ML24088A261

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2023 Annual Operating Report for the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
ML24088A261
Person / Time
Site: Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
Issue date: 03/28/2024
From: Smolinski A
US Dept of Defense, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Annual Operating Report - 2023 TRIGA Mark-F To satisfy the requirements of:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License No. R-84, Docket No. 50-170 Technical Specification 6.6.a.

Prepared by:

Mr. Andrew Smolinski Reactor Facility Manager, AFRRI Edited by:

Nicholas P. Hance LT, MSC, USN Director for Administration, AFRRI Submitted by:

Gerald F. Burke CAPT, MSC, USN Institute Director, AFRRI

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. General Information
a. Key reactor personnel and staffing changes
b. Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) composition
3. Facility Operations Summary (T.S.6.6.a.1)
a. Facility Design Changes (1) License Amendment Request (2) Facility Modifications
b. Performance Characteristics
c. Operational Procedures
d. Results of Surveillance Tests and Inspections
4. Core Burnup - Characteristics (T.S.6.6.a.2)
a. Energy Generated by the Reactor Core
b. Number of Pulses $2.00 or Larger
5. Unscheduled Shutdowns (T.S.6.6.a.3)
a. Unscheduled Shutdowns
b. Related Corrective Actions to Ensure Safe Operations
6. Safety-Significant Maintenance (T.S.6.6.a.4)
a. Corrective Maintenance
b. Preventive Maintenance
7. Changes affecting the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) (T.S.6.6.a.5 and T.S.6.6.a.6)

(Made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and summaries of 50.59 Safety Evaluations

a. Changes that affect the description in the SAR
b. Procedure changes that affect the description in the SAR
c. New experiments or tests not encompassed in the SAR
8. Radioactive Effluents (T.S.6.6.a.7)
a. Liquid Waste Summary
b. Gaseous Waste Summary
c. Solid Waste Summary
9. Environmental Radiological Surveys (T.S.6.6.a.8)
10. Exposures Greater Than 25% of 10 CFR 20 Limits (T.S.6.6.a.9)
11. Conclusion
1. Introduction The TRIGA Mark-F reactor at AFRRI was available for normal operations for the duration of 2023. Operating licenses were received on 13 APR 23 for two additional Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) and one Reactor Operator upgraded to SRO. With the loss of one SRO due to transfer of employment, there are a total of five SRO-licensed staff members currently at AFRRI.

All surveillance and maintenance activities were completed and within periodicity, and routine experiments have resumed.

There were three reactor modifications approved under 50.59 during the year and no License Amendment Requests (LAR) submitted. There were nine unscheduled shutdowns during 2023, all due to known causes. All safety systems performed as designed.

The 2023 annual audit required by the reactor technical specifications was conducted from 04 DEC 23 to 05 DEC 23 by Mr. Thomas Regan from the University of Massachusetts-Lowell Research Reactor facility (UMLRR). The audit report indicated no major discrepancies in reactor operations, maintenance, or documentation. The audit identified some minor findings and provided suggested changes and improvements.

A full NRC inspection of reactor facility operations was conducted by Mr. Andrew Waugh from 24 JUL 23 to 27 JUL 23, which included observation of reactor and prep area operations.

The inspection resulted in no new violations or Inspection Follow-up Items (IFI).

There were several RSC membership changes during the year with the transition of the AFRRI Institute Director, Deputy Director, Chief of Staff, Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), and Assistant Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO).

The remainder of this report is written in the format designated in the Technical Specifications for the TRIGA Mark-F reactor at AFRRI. Items not specifically required are presented in the General Information section. The following sections correspond to the required items listed in Section 6.6.a. of the Technical Specifications.

2. General Information
a. Key AFRRI personnel (as of 31 DEC 23):

AFRRI Institute Director - CAPT Gerald Burke, USN AFRRI Deputy Director - Col Susan Whiteway, USAF AFRRI Chief of Staff - LTC Karen Thomas, USA Radiation Sciences Department (RSD) Head - Andrew Cook (SRO)

Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) - MAJ Jacob Vincent, USA Reactor Facility Director (RFD) - Andrew Cook Reactor operations personnel:

Reactor Operations Supervisor (ROS) - Andrew Smolinski (SRO)

Training Coordinator - Benjamin Knibbe (SRO)

Other reactor operators:

Mathieu Brener (SRO)

Addison Guynn (SRO)

Operator candidates:

MAJ Andrew Ng, USA (AFRRI Executive Officer)

MSG Liberio Miguelpablo, USA SFC John Wilson, USA Justin Payer Newly licensed operators:

Addison Guynn (SRO-upgrade), 13 JUN 23 Benjamin Knibbe (SRO), 13 JUN 23 Andrew Smolinski (SRO), 13 JUN 23 Additions to reactor and support staff in 2023:

MAJ Jacob Vincent, USA (RSO)

Catherine Benton (ARSO)

MAJ Andrew Ng, USA (AFRRI Executive Officer)

SFC John Wilson, USA Departures in 2023:

Timothy Ayers (SRO)

Harry Spence

b. There were two changes to the Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) during 2023:

Col Susan Whiteway replaced LTC Jeffrey Brown, USA as Chair, RSC MAJ Jacob Vincent replaced Jeffrey Sumlin as AFRRI Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)

Per the requirements in Section 6.2.1.1 of Technical Specifications for the TRIGA Mark-F reactor at AFRRI, the RSC consisted of the following members as of 31 DEC 23:

RSC Chair and Director's Representative - Col Susan Whiteway Radiation Safety Officer - MAJ Jacob Vincent Radiation Sciences Department (RSD) Head / Reactor Facility Director - Andrew Cook Reactor Operations Supervisor (ROS) - Andrew Smolinski Health Physics Specialist (External) - Joe Pawlovich Reactor Operations Specialist (External) - Jere Jenkins Reactor Operations Specialist (External) - Leo Bobek Recorder - Benjamin Knibbe Approved Alternates:

LTC Karen Thomas MAJ Andrew Ng Catherine Benton

Two meetings were held in 2023:

15 JUN 23 07 DEC 23

3. Facility Operations Summary A summary of changes to the facility design, performance characteristics, administrative procedures, and operational procedures related to reactor safety, as well as the results of surveillance testing, are provided in this section.
a. Facility Design Changes (1) License Amendment Request (LAR)

There were no License Amendment Requests submitted during 2023. However, a Phase 0 meeting was held with NRC personnel on 14 FEB 23 for a proposed LAR No. 27 for the AFRRI TRIGA Mark-F Operating License R-84. The LAR included changes to the Technical Specifications related to:

  • Splitting RSD Head and RFD positions.
  • Updating qualification requirements for Reactor Facility Manager and ROS to align with standard American National Standard (ANS) 15.4.
  • Allowing the low source interlock to be linked to wide range logarithmic or multi-range linear nuclear instruments.
  • Changing the required location of Stack Gas Monitor readouts to be local and in control room, rather than control room and reactor bay.

Since the Phase 0 public meeting with the NRC, other inconsistencies in the Technical Specifications have been identified by operators that have delayed the submittal. The RSC requested that a review be conducted on alignment between ANS 15.1 and the current tech specs, and that any gaps be identified for resolution prior to the submittal. Changes stemming from these activities will be added to the request after approval by the RSC.

(2) Facility Modifications (FM)

Three facility modifications were performed requiring 50.59 evaluations:

FM-014: The core position bypass switch logic in the facility interlock system was modified. Approved by RSC on 15 JUN 23.

FM-015: The lead door seal-in logic, time delay, and bypass switch indication in the facility interlock system was modified. Approved by RSC on 15 JUN 23.

FM-016: The reactor protection system scram logic board input voltage was converted from 24V to 5V to address a problem with the original GA design. This was in accordance with the subcomponent manufacturers recommendation following two failures of the board in less than a year. Approved by RSC on 15 JUN 23.

a. Performance Characteristics There were no changes to the performance characteristics of the core during 2023. All fuel elements and control rods remained in place for operations throughout the year until 01 NOV 23, when the annual maintenance shutdown began. Fuel inspections on B, C, half of E, and F-rings, and control rod inspection were completed with no new degraded fuel or control rods identified.

Rod calibrations, thermal power calibration, and power coefficient of reactivity surveillance performed in NOV 23 confirmed that core performance agreed with previous operational data.

b. Administrative Procedures There were two new Administrative Procedures implemented in 2023, and one revised:
  • 553: Writing and Modifying Procedures (Rev 1)
  • 556: Corrective Action Process (CAP) (Initial Issue)
  • 559: 50.59 Screening and Evaluation Process (Initial Issue)

The changes do not adversely affect reactor operations or safety. The revised procedures were approved by the RFD and reviewed by the RSC.

c. Operational Procedures There were several updates to the Operational Procedures during 2023. The changes do not adversely affect reactor operations or safety. The revised procedures were approved by the RFD and reviewed by the RSC:

001 Reactor Startup Checklist (Rev 1) 002 Reactor Operations (Rev 2) 003 End of Day Checklist (Rev 2) 005 Logbook (Rev 2) 101 Weekly Checklist (Rev 1) 103 Quarterly Checklist (Rev 1)

d. Results of Surveillance Tests and Inspections All maintenance and surveillance tasks during 2023 were accomplished as normally scheduled during the year, including those tasks involving the reactor fuel, instrumentation, control rod drives, and other related components. The annual maintenance and surveillance outage were during the month of NOV 23. Fuel inspections on B, C, half of E, and F-rings, and control rod inspection were completed with no new degraded fuel or control rods identified.

There were nine reactor malfunctions and 48 corrective maintenance items identified during 2023. Refer to section 6 below.

Annual Technical Specification Audit - The 2023 annual reactor audit required by the reactor technical specifications included:

  • Conformance of facility operation to the Technical Specifications (TS) and the license
  • Results of all actions taken to correct deficiencies occurring in facility equipment, structures, systems, or methods of operation that affect safety
  • Reactor Facility ALARA Program The audit report indicated no major discrepancies were found in reactor operations, maintenance, or documentation. There were three minor findings/suggested improvements identified in the audit:
1. Some minor issues with signature discipline were noted, on items that are listed as N/A often no initials as to who performed or decided that was the case. Items that had been lined out without initials noting who had deleted the entry.
2. Quarterly T.S. 4.5.2 environmental samples were performed for Q4-CY22 on the following dates below:
  • Primary Water - 13 OCT 22
  • Soil -18 OCT 22
  • Vegetation -18 OCT 22 Due date for these would be 13 JAN 23 for Q1-CY23, making the grace period date 13 FEB
23. Surveillance was documented as completed on 14 FEB 23, missing grace period date by one day. The samples were collected and prepared in JAN 23 within periodicity, but the analysis was delayed due to the failure of an HPGE cryocooler system. Analysis was completed 14 FEB 23 as soon as repairs were complete. There were no reactor operations performed on that day. It was recommended that the circumstances be noted in a memorandum to file.
3. Semi-annual JAN - JUN TS 4.2.1b control rod drop times were performed 23 JUL 22 with a six-month frequency, not to exceed 7.5 months. The surveillance was performed next on 13 JUN 23 for an interval of almost 11 months. Upon review it was determined that the paperwork was missing, but the required surveillance was documented in the reactor logbook as having been performed on 26 JAN 23.

Biennial Security Audit - The biennial Reactor Facility Security Plan was audited from 27 JUN 23 to 05 JUL 23. It was found to comply with all applicable regulations and NRC orders.

Conditions of the plan were inspected included special nuclear material (SNM) storage and accountability, access control and physical security of the Controlled Access Area and the Reactor Control Area, personnel access, background investigations for personnel with unescorted access, the Reactor Facility Key System, and Security Force surveillances. There were no discrepancies.

NRC Inspection - A routine NRC inspection of reactor facility operations was conducted by Mr.

Andrew Waugh from 24 JUL 23 to 27 JUL 23. The inspection resulted in no new violations or findings of significance. The results of the inspection are documented in Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safety Inspection Report No. 05000170/2023201, dated 26 SEP 23.

4. Core Burnup Characteristics
a. Energy Generated by the Reactor Core:

Month Kilowatt-Hours Jan 403.5 Feb 759.2 Mar 468.4 Apr 458.2 May 1,188.0 Jun 1,883.6 Jul 7,473.7 Aug 289.4 Sep 5,303.1 Oct 3,135.3 Nov 4,692.0 Dec 6,819.2 TOTAL 32,873.7

b. Number of Pulses $2.00 or Larger:

Total energy generated in 2023: 32,873.7 kWh Total energy on fuel elements: 1,204,750.5 kWh Total energy on FFCRs*: 471,950.8 kWh Total pulses this year > $2.00: 0 Total pulses on fuel elements > $2.00: 4,219 Total pulses on FFCRs* > $2.00: 107 Total pulses this year: 0 Total pulses on fuel elements: 12,201 Total pulses on FFCRs*: 2,436

5. Unscheduled Shutdowns
a. There were 9 unscheduled shutdowns in 2023 (all safety systems performed as designed):

08 FEB - SCRAM 0008 System SCRAM after Resetting Channels 23 MAR - SCRAM 0009 user interface terminal (UIT) Scram on Startup 05 MAY - SCRAM 0010 AC power loss scram during operation 17 MAY - SCRAM 0011 Spurious control computer system (CCS) Watchdog Scram at 0745 30 JUN - SCRAM 0012 AC power loss scram during operation 19 JUL - SCRAM 0013 Spurious CCS Watchdog Scram at 0745 06 OCT - SCRAM 0014 AC power loss scram during operation 27 NOV - SCRAM 0015 AC power loss scram during operation due to substation maintenance 28 NOV - SCRAM 0016 Inadvertent, nuclear instrument (NI) channel adjustment for calibration

b. Related Corrective Actions None of the unscheduled shutdowns were reportable events, and no operating limits were exceeded. The three AC power loss scrams not caused by substation maintenance were caused by a periodic self-test of the console UPS. Following approval of the UPS maintenance software by IT, that 14-day self-test function has been disabled. The issue has not reoccurred since then.

The spurious scrams initiated by the CCS watchdog consistently at 0745 EDT (0645 EST) every few days/weeks have been experienced at similar facilities (INL). It appears to be an operating system issue with LINUX SUSE 12.3. All safety systems operate as designed upon receipt of the signal. An operating system upgrade resolved the issue at INL, and a similar upgrade is being pursued.

The safety channel high scram was due to an artificially high (conservative) reading due to manual adjustment of the detector in the reactor tank during calibration. It did not result in an actual overpower condition. Power was approximately 90% (900kW) at the time of the scram.

A modification to the detector support that allows finer adjustment is being pursued as a corrective action.

6. Safety-Significant Maintenance
a. Corrective Maintenance (CM) - 48 corrective maintenance items, 15 safety-related:
1. CM 23-001 (03 JAN 23) Transient control rod drive failed to move during startup checklist. The motor coupling found disengaged and backed off due to a loose set screw.

The coupling was repaired and drive retested satisfactorily.

2. CM 23-002 (04 JAN 23) Transient control rod drive motor was shaking/stuttering during movement for maintenance outage inspections. The limit switch was found misaligned, causing partial actuation during movement. Proper switch alignment was confirmed and tested after the drive was disassembled and rebuilt (CM 23-019).
3. CM 23-005 (24 JAN 23) Shim control rod drive limit switch was binding.

Troubleshooting revealed a drive alignment issue. Drive components were disassembled and realigned and limit switches adjusted. The drive was retested satisfactorily.

4. CM 23-006 (08 FEB 23) The fuel temperature instrument nuclear instrument channel was troubleshot as part of SCRAM 0008 corrective actions. Video identified all NFT trips were momentarily dropping out once every 5-10 times the Reset Channels button was pressed. The root cause is that the internal channel software has been shown to drop the operate permissive signal from the scram relay signal path inside the instrument intermittently when that subroutine is executed. The frequency of the nuclear fuel temperature (NFT) failure was partially mitigated with a console software change FSM-001 which removed the channel reset command from the console software when switching from Auto to Manual. This failure is now a known problem and actively being worked by the nuclear instrument vendor (General Atomics, GA). The effect is a momentary dropout of all internal trip relays, causing the K-1 relay to de-energize. While it is a nuisance for reactor operations and potentially impactful to experiment operations, it is not a safety concern for the reactor since the reactor fails to a safe condition, with all scram systems and control rods operating as designed.
5. CM 23-011 (24 MAR 23) and CM 23-031 (18 JUL 23) Exposure room horns were found not working during routine area inspections. Compensatory action for exposure room entry was taken in accordance with Technical Specification 4.2.4.c. Evaluation showed horn electronics failed due to radiation damage. Horns replaced and retested satisfactorily.
6. CM 23-015 (03 APR 23) The lead doors opened without operator interaction after the console key was turned on for the startup checklist, causing an unanticipated facility interface system (FIS) SCRAM signal. FIS SCRAM was identified as fully compliant with design of FIS logic circuit after testing. As designed, any initiation of the lead door open time delay by pressing the lead door open button while the console key is on, initiates the door opening sequence. If the key is removed and subsequently turned back on, the sequence continues without re-initiation, meaning the lead doors will open after the time delay without intervention from the operator. Only pressing the door stop or door close buttons or removing power from the K70 relay terminates the sequence. This does not result in a safety concern nor a Tech-Spec violation as the system operates as required by Tech Specs. However, Facility Modification FM-015 was initiated to prevent the sequence from being pending after the key is removed, since this delay could be several days and a different operator could be at the controls.
7. CM 23-019 (11 MAY 23) The transient rod drive developed an air leak during operation.

Air pressure was verified to be >45 psi during operation, which is the minimum to ensure the rod does not drift down. Drive was disassembled and rebuilt during the maintenance outage, replacing O-rings and seals on the piston rod. Transient rod drive installation, post-maintenance inspection, and retest was completed satisfactorily.

8. CM 23-025 (23 MAY 23) A reactor protection system scram logic board chip had failed in a fashion similar to CM 22-023 on 15 DEC 22 during the prestart checklist, with an acrid odor coming from the data acquisition cabinet. The system failed safe (scrammed state). The board was replaced again with identical spare. The root cause of the repeat failure was traced to a design flaw in the use of this board. The system was designed using 24VDC instead of 5VDC to these logic chips, reducing their longevity. Facility Modification FM-016 was processed, with assistance from the board manufacturer (Omega) and control system vendor (GA). There has been no reoccurrence since installation of the modification on 15 JUN 23.
9. CM 23-030 (13 JUL 23) Demonstrated the pulsing channel (NPP) pulse data capture failure, and beta-tested new GA NPP software with vendor support using a test plan that did not include critical operations (zero-power pulses with the other three rods inserted fully). GA was troubleshooting a potential solution to issues identified in original SAT-1 and FSM-001 with the pulsing channel data capture and transfer. Testing was strictly for bug identification and beta-testing. Testing did not resolve the pulse data capture issue.

Pulsing is still restricted pending software changes from the vendor. After testing, configuration was restored to the original setup and retested satisfactorily.

10. CM 23-040 (20 SEP 23) NFT1 fuel temperature indication displayed intermittent signal loss during operation. Problem was loose thermocouple connector, and was quickly repaired and restored to operation. Signal returned to previous indication based on trends.
11. CM 23-041 (10/25/23) The secondary cooling system was investigated based on high differential pressure (DP) across the heat exchanger. The state of the secondary system is limiting the ability to run long durations at high power. Substantial scale build-up in the cooling tower and secondary piping was identified. In addition, there is insufficient

straining/filtration in the secondary system prior to the heat exchanger, with debris buildup throughout the system due to the open top cooling tower. A high power (850kW) endurance test was performed, with primary temperatures rising 20C in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and 30C in three hours. High power runs may need to be restricted to adhere to the 60C primary temperature tech spec limit, but indications are available to the operator to ensure compliance. De-scaling operations and system modifications are being pursued to restore capability.

12. CM 23-042 (07 NOV 23) Standard fuel element 3347E in core position F24 was improperly seated after fuel inspection was completed. The orientation, with triangular top fitting stuck under the top grid plate and lower end-fitting disengaged and offset towards the shroud, was preventing attachment to the fuel element handling tool. Under direction of the RFD, a tool was made with an aluminum pipe section attached to the extendable pole that was just large enough to fit over the element top-fitting, with a wire rope fixed to the end of the new tool to lasso the top fitting of the element. This allowed the element to be straightened enough clear the top plate and re-engage the normal fuel element handling tool. Visual inspection was reperformed to verify no damage to the element had occurred. After passing inspection, element 3347E was returned to F24 core position and seated properly.
13. CM 23-044 (28 NOV 23) With the reactor at 5W and banked, k-excess was found slightly low. After visually checking the rod drive positions, it was identified that the safety control rod drive was lower than the others, with the same indicated rod position. The reactor was shut down. Manipulation of the drive showed that the drive would jump/bind at ~900 and 360 units, with the draw tube catching on a loose top mounting plate, causing the indication potentiometer to slip. Drive components were disassembled and realigned and limit switches adjusted. The drive was retested satisfactorily.
14. CM 23-045 (29 NOV 23) Found erratic behavior in NMP signal prior to startup.

Identified and repaired loose TNC connector for compensation voltage, which is critical for low source interlock functionality. NMP channel tests and Low Source interlock tests completed satisfactorily.

15. CM 23-047 The console UPS self-test feature, which causes a spurious loss of AC scram every 14 days was disabled via vendor software. See Scram Documentation from 05 MAY 23, 30 JUN 23, and 06 OCT 23. Safety systems functioned as designed.
b. Preventative Maintenance All maintenance and surveillance tasks during 2023 were accomplished as normally scheduled during the year, including those tasks involving the reactor fuel, instrumentation, control rod drives, and other related components. The annual maintenance and surveillance outage were during the month of November. Fuel inspections on B, C, half of E, and F-rings, and control rod inspection were completed with no new degraded fuel or control rods identified.

As described in the annual audit summary of section 4.d., there was one radiological survey surveillance that had a timing anomaly due to equipment failure. 1st Quarter water and environmental samples were due on 13 JAN 23, making the grace period date 13 FEB 23. The surveillance was documented as completed on 14 FEB 23, missing grace period date by one day.

The samples were collected and prepared in January within periodicity, but the analysis was delayed due to the failure of an HPGe cryocooler system. Analysis was completed 14 FEB 23 as soon as repairs were complete. There were no reactor operations performed on that day. The circumstances have been documented in a memo to file.

The current state of the HPGe is now out of service for required surveillances as the calibration sources are below the threshold required to pass the QA checks. New sources are currently on order, to return the equipment to service. In the meantime, samples are being collected and analyzed on schedule using a certified external laboratory.

7. Changes affecting the Safety Analysis Report (SAR)

(Made Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and Summaries of 50.59 Safety Evaluations)

a. Facility Changes that Affect the Description in the SAR There were three facility modifications were performed that required 50.59 evaluations that affect the description in the SAR:
  • FM-014: The core position bypass switch logic in the facility interlock system was modified. Approved by RSC on 15 JUN 23
  • FM-015: The lead door seal-in logic, time delay, and bypass switch indication in the facility interlock system was modified. Approved by RSC on 15 JUN 23.
  • FM-016: The reactor protection system scram logic board input voltage was converted from 24V to 5V to address a problem with the original GA design. This was in accordance with the subcomponent manufacturers recommendation following two failures of the board in less than a year. Approved by RSC on 15 JUN 23.
b. Procedure Changes that Affect the Description in the SAR Several reactor administrative and operating procedures were in 2023. No procedures changed screened in to 50.59 evaluation or required changes to the SAR description.
c. New Experiments or Tests Not Encompassed in the SAR The experiment program was restarted in 2023. The 22 experiment campaigns performed at the reactor in 2023 surpassed the total number of experiments performed at the reactor since 2011. Only routine experiments covered under existing routine reactor authorizations or reactor parameter authorizations, T.S. 6.4.b. and T.S. 6.4.c respectively, were performed in 2023. No new experiments or tests were performed during the reporting period that were not encompassed by the final safety analysis report (FSAR).
8. Radioactive Effluents
a. Liquid Waste: The reactor produced no liquid waste during 2023.
b. Gaseous Waste: There were no particulate discharges in 2023. The total activity of Argon-41 discharged in 2023 was 12.56 curies. The estimated effluent concentration

from the release of Argon-41 represents 4.43% of the constraint limit for unrestricted areas (10 CFR 20.1101(d) and Table 2, Appendix B, 10 CFR 20).

Quarter Argon-41 JAN - MAR 2023 0.895 Ci APR - JUN 2023 0.458 Ci JUL - SEP 2023 5.376 Ci OCT - DEC 2023 5.829 Ci 2023 Total 12.56 Ci

c. Solid Waste: All solid radioactive waste material is transferred to the AFRRI byproduct license; none was disposed of under the R-84 reactor license.
9. Environmental Radiological Surveys All environmental sampling of soil and vegetation yielded radionuclide levels within the background range. The radionuclides that were detected were those expected from natural background and from long-term fallout from nuclear weapons testing.
10. Exposures Greater Than 25% of 10 CFR 20 Limits There were no doses to reactor staff personnel greater than 25% of 10 CFR 20 occupational limits. No visitors were exposed to doses greater than public radiation dose limits.
11. Conclusion 2023 was an incredibly productive year for the TRIGA Mark-F reactor at AFRRI. This can be attributed to high prioritization on filling vacancies, and robust training program for our reactor staff. On 13 MAR 23, researchers and support personnel from three different departments within AFRRI successfully completed the first experiment with the reactor, after it was non-operational for six years. In 2023, the reactor accumulated more operational hours than the previous ten years combined. AFRRI is looking forward to further research, leadership, training, and education in 2024.
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