ML24092A042
| ML24092A042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | U.S. Geological Survey |
| Issue date: | 03/28/2024 |
| From: | Wallick J US Dept of Interior, Geological Survey (USGS) |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| Download: ML24092A042 (1) | |
Text
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY Rocky Mountain Region Box 25046 M.S. 974 Denver Federal Center Denver, Colorado 80225 USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 1 of 1 Document Date: 2024-03-28 DATE:
Thursday, March 28, 2024 TO:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk FROM:
Jonathan Wallick, Reactor Director/Supervisor
SUBJECT:
U.S. Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor, Docket Number 50-274, License Number R-113, Annual Report Submittal in Accordance with Technical Specification 6.7.1 Rev. 00 PURPOSE By way of this letter, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is submitting the annual operating report as required by Technical Specification 6.7.1 of license number R-113, covering the period of January 1st, 2023, through December 31st, 2023.
CONTACT If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (303) 236-4726.
Sincerely, Jonathan Wallick, Reactor Director Copied to:
Shannon Mahan, Reactor Administrator, USGS Geoffrey Wertz, Project Manager, US NRC Michelle Sutherland, Project Manager, US NRC Kevin Roche, Inspector, US NRC Attachments:
(1) U. S. Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor Facility Annual Report 2023 JONATHAN WALLICK 2024.03.28 14:30:16 -06'00'
JONATHAN WALLICK l Reactor Director U. S. Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor Facility Annual Report 2023 FACILITY LICENSE R-113 - DOCKET NUMBER 50-274
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 1 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents......................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Section 1: Operations Summary.................................................................................................................................................. 2 Section 2: Inadvertent Scrams, Unplanned Shutdowns, Events at Power................................................................................... 4 Section 3: Maintenance, Surveillance, and Other Incidents........................................................................................................ 7 Section 4: Facility Changes and Special Experiments Approved.................................................................................................. 8 Section 5: Radioactive Effluent Release..................................................................................................................................... 10 (a) Gases................................................................................................................................................................................ 10 (b) Liquids and Solids............................................................................................................................................................ 11 Solid, Dry Waste:.............................................................................................................................................................. 11 Liquid Waste:.................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Section 6: Environmental Surveillance...................................................................................................................................... 12 Section 7: Radiation Exposure to Personnel.............................................................................................................................. 15 Section 8: Fuel Inspections........................................................................................................................................................ 16 Section 9: Closing Remarks........................................................................................................................................................ 17
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 2 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 1: OPERATIONS
SUMMARY
During CY2023, the U.S. Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor Facility (GSTR) was operational for only the first seven months of the year. Owing to discoveries made during the quinquennial fuel inspection and the subsequent recovery actions, the reactor was maintained in an administrative shutdown per the order of the Reactor Director starting from August 7th, 2023, at 1233. Operations had been substantially normal and regular, supporting scientific research both internal and external to the agency. Efforts are still underway to resolve the findings and resume operations.
Typically, operation of this facility supports research and development by the U.S. Geological Survey, Colorado School of Mines (CSM), and a collection of other academic, commercial, and industrial collaborators. Research is usually conducted using geochronology techniques, such as argon/argon comparison and fission track analysis, but also includes student research projects and radiotracer production. Operator training and education is also a component of the GSTR mission, primarily as a class conducted by CSM and supported by the reactor staff, providing hands on experience in reactor operations, engineering, and neutron activation techniques.
Additionally, tours and visits by various members of the public generally take place and have returned to effectively normal this calendar year owing to the termination of the COVID-19 public health emergency as of May 11th, 2023.
Two NRC inspections took place this calendar year, supplementing the lack of an inspection the previous calendar year. These inspections took place mid-January 2023 and late August 2023. One Severity Level IV violation was found to have occurred (lowest level) from the August inspection but treated as a non-cited violation owing to the facility self-identification and reporting.
No personnel were given an examination by the NRC to obtain operator licenses this calendar year, owing primarily to the shutdown state of the facility. One person is in training actively, a new hire to the operations staff. As of December 31st, 2023, four senior operators and one reactor operator were licensed.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 3 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 TABLE I - General Information Experiment Authorizations Active 25 Experiments Performed 53 Samples Packages Irradiated 93 Total Samples Irradiated 1524 Energy Generated this Period (Megawatt-hours) 148.008 Total Energy Generated since Initial Criticality (Megawatt-hours) 41,232.950 Pulse Operations this Period 6
Total Pulses since Initial Criticality 304 Hours Critical this Period 222.20 Total Hours since Initial Criticality 45,232.12 Inadvertent Scrams 4
Total Scrams since Initial Criticality 1166
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 4 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 2: INADVERTENT SCRAMS, UNPLANNED SHUTDOWNS, EVENTS AT POWER TABLE II - Scrams, Unplanned Shutdowns, Events at Power Date Time Power Type and Cause 2023-01-19 0651 800 kW Scram #1163: NM-1000 Timeout Scram The NM-1000 nuclear instrument failed to communicate for a preset amount of time and caused an automatic scram of the reactor. The reactor was operating at a steady state 800 kW. All rods inserted and the reactor was promptly shut down.
The NM-1000 stopped communicating for about 1 minute. The power level indicated stayed frozen at about 800 kW and did not change until the instrument started responding again. Upon loss of communication, the reactor initiated a SCRAM and all control rods responded nominally. Power readings on the other 2 channels responded nominally and the reactor was confirmed to be shut down after the SCRAM.
The cause of the communication fault is unknown. Such faults have occurred in the past, but very infrequently, and the NM-1000 started working again shortly after the fault. The NM-1000 and computer system were rebooted.
A way to "split" the NM-1000 output to record it separately is being sought; this could show definitively if future issues are generated from the NM-1000 or the computer system itself. Testing could not reproduce the problem.
Restart was authorized by the SRO and saw no further timely recurrence.
2023-02-13 1356 800 kW Scram #1164: NM-1000 Timeout Scram The NM-1000 nuclear instrument failed to communicate for a preset amount of time and caused an automatic scram of the reactor. The reactor was operating at a steady state 800 kW. All rods inserted and the reactor was promptly shut down.
The NM-1000 stopped communicating. The power level indicated stayed frozen at about 800 kW and did not change until the instrument was reset. Upon loss of communication, the reactor initiated a SCRAM and all control rods responded nominally. Power readings on the other two detectors responded nominally and the reactor was confirmed to be shut down after the SCRAM.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 5 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 The cause of the communication fault is unknown and has persisted for years, evading detection and actual resolution. A solution to track down the root cause is in the works.
The NM-1000 was reset via the A-2 card and then the software prechecks were run again. The instrument did not fully pass the checks; therefore, the instrument was then reset by cycling power to the computer module. The instrument then passed all prechecks successfully and returned to service.
Restart was authorized by the SRO and saw no further timely recurrence.
2023-03-10 1432 800 kW Scram #1165: NM-1000 Timeout Scram The NM-1000 nuclear instrument failed to communicate for a preset amount of time and caused an automatic scram of the reactor. The reactor was being started up to 800 kW. All rods inserted and the reactor was promptly shut down.
Screen froze for about 7-10 seconds on approach to 800 kW, then scrammed due to an NM-1000 instrument timeout. The NM-1000 started responding again a few seconds after the SCRAM. Beyond the "timeout" message, no exact root cause has yet been determined. Due to the intermittent nature of this SCRAM, finding the root cause will take further investigation.
Reactor operations ceased for the day, and a closer investigation of NM-1000 components were performed the following week. If the SCRAM was truly spurious, a root cause may prove elusive.
Updated on 2023-03-14: The startup checklist did not detect any problems with the NM or the console system. Operations can proceed.
Restart was authorized by the SRO and saw no further timely recurrence.
2023-05-30 0935 800 kW Scram #1166: NP High Power Scram The NP-1000 nuclear instrument initiated a high-power scram on detection of a power level in excess of the setpoint. The reactor was being started up to 800 kW. All rods inserted and the reactor was promptly shut down.
While establishing power at 800 kW, the scram occurred as the result of an observed power jump. The operator was establishing power quickly from shutdown conditions to 800 kW, and the instrument was unable to respond in a timely manner.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 6 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 The operator was instructed to reduce the speed of their startup when establishing power levels near 800 kW to prevent repeat incidents.
Restart was authorized by the SRO and saw no further timely recurrence.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 7 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 3: MAINTENANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND OTHER INCIDENTS The following non-routine maintenance/surveillance activities were carried out during this period. Any reactor operation related items discussed above are not repeated here.
TABLE III - Maintenance, Surveillance, and Other Incidents Date Time Title and Description 2023-08-07 to Present All Days Fuel Inspection Issues:
SUMMARY
During the scheduled fuel measurements in August of 2023, multiple problems were identified:
First, discrepancies in the records regarding current fuel position versus actual positions were identified using visual verifications of serial numbers on elements.
Second, an observation was made that several elongation measurements taken on different elements were identical within four significant digits. This scenario seemed highly improbable unless measurements were affected by an unknown parameter. This prompted an investigation resulting in the identification of an inadequate setup of the fuel element measurement tool. The root cause of this discrepancy originated from undocumented changes made to fittings approximately twenty years ago due to poor change management practices and an incomplete understanding of the precise operation and limitations of the tool.
This finding has highlighted a resulting inability to accurately measure the elongation of aluminum fuel. Checking our historical records, it is uncertain as to whether the aluminum fuel was ever actually characterized using this set up, but there is no way at this point to validate the practices previously used, given the turnover of personnel with the facility. Historical records will be assumed to be correct using the trust but verify axiom; however, accurate measurements will be obtained for all fuel either in use or planned for use prior to installation in core.
Finally, at the time of this writing, visual inspection of the aluminum clad elements in-core revealed a heavy oxide layer or layers on every element observed. A total of fifty-one aluminum clad elements are installed in the core at present time, and no obvious explanation exists for the mechanism that would have induced or created this coating. Ongoing research into this discovery will continue.
This summary is expanded upon in a 53-page internal report, as well as three supplementary reports on analyzing and correcting these items. At current time, corrective actions are still underway, and the reactor remains shutdown.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 8 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 4: FACILITY CHANGES AND SPECIAL EXPERIMENTS APPROVED Regarding 50.59 changes at the facility, initiation of work on seven changes took place in calendar year 2023, while three changes were fully completed in the same period.
Completed: 2022 Changing RAM 01 Detector: Changing the detector for Radiation Area Monitor 1 in the Reactor Bay from what appears to be a LND 714 to a Ludlum Model 133-3 energy-compensated GM detector.
The previous detector was scavenged from a Ludlum 375 detector at some point in the facilitys history and has a hard-wired connection to a BNC cable. There is no documentation that can be located detailing any wiring diagrams, etc., of this setup. The BNC cable is also quite old and could benefit from replacement. Additionally, due to the hard-wired cable, the detector cannot easily be removed for calibration on the calibration range, so a less-rigorous in-situ calibration is typically performed. Replacing this detector allowed for calibration on the range, as well as making maintenance or replacement easier and less time-consuming in the future. This replacement process also ensured all documentation is up to date. The change was completed on 2023-02-16.
Initiated and Completed: 2023-01: 151-153 Passthrough: A passthrough was installed between rooms 151 and 153 of the building to accommodate the passage of irradiated materials to the new NAA laboratory space without transiting them through building common spaces. The new laboratory is not yet active (does not even have a floor yet), but to support future use, this change was made. It is locking capable with a built-in interlock to prevent opening both doors at once and is of minimal size to accomplish its task. It was successfully completed on 2023-05-17.
Initiated: 2023-05-A - Adding High Water Level Alarm: While it has always been a requirement to have a low water level alarm for the reactor tank, having the condition of a high-water level alarm has not, though it is a best practice to guard against overfilling and damaging components such as electrical outlets and instrumentation/control components. This is being pursued as a preventive measure against such damages and will alarm in a similar manner at the reactor control console.
Initiated: 2023-06-A - Security Upgrades: Security upgrades at the facility have been in the planning phase for multiple years and physical installations have begun as of June. While security related items are addressed under the 10 CFR 50.54p, the screening process of 50.59 was utilized to ensure coverage of the proposed changes as part of the change management program. These upgrades will not be detailed in this report.
Initiated: 2023-06-B - Radiation Panel Upgrade: The central radiation indicating and alarm panel for the reactor facility and the entirety of the building is in process of being replaced. The panel appears to be an original installation or dating back 30+ years at the very least, with several undocumented modifications and obsolete parts. Several failures of channels through recent years have necessitated switching to functioning channels, and some failures have had cascading damage occur to connected detection units. For these reasons, replacement with modern, in-production components is being pursued. This change is currently in process.
Initiated and Completed: 2023-06-C - Procedure Replacements: Several procedures were replaced, revised, or added to the GSTR's set of procedures. Most procedures were related to radiation safety tasks, such as calibrations of meters and performance of calculations. They are listed below. This change was completed 2023-08-30.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 9 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28
- 1. Radiation Procedure Readily Dispersible Material
- 2. Standard Procedure Test Equipment Items and Requirements
- 3. Standard Procedure-20A - Frequency Generator Calibration
- 4. Standard Procedure-20B - Gamma Radiation Instrument Calibrator Operation
- 5. Standard Procedure-20C - Portable Radiation Instrument Calibration - mR Range
- 6. Standard Procedure-20D - Portable Radiation Instrument Calibration - uR Range
- 7. Standard Procedure-20E - Continuous Air Monitor Maintenance and Calibration
- 8. Standard Procedure-20F - Portable Radiation Instrument Calibration - CPM Range
- 9. Standard Procedure-20G - Radiation Area Monitor Calibration
- 10. Standard Procedure-20H - Portal Monitor Calibration
- 11. Standard Procedure Control Rod Drop Time Measurements
- 12. Standard Procedure Stack Gas Radionuclide Analysis
- 13. Standard Procedure Pool Water Radioactivity Testing Initiated: 2023-08-A - Fuel Visual Inspection Tool: A visual inspection apparatus is being designed and fabricated at the facility for the purpose of accurately and precisely characterizing the surface condition of fuel elements.
This work has been in process since before the issues were discovered during the fuel inspection in August. This change has become a joint effort between the reactor facility and the Colorado School of Mines. Design is set to include a high-quality camera which will be used to slowly scan and map the surface of fuel element cladding. It is the intention of this system to provide images that can be compared inspection to inspection to characterize any degradation or damage that has occurred to the fuel between inspections. This change is currently in process.
Initiated: 2023-08-B - Fuel Inspection Issues Corrective Actions: As summarized in table III, the fuel issues identified during the August inspection will require several efforts and actions to fully rectify. A 50.59 screening/evaluation is being conducted to ensure that all actions as a result of this situation will be allowable without a license amendment or changes to the technical specifications. This change is currently in process.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 10 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 5: RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE (A) GASES The major direct release to the environment is Argon-41 produced during normal operations. Very small amounts of other gases may be released from irradiated materials in experiments.
Releases of Argon-41 are measured directly from the effluent of the reactor bay utilizing a shielded sodium iodide detector equipped with both single channel analyzer and multichannel analyzer capabilities, and are presented below by month:
TABLE IV - Argon-41 Effluent Releases Period Average Concentration (uCi/mL)
Allowable Monthly Release (uCi/mL)
% of Monthly Allowable Release January 3.07E-08 4.8E-06 0.64%
February 1.78E-08 4.8E-06 0.37%
March 8.54E-08 4.8E-06 1.78%
April 4.08E-08 4.8E-06 0.85%
May 3.50E-08 4.8E-06 0.73%
June 3.31E-08 4.8E-06 0.69%
July 2.50E-08 4.8E-06 0.52%
August 1.44E-10 4.8E-06 0.00%
September 0.00E+00 4.8E-06 0.00%
October 0.00E+00 4.8E-06 0.00%
November 0.00E+00 4.8E-06 0.00%
December 0.00E+00 4.8E-06 0.00%
Annual Averages:
2.23E-08 4.8E-06 0.47%
Releases of Tritium are calculated using 1) the volume of water that is calculated to have evaporated from the tank in a given month, and 2) the primary water tritium concentration that was measured by an internal measurement method each quarter throughout the year.
The Tritium releases are presented below, by month:
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 11 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 TABLE V - Hydrogen-3 (Tritium) Effluent Releases Period Average Concentration (uCi/mL)
Allowable Monthly Release (uCi/mL)
% of Monthly Allowable Release January 5.73E-11 1E-07 0.06%
February 5.73E-11 1E-07 0.06%
March 4.54E-11 1E-07 0.05%
April 3.26E-11 1E-07 0.03%
May 9.98E-11 1E-07 0.10%
June 1.24E-10 1E-07 0.12%
July 1.25E-10 1E-07 0.13%
August 1.25E-10 1E-07 0.13%
September 4.14E-11 1E-07 0.04%
October 9.89E-11 1E-07 0.10%
November 4.71E-11 1E-07 0.05%
December 4.33E-11 1E-07 0.04%
Annual Averages:
7.48E-11 1E-07 0.07%
(B) LIQUIDS AND SOLIDS Liquid and solid wastes from utilization of by-product materials are disposed through a vendor contract.
Disposals to this custody are given below. It is important to note that activity values are estimated at the time of transfer. Since few shipments are being made from the federal center, decay to negligible levels occurs for all short and medium-lived radionuclides. No waste shipments were made in CY 2023.
SOLID, DRY WASTE:
No solid, dry waste transfers took place this reporting period.
LIQUID WASTE:
No liquid waste transfers took place this reporting period.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 12 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 6: ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEILLANCE Calcium Sulfate/Dysprosium thermo luminescent dosimeters are in place at 11 locations around the GSTR for environmental monitoring purposes. These were provided by Radiation Detection Company, which is an NVLAP-accredited dosimetry vendor and processor. The environmental dosimeters are located outside within sealed weatherproof boxes or inside the facility mounted to different walls and surfaces. The table below lists the locations.
Routine contamination surveys consisting of wipe tests and G-M surveys have shown mostly a clean facility with significant, removable contamination only in areas coming into direct contact with samples removed from the reactor, and on sample handling tools. Trash is surveyed before disposal and not disposed of unless found to be free of removable and fixed contamination.
Table VI - Locations for Environmental Dosimeters
- 1. Reactor Bay Exhaust
- 2. Vehicle Gate
- 3. Room 151 Door Gate
- 4. Cooling Tower Fence
- 5. Southwest Light Pole
- 6. West Light Pole
- 7. Reactor Fence
- 8. Basement Tunnel
- 9. Northwest Light Pole
- 10. Northeast Light Pole
- 11. East Light Pole
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 13 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 Table VII - Environmental Dosimetry Data Average Total Deep Dose Exposures in mrem (Including Control Background)
Location Quarter Annual Prior Year Difference 2023 Q1 2023 Q2 2023 Q3 2023 Q4
- 1. Reactor Bay Exhaust 0
15 0
0 15 92
-77
- 2. Vehicle Gate 0
0 0
0 0
17
-17
- 3. Room 151 Door Gate 45 64 37 40 186 193
-7
- 4. Cooling Tower Fence 0
0 0
0 0
1
-1
- 5. Southwest Light Pole 0
0 0
0 0
3
-3
- 6. West Light Pole 0
0 0
0 0
2
-2
- 7. Reactor Fence 17 38 0
13 68 82
-14
- 8. Basement Tunnel 58 94 59 63 274 256
+18
- 9. Northwest Light Pole 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
- 10. Northeast Light Pole 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
- 11. East Light Pole 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Notes:
- 1. Above totals have the background subtracted. TLDs were supplied and analyzed by Radiation Detection Company, NVLAP accredited dosimetry vendor.
- a. 2nd quarter badges monitored from 2023-04-01 to 2023-07-19 and 3rd quarter badges monitored from 2023-07-19 to 2023-09-30; owing to the account having initially set up in July 2022 for a one-year period, thus badges were not shipped immediately for Q3 2023. The account was then reconfigured with an auto-renewing billing option, so this will not occur again in the future.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 14 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 Discussion Raw data is presented here, along with a comparison to the prior year. Locations near or inside the facility are usually the highest; by contrast, remote locations (such as the light pole series) are the lowest. Data for this year reflect several points of interest:
Location 1 tends to have higher doses when high-activity volatile samples are processed in the fume hood, since some of the volatile material will be captured in the nearby HEPA filters for that hood.
Locations 3 and 7 are positioned on the west fence of the facility. Several sources of radiation are present near these badges: 1) a dry storage tank in Room 151, which contains a previously installed rotary specimen rack, possessing a substantial amount of Cobalt-60, 2) high-activity sample transfers in the fume hood in Room 151 can temporarily elevate the dose rate, and 3) reactor operation will marginally elevate the dose rate to about double the background.
Location 8, in the basement, is opposite a wall for the main radioactive waste storage area. This area has a very low occupancy factor, and the waste was intended to be shipped out for disposal in CY 2023 but has been delayed to CY 2024 due to contract procurement issues.
Exposure estimated to a single individual in an uncontrolled area at this facility is minimal. Location 1 is on the facility roof, so a member of the public would not have reason to be up there, and maintenance activities are infrequent and thus result in a very low occupancy factor.
Locations 3 and 7 are physically closest to the facilitys walls and highest source of exposure, which was the logic in choosing those locations. The Denver Federal Center itself has a limited public occupancy, as it is only open to the public from 0600-1800 during the week. So, the possible maximum exposure to any one point that is accessible to the layperson is approximately 36%, not accounting for holidays nor the fact that any person occupying space near the facility would be challenged and asked to leave if they had no just cause.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 15 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 7: RADIATION EXPOSURE TO PERSONNEL The GSTR issues TLD badges to reactor staff and volunteers of the facility only. Finger dosimetry (TLD) rings are also issued to all badged personnel, as there is a strong likelihood of regularly handling radioactive sources. TLDs are processed by Radiation Detection Company. Reporting categories are deep, eye, shallow, and extremity.
Other individuals visiting or intermittently working in the facility were issued electronic dosimeters which are documented in the facilitys Visitor Log and have no appreciable exposures.
TABLE VIII Personnel Exposure (mrem) 2023-01-01 to 2023-12-31 Employee Code Whole Body Ring Deep Eye Shallow Shallow CF0707 12 13 12 87 JJ0722 0
0 0
83 VL0722 0
0 0
121 CM0715 0
0 11 98 JW0420 0
0 0
28 DP0923 0
0 0
27 Total 12 13 23 444
- 1. Above totals have the background subtracted. TLDs were processed by Radiation Detection Company.
- 2. Although neutron dose is monitored, no person experienced any neutron dose during any monitoring period.
Personnel exposures continue to be very low at this facility in keeping with ALARA efforts.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 16 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 8: FUEL INSPECTIONS One fuel inspection has taken place during this period. The fuel inspection was started on 2023-08-02 and currently remains open owing to discovery of the issues summarized earlier in this report. As corrective actions are identified, executed, and closed, the inspection will be able to proceed to closure. As of this time, fifty-one (51) elements will be removed from service, consisting completely of the aluminum-clad elements obtained from the Veterans Affairs reactor in 2003. Otherwise, the inspection will be finished in CY 2024.
U.S.G.S. TRIGA Reactor Annual Report USGS - Facility License R-113 - Docket Number 50-274 Page 17 of 17 Document Date: 2024-03-28 SECTION 9: CLOSING REMARKS This has been an extremely challenging year for the GSTR, placing us back into a shutdown status as we struggle with unforeseen, latent issues. As can be seen above, aging management and poor historical configuration management has presented significant maintenance issues and is being given due attention as a result. Despite this status, we continue to make progress on several initiatives, as has been mentioned previously:
Renovation and establishment of an analytics laboratory, equipped for neutron activation analysis and inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy, is moving along, though progress has slowed.
The building management responsible for installing an epoxy floor following the asbestos abatement has stalled on several occasions, making the timeline nearly four years since the project was first started.
September marked the first new person to start work at the facility, backfilling the position of now Chief of Operations and Maintenance Farwell. Following this hiring action, the facility moves forward to fill an administrative support position, an analyst position for the new laboratory in mid-2024 and continue expansion efforts to develop a complete and robust reactor program.
Core analyses have been catapulted to the forefront of activities at the GSTR in support of reconfiguring the core after deciding to retire all aluminum-clad elements that were in service. With neutronics now securely modeled, the facility can make progress in thermal-hydraulics analysis to eschew the 800-kW restriction that has been imposed since the license renewal in 2016.
While documentation at the facility has been a challenging issue for many years, earnest efforts are underway to establish a well-documented overall management system in the style recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency. By fully structuring the activities at the GSTR in this manner, the upfront investment of time and resources will ideally result in a robust program that has clear intentions and requirements for execution, reducing the amount of uncertainty and unknown factors in the facility.
The facility presses on, combatting latent issues affecting availability and reliability. Improving relevance, capability, and capacity remain core efforts and with additional personnel now finding station at the facility, these pursuits are becoming more tangible. Partnerships with our stakeholders continue to broaden and improve, securing the scientific and commercial impacts of the facility.