ML23202A218

Transmittal of Report, International Meeting of Nuclear Regulatory Advisory Committee - March 2023

ML23202A218
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Issue date:	03/31/2023
From:	Rempe J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
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International Meeting of Nuclear Regulatory Advisory Committees

- March 2023 Contributing Advisory Committees, Regulator (Country):

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (Finland)

Groupe Permanent d'Experts, Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (France) June 2023 Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee and Reactor Safety Examination Committee, Nuclear Regulation Authority (Japan)

Chief Nuclear Inspectors Independent Advisory Panel, Expert Panel on Natural Hazards, and Advisory Groups on Graphite Office of Nuclear Regulation (U.K.)

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.)

June 2023

DISCLAIMER This information was prepared by representatives from several nuclear regulatory agency advisory groups. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of governments or the agencies of participating organizations.

International Meeting of Nuclear Regulatory Advisory Committees - March 2023 Contributor Organizations, Regulator:

• Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (Finland)

• Groupe Permanent d'Experts, Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (France)

• Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee and Reactor Safety Examination Committee, Nuclear Regulation Authority (Japan)

• Chief Nuclear Inspectors Independent Advisory Panel, Expert Panel on Natural Hazards, and Advisory Groups on Graphite Office of Nuclear Regulation (U.K.)

• Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.)

June 2023 i

ABSTRACT In March 2023, representatives from advisory committees to nuclear reactor regulators completed an international interaction to gain a working understanding of advisory committee roles and organizations as well as to discuss common technical safety issues of interest and effective solutions to address these challenges. Representatives from advisory committees providing support to regulators in Finland, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated in meetings supporting associated with this interaction. This document summarizes the objectives and approach for, as well as the findings and insights gained from, this international interaction. Presentations from these meetings are also included.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Successful conduct of this international interaction and preparation of this report required contributions from several individuals and organizations. The effort to resume this international collaboration of nuclear regulatory advisory committees would not have been possible without the active contributions of the following individuals: Lasse Reiman and Juhani Hyvrinen (ACNS); Karin Rantamki (STUK); Thierry Charles, Bertrand de LEpinois, and Hervé Mbonjo (GPR); Naoto Sekimura (RSEC); Akio Yamamoto (NFSEC); Shinji Kinjo and Tomoya Ichimura (NRA); Paul Garesse, Aidan Parkes, and Tim Parkes (ONR); Ron Ballinger, Vicki Bier, Dave Petti, Joy Rempe (ACRS ); and Alesha Bellinger, Thomas Daschiell, Kent Howard, Scott Moore, Hossein Nourbakhsh, Quynh Nguyen, Tammy Skov, Andrea Torres, and Sandra Walker (NRC). Their efforts are greatly appreciated.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................... iii ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................. viii

1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Objectives................................................................................................................................. 2 1.2 Approach .................................................................................................................................. 2 1.3 Report Organization ................................................................................................................. 3

2. PLANNING MEETING ..................................................................................................................... 4 2.1 Advisory Committee Overviews .............................................................................................. 4 2.1.1 Finland ........................................................................................................................ 4 2.1.2 France .......................................................................................................................... 5 2.1.3 Japan ........................................................................................................................... 7 2.1.4 United Kingdom.......................................................................................................... 8 2.1.5 United States ............................................................................................................... 9 2.2 Summary and March 2023 Planning ...................................................................................... 10

3. SESSION 1 - OPERATING FLEET ............................................................................................... 12 3.1 Presentations and Discussions................................................................................................ 12 3.1.1 Finland ...................................................................................................................... 12 3.1.2 France ........................................................................................................................ 12 3.1.3 Japan ......................................................................................................................... 13 3.1.4 United States ............................................................................................................. 14 3.2 Summary ................................................................................................................................ 15

4. SESSION 2 - NEW CHALLENGES ............................................................................................... 16 4.1 Presentations and Discussions................................................................................................ 16 4.1.1 Finland ...................................................................................................................... 16 iv

4.1.2 France ........................................................................................................................ 16 4.1.3 Japan ......................................................................................................................... 17 4.1.4 United Kingdom........................................................................................................ 18 4.1.5 United States ............................................................................................................. 18 4.2 Summary ................................................................................................................................ 19

5. INSIGHTS GAINED AND FUTURE INTERACTIONS ............................................................... 21 5.1 Insights Gained ...................................................................................................................... 21 5.2 Future Interactions ................................................................................................................. 22

6. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 24 APPENDIX A MEETING AGENDAS AND ATTENDEE LISTS .......................................................... 26 APPENDIX B DECEMBER 5, 2022, PLANNING MEETING PRESENTATIONS .............................. 35 APPENDIX C MARCH 14, 2023, SESSION 1 PRESENTATIONS ....................................................... 75 APPENDIX D MARCH 15, 2023, SESSION 2 PRESENTATIONS ..................................................... 136 v

FIGURES Figure 1. Components of a strong regulatory sub-system.[5] ....................................................................... 1 vi

TABLES Table 1. Organizations represented in international meeting of regulatory advisory committees ................ 2 Table 2. GPE advisory committees and areas of expertise ........................................................................... 6 vii

ACRONYMS ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (U.S.) a ACNS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (Finland)

AEA Atomic Energy Act (U.S.)

AESJ Atomic Energy Society of Japan (Japan)

AMP Accident Management Program AMTE Aging Management Technical Evaluation ASN Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (France)

BWR Boiling Water Reactor CCF Common Cause Failure CNI Chief Nuclear Inspector (U.K.)

CNIs IAP CNIs Independent Advisory Panel (U.K.)

COI Conflict-of-Interest EPR European Pressurized Reactor EPZ Emergency Planning Zone EU European Union FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act (U.S.)

FFRD Fuel Fragmentation, Relocation and Dispersion FOAK First-of-a-Kind GD Government Decree (Finland)

GOJ Government of Japan a In cases where an acronym is country-specific, the country is identified in parentheses.

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GPD Groupe permanent dexperts pour les déchets (France)

GPDEM Groupe permanent dexperts pour le démantlement (France)

GPE Groupes permanents dexperts (France)

GPESPN Groupe permanent d'experts pour les équipements sous pression Nucléaires (France)

GPR Groupe permanent dexperts pour les réacteurs (France)

GPRP Groupe permanent dexperts en Radioprotection (France)

GPT Groupe permanent dexperts pour les transports (France)

GPU Groupe permanent d'experts pour les laboratoires et usines (France)

GX Green Transformation (Japan)

HEAF High Energy Arcing Fault IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAP Independent Advisory Panel (U.K.)

I&C Instrumentation and Control INES International Nuclear Event Scale INRA International Nuclear Regulators Association IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service (by IAEA)

IRSN Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire LOCA Loss of Coolant Accidents LWR Light Water Reactor MEAE Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan)

NFSEC Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee (Japan)

NPP Nuclear Power Plant ix

NPS Nuclear Power Station NRA Nuclear Regulation Authority (Japan)

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.)

NSC Nuclear Safety Commission (Japan)

OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development OECD/NEA OECD Nuclear Energy Agency OL Operating License ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation (U.K.)

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PSACI Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement PSR Periodic Safety Review (Finland)

PWR Pressurized Water Reactor ROP Reactor Oversight Process RSEC Reactor Safety Examination Committee (Japan)

RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel SLR Subsequent License Renewal (U.S.)

SMR Small Modular Reactor SFP Spent Fuel Pool SSC Structures, Systems, and Component STUK Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (Finland)

TSO Technical Support Organization U.K. or UK United Kingdom U.S. or US United States x

VD Vvisite Décennale (Ten Year Outage, France)

WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators Association YVL Regulatory Guides on Nuclear Safety (Finland) xi

International Meeting of Nuclear Regulatory Advisory Committees - March 2023

1. INTRODUCTION Recently, there has been significant international interest in nuclear power as a carbon-free source of electricity. However, there are challenges associated with proposed new designs and with continued operation of the current fleet. New reactor designs are being proposed for which there is little, if any, operating experience to support their safety case. In addition, aging issues are emerging with the operating fleet of reactors. Furthermore, new technologies and fuel types, with little nuclear operational experience, are proposed that may benefit current and new reactor operation. Regulation of the current fleet and licensing of new fuels, technologies, and designs are required to ensure the safety of the current operating fleet and the safety benefits of these advanced options.

Although nuclear reactor regulation is a national responsibility, several opportunities for international collaboration exist to facilitate communication between regulatory agencies, such as the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA), Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA),

and other activities sponsored by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[1, 2, 3, 4] No such opportunity exists, however, for advisory committees for nuclear safety to regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, the importance of having independent technical advice, by a standing panel of experts, is internationally recognized as a key component of a strong nuclear regulatory subsubsystem (see Figure 1).[5] Representatives of advisory committees to regulatory agencies in several countries [e.g., Finland, France, Japan, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (U.S.)] agreed that an international interaction by regulatory advisory committees would be beneficial and held a meeting in March 2023.

Figure 1. Components of a strong regulatory sub-system (Image courtesy of IAEA [5])

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1.1 Objectives Advisory committee representatives collectively agreed this interaction should focus on the following objectives:

• Gain a working understanding of differences in advisory committee roles and organizations

• Share experience on common issues of interest and discuss effective advisory committee solutions to address these issues (recognizing nuclear reactor regulation is a national responsibility)

• Increase advisory committee effectiveness by:

- Gaining knowledge about emerging issues and new technologies of interest

- Identifying, contributing to, and gaining from international regulatory advisory group best practices and safety perspectives

- Sharing knowledge about activities to strengthen advisory committee roles With respect to the first objective, there are significant differences in the roles and structures of advisory committees. Participants recognized that understanding these differences is important. The second objective pertains to gaining insights from each others experience and solutions. Although nuclear reactor regulation is a national responsibility, regulatory advisory committees are facing similar challenges. With respect to the third item, representatives agreed it was important to increase committee effectiveness. Shared knowledge about best practices, safety perspectives, and activities to strengthen advisory committee roles were identified as mechanisms to increase advisory committee effectiveness.

1.2 Approach In this interaction, representatives from the five regulatory advisory committees listed in Table 1 participated. To better accomplish the objectives for this interaction, participants held a December 5, 2022, planning meeting to become acquainted with organizational differences and select the topics for discussion at the main hybrid meeting (March 14 and 15, 2023). Agendas and a list of participants for each of these meetings are found in Appendix A.

Table 1. Organizations represented in international meeting of regulatory advisory committees Country Regulatory Agency Participating Advisory Committee Finland Radiation and Nuclear Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS)

Safety Authority (STUK)

France Autorité de Sûreté Groupes permanents dexperts (GPE)

Nucléaire (ASN)

• Groupe permanent d'experts pour les réacteurs (GPR) b

• Groupe permanent d'experts pour les laboratoires et usines (GPU)

• Groupe permanent dexperts pour les déchets (GPD)

• Groupe permanent dexperts pour le démantlement (GPDEM)

• Groupe permanent d'experts pour les équipements sous pression Nucléaires (GPESPN)b

• Groupe permanent dexperts pour les transports (GPT)

• Groupe permanent dexperts en Radioprotection (GPRP) b GPE committees participating in this international reactor safety interaction.

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Country Regulatory Agency Participating Advisory Committee Japan Nuclear Regulation

• Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee (NFSEC)

Authority (NRA)

• Reactor Safety Examination Committee (RSEC)

United Office for Nuclear

• Chief Nuclear Inspectors (CNI) Independent Advisory Kingdom Regulation (ONR) Panel (IAP)

• Expert Panel on Natural Hazards

• Advisory Groups on Graphite United States Nuclear Regulatory Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)

Commission (NRC) 1.3 Report Organization This report summarizes outcomes from this international interaction. The balance of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes preliminary introductory meeting discussion topics.

Sections 3 and 4 summarize insights from the two selected discussion topics. Section 5 of this report summarizes insights and recommendations from this effort. References are listed in Section 6.

Appendices to this document provide more detailed information. Specifically, Appendix A provides lists of attendees and agendas from the planning and main meeting. Appendices B through D contain meeting presentations.

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2. PLANNING MEETING In preparatory interactions, participants concluded it would be beneficial to hold a December 2022 planning meeting prior to the March 2023 meeting. This planning meeting allowed paricipants to become aware of differences among advisory committee structures, authority, membership, and organizations. In addition, this real-time virtual interaction allowed participants to better understand the objectives for this international activity and facilitated selection of topics for the March 2023 meeting. Appendix A includes an agenda for and a list of participants in this planning meeting. Appendix B includes slides presented during this planning meeting.

2.1 Advisory Committee Overviews In the December 2022 planning meeting, representatives from each advisory committee provided presentations describing their committee structure, authority, and organization. In these presentations, many participants also proposed topics for the March 2023 meeting.

2.1.1 Finland Dr. Lasse Reiman, ACSN Chairman, provided an overview of their committee structure, organization, and on-going activities. The ACSN is an independent body nominated by the Government of Finland. It was established in connection with the renewal of the Nuclear Energy Act in 1987.[6] ACSN tasks, composition,and meeting practices are defined by the Government Decree (GD) 1015/2016, 24 November 2016.[7] ACSN has seven members and a part-time secretary from STUK. According to GD 1015/2016, the Director General of STUK is a permanent expert on ACSN. Other permanent experts can be nominated for a specific term of the Committee. ACSN activities are supported by two international subcommittees (reactor safety, nuclear waste safety), with five foreign members on each subcommittee.

International participation provides a means to gather information from regulatory approachs on selected safety issues in other countries. The chair of a subcommittee must be a member of ACSN. The subcommittees discuss and give recommendations to STUK concerning important topical safety issues, and the main committee reviews (and typically confirms) their recommendations.

Per GD 1015/2016,[7] ACSN main tasks are:

• To give statements on license applications concerning construction and operation of a nuclear facility and on other important applications concerning the use of nuclear power,

• To give statements on regulations and guides concerning safe use of nuclear power,

• To give statements on important issues related to regulatory oversight of the safe use of nuclear power,

• To follow development of nuclear safety and related research,

• To promote national co-operation and follow international co-operation concerning safe use of nuclear power, and

• To make initiatives to competent authorities for necessary actions concerning the safe use of nuclear power.

In reviewing license applications, ACSN follows their rules and procedures [8] to assess the application and the scope and depth of STUKs review. ACSN reviews include applicant/licensee and STUK presentations and related facility visits. Meeting memorandum issued by ACSN are public. For each ACSN term, an Action Plan is developed based on tasks defined in GD 1015/2016.[7] In addition to review of license applications and review of regulations and regulatory guides, Action Plan activities include, for example, the following:

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• Important operating experiences and events at Finnish nuclear facilities,

• Implementation of STUKs strategy,

• Development of on-site emergency preparedness arrangements, and

• Experiences from safeguards oversight.

Currently, ACSN is reviewing two license applications:

• Renewal of the Operating License (OL) of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) until 2050. The existing operating licenses expire in 2027 (Loviisa 1) and 2030 (Loviisa 2). At these times, the units will have operated for 50 years.

• Operating License of the final disposal facility and encapsulation plant for spent fuel (ONKALO facility).

In recent years, other topics reviewed by ACSN include: Olkiluoto 3 OL application; periodic safety review (PSR), including the plan for final disposal of low and medium level waste, for the Loviisa nuclear power plant (NPP); revisions to STUK regulations and regulatory guides; approval of standard equipment for safety related applications (KELPO project); modernization of Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems at operating NPPs; and major events at operating NPPs. In addition, ACSN made an initiative related to identifying preparations needed by the government and STUK for the possible use of small modular reactors (SMRs). This effort led to several statements regarding possible licensing process revisions and needed research resources.

In his presentation, Dr. Reiman also discussed ACSN challenges, such as the amount of required work, cognizance of recent nuclear safety developments, and maintaining independence.

For the March 2023 meeting topics, ACSN members suggested the following three topics:

• Approval practices and processes (for example plant and systems design maturity in the construction license phase, qualification practices for equipment approvals including approval of standard commercial grade products)

• Near-future nuclear technologies and their regulatory challenges

• Regulatory oversight of organizational issues During the discussion after this presentation, participants inquired about the contents of, and the actions being taken to address, the statements given by ACSN during 2021. In his response, Dr. Reiman indicated that most statements pertain to changes concerning Finnish regulatory guides (YVL Guides) and legislation related to nuclear safety, related to emergency planning, and security-related licensing requirements. He observed that there is concern that there may be several applications for new reactors (including SMRs) to review simultaneously, which would be a challenge to Committee resources.

2.1.2 France Dr. Thierry Charles, GPR Chairman, provided an overview of the technical expertise provided to ASN, which includes input from the Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN), the French technical support organization, and input from several expert advisory committees (Groupes permanents dexperts or GPE). Upon ASN request (and prior to ASN decisions),[9] IRSN and GPE advisory committees issue opinions on important safety or radioprotection issues (e.g., new regulations; plant development, commissioning, and decommissioning; and incidents). The seven ASN advisory committees are identified in Table 2 with their main review topic and typical areas of member expertise.

Consistent with their procedures and bylaws [9], each advisory committee has a chair and vice-chair with approximately 30 to 35 members. GPE opinions are formulated by the committee members after plenary and information meetings. As appropriate, several advisory groups work together on a specific issue. For 5

example, the GPR and GPESPN jointly address common reactor issues, such as the current stress corrosion cracking issue affecting several French reactors. By developing informed and independent opinions, GPEs contribute to the development of and act as guarantors of the nuclear safety and radiation protection doctrine.

Table 2. GPE advisory committees and areas of expertise Committee Topic Member Areas of Expertise Groupe permanent d'experts pour Nuclear Reactors

• Design and operation of plants (e.g., PWR les réacteurs (GPR) for GPR)

Groupe permanent d'experts pour Laboratories and

• Technical fields (e.g, neutronics, les laboratoires et usines (GPU) Plants thermohydraulic)

Groupe permanent dexperts pour Waste

• General risks (e.g., fire, high energy arcing les déchets (GPD) fault or HEAF)

Groupe permanent dexperts pour le Decommissioning démantlement (GPDEM)

Groupe permanent d'experts pour Nuclear Pressure Nuclear pressure equipment (e.g., materials, les équipements sous pression Equipment mechanics, corrosion, welding, non-Nucléaires (GPESPN) destructive control)

Groupe permanent dexperts pour Transport Radioactive transport and associated risks, in les transports (GPT) particular representatives from the French committee for certification of companies in training and monitoring of personnel working with ionizing radiations.

Groupe permanent dexperts en Radiation Radiation protection of workers, the public Radioprotection (GPRP) Protection and patients and for medical, industrial and research applications of ionizing radiations, including natural ionizing radiations With respect to the operating fleet, GPE is reviewing the following topics:

• Long term operation and periodic safety reviews

- Aging management

- Safety reassessment: accident analyses, internal and external hazards, severe accidents, probabilistic safety assessment, modifications to improve safety

• Lessons learnt from operation

• Lessons learnt from Fukushima Daiichi Dr. Charles highlighted several challenges associated with the operating fleet, such as continued plant conformance with safety requirements, human and organizational factors, aging management (including the reactor pressure vessel), safety improvements associated with lifetime extension, severe accident mitigation, and the impact of climate change (e.g., changes in flooding risk).

With respect to new reactors, GPE is reviewing the following topics:

• European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) Flamanville 3: including more than 20 meetings of GPR and GPESPN about the safety case and deviations

• EPR2: general safety options, design, and safety case Dr. Charles highlighted several challenges associated with licensing of new reactors, such as control of quality and reliability of industrial equipment, project management and safety requirement integration, implementation of the break preclusion (i.e., break exclusion) approach, consideration of defense in depth, consideration of passive systems, and definition of SMR general safety objectives. For the March 2023 meeting topics, GPE members suggested the following topics:

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• Operating fleet: Lessons learnt from NPP operation and long-term NPP operation

• New challenges: General safety objectives for new reactors The GPE presentation also included two slides regarding the format of the March 2023 meeting; these slides were discussed by Dr. Charles during the closing meeting discussion (see Section 2.2).

During the discussion after this presentation, participants inquired about the process used to obtain the GPE advisory committee members and the ability to arrive at consensus opinions with the many (30-35) members in each advisory committee. In his response, Dr. Charles indicated that many members stay on their advisory committee for multiple terms, which helps reduce the number of new members from public calls (ASN has procedures in place for reviewing applications and selecting new members). Although the final committee opinion may note differences in member views on some topics, Dr. Charles observed there are consensus views on most topics discussed in advisory committee opinions.

2.1.3 Japan Dr. Naoto Sekimura, Chairman of RSEC and Dr. Akio Yamamoto, Chairman of NFSEC, provided an overview of the two advisory committees that provide technical advice to NRA for regulatory decision-making. These two advisory committees, RSEC and NFSEC, were established in NRA, the regulatory body established by the Government of Japan after TEPCOs Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, in the 2012 Act for Establishment of Nuclear Regulation Authority.[10] Advisory committees with the same names, i.e. RSEC and NFSEC, existed in the previous regulatory systems in Japan, which were established in 1961 and 1976, respectively, under the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC). The NSC was responsible for double-checking of applications examined by the regulatory authority; and RSEC and NFSEC in NSC carried out the responsibility. The Japanese Diet required RSEC and NFSEC in NRA to play a different role from the committees in NSC.[11] The roles of the RSEC and NFSEC in NRA are to provide objective advice on the decisions of NRA (without substituting NRAs own decision-making) and to investigate and deliberate on matters requested by NRA. RSEC and NFSEC meetings and meeting materials are available to the public, consistent with published guidance. [12,13]

RSEC, which may have up to 30 members, reviews topics associated with reactor safety, and NFSEC, which may have up to 20 members, reviews topics related to nuclear fuel safety. Both RSEC and NFSEC review hazards associated with volcanoes, earthquakes, and tsunami. Several members serve on both RSEC and NFSEC. For some topics, joint reviews are conducted.

Currently, NRA has requested RSEC and NFSEC provide input on the following:

• To conduct investigations and deliberations on the necessity of responses based on the collection and analysis of information on accidents and troubles that have occurred in Japan and overseas (as well as on trends in regulations overseas) and to provide advice;

• To evaluate and advise on the status of NRA responses to conclusions (including conclusions related to transportation) of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) of the IAEA follow-up mission conducted in January 2020 [14];

• To conduct investigations and deliberations on the implementation status of the new nuclear regulatory inspection system [i.e., a Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)-type inspection] enforced in April 2020 by regulatory bodies and operators and to provide advice;

• With regard to the evaluation for improving the safety of reactor facilities for power generation conducted by the establishers of reactors for power generation under Article 43-3-29 of the Reactor Regulation Act [15], to advise how the system should be organized and how its operation should be improved, at first, to report on the improvement of the operation of the system based on the framework of the current system; 7

• To conduct investigations and deliberations on the NRA's evaluation of the volcano monitoring results of nuclear power generation operators and provide advice [only RSEC subcommittees on volcanic hazards and earthquake hazards];

• To conduct investigations and deliberations on the NRA's evaluation of the volcano monitoring results of nuclear fuel facility operators and provide advice [only NFSEC subcommittees on volcanic hazards and earthquake hazards];

• To conduct investigations and deliberations on the necessity of regulatory responses and provide advice, based on the results of collection and analysis of information related to earthquakes, tsunamis, and other events, such as disasters that have occurred in Japan and overseas, and knowledge announced by administrative agencies, etc. [both RSEC and NFSEC subcommittees on volcanic hazards and earthquake hazards]; and

• To conduct investigations and deliberations on the necessity of regulatory responses and provide advice, based on the results of collection and analysis of information related to volcanic events, such as disasters that have occurred in Japan and overseas, and findings announced by administrative agencies, etc. [both RSEC and NFSEC subcommittees on volcanic hazards and earthquake hazards].

In recent years, RSEC and NFSEC have reported to NRA on significant topics, such as the following:

• Collection and analysis of international nuclear reactor accidents, issues, and regulatory changes;

• Implementation status of the new nuclear regulatory inspection system established in April 2020;

• Progress in collecting information from operators about safety improvements in Japanese power reactor installations; and

• Comparative evaluation between the new NRA safety goal and safety achieved by compliance with new Japanese regulatory standards.

With respect to the latter topic, the RSEC report provided several recommendations, such as the importance of continuous safety improvements in the new NRA safety goal (in order to preclude future severe accidents), the need for NRA to refer to the safety goals when formulating regulatory standards, to note that safety goals and safety levels cannot and should not be directly compared using probabilistic assessments, and to explain these points to the public. Because NRA had not authorized RSEC and NFSEC participation in the March 2023 meeting at the time that the December 5, 2022, meeting was held, no discussion topic suggestions were offered.

During the discussion after this presentation, participants expressed interest in NRAs new safety goal and the use of the response from RSEC and NFSEC in the regulation. In his response, Dr. Sekimura indicated that the process of NRAs consideration was on-going. Although the report is in Japanese, he agreed to provide a copy to meeting participants.

2.1.4 United Kingdom Mr. Paul Garesse, ONR Principal Inspector, ONR, Dr. Lee Easterbrook, ONR Principal Inspector, and Dr.

Aidan Parkes, ONR Inspector, provided an overview of several expert panels that provide input to the ONR.[16] They described three ONR expert panels: the Expert Panel on Natural Hazards (established in 2010), which addresses seimic, meteorologic, coastal flooding (including tsunami), aircraft crash hazards and climate change impacts; the ONR Advisory Groups on Graphite, which address graphite topics associated with Magnox and AGR graphite topics such as aging; and the Chief Nuclear Inspectors (CNIs) Independent Advisory Panel (IAP), which provides advice on nuclear related matters including regulator strategy, policy, and new technology developments. Chaired by the ONR CNI, the panel membership is comprised of experts from industry, academia, non-government organizations, and other government departments. Thus, the IAP is designed to provide the ONR access to independent external advice on a diverse range of nuclear matters.

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Currently, the IAP provides advice and perspectives on the following topics:

• Development of regulatory priorities and strategies (consideration of ethics in regulatory decision-making)

• Developments in nuclear technologies and their potential implications for nuclear regulation (e.g.,

regulating innovation, improved regulatory efficiency

• Research needs (e.g., impact of climate change, cyber security, regulatory strategy)

• Engagement with external centers It was emphasized that expert panel contributions are their advice and not considered ONR views.

During the discussion after this presentation, participants inquired about the timing when the expert panel on external hazards was formed (noting it was prior to the March 2011 Fukushima events). ONR representatives indicated this panel was formed after a PSR of reactors at the Hinkley site. However, it was acknowledged that the significance and scope of this panel increased considerably after the 2011 Fukusima events.

2.1.5 United States Dr. Joy Rempe, ACRS Chairman, provided an overview of the ACRS structure, organization, and on-going activities. The ACRS is the NRCs only statutory committee established by the 1957 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954.[17] The AEA authorizes up to 15 ACRS members, which are appointed by the NRC Commissioners for a term of 4 years and may be reappointed to additional terms.

ACRS members come from industry, academia, and national laboratories with diverse backgrounds in various disciplines (e.g., risk assessment, reactor safety, thermal hydraulics, fuels, materials, plant operations, and digital I&C).

The ACRS is independent of the NRC staff. ACRS issues publicly available letter reports[18] that provide the Commission with its independent technical reviews of, and advice on the NRC safety research program and NRC staff evaluations of the safety of proposed or existing reactor facilities and assessments of proposed safety standards. ACRS also provides briefings to the NRC Commissioners on topics of interest. It is required (by the AEA or Commission direction) that ACRS participate in the reviews of several topics, such as submittals for new reactor licenses, subsequent license renewals, and the NRCs research program. In addition, ACRS may initiate reviews on safety topics of interest. ACRS conducts monthly full committee and subcommittee meetings according to requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and processes outlined in ACRS Bylaws.[19,20] In addition, ACRS periodically visits NRC regional offices and licensee facilities of interest (operating plant sites, construction sites, and fuel fabrication facilities).

With respect to the operating fleet, ACRS is reviewing staff reviews or guidance on the following topics:

• Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) applications (that allow plant operation up to 80 years)

• New analytical methods to simulate accident progression and phenomena

• Fuel performance topics

• Digital I&C implementation (common-cause failure, software, etc.),

• Emerging technologies, such as digital twins, and artificial intelligence) and issues, such as HEAFs, vessel embrittlement under high fluence conditions, and cyber security With respect to licensing and operation of new reactors, ACRS is reviewing the following topics:

• Alignment and lessons learned for NRCs current licensing pathways (10 CFR Part 50 for applicants pursuing separate Construction Permits and Operating Licenses and 10 CFR Part 52 for applicants pursuing Certified Designs)

• 10 CFR Part 53 development (optional new technology-inclusive licensing framework), and 9

• Related licensing guidance on topics such as emergency planning, operator licensing, licensing basis event selection, etc.

• Staff reviews of licensing documents (along with applications) provided by several design centers (This includes KAIROS, NuScale, X-Energy, Terrapower, Westinghouse, and about a dozen anticipated additional organizations during the next three to five years).

In her presentation, Dr. Rempe elaborated on several ACRS challenges:

• Numerous (potential) applications from design developers

• Industry concerns about cost/schedule for licensing reviews

• Appropriate membership succession The first item pertains to the number of licensing documents for new reactor designs that differ substantially from the operating fleet. ACRS is focusing on how licensing basis events should be identified for designs with little (or no) operating experience, and the lack of sufficient data to validate fuel, reactor system performance, and methods to evaluate event progression in these designs. The second item relates to industry concerns about the cost and time required for regulatory reviews. ACRS is implementing new approaches to increase review effectiveness without adversely impacting safety. The third item pertains to ACRS membership succession. As noted above, ACRS may have up to 15 members, but there are no term limits. Although ACRS benefits from new member perspectives, there is a need for knowledge transfer to these new members and the process to obtain and transfer knowledge to new members requires time.

For the March 2023 meeting topics, ACRS members suggested the following three topics:

• Operating Fleet (including aging-related issues and the use of high burnup fuels)

• Licensing and operation of First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) reactors, including areas such as:

- Achievement of safety with little or no operating experience

- The suitability of current licensing frameworks

- Treatment of uncertainties

- Application of defense in depth

• Risk surrogates (Safety Goals) for small modular Light Water Reactors (LWRs) and non-LWRs Finally, Dr. Rempe closed by emphasizing two desired ACRS outcomes from this international activity:

(a) identifying emerging issues related to the operating fleet, and (b) advice being given to address issues associated with new FOAK reactors. In the discussion following this presentation, participants inquired about time constraints on ACRS members (considering the broad spectrum of activities members address) and how conflict-of-interest issues (COI) are avoided by ACRS members. Dr. Rempe responded that ACRS positions are considered part-time, and financially compensated accordingly. When COI issues arise, she noted that members recuse themselves from deliberations on the topic of concern.

2.2 Summary and March 2023 Planning As indicated in the agenda for this meeting, the final session was a joint discussion to summarize insights from the December 5 planning meeting and prepare for the March 2023 meeting. During this discussion, participants agreed upon topics, such as the meeting objective, the topics for discussion, the meeting date, and the documentation of meeting accomplishments. Appendix B.6 contains slides, which were jointly developed by meeting participants, to document results from this December 2022 discussion.

2.2.1.1 Summary Significant differences were identified in advisory committee organizations and roles:

• Committee membership number 10

• Committee member composition-nationality (several advisory committees include international members), areas of expertise (safety, reactor design, radiation safety, external events, waste management, etc.) and employment history (industry, university, national laboratory, regulator, etc.)

• Role (proactive versus reactive activities)

• Topics addressed and process for selection of topics

• Methods for providing input to the regulator

• Methods for including public stakeholder participation and public education Despite these differences, participants agreed that advisory committees have similar objectives and are reviewing many similar topics. Participants observed, however, that implementation of best practices and insights identified in subsequent interactions may be limited due to national differences in the following:

• Committee charter, regulation, or public law and the manner in which advisory committee discussions and contributions are made available to stakeholders; and

• External factors (e.g., reliance on nuclear, political, public acceptance and communication, prior events in a country, emphasis on cost/benefit criterion versus continuous improvement, standardization of existing fleet, interest in new builds and advanced reactors, long-term solution for waste, work force availability).

Nevertheless, it was agreed that the interaction should be pursued because of the importance of identifying these best practices and insights.

2.2.1.2 March 2023 Planning This planning discussion emphasized selection of meeting objectives, format and discussion topics for the March 2023 meeting and documentation of this interaction.

During the discussion on the March 2023 meeting objectives, Dr. Naoto Sekimura shared slides (see Appendix B.3.2) regarding the importance of having an expert panel to provide independent advice to a regulator. This point was added to the discussion about meeting objectives (see Section 1.1).

Dr. Charles led the discussion of the meeting format and discussion topic selection. It was agreed that a two-day meeting, consisting of two half-day thematic sessions) would be the best format. The first session (on Day 1) should focus on issues pertaining to the operating fleet, including topics such as operating experience feedback, long-term operating issues (including aging of non-replaceable equipment), and modernization of regulatory activities (including risk-informed applications). The second session (on Day 2) should focus on new challenges, including topics such as safety objectives for new LWR and FOAK reactors, international perspectives pertaining to emerging technical issues, and efforts to strengthen the role of advisory committee experts (including methods to address diverse opinions).

Meeting participants agreed that the March 2023 sessions would occur on the afternoon of Tuesday March 14, 2023, and on the morning of Wednesday, March 15, 2023.

Finally, with respect to documentation of this international meeting activity, members of the ACRS, the hosts for the March 2023 meeting, agreed to develop a draft report template for interaction meeting with populated draft sections for the planning meeting. This draft document was circulated to participants for comment (and revised accordingly).

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3. SESSION 1 - OPERATING FLEET Participants in Session 1 represented four countries: Finland, France, Japan, and the U.S. This section summarizes input from each presentation (Section 3.1) and subsequent discussion (Section 3.2). .

Appendix A includes an agenda and a list of participants for Session 1. Appendix C includes slides presented during this session.

3.1 Presentations and Discussions 3.1.1 Finland In this presentation, which was authored by Dr. Karin Rantamki, ACSN Secretary, Dr. Petri Kinnunen, Member ACSN, and Dr. Heli Talja, Member ACSN, Dr. Rantamki focused on aging management and described Finlands approach, which can be summarized with the statement, We know our plants. Their comprehensive aging management program (AMP) requires understanding functioning of the whole plant as well as relevant components, consideration of risk assessment, understanding aging mechanisms (embrittlement, fatigue, thermal fatigue, stress corrosion cracking, corrosion, etc.), and cooperation between the plant owner, the regulator, and research institutes. Appropriate actions are taken to prevent, detect, monitor, and mitigate aging so that components are maintained with defined acceptance criteria. The most important aging issue, embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) of the Loviisa plant units was discussed in depth in the Finnish presentation. In addition, subsequent discussion raised three additional topics, namely aging of concrete, aging of cabling and obsolescence of I&C technology. The principle of continuous improvement, which is related to their PSR reviews, was also discussed.

3.1.2 France For Session 1, Dr. Bertrand de LEpinois, Member GPR, provided GPE presentations on two topics:

implementing lessons learned from operating plant events; and periodic safety review (PSR) and long-term operation (LTO).

3.1.2.1 Operating Plant Feedback On top of the utilitys responsibility to process the operational feedback and the day-to-day regulator interaction to check that lessons learnt are properly implemented, the presentation emphasized that the GPR holds regular meetings (now every year) dedicated to operational feedback. Based on a comprehensive report by IRSN, the GPE discusses the main events, families of events, and trends (as the weight of human and organizational factors in a majority of events). The main events addressed in recent years include topics, such as an International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) level 2 operating incident review of lessons learnt (e.g., primary circuit drainage under void conditions), the stainless-steel stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in 2022, and the Fukushima Daiichi accident (the GPE being instrumental in setting the safety philosophy and strategy following this accident). Some themes are also discussed; for example, last year, discussions focused on heat sink issues (marine ingress, risks of clogging, corrosion);

maintenance operational feedback; and an attempt to a posteriori detect declining trends at one site using indicators (the thorough analysis gave no clear result, showing that qualitative information and in-field interaction are essential to appreciate how the work is done and foresee a potential decline of a plant).

3.1.2.2 Periodic Safety Review (PSR) and Long-Term Operation (LTO)

In France, the license for an operating plant has no fixed term, but a periodic safety reassessment must be performed every ten years, after which the regulator approves continued operation. The GPR presentation emphasized these ten-year exercises are organized into two parts: a compliance review, including extended inspection during the ten-year outage or visite décennale (VD) and a PSR. To determine which safety improvements make sense (or appear necessary) for a plant, the PSR considers 12

operational feedback (at fleet and international levels), the progress of knowledge, and the development of technologies and standards for new reactors. The PSR includes a generic phase (considering the whole series of reactors) and a specific phase (dedicated to a given reactor). The licensee proposes a PSR orientation (i.e., a draft proposal for the PSR evaluation), which is reviewed and amended by the regulator (which includes a review by the GPE); the licensee then performs the PSR studies, which are reviewed by IRSN followed by the GPE before the ASN takes a position and before changes are implemented by the licensee.

Significant upgrades are performed during VDs, especially the fourth VD (VD4) after forty years of operation. The compliance checks were augmented (including extra inspections of components such as anchoring, a thorough aging assessment, equipment qualification beyond 40 years, etc.) In terms of an upgrade, a specific objective is, along with completing the post Fukushima backfitting, to approach the new reactor safety objectives, in particular: avoid protection measures for the population in case of a design basis accident; increase the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents (including a new injection and cooling injection path - to prevent core melt and, in case of core melt, to extract residual heat from the containment without venting - and measures to prevent basemat ablation in case of core melt); and reduce the residual risk of fuel damage in the spent fuel pool. Many GPE meetings occurred, providing opinions on the VD4 objectives, accident studies, hazards, RPV and primary circuit integrity, severe accidents, the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and the overall conclusions.

3.1.3 Japan For Session 1, Dr. Tomoya Ichimura, Deputy Secretary-General for Technoical Affairs, NRA, presented an overview of recent changes in nuclear power station (NPS) regulation in Japan; this was followed by a presentation by Dr. Naoto Sekimura, Chair NRA RSEC, on the status of regulation, aging, management, and safe LTO of nuclear power plants in Japan.

3.1.3.1 Operating Fleet Regulation After the March 2011 accident at TEPCOS Fukushima Daiichi NPS, safety regulations for nuclear reactors in Japan totally changed. Changes included establishing new sets of regulatory requirements, which became effective on July 8, 2013, based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. At present, plant operators have applied for the conformity review for 27 reactors (of which 17 have been permitted through NRA review processes), while 24 are being decommissioned. Continuous improvement of safety is one of the most important lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

Through a back-fitting system, the latest knowledge is incorporated into requirements and applied to the operating fleet. The NRA has been constantly collecting and reviewing new findings / knowledge and incorporating them into regulatory requirements and require back-fitting with specific time limits. In this process, the NRA seeks advice from the Reactor Safety Examination Committee (RSEC) and the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee (NFSEC), both established in May 2014.

Introduction of Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement (PSACI) is also a part of continuous improvement. The NRA requires operators to conduct PSACI including PSRs, stress tests, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) on their operating reactors and submit the results to the NRA. Also, the NRA introduced a new inspection framework in 2020, which made the role of operators and regulator clearer and introduced the risk-informed, performance-based regulation similar to the Reactor Oversight Proces (ROP) in the US. The NRA has asked the RSEC and the NFSEC to deliberate on the improvements to the PSACI system as well as advise on this regulatory inspection system.

In the amended Reactor Regulation Act after the Fukushima Accident,[15] the operating period of NPP is set to 40 years with a maximum extension of 20 years only once. In the green transformation (GX) strategy announced by the Government of Japan (GOJ) in December 2022,[21] however, a modification of the operational period of NPP was suggested, which maintains the general framework of 40 years plus 13

20 years while considering a mechanism that would allow the period during which operation is suspended after the Accident to be added to the operating period subject to approval by Japans Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Resonding to this movement, the NRA has started considering a regulatory proposal to revise the Reactor Regulation Act, so that appropriate safety regulations can be applied to reactors regardless of the operating period. The proposal will be discussed in the current Diet session.

3.1.3.2 Current Status of Regulation, Aging Management, and Safe LTO The NRA requires that NPP operators conduct an Aging Management Technical Evaluation (AMTE) prior to 30 years of operation and every 10 years thereafter in each plant. In the evaluation, all safety-related components, systems, and structures (etc.) are assessed assuming 60 years of operation. Licensees can apply a Standard,[22] complied and updated by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, which lists possible aging degradation mechanisms and references the latest findings and existing knowledge base.

The AMTE also requires evaluation of the simultaneous superposition of aging degradation and possible effects of earthquakes and tsunamis. In addition, the AMTE requires the effectiveness of the current maintenance program be evaluated, and if necessary, a long-term maintenance plan for the next 10 years be developed and implemented.

The NRA requires operators conduct special inspections of RPVs, containment vessels, concrete structures, etc., if they are to operate for more than 40 years. In addition to these data collection requirements, the expansion of knowledge on degradation using harvested materials from decommissioning reactors is underway by several projects, which are led by METI, operators, and the NRA.

3.1.4 United States In his presentation, Dr. Ron Ballinger, ACRS member, focused on a selection of current issues related to LWR structural materials and nuclear fuel that will impact extended operation. The presentation emphasized issues addressed in the ACRS letter reports.[23,24,25] These issues included:

• RPV embrittlement

• Environmentally assisted structural materials degradation

• Fuel cladding embrittlement

• Fuel fragmentation and relocation Dr. Ballinger provided a brief overview of materials and fuel degradation issues related to extended operation. His presentation included a list of structures and components for which degradation must be evaluated. Due to timely replacement of most major components (e.g., steam generators, turbines, pressurizers, condensers, steam dryers) and dispositioning of all dissimilar welds (e.g., replaced or mitigated), he observed that elapsed operating time was an inappropriate measure for the age of a plant.

As a practicable matter, the only major components that are not replaceable are the RPV, vessel support structures, and major concrete components (e.g., basemat, pedestal, reactor cavity). Because fuel is a consumable item, aging issues concern reliability when burnup and exposure time are extended.

He observed that the expected neutron fluence at extended operation may likely exceed the bounds of the empirical data base for evaluating the effect of exposure on RPV embrittlement criteria using the current model found in Regulatory Guide 1.99. An updated model that includes a much-enhanced database was discussed which addresses this shortcoming.

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Environmentally assisted structural materials degradation, primarily due to stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel, including welds and heat-effected zones, is one of the most significant degradation mechanisms for LWR structural materials. This issue has been an ongoing problem since the early days of the LWR industry. Extensive research has been conducted to develop mitigation strategies. However, the issue persists, as suggested by recent incidents of cracking in Type 316 stainless steel weld heat affected zones in nominally reducing (thought to be benign) environments.

Fuel issues, including cladding embrittlement and pellet fragmentation and relocation are becoming more important for some LWR accident scenarios. First-generation fuel cladding (containing Zircaloy-2,4) corrosion results in the absorption of corrosion-generated hydrogen. This reduces cladding ductility, with the reduction increasing with burnup (exposure time). Second (and higher) generation fuel cladding (M5, ZIRLO c, etc.) are much more corrosion resistant, producing much less hydrogen that can be absorbed by the cladding. Hence, the effect on ductility is greatly reduced, allowing for better performance at higher burnup (exposure time).

Although cladding performance has been greatly improved, the effect of increased burnup on fuel pellet performance has been identified as a potential issue. At high burnup (> ~50 GWd/MTU) and cladding strains exceeding 3% (where the cladding is actually breached), there are concerns about the possibility of fuel fragmentation, relocation, and dispersion (FFRD) of fuel fines into the coolant. Potential limitations on fuel duty are being discussed. However, FFRD phenomena are complex; and little representative data exist for LOCA or other severe transients that could lead to such conditions. In an ACRS letter report on this topic,[24] the committee suggested a more risk-informed approach be taken to estimate the occurrence frequencies, as well as the consequences, of events that could lead to FFRD conditions.

3.2 Summary Session 1 presentations considered several topics, including aging management best practices lessons learned from operating experience and PSR or license renewal application reviews. Presentations indicated similar aging mechanisms have been identified and are monitored, especially in evaluations of PSRs and/or license renewal applications. Discussions emphasize advisory committee contributions in developing approaches to address topics, such as RPV embrittlement, concrete aging, cable aging, and I&C technology obsolescence. With respect to the latter, discussions emphasized that similar principles (redundancy, redundant division independence, defense-in-depth and diversity, control of physical and external source electronic access) were emphasized before allowing the introduction of digital I&C into the operating fleet.

Advisory committee contributions differed in PSR/license renewal reviews and on ensuring implementation of lessons learned from operating experience. For example, the GPE holds an annual meeting with an in-depth focus on recent operating experience identification and implementation. The RSEC and the NFSEC PSACI deliberations on improvements appear similar to ACRS involvement in reviewing guidance developed for evaluating life extension and SLR. However, contributions differ because of country-specific differences: U.S. regulatory processes emphasize risk insights (using risk information to detect and prioritize plant vulnerabilities) and cost/benefit limitations; whereas Finland, France, and Japan regulatory processes emphasize the continuous improvement approach associated with PSR evaluations.

c ZIRLO is a trademark of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

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4. SESSION 2 - NEW CHALLENGES Participants in Session 2 represented five countries: Finland, France, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.

This section summarizes input from each presentation (Section 4.1) and subsequent discussion (Section 4.2). Appendix A includes an agenda for and a list of participants in Session 1. Appendix D includes slides presented during this session.

4.1 Presentations and Discussions 4.1.1 Finland In their Session 2 presentation, Professor Juhani Hyvrinen, ACNS Member, provided an overview of recent new build experience in Finland, the outlook on SMRs in Finland, and the impact of ACNS contributions on these activities. The presentation emphasized not only the issues in deploying new builds (large PWRs and SMRs), but also the benefits associated with deploying new reactors in Finland, such as public acceptance, a path forward for waste management, and a skilled nuclear workforce.

In reviewing the recent new build experience, Professor Hyvrinen emphasized difficulties associated with design modifications after approval of the construction license, suggesting design incompleteness, along with cultural differences, led to licensing delays (in the case of Olkiluoto 3 EPR) and plant cancellation (in the case of the Hanhikivi 1 VVER). In both the Olkiluoto 3 and Hanikivi 1 cases, attempts to create safety through compliance with the letter of the requirements were not very successful.

In addition, he cited difficulties associated with equipment quality, supply chain difficulties, and failures to respond to the supplier, owner, and regulator expectations.

There is considerable interest by large companies in Finland to deploy SMRs and by one university to deploy a microreactor. The ACNS October 2019 initiative[26] was presented as an example of a proactive approach motivated by the potential for smaller reactor projects to overcome difficulties associated with larger reactors. The ACNS paper from this initiative emphasized SMR differences, such as design features, manufacturing methods, serial production, siting near population centers, and other potential SMR impacts (e.g., district heating, co-generation). Because of these differences, the ACNS paper emphasized the need for new regulatory processes, such as separate site and licensing reviews. To further assist their data collection on this topic, ACNS also held a seminar devoted to SMRs.

The ACNS paper contributed to a decision by the Finland Ministry of Economy and the Employment to include considerations on SMRs in the Nuclear Energy Act.[27] Revisions are considering differences in siting, land use, environmental impact, nuclear fuel and nuclear waste management, nuclear safeguards, and other SMR technology effects, such as modular construction, high-quality less-expensive (non-nuclear grade) equipment, passive safety systems, and smaller unit size. Revisions should allow a graded-approach for several aspects associated with SMR licensing reviews, such as: separate approvals for the SMR technology and plant site (to better enable serial production); better definition of the intent and purpose of Finlands Decision-in-Principle (which occurs prior to a construction license), performance-based safety assessments, and appropriate emergency protection zone sizing; and allow the use of high quality conventional equipment. It was observed that this SMR rethinking could also be beneficial for large reactors.

4.1.2 France For Session 2, the presentation by Dr. Bertrand de LEpinois, Member GPR, focused on Guide 22,[28]

which addresses safety standards for new reactors. ASN Guides provide guidance on recognized ways to implement regulation. Guide 22 targets large PWRs, although its directions can be used for other types of reactors (e.g., light water SMRs). In addition to reviewing some basic principles, such as defense in depth, barriers, redundancy, single failure criterion, and equipment qualification, Guide 22 covers some features more specific to Generation 3 reactors, such as design extension conditions, severe accident mitigation, post-Fukushima considerations (e.g., design extension hazards), and modern technology 16

implementation (e.g., digital I&C). Guide 22 primarily originated from EPR technical guidelines issued in 2000. The aim of this guide was to make the EPR guidelines less design-dependent and to provide an update on post-Fukushima considerations.

The GPE had a key role in setting EPR safety objectives and in writing EPR technical guidelines (holding tens of meetings over a decade with its German counterpart). In addition, the GPE met twice on draft Guide 22, providing 400 comments.

During this discussion, Dr. de LEpinois also mentioned the philosophy being used in Europe which emphasizes practically eliminating core-melt accidents that could lead to large early releases and avoiding long-lasting effects in the environment.[29]

4.1.3 Japan For Session 2, a joint presentation by Dr. Tomoya Ichimura, Deputy Secretary-General for Technoical Affairs, NRA, and Dr. Naoto Sekimura, Chair, NRA RSEC, focused on three challenges: next generation advanced reactors, advisory committee structure and discussion topics, and the nuclear regulatory human resource development project.

4.1.3.1 Next Generation Advanced Reactors The Government of Japan (GOJ) announced its Green Transformation (GX) Strategy in December 2022.[21] The GX includes efforts to develop and construct innovative reactors that will replace current reactors. The government has suggested that the term, innovative reactors, include innovative LWRs, SMRs, fast reactors, gas-cooled reactors, and nuclear fusion reactors. The current regulatory requirements, however, are for existing Japanese LWRs (i.e., PWRs and BWRs). Hence, the NRA intends to develop a new set of requirements applicable to innovative reactors, according to the design maturity of discussions and interest expressed by plant operators. To date, however, no operators have expressed concrete intentions to construct new reactors.

4.1.3.2 Advisory Committee Structure and Activities The RSEC and the NFSEC are advisory committees that investigate and deliberate on reactor safety and other issues requested by NRA. However, RSEC and NFSEC advice does not replace the NRA decision-making process. Regular RSEC and NFSEC meetings are open to the public, and results are reported to the NRA. Most RSEC and the NFSEC members are active university faculty members or senior-level researchers from research institutions.

Currently, the NRA has requested the RSEC and the NFSEC investigate and deliberate on the following issues: NRA response to information acquisition and analysis of accidents and emerging issues in domestic and international nuclear facilities; response of NRA to the recommendations and suggestions by the IRRS mission by IAEA; the implementation status of the new inspection system (Section 3.1.3.1),

improvement of PSACI (Section 3.1.3.1), and response of NRA to the knowledge of natural hazards such as volcanoes and earthquakes. Previously, the RSEC and the NFSEC have worked on issues, such as the relationship between safety goals and the safety level of reactors that met the new regulatory requirements. While pointing out the importance of safety goals, it was noted that safety goals and safety levels cannot and should not be directly compared using probabilistic assessments. Discussions by the RSEC and the NFSEC also emphasized the peculiarities of risk profiles of nuclear power plants in Japan, in which contributions from large scale natural hazards, such as earthquakes, could overwhelm other challenges.

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4.1.3.3 Nuclear Regulatory Human Resource Development Project The NRA provides financial support for programs conducted at universities and other institutions in Japan to develop human resources effectively, efficiently, and strategically with the scientific and technical knowledge and management capabilities necessary for future nuclear regulation. The members of the universities and other organizations participating in the program include members of the RSEC and the NFSEC. For example, the University of Tokyo has been continuously promoting human resources with background knowledge and experience in processes that will facilitate introduction of international guidance and standards into domestic nuclear regulations. Activities include utilizing internships at international organizations such as IAEA and OECD/NEA and releasing reports documenting deliberations by RSEC and the NFSEC.

4.1.4 United Kingdom For Session 2, the ONR presentation by Mr. Tim Parkes, Superintending Inspector, Head of Safety Regulation - Sizewell C, Advanced Nuclear Technologies and Innovation, focused on three points:

approach to developing acceptance criteria for novel reactors, international collaboration on vendor inspections and commissioning test results, and practical elimination of emergency preparedness. The UK regulatory framework and supporting guidance is well-established, generally robust, and technology neutral. However, challenges arise from the ONR goal setting approach due to the lack of established relevant good practices and operational experience for advanced technologies. Mr. Parkes noted that ONR is open to collaborating with other regulators, considering criteria developed in other countries and working collectively to assess reactor designs and safety cases.

To ensure the success of SMRs, many multiples of reactor units need to be deployed. It is unlikely that they will all be delivered through home-grown supply chains and manufacturing capabilities. Therefore, vendor inspections and commissioning test results are necessary. Mr. Parkes noted that, in the past, advisory committees might have taken a key role in deciding what must be demonstrated. However, it is unclear how these requirements will be derived, shared, and demonstrated in the context of a goal of common designs across countries; and Mr. Parkes noted ONR welcomed further discussion on this topic.

SMR vendors entering the UK market have continually queried emergency preparedness and offsite planning requirements. There are two main drivers for this: deploying SMRs in new areas closer to populations and awareness of the U.S. NRC effort to develop a risk-informed technology-inclusive regulatory framework for advanced reactors.[30] The challenge in the UK is that it is the duty of the local government authority to determine the appropriate emergency planning zone (EPZ), with many considerations, including technical information provided by the operator. To support this, when a design undergoes assessment, the ONR focusses on the requirement that large or early releases are practically eliminated by design. During their presentation, the ONR participants also noted that they welcomed further discussion on this topic and on the topic of international collaboration to demonstrate the concept of practical elimination.

4.1.5 United States For Session 2, the ACRS provided presentations on two topics: licensing FOAK reactors for which there is little or no operating experience and implementing safety goals for small modular reactors and micro-reactors.

4.1.5.1 Licensing FOAK Reactors The presentation by Dr. David Petti, ACRS member-at-large, focused on licensing considerations for FOAK reactors when there is little or no operating experience. The presentation discussed the need for identification of safety functions in the design and how to confirm the integrated performance of systems 18

that implement those functions. Safety margin, defense-in-depth, and relevant operating experience were identified as playing important roles in reducing uncertainties in the design. In addition, the importance of a robust process to identify all postulated accidents was emphasized as important for producing a credible safety analysis. Dr. Petti observed that the inherent safety characteristics and smaller thermal power of many of the advanced non-LWR systems should result in reduced source terms and smaller off-site consequences compared to existing large LWRs. In summary, advanced reactors inherent safety characteristics should lead to a greater emphasis on accident prevention than accident mitigation. His presentation also emphasized that the lack of operating experience could be compensated with by greater reliance on inherent and passive safety features, large safety margins, and defense in depth in the design, supported by scaled testing and integral safety demonstration.

4.1.5.2 Safety Goals Dr. Vicki Bier, ACRS member, presented a discussion of safety goals for nuclear-power plants in the United States, motivated by the ACRS review of draft language for a risk informed, technology-inclusive regulatory framework for advanced reactors.[30] The presentation began with a brief history of the development and implementation of safety goals in the U.S., including both quantitative and qualitative goals. The presentation then outlined several challenges that may be involved in applying the existing safety goals to new reactor designs. Examples include: smaller reactor sizes and source terms; the fact that core-damage frequency may not be well defined for some reactor designs; questions about how to apply quantitative safety goals to reactors that may have bounding analyses instead of probabilistic risk analyses; and changes to the nature of competing technologies for generating electricity (e.g., greater reliance on natural gas instead of coal). Further planned ACRS activities include collecting additional historical information, reviewing related international efforts, and preparation of a white paper discussing the issues outlined above.

The U.S. approach differs from other approaches, such as the European Union (EU) approach outlined in Council Directive 2014/87/EURATOM[29]:

Member States shall ensure that the national nuclear safety framework requires that nuclear installations are designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned with the objective of preventing accidents and, should an accident occur, mitigating its consequences and avoiding:

(a) early radioactive releases that would require off-site emergency measures but with insufficient time to implement them; (b) large radioactive releases that would require protective measures that could not be limited in area or time.

Criterion (b), imposing the condition that protective measures should be limited in area or time, differs from the criteria in the current U.S. safety goals, which are based more directly on health effects. In other words, a large radioactive release that causes limited health effects, because of extensive protective measures, would satisfy the U.S. safety goals, but not the above obligation from the EU.

4.2 Summary Session 2 presentations described several new challenges. In the area of new builds, presentations highlighted topics such as:

• Required information for construction permits/licenses versus operating licenses

• Appropriate Structures, Systems, and Component (SSC) quality and supply chain limitations

• Consideration of cultural differences in non-domestic designs

• Use of PRA in regulatory decision-making 19

Several presentations highlighted potential opportunities and challenges with FOAK SMRs and microreactors, such as:

• Appropriate EPZ sizing that considers new missions and enhanced safety (and application of concepts such as practical elimination and safety goals to characterize SMR safety)

• Key considerations: critical safety functions identification, initiating event and licensing basis event section, confirmatory analysis and testing of novel system performance, increased safety margin to compensate for uncertainties associated with lack of operating experience

• New guidance and a regulatory framework for advanced non-LWRs

• International collaboration/multi-national design evaluation Presentations also highlighted other challenges, such as:

• Consideration of external events

• Digital I&C implementation

• Human resource development

• Public /stakeholder communication and engagement In Session 2 discussions, several participants highlighted prior and recent advisory committee contributions to address the above challenges, such as input to regulatory guidance, white papers/reports to instigate regulatory actions (such as revising regulations to accommodate new reactors) and reviewing draft regulations and guidance. Discussions also emphasized the importance of country-specific external factors discussed in Section 2.2 (e.g., advisory committee organization and authorization, reliance on nuclear, public acceptance, regulation, status of long-term solution for waste, and current interest in deploying new builds). Several participants expressed interest in future interactions to probe more-deeply on several topics, in particular potential opportunities to advisory committees to collaborate on addressing challenges associated with FOAK SMRs and microreactors.

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5. INSIGHTS GAINED AND FUTURE INTERACTIONS As outlined in Section 1.1, this international effort was conducted with the following objectives:

• Gain a working understanding of differences in advisory committee roles and organizations

• Share experience on common issues of interest and discuss effective advisory committee solutions to address these issues (recognizing nuclear reactor regulation is a national responsibility)

• Increase advisory committee effectiveness by:

- Gaining knowledge about emerging issues and new technologies of interest

- Identifying, contributing to, and gaining from international regulatory advisory group best practices and safety perspectives

- Sharing knowledge about activities to strengthen advisory committee roles As summarized in this section, several insights were gained in the areas of advisory committee organization and role, operating fleet, and new challenges. These insights provided a basis for recommendations related to future interactions.

5.1 Insights Gained Advisory Committee Organization and Role As discussed in Section 2.2, significant differences were identified in advisory committee organization and roles. Selected best practices of interest for future consideration include:

• Inclusion of international perspective (through international members, consideration of IAEA guidance and standards, or international advisory committee interactions)

• Inclusion of retired members from industry

• Publication of results from advisory committee meeting deliberations and recommendations

• Potential for self-initiated actions (areas where self-initiated actions led to significant changes being implemented in the regulatory framework or policies).

However, it was acknowledged that implementation of best practices and insights may be limited due to national external factors. Because of potential benefits from process improvements, participants suggested this topic should continue to be explored in future interactions.

Operating Fleet As discussed in Section 3.2, Session 1 discussions indicate similar aging mechanisms have been identified and are monitored in evaluations of PSRs and/or license renewal applications. Discussions emphasized that advisory committees provide input on methods used to address topics, such as RPV embrittlement, concrete aging, cable aging, and I&C technology obsolescence. However, the level of advisory committee contributions differed in PSR/license renewal reviews and on ensuring implementation of lessons learned from operating experience. In addition, discussions identified several country-specific differences: U.S. regulatory processes consider risk insights (as a tool for identifying and prioritizing plant vulnerabilities) and cost/benefit limitations; whereas Finland, France, and Japan processes emphasize a continuous improvement approach associated with PSR evaluations. Selected best practices of interest for future consideration include:

• Focused reviews of domestic (as well as international) operating experience lessons-learned identification and implementation.

• Methods to monitor SSC aging (in particular, RPV embrittlement) 21

New Challenges As discussed in Section 4.2, Session 2 presentations described a wide range of new challenges associated with new builds, FOAK SMRs, and microreactors as well as new challenges affecting operating reactors.

Session 2 presentations highlighted advisory committee contributions to address these challenges, such as developing white papers/reports to influence regulatory actions and reviewing new guidance and regulation. Discussions also emphasized the importance of country-specific external factors discussed in Section 2.2 (e.g., advisory committee organization and authorization, reliance on nuclear, public acceptance, regulation, status of long-term solution for waste, and current interest in deploying new builds).

Selected best practices of interest for future consideration include:

• Methods for engaging stakeholders

• Development of white papers or reports with significant impact on regulatory processes Several participants expressed interest in future international regulatory advisory committee interactions to further probe several topics. Although it is recognized that country-specific factors remain, several participants expressed interest in evaluating whether this international collaboration of advisory committees could provide useful contributions on the following topics:

• Appropriate EPZ sizing that considers new missions and enhanced safety (and application of concepts such as practical elimination and safety goals)

• Development of common acceptance criteria (risk metrics) for FOAK reactors with little operating experience During the discussions, several participants expressed optimism about the potential to propose globally acceptable limits if organizations focused on the primary safety function of control radiation release (see Section 4.1.5.1). Although differences may remain due to differences in the methods used to estimate doses (e.g., activity inventory, release mechanisms, radionuclide transport, intake paths), dose estimates should remain within reasonable safety margins for any given accident in different countries.

5.2 Future Interactions Participants agreed to several follow-on actions. This section summarizes these actions and suggestions for future interactions.

Report Participants agreed to contribute to a publicly available document, which included all of the presentations and summarized the discussion topics and key findings, and insights. Publication of this document completes this action item.

Future Meeting Frequency, Location, and Participation Participants agreed follow-on interactions would be beneficial. It was agreed that future hybrid meetings (with some in-person attendance) should occur in approximately 3 years. The location will be finalized at a later date.

Because of advisory committee membership changes, participants agreed that at least one-interim or more virtual interaction(s) should occur between each hybrid meeting. Participants from one organization suggested that specific networks between advisory committees be formed to exchange ideas on specific 22

topics (such as collaboration to provide ideas/suggestions regarding guidance for SMR or microreactor deployment).

Many participants indicated the number of participating countries was appropriate. If additional advisory committees from other countries are included in future interactions, participants observed that the discussion time should also be included (because of the importance of active discussions in this interaction). It was suggested that future interactions should try to include members of advisory committees that support the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

Future Meeting Structure and Candidate Topics In general, the interaction structure (a pre-meeting virtual meeting to finalize technical topic selection followed by a hybrid meeting with two sessions focused on the two technical topics) was deemed appropriate. However, it was suggested the hybrid interaction be expanded to include a visit to a nuclear site.

For the next interaction, it was suggested the following outline be considered.

Plenary Meeting:

• Important issues for each country and work of the corresponding advisory committee during the last three years,

• Sharing on specific topics, and

• Proposed emerging topics for exchange at the next hybrid meeting.

Candidate Topics for Hybrid Exchange

• Selected committee practices (e.g., publication of meeting transcripts, findings, and recommendations, ability to take self-initiated proactive actions, communication avenue with regulatory agency management) and resources (e.g., funding for member labor, support staff, and travel for meetings and site visits)

• Aging (RPV embrittlement in particular)

• SMRs (LWR and Non-LWR) and microreactors and potential for international regulatory advisory committee collaboration to facilitate international licensing collaboration / cooperation

• Climate change considerations (reassessment of hazards associated with external events)

• Fuel behavior feedback (e.g., high burnup fuel, accident tolerant fuel)

• Severe accident prevention and mitigation measures (post-Fukushima actions) 23

6. REFERENCES

1. U.S. NRC, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/international-nuclear-regulators-association-inra.html.

2. WENRA, Western European Regulators Association, https://www.wenra.eu/.

3. OECD, Regulators Reflect on Lessons Learnt 10 Years on from Fukusihma Accident https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_76532/regulators-reflect-on-lessons-learnt-10-years-on-from-fukushima-accident.

4. IAEA, International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG),

https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-and-security/committees/insag.

5. International Nuclear Safety Group, 2017 Ensuring Robust National Nuclear Safety Systems -

Institutional Strength in Depth, INSAG-27, IAEA Publication 1779, Vienna (2017).

6. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987),

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=&p_isn=85507&p_classification=14.01.

7. Government Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (1015/2016), 24 November 2016.

8. Rules & Procedures, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety.

9. ASN GPE requests and responses www.asn.fr

10. Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, Act No. 47 published in the Extra Official Gazette of June 27, 2012; Final Revision: Act No. 82 of November 22, 2013. (see https://www.nra.go.jp/english/legislative/acts.html)

11. Supplementary Resolution to the Bill for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (in Japanese only), https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/gianjoho/ketsugi/180/f073_062001.pdf.

12. RSEC operational policy (in Japanese only), https://www.nra.go.jp/data/000337732.pdf.

13. NFSEC operational policy (in Japanese only), https://www.nra.go.jp/data/000337733.pdf.

14. IAEA, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Follow-Up Mission to Japan, 14-21 January 2020, https://www.nra.go.jp/data/000305635.pdf

15. Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactor, Issuance:

Act No. 166 of June 10, 1957, Final revision: Act No. 82 of November 22, 2013, https://www.nra.go.jp/english/legislative/acts.html

16. Office of Nuclear Regulation Expert Panels, https://www.onr.org.uk/external-panels/index.html.

17. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1630/pdf/COMPS-1630.pdf.

18. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Letter Reports, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/letters/index.html.

19. Federal Advisory Committee Act, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title5/title5a/node2&edition=prelim,.

20. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/advisory/acrs.html.

21. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Green Transformation - Basic Policy for Realization ~

Future Roadmap for 10 years, December 2022, https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2022/02/20230210002/20230210002_1.pdf 24

22. Atomic Energy Society of Japan, Code on Implementation and Review of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing Management Programs :2015 (AESJ-SC-P005E2015, https://www.aesj.net/publish-1717.

23. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, report from Joy Rempe, ACRS Chairman, to Christopher T. Hanson, NRC Chairman,

Subject:

Rulemaking Plan for the Revision of Embrittlement and Surveillance Requirements for High-Fluence Nuclear Power Plants in Long-Term Operation, April 28, 2022. (https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2210/ML22105A325.pdf)

24. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Letter from Matthew W. Sunseri, ACRS Chairman, to Daniel H. Dorman, NRC Executive Director for Operations,

Subject:

Research Information Letter (RIL) 2021-13 on Interpretation of Research on Fuel Fragmentation, Relocation, and Dispersal at High Burnup, December 20, 2021. (https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2134/ML21347A940.pdf)

25. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Report from Dennis C. Bley, ACRS Chairman, to Stephen G. Burns, NRC Chairman,

Subject:

Draft Final Rule 10 CFR 50.46c, Emergency Core Cooling System Performance During Loss-Of-Coolant Accidents (LOCA) and Associated Regulatory Guides, February 23, 2016. (https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1604/ML16048A522.pdf)

26. Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety, Opinion on Development Needs in Finland Associated with Small Modular Reactors, October 9, 2019 (in Finnish).

27. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987),

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=&p_isn=85507&p_classification=14.01.

28. Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire, Guide ASN N° 22: Conception des réacteurs eau sous pression, July 18, 2017 , (https://www.asn.fr/l-asn-reglemente/guides-de-l-asn/guide-de-l-asn-n-22-conception-des-reacteurs-a-eau-sous-pression), in French.

29. Official Journal of the European Union, Council Directive 2014/87/EURATOM of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establish a Community framework for the Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installations, July 2014, (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0087).

30. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Proposed Rule: Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors (RIN 3150-AK31), SECY-23-0021, March 1, 2023.

25

APPENDIX A MEETING AGENDAS AND ATTENDEE LISTS 26

December 5, 2022, Planning Meeting Agenda 27

December 5, 2022, Planning Meeting Agenda (Continued) 28

December 5, 2022, Planning Meeting Attendees Name Position Finland -Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)

Lasse Reiman Chairman Timo Vanttola Vice Chairman Juhani Hyvrinen Member Petri Kinnunen Member Petri Kotiluoto Member Heli Talja Member Liisa Heikinheimo MEAE Staff Karin Rantamki Technical Secretary France - Groupe Permanent Réacteurs (GPR) and Groupe permanent d'experts pour les équipements sous pression Nucléaires (GPESPN) to the Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN)

Thierry Charles Chairman, GPR Jean-François Bossu Member, GPR Etienne Courtin Member, GPR Alain Ehrlacher Member, GPR François Billon Member, GPESPN Denis Buisine Member, GPESPN Damien Couplet Member, GPESPN François Champigny Member, GPESPN Marie-Bernadette Degeye Member, GPR Jacques Devos Member, GPR Jean-Louis Francard Member, GPR Jean-Philippe Longin Member, GPESPN Philippe Lorino Member, GPR José ngel Martinez Member, GPESPN Hervé Mbonjo Member, GPR Jean-Marc Miraucourt Member, GPR Norbert Nicaise Member, GPR Patrick Raymond Member, GPR Guy Roussel Member, GPESPN Philippe Saint-Raymond Member, GPR 29

December 5, 2022, Meeting Attendees (Continued)

Name Position France - GPR and GPESPN to ASN (continued)

Jean- François Sidaner Member, GPR Béatrice Tombuyses Member, GPR François Toutlemonde Member, GPR Marc Vincke Member, GPR Eero Virtanen Member, GPR Franck Lebrun Member, ASN Japan - Reactor Safety Examination Committee (RSEC) and Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee (NFSEC) to Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)

Naoto Sekimura Chairman, RSEC Akio Yamamoto Chairman, NFSEC Shinji Kinjo NRA Staff United Kingdom Paul Garesse Principal Inspector and ONR Chief Nuclear Inspectors Independent Advisory Panel Secretariat Richard Fowler Principal Inspector Andria Gilmour Superintending Inspector Aidan Parkes Inspector and Co-chair, ONR Expert Panel on Natural Hazards Lee Easterbrook Principal Inspector United States - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Joy Rempe Chairman Walter Kirchner Vice Chairman Dave Petti Member-At-Large Ronald Ballinger Member Charles Brown Member Vesna Dmitrijevic Member Vicki Bier Member Greg Halnon Member Jose March-Leuba Member Scott Moore ACRS Executive Director Quynh Nguyn ACRS Lead Engineer for International Regulatory Advisory Committee Activity 30

March 14-15, 2023, Meeting Agenda 31

March 14-15, 2023, Meeting Agenda (continued) 32

March 14-15, 2023, Meeting Attendees Name Position Finland -Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)

Lasse Reiman Chairman Timo Vanttola Vice Chairman Juhani Hyvrinen Member Petri Kinnunen Member Petri Kotiluoto Member Heli Talja Member Liisa Heikinheimo Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) Staff Karin Rantamki Technical Secretary France - Groupe Permanent Réacteurs (GPR) and Groupe permanent d'experts pour les équipements sous pression Nucléaires (GPESPN) to the Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN)

Thierry Charles Chairman, GPR Jean-François Bossu Member, GPR Etienne Courtin Member, GPR Alain Ehrlacher Member, GPR François Billon Member, GPESPN Denis Buisine Member, GPESPN Damien Couplet Member, GPESPN François Champigny Member, GPESPN Marie-Bernadette Degeye Member, GPR Jacques Devos Member, GPR Bertrand de LEpinois Member, GPR Karine Herviou Member, GPR Jean-Louis Francard Member, GPR Jean-Philippe Longin Member, GPESPN Philippe Lorino Member, GPR José ngel Martinez Member, GPESPN Hervé Mbonjo Member, GPR Jean-Marc Miraucourt Member, GPR Norbert Nicaise Member, GPR Patrick Raymond Member, GPR 33

March 14-15, 2023, Meeting Attendees (continued)

Name Position France - GPR and GPESPN to ASN (continued)

Guy Roussel Member, GPESPN Philippe Saint-Raymond Member, GPR Jean- François Sidaner Member, GPR Béatrice Tombuyses Member, GPR François Toutlemonde Member, GPR Marc Vincke Member, GPR Eero Virtanen Member, GPR Franck Lebrun Member, ASN Japan - Reactor Safety Examination Committee (RSEC) and Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee (NFSEC) to Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)

Naoto Sekimura Chairman, RSEC Tomoya Ichimura NRA Staff Shinji Kinjo NRA Staff United Kingdom Tim Parkes Superintending Inspector, Head of Safety Regulation - Sizewell C, Advanced Nuclear Technologies and Innovation Rachel Curtis Inspector - External Hazards Paul Garesse Principal Inspector - Executive Suport Office United States - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Joy Rempe Chairman Walter Kirchner Vice Chairman Dave Petti Member-At-Large Ronald Ballinger Member Charles Brown Member Vesna Dmitrijevic Member Vicki Bier Member Greg Halnon Member Jose March-Leuba Member Scott Moore ACRS Executive Director Quynh Nguyn ACRS Lead Engineer for International Regulatory Advisory Committee Activity 34

APPENDIX B DECEMBER 5, 2022, PLANNING MEETING PRESENTATIONS 35

B.1 Finland 36

37 38 39 40 B.2 France 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 B.3 Japan B.3.1 Overview Presentation 49

50 51 52 53 54 B.3.2 Supplementary Presentation during Closing Discussion 55

56 B.4 United Kingdom 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 B.5 United States 68

69 70 71 B.5 Closing Discussion 72

73 74 APPENDIX C MARCH 14, 2023, SESSION 1 PRESENTATIONS 75

C.1 Finland 76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 C.2 France C.2.1 Operational Feedback Presentation 84

85 86 87 88 89 C.2.2 PSRs and LTO Presentation 90

91 92 93 94 95 96 C.3 Japan C.3.1 Regulation for Current Fleet 97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 C.3.2 Current Status of Regulation, Aging Management and LTO 113

114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 C.4 United States 125

126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 APPENDIX D MARCH 15, 2023, SESSION 2 PRESENTATIONS 136

D.1 Finland 137

138 139 140 141 142 143 144 D.2 France 145

146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 D.3 Japan 154

155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 D.4 United Kingdom 175

176 177 178 179 180 181 D.5 United States D.5.1 Licensing of FOAK Reactors 182

183 184 185 186 187 188 D.5.2 Risk Surrotates (Safety Goals) for SMRS and Microreactors 189

190 191 192