolidated Power Supply Birmingham, AL N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated CPSs implementation of quality activities associated with the manufacture and supply of ASME Class 1, 2, 3, and non-code safety related bars, plates, and tubes used in U.S. nuclear power plants.

Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection team included:

• Liquid penetrant testing (PT) performed on several ASME Class 1 NB 1/2 3000# socket weld (SW) carbon steel (CS) 90 deg elbows.

• Metal cutting and machining activities performed on an ASTM A36 CS 3/8 thick "at bar.

• Tensile strength testing and chemical testing performed on an ASTM A36 CS 3/8 thick "at bar.

1 Nonconformance The NRC identi"ed nonconformances regarding the commercial grade dedication process.

20 2024 Hanna Cylinders Pleasant Prairie, WI N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Hannas implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related specialized alloy fabrication and assembly services for U.S. nuclear power plants.

4 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Hanna was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of quality assurance program (indoctrination and training), control of purchased material,

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 9 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings The NRC inspection team observed the following speci"c activities:

• Machining of a hydraulic cylinder piston equipment, and services, control of measuring and test equipment, and corrective action.

21 2024 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co.

Vienna, VA N

This inspection evaluated KHNPs implementation of activities associated with the protection of Safeguards Information (SGI) associated with the APR1400 design certi"cation.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

22 2023 Henry Pratt Company, LLC Kimball, TN Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated HPCOs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, testing, and commercial-grade dedication of safety-related valves, valve parts, and appurtenances for U.S. nuclear power plants. In addition, the NRC inspection team evaluated HPCOs closure of corrective actions for the inspection "ndings documented in inspection report No. 99901349/2002-201.

NRC inspection team during this inspection included Receipt inspection of eight hex head cap screws.

Henry Pratt Company, LLCs scope of supply includes safety-related ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Non-Code Class 2 and Class 3 valves, valve parts, and appurtenances.

1 Nonconformance Cited nonconformance relates to HPCO for failing to: (1) assure that the applicable regulatory, technical, and quality requirements were included or referenced in the procurement documents for materials and services; and (2) assess the eectiveness of the control of quality by contractors.

Speci"cally, HPCO: (1) did not invoke the applicable regulatory, technical, and quality requirements in the procurement documents for paint and water testing services used in safety-related components, and (2) did not perform an assessment of the paint and water testing services suppliers to verify the adequate implementation of their quality controls associated with the manufacturing of the paint and the supply of water testing services.

23 2023 Thermo Fisher Scienti"c Oakwood Village, OH N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated TFSs implementation of quality activities associated with the manufacture of Excore Neutron Flux Monitoring System spare and replacement parts for U.S. nuclear power plants.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV TFS failed to evaluate a deviation to identify defects associated with substantial safety hazards as soon as practicable. Speci"cally, TFS received information from an NRC licensee that a screw was missing on the base/back panel of a safety-related power supply, No. 201401-101, Serial Number 514, Revision T. Upon further inspection, TFS

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 10 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings also discovered that a wrong base/back panel was installed and mislabeled. The part installed was No. 201458-101 and mislabeled as 201458-102. TFS failed to evaluate the reported deviation and document the actions in the material review board evaluation form in order to determine if a reportable defect exists that could create a substantial safety hazard.

24 2023 Namco Controls Elizabethtown, NC N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Namcos implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, manufacturing, testing and commercial grade dedication activities of safety-related limit switches being supplied to U.S nuclear power plants.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Namco was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

25 2023 Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC Cranberry Township, PA N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of safety-related design and engineering services for U.S. nuclear power plants and the Safeguards Information (SGI) program to determine its eectiveness in protecting SGI.

This was a process inspection with a walk down of SGI cabinets.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

26 2023 Velan, Inc.

Montréal, QC, Canada Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Velans implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related valves and components for U.S. nuclear power plants.

Velan, Inc.s scope of supply includes safety-related and ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code Class 1, 2, and 3 valves and valve replacement parts.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

27 2023 Ansys Corporation Canonsburg, PA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated Ansys implementation of the quality activities associated with design veri"cation and engineering simulation 2 Violations - Severity Level IV Ansys failed to adopt appropriate procedures to evaluate deviations and failures to comply and identify defects as

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 11 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings software products used for safety-related applications for US Nuclear Power Plants.

soon as practicable. Ansys failed to perform an adequate evaluation of a deviation in its products to determine a defect exists, or notify Ansys customers of all deviations (e.g., non-class 3 errors) so that they may evaluate the deviations, pursuant to § 21.21(a).

28 2023 Fluor Nuclear Power Greenville, SC N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated FNPs implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of engineering, procurement, and construction services for U.S.

nuclear power plants and advance reactors.

This was a QA process inspection.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

29 2023 Prysmian Group Willimantic, CT N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Prysmians implementation of quality activities associated with the quali"cation and commercial-grade dedication (CGD) of class 1E components for U.S. nuclear power plants.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Prysmian was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services.

30 2023 Valcor Engineering Spring"eld, NJ Y

NB-stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Valcors implementation of quality activities associated with the design, manufacture, and testing of safety-related valves and components for U.S.

nuclear power plants.

This was largely a process inspection but did include observation of receipt inspection of some O-rings and a dye penetrant examination of a unspeci"ed safety-related part.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

31 2023 Mistras Services Heath, OH N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated Mistras implementation of the quality activities associated with nondestructive examination services provided for safety-related equipment at U.S. nuclear power plants.

2 Apparent Violations (Severity Level Not Assessed)

The "rst apparent violation involves Mistras failure to adopt appropriate procedures to evaluate deviations as soon as practicable. The second apparent violation involves Mistras failure to notify all aected NRC Licensees of a deviation

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 12 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings related to Mistras failure to ensure annual calibrations for the Acoustic Emission (AE) systems.

1 Nonconformance NRC identi"ed speci"c process failures related to NDE work at operating nuclear power plants in the US.

32 2023 Nutherm International, Inc.

Mount Vernon, IL N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Nutherms implementation of quality activities associated with the quali"cation and commercial-grade dedication (CGD) of class 1E components for U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

33 2023 Global Nuclear Fuel -

Americas, LLC Wilmington, NC N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated GNF-As implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of safety-related fuel design and fabrication for U.S. nuclear power plants.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that GNF-A was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of inspections and audits.

34 2023 Ultra Energy, Round Rock, TX N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Ultras implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and commercial grade dedication of safety-related sensors and process instruments for U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

35 2023 MPR Associates, Inc.

Alexandria, VA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated MPRs implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of safety-related engineering and design services, software development, commercial-grade dedication services, and Basler excitation systems and associated components for U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

36 2023 Curtiss-Wright QualTech NP Cincinnati, OH N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated QualTechs implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of commercial-grade dedication of electrical and mechanical parts and components, original equipment manufacturing of parts and components, and environmental and seismic quali"cation services to the U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 13 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 37 2023 Fluke Biomedical Company Solon, OH N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated FBCs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, manufacturing, and testing of radiation monitoring equipment, replacement parts, and calibration services for U.S.

nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

38 2023 Curtis-Wright - EMS -

Target Rock Farmingdale, NY N

This technical focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Target Rocks implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, manufacture, and testing of safety-related valves and components for U.S. nuclear power plants.

This is primarily related to Solenoid Valves.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Target Rock was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

39 2022 Reuter-Stokes, LLC Twinsburg, OH N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Reuter-Stokes implementation of quality activities associated with the design, manufacture and servicing of nuclear instrumentation and detectors.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Reuter-Stokes was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of Criterion VIII, Identi"cation and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

40 2022 Flowserve Flow Control Division - Limitorque Lynchburg, VA N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Flowserve Limitorques implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related Class 1E motor operated valve actuators and spare parts for U.S. nuclear power plants.

3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Flowserve Limitorque was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control, procurement document control, and corrective action.

41 2022 Schulz Electric Company East Haven, CT N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated SECs implementation of the quality activities associated with design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related components being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

Schulz Electric Company provides electric motor repairs, rewinding, and dedication services to the commercial nuclear industry.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

42 2022 Energy Steel & Supply Company Y

N-Stamp This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated ESSCs implementation of quality activities 1 Nonconformance

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 14 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings Rochester Hills, MI

[NOTE: In 2019, ESSC was acquired by Hayward Tyler, a division of Avingtrans.

Hayward Tyler was inspected separately.]

NA-Stamp NPT-Stamp NS-Stamp NR-Stamp associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related components (e.g., pumps, valves, heat exchangers, piping subassemblies, etc.) being supplied for U.S. nuclear power plants.

ESSCs scope of supply includes ASME B&PV Code Class 1, 2, and 3 design, fabrication and supply of safety related non-ASME Section III products and services for NRCs regulated facilities.

NRC identi"ed a nonconformance related to a report process issue. They did not identify an issue with speci"c components.

43 2022 Pooled Equip Inventory Co (PEICo)

Birmingham, AL N

The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the Pooled Inventory Management (PIM) which is a contracted agent of PEICo, for the support activities of the SAFER program.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

44 2022 Westinghouse Electric Company Global Operations Services Cranberry Township, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, testing and analysis of safety-related fuel assemblies being supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

45 2022 Dresser, LLC Jacksonville, FL Y

N-Stamp NV-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Dressers implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of valves and valve replacement parts for U.S.

nuclear power plants.

Dressers scope of supply includes ASME B&PV Code Class 1, 2, and 3 and non-Code safety-related Consolidated and Masoneilan pressure relief valves, control valves, parts, and appurtenances including transducers, positioners, and air-sets.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

46 2022 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Wilmington, NC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated GNF-As implementation of the quality activities associated with design, fabrication and testing of safety-related components being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

This limited-scope inspection speci"cally evaluated GNF-As implementation of activities associated with No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 15 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings the protection of Safeguards Information (SGI) associated with the GNF-As reactor design components for use in the U.S. nuclear power plant.

47 2022 Curtiss-Wright Steam and Air Solutions Summerville, SC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated CW-SAS implementation of the quality activities associated with design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related components being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

CW-SAS provides Terry Turbine pumps, spare parts, and services to the commercial nuclear industry.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

48 2021 Engine Systems, Inc.

Rocky Mount, NC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated ESIs implementation of the quality activities associated with safety-related testing services provided to U.S. nuclear power plants.

Engine Systems provides diesel engine replacement equipment and services to U.S. nuclear power plants including safety related components, seismic and environmental quali"cation services and commercial grade dedication services for diesel engine parts and components.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV ESI failed to adopt appropriate procedures to evaluate deviations and failures to comply and identify defects as soon as practicable. Speci"cally, Engine Systems received a failed pressure regulating valve on February 24, 2021, from a facility subject to the regulations in 10 CFR Part 50. Due to inappropriate procedures in place, six months elapsed between the arrival of the failed part at ESI and the evaluation of that valve on August 19, 2021, which resulted in a Part 21 noti"cation to the NRC.

49 2021 Hayward-Tyler, Inc.

Colchester, VT Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp NS-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated HTIs implementation of the quality activities associated with design, fabrication and testing of safety-related components being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

The NRC inspection team observed the following speci"c activities:

• Shop area walkdown and work practices of HTIs implementation for identi"cation of parts and materials, including area of nonconforming materials No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 16 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings

• Gas tungsten arc welding on a high-pressure service water discharge head fabrication per Work Traveler UG11156-2-1

• Magnetic particle examination of a High-Pressure Service Water Lower Column Assembly per Work Traveler UG11156-1-8 50 2021 Framatome Inc.

Lynchburg, VA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Framatomes implementation of the quality activities associated with: (1) Arkansas Nuclear Ones radial peaking factor exceeding both the generic cycle independent criteria and the basic maneuvering acceptance criteria values, and (2) the digital instrumentation and control modernization project for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Framatome was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

51 2021 NTS Huntsville Huntsville, AL N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated NTS implementation of the quality activities associated with safety-related testing services provided to U.S. nuclear power plants and advanced reactors.

NTS Huntsville provides the following services to U.S.

nuclear power plants and advance reactors: third party seismic and environmental quali"cation, measurement and testing equipment calibration services, safety relief valve and snubber testing/refurbishment, and third-party dedication of seismic and environmentally quali"ed level transmitters, NTS series 812 relays, digital recorders, and circuit breakers.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that NTS was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of control of purchased material, equipment, and services and corrective action.

52 2021 Fairbanks Morse Engine Beloit, WI N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated FMEs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related emergency diesel generators and parts being supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

53 2021 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

This technically-focused inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the development of the Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS) for Entergys Waterford Unit 3 (WF3) digital upgrade project No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 17 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 54 2021 Curtiss-Wright Nuclear

- Nova Middleburg Heights, OH N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Novas implementation of the quality activities associated with design control associated for commercial-grade dedication and reverse engineering, and fabrication and testing of safety-related components being supplied to the U.S.

operating nuclear power plants.

This facility provides safety-related fasteners and machined components for U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

55 2021 FRAMATOME SAINT-MARCEL FRANCE

- MDEP Inspection N

The purpose of this MDEP multinational vendor inspection is to evaluate the ability of Framatome to ensure that the equipment delivered from its Saint-Marcel site meet the applicable participating regulators requirements. Framatome manufactures heavy nuclear island components including nuclear reactor vessels, steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pumps, and primary piping that connects the reactor to the steam generators. The Saint-Marcel site is dedicated to the assembly of vessels, steam generators, pressurizers, and primary piping. The Saint-Marcel site identi"ed technical issues in 2019 with their PWHT (electrical resistance 2 and blankets process) involving several global nuclear customers.

These identi"ed issues are applicable to past USA, Finland, and France projects, as well as ongoing France and United Kingdom projects.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

56 2021 Trillium Valves USA Ipswich, MA Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Trilliums implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related valves being supplied to U.S.

nuclear power plants for operating reactors.

Trilliums scope of supply for the U.S. nuclear power plants includes the design, manufacture, and testing of ASME safety-related valves for operating reactors.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

57 2021 SOR Inc.

Lenexa, KS N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated SORs quality assurance (QA) program 1 Nonconformance

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 18 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings activities including the design, fabrication, testing, and dedication of nuclear quali"ed pressure, dierential pressure, vacuum, and temperature switches being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

The NRC inspection team determined that SOR was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

58 2021 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

This technically-focused inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the development of the Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS) for Entergys Waterford Unit 3 (WF3) digital upgrade project.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

59 2021 Framatome Inc.

Lynchburg, VA N

This technically-focused virtual inspection speci"cally evaluated Framatomes implementation of the quality activities associated with: (1) the development of new interim safety limits associated with the Barnett and Biasi correlations used to predict the critical heat "ux to con"rm the new values ensure the 95/95 acceptance criteria is satis"ed; (2) supplier oversight, and (3) corrective action.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

60 2021 Westinghouse Electric Company (New Stanton, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of the quality activities associated with testing and quali"cation of safety-related components that comprise the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system for the AP1000 reactors currently under construction at Vogtle Units 3 and 4.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

61 2020 Framatome Fuel Fabrication Richland, WA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Framatomes implementation of the quality activities associated with: 1) design, analysis, and corrective actions associated Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluations CASMO4/MICROBURN-B2 and Fuel Performance Modeling; 2) nonconforming materials, parts, or components; 3) and safety conscience work environment.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

62 2020 Lake Engineering Company Greenville, RI N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated LECs implementation of the quality activities associated with commercial grade dedication, assembly, and testing of safety-related No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 19 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings snubber components being supplied to the U.S.

operating nuclear power plants.

63 2020 Pooled Equip Inventory Co (PEICo)

Phoenix, AZ N

The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the Pooled Inventory Management (PIM) which is a contracted agent of PEICo, for the support activities of the SAFER program.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

64 2020 AMETEK Solidstate Controls Columbus, OH N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Ameteks implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of Class 1E protection equipment, nuclear battery chargers, fusible panelboards, static inverters, terminal blocks, and commercial-grade dedication services to U.S.

nuclear power plants.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Ametek was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

65 2020 C&D Technologies Blue Bell, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated C&Ds implementation and closure of previously identi"ed Notices of Nonconformance and the corrective actions.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

66 2020 Enersys Reading, PA N

This technically-focused virtual inspection speci"cally evaluated Enersys implementation of the corrective actions taken in response to the NRC inspection teams identi"cation of instances of untimely or inadequate evaluations of material review reports (MRRs) and corrective action reports (CARs) documented in the NRCs Inspection Report No.

99901435/2020-201 No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

67 2020 Valcor Engineering Corporation Spring"eld, NJ Y

N-Stamp NS-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused virtual inspection speci"cally evaluated Valcors implementation and closure of the corrective actions taken in response to Notice of Nonconformance (NON) 99900728/2017-201-01 and NON 99900728/2017-201-03.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Nonconformances -01 and -03 were closed.

Nonconformance -02 remained open to be addressed in a future inspection.

68 2020 Framatome Inc.

Lynchburg, VA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp NR-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Framatomes implementation of the quality activities associated with the evaluations, investigations, and corrective actions associated with the ultrasonic testing inspection performed at Palisades, for the upper head control rod drive penetrations No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 20 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 69 2020 EnerSys Reading, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated EnerSys implementation of the quality activities associated with fabrication, assembly, and testing of safety-related batteries and components being supplied to the U.S.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

70 2020 ASCO L.P.

Aiken, SC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated ASCOs implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of safety-related valves for new plant construction and operating reactor projects for the U.S. nuclear power industry.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

71 2020 Westinghouse New Stanton, Pennsylvania N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated W-NSs implementation of the quality activities associated with testing of safety-related components that comprise the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system for the AP1000 reactors currently under construction at Vogtle Units 3 and 4.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

72 2020 Sargent & Lundy, LLC Chicago, IL N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated S&Ls implementation of the quality activities associated with the consulting, engineering, design, analysis, and supply of safety-related software being supplied for new plant construction and nuclear operating power reactor projects for the U.S. nuclear industry.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

73 2020 Westinghouse Electric Company Hopkins, SC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WEC-CFFFs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of nuclear fuel assemblies and nuclear fuel assembly components being supplied to the U.S. nuclear power plants.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that WEC CFFF was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of control of special processes.

74 2020 Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.

Chanhassen, MN N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated RNIIs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, engineering, manufacturing, and supply of pressure transmitters, dierential pressure transmitters, trip/calibration systems, signal conditioners, spare and replacement parts, and repair services.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that RNII was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of design and test control.

75 2020 Bechtel Power Corporation N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated BPCs implementation of the quality No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 21 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings Reston, VA activities associated with the engineering services, design modi"cations, procurement services, software, construction management and installation services being supplied to the U.S. nuclear power plants.

76 2020 Fisher Controls International, LLC Marshalltown, IA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Fisher Controls implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of valves, actuators, actuator accessories, replacement parts and/or appurtenances being supplied to the U.S. nuclear power plants.

2 Nonconformances De"ciencies identi"ed regarding design control related to electro-pneumatic transducers.

77 2019 ENSA Equipos Nucleares S.A. S.M.E.

Maliano, Cantabria, Spain Y

N-stamp This was an MDEP cooperative inspection.

This technically-focused multinational inspection speci"cally evaluated ENSAs implementation of the quality assurance (QA) activities associated with fabrication, assembly, and testing of safety-related components being supplied to operating nuclear power plants. This was a process inspection.

1 Nonconformance There was one "nding related to Manufacturing Control and Control of Special Processes. Speci"cally, while performing liquid penetrant examination of the weld preparation of the backing plate for 2PR3-10A01 to the surge nozzle, the MDEP inspection team observed the ENSA Level II inspector was not aware that the weld preparation was under the part to be inspected, and ENSA drawing OPR3.19862 Revision 0 was not used as a reference to determine the area of examination. The ENSA Level II inspector did not review the ENSA drawing prior to commencing the inspection to determine the primary area to be inspected; therefore, the part was orientated such that the primary area was under the part.

78 2019 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH)

Wilmington, NC.

N This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated GEHs implementation of the quality activities associated with the treatment of safety-related products and services supplied to the domestic nuclear power industry and the SGI program to determine its eectiveness in protecting SGI.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 22 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings This was primarily a QA process and SGI process inspection.

79 2019 Framatome Inc.

Lynchburg, VA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp NR-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Framatomes implementation of the quality activities associated with 1) design, analysis, and corrective actions associated with TCD in safety-related computer codes used for the U.S. nuclear power plants; 2) the evaluations, investigations, and corrective actions associated in the ultrasonic testing inspection performed at Palisades, for the upper head control rod drive penetration; 3) oversight of suppliers and commercial-grade dedication programs; and 4) eective protection of SGI.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

80 2019 Curtiss-Wright Enertech Brea, CA Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Enertechs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing of safety-related components being supplied to the U.S. nuclear power plants (operating and under construction).

Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection included:

• Assembly and functional pressure test on an accumulator on Project No. 801519 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

• Assembly of refurbished rotary 42K actuator on Project No. 520372 for Hope Creek Nuclear Plant

• Hydrostatic test of two 1/2-inch SAE adapters on Project No. 608358 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

• Welding Procedure Quali"cation of Welding Procedure Speci"cation No. MA328055, using the manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding process

• Receipt inspection of a valve body, 6-inches, Class 900, DRV-Z weld overlay, ASMEB&PV Code,Section III Class 3, 1974 Edition with 1975 Summer Addenda 1 Nonconformance The NRC identi"ed a de"ciency in the QA process, speci"cally the NRC inspection team determined that Enertech was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

81 2019 Arcos Industries, LLC Mount Carmel, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Arcos implementation of the quality 1 Nonconformance

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 23 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings activities associated with the fabrication and testing of safety-related welding materials being supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants (operating and under construction).

Arcos failed to ensure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identi"ed and corrected. Speci"cally, Arcos failed to initiate corrective actions for seven "ndings identi"ed during the 2018 internal audit.

Minor issues were identi"ed related to Supplier Oversight and Internal Audits and Commercial Grade Dedication and Utilization of Unquali"ed Source Material.

82 2019 AZZ Nuclear l NLI Fort Worth, TX N

This limited-scope inspection speci"cally evaluated NLIs implementation of the quality activities associated with design control and equipment quali"cation, commercial-grade dedication, and nonconforming materials/parts/components and corrective action for equipment being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

AZZ l NLI fabricates, tests, and dedicates a variety of components for nuclear facilities, including breakers, relays, switches, and software for the U.S. operating "eet.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspectors determined that NLI was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of design control with regard to the environmental quali"cation of safety-related components.

83 2019 L&S Machine Company Latrobe, PA Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated L&Ss implementation of the quality activities associated with fabrication, assembly, and testing of safety-related components for nuclear fuel assemblies being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that L&S was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

84 2019 Tioga Pipe, Inc.

Easton, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Tiogas implementation of the quality activities associated with the supply of safety-related ferrous and non-ferrous material (e.g., pipes, "ttings, "anges, bar, plates, etc.) for the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

85 2019 AREVA NP COURBEVOIE FRANCE N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated the reconciliation of the manufacturing "les for forgings with identi"ed irregularities supplied No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 24 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings by AREVA NP to U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

Speci"cally, the NRC inspection team reviewed documentation to verify that forgings were properly fabricated, inspected, and tested in accordance with customers design, regulatory, and code requirements.

This was a follow up to the MDEP inspection where issues with material certi"cations were identi"ed for a number of forgings produced by Creusot Forge.

The NRC inspection team concluded that the Framatome evaluations provide reasonable assurance that these forgings meet the design requirements and can perform their intended safety functions.

86 2019 Framatome Le Creusot Le Creusot, France Not clear but likely This was more follow up to the MDEP inspection.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

87 2019 Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC)

Cranberry Township, PA.

N This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of the quality activities associated with the treatment of TCD in safety-related computer codes used for operating U.S.

nuclear power plants and the SGI program to determine its eectiveness in protecting SGI.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

88 2019 HydroAire Services, Inc.

Chicago, IL Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated HydroAires implementation of the quality activities associated with design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of safety-related pumps being supplied to the U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

HydroAires scope of supply for the commercial US nuclear industry includes manufacturing, repair, and replacement of safety-related American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 1, 2, & 3 and non-ASME safety-related pumps, including spare/replacement parts, components, and appurtenances; associated engineering; and "eld services.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that, HydroAire failed to calibrate its digital pressure gages over their entire working range of 0-7000 pounds per square inch gage (psig) used during hydrostatic test activity of Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler &

Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code. The NRC inspectors identi"ed twenty-two hydrostatic tests (two safety-related pumps and eighteen pump components) where HydroAire inadequately calibrated the digital pressure gages at an operating range of 1167-7000 psig and used them during testing of ASME Section III safety-related components at a hydrostatic pressure range of 152-370 psig.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 25 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings HydroAire has been Inadequately calibrating and using these digital pressure gages since 2016. The validity of such hydrostatic test results are of indeterminate quality.

89 2019 Westinghouse New Stanton, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Westinghouses implementation of the quality activities associated with testing of safety-related components that comprise the uninterruptible power supply system for the AP1000 reactors currently under construction at Vogtle Units 3 and 4.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

90 2019 Applied Testing Services, Inc.

Marietta, GA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated ATSs implementation of the quality activities associated with testing and calibration services provided for safety-related materials and equipment in support of operating nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

91 2018 Transware Enterprises Inc.

Sycamore, IL N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Transwares implementation of the quality activities associated with nuclear "uence evaluations for the U.S. nuclear industry No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

92 2018 Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB facility Vsters, Sweden N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WES implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of nuclear fuel assemblies and nuclear fuel assembly components for U.S. nuclear power plants.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that WES was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of control of special processes and inspection.

93 2018 Laboratory Testing, Inc.

Hatfield, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated LTIs implementation of the quality activities associated with testing and calibration services provided for safety-related materials and equipment in support of operating nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

94 2018 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

This inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS)

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 26 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 currently under construction.

95 2018 Hayward Tyler, Inc.,

Colchester, VT Y

N-Stamp The purpose of the limited scope inspection was to assess HTIs compliance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, and selected portions of Appendix B, Quality Assurance Program Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.

This was a QA program process inspection rather than an inspection that evaluated any speci"c component or fabrication method but is important because they are the "rst Section III, Div. 5 N-stamp holder.

5 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that HTI was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of procurement document control, control of purchased material, equipment, control of measuring and test equipment and services, and corrective action.

96 2018 Crane Nuclear, Inc.

Bolingbrook, IL Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated CNIs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related valves and, replacement valves and components being supplied to the construction of the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design in Waynesboro, GA and to current operating reactors.

This inspection closed a 2015 nonconformance related to corrective actions.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

97 2018 Gutor Electronic LLC Wettingen Switzerland N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Gutors implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of components that comprise the Uninterruptable Power Supply System for the Westinghouse AP1000 reactors being constructed at the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 site.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Gutor was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control and instructions, procedures, and drawings.

98 2018 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of aspects of the HFE program associated with the HFE veri"cation and validation activities related to Integrated System Validation (ISV).

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 27 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 99 2018 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of quality activities associated with design control, oversight of suppliers, internal audits, and corrective actions.

This was a QA program implementation inspection rather than an inspection evaluation speci"c components or fabrication processes.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

100 2018 Target Rock, a division of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company East Farmingdale, NY Y

N-stamp This technically-focused inspection concentrated on implementation of TRs QA program activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) proof of concept valve to provide reasonable assurance of the feasibility of a "rst-of-a-kind-engineering (FOAKE) design to support NuScales design certi"cation application submittal activities.

2 Nonconformances De"ciencies were identi"ed in Design Control, Test Control, and Corrective Actions.

101 2018 Schulz Electric Company New Haven, CT N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated SECs implementation of the quality activities associated with the rewinding, repair, and supply of safety-related motors to the U.S. nuclear industry.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that SEC was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control and control of purchase material, equipment, and services.

102 2018 Turner Industries Group, L.L.C.

Paris, TX Y

NA-Stamp NPT-Stamp NS -Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Turner Industries implementation of the quality activities associated with the design and fabrication of the piping subassemblies for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

103 2018 General Electric Hitachi Nuclear Energy Wilmington, NC --

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL

- AMERICAS, LLC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated GNF-As implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of the nuclear fuel being supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that GNF-A was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

104 2018 Flowserve Corporation Lynchburg, VA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Flowserves implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of the Limitorque motor-operated valve 3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Flowserve was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control, inspection, control of

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 28 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings actuators and replacement valve parts for the U.S.

nuclear industry.

quality assurance records, and control of purchase material, equipment, and services.

105 2018 Dresser, LLC Jacksonville, FL Y

N-Stamp NV-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Dressers implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of the main steam safety valves for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design and for the domestic operating reactors.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

106 2018 IHI Corporation Yokohama, Japan N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated IHIs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of the conical roof structure components for the Shield Building of the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design for the domestic reactors being supplied to Vogtle Electric Generating Station, Units 3 & 4.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

107 2018 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA.

N This inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 currently under construction.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

108 2017 Newport News Industrial Corporation Newport News, VA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated NNIs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of the air inlet panels and tension ring panels for the Shield Building of the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design for the domestic reactors being supplied to Vogtle Electric Generating Station, Units 3 & 4.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

109 2017 System One Holdings, LLC Cheswick, PA N

The inspection assessed aspects of System Ones quality assurance activities, which included the corrective action and audit programs associated with the training and quali"cation for nuclear power plant licensees regarding activities associated with conducting inspection and nondestructive examination of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs)

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 29 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 110 2017 Flowserve Pump Division Vernon, CA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated FLSs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related pumps for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design and for the domestic operating reactors. Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection team included:

• Commercial-grade dedication for safety-related items such as O-Rings and small machined parts

• Calibration of a 1000 PSI pressure gauge.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

111 2017 SOR Inc.

Lenexa, KS N

This inspection evaluated SORs quality assurance (QA) program activities including the design, fabrication, testing, and dedication of nuclear quali"ed pressure, dierential pressure, vacuum and temperature switches supplied to the domestic nuclear operating "eet.

2 Nonconformances The NRC identi"ed multiple examples where SOR failed to qualify safety-related switches in accordance with technical and purchase order requirements to verify the switches could meet their intended safety function under the most adverse design conditions.

112 2017 Valcor Engineering Corporation Spring"eld Township, NJ N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Valcors implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of the solenoid valves and replacement valve parts for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design and for the domestic operating reactors.

3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Valcor was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control, control of purchase material, equipment, and services, and control of measuring and testing equipment.

113 2017 The Okonite Company Ramsey, NJ N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Okonites implementation of quality activities associated design control, quali"cation, control of purchased materials, test control, measuring and test equipment (M&TE),

nonconforming materials, internal audits, 10 CFR Part 21, and corrective action activities for operating reactor plant No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

114 2017 Aecon Industrial Cambridge ON Canada Y

NA-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Aecons implementation of the quality activities associated with the fabrication, assembly, and testing activities of mechanical modules being supplied to the Westinghouse Electric Company No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 30 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings AP1000 reactor design. This was partially related to the spool-piece issue discussed in the 2016 inspection.

115 2017 Konecranes Nuclear Equipment & Services, LLC New Berlin, WI N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated KNESs implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of the containment building polar crane for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stations Units 1, 2 and

3.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that KNES was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control and of control of purchased equipment, materials, and services.

116 2017 Vigor Works, LLC Clackamas, OR Y

NS-Stamp NA-Stamp NPT-Stamp U-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Vigors implementation of the quality activities associated with the fabrication, assembly, and testing activities of CB20 Passive Containment Cooling Water Tank L modules being supplied to the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactor design.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

117 2017 Flowserve Corporation Raleigh, NC Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Flowserves implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related valves and valve replacement parts for the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC)

AP1000 reactor design and for the current "eet of operating reactors. Speci"c activities observed by the NRC inspection team included:

• hydrostatic and pneumatic testing on a 6-inch motor operated valve (MOV) for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (hereafter referred to as V.C. Summer) Unit 2

• hydrostatic testing on an 8-inch automatic depressurization system (ADS) MOV for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (hereafter referred to as Vogtle) Unit 3

• functional testing on an 8-inch ADS MOV for Vogtle Unit 3

• receipt inspection of a body casting for a gate valve for Arkansas Nuclear One

• "nal inspection of two 1/2-inch globe valves for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 4 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Flowserve was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of instructions, procedures, and drawings, control of purchased equipment, materials, and services, and control of special processes.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 31 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings

• ultrasonic testing inspection of a hinge pin replacement part for LaSalle County Station

• liquid penetrant testing (LP) inspection of a seat ring for a 38-inch valve for Vogtle Unit 3

• LP inspection of a bonnet for a 6-inch valve for Vogtle Unit 3

• radiographic testing of a welder as part of their American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code quali"cation

• welding on a stainless steel disk piston for an 8-inch valve for V.C. Summer Unit 2 118 2017 Pennatronics Corporation California, PA N

During this inspection, the NRC sta evaluated aspects of Pennatronics fabrication and testing of build-to-print circuit boards, nonconformance, corrective action (CA), and commercial grade dedication program implementation.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

119 2017 Mirion Technologies (IST) Corporation Horseheads, NY N

This technically-focused inspection evaluated Mirions design, manufacturing and testing of the AP1000 excore detector nuclear instrumentation for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 sites currently under construction.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Mirion was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of control of purchased material, equipment, and services for various raw materials used in the production of excore detector nuclear instruments.

120 2017 Greenberry Industrial Corvallis, OR Y

PP-Stamp P-Stamp S-Stamp U-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Greenberrys implementation of the quality activities associated with the fabrication, assembly, and testing of the safety-related AP1000 containment "oor modules being supplied for the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactor design and that will be delivered to Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 & 4 and V.C. Summer Nuclear Generation Station Units 2 & 3.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

121 2017 Mirion Technologies Inc.

Bualo, NY Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This inspection speci"cally evaluated Mirions implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication of containment penetrations for the AP1000 reactors currently under construction in the U.S., as well as containment penetrations, squib No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 32 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings Note: Speci"c to Bualo site.

valves, and resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) being supplied to the U.S. nuclear operating "eet.

122 2017 C&D Technologies Attica, IN N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated C&Ds manufacturing and testing of batteries supplied to operating nuclear power plants.

1 Nonconformance Speci"cally, C&D failed to verify that an internal audit was performed by personnel not having direct responsibilities in the areas being audited.

123 2017 Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse Mangiarotti)

Hopkins, SC Y

NA-Stamp NPT-Stamp NS-Stamp This technically-focused inspection evaluated Mangiarottis implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for the WEC AP1000 reactor design. Additionally, this inspection evaluated the implementation of corrective actions taken by WEC to address the supplier oversight issues identi"ed at Mangiarotti.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that WEC was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action associated with incorrect use of material for the Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (PRHR HXH) lower support stiener plates.

124 2017 Velan Inc.

Montreal, QC, Canada Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Velans implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of safety-related valves and valve replacement parts being supplied to the domestic operating reactors.

Inspectors observed activities related to various valves with sizes ranging from 4-inch to 1-inch.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV Velan failed to specify in procurement documents for suppliers of safety-related materials and services to be procured as basic components that the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 apply.

125 2017 AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS Columbus, OH N

This inspection focused on AMETEKs work to develop, test, and validate the design of a digital uninterruptable power supply (UPS) system (battery charger, inverter, and transfer switch) for the Hope Creek Nuclear Plant.

2 Nonconformances The inspectors identi"ed two Nonconformances in the areas of design control and corrective actions. These "ndings were associated with AMETEKs supply of replacement parts and legacy analog systems.

126 2017 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

This inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 currently under construction.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Resolved previous nonconformances with no new "ndings.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 33 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 127 2017 AREVA Inc.

Lynchburg, VA N

This inspection focused on AREVA Inc.s documentation and evaluation of potential carbon macrosegregation issues in forgings supplied by AREVA for U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

128 2017 Pooled Equipment Inventory Company -

PIM Birmingham, AL N

This technically focused inspection evaluated PEICo/PIMs implementation of activities, at its second location in Memphis, TN, associated with the storage, maintenance, procurement, testing, and FLEX equipment deployment during an emergency to U.S.

operating nuclear plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

129 2017 L&S Machine Company Latrobe, PA Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated L&S implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication of safety-related fuel assembly components for the Westinghouse Electric Company.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that L&S was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of Corrective Action, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, and Audits.

130 2017 Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Target Rock Division East Farmingdale, NY Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated TRs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, procurement, manufacture, and testing of valves with an emphasis on 6-inch by 10-inch relief valves.

1 Nonconformance The inspection team determined that TR was not implementing its commercial-grade dedication program in accordance with the requirements of Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

131 2017 Swagelok Company Solon, OH Y

NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Swagelok's implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, and testing the safety-related valves and replacement parts for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design and for several domestic operating reactors.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Swagelok was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

132 2017 Chicago Bridge & Iron Laurens, SC Y

N-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated CB&I Laurens implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing of safety-related piping for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV CB&I Laurens failed to adequately evaluate a deviation potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(1).

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 34 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 133 2017 Westinghouse Waltz Mill Site Madison, PA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, quali"cation and rewinding of safety-related motors for the NRC licensees.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

134 2017 Westinghouse/WECTEC facility Charlotte, North Carolina N

The purpose of the inspection was to review implementation of Westinghouses processes for transferring the design requirements contained in the AP1000 Design Control Document into detailed engineering, procurement, and construction documents, consistent with NRC requirements. The focus of this inspection was on the Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (IDS) and supporting systems.

1 Nonconformance The inspectors determined that Westinghouse did not fully implement its QA program in the areas of design control and commercial-grade dedication regarding this "nding.

135 2017 Pooled Equipment Inventory Company -

PIM Birmingham, AL N

The purpose of the limited-scope inspection was to assess PEICo/PIMs conformance with the provisions of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, as endorsed by the NRC.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

136 2016 Enercon Services, Inc.

Kennesaw, GA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated Enercons implementation of quality activities associated with the commercial-grade dedication of the Storm Precipitation Analysis System (SPAS) software, Versions 9.5 and 10.0.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Enercon was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of design control, related to commercial-grade dedication.

137 2016 Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Division Cheswick, PA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated EMDs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing of the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) for the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactor design.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that EMD was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control and control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

138 2016 AZZ Nuclear l NLI Fort Worth, TX N

This inspection speci"cally veri"ed the closure of nonconformances identi"ed in NRC Inspection Report 99901298/2012-201 involving the adequacy of design changes and commercial-grade dedication of requested testing services by Nemko. This inspection also veri"ed critical characteristics associated with MIL-STD-461E, Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of 1 Violation - Severity Level IV AZZ l NLI failed to adequately evaluate deviations associated with a substantial safety hazard for a dedicated item.

4 Nonconformances The inspectors determined AZZ l NLI was not fully implementing its QA program in

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 35 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings Subsystems and Equipment, and the applicable Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61000, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), tests were included in the commercial-grade survey.

the areas of design control and corrective action.

139 2016 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of aspects of the HFE program associated with the HFE veri"cation and validation activities including: Human-System Interface (HSI)

Task Support Veri"cation (TSV) and Integrated System Validation (ISV).

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

140 2016 Pentair Valves and Controls Mans"eld, MA Y

N-Stamp This inspection speci"cally evaluated Pentairs implementation of quality activities associated with the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of the PV-16, auxiliary relief valves, for the Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP1000 reactor design.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Pentair was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

141 2016 General Atomics San Diego, CA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated GA-EMSs production of radiation monitoring systems (RMSs) for the U.S. AP1000 "eet and operating reactor plants.

4 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that GA-EMS was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control, related to commercial-grade dedication; control of purchased material, equipment, and services; control of measuring and test equipment; and corrective action.

142 2016 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of quality activities associated with corrective actions, oversight of suppliers, procurement document control, and design control.

2 Nonconformances Speci"cally, 1) WEC failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality that could potentially aect regulatory compliance and/or nuclear safety when WEC determined that the design of safety-related valves for the AP1000 did not comply with ASME Section XI, and 2) WEC failed to apply adequate design control measures to ensure that accessibility for inservice inspection was provided for AP1000 safety-related valves.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 36 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 143 2016 Paxton & Vierling Steel Carter Lake, IA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated PVSs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of containment structural modules for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

144 2016 Aecon Industrial Cambridge ON Canada Y

NA-Stamp NPT-Stamp This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Aecons implementation of the quality activities associated with the fabrication, assembly, and testing of the Q223: Direct Vessel Injection B mechanical module being supplied to the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactor design. The inspection also evaluated activities related to Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PV Code) and the American Welding Society D1.1:2000, Structural Welding Code - Steel.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

However, during the walkthrough of the fabrication shop as part of the bag man trip, the NRC sta observed two 10-inch piping spools supplied by Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) in Laurens, South Carolina that had abrupt weld contours that did not meet Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, of the ASME B&PV Code, which requires osets to have at least a 3:1 taper over the width of the "nished weld or, if necessary, by adding additional weld metal beyond what would otherwise be the edge of the weld. The NRC sta noted that the outside diameter oset was visible for approximately half of the pipe weld circumference, and acts as a stress concentration and could aect the design stresses and piping integrity.

As a result of this observation, Aecon issued Non-conformance report (NCR) -

No. A00002-000-0206, dated June 30, 2016.

During the full inspection the NRC inspection team veri"ed that Aecon adequately disposition NCR -No. A00002-000-0206, and that non-conforming material was repaired as dispositioned by the designer (WEC). The NRC inspection

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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nei.org 37 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings team observed that the welds had been repaired to meet the requirements of the ASME B&PV Code and the WEC design speci"cation. After observing the repairs, the NRC inspection team inspected other welds and identi"ed seven additional welds that did not meet the requirements of the ASME B&PV Code and the applicable design speci"cation. Aecon issued NCR -No. A00002-000-0259 that will require WECTEC Source Inspectors to perform 100 percent inspection on all of the piping spool welds manufactured by CB&I Laurens that are currently being installed into the mechanical modules at Aecon. Since WEC has responsibility for the piping spools, WEC will take ownership of the corrective actions to be performed by Aecon. The NRC will evaluate WECs corrective actions for the piping spool welds that did not meet the ASME B&PV Code and the design speci"cation requirements during the next scheduled inspection at WECs headquarter oces.

145 2016 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

This inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 currently under construction.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Closed previous nonconformances.

146 2016 Namco Controls Elizabethtown, NC N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Namcos implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication, testing, design control, quali"cation, and commercial grade dedication activities associated with safety-related limit switches to U.S. operating nuclear plants and AP1000 plants.

4 Nonconformances The NRC sta determined that the implementation of your QA program did not meet certain NRC requirements imposed on you by your customer or NRC licensees in the areas of commercial grade dedication; nonconforming material, parts or components; corrective

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 38 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings actions; and instructions, procedures and drawings.

147 2016 SPX, Copes-Vulcan McKean, PA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp NR-Stamp This inspection speci"cally veri"ed the closure of nonconformances identi"ed in NRC Inspection Reports 99900080/2012-201 and 9990080/2013-201; evaluated the adequacy of design changes to the squib valves that were implemented to address issues concerning water intrusion identi"ed during quali"cation testing; and evaluated the adequacy of a modi"cation to the initiators (part of the squib valve explosive system) that was implemented to address degradation in performance identi"ed during recent data analysis.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

148 2016 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

The purpose of the inspection was to review the corrective actions taken by WEC in response to two issues (Nonconformance 99900404/2011-201-02 and Open Item 99900404/2011-201-05) identi"ed during a previous NRC inspection associated with the design and quali"cation testing of systems and components being supplied as part of the AP1000 reactor design.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Two previous nonconformances remained open, pending submittal, review and approval of License Amendment Requests by AP1000 licensees.

149 2016 GE Oil & Gas Pineville, LA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated GE Oil & Gass implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of the PV-65 Main Steam Safety Valves for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design, as well as relief valves for the operating reactor "eet.

1 Nonconformance GE Oil & Gas failed to adequately identify and verify the speci"ed critical characteristic of tensile strength during the dedication of valve spindles.

150 2016 Equipos Nucleares, S.A (ENSA)

Maliano, Cantabria (Spain)

Y N-stamp This inspection speci"cally evaluated ENSAs implementation of quality activities associated with the design and fabrication of the replacement steam generators for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 in accordance with the applicable requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code. The enclosed report presents the results of the inspection.

3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that ENSA was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control, control of purchased material, equipment, and services, and control of special processes.

151 2016 Electroswitch Corporation N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Electroswitchs implementation of quality 2 Nonconformances

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings Weymouth, MA activities associated with the manufacturing, design, and testing, for safety-related power switches and relays supplied to U.S. operating nuclear power plants.

Speci"cally, (1) Electroswitch failed to qualify multiple components and product lines to meet the requirements of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, (IEEE) 323 and IEEE C37.90 as required by multiple purchase orders; and (2) failed to ensure that commercially procured materials, components, and services had adequate veri"cation to meet 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requirements and ensure that the commercial materials and parts are equivalent to what was originally quali"ed.

152 2016 Lisega Inc.

Kodak, TN N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Lisegas implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, manufacturing, and testing of American Society of Mechanical Engineers,Section III, piping supports being supplied to the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design as well as operating reactors.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

153 2016 Exelon PowerLabs, LLC Coatesville, PA N

The technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated quality assurance (QA) activities associated with the testing and calibration of safety equipment supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

154 2016 ASCO Valve, Inc.

Aiken, SC N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated ASCOs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of the safety-related solenoid valves and hydramotors for the operating nuclear power plants. In addition, the inspectors evaluated environmental quali"cations for safety-related solenoid valves performed at ASCO for Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactors.

1 Nonconformance Speci"cally, 1) ASCO failed to conduct commercial-grade surveys at the manufacturer of commercial elastomers to verify the critical characteristic for material identi"cation. 2) ASCO failed to verify identi"ed critical characteristics through inspection and testing for a nuclear coil kit and a nuclear O-ring, as established in their acceptance method plan. 3) ASCO failed to provide the technical basis for selection and use of sampling plans for CGD of commercial

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings elastomers for the critical characteristic material identi"cation by destructive testing as part of their acceptance method plan.

155 2016 Carboline Company St. Louis, MO N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Carbolines implementation of the quality activities associated with the design, manufacturing, and testing of nuclear grade protective coatings being supplied to the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 new reactor plants design as well as current operating reactors.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

156 2016 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs implementation of aspects of the HFE program associated with the HFE veri"cation and validation activities including: Human-System Interface (HSI)

Task Support Veri"cation (TSV), HFE Design Veri"cation (DV), and Integrated System Validation (ISV).

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

157 2016 Cameron Measurement Systems City of Industry, CA N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Camerons implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication, design, testing, and commercial-grade-dedication (CGD) activities for safety-related switches and pressure transducers supplied to U.S. operating nuclear power plants No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

158 2016 SPX, Copes-Vulcan McKean, PA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp NR-Stamp The inspection was performed on the premises of United Technologies Incorporated in Fair"eld, California who is a commercial contractor to SPX. The inspection was focused on the design validation testing of squib valve explosive system, which is part of a component that is being supplied for use in safety-related applications in the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design. Since United Technologies does not have a nuclear quality assurance program, this inspection focused on SPXs commercial-grade dedication and oversight of these activities.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

159 2016 Canberra Industries Inc.

N This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Canberras implementation of quality 3 Nonconformances

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings Meriden, CT activities associated with the fabrication, design, testing, and commercial-grade-dedication (CGD) activities for the radiation monitoring systems and safety-related systems supplied to U.S. operating power plants.

Speci"cally, (1) Canberra failed to adequately dedicate the use of commercial supplier TUV for services that support safety-related quali"cation activities; and (2) failed to ensure that several purchase orders (POs) were adequately dedicated and reviewed for appropriate quali"cation as required by the POs.

160 2016 Nova Machine Products Company Middleburg Heights, Ohio N

This technically-focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Novas implementation of quality activities associated with the design and fabrication of safety-related American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code fasteners and machined components, and Novas reverse engineering processes for safety-related components supplied to U.S. nuclear power plants.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV Nova failed to conduct a Part 21 evaluation for a deviation potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard as soon as practical and within 60 days of discovery concerning two degraded hydraulic control unit (HCU) accumulators installed at Fermi Unit 2, which were reverse-engineered and supplied by Nova.

3 Nonconformances The inspectors determined that Nova was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of: design control, commercial grade dedication, and internal audits.

Speci"cally; 1) Nova failed to establish adequate design control measures to verify and check the adequacy of the design of hydraulic control unit accumulators used in the control rod drive system of boiling water reactors, 2)

Nova failed to establish adequate measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Nova failed to assure that purchased material and

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings services, whether purchased directly or through contractors and subcontractors, conform to the procurement documents; and 3) Nova failed to verify that audits were performed by personnel not having direct responsibilities in the areas being audited.

161 2016 C&D Technologies, Inc.

(C&D) facility Blue Bell, PA N

This inspection speci"cally assessed C&Ds corrective actions to close previous NRC identi"ed violations, an unresolved item, and other nonconformances identi"ed in inspection reports 99901385/2009-201.

It appears the company makes or assembles batteries. This was related to failures in the Part 21 program and was being considered for escalated enforcement.

3 Apparent Violations - Considered for Escalated Enforcement Notice of Violation not issued pending determination on escalated enforcement.

2 Nonconformances Speci"cally, C&D failed to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality and failed to prevent recurrence of a signi"cant condition adverse to quality.

162 2016 Sulzer Pumps (US) Inc.

Chattanooga, TN Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp This inspection speci"cally evaluated Sulzers implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of the safety-related pumps for the operating nuclear reactors "eet.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed 163 2016 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

This inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Component Interface Module (CIM), a sub-system within the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C.

Summer Units 2 and 3 currently under construction.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed 164 2015 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

Inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 currently under construction.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed 165 2015 Crane Nuclear, Inc.

Bolingbrook, IL N

Inspection evaluated Cranes corrective actions related to the NRC inspection "ndings identi"ed and documented in Crane Inspection Report No.:

9990145/2015-201.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV Crane failed to evaluate a deviation potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(1) or provide an interim report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 1 Nonconformance Speci"cally, the NRC inspection team determined that Crane was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective actions.

166 2015 SPX, Copes-Vulcan McKean, PA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp NR-Stamp The inspection was focused on the design validation testing of squib valve initiators, which are components that are being supplied for use in safety-related applications in the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

167 2015 Specialty Maintenance and Construction, Inc.

A Division of Metaltek International Lakeland, FL N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated SMCIs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication of the embed plates for the CA-01 (steam generator and refueling canal modules) and CA-02 (independent wall structure connecting CA-1 and CA-03 (in-containment refueling water storage tank module)) modules for the Westinghouse Electric Companys AP1000 reactor design.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that SMCI was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control and control of special processes.

168 2015 Thermo Fisher Scienti"c San Diego, CA N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated TFSs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing of safety-related excore neutron "ux monitoring systems supplied to U.S.

operating reactor plants and to the Watts Bar Unit 2 completion project.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV TFS failed to notify the NRC within both the initial two day and written 30 day time periods that a defect existed in a Power Range Detector (Part No. 201872-101, Serial No. 006) that was shipped to Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.

1 Nonconformance TFS failed to ensure that K-type thermocouple measuring devices were identi"ed with a serial number and calibrated at periodic intervals to maintain accuracy within necessary limits.

169 2015 ABB, Incorporated Coral Springs, FL N

Inspection evaluated ABBs implementation of quality activities associated with recent ABB Part 21 noti"cations since June 2013, and ABBs control of purchased material, speci"cally related to relays.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspectors determined that ABB was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of procedures, control of purchased material, and inspection.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings 170 2015 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

Inspection evaluated aspects of the WECs corrective action program and design controls associated with the high con"dence of low probability of failure values used in the Design Control Document and Shield Building Report.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

171 2015 Engine Systems Inc.

Rocky Mount, NC N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated ESIs quali"cation and commercial-grade dedication (CGD) of diesel engine components supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants.

2 Nonconformances ESI failed to ensure that either a commercial grade survey or source veri"cation was performed on a commercial laboratory for testing services for the four ball wear test performed for a safety-related grease. Also ESI failed to perform a root cause evaluation on a self-identi"ed signi"cant condition adverse to quality and failed to implement corrective actions to preclude repetition.

172 2015 Chicago Bridge and Iron Company Charlotte, NC N

The purpose of the inspection was to assess CB&I LCs implementation of Con"rmatory Order (CO) EA 196, dated September 25, 2014, speci"cally to evaluate communications, training, work processes, nuclear safety culture, safety conscious work environment (SCWE), and other activities at CB&I LC.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

173 2015 National Technical Systems Huntsville, AL N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated the quality assurance (QA) program as it pertains to NTSs testing services to support the quali"cation testing of the 8-inch high pressure (HP) and the low pressure (LP) squib valves in the Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) of the AP1000 reactor design.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that NTS was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of test control and control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

174 2015 Kinectrics, Inc.

Toronto, ON, Canada N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated Kinectrics implementation of quality activities associated with the testing of safety-related components supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants and to Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse) AP1000 plants under construction. The focus was on implementation of testing.

3 Nonconformances Kinectrics failed to establish adequate measures to ensure that testing requirements were satis"ed, failed to implement measures to control the issuance and use of technical documents, failed to initiate and implement the nonconformance and corrective action processes, and failed to verify a commercial-grade dedication (CGD)

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings critical characteristic associated with software validation.

175 2015 Premier Technology, Inc.

Blackfoot, ID N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated PTIs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of the Integrated Head Package and Reactor Vessel Internal Lifting Rig for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

176 2015 Fisher Controls International LLC Marshalltown, IA Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp Inspection speci"cally evaluated Fishers implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing activities of PV14 and PV63 air operated globe valves for the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactor design and of control valves being manufactured in support of operating reactors.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

177 2015 Chicago Bridge & Iron Laurens, SC Y

N-Stamp Inspection speci"cally evaluated CB&I Laurens implementation of the quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing of piping spools for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

3 Nonconformances CB&I Laurens was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of corrective action, control of special processes, and control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

NOTE: This is related to the 2016 "ndings for Aecon Industrial where de"ciencies in the spool pieces were identi"ed by NRC and subsequently by Aecon Industrial.

178 2015 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

Inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 currently under construction.

3 Nonconformances These "ndings are material to the ITAAC acceptance criteria, speci"cally, for ITAAC 2.5.02.07, in that WEC failed to identify all credible failures and perform adequate testing of isolation devices in the PMS. In addition, two "ndings material to ITAAC 2.5.02.03 were identi"ed where WEC failed to demonstrate that PMS equipment can withstand electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function.

179 2015 Crane Nuclear, Inc.

Bolingbrook, IL Y

N-Stamp NPT-Stamp Inspection speci"cally evaluated Cranes implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of safety-related valves for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design, as well as for the operating reactor "eet.

3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Crane was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of design control, corrective actions and control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

180 2015 ATC Nuclear Tennessee Oak Ridge, TN N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated ATCs quali"cation and commercial-grade dedication(CGD) of Class 1E components supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants.

3 Nonconformances ATC failed to verify the adequacy of the design of circuit breakers through a suitable testing program. Furthermore, ATC failed to identify appropriate acceptance methods for identi"ed critical characteristics of an Endevco cable assembly and 535 digital controllers.

Lastly, ATC failed to ensure that deviations between purchase order requirements and test procedures were adequately identi"ed, evaluated, and documented.

181 2015 Westinghouse Electric Company Cranberry Township, PA N

During this inspection, the NRC sta determined that the implementation of the WEC QA program failed to meet certain NRC requirements imposed on you by your customers. Speci"cally, the sta determined that WEC was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of corrective actions, oversight of suppliers, and audits. Several WEC corrective actions were neither timely nor eective in correcting these de"ciencies.

The scope of supply includes but not limited to safety-related design, fabrication, testing, and delivery of the Protection and Safety Monitoring 3 Nonconformances The sta determined that WEC was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of corrective actions, oversight of suppliers, and audits.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings System and Diverse Actuation System digital instruments and controls products to the current US AP1000 plants under construction.

182 2015 Pentas Controls, LLC Phoenix, AZ N

This technically focused inspection speci"cally evaluated Pentas implementation of quality activities associated with the refurbishing and inspection of electronic components.

3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that Pentas was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of nonconformances, corrective action, and commercial grade dedication.

183 2015 National Testing Services Huntsville, AL N

The NRC inspectors observed the setup and reviewed procedures associated with the submergence testing and irradiation of the explosive cartridges, a subcomponent of the 8-inch squib valves, which are used in safety related applications for the AP1000 reactor design.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspectors determined that NTS was not fully implementing its QA program in the area Design Control consistent with regulatory and contractual requirements and applicable procedures.

184 2015 General Cable Willimantic, CT N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated General Cables implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing of safety-related cables supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants and to the AP1000 plants under construction.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV General Cable failed to adequately evaluate a deviation identi"ed through a Nuclear Industry Assessment Committee audit that hot creep, which is listed as a critical characteristic in quali"cation test document EP-XII-5, Low voltage nuclear Ultrol Class 1E and non-Class 1E cables, was not tested as per Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA) T-27-581, Test method for measurement of hot creep of polymeric insulations, in six purchase orders.

2 Nonconformances General Cable failed to ensure that assumptions from design quali"cation reports were correctly translated into certi"cates of conformances sent to their customers and General Cable failed to take measures to ensure that original type testing performed for safety-related

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings cables envelop customer quali"cation requirements.

185 2015 Reuter-Stokes Inc., a Division of GE Measurement and Control Twinsburg, OH N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated GERS implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing of safety-related local power range monitors (LPRM) supplied to U.S.

operating reactor plants.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

186 2015 Chicago Bridge & Iron Lake Charles Lake Charles, LA N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated CB&I LCs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection activities of Westinghouse Electric Companys AP1000 reactor design of structural sub-modules for commercial nuclear power plant applications.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that CB&I LC was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

187 2014 WEC Newington, NH N

Implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM) and reactor vessel internals (RVI) for the WEC AP1000 reactor design.

1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that WEC Newington Operations was not fully implementing its QA program in the area of corrective action.

188 2014 Curtis-Wright QualTech NP, Huntsville, AL N

Evaluated QualTechs implementation of equipment quali"cation (EQ), test control, and oversight of contracted activities program.

2 Nonconformances NRC identi"ed three examples where QualTech failed to do an adequate review of suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components.

Additionally, the NRC inspection team identi"ed three examples where QualTech failed to ensure that deviations from acceptance criteria (i.e. test anomalies) and purchase order (PO) speci"cations were documented and evaluated.

189 2014 Westinghouse Fuel Handling Equipment and Crane Manufacturing (WFHE&CM) facilities N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated WFHE&CMs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and testing activities of the polar crane for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV WFHE&CM failed to evaluate a deviation potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(1) or provide an interim report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings in Shoreview and Hutchinson, MN 2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that WFHE&CM was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of corrective actions and control of measuring and test equipment.

190 2014 Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) in San Antonio, Texas N

Inspection focused on the areas of SWRIs work in the following areas: radiation testing; seismic testing; platinum plating of main steam isolation pilot valve internals; chemical analysis; and mechanical failure analysis 2 Nonconformances The NRC inspectors determined that SWRI was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of Test Control; Control of Measuring and Test Equipment; and Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings consistent with regulatory and contractual requirements and applicable procedures.

191 2014 Specialty Maintenance and Construction, Inc.

Lakeland, FL N

Inspection evaluated SMCIs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication of the remain-in-place steel formwork modules for concrete, in-containment refueling water storage tank wall and reactor vessel cavity modules for the Westinghouse Electric Companys AP1000 reactor design.

4 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that SMCI was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of corrective action, nonconforming materials, parts, or components, handling, storage, and shipping, and control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

192 2014 Oregon Iron Works, Inc.

Nuclear Product Division Clackamas, Oregon N

Evaluated OIWs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of the CA20 Auxiliary Building Modules for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design 3 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that OIW was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of (1) corrective action, (2) design control, (3) nonconforming materials, parts, or components, and (4) control of purchased material, equipment, and services.

193 2014 RSCC Wire & Cable LLC East Granby, CT N

Evaluated RSCCs design control, quali"cation testing, manufacturing, inspections, testing controls, nonconformance, 10 CFR Part 21, and corrective action activities for operating reactor plants.

1 Nonconformance RSCC failed to ensure that technical changes to safety-related design speci"cations were provided to customers in accordance with RSCCs Quality Manual.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings RSCC provides class 1E cables and commercial grade dedication services.

194 2014 Chicago Bridge & Iron Power Charlotte, NC N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated implementation of CB&I Powers quality assurance (QA) program related to oversight of contracted activities, including procurement document control and external audits, and implementation of 10 CFR Part 21 for evaluating deviations and reporting defects that could cause a substantial safety hazard.

Inspected activities related to contracted services to construct Summer and Vogtle plants.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that CB&I Power was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of procurement document control; control of purchased material, equipment, and services; and corrective action.

195 2014 Konecranes Nuclear Equipment and Services LLC New Berlin, WI N

Inspection evaluated KNESs design control, nonconformance, corrective action, and 10 CFR Part 21 activities for cranes supplied compliant with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Nuclear Overhead and Gantry Cranes (NOG) -1 requirements, especially as they relate to the replacement fuel handling crane for Indian Point Unit

3.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

196 2014 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

Inspection evaluated aspects of the WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Diverse Actuation system (DAS) and Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 currently under construction.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

197 2014 Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Korea Y

N-Stamp Inspection evaluated that Doosans fabrication activities associated with reactor coolant pump casings, steam generators, reactor vessels, and reactor vessel closure heads for the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactor design were eectively implemented and meet the applicable requirements of Appendix B, and Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

198 2014 Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated EMDs implementation of quality activities associated with 1 Nonconformance

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings Electro-Mechanical Division Cheswick, PA the design and fabrication of reactor coolant pumps for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

Because of an ongoing re-design of the RCP lower thrust bearing and lower "ywheel, this was a limited scope inspection that concentrated on organization, the QA program, nonconforming materials, parts and components, corrective actions, and limited portions of design control, e.g., a QA process inspection.

The NRC inspection team determined that EMD was not fully implementing its QA program with respect to management oversight and implementation of corrective actions.

199 2014 NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Mount Vernon, IL N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated Nutherms quali"cation and commercial-grade dedication (CGD) of class 1E components supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants.

4 Nonconformances Nutherm failed to perform an engineering evaluation to justify how a design change on a level switch was still bounded by the initial seismic quali"cation. In addition, Nutherm failed to translate contract requirements into test procedures associated with the testing of certain safety-related components. Furthermore, Nutherm failed to qualify direct current (DC) starter panels under the most severe test sequence speci"ed by IEEE 323-1974, and Nutherm did not identify or verify critical characteristics in their CGD of Global Testing Laboratories or Elite Electronics Engineering that would ensure that either commercial testing laboratory would have the capabilities necessary to perform the requirements of the electromagnetic interference (EMI) / radio-frequency interference (RFI) standards requested through Nutherms purchase orders.

200 2014 Curtiss-Wright QualTech NP, Huntsville, AL N

This inspection speci"cally evaluated QualTechs quality assurance (QA) program associated with:

design control; quali"cation testing; commercial grade dedication; inspections; testing controls; measuring and test equipment; nonconformance; 10 3 Nonconformances QualTech did not ensure that the design basis/quali"cation report for generation 3 quick disconnect electrical connectors were correctly translated into the

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

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Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings CFR Part 21; oversight of contracting activities; procurement document; audits; and corrective action activities for operating reactor plants. In addition, during this inspection, the NRC sta looked at the quali"cation activities for electrical connectors for the AP1000 squib valves.

maintenance and installation procedure.

Additionally, QualTech failed to ensure that electromagnetic interference quali"cation testing services obtained through Wyle Labs met the requirements of QualTechs purchase orders. Finally, QualTech did not document and evaluate "ve examples of test deviations.

201 2014 Valinox Nucléaire France N

Part of an MDEP cooperative inspection. Inspection speci"cally evaluated Valinoxs implementation of their quality assurance program, including associated procedures and instructions, related to the fabrication and testing of safety-related steam generator (SG) tubes for the international commercial nuclear power market.

4 Nonconformances NRC found four instances where the implementation of the Quality Assurance (QA) program failed to meet certain criteria. These included the failure to compensate for thermocouple accuracy in your heat treatment process, two examples of performing inadequate inspections, a failure to ensure records are stored properly, and a failure to perform required audits.

202 2014 RSCC Wire & Cable LLC East Granby, CT N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated RSCCs design control, quali"cation testing, commercial grade dedication, manufacturing, inspections, testing controls, measuring and test equipment (M&TE),

nonconformance, 10 CFR Part 21, and corrective action activities for operating reactor plants.

2 Nonconformances RSCC did not evaluate or place controls on the use of L4 oil on the KXL-760D insulation during the manufacturing process for Class 1E nuclear cables.

Additionally, RSCC failed to ensure that product speci"cation drawings were consistent with actual design speci"cations.

203 2014 Westinghouse Electric Company Carolina Energy Solutions Rock Hill, SC N

NRC sta looked at documentation and controls related to fabrication activities associated with the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) from Revision 19 of the approved AP1000 design certi"cation document, related to welded installation and nondestructive examination in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 53 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings The following were reviewed: 1) 1-inch special bore bosses, wide and narrow range thermowell bosses, and pressurizer spray half cap scoop components on the reactor coolant loop piping spool pieces, and 2) the buttering of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) suction casing to dilute the sulfur content in the RCP base material.

204 2014 Specialty Maintenance and Construction, Inc.

A Division of Metaltek International Lakeland, FL N

Inspection evaluated SMCIs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection of the remain-in-place steel formwork modules for concrete and in-containment refueling water storage tank wall sub-modules for the Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 reactor design.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that SMCI was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of control of special processes and nonconforming materials, parts, or components.

205 2014 Steros Isomedix Whippany, NJ N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated Steriss control over radiation testing services associated with the equipment quali"cation testing of nuclear safety-related components 1 Nonconformance The NRC inspection team determined that Steris was not fully implementing its quality assurance program in the areas of Test Control and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment consistent with regulatory and contractual requirements, and applicable procedures.

206 2014 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

NRC sta evaluated implementation of WECs commercial grade dedication program as it relates to the development of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) and inspected on-going cabinet hardware testing and channel integration testing for the PMS, as well as cabinet hardware testing for the Diverse Actuation System.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

207 2014 C&D Technologies, Inc.

Blue Bell, PA N

inspection speci"cally evaluated C&Ds design, quali"cation, and commercial-grade dedication activities associated with safety-related batteries supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants.

4 Nonconformances C&D failed to show how the seismic requirement to test aged cells was met by type testing or analysis for LCR-21 batteries. Additionally, C&D failed to adequately demonstrate that original type testing performed for K-line batteries envelop current customer quali"cation requirements. Furthermore,

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 54 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings C&D failed to implement adequate nonconformance and corrective action programs.

208 2014 United Controls International Norcross, GA N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated UCIs design control, quali"cation, and commercial-grade dedication of safety-related items supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants 1 Violation - Severity Level IV UCI failed to implement their procedures for performing evaluations of deviations and for determining whether such deviations constitute a substantial safety hazard.

209 2014 Wyle Laboratories Huntsville, AL N

Inspection was performed as part of the NRCs program to provide enhanced oversight of the manufacturing and testing of key safety related components being supplied as part of the AP1000 reactor design. During this inspection, the NRC inspectors observed the setup and reviewed procedures associated with the submergence testing of the explosive cartridges, a subcomponent of the 8-inch squib valves, which are used in safety related applications for the AP1000 reactor design.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

210 2014 Pentair Valves and Controls Mans"eld, MA N

This was a follow-up to the June 2013 NRC inspection that speci"cally evaluated Pentairs quality assurance (QA) activities associated with the testing of the pressurizer safety valve (PV-62), for the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) AP1000 reactor design and implementation of its Part 21 program. The inspection also evaluated activities related to Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code and ASME Standard QME-1-2007, Quali"cation of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants.

1 Violation - Severity Level IV Pentair failed to evaluate deviations documented in corrective action reports 673, 674 and 675 to identify defects that could be associated with substantial safety hazards within 60 days of discovery or "le an interim report to inform the NRC that the evaluation would not be completed within 60 days of discovery.

211 2014 Westinghouse Electric Company Warrendale, PA N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated WECs testing of safety-related components for the Vogtle and Summer new plant builds. NRC sta evaluated the Component Interface Module (CIM) planning phase documentation associated with the CIM software lifecycle model, and inspected on-going cabinet 2 Nonconformances The inspectors determined that the WEC design process did not adequately identify, document, or implement certain technical and administrative requirements associated with the CIM

Attachment A - Evaluation of 10 years of NRC Vendor Inspections

© NEI 2025. All rights reserved.

nei.org 55 No.

Year Company ASME Certi"cate (Y/N)

Scope Findings hardware testing, and channel integration testing for the Protection and Safety Monitoring System as well as factory acceptance testing for the Diverse Actuation System.

planning phase of the CIM software design lifecycle model.

212 2014 Chicago Bridge & Iron Lake Charles Lake Charles, LA N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated CB&I LCs implementation of quality activities associated with the fabrication and inspection activities of Westinghouse Electric Companys AP1000 reactor design structural sub-modules for commercial nuclear power plant applications.

2 Nonconformances The NRC inspection team determined that CB&I LC was not fully implementing its QA program in the areas of corrective action and control of nonconforming items.

213 2014 EnerSys Reading, PA N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated EnerSyss design, quali"cation, and commercial-grade dedication of safety-related batteries supplied to U.S. operating reactor plants No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

214 2014 Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.

Chanhassen, MN N

Inspection speci"cally evaluated RNIIs processes for corrective action, design control, commercial grade dedication, oversight of suppliers, and compliance with reporting requirements for defective parts.

1 Nonconformance The "nding involves technical evaluations that did not include requirements for veri"cation of some of the critical characteristics that had been identi"ed as essential to the safety-related functions.

215 2014 Wyle Laboratories Huntsville, AL N

NRC inspectors observed the functional quali"cation testing of the 14-inch squib valves in the 4th stage of the automatic depressurization system for the AP1000 reactor design. This test is associated with inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) from Revision 19 of the certi"ed AP1000 Design Control Document, Tier 1.

No "ndings of signi"cance were identi"ed.

Record 25-757 CODE CASE N-883-2 v2 Attachment B - ASME Code Case N-883-2 v2 (Draft)

Case N-883-2 Construction of Items Prior to the Establishment of a Section III, Division 1 or Division 5 Owner Section III, Division 1;Section III Division 5 Inquiry: Under what conditions may Certificate Holders construct items prior to the establishment of an Owner, and under what conditions may Owners utilize these items in their facility?

Reply: It is the opinion of the Committee that Certificate Holders may construct items prior to the establishment of an Owner, and that Owners may utilize items constructed under these provisions, under the following conditions:

(a) Owners may utilize items constructed under the provisions of this Case only when the items have been constructed by Certificate Holders whose quality program provides controls for completion of the Owner responsibilities as described below. The Certificate Holder shall follow the Division 1 or Division 5 requirements below for the item constructed.

(b) The Certificate Holder shall prepare, or cause to be prepared, a Design Specification(s) meeting the requirements of the Code Edition and Addenda as required by NCA/HAB-1140. Except for documenting an Owner QA program (NCA-3211.1(a)/HAB-3220(b)), obtaining an Owner Certificate from the Society (NCA-3211.4(a)/HAB-3230),

and documenting the Owner review of Design Reports (NCA-3211.20(a)/HAB-3260(a)), the Certificate Holder shall be responsible for Owner responsibilities and duties required by NCA-3200, HAA-3200, or HAB-3200 as applicable. The Certificate Holder shall retain those responsibilities required of an Owner until such time that the requirements of (i) of the Case have been completed.

Design Specifications shall include shelf-life requirements, which, if not addressed, could have an adverse effect on the design life of the item. The Certificate Holders Quality Assurance program shall define the requirements for long-term storage and shelf life of completed items. The Program shall also address provisions for shipping, cleaning, preservation, and any periodic maintenance activities deemed necessary to satisfactorily maintain the completed items.

(c) The Certificate Holder shall document the activities specific for the implementation of this Case within their Quality Assurance Program. The Certificate Holder shall meet all the applicable requirements of Subsection NCA, Subsection HAA, or Subsection HAB as applicable, and the requirements applicable to the Code Class of the item.

(d) Once an Owner contract has been received and accepted by the Certificate Holder for items constructed in accordance with this Case, the Certificate Holder shall notify the applicable Regulatory Authority having jurisdiction at the Owners facility.

(e) The Certificate Holder shall perform the preservice examinations the Design Specification requires be performed by the Certificate Holder during construction.

(f) Entries on the applicable Data Reports that would apply to a specific Owner name and/or location of installation shall be identified as unknown.

(g) Stamping of the items shall be performed in accordance with Subsection NCA, HAA, or HAB as applicable, except that the provisions of the Owners review of Design Reports shall be deferred until an Owner is established (see (i) (2) of this Case).

(h) The items shall remain under the control of the Certificate Holder until the provisions of (i) of this Case are satisfied.

Record 25-757 CODE CASE N-883-2 v2 Attachment B - ASME Code Case N-883-2 v2 (Draft)

(i) When an Owner has been established and prior to shipment of the item to the Owners facility, the following shall be completed:

(1) The Owner shall be responsible for evaluating and justifying the use of the Design Specification(s) as the basis for construction with their own Design Specification(s) and revise as needed. This evaluation and justification shall be documented as a

lifetime record.

Alternately, the Owner may adopt the Design Specifications used as the basis for construction. It is the responsibility of the Owner to assure that the Design Specifications address all regulatory requirements applicable to the items.

(2) The Owner shall provide written acceptance of the applicable Design Report in accordance with NCA-3211.20/HAB-3260.

(3) The final Data Report for the completed items shall be annotated by the Certificate Holder to include the information specific to the Owners name and location of installation, such as manufactured for and location of installation.

(4) The Authorized Nuclear Inspector shall verify that requirements of (i) of this Case have been performed and verify the updated Data Report required by (i) (3) of this Code Case has been annotated by the Certificate Holder. The Certificate Holder shall provide records for preservice examinations they performed to the Owner.

(j) The use of this Case shall be identified in the Data Report(s), Design Report(s), and Design Specification(s) for the items.