ML25077A171

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Accelerated Decommissioning Partners (ADP) CR3, LLC, Crystal River Unit 3- Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Report 07201035/2025401
ML25077A171
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/2025
From: Brice Bickett
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch
To: Reid B
ADP CR3
References
IR 2025401
Download: ML25077A171 (1)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD, SUITE 102 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415 March 26, 2025 Docket No.

07201035 License No. DPR-72 Billy Reid Site Vice President ADP CR3, LLC 2760 South Falkenburg Rd.

Riverview FL 33578

SUBJECT:

ACCELERATED DECOMMISSIONING PARTNERS (ADP) CR3, LLC, CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3-INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT 07201035/2025401

Dear Mr. Billy Reid:

On March 5, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security inspection at the permanently shut down Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3 (CR-3) ISFSI. The inspection covered your physical security plan and the October 16, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures for Dry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Order and was conducted using NRC Inspection Procedure 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you, and other members of your staff on March 5, 2025.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of an examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of more than minor significance were identified.

B. Reid 2

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this cover letter and enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, Brice Bickett, Branch Chief Security, Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 07201035/2025401 Distribution via ListServ cc w/encl:

M. Widener, Manager, Nuclear Security C. Eldredge, Chief, Bureau of Radiation Control, State of Florida BRICE BICKETT Digitally signed by BRICE BICKETT Date: 2025.03.26 14:56:20 -04'00'

ML25077A171 OFFICE RI/DRSS RI/DRSS RI/DRSS RI/DRSS NAME DCaron MOrdoyne ADimitriadis/ad BBickett DATE 03/18/2025 03/20/2025 03/24/2025 03/26/2025

Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I INSPECTION REPORT Docket No.

07201035 License No.

DPR-72 Report No.

07201035/2025401 Licensee:

Accelerated Decommissioning Partners CR3, LLC (ADP)

Address:

15760 W. Power Line Road Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 Location Inspected:

ADP, LLC, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

Inspection Dates:

March 4-5, 2025 Inspectors:

Dana Caron, Senior Physical Security Inspector Mike Ordoyne, Physical Security Inspector Approved by:

Brice Bickett, Chief Security, Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security

2 REPORT DETAILS

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3 (CR-3) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI.

The inspectors: (1) reviewed portions of the access authorization program for the ISFSI; (2) evaluated and assessed the licensees testing and maintenance program to assure the functionality and reliability of security equipment; and (3) evaluated the security systems to determine if a rapid, capable response to safeguards contingency events had been appropriately developed and effectively implemented.

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA) were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h)the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j)communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA); (k) a security organization with written procedures had been established; (l)members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o)training included ISFSI activities; (p)safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r)signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s)the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage.

b. Observations and Findings No findings were identified.

The inspectors reviewed 16 condition reports, self and independent assessments, training records, weekly equipment testing records, daily patrol records, and intrusion alarm system performance testing records. The inspectors conducted challenge testing of the intrusion detection system and the alarm assessment system.

3

c. Conclusions No violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Exit Meeting Summary On March 5, 2025, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Billy Reid, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

A-1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel M. Widener, Manager, Nuclear Security LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Opened and Closed None Closed None INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures CR3-ISFSI-0004, Nuclear Fitness for Duty Policy, Revision 4 CR3-ISFSI-0310, Access Authorization Processing, Revision 2 CR3-ISFSI-0451, Behavior Observation Program and FFD Unscheduled Work Call Out, Revision 2 CR3-ISFSI-0240, Security Keys, Locks, and Combinations, Revision 2 CR3-ISFSI-0110, Protection of Information Related to Nuclear Security, Revision 2 CR3-ISFSI-6000, Security Equipment Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance, Revision 8 CR3-ISFSI-0220, Security Communications, Revision 3 CR3-ISFSI-0580, Firearms Maintenance, Testing, and Accountability, Revision 4CR3-ISFSI-0208, Security Compensatory Measures, Revision 9 CR3-ISFSI-0201, Security Force Personnel General Orders, Duties, and Responsibilities, Revision 8 Other Crystal River Unit 3 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 5 QA-23-005, Quality Assurance Audit No. CR3-A-23-01, ISFSI Operations QS-CR3-24-001, Independent Review of the Security Program Implementation, 4/22/2024 31535-CALC-C-001, Blast Analysis of the CR3 Security Operations Center (SOC), Revision 0E2

A-2 Condition Reports 2024000064 2024000055 2024000040 2024000037 2024000033 2023000128 2023000098 2022000129 2022000118 2022000115 2022000098 2022000097 2022000096 2022000093 2022000082 2022000081 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADAMS Agencywide Documents and Access Management System CFR Code of Federal Regulations IDS Intrusion Detection System ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation LLEA Local Law Enforcement Agency NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PA Protected Area PARS Publicly Available Records