ML24270A118
ML24270A118 | |
Person / Time | |
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Issue date: | 10/07/2024 |
From: | Chang Y NRC/RES/DRA/HFRB |
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Download: ML24270A118 (25) | |
Text
IDHEAS Suite for Human Reliability Analysis
- An Overview and Recent Developmental Focuses Yung Hsien James Chang, Ph.D.
Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Presented at PSAM17/ASRAM2024 Conference Sendai, Japan October 7 - 11, 2024
2 Presentation Outline
- Near-term work focuses
- An example of supporting the development of IDHEAS-ECA desktop guide
- Opportunities for collaborations
3 IDHEAS Suite - Developmental Background
- The Significance determination process (SDP) and Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) are the NRCs human reliability Analysis (HRA) applications for reactor safety
- Require assess human error probabilities (HEPs) with specific contexts, identified by inspection findings.
- The existing methods performance influencing factors (PIFs) generally lack of adequate granularities to represent the context and data basis to assess the HEPs.
4 IDHEAS Suite - Functions and Products Function Products High-Level HRA guidance IDHEAS-General Methodology (NUREG-2198)
HEP quantification IDHEAS-ECA (NUREG-2256); IDHEAS-AT Power (NUREG-2199);
IDHEAS-Dependency (RIL 2021-14); Error Recovery (TBD);
Time Uncertainty (TBD); and HEP Uncertainty (TBD);
Expert elicitation (NUREG-2255, draft)
Data basis IDHEAS-DATA (in process) and SACADA, Guidance on data generalization and integration.
Software tool IDHEAS-ECA tool (present status: rev. 1.2)
Quality control IDHEAS-ECA desktop guide (in development); independent reviews IDHEAS-ECA Evaluation of SPAR HFEs (in process) - also demonstrate documentation.
NUREGs are available in https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/index.html.
Research Information letters (RIL) are available in https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/research-info-letters/index.html.
5 The NRCs 2024 HRA Publications
- HRA R&D five-year plan (internal)
- RIL 2024-03 Integrated Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) - Time and Time Uncertainty.
- RIL 2024-04 Human Reliability Analysis for Calculating Effects of Performance Influencing Factors: A Review of Historical Approaches.
- RIL 2024-05 Simulator Data Analysis to Inform Digitalized Environment Impacts on Human Reliability
- RIL 2024-11 Use of Expert Elicitation Guidance to Inform a Small-Scale Knowledge Judgment Application
- NUREG-2255 Expert Elicitation Guidance (in process)
- RIL 2024-xx IDHEAS-DATA Verification (in process)
- IDHEAS-ECA tool rev. 1.3 (in process)
6 Near-Term Work Focuses
- Guidance development
- Develop IDHEAS-ECA desktop guide
- Recommended by an NRC workgroup that use IDHEAS-ECA to analyze SPAR human actions
- To improve reliability and consistency of analysts applying IDHEAS-ECA
- With support of industry
- Verify IDHEAS-Dependency
- Develop IDHEAS-Error Recoveries
- Develop IDHEAS-Time Uncertainty
- IDHEAS-ECA tool rev. 1.3 - add dependency model
- Collect HRA data (continuous effort)
- Publish the in-process products
7 Develop IDHEAS-ECA Desktop Guide
- Revisit references listed in IDHEAS-DATA to
- Enhance the existing IDHEAS-ECA guidance on the selection of cognitive failure modes (CFMs) and performance influencing factor attributes (PIFAs)
- Provide adequate details about the references contents to supplement guidance to support the analysts in selecting CFMs and PIFAs
- Update the data in IDHEAS-DATA
Data Generalization and Integration 8
9 A Data Generalization and Integration Example
- Task Complexity: C1 Detection overload with multiple competing signals
- Track the states of multiple systems
- Monitor many parameters
- Memorize many pieces of information detected
- Many types or categories of information to be detected
- IDHEAS-ECA consolidates multiple data points to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs)
Task Complexity in Detection: C1
- Implemented in IDHEAS-ECA HEP range: 3E 3E-1 10
Data Sources (1/2)
There references are available in IDHEAS-DATA (Draft, ADAMS Accession #: ML20238B982).
[26] is SACADA data.
11
12 Data Sources (2/2)
[26] SACADA Detection Data
- Alarm board is dark 13 Desc.
Malfunction TOE (training objective element)
UNSAT SAT SAT SAT+
Total UNSAT Ratio(%)
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Determines 1A CCW pump has tripped 1
13 0
0 14 7.14 RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Per 0POP09-AN-02M3 ensures the standby CCW train starts with proper alignment 0
12 0
1 13 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Initiate Tech Spec actions 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Determines 1C RCP Thermal Barrier Isolation valve closed 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Per 0POP09-AN-04M7 determines the Thermal Barrier Isolation valve MOV-0390 has closed du 0
13 1
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Enters 0POP04-RC-0002 RCP off-normal 0
13 1
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Briefs loss of ALL seal cooling to be ready in case Seal Injection is lost 1
13 0
0 14 7.14 RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Loss of 1A CCW Pump Ensures Tech Specs recognition and compliance 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Total Loss of RCP Seal Cooling Determines total loss of RCP seal cooling 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Total Loss of RCP Seal Cooling Trips the Reactor and ensures Main Turbine is Tripped 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Total Loss of RCP Seal Cooling Trips 1C RCP within 1 minute of loss of RCP seal cooling 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Total Loss of RCP Seal Cooling Restores cooling with PDP prior to reaching 230 0F on the #1 seal inlet temperature 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Small Break LOCA Determines RCS leakage into the Containment building 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Small Break LOCA Ensures Safety Injection is actuated and either continues on in 0POP05-EO-EO00 or Transition 0
14 0
0 14 0
RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Small Break LOCA Determines RCS pressure has reached RCP Trip Criteria value 1
13 0
0 14 7.14 RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Small Break LOCA Determines that RCP Trip criteria is NOT met due to effectively NOT having a HHSI in service 3
11 0
0 14 21.43 RCP Seal Cooling Evaluation Small Break LOCA (IF time permits) Declares an ALERT due to FA1 any Loss or ANY potential Loss of Fuel Clad o 0
12 0
0 12 0
[26] An Example of SACADA Detection Data
- Alarm board is busy 14 Desc.
Malfunction TOE (training objective element)
UNSAT SAT SAT SAT+
Total UNSAT Ratio(%)
CVCS Issues RC filter 1A plugs Responds to changes in indicated letdown flow (alarm response) 0 11 1
0 12 0
CVCS Issues RC filter 1A plugs Diagnoses indications as plugged RC filter (alarm response directed) 0 12 0
0 12 0
CVCS Issues RC filter 1A plugs Directs swapping of in service RC filter per 0POP02-CV-0004 0
12 0
0 12 0
CVCS Issues RC filter 1A plugs Verifies adequate level exists for Letdown diversion prior to diverting Letdown 0
11 0
0 11 0
CVCS Issues Loss of power to PL125F Diagnoses loss of PL125F (ICS computer point - Point INFO) 0 11 1
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of power to PL125F Enters 0POP04-DA-0001 Loss of Non-Class 125 vdc 0
12 0
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of power to PL125F Notes power exceeding limits and reduces power per Immediate Actions of 0POP04-MS-0001 0
9 2
1 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of power to PL125F Determines need for additional CD flow, and directs/starts an additional CD pump per 0POP04-CD-000 0
11 1
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of power to PL125F Throttles DA LVL valves to <80% to prevent CP bypass and slowly controls flow to restore level. (power 2
8 2
0 12 16.67 CVCS Issues Loss of power to PL125F Notifies QSE by ring down if power reduction of more than 25Mwe is necessary.
0 12 0
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of CCW to LD HX Responds to alarms/indications on CP004. Performs alarm response 4M08/C3 1
11 0
0 12 8.33 CVCS Issues Loss of CCW to LD HX Diagnoses loss of cooling to Letdown HX 0
11 1
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of CCW to LD HX Dispatches PO to CC-TV-4494 to inspect 0
12 0
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of CCW to LD HX Enters and directs applicable steps of 0POP04-CV-0004.
0 12 0
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of CCW to LD HX Directs bypass of CC-TV-4494 or directs placing Excess letdown in service to control inventory 0
12 0
0 12 0
CVCS Issues Loss of CCW to LD HX Directs swapping CVCS seal return to the VCT due to failure 0
10 0
0 10 0
CVCS Issues Loss of CCW to LD HX Controls Excess Letdown parameters to prevent lifting of seal return relief (150#)
1 9
0 0
10 10 CVCS Issues Low Stator Cooling Water DP Turbine trip Dispatches Operator to ZLP 119 to respond to Stator Cooling TRBL alarm 0
11 0
0 11 0
CVCS Issues Low Stator Cooling Water DP Turbine trip Diagnose Turbine trip due to low Stator Cooling Water DP 0
11 0
0 11 0
CVCS Issues Low Stator Cooling Water DP Turbine trip Enters 0POP05-EO-EO00 Reactor trip response 0
11 0
0 11 0
CVCS Issues Low Stator Cooling Water DP Turbine trip Performs Immediate actions from memory 0
11 0
0 11 0
[26] An Example of SACADA Detection Data -
- Alarm board is overloaded 15 Desc.
Malfunction TOE (training objective element)
UNSAT SAT SAT SAT+
Total NSAT Ratio(%
RCS LOCA to ES12 LP Turbine 11 Inlet Temperature Fails High Determines Temperature Indicator has Failed High 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 LP Turbine 11 Inlet Temperature Fails High Enters 0POP09-AN-08M3 window D-2 MSR TRBL 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 LP Turbine 11 Inlet Temperature Fails High Dispatches a Plant Operator to investigate 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 LP Turbine 11 Inlet Temperature Fails High Determines that computer point BD7400 indicates trouble 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 LP Turbine 11 Inlet Temperature Fails High Performs Addendum 1 of 0POP09-AN-08M3 window D-2 MSR TRBL 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 LP Turbine 11 Inlet Temperature Fails High Places the MSR Controller in Manual and restores MSR temperature 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 ECW Strainer Clogging Enters 0POP09-AN-02M4 and dispatches a Plant Operator to the ECW Structure 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 ECW Strainer Clogging Enters 0POP04-EW-0001 and takes actions to restore ECW 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 ECW Strainer Clogging Directs/Places ESF DG 13 in PTS and secures C train ECW/CCW 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 ECW Strainer Clogging Makes Plant Page to get other licensed personnel back into the Control Room 0
12 0
0 12 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 ECW Strainer Clogging Determines Essen Chiller 12C has tripped 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 ECW Strainer Clogging Determines that 1C ECW pump and all the cascading Train C equipment is INOPERABLE and enters 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Diagnose RCS leakage to the RCB and estimate leakage at 45 to 75 gpm.
0 11 0
2 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Enter POP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage and transition to Addendum 3.
0 12 1
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Determine that leakage is within the capacity of charging to maintain Pressurizer level and within make 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Respond to Containment Pressure Hi/Lo alarm and enter 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action. (T.S. 3.6.1.4) 0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Notify Health Physics.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Remove normal letdown and charging from service.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Determine that RCS leakage is greater than Tech Spec limits. (T.S. 3.4.6.2) 0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Continue through POP04-RC-0003 in an attempt to identify and isolate the source of the leakage.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS Leakage (~60 gpm)
Declare an Unusual Event based on unidentified leakage greater than 10 gpm per SU4 EAL-1 and inclu 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Determine and report that RCS leakage has exceeded charging capacity to maintain pressurizer level.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Direct a reactor trip and safety injection based on increasing RCS leakage.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Enter POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Perform POP05-EO-EO00 immediate actions from memory.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Notifies Owners of the Rx. Trip within 15 minutes of a unit trip and updates website within an hour with 1
12 0
0 13 7.69 RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Perform POP05-EO-EO00, Addendum 5 when directed.
1 11 1
0 13 7.69 RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Transition to POP05-EO-EO10 based on RCS leakage to containment.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Depressurize steam generators to 1000 psig and adjust PORV set points within 45 minutes from LOC 0
12 0
1 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Initiate charging flow to restore pressurizer level.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Directs/Performs 0POP04-ZO-0003, Secondary Plant Stabilization.
0 12 0
1 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Direct a transition to POP05-EO-ES12, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Declare an Alert based on RCS leakage greater than the capacity of charging (FA1) and include escala 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 LP Turbine 11 Inlet Temperature Fails High Discusses turbine trip contingencies associated with MSR Manual mode 2
10 0
1 13 15.38 RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
CONTROLS cooldown rate less than or equal to 100 degrees/hr.
0 13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
CONTROLS depressurization and MAINTAINS greater than or equal to 35 degrees subcooling 0
13 0
0 13 0
RCS LOCA to ES12 RCS LOCA (450 gpm)
Determines that the 12B Essential Chiller has tripped, and secures EAB HVAC for that train.
3 8
2 0
13 23.08
16
[26] SACADA Statistics Against Control Board Status HEP PIFA Notes 2.1E-3 (2/953)
Alarm board is dark Other PIFAs may exist.
5.0E-3 (5/991)
Alarm board is busy Other PIFAs may exist.
3.9E-2 (6/155)
Alarm board is overloaded Other PIFAs may exist.
The scenarios and the descriptions of the training objective elements (TOE) provide additional information.
[37] THERP 17
18
[37] THERP Annunciator Response Model -
Applicability and Considerations
- "one annunciator" also refers to a set of annunciators that trained operators regard as a single unit.
- How to count the number of annunciators?
- Apply to the operator needs to attend a number of annunciators in the condition multiple annunciators activated.
- Knowledge-driven behavior instead of procedure-guided behavior
- Pr[Fi] is the failure to initiate action in response to the i-th annunciator in a group of n annunciators.
- Need to have annunciator occurrence sequence.
- Pr[F.i] is the failure to initiate action in response to a randomly selected annunciator in a group of annunciators.
- The error modes include detection, understanding, and decisionmaking.
19
[132] Cummings, Mary L. and Chris Tsonis. Deconstructing complexity in air traffic control proceeding of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 2005
- Students performed air traffic controller (ATC) tasks in a simple GUI:
- 10, 20, and 30 aircrafts
- Sequential and non-sequential arrival
- Number of color codes
- Test: The students were asked How many aircraft will depart in 20 minutes? The students need to
- Answer the question
- Notify the supervisor on when they first noted that a flight of a certain carrier entered the outermost control circle. Failure to provide the notification is an error of omission.
[132] GUI and Color Code 20
21
[132] Error of Omission Ratio Color #
Correct#
Error#
HEP 3
125 38 0.23 6
130 40 0.24 9
105 65 0.38
22
[132] Considerations on using [132] Data
- Additional PIFAs: high time constraint and dual tasking
- Student test subjects and simplified GUI
- Difficult to identify nuclear tasks having the similar challenges in information detection
23 Additional Data - HuREX Data
- APR1400 simulator data collected by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI)
- Digital control room and procedures
24 Data-Informed Considerations in Developing IDHEAS-ECA Desktop Guide
- The existing guidance requires the analysts to count the number of competing signals. Analysts questions:
- What is the counting unit? (THERP definition on annunciators)
- Definition of competing.
- SACADAs situational factors may be a better alternative to be incorporated into IDHEAS-ECA desktop guide
- HuREX data suggest the need to distinguish procedure-guided detection vs. self awareness detections
25 Opportunities for Collaborations
- The NRC welcomes collaborations in HRA method, data, and tool
- The NRC can provide free applications, source codes, and technical support of IDHEAS-ECA and SACADA
- Collaborations require go through the NRC approval process.
- NRCs HRA data needs
- Multiple sites: Existing data is from a nuclear site.
- Field performance data: Existing data only contains control room actions. Field data, e.g., job performance measures, would expand the coverage.
- Timing data: to assess time uncertainty and the drivers