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9-19-2024 - Meeting Summary Public Meeting - Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors - Proposed Rule
	ML24254A350
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/19/2024
From:	Dennis Andrukat; NRC/NMSS/DREFS/RRPB
To:	;
References
	NRC-2017-0227, RIN 3150-AK19
	Download: ML24254A350 (6)
	v • d • e

1 ML24254A350 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Meeting Summary September 19, 2024

Title:

Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors Rulemaking: Public Comment Period Meeting Identifier: 20241119 Date of Meeting: September 19, 2024 Location: Webinar (via Microsoft Teams)

Type of Meeting: Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session Purpose of Meeting:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff hosted a public meeting to present the published proposed rule Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors (non-light water reactors and small modular reactors). This meeting also allowed an opportunity for stakeholders to ask clarification questions to help understand the proposed rule and to develop any public comments.

General Details:

The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to provide certain alternative, risk-informed, performance-based physical security requirements for advanced reactors that would result in greater regulatory stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process and reduce the need for exemptions.

On August 1, 2018, the staff submitted SECY-18-0076, Options and Recommendation for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors, presenting alternatives and a recommendation to the Commission on possible changes to the regulations and guidance related to physical security for advanced reactors. The staff evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative and recommended a limited-scope rulemaking to further assess and, if appropriate, develop a limited set of alternative security requirements that licensees of certain advanced reactor designs could implement. The staff also recommended developing necessary guidance to address performance criteria used to determine an advanced reactor applicant's eligibility for using one or more of the alternative physical security requirements. The Commission approved the staffs recommendation to initiate a limited-scope rulemaking and to interact with stakeholders to identify specific requirements within existing regulations that would play a diminished role in providing physical security for advanced reactors while at the same time contributing significantly to capital and/or operating costs.

Extensive public outreach was conducted during the development of the proposed rule, including by soliciting comments on the regulatory basis (84 FR 33861), holding public meetings, and issuing draft versions of preliminary proposed rule language. The proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on August 9, 2024 (89 FR 65226),

2 ML24254A350 for a 75-day comment period that is scheduled to end on October 23, 2024. The NRC staff is scheduled to deliver the final rule to the Commission in September 2025, and the estimated publication date of the final rule is March 2026.

Along with the publication of the proposed rule, the NRC staff publicly released supporting and related materials:

Draft Regulatory Analysis (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML24178A372)

Draft Environmental Assessment (ML24178A374)

Draft Supporting Statements for Information Collections (ML21334A009; ML22131A161; ML22131A167)

The NRC staff also issued the following guidance documents for public comment in parallel with the proposed rule:

DG-5071 Rev. 2 (Proposed RG 5.81 Rev. 2) Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors (non-public)

DG-5072 Rev. 0 (Proposed New RG 5.90) Guidance for Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Small Modular Reactors and Non-Light-Water Reactors (ADAMS Accession No. ML20041E037)

The meeting consisted of an NRC staff presentation on the topics covered in the proposed rule and associated guidance, and a question and answer session where the public was invited to pose questions to the NRC staff to get any needed clarifications on the proposed rule, supporting documents, and draft regulatory guidance. The meeting was attended by approximately 84 people participating through webinar, including NRC staff and members of the public.

Summary of Presentation:

At 1:00 p.m. EDT, Dennis Andrukat of the NRC opened the meeting and introduced himself as the meeting facilitator and Project Manager for the rulemaking. Mr. Andrukat described the purpose of the meeting (to provide information to help stakeholders prepare comments on the Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors proposed rule and draft regulatory guidance); provided an overview of the meeting agenda; introduced Beth Reed, a Security Specialist in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and Lou Cubellis, a Senior Security Specialist in the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), as additional presenters; and advised participants on the features of the teleconference platform, including how to ask questions. Mr. Andrukat then introduced Anthony Bowers, Deputy Director of the Division of Physical and Cybersecurity Policy in NSIR, to give opening remarks.

Mr. Bowers noted the significance of the publication of the proposed rule, which is the result of many years of work in this direction, and further discussed the purpose of the meeting. In addition, Mr. Bowers reminded the audience that this proposed rule would

3 ML24254A350 have limited scope, and other requirements in the existing power reactor security framework would still have to be met.

Mr. Bowers then turned the meeting back over to Mr. Andrukat, who began the slide presentation by providing an overview of the background and status of the proposed rule. Mr. Andrukat noted the public outreach that occurred on the Regulatory Basis and preliminary proposed rule language and discussed the schedule of the comment period for the proposed rule. Mr. Andrukat displayed the slide with links to key documents and explained that the NRC staff is issuing two guidance documents that are available for public comment. Additionally, Mr. Andrukat noted that one of the guidance documents is Official Use Only, and therefore has its own instructions for comment submittals.

Mr. Andrukat then turned the meeting over to Ms. Reed to present on the details of proposed rule.

Ms. Reed first discussed focus areas of the proposed rule language, and then proceeded to review the proposed rule language, key definitions, and the process for determining achievable target sets and determining eligibility. Ms. Reed then turned the meeting over to Mr. Cubellis, who continued the review of the proposed rule language, starting with the five proposed specific alternative physical security requirements.

Mr. Andrukat then transitioned the discussion to draft regulatory guidance and turned the meeting over to Ms. Reed. Ms. Reed discussed DG-5072 before turning the meeting over to Mr. Cubellis, who continued the discussion of DG-5072, and then discussed DG-5071. Next, Mr. Cubellis turned the meeting over to Mr. Andrukat, who discussed the Regulatory Analysis, providing a brief summary of the costs and benefits of the proposed rule. Mr. Andrukat then discussed the specific and general requests for comments that are included in the proposed rule. Next, Mr. Andrukat provided some tips for preparing comments on the proposed rule, mentioning that the NRC presentation included a slide summarizing how to submit a public comment. Mr. Andrukat also noted that comments on DG-5071 will follow a separate process, and to contact Mr. Cubellis for more information. Mr. Andrukat then concluded the presentation by discussing next steps for the rulemaking.

Summary of Question and Answer Session:

Several members of the public raised questions related to the proposed rule language.

Below is a high-level summary of the questions that were asked and the NRC staffs responses.

A stakeholder asked about the term radionuclides from any source, used throughout the rule text. Specifically, the stakeholder requested clarification on whether it was the NRCs intent that analyses cover source materials other than fuel.

NRC staff responded that this term was used to describe the location of fuel related materials so that licensees analyze more than just the traditional reactor core, as some new designs may include fuel-related material outside of the core.

A stakeholder asked about 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3), specifically asking what is meant by the phrase exceeding that analyzed in the design basis accident licensing basis.

4 ML24254A350 NRC staff provided additional context on the rationale behind this language, and additional details on the analysis requirements. Another stakeholder asked for clarification on the flowchart on slide 16. NRC staff responded that it is more of a logic diagram, and not so much a linear process.

A stakeholder asked about question 1b in the proposed rules specific requests for comments, specifically asked why NRC staff chose not to use a more specific technology-inclusive requirement. NRC staff provided the rationale behind its decision to use the term significant release of radionuclides from any source, and the stakeholder noted that term should be defined within the rule and not in guidance only.

A stakeholder asked about question 2 in the proposed rules specific requests for comments, specifically asking why NRC staff chose not to propose the hybrid approach. NRC staff noted that the idea of a hybrid approach wasnt considered until development of the proposed rule was well underway, so it was not included in the proposed rule.

A stakeholder noted disagreement with the concept of zero armed responders onsite because offsite responders typically have competing priorities, so they will likely not provide the same level of security.

A stakeholder asked about HALEU fuel, which is used by most small modular reactors and non-light-water reactors and is a category II fuel, and whether it is covered by the proposed security requirements. NRC staff noted that the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 are stricter than requirements for special nuclear material, so supplemental security measures are not needed.

A stakeholder said that the guidance for consequence analysis seemed light, and asked if the NRC is planning on developing additional guidance. NRC staff said they are not, but if stakeholders think it is needed, they should submit formal comments on the issue.

A stakeholder asked whether a facility with category I fuel would need to have armed responders to protect against the design-basis threat (DBT). NRC staff confirmed that a facility with category I fuel would have to defend against both of the NRCs design basis threats: theft or diversion and radiological sabotage.

A stakeholder asked about the use of the term high assurance throughout the proposed rule, noting that the enclosure 2 of the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for the Part 53 proposed rule included a strikeout edit that changed high assurance to reasonable assurance. NRC staff noted this proposed rule uses high assurance because the Commission did not instruct the staff to use reasonable assurance text in this rulemaking, and future changes to the proposed regulatory language would be made based on the Commissions direction or potentially as a logical outgrowth of a public comment on this topic. After the public meeting, in a phone call with this stakeholder, NRC staff further clarified that the stakeholders referenced reasonable assurance change in the Part 53-related SRM was actually for proposed 10 CFR 73.100, and not 10 CFR 73.55.

5 ML24254A350 A stakeholder asked about bounding values for the consequence analysis. NRC staff responded with their reasoning for the bounding values described in the proposed rule. Another stakeholder asked about the implications of having a reactor with a lower estimated design-basis accident consequence, and how that would impact target sets. NRC staff responded that like currently operating power reactor licensees, new reactor applicants and licensees would continue to 1) identify target sets that need to be protected to ensure a malicious act(s) will not lead to consequences that exceed the relevant design basis accident estimate, and 2) design their physical protection programs and protective strategies to adequately defend at least one element of every achievable target set against the DBT of radiological sabotage.

A stakeholder asked about the regulatory analysis, specifically what went into the estimates for costs of implementation of the proposed rule, noting it was surprising there was such clear indication of cost reduction.

A stakeholder asked about the proposed alternative for physical barriers, specifically asked why this topic needs to be addressed in the rulemaking. NRC staff explained it decided to include the topic to avoid any confusion regarding whether future, eligible licensees would be able to implement non-traditional barriers or delay features without prior NRC approval.

Closing:

Mr. Andrukat made brief closing remarks, including mentioning that participants in the public meeting can submit feedback to improve the structure of future public meetings through the NRC Public Meeting Feedback Form, available in the slide presentation.

Mr. Andrukat thanked everyone for attending the meeting and ended the meeting at 4:07 p.m. EDT.

Action Items/Next Steps:

The public comment period for the proposed rule ends October 23, 2024.

ML24254A350

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