ML23156A388

PR-140 - 50FR13978 - Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence

ML23156A388
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/09/1985
From:	Hoyle J NRC/SECY
To:
References
PR-140, 50FR13978
Download: ML23156A388 (1)

Text

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 04/09/1985 TITLE: PR-140 - 50FR13978 - CRITERIA FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE CASE

REFERENCE:

PR-140 50FR13978 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OF RULEMAKING PROPOSED RULE: PR-140 OPEN ITEM (Y/N) N RULE NAME: CRITERIA FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 50FR13978 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 04 / 09 / 85 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: 27 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 08 / 07 / 85 EXTENSION DATE: 09 / 06 / 85 FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: I I NOTES ON: VOLUME 1 (5/29/85 - 9 / 1 8 /85). FILE LOCATED ON Pl.

STATUS :

. OP RULE :

HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-140 RULE TITLE: CRITERIA FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE PROPOSED RULE PROPOSED RULE DATE PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER: 83-064A SRM DATE: 02 / 02 / 85 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 04 / 02 / 85 FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: SRM DATE: I I SIGNED BY SECRETARY: I I STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE CONTACT!: H.T. PETERSON MAIL STOP: 1130-SS PHONE: 427-4578 CONTACT2: ERIC JAKEL MAIL STOP: 9604MNBB PHONE: 492-8691

• DOCKET FILE INVENTORY Docket No. PR-140 (50 FR 13978)

In the Matter of CRITERIA FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE VOLUME 1 Document Docket Date of Titl e or No. Date Document Descri~tion of Document 01 04/04/85 04/02/85 Federal Register Notice - Proposed rule (published 04/09/85) 02 05/31/85 05/29/85 Contnents Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office (Loux) (1) 03 04/30/85 04/29/85 Co1T1T1ents NRC/NRR {Edison) {lA) 04 06/03/85 06/01/85 Comments Ecology/Alert (Nemethy ) (2) 05 06/03/85 05/21/85 Corrments County of Monroe, Mi chigan Board of Conmissioners {Petticrew) (3) 06 06/24/85 06/20/85 Corrments South Caroli na Department of Health and Environmental Control (Shealy) {4}

. 07 07/08/85 07/02/85 Convnents Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (Lash) (5}

08 07/25/85 07/22/85 Comments Baltimore Gas and Electric (Tiernan) (6) 09 07/30/85 07/25/85 Ltr Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

(Hodge) requesting extension of time ti l 08/20/85 to file comments 10 07/30/85 07/25/85 Conments Wayne C.Gaul (7) 11 08/01/85 07/29/85 Comnents Mississippi State Department of Health{ Fuente} (8) 12 08/02/85 07/31/85 Comnents Union Electric Company (Schnell) (9) 13 08/05/85 08/05/85 Federal Register Notice - Extension of comment period {until 09/06/85) 14 08/07/85 08/07/85 Conments Florida Power & Light Company (Hudiburg) {10) 15 08/08/85 08/02/85 Co1T1T1ents Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Edwards) ( 11) 16 08/08/85 08/06/85 Comments Arizona Public Service Company

{12) 17 08/08/85 08/07/85 Co11111ents Department of Energy {Vaughan)

{13) 18 08/08/85 08/07/85 Comnents Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell

& Reynolds (Knotts) (14)

. 19 08/12/85 08/07/85 Co11111ents Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Mittl) {15)

PR-140 (50 FR 13978)

• 20 21 08/15/85 08/15/85 08/06/85 0812/85 Co11111ents Arizona Public Service Company (Brunt) {16)

Comments GA Technologies Inc (Hogan)

(17) 22 08/29/85 08/23/85 Co11111ents Boston Edison Company

{Harrington) {18) 23 09/06/85 09/06/85 Comments Florida Power &Light Company

{Hudiburg) {19) 24 09/06/85 09/06/85 Comments Edison Electric Institute (

Kearney) (20) 25 09/06/85 09/06/85 Comments KMC, Inc. (Riehm) {21) 26 09/09/85 09/05/85 Co11111ents Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

(Walske) (22) 27 09/09/85 09/05/85 Co11111ents Virginia Electric and Power Company (Stewart) {23) 28 09/09/85 09/05/85 Co11111ents Georgia Power Company (Gucwa)

{24) 29 09/10/85 09/09/85 Co11111ents American Nuclear Insurers (Proom/0'Connell) {25) 30 09/16/85 09/10/85 Co11111ents Tennessee Valley Authority (Hufham) {26) 31 09/20/85 09/18/85 Co11111ents Co11111onwealth Edison (Farrar)

{27)

Commonwealth Edison One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 OO CK ~TEO September 18, 1985 USNRC

• as SEP 20 P2 :35 Secretary of the Commission OFF! :.: :: ' . t:" St.i~Rr_1/d< ;

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OOCKEi iN G & SER VILt Washington, D.C. 20555 BR ANCH ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Proposed Rule: "Criteria for Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" 10 CFR 140.84, 140.85 (50 Fed. Reg. 13978-13985, April 9, 1985)

Dear Si r :

Commonwealth Edison has already endorsed the comments submitted by the Nuclear Utilities Group on August 7, 1985. Commonwealth Edison would like to add the following comments regarding the proposed changes to the rules concerning the definition of "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence." (ENO).

Commonwealth Edison and the Nuclear Utilities Group believe that it is not necessary to revise the current ENO standards. Should such a revision occur, however, Commonwealth Edison believes the revision should incorporate the comments made by the Nuclear Utilities Group as well as those contained in this letter.

Commonwealth Edison would like to reinforce an idea expressed by the Nuclear Utilities Group concerning Commissioner Bernthal ' s proposal. Although Commissioner Bernthal's proposal has many facets which would recommend its implementation, it would, if adopted alone, clearly violate the statutory definition of ENO. The statute states that an ENO is "any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, specia l , nuclear or byproduct material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation offsite which the Commission determines to be s ubstantial and which the Commission determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite". 42 u.s.c. § 2014(j).

Commissioner Bernthal apparently reads the phrase "will probably result in substantial.damages" as allowing the Commission to adopt only one criterion requiring only a substantial discharge offsite or substantial radiation offsite. 50 Fed. Reg. 12983. The legislative history makes clear that this"Ts an improper reading. The "will probably" language was designed to allow the Commission to take into account the latent effects of nuclear-related injuries when

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Secretary of the Commission September 13, 1985 Page Two assessing damages. lt certainly was not designed to allow the Commission to eliminate one of the statutorily required elements.

The Senate Report which accompanied the ENO legislation clearly required the Commission to establish two criteria in its definition of an ENO. The report stated that "various elements must be present before the definition is met". s. Rep. No. 1605, 89 th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3201, 3223. In particular, the Report stated that the Commi ssion was required to develop criteria in advance of the event which would be used to determine whether the discharge or release was substantial.

"In addition, the Commission must determine whether the event has resulted or will probably result in 'substantial damages' to persons or property offsite. The Commission will determine the substantiality of damages to persons or property offsite in a particular case in accordance with the criteria, referred to above, which have been developed in advance of the event". Id.

Commonwealth Edison would strenuously oppose any proposal which would eliminate from the regulations either one of the statutorily required elements.

Commonwealth Edison would not oppose, however, the adoption of a regulation based on a modified version of Commissioner Bernthal's proposal if that regulation also included a separate section for determining what constitutes substantial offsite damages.

Commissioner Bernthal 's proposal is a better definition of substantial discharge or dispersal than either of the other options proposed by the Commission. Commissioner Bernthal ' s measurement of radiation is time dependent and as explained by the Nuclear Utili t ies Group this should be required of any revision to the regulation.

Before Commissioner Bernthal's proposal is adopted as a replacement for the current§ 140.84 the comments made by the Nuclear Utilities Group should be incorporated. Addi-tionally, the standard in Commi ssioner Bernthal's subsection (b) should be revised so that t he standard is clearly not a hypothetical person standard. This would assure that the problems with the hypothetical person standard identified by

' Secretary of the Commission Se ptember 13, 1985 Page Three the Nuclear Utilities Group do not arise under this new regulation.

Commonwealth Edison also supports the Nuclear Utilities Group's comments concerning the second Criterion, 10 CFR 140.85. The primary addi tional comment Commonwealth Edison has concerning that section involves the $2,500,000 threshold in parts (b}, (c} and (d). The Senate Report which accompanied the ENO legislation stated that Congress expected the Commission to find damages substantial if they exceeded 5 million dollars. s. Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong.,

2d. Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News 3201, 3223.

Five million 1966 dol l ars equals approximately fifteen million 1985 dollars. See, Dept. of Labor Bull.

2217, Handbook of Labor Statistics 350 (June 1985). Similarly, at the time of the Congressional statement, five million dollars equaled approximately 1/15 of the available private insurance pool under the Price-Anderson Act. One-fifteenth of the current insurance pool equals approximately 11 million dollars.

Therefore, Commonwealth Edison would urge the Commission to set the damage requirement for §140.85 at at least 15 million dollars rather than 2.5 million dollars which is only one-half the amount Congress assumed in 1966 would be used.

In conclusion, Commonwealth Edison believes that no revision to the current regul ation is needed. Should such a revision occur, the new regulation should be based on a modified version of Commissioner Bernthal's proposal combined with a modified section 140.85. Finally, Common-wealth Edison would appreciate the opportunity for further comments once the Commission decides on one proposal.

We greatly appreciate this opportunity to provide comments.

S;/;y, D. ;:;:;:;'

Director of Nuclear Licensing Commonwealth Edison Company

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTH,;R: (:50 fZ,<!_ / gq7f)

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 1630 Chestn ut St reet Towe r II September 10, 19~

SEP 16 A11 :27 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

Tennessee Valley Authority <TVA) is pleased to provide comments on the proposed rule to 10 CFR Part 140 concerning criteria for an extraordinary nuclear occurrence (ENO) as noticed in the April 9, 1985 Federal Register (50 FR 13978-13985) .

We agree that it is in the best interest of the general public and the utility industry for an ENO determination to be made in a more timely manner after an accident has occurred. Of the three options, it appears option 3 best meets this objective. The criterion is almost immediately measurable and would allow for a rapid evaluation and determination to be made.

Specifically, we support option 3 as to a revision of 10 CFR 140.84 that requires evaluation of releases and dosages offsite.

Additionally, the remainder of option 3 consists of deleting section 140.85, which deals with determination of substantial damages to persons or property offsite. The proposal does not address ch anges to 10 CFR 140 . 81, "Scope and Purpose," (b)(2) which states that one of the purposes is determining that there have been or will be substantial damages. That purpose is now accomplished by section 140.85 . If the regulation were to be changed by option 3 to presume that substantial damages no longer need to be determined because of the revised release and dose criteria, then section 140.81 should be revised to clearly state this reasoning.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment.

Very truly yours, E NESS EE.YAL}E} AUTHORITY 7,I u.} ~ ~ dJ W. Hufham, Mandg~r Licensing and Risk Protection cc: Executive Secretary Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Tom Tipton AIF, Inc .

7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, Ma ry land 2081 4 An Equal Opportunity Employer

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

COMMENT ON PROPOSED CHANGE TO 10CFR PART 140; CRITERIA FOR ENO Representatives of the nuclear insurance Pools have examined the alternative modifications proposed to 10 CFR 140.84 and 140.85 that were published in the Federal Register on April 9, 1985.

The questions relating to the present criteria are raised both in the notice of proposed rule making and in NUREG-0637, Report to the NRC From the Staff Panel on the Comnission' s Determination of an Extraordi nary Nucl ear Occurrence (ENO) . Questi ons encoun tered by the NRC staff in applying the present crite ria are described in the latter report.

The legislative history of the amendment of the Atomic Energy Law to include a definition of 11 extraordinary nuclear occurrence 11 and the application of the waivers of defenses is briefly cited in the Commission's notice. The nuclear incident that causes the application of the waivers of defenses must be a nuclear incident that (1) causes a substantial discharge of nuclear material offsite, or radiation levels offsite, which in turn (2) causes substantial bodily injury or property damage offsite.

Relation Between ENO and Insuran ce The notice describes the Commission's belief that none of the proposed criteria will affect insurance premiums (P13982) and cites testimony of the Pools' representatives before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1966 that claims experience would be the principal detenninant of insurance premiums and that institution of the waivers of defenses would not be expected to have any effect on premiums. Although actual claims experience is a major factor affecting premiums, it is only a starting point. In a period of 11 social inflation 11 (that is, ever increasing expectations as to the eligibility for tort compensation and the amount of damages recoverable), past experience must be modified, often substantially, by judgment estimates as to the liability rules, social and judicial attitudes of the future. If revised criteria are perceived by insurers and reinsurers partic ipating in the Pools as expanding the liability of NRC licensees to whom they provide nuclear liability

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insurance, they will carefully exam in e both the amount of insurance they provide to the Pools and the adequacy of the premium. The Pools believe that weakening the ENO criteria, either as a matter of philosophy or in practical effect, will cause a loss of capacity and increased premium.

General Comments All interests are best served by criteria that minimize the exercise of judgment in carrying out the objectives of the ENO concept, that are simple, and yet are broad enough to contemplate any nuclear incident that occurs. That perhaps only the most unlikely incidents would ever meet the criteria should not be cause to reduce them.

Meaning of 11 0ffsite 11 What constitutes 11 offsite 11 is a critical matter in applying criteria, and in evaluating the reasonableness of some of the revised criteria offered. We believe that a reasonable conception of 11 offsite 11 might be any area off the reactor site to which the public has free access.

In any case, we think that a definition of what is intended by 11 offsite 11 should be added to the criteria; or if not formally defined what the NRC intends by 11 offsite 11 should be expressed in a subsequent notice.

"Persons offsite 11 When the criteria refer to "persons off site", or 11 offsite persons 11 , or sometimes only "persons", but who are intended to be "persons offsite 11 ,

it should be made clear that only members of the general public are intended. For example, persons (workers, regulators and others) responding to the accident, and policemen or firemen performing their professional duties should not be regarded as "persons offsite 11

• This intention might be expressed in a subsequent notice, and perhaps "persons offsite" need not be formally defined.

Comment on Option #1 Criterion I

1. The deletion of "cou l d have been" from subparagraph (a) of Criterion I eliminates a part i cularly difficult and non-objective measure of exposure, the futility of which has been demonstrated by the attempt to measure exposure to a hypothetical person in the NRC Staff Panel's Report on the TM! Unit 2 accide nt (NUREG-0637).

2. Revised Table 1 -- The substantial lowering of the doses in Table I creates the unfortu nate and inaccurate impression that a five rem whole body dose is likely to produce serious risk of bodily injury.

In fact, this is less than one-half of the dose permitted for a nuclear worker in a year. The Table will inevitably color the doses listed as being capable of producing substantial bodily injury and will be offered as evidence of substantial risk of harm to workers.

Emp l oyers and others would be placed in a defensive posture to explain why 5 rems is not substantial, though the NRC regulation says that it is. Also, the Table is likely to be cited as evidence that present regulations to protect workers are inadequate.

For these reasons alone Option #1 is unsuitable, even assuming that other proposed changes functioned well.

3. Subparagraph (a) (4) is new, but appears to be redundant of what is described in preceding subparagraphs (2) and (3).

Criterion II

4. Subparagraph (a) -- The revised subparagraph (a) is superior to the existing regulation because it is, at least ostensibly, less subjective. On page 13980 of the notice (third column) it is stated that the Commission would make realistic (as opposed to overly conservative) evaluation to determine i f an incident meets this criterion. This information is important for future application and for our understanding of how this criterion will be applied.

Commissioner Bernthal's comments on Criterion I of Option #1 (P13982-3rd column) are telling, however. The need to track two paths, that of persons at risk and of the plume, and to identify their intersection to estimate dose is a substantial enterprise.

The margin for error will be great, and it is probable that despite the good work of the NRC staff any estimates of dose offered wi 11 not be received as credible unless the NRC concludes the criterion is met. A more basic criticism that the Commissioner has offered is that it should not be necessary to measure dose to persons in order to evaluate if a di scharge of nuclear material offsite. or radiation levels offsite, are substantial.

5. Subparagraph (b) -- The value of property that is contaminated is not necessarily well correlated with the amount of damage due to contamination. For example: one property owner may own 1000 acres of land worth $5 million adjoining a reactor but only 1 acre is contaminated and it will cost $250,000 to decontaminate it. The entire $5 million would be counted to implement Criterion II. If the same accident occurred at another reactor site surrounded by very small parcels of land so that each land parcel had small value (i.e., $100,000), the same 11 damage 11 to 1 acre would be valued at

$100,000 despite the cost of decontamination being $250,000. One can hypothesize an accident that causes very slight contamination to much property or to a small area of property with high value, but no decontamination or little decontamination is required so that actual damages have no relation to the value of the property affected.

In addition, the value of the property that is necessary to satisfy this proposed condition is only $2.5 million, reduced from the present criterion ($5 million damage in the aggregate).The reduction is both as to amount ($5 million vs $2.5 million), and the thing that is measured (the value of affected property vs. the amount of the actual damage in the present criterion). There does not appear to be any justification for this substantial weakening of the threshold.

6. Subparagraphs (c) and (d); employment loss and evacuation days --

Both of these proposed criteri a focus evaluation on reaction to the

incident. Rather than measure whether property damage is substantial, an evaluation would be made of how workers and local authorities react. Reaction could well depend on the tone and accuracy of media reporting and the pressures of local politics.

The proposed criterion could itself be a factor in inducing an evacuation or in causing it to be extended. The power to declare an ENO would, in effect, be shared by the NRC with others. We believe that this criterion does not add an objective measure to the process of evaluating an incident to determine if it qualifies as an ENO.

Connnents on Option #2 This proposal differs from Option #1 only in the points noted below to which connnents are appended.

1. Criterion I -- Would include measurement of dose to a hypothetical person at the site bo un dary (presumably offsite), but otherwise follows Option #1.

We believe that the complex exercise necessary to measure dose to a hypothetical person detracts from the goal of achieving an objective measure of the severity of an incident. The need to consider if the "person" moves about so as to always be downwind, the possibility that the plume settles well beyond the site boundary, etc., operate to detract from the usefulness of this approach. This has to some degree been demonstrated by the NRC' s staff's efforts recounted in NUREG-0637.

2. Criterion II -- The same as in Option #1 except that a substitution is made for subparagraph (a), so that a collective dose of 100,000 person-rem must be delivered to persons within a 50 mile radius for the criterion to be met.

The collective dose criterion does not provide a uniform measure of the injury or damage caused by an incident since it is determined primarily by the number of persons who reside within the 50 mile radius. Depending upon the size of the population, the criterion could be met, but the dose to individuals could be a very small fraction of what they receive from background in one year. The NRC determination that an ENO has occurred would, nevertheless, signify that there has been substantial bodily injury, which in fact would not be the case.

Corrunents on Option #3 Given the complexity of the present criteria and the deficiencies noted in Options 1 and 2, the relative simplicity of Option #3 is attractive.

We believe, however, that the Commission may not presume that there has been or will be "substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite" based upon the conditions in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) being satisfied. The definition of ENO in section ll(j) of the Atomic Energy Law requires that the Commission make a "determination" that the levels of radiation or contamination "has resulted or probably will result in

• substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite 11

• Of the criterion required by the law, it is the second -- the finding of substantial damages off site that is the essence of finding that an ENO has occurred. An evaluat i on of such damage must be made and a threshold value exceeded.

Condition (b) is particularly inappropriate as the basis for assuming as a fact that there has been or will be injury to persons since it appears to contemplate measurin g dose to a hypothetical person. The population about a reactor wi l l l ikely be away from where this measurement was taken and so it would not reflect actual or potential injury to persons.

Nevertheless, Option #3 suggests a modification that warrants further examination. The modification involves adding two 11 results 11 tests. The first might be the same as that proposed in paragraph (a) of Criterion II of Option #1. The second test would be the actual or estimated cost of decontaminating the off-site property that is rendered unfit for normal use (or its fair value if the property must be disposed of). We suggest a threshold figure of $5 Million in the aggregate. These tests could be promptly performed after an incident and would be adequate to verify that substantial off-site injury or damage had occurred or was probable.

Should the Commission conclude that a much different and simpler approach from the present criteria is required, Option #3 appears to offer the ....---

most fertile possibi l ity, subject to the cautions and suggestions that we made in our comments above.

We are pleased to have had this opportunity to comment on the proposals, and we are appreciative of the effort expended on this matter by the Commission and its staff. It is important that the public have the opportunity to comment further on any amendment that the Commission proposes that results from the comments received.

Very truly yours, MUTUAL ATOMIC ENERGY AMERICA t N NC ERS LIABILITY UNDERWRITERS By: --++-- - - - - -- - By: /11u_'J_vi_ {)) ~

Bu rt C. Proom, CPCU J .~ael O'Connell ~

President General Manager

'85 08*14 007 GPC NUC OPS P.02 Georaia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Qeorg111 30308 Telephon11 404 ~ 6 Malling AddrKS:

P091 Offlo& Bo~ 45-4~ D0ClffTEO Atlanta. Qeorg1a 30302 USN~c Georgia Power LT. Quow11 Managl:'r Nuclear Eng11'lffrlng

_W SEP -9 rtp, !f':'5gn e/1.,>e/11(; .w~r~m and Chief Nucl~r Engineer er ~ NED ..85-659 0OFFJc~-  ;,l

°CKfrttfo '--'Rt IA,t, *: 211 ON BRANct£Rv1u September 5, 1985 Secretary of the Comm1ss1on

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Co~nission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch i'*~1*1-..r::r:L uii Prop111:~d Rev1Z1on to 10 CFR Part 140

,0:1 ~-8 rf~f_v,r c1Jl.ly.:ra£_rdJ nary Nuclear- Occurrenc~

IJn April 9, 1985~ the Nuclet1r Regulatory Commission (NRG) published 1n the £2~arQl Registet, a No~1ce cf Proposed Rulemaking entitled Criter1a for 11 an t;(tNorofriar;* N"ucleel* Occutr~nce 11

, which indicated that the NRC was 1 considering revisions to 11 CFR !40,84 and 140.85. These proposed rev1s1ons l would modify thG ex1stin9 ..:t1teri0. usE:d in determining whether a nuc1ear inc1 dent 1$. an 11 exuaord1n~r.:,: n1Jc1 e2.r occurrence" (ENO). These criteria are ..-i.

sign1f1cant bi:cause they i3stab11~h ~ threshold for the "waiver of defenses 11 and other provisions of Pr~,:_,e.,Arid<ei'SOn.

Geor91 a Powsr Company ( GPC) uppreci ates the opporturd ty to comment on r,:,*;~, r*ropos:ed ru~e for ai1 :NI) and pr'ov1des the comments 1hted below, In

.. : * * - 1,1;;~ GFC i::ar"c1c1pated in the rievelopment of the Atomic lndustrial Forum r.wents tc th~s ruh:.11(;1king and con,~urs with their comments.

'1112 statement of considerJtfo(IS acrornrt1rryi1:g the p1*oposed ENO r.ulemaking indicated that tfrn chc.nges hare GC\ng proposed to $imp11fy the "admir:i~trative crftaria. 11 usad by the NRC n making ari ENO determination and p~ovided three options fat' public com~~nt, GPC notes, however, that e~ch of the three options go far beyond t: * * ... ciriiinistrative aspects of the regu1at1ons in that they would~ if enacted~ substantively and technically change the threshold for an ENO determination, GPC is concerned w1th the criter1~ of each of the three options addressed in this ru1emak1ng 1n that each option would apply lower radiation dose 1imits to the threshold criteria ;or making ~n ENO determination, The documentation accompanying. tilts ru1emakfngp or

-:otherw_ise currently availab1e. does not provide adaquat,e technical bases for such changes. These changes would broade~ the rang~ 9f events which, would be declared ENOs. irrespective of, tbe'*~s1g,nif1eance of offs1te 1njur1es or damages. ,** * . '.*

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Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 5, 1985 Page Two Comments on Option 1:

GPC agrees with the prov1s1ons of Option l which replace the words, " ***

one or more persons offsite were, could have been, or might be exposed *** 11 , in the current Criter ion 1, with the words, 11 * *

• one or more persons offsite were or will probably be exposed *** ". This proposed change removes the speculative "might have been" condition of the present rule.

In addition to the above clarification, Options l and 2 would lower the whole body, thyroid, and organ doses to levels "consistent" with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAG)

(e.g., the whole body dose for determining that a substantial release of radiation or radioactive material offsite would be lowered from 20 rems to 5 rems). These values are indeed the same as values chosen for particular PAGs. However, the PAGs were chosen as action levels to cause emergency planning decision-makers to initiate prudent protective actions to prevent ultimate higher offsite exposures and injury, and these 1eve 1s in and of themselves were never intended to constitute a substantial release or an extraordinary accident. Option l apparently assumes that application of these levels to ENO determinations is technically appropriate. GPC maintains that there have been no technical bases for such a major revision and suggests that such changes should be supported by appropriate research, and be subjected to technical peer review and comment prior to incorporation in the regulations. In the interim, we recommend retention of the current criteria.

Criterion II of Option l could be interpreted to indicate that an accident would cause "substantial damages" if five more people collectively accumulated 100 rads during the course of an accident.

This statement should be clarified to indicate that five or more people each have received a radiation dose equivalent of 100 rads during the course of an accident.

The property damage standard of Criterion II looks to the value of the property contaminated rather than the offsite damage actually sustained. While this greatly simplifies any "substantial damage" finding, GPC objects to such a revision and would urge the NRC to reject this part of the proposal and retain the existing property damage tests.

Finally, Criterion II(c) and II(d) would allow a "substantial damage" determination if employment loss of at least 25,000 person days occurred or if an evacuation of at least 100,000 person days occurred, as the result of an official state or local order. GPC notes that the number 700775

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Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 5, 1985 Page Three Comments on Option 1: (Continued) of days of lost employment or evacuation times would be largely a function of decisions made by employers and employees or governmental authorities surrounding a site. Political or other pressures which are likely to be present during an incident could possibly create negative incentives to extend the absence or evacuation duration so to exceed the ENO threshold. In addition we would point out that NRC guidance document, (NUREG-0654), recommends that plans for precautionary evacuation or sheltering be in place and be implemented in certain instances prior to an anticipated significant release. An anticipatory or precautionary evacuation could the ref ore lead to an inappropriate substantial damage find in g, without an actual release ever taking place.

Comments on Option 2:

Many of the GPC comments on Opt ion l apply equally to Option 2 s i nee Table l in Criterion l and several of the conditions in Criterion II are common between the two Options.

Option 2 retains the uncertainty of the existing ENO criteria with regard to doses which "were or could have been received" (emphasis added) . In this regard, GPC prefers the wording of Option 1.

Option 2 also revises the substantial injury criteria by reflecting collective rather than individual exposure within a 50 mile radius. The validity of such a collective exposure approach suffers from a practical perspective in that it is highly dependent on population density. It is conceivable that a minor release in some highly populated areas would trigger a substantial injury finding, when the actual doses would indicate otherwise. Therefore GPC prefers the approach of Option 1, criterion I I ( a)

• Comments on Option 3:

Option 3 combines the "substantial discharge" and "substantial damages" criteria by establishing specific contamination levels and dose rates to trigger an ENO determination. Furthermore, the levels chosen are unduly conservative in that they represent low dose or contamination levels and that the levels chosen show no relation to cumulative dose or substantial damage or injury.

Option 3 is also defic ient in that it does not specify the area over which the radiation or contamination levels would have to occur to trigger an ENO. Using t his criteria a source or transportation accident encompassing a relativel y small area could trigger an inappropriate ENO determination and subsequent waiver of defenses.

700775

• Georgia Power <<\

Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission September 5, 1985 Page Four Summary:

GPC appreciates the steps of the NRC to clarify and simplify the ENO determination process; however, GP C finds that the proposed options substantively change the criteria for making ENO determination without the adequate technical underpinning to support the changes. Additional analyses of the technical and practical aspects of this issue are necessary to prepare a ENO rule change which improves the current process. GPC recommends that further analysis al so include an evaluation of any ENO rulemaking's impact on the availability of private insurance since the private insurance industry has such a major role in the Price-Anderson process.

Very truly yours,

~ ,;;r <5:J- G ...._

L. T. Gucwa SHC/mb xc: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.

Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.

Mr. J. W. Lamb Mr. G. Bockhold 700775

OOCIII -;'PR- '4() pi

{~P/LJ 1r7"5 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPA NY R ICHMOND, VIRGINIA 2 3 2 6 1 W. L . STEWART .85 V ICE PR ES IDE NT SEP -9 A1(

NUC L E AR OP E RAT ION S Sep t ember 5, 1985 Mr. Chilk Serial No.85-644 Secretary of the Commission NO/ETS:acm U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. 50 - 280 Washington, D. C. 20555 50 - 281 50-338 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch 50-339 License Nos. DPR - 32

Dear Mr. Chilk:

DPR-37 NPF-4 NPF-7 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 CRI TERI A FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE (50 F.R. 13978-85, April 9, 1985)

Virginia Electric and Power Company is pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the Commission's pr oposal to revise the criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO).

On April 9, 1985, the Commi ssion published a proposed rev1s1on to the regulations in 10 CFR Part 140 defining an "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" (ENO). The proposal requested public comments on the three alternative approaches to revising these criteria. By notice in the ...__

Federa l Regi ster dated August 8, 1985 (50 F.R. 32086-87), the period for receipt of public comment was extended to September 6, 1985.

The Commission writes in its proposed rule (50 F.R. at 13976, Col.2), that the proposed changes are des i gned both to "simplify the administrative criter ia" and to "avoid the pr ob l ems encountered by the , Commission in applying the existing criteria to the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant."

However, the Commission does not make clear how the proposed changes satisfy both of these goals and there are reasons to doubt the proposed changes will do so. For example: (A) Options 1 and 2 each retain the format and complexity of the current criteria; (B) the Commission has not articulated any difficulties it experienced applying Criterion I, Part 140.84 (a) in making its TMI ENO determination; and, (C) it is by no means clear that a "lowering" of the radiation exposure thresholds is the same as a "simplification".

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VIROINIA ELECTRIC AND PoWER CO!(PANY TO Mr. Chilk Pa ge 2 VEPCO believes that the Commission should:

(1) more clearly state its goals when proposing a change of this magnitude and (2) more clearly identify how these goals are met by the proposed changes.

For example, if the Commission seeks to trigger the waiver of defenses for accidents less severe than previously contemplated, it should clearly state that objective and provide justification for its reinterpretation of the Congressional mandate. If, on the other hand, the Commission seeks to update the regulation, it should make that declaration and then take into consideration the latest data on the biological effects of radiation, the latest source term studies and, for purposes of property damage, inflat ion since 1966. In the interest of allowing meaningful public commen* ~n such an update, each proposed change should cite to a study or exist i

• fact.

As to the merits of the three options described in the Federal Register notice, VEPCO endorses the comments submitted by the Atomic Industrial Forum and the law firm of Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds (Joseph B. Knotts, Jr. writing on behalf of VEPCO and eight other utilities). In particular, VEPCO wishes to emphasize its deep concern over the significant reductions in the exposure levels in proposed Options 1 and 2.

As stated in 10 CFR Part 140.81, the waiver of defenses should:

come into effect only where the discharge or dispersal constitutes a substantial amount of source, special nuclear or byproduct material, or has caused substantial radiation levels offsite. The various limits in present NRC regulations are not appropriate for direct application in the determination of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," for they were arrived at with other purposes in mind,

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND PoWER COMPANY TO Mr. Chilk Page 3 and those limits have been set at a level which is conservatively arrived at by incorporating a significant safety factor. Thus a discharge or dispersal which exceeds the limits in NRC regulations, or in license conditions, although possible cause for concern, is not one which would be expected to cause substantial injury or damage unless it exceeds by some significant multiple the appropriate regulatory limit.

Thus, a change in the dose criteria for purposes of consistency with the Protective Action Guides is both unnecessary and "not appropriate . "

Further, the proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," would lower the occupational whole body dose limit to 5 rem per year, with special allowances to increase it to 10 rem per year for planned special exposures. If both Part 20 and Part 140 proposed changes were effected, there would exist the anomalous situation wherein the NRC would assert both that (1) a one-time dose of 5 rem to a non-nuclear worker trigge rs the substantial release criterion, and (2) is at the same time equal to just 1/2 of a non-threatening yearly dose to the nuclear worker.

The proposed radiation thresholds simply are far from "expected to cause substantial injury or damage" and could cause unwarranted concern to nuclear workers.

In summary, VEPCO finds the proposed changes unjustified and unsupported.

The Company recommends that the NRC carefully consider the comments of the Atomic Industrial Forum and Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell, and Reynolds and publish a revised proposal for comment.

Again, we appreciate the opportunity to respond to this issue.

W. L. Stewart

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND PowER COMPANY TO Mr. Chilk Page 4 cc: Mr. S. Varga, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Mr. E. J. Butcher, Acting Chief Operating Reactor Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing

Atomiclnd~strialF~rum,ln~

7101 Wisconsin Avenue

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Bethesda, MD 20814-4805 Telephone : (301) 654-9260 L"A 0 {)

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~IJ / !2 t:J 1 1\.;  :.> 7 2 OCK ETfD USNtiC CarlWalske 5 SEP -9 A10 :51 President September S, 1985 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Proposed Rule Relating to Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (SO F.R. 13978-85, April 9, 1985).

Dear Sir:

On April 9, 1985, the Commission published a proposed rev1s1on to the rules in 10 CFR Part 140 relating to the criteria for defining an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" (ENO). The proposal requested public comments on three alternative approaches to revising these criteria. By notice in the Federal Register dated August 8, 1985 (50 F.R. 32086-87), the period for receipt of public comment was extended to September 6, 1985.

The Atomic Industrial Forum's Insurance and Indemnity Committee and the Radiation Protection Subcommittee of the Forum's Committee on the Environment have reviewed the options outlined in the notice and have the following comments.

These Committees recognize the difficulty of the task of implementing statutory language which is necessarily imprecise and which is accompanied by very limited experience. We believe that two of the three alternatives proposed by the Commission may have merit. In many respects, however, the Commssion has not fully explained the rationale underlying the proposals. Merely citing sources of a technical nature without development of a full explanation of the content of those sources as bases for the proposed rule has made it difficult to identify the Commission's technical justification for much of the April 9th proposal.

As a result of these deficiencies, the Committees are unable at this time to support fully any of the Commission's alternatives

U. S. NUCLEAR ~Glll T~Y COMMISSI08 DOCKETI r:. ~ ' E ECTION OFFI

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Secretary September 5, 1985 without significant modification. We believe that an appropriate course of action would be to prepare a complete discussion of the Commission's policy, technical and legal reasons for the proposed revision and to take further public comment on a re-published proposal. The Forum's Committees stand ready to assist the Commission and its staff during the course of this rulemaking.

Background

Before providing our specific comments on the pending proposal, it may be useful to review the statutory and regulatory back-ground of the "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" concept in order to provide a context for discussion and understanding.

Following passage of the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 and extension in 1965, Congress made a number of significant revisions to that law in 1966. Among those changes was the addition of the concept of an "extraordinary nuclear occur-rence" -- a term which is defined in the Atomic Energy Act as follows:

The term 'extraordinary nuclear occurrence' means any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the Commission determines to be substantial, and which the Commssion determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial damage to persons offsite or property offsite. Atomic Energy Act, as amended, Section ll(j),

42 U.S.C. Section 2014 (j).

It is, of course, well known that the significance of this term is that it establishes a threshold for the "waiver of defenses" provision of Price-Anderson. That is, if the Commission deter-mines that an ENO has occurred, certain defenses otherwise available to defendants in the ensuing litigation would be precluded.

The intent of Congress with respect to the ENO threshold is made abundantly clear in the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act. First, an extraordinary nuclear occurrence must be an "extraordinary" event. The authors of the 1966 amendments repeatedly used terms such as "catastrophic" and

Secretary September S, 1985 "serious" in indicating that "there is no pressing need to invoke the mechanisms and procedures in situations which are not exceptional and which can well be taken care of by the traditional system of tort law." (See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Report Accompanying Bills to Amend Price-Anderson Act to Provide Immediate Financial Assistance to Claimants and to Require Waiver of Defenses, (September 16, 1966), excerpts reprinted in Selected Materials on Atomic Ener¥y Indemnity and Insurance Legislation, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, page 309 (1974)).

Second, Congress was mindful of the need to ensure that the waiver system would not be available to plaintiffs who chose to proceed with "spurious" or "nuisance" claims. (Id. at 309; See also, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on AtoiiiTc Energy on Proposed Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses, 84th Congress, Second Session, pages 23, SO, 57-58, 81, 122 and 123 (1966)). Congress considered these types of claims to be outside of the spectrum of incidents appropriate for application of the waivers provision since, among other things, there would be no need to provide immediately available funds for personal injury or property damage.

Numerous parties, including the Commission, have indicated in reports and in recent Congressional testimony that these dual principles underlying the ENO threshold continue to be appro-priate cornerstones of Price-Anderson's public protection provisions. (See, for example, The Price-Anderson Act -- The Third Decade, NUREG-0957, p. IV-9 and Hearint on Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act of 1954 Before the Su committee on Energy and the Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Congress, Second Session, June 11, 1984, pps. 189-191 (Statement of Steve C. Griffith, Jr., on behalf of AIF, ANEC and EEI) and p. 335 (Statement of Richard Schmalz on behalf of ANI and MAELUJ.

Following the 1966 amendments to Price-Anderson, the Atomic Energy Commission implemented the statutory revisions by rulemaking. Proposed regulations on ENO criteria were published for public comment on May 9, 1968, (33 F.R. 6978-86) followed by the publication of final regulations on October 31, 1968. (33 F.R. 15998-99). The Commission's May 9, 1968 notice of proposed rulemaking closely parallels the above described legislative history.

Secretary September 5, 1985 The Commission has traditionally, and we believe correctly, interpreted the statutory definition of an ENO as requiring the satisfaction of both parts of a two - stage test. The first part of the test specifies what constitutes a substantial discharge or release of radioactive material offsite and is known as Criterion I. (10 CFR 140.84). The second element of the test, Criterion II, sets forth standards for determining whether substantial offsite damages to persons or property have occurred. (10 CFR 140.85J . Options 1 and 2 of the Commission's recent proposal would revise Criterion I, while Option 3 would combine Criterion I and Criterion II into a single standard with three parts.

Application at TMI; Comments on the Options A brief analysis of the Commission's application of the ENO criteria to the Three Mile Island accident is appropriate since the "problems" of that application serve as a partial basis for the instant rulemaking . With respect to Criterion I, the staff had little trouble applying that criterion to the TMI circum-stances but found it necessary to use conservative assumptions as to the duration of the accident, the definition of "offsite", and the characterization of the offsite persons exposed. (Re ort to the Nuclear Re ulator Commission from the Staff Panel on t e omm1ss1on s eterm1nat1on o an xtra-ordinar Nuclear Occurrence (ENO), NUREG-0637, pps. 12 -18 January, 1980 In comparison, the panel came to the following conclusion on Criterion II:

In summary, the Panel finds that Criterion II presents several difficult problems of interpretation, the resolution of which would affect the determination of whether the criterion had been satisfied. In any event, the evidence available at this time is insufficient for the Panel to determine whether Criterion II has been satisfied . (NUREG-0637, p. 35).

The Forum's Committees believe that there are at least two lessons to be learned from the Three Mile Island deter-mination. First, given that the ENO criteria must be flexible enough to apply to a variety of situations, it will be nearly impossible to now draft ENO criteria which eliminate completely the need to apply valid assumptions at the time the rule is invoked. Second, it seems clear that Criterion II could be

Secretary September 5, 1985 modified now in an effort to ensure that sufficient information for an ENO determination can be made available to the Commission in a timely manner.

Substantial Release (Criterion I)

Options 1 and 2 for Criterion I are identical except for word differences in introductory paragraph (a) . Option 1 speaks of persons who have been or probably will be exposed to radiation while Option 2 uses the terms "were or could have been." Thus both Options 1 and 2 depend to some extent on speculation as to the full extent of exposure to persons in the area near the site of an accident. Similarly, Option 3 is based primarily on speculation since, as noted in the proposal, Option 3 is intended to identify "those conditions which could lead to injury or damages." (See 50 F.R. 13981, second column).

We support the Commission's intention to eliminate speculation as to which persons may have been exposed to releases of radiation . In situations where data on measured exposures to actual persons are not available and persons are known to have been in the area of the plume, the analysis could be based on assumptions as to the "hypothetical individual." Recognizing that some assumptions may be necessary , care must be taken to use realistic assumptions as to the mobility and knowledge of these individuals. (See Re~ort to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the Staff anel on the Commission's Determination of an Extraordinar Nuclear Occurrence (ENO),

N , pps. anuary, , 1n w 1c 1t 1s assumed unrealistically that the hypothetical individual possessed the knowledge and the desire to always remain in the area of highest radiation exposure during the course of the accident).

Consistency With Protective Action Guides The Commission states that the reduced dose levels for Criterion I which appear in Options 1 and 2 have "been selected to be numerically consistent with Protective Action Guides proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration." (SO F.R. 13980, second column). The Protective Action Guides (PAGs) are also referenced as support for the approach of Option 3. (50 F.R . 13983, second column).

The Commission acknowledges that the doses in Options 1 and 2 are in the range of the occupational dose limits in current NRC regulations. (SO F.R . 13980, second column) .

Secretary September 5, 1985 First, we believe the Commission's proposed reduction in the Criterion I dose levels to the PAG values is inconsistent with its expressed intent for this rulemaking. In both the original notice of proposed rulemaking and the notice extending the comment period, the Commission stated that it intended the proposed rules to "simplify the administrative criteria used by the Commission in making the ENO determination ... " (50 P.R.

3978; 50 F. R. 32086). However, changing the dose levels to be used in Criterion I contributes nothing to administrative simplicity; it merely changes the threshold at which the Criterion I determination is to be made. At the same time, the changed dose levels represent a significant substantive change in the ENO determination, which the Commission indicated it was not intending to do.

We also believe the Commission has lost sight of the function of the ENO criteria in proposing the reduced Criterion I dose levels. The reduced dose levels are inappropriate for a number of reasons. Reduction of the Criterion I doses to levels at or approaching annual occupational dose limits is inappropriate in view of the underlying legislative history as well as the existing ENO regulation. (See 10 CFR 140.8l(b)(l) which, under any of the proposed options, would continue to provide in part that "[a] substantial discharge, for purposes of the criteria, represents a perturbation of the environment which is clearly above that which could be anticipated from the conduct of normal activities.") Moreover, an inexplicable dichotomy between onsite workers and offsite persons is created if the permissible levels of radiation for onsite workers are adopted as the levels which define a substantial release offsite.

Reduction of Criterion I doses could also have an adverse effect on future radiation tort litigation. With respect to onsite workers, the effect may be one of providing a "no-fault" remedy in addition to that already provided under workers' compensation laws. In cases involving other claims, we believe courts are likely to construe the "substantial release" doses of proposed Options 1 and 2 as very persuasive, perhaps even prima facie, evidence of injury to persons without regard to Criterion II and the other complexities of the ENO regulation.

Contrary to the Commission's assertion (50 F.R. 13982),

insurance premiums and capacity are likely to be adversely affected if the dose reductions in Table 1 of Options 1 and 2 lead to these results.

Secretary September 5, 1985 There are a number of issues relating to adoption of the Protective Action Guides which are not discussed in the Commission's April 9th notice. Among those issues are (1) identification of the evolution of as well as the reasons for differences in the EPA and FDA PAG limits (primarily in pathway of exposure), (2) identification of the range of doses given in each agency's PAGs, (3) discussion of why the Commission proposes, in most cases, to adopt the upper boundary of those ranges, and (4) discussion of whether an exception or special provision should exist for doses to emergency workers, (5) discussion of whether the current rule was in fact based on the "then effective Protective Action Guides" (50 F.R. 13979) since the 1968 rulemaking notices contain no such reference, and (6) discussion of the appropriateness of omitting a time limitation for the committed dose from the proposed rule. We urge the Commission to publish a complete discussion of the above issues and any other issues identified in public comment as associated with adoption of the PAGs so that the public is afforded the opportunity to comment on the full extent of the Commission's technical and policy approach to revising Criterion I.

Substantial Damage to Persons Offsite (Criterion II)

With respect to Criterion II, the Commission proposes to revise the current rule which requires that 5 or more people located offsite show "objective clinical evidence of physical injury from exposure" within 30 days of an event. (10 CFR 140.85 (a)(l)). In general, Option 1 would establish a dose level of 100 rads to 5 or more people, while Option 2 would require a collective dose of 100,000 person-rem.

The Committees believe that Option 1 is an appropriate revision since current technical literature suggests that 75-100 rads is in the range at which some acute effects of radiation would be evident. This provision, however, should be clarified in a number of ways. The statutory definition of an ENO specifies clearly that Criterion II relates to persons offsite, and the regulation should so reflect. It should also be stated either in the rule or the accompanying explanation that this portion of Criterion II requires an exposure of 100 rads to each of 5 people (not 20 rads to 5 people), and the temporal limitation of the current rule (within 30 days) should be added. Finally, the emergency worker exception discussed above with respect to Criterion I is also appropriate for inclusion in Criterion II.

Secretary September 5, 1985 We oppose the collective dose approach in Option 2 because a very small dose (i.e., well within current operating limits) to a large number of persons would qualify as an ENO. While we do not intend to convey the impression that any significant doses to a large population are routinely acceptable, the application of Option 2 in this manner is simply not consistent with the concept of a threshold for an extraordinary event.

Substantial Damage to Property Offsite (Criterion II)

Options 1 and 2 would change the current ENO rule substantially with respect to the offsite property damage portion of Criterion II. The revisions include replacement of the require-ment of actual or probable damage to property with the concepts of property valuation, employment loss, and evacuation, each having a "total valuation" of $2 .5 million. (50 F. R.

13980-81). The Commission states that each of these three items can "be readily counted or estimated within a relatively short time following an accident ... " (Id.)

We do not support the use of employment loss and evacuation as appropriate indicators of substantial property loss since each contains an uncontrolled, built-in incentive to achieve the monetary thresholds. Evacuations might be undertaken without sufficient cause by residents near the site or ordered unnecessarily by public officials with a view toward ensuring an ENO determination for the benefit of their constituencies.

The costs associated with actions not within the control of the NRC or the licensee should not be elements of property damages for purposes of an ENO determination. With respect to property valuation, we believe the concept of actual loss, measured by a parameter such as decontamination costs, must be retained in Criterion II. This prevents an ENO finding in the situation where, for example, a few square meters of a multi-million dollar office building become contaminated but can be quickly and inexpensively decontaminated.

We suggest that the Commission's focus on the perceived difficulties of the Three Mile Island ENO determination should be sharpened. The difficulty in identifying sufficient evidence of offsite property damage should not come as a surprise since substantial offsite releases of radioactivity did not occur at TM!. To the extent that the Commission may be concerned that the dollar amounts in Criterion II of the

Secretary September 5, 1985 current rule should be revised, we offer the observation that the dollar threshold established in 1968 has already been effectively lowered in light of changes in economic conditions such as inflation. Finally, if difficulty in applying the current Criterion II is anticipated, the Commission can, by rulemaking or otherwise, provide that it may obtain the services of experts in the field of estimating property values, losses, decontamination expenses and other indicators of damage to property.

In summary, we view Options 1 and 2 of Criterion II as unacceptable alternatives to the current rule, and recommend that Criterion II of the current rule be retained.

Comments on Option 3 Option 3 represents a radical departure from the two-step ENO determination in the Commission's existing regulations. Option 3 is appealing in many respects (for example, Option 3 contains a time period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for dose measurements) but the Committees are unable to fully support this alternative because we are unable to identify its technical and legal basis. While the literature cited at 50 F.R. 13983 recognizes damage thresholds of increasing severity, it is not clear that these sources would support a correlation between doses to persons and surface contamination doses. Nor is it clear that there is support for the postulated decontamination threshold dose rate in Option 3 of 10 millirad/hr since the "studies" underlying this technical assumption are not identified. Finally, it is not clear that Option 3, which does not require either consideration of doses to individuals or of actual damage to property, is a permissible interpretation of the Price-Anderson law. We believe the Commission's rulemaking notice should address this potential legal issue and include specific citations to any technical literature supporting the major assumptions (50 F.R. 13983) which form the basis for Option 3.

Additional Comments The discussion accompanying the proposed rule does not indicate whether the recent research efforts by the NRC and others on the accident source term have been considered. This is particularly true with respect to Option 3 which is apparently

Secretary September S, 1985 based in part on WASH-1400 analyses. It is recommended that the staff review this subject area to determine whether there are certain aspects of the likely reduction in source term that may be pertinent to the proposed ENO rule.

The Committee recommends that two other items omitted from the proposal and accompanying explanation be addressed. These are (a) the basis for adding subparagraph (a)(4) ("radiation from sources internal to the body") in Criterion I, Options 1 and 2, in view of the use of the term "committed dose" in Table 1, and (b) a discussion of the relationship between the NRC's ENO proposals and the existing ENO regulations of the Department of Energy at 10 CFR Part 840. Additional comments of a technical nature are included in Attachment 1.

Summary We find that the Commission has made some progress toward defining a new approach to the ENO criteria but we believe substantial additional analysis and opportunity for receipt of public comments is warranted. While the Forum's Committees cannot fully support any of the options, we find that portions of Options 1 and 3 have particular merit. We recommend that the Commission consider combining the best elements of these options in future rulemaking.

- Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments.

Sincerely CW:hmm

Attachment 1 September 5, 1985 FURTHER TECHNICAL COMMENTS Option fl

1. 140.84 (a), Table I - the title is not consistent with the scientific definitions of the quantities "committed dose equivalent" and "dose equivalent commitment" (see ICRP Publication 26, page 6). The title should be consistent with scientific definitions used in ICRP Publication 26.

It is suggested that the term "dose equivalent" or

-2.

3.

"committed dose equivalent" be used.

140.84 (a) - "radiation material" should be changed (two places) to "radioactive material."

140.84 (b), Table II - the meaning of the word "total" in t he title "Total Surface Contamination Levels" is unclear.

This meaning is further confused by the footnote to the title which refers to "the maximum levels (above back-ground) observed or projected . . . " The reference to surface contamination level should clearly indicate that it is averaged over at least 100 square meters in the case of (b) (1).

Option #2 Technical comments on Option #1 ar e similar for Option #2.

Option #3

1. 140.84 (a) - "exposure rate" measured in units of roentgen per unit time remains in common use for characterizing gamma radiation fields in air. To avoid confusion, the wording should be changed to " ... produce gamma dose rates II

2. 140. 84 (c) - the phrase "beta or gamma emitting radionuclides" should be substituted for "beta-gamma-emitting." It may be more practical to express the measurements at one meter in appropriate equivalent values rather than to specify a rate one centimeter above the ground.

3. 140.84 (c) - this criterion refers to contamination of "real and personal property" as det ermined by a measure-ment" ... above the ground." However, the contaminated property may not be "ground."

4. 140.84 (b) - this criterion should read "the integrated off-site air dose ... " to clar i fy where the hypothetical individual is located.

5. It is noted that Option #3 does not base the ENO criterion on internal exposures. This is probably acceptable because in the cases of "substantial injuries" or "substantial damages" from internal exposures when 140.84 (a) and 140.84 (b) are not satisfied, then 140.84 (c) probably would be satisfied.

"85 SEP -6 P3 :25 KMC, Inc.

801 18TH STREET, NW SUITE 300 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-4200 September 6, 1985 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Proposed Rule 10 C.F.R. Part 140, Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence

Dear Mr. Chilk:

This letter, providing comments on the subject rule, is submitted by KMC, Inc. on behalf of utility members of the Radiation Standards Industry Group. Those utilities are listed in Enclosure 1. To summarize our comments briefly, we recommend that the Commission defer any action on the proposed rule until after Congress has acted on the possible extension and modification of the Price-Anderson Act.

Absent Congressional action revising the statutory pro-visions governing the extraordinary nuclear occurrence

("ENO") concept, we recommend that the Commission retain its present rule unaltered. We do not believe that any of the proposed options will correct the problems the Commission perceives exist with the present rule nor do we believe that the proposed rule adequately substantiates these perceived problems. Our comments below and in Enclosure 2 elaborate upon these conclusions and address each of the three options described in the proposed rule. If you have questions about any of our comments, please do not hesitate to contact us.

First, the NRC should delay any revision of its ENO rule until after Congress has completed its consideration of the possible extension and modification of the Price-Anderson Act. Absent such deference by the NRC, any Congressional action involving the ENO concept could be incorrectly based on the current rule. Additionally, if

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 6, 1985 Page 2 Congress amends the statutory provision governing the ENO rule, the NRC could be required to revise its rule again.1/

Deference will avoid unnecessary revisions by the NRC and will permit Congress to conduct its debate without the NRC's rule changing in midstream.

Second, the present rule correctly implements the statutory definition of an ENO. The proposed rule is inconsistent with Congressional intent as it would lower the dose level for a substantial offsite release of radioactiv-ity to five rem, the annual occupational exposure limit.

Thus, contrary to the legislative history, the proposed rule would permit the Commission to define as an ENO an event near the range of anticipated occurrences and involving doses within or near permissible regulatory limits.

It is clear that Congress intended that any event which would trigger the waiver of defenses would be substantial and not near the range of anticipated occurrences. This is apparent from the definition of an ENO:

• .

• any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the Commission determines to be substantial, and which the Commission determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial damage to persons offsite or property offsite. Atomic Energy Act, as amended, Section 11 ( j) ,

42 U.S.C. Section 2014(j).

Additionally, in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Report Accompanying Bills to Amend Price-Anderson Act to Provide Immediate Financial Assistance to Claimants and to Require Waiver of Defenses (September 16, 1966) , the authors said that "there is no pressing need to invoke the mechanisms and procedures in situations which are not exceptional and which can well be taken care of by the traditional system of tort law." Selected Materials on Atomic Energy Indemnity and Insurance Legislation, 93rd Congress, Second Session, page

!/ We are aware of at least one Congressional proposal to eliminate the ENO concept.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 6, 1985 Page 3 309 (1974). Congress did not intend that the ENO concept would trigger a waiver of defenses for frivolous or nuisance suits. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses, 84th Congress, Second Session, pages 23, 5 0 , 5 7 - 5 8 , 81 , 12 2 , and 12 3 ( 19 6 6 )

• The proposed rule would also replace a determination of actual or probable offsite property damage with determina-tions of property valuation, employment loss, and evacuation costs. Thus, instead of adhering closely to Congressional intent, the NRC proposes to consider criteria which may or may not, depending upon the circumstances of a particular event, be related to substantial offsite property damages.

While such criteria may be easier for the NRC to measure, they are not necessarily appropriate measures for an ENO determination. Rather, the off site property damages which should be determined are those which result from the release of radioactive material, such as the total cost necessary to put affected property back into use.

Third, while a primary reason given for the proposed revision is to "avoid the problems encountered by the Commission in applying the existing criteria to the accident at the Three Mile Island ("TMI") nuclear plant," these problems are not set forth in detail. Thus, it is difficult to provide comments which are fully and particularly respon-sive to these perceived problems. For example, the NRC states that it was difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate accurately and in a timely manner monetary damages pursuant to Criterion II. While not stated, apparently this diffi-culty flowed, at least in part, from the fact that the TMI accident did not result in a substantial offsite release of radioactivity nor substantial offsite property damages. We do not believe that the difficulty of estimating damages when there is no substantial offsite release of radioactiv-ity should cause the Commission to change its rule. Pre-sumably another reason why the NRC had difficulty ascertain-ing the damages resulting from the TMI accident was the NRC's lack of personnel trained in making such damage estimates. If in the future there is an event resulting in offsite property damage and the Commission does not have the requisite in-house ability to ascertain monetary damages, the Commission could hire experts who could estimate such damages for it.

With regard to these perceived problems, it should be noted that the NRC has never declared an event to be an ENO.

The TMI accident is the only event that has even warranted

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 6, 1985 Page 4 such consideration. Any regulation which is implemented so infrequently will not be automatic in its implementation.

Moreover, NRC' s application of the rule took place in a climate of intense scrutiny from Congress, the media, and the public. It is to be expected that, in such circum-stances, the NRC would have difficulty applying the criteria for the first time. We believe that there will continue to be similar problems in the future when an event does not release substantial quantities of radiation or cause sub-stantial off site damages . Thus, it is unlikely that the goal underlying the revision, to make the ENO rule easily applied when such an event occurs, can be achieved. More-over, we do not believe that such an event provides a justifiable basis for revising the rule .

Finally, we are concerned that defining a five rem dose as "substantial," even if only for the purposes of the ENO rule, will have an adverse impact on the NRC and the commer-cial nuclear power industry. Adoption of this definition will likely lead the public to assume that the NRC has concluded that a five rem dose is substantial in terms of its human health effects. When this assumption is compared to the present occupational dose limit, it is likely that the public will further assume that the NRC is inadequately protecting health and safety.

In addition to this adverse effect on the public's perception of the NRC, we believe that this downward re-vision could adversely affect industry's defense of ra-diation injury claims brought before workers compensation boards and courts by industry employees . It is likely that the revised ENO Criterion I will be introduced as evidence that personal injury results from receipt of a five rem dose . If courts and workers compensation boards accept this argument that Criterion I reflects the NRC's judgment that personal injury results from receipt of a five rem dose, then there could be an adverse impact on the availability to industry of insurance and on industry insurance rates.I/

2/ We note that insurance industry statements noted in the proposed rule that there would be no adverse impacts on the availability of insurance and on insurance rates are about 20 years old and cannot be relied upon to represent that industry's opinion today.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 6, 1985 Page 5 In sum, we recommend that the Commission defer its action on a revised ENO rule until after Congress has acted on the possible extension and modification of the Price-Anderson Act. Absent Congressional action modifying the ENO concept, we recommend that the present rule not be changed.

Peter F. Riehm Associate

ENCLOSURE 1 UTILITIES COMMENTING ON PROPOSED RULE 10 CFR PART 140, CRITERIA FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE Detroit Edison Company Omaha Public Power District Pacific Gas & Electric Company Toledo Edison Company Yankee Atomic Electric Company

ENCLOSURE 2 Detailed Comment on Proposed ENO Options Comment 1.1: The discussion of "substantial releases or substan-tial offsite doses" is confusing. The Supplementary Information states clearly:

The proposed dose levels for Criterion I .... are in the range of the occupational dose limits and hence could be re!arded as too low to be vieweaas being "substantia ". (Emphasis added)

- We agree with this.

However, the text then continues and tries to justify why such low levels are, nevertheless, "substantial." We are not convinced by this argument. A dose of this magnitude either is or is not "substantial." As these doses are in the range of occupa-tional dose limits, and as the NRC has concluded that its occupa-tional dose limits are sufficiently low, then the only proper conclusion is that the proposed limits are well below "substan-tial" and are improper for consideration in the ENO criteria.

Given the Congressional intent underlying the ENO concept, to conclude otherwise is to introduce confusion.

The proposed dose criteria are too low.

Comment 1.2: The Supplementary Information states:

The proposed modification has been selected to be numerically consistent with Protective Action Guides proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency .... This ensures that any nuclear acci-dent which would have warranted protective actions will be found to involve a substantial release of radioactive materials which would satisfy the first condition for an ENO determination.

Yet existing 10 CFR 140.81 states that "The criteria ..... are not intended to indicate a level at which some protective action is indicated."

We find that setting the doses to be consistent with EPA's PAGs is counter to the long-standing philosophy of the ENO concept and the quoted text in 10 CFR 140.81. No justification has been offered for using PAGs and other health and safety technical documents as bases in support of the proposed criteria.

Comment 1 . 3 : The proposed rule states in 10 CFR 140.BS(a):

Five or more people have received a radiation dose equivalent to the whole body or any organ in excess of 100 rads (1 gray) during the course of the accident. (Emphasis added)

As this criterion involves doses "during the course of the accident," doses resulting from the accident which are received after the accident (e.g., through the food chain) would not be considered. Is this intended?

Comment 1.4: The Supplementary Information states:

...* the assessed value of property requiring decontamination is used as an index of damage.

This is an easy approach but would be appropriate only if that property is destroyed or rendered essentially useless. A more appropriate property damage measurement would be the cost of decontamination, if necessary, to return the property to its original condition.

Comment 1.5: We agree with the statement in the Supplementary Information that:

In evaluating the doses for defining "substantial injury," the Commission intends that the method-ology used for the evaluations be realistic rather than overly conservative.

Comment 1.6: It should be clarified that the sources of radiation listed in proposed 10 CFR 140 .84(a) include only those sources resulting from the accident in question, particularly for sources internal to the body. Also, we do not understand what is gained by the addition of item (4): "Radiation from sources internal to the body."

Comments on Option 2 Comment 2.1: Same as Comment 1.1 above.

Comment 2.2: Same as Comment 1.2 above.

Comment 2.3: The proposed rule states in 10 CFR 140.84(a):

The Commission finds that any of the following doses were or could have been received by a person or persons located on or near any site boundary throughout the duration of the accident.

Thus Comment 1.3 above applies here also.

Comment 2.4: Same as Comment 1.4 above.

Comment 2.5: The proposed rule in 10 CFR 140.85(a) refers to "a calculated collective dose .... " We note that in the Connnission's recently approved proposed Part 20 rule, a "de minimis" concept is incorporated into the collective dose calculation. We believe it would .be likewise appropriate and consistent to incorporate a similar concept here.

Comment 2.6: Same as Comment 1.6 above.

Comments on Option 3 Comment 3.1: Option 3 states regarding the present Criterion I:

.*. it is a measure of exposure and possible damage (cf. Criterion II), not a measure of discharge or radiation level. (Emphasis added)

We disagree. Nor do we agree with assertion regarding Criterion I that:

... one must be able to track two paths : the path of the persons at risk and the path of the plume of radionuclides.

To the contrary, the present Criterion I states clearly that the Commission must find that:

• .. one or more persons offsite were, could have been, or might be exposed *... (Emphasis added)

We believe that this allows for a standard "fencepost cow" calcula-tion, which is done regardless of whether the cow is actually present. As such, it is truly a measure of discharge. Further-more, by calling into question the ability to determine plume characteristics (i.e . , size, speed, content, etc.), Option 3 challenges the ability to adequately calculate exposure in the required accident analyses found in Chapter 15 of every Safety Analysis Report. We doubt that the Connnission intends to do this.

Thus we find that Option 3 is wrong in declaring the present Criterion I not to be what it purports to be. Hence, the proposal to reduce the two criteria to one has no basis.

Comment 3.2: As originally intended by Congress and as presently promulgated by the NRC, for an event to be declared an ENO, it must involve both a substantial discharge and substantial damages offsite. Thus, an event which involves a large discharge result-ing in small damages would be precluded from classification as an ENO by virtue of this two part test. However, Option 3 eliminates the two part test and replaces it with a test whereby only offsite damages are considered regardless of release size. This is not

consistent with Congressional intent, but comports with the erroneous interpretation of Criterion I as discussed in Comment 3.1.

The rule should properly maintain its present two-criteria form.

Comment 3.3: As defined in the Atomic Energy Act, an ENO is an event which, among other things, "has resulted or probably will result, in substantial damage to persons offsite or property offsite." The present Criterion II divides offsite property into two categories: (1) contiguous offsite property which is owned (or leased) by the indemnified party, and (2) all other offsite property. We believe this is appropriate. We do not understand the basis for deleting the first category. Until a basis is supplied, the present "Column 1" should be retained in the Table.

JOHN J. KEAR('lEY, Senior Vice President The Honorable Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Proposed Rule: Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurence (50 Fed. Reg. 13978-85, April 9, 1985)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission published on April 9, 1985, for comment, a proposed rule consisting of three options for Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurence. The Edison Electric Institute has a vital interest in the NRC's Extraordinary Nuclear Occurence (ENO) rulemaking.

The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) is the association of the nation's investor-owned electric companies and its members currently operate 78 nuclear energy units with full power operating licenses and one with a low power license. EEI members will operate 23 additional units now under construction.

On September 6, 1985, the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) filed extensive comments on the proposed rule. Representatives of EEI member companies and EEI staff participated with the AIF Committees in preparation of those comments. EEI fully endorses the AIF comments on the proposed rule for Criteria for an ENO. We wish to emphasize, however, two fundamental points made in the AIF comments:

o ENO Threshold As a result of the Commission's difficulty in applying the existing Criteria to the facts about the March 29, 1979 TMI-2 accident (which was determined not to be an ENO), the Commission is proposing to revise the ENO Criteria so as to make them more practicable. EEI does not disagree with the Commission's desire to render these Criteria more practicable.

However, it appears that in doing so, the Commission has also proposed to lower the threshold for determining that an ENO

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Hon. Samuel J. Chilk September 9, 1985 Page 2 has occurred. Congress desired to establish a level of discharge that is clearly above that which could be expected from normal activities. We respectfully suggest that the Commission has lost sight of the intent of the statutory language; an intent that is reflected in the existing Criteria. EEI recommends that the Commission revisit the threshold question in light of the Congressional intent and use a higher threshold, similar to the existing Criteria, for revising the Criteria.

o Explanatory Information The explanatory material contained in the April 9, 1985 Federal Register notice does not explain fully the Commission's underlying rationale for the proposals. We suggest that it would be in the best interest of all concerned for the Commission to publish a more complete explanation of the policy, technical and legal aspects of the proposal.

In summary, EEI recommends that the Commission reconsider the proposed rule, taking into account the intent of the statutory language and re-propose the rule along with a full explanation of its rationale. EEI, along with the AIF Committees, would be pleased to assist the Commission and its Staff in this endeavor.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely yours, arney I ice President JJK:ski

P.O. BOX 529100 MIAMI , FL 33152

• ss s£P -6 P' :3o l=l=I FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR §§140.84 and 140.85 (50 Fed. Reg. 13978 and 32086 (1985))

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On April 9, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

("NRC) published in the Federal Register a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking entitled "Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" and invited comments on its proposed criteria.

Florida Power & Light Company ("FPL") filed comments on August 7, 1985, the deadline stated in the Notice. However, on August 8, 1985, the NRC published an additional notice in the Federal Register extending the time period for comments to September 6, 1985. During this extension period, FPL has reviewed other comments which have been filed and ha s participated in the development of the comments which are to be submitted on behalf of the Atomic Industrial Forum ("AIF"). The brief comments which follow are an amplification of FPL's Augu?t 7, 1985 comments.

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Mr. Samuel Chilk September 6, 1985 Page 2 In its earlier comments, FPL did not object to the use of current Protective Action Guide ("PAG") values as Criterion I radiation exposure limits for the general populace, although it did urge the NRC not to app ly those limits to emergency workers. FPL continues to believe that the PAG values may be reasonab l e for use in Criterion I . However , FPL agrees with the

- observation which AIF makes in its comments that neither the NRC's original Notice of Proposed Rulemaking nor the extension notice indicate an intent to modify substantively the exposure levels contained in the existing rule.

Both the original Notice and the extension notice contain the following expression of the NRC's intent: "The proposed changes are designed to simplify the administrative criteria used by the Commission in making an ENO determination and to avoid the problems encountered by the Commission in applying the existing criteria to the accident at Three Mile -'

Island." 50 Fed. Reg. at 13978 and 32086. No mention is made of changing the substantive values used in the criteria, but all three versions of the proposed rule contain such changes.

Moreover, the revisions to the Criterion I exposure levels in the proposed rule would not contribute at all to "administrative simplicity" or help to avoid the problems encountered in applying the existing rule at Three Mile Island; the exposure

Mr. Samuel Chilk September 6, 1985 Page 3 level revisions are simply inconsistent with the NRC's expressed intent.

This inconsistency is not merely a procedural defect.

It affects interested parties' ability to comment on the proposed rules because the exposure level revisions are not

- sufficiently the focus of the proposed rule's supplementary information to have received a thorough explanation or justification therein. FPL has been hindered by this lack of explanation and justification throughout its review of the proposed rule. While it was able to determine that the current PAG values might be acceptable fpr Criterion I, FPL cannot tell why the NRC has chosen those values or why the NRC felt that they properly defined a "substantial discharge."

FPL agrees with the AIF that the NRC should not adopt the PAG values for Criterion I without devoting more detailed and specific attention to the merits of doing so. FPL further recommends that rulemaking on the substantive values used in both Criteria I and II should be separate from the current rulemaking, which the NRC has said is supposed to be focused on simplifying the existing rule and making it easier to apply.

The quality of the consideration given to both the procedural

Mr. Samuel Chilk September 6, 1985 Page 4 and substantive proposals will be enhanced if the NRC will make that separation.

FPL hopes that this amplification of its earlier comments will be helpful to the NRC. It respec t fully requests the NRC to consider and reflect both the original comments and

- this amplification in any revision to the ENO rule which NRC decides to a d opt.

Respectfully submitted, t:~-~iburg /

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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY~ F£ 13971'°)

80 BOYLS TON STREET BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 2199 WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON ENIDIII VICI: ~Rl: IDl:NT DOCK~~ED NUCLIEAII USNRC Au&_u st 23, 1985

'85 AUG 29 A11 B~()o 85-155 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk GFFICE o.:- SE.L.M. !,-

• DOCKETI NG & SEPV It .

Secretary BRANCH U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss ion Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch License DPR-35 Docket 50-293

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Rule Amend ing 10CFR 140.84 and 140 .85 -

Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Boston Edison Company (BECo) has reviewed the proposed revisions to the "Extraordina ry Nuclear Occurrence (ENO)" Criteria as published in Federal Register Vol. 50, No. 68, dated April 9, 1985 and offers the following comments for your conside ration .

1. The Fede ra l Register states that the March 1979 TMI-2 accident presented several problems in applying the existing ENO criteria and that the NRC is proposing revisions to alle viate those problems. It states further that the proposed revisions to the crite r ia would not have changed the outcome of ENO determination for the TMI-2 accide nt had they been applied.

Therefore, it appears that the sole intent of the NRC in amending the ENO criteria is to simplify the implementation of the criteria for an ENO determination. Also, our review of the proposed th ree options indicates that there are no substantive changes in the proposed revisions to the ENO criteria. Boston Edison believes that for the pu rpos e of simplifying the implementation of the ENO criteria, the NRC should not re vis e the rule; instead the NRC should develop regulatory guidanc e to simplify the implementation of the rule. The NRC regulatory gu idance (Regulatory Guides) should provide clear instructions concerning the implementation of the ENO criteria.

2. The proposed revisions to the ENO crite r ia utilizes the revised Environme ntal Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines (EPA PAG ) for the purpose of determining substantial releases. The EPA PAG limits are intended for emergency planning purposes to protect the population at risk from the onset of release of activity. They are not intend~d to provide a base line crite r ia for the purpose of ENO determination. The EN0 11 11 criteria signifies an extraordinary nuclear event and should, therefore, 11 11 include such base line dose lim its which have eithe r proven to or will cause physical or psychological damage if prolonge d exposu r e is sustained .

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. BOSTON EDISON COMPANY PAGE 2 August 23, 1985 For this purpose, BECo suggests that the dose limits for the ENO criteria should be extracted from International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) publications based upon documented radiation damage.

3. Radiation exposure is measured in "time" parameters to estimate the total radiation dose. Options 1 and 2 do not specify an integ r ated time factor whil e option 3 includes a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time factor to estimate the total dose.

Without such time factors, it would be difficult to establish the fact that the exposure was due to normal or off-normal or accident conditions.

Also, since licensees would not be able to distinguish the causes of exposure, i.e. normal or accident dose, the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act and ENO would have to be invoked whenever the predetermined exposure is reached. Therefore , BfCo suggests that a "time interval" be identified in the criteria. Again, the place to identify such an integrating time interval is in a regulatory guide with clear instructions, not in the regulations.

4. In addition to the above specific comments, BECo endorses the comments offered by the Law Offices of Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds on behalf of their member utilities.

In consideration of the above comments, BECo recommends the following:

a) BECo believes that the existing ENO criteria are satisfactory. The NRC should retain the existing criteria and develop regulatory guidance to implement it, or b) If the NRC still decides to revise the existing ENO criteria, then the NRC should publish a revised proposal for further public comments taking into consideration the above comments . .

Should you wish to discuss our comments, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

()JJ)

WGL/ns

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GA Technologies Inc.

P.O. BOX 85608 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92138 (619) 455-3000 LAW DEPARTMENT *as AUG 15 A10 :09 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, n.c. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Criteria for ENO Gentlemen:

In the Federal Register for April 9, 1985, NRC published a proposed rule amendment concerning the criteria it will use, if occasion arises, to determine that an extraordinary nuclear occurrence within the meaning of the Price-Anderson Act as amended had occurred.

A reader is struck by the Commission's assertion that it believes the present criteria established in 10 CFR Part 140 are consistent with the statutory definition of an ENO, a belief GA shares. From that premise it follows that the Commission is proposing merely to refine a regulation that is already correct - an activity which hardly seems worthwhile -

or that the Commission believes its own internal difficulties in applying the present criteria for TMI were so great as to make the regulation operationally so defective as to warrant the time and effort entailed for NRC and interested persons to make it more convenient for the staff to use and thus reach a presumably nbettern or quicker result. The published explanation of the proposal is not convincing on the latter score. After all, the NRC's function in the matter is fairly minor: it does not determine anyone's damages and it awards no recovery so it need not be excruciatingly precise. If it once says an event was not shown to be an ENO, nothing seems to prevent its reconsidering that if and when more or better data become available. A distant observer tends to infer that the agency's asserted difficulty in the TMI ENO evaluation was exacerbated by its taking itself too seriously.

10955 JOHN JAY HOPKINS DR. , SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92121

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 12, 1985 The present criteria may well attempt too slavishly to elucidate the substantial damages standard in the statute.

Commissioner Bernthal's Option #3 would apparently reduce the agency's problems in dealing with the present criteria, and his published comments are quite persuasive. The proposed Options 1 and 2, however, merely substitute new defects and questionable conclusions for the present criteria, which themselves aren ' t really too bad except for the speculative element in their " might be " measurement of personal radiation exposure. If the criteria are to be changed at all, it seems to us that NRC might as well make a large change and skirt the old difficulties rather than just replacing them with others.

Therefore, if NRC elects to go ahead with the proposed rulemaking notwithstanding the lack of any real need for it, we favor adopting some version of Option 3. As to that, however, we observe it presently does not include as an express element a ny cons ider at ion for the fact that the surr oundings of one reactor may be nearly valueless unpopulated land while those around another may be heavily populated or very valuable or both.

Very truly yours ,

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• PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85036 DOC:KE-TEO August 6, 1985 USN RC

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Secretary of the Commission OOC KE l ING & SEf,'/1 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission BRANCH Washington, D. c. 20555 Re: Request for Public Comments on Proposed Change to 10 CFR Part 140; Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence Gentlemen:

The Federal Register of April 9, 1985, published a notice of proposed rulemaking ("Notice") by the U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") which advised that NRC was con-sidering a revision of its regulations, 10 CFR §§140.84 and 140.85, establishing criteria for use in determining whether any specific nuclear incident that may occur is or is not an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" ("ENO"). The establish-ment of such criteria was required by the 1966 amendments of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("Act") which, among other things, require persons held liable for an ENO to waive cer-tain defenses against claims covered by either the financial protection or government indemnity provided pursuant to Sec-tion 170 of the Act.

The Notice states that consideration is being given to the revision of the existing ENO criteria to simplify their administration and to avoid three of several problems encountered in their application to the Three Mile Island

("TMI") nuclear incident as reported in NUREG-0637 - "Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the Staff Panel on the Commission's Determination of an Extraordinary Nuclear Occur-rence (ENO)", December, 1979. No explanation is given in the Notice why only three of the problems identified in NUREG-0637 are addressed in the revisions of the criteria under consideration.

The Notice requests comments on three different options for revision of the existing ENO criteria. Options

1. 1 and #2 would retain the framework of the existing criteria and require two distinct determinations be made as to (1)

"substantial releases" and (2) "substantial damages". Option

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Secretary of the Commission August 7, 1985 Page 2

1. 3 would require only a single determination that relec,ses of radioactive material during an accident resulted in specified property decontamination threshold dose l evels or threshold integrated air dose to individuals. In such cases the proba-ble occurrence of substantial damages or substantial injuries would bvresumed on the basis of unidentified correlation studies.

The following comments of Arizona Public Servic~

Company are limited solely to Option #3 which in concept would provide quantifiable, objective cri teria for determin-ing whether or not an ENO has taken place. In our view Op-tion #3, with certain modifications that would retain the quantifiable, objective criteria, is preferable to either Option #1 or Option #2. We concur with the additional com-ments of Commissioner Bernthal which persuasively articulate the potential problems associated with Option #1 and Option

1. 2, and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat such com-ments here.

General Comments First, we would urge that any revision of the ex-isting ENO criteria address two problems reported in NUREG-0637 in applying the existing criteria to the TMI incident:

1. The need for defining the duration of the accident.

2. The need for defining 11 offsite 11

• Second, the phrasing of Option #3 should be modi-fied to make it explicit that the three alternative condi-tions apply only ( i) to the contamination of 11 offsi te" real and personal property or (ii) integrated doses received by 11 offsite 11 individuals as a result of the release of radioac-tive materials during the course of the incident.

Third, some provision for the quantification of 11 substantial damages II must be added to conditions (a), ( b) and (c) of Option #3 to meet the legislati ve mandate.

!I Counsel has advised us that such studies should be i den-tified in future rulemaking notices if the problems asso-ciated with Table s-3 of 10 CFR Part 51 are to be avoided.

Secretary of the Commission August 7, 1985 Page 3

1. Definition of the "Duration of the Accident."

NUREG- 0637 reports (pages 12-13) that the Staff Panel, for purposes of the ENO determination only, assumed the TMI incident to have terminated when the reactor was placed in a configuration for natural cooling and all dis-charges were within the dose levels and concentrations speci-fied in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 20. This postulation of limited accident duration was considered nec-essary to make a timely ENO determination as required by pub-lic interest considerations and was justified on technical grounds. We would add that a timely ENO determination is re-quired by law and practical considerations even though there may be a possibility of additional releases after the termi-nation of the accident.

In our view the criteria used by the Staff Panel to define the duration of the accident were proper and should be codified in the revision of the ENO criteria.

2. Definition of "Off-Site".

No definition of "off-site" is found in the ENO criteria or elsewhere in 10 CFR Part 140. The problems asso-ciated with this oversight are highlighted at pages 14 and 15 of NUREG-0637. It appears, though not explicitly stated, that the Staff Panel initially tried to utilize the defini-tion given in Section ll(j) of the Act, i.e., by using the definition of the II location II described in- the TMI indernni ty agreement. Unfortunately, the description of the "location" in the indernni ty agreement was vague and ambiguous. This lead the Staff Panel to consider several alternative defini-tions of "offsi te". In the end the Panel adopted the "most conservative" definition, i.e., "all areas, whether or not owned by the licensee, outside of the owner-controlled area enclosed by the permanent fence on Three Mile Island."

There is no justification for permitting such ambi-guities to persist in the revision of the ENO criteria. A definition of "offsite" that can be appl ied simply and objec-tively and without subjective judgments of "conservatism" should be incorporated either in the ENO criteria or else-where in 10 CFR Part 140.

Most, if not all, licenses include a description of the site or site boundaries by use of a map or by reference to a description in the license application. This descrip-

Secretary of the Commission Augus t 7, 1985 Page 4 ti on is provided in order to define the "restricted area" and "unrestricted areas" for purposes of limiting release,s from normal operation to levels permitted by Part 20. It seems appropriate, then, to define "offsite" in Part 140 in a con-sistent manner as being "all areas outside the boundaries of the site described in the applicable license or license application."

If for some reason it is considered that the Pa~t 140 definition of "offsite" must be the same as the statutory definition in Section ll(j) of the Act, then it is suggested a caveat or proviso be added to the regulatory definition, such as:

"provided, if the 'location' described in the applicable indemnity agreement is ambiguous, then, 'offsite' shall mean all areas outside the boundary of the 'site' described in the applicable license or license application."

Adoption of either of these alternative definitions would obviate the problems found after the TMI incident where the definition of "location" was ambiguous.

3. Phrasing in Conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Option #3.

The phrasing of conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Option #3 is such that they could be interpreted to apply to contamination of "onsi te" property and to integrated doses received "onsite". This result would be contrary to statuto-ry intent and presumably Commissioner Bernthal's intent as well. The potential for misinterpretation can be easily elim-inated by simply inserting the word "offsite" at the begin-ning of conditions (a) and (c) and after the word "received" in condition (b).

Further, conditions (a) and (c) are phrased in a manner that they would be triggered by the accumulated con-tamination of property from the material released as a result of a particular nuclear incident and prior contamination from sources independent of the facility involved, ~-9-, operation of a nearby waste storage or disposal facility. such a re-sult would also be contrary to the statutory intent and pre-

Secretary of the Commission August 7 , 1 985 Page 5 sumably Commissioner Bernthal's as well. This unintended resul t could be precluded by the addition of the underscored language to conditions (a) and (c) as indicated below:

11 (a) Offsi te real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination with radioactive materials released during event which would produce ... "

" ( c) Offsi te real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination with radioactive materials released dur-ing the event which would produce radiation emissions . . . "

4. Quantification of Substantial Damages or Injuries Option #3 is premised on the presumption that sub -

stantial damages or injuries will probably result from releases of radioactive materials offsite which meet the con-ditions speci fied in conditi ons (a), (b) or (c). Thus, Com-missioner Bernthal included in his addi ti onal comments the statement:

"2. For a wide variation of accidents of accident conditions, the postulated de-contamination threshold dose rate of 10 millirad/hr (0.10 milligray/hr) covers cases where costs of decontamination would be significant (i.e., at least a few million dollars)." - -

This statement can only be true, however, if the postulated decontamination threshold dose rate exists over some identifiable area of offsite property or if decontamina-tion costs are escalated because of the nature of the contam-inated property or the contamination itself.

Consequently, in order to meet the statutory re-quirements for ENO determinations, it is necessary to add to conditions (a) and (c) a conjunctive requirement that the decontamination threshold dose rate exists over some speci-fied area (certainly an area larger than 100 square meters) or the estimated decontamination costs exceed a specifi ed value. For example, for some remote sites an appropr i ate

Secretary of the Commission Augus t 7, 1985 P age 6 area specification might be that the decontami~tion thresh-old dose rate exists over two square miles. Such a requirement may not be appropriate for sites located in con-gested areas. Consequently, an alternate threshold stated in terms of estimated decontamination costs in excess of a spec-ified amount should also be included. We consider the addi-tion of the following clause to conditions (a) and (c) of Option #3 would be appropriate to accomplish the objective of making Option #3 compatible with statutory requirements.

11

, and such contamination exists over an area of square miles or any smaller area if the costs of decontamination are estimated to exceed $ _ __ _ _ _ 11

- In setting the threshold amount of estimated decon-tamination costs the Commission should be mindful that the Joint Committee report accompanying the 1966 amendments re-flects a Congressiona~/view that $5,000,000 would constitute "substantial damages"=-' and that one of the more cogent arguments for increasing the Price-Anderson limitation on liability is that inflation has eroded the protection afford-ed by the current limitation.

With respect to condition ( c) a similar problem exists -- if in fact no people were subject to exposures greater than the threshold dose levels, there could not be substantial injuries, and no presumption based upon measured exposures at a fencepost will save Option #3. As a minimum, some determination will have to bvade as to the number of people who were or might have been subject to the threshold exposure level from the postulated noble gas plume. In this y Approximately equivalent to the area of a 90° segment of a circle with a radius of 1.6 miles.

y U.S. Cong. & Adrnin. News 1966, page 3223.

Realistic assumptions should be used in this estimation; ridiculous assumptions, such as a child engaged in a 24-hour aerobic exercise on a site boundary fencepost should be pro-scribed.

Secretary of the Commission Augus t 7, 1985 Page 7 connecti on, we would concede that where protective action is requi red to preclude exposures to the threshold air dose, a determination that an ENO had occurred would be appropriate and that the fact of actual exposures should be left to the courts.

Accordingly, we suggest that consideration be given to adding the following clause (or something comparable) to condition (b).

11 and it is determined that -----e or more individuals residing or engaged in normal pursuits in areas where they might have received such air dose if no protective actions were taken."

In our view the threshold number of individuals should be not less than t e n.

In conclusion, Arizona Public service Company rec-ognizes the need to simplify the existing ENO criteria. In accomplishing such task, we prefer the adoption of the con-ceptual approach espoused by Commissioner Bernthal, because it relies upon quantifiable, objective tests. Nevertheless, we consider some modifications must be made to Option #3 so that its objectives can be achieved in legally sustainable manner.

If you have any questions regarding our comments we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

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80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101 / 201 430-8217 MAI LING ADDRESS/ P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 DOCKETED Robert L. Mittl General Manager USNRC Nuclear Assurance and Regulation

• as AUG 12 A10 :27 August 7, 1985 CFFI C~ o.: SE 1., ~t. Lt. ..

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BRANCH Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE We have reviewed the notice of proposed rulemaking which addresses the criteria for an "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" (ENO) and offer the following comments for your consideration.

Option 1 Comments 140.84 Paragraph (a) - Changing the phrase "could have been or might be exposed" to "has been or probably will be exposed" is a favorable modifica-tion because it reduces the subjectiveness in ascertaining an ENO.

Table 1 - The reduction of the whole body dose by 75 percent (from 20 rem to 5 rem) is meant to correspond to EPA recommendations.

However, the dose is now called a "com-mitted" dose which is derived from the sum of various potential sources, including food. Therefore, the 5 . rem may, in fact, be delivered over a period of years, which might not constitute a substantial expo-sure. A time requirement such as "5 rem in any one year" should be added

• The Energy People 95-4912 (4M) 7-83

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 2 8/7/85 140.85 Paragraph (a) - Changing the requirement of clinical evidence of injury to a dose of 100 rads is acceptable in that it eliminates the problems of radiosensitivity differences between individuals and false positives due to stress induced symptoms.

Option 2 Comments 140.84 Paragraph (a) - By adding the statement that the individual to be considered in calculating dosage is located on any site boundary for the duration of the accident, much smaller releases would be considered substantial a nd t he NRC 's d ec la r ati o n o f a n ENO woul d be based on an unlikely situation rather than on fact.

140.85 Paragraph (a) - This proposed addition also makes the determination more theoretical. A calculated collective population dose is not a definitive indicator of substantial damage. The dose is dependent on the site and the size of the population rather than the actual release and resulting damage.

Paragraph (b) - This proposal states that an individual has caused substantial damage if expensive real estate is contaminated after an event. Radioactive decay and ease of decontamination should be considered when using this approach. Very expensive property contaminated for a short time is not necessarily substantial damage.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 3 8/7/85 Option 3 Comments 140.84 Paragraph (a) - This proposal gives no guidance as to the type of property, size of property, and the length of time the property must be unfit for normal use. As currently stated, items of a trivial nature which become contaminated would meet the criterion.

Paragraph (b) - This proposal does not specify the location where the dose is received.

Also, it again relies on the hypothetical "could be received."

Paragraph (c) - A proposal such as this highlights an area in which licensees are vulnerable - radio-active waste shipments. This option, much like the present regulation, is very con-servative in the area of transportation accidents. There is a higher probability of triggering an ENO for a transportation accident than any other scenario.

However, even though the spread of contamination following an LSA radwaste shipment accident may meet these criteria, it would not necessarily be a substantial release with substantial damage relative to other criteria scenarios.

General Comments By separating small mishaps which are not overtly harmful to persons or property from large scale general population hazards, all interests could be better protected. For smaller releases, licensees would be protected by the legal system and the burden of proof. For large scale accidents, the plaintiff would be protected and assisted by the Price-Anderson Act through the waiver of certain defenses by the utility when a legitimate liability exists.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 4 8/7/85 In the area of radiation injury claims, an obstacle for the plaintiff has been in demonstrating a causal link. In considering when to remove the burden of proving negligence from the plaintiff, we must be aware that the National Institutes of Health has already developed Probability of Causation tables to almost completely eliminate the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating causal link. Therefore, in adopting more lenient criteria for determining an ENO, it is possible that an increase of litigation may occur in which the licensee has no defense. Following a release defined as substantial (according to the proposed rule), any individual who did receive or may have received a dose and develops a cancer within the next 20 years would be able to collect damages from the licensee even though neither causal link nor negligence has been proved. As this would be an unreasonable burden on the licensee, wording which prohibits both presumed negligence and presumed causation from being used concurrently ought to be added.

In conclusion, rather than make the criteria more general as suggested in Option 3, additional guidelines ought to be added which anticipate and address more of the problems which are likely to arise. Only then can such occurrences be handled efficiently and fairly.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rulemaking.

Very truly yours, IO 18 1/4

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LAW OFFICES OF BISHOP, LIBERMAN , COOK, PU RC ELL & REYNOLDS 1200 SEVENTEENTH ST R EET, N.W. IN NEW YORK WASHINGTON, D . C.20036 BISHOP, LIBERMAN & COOK (202) 857-9800 1155 AVEN UE 0* THE AMERI C AS NEW YO RK. NEW YORK 10036 TE L EX 4405 7 4 INTLAW UI (212) 70 4 -0100 TELEX 222 767 WR ITER'S DIRECT OI AL 00tKM.~

August 7, 1985 US C Mr. Samuel Chilk *as AUG -8 Pl2 :26 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission GFF, . I .. -L, Was h ington, o.c. 20555 OOC r E.TING &. Sb*

Attn! Docketing and Service Branch BRANCH

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Rule Amending 10 C.F.R.

140.84 and 140.85 re Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On April 9, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11

( NRC 11 ) published alternative proposed rules that would, if adopted, revise the criteria for determining whether an incident involving release of radiation or radioactive material is an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" ("ENO")

for purposes of the Price-Anderson Act. See 50 Fed. Reg.

13978 . The current criteria for an ENO are codified in 10 C.F.R. 140.84 and 140.85.

If an event is classified as an ENO, claimants under t h e Price-Anderson Act are relieved of the burden of proving negligence by the defendant and of overcoming such defenses as contributory negligence, governmental immunity, and certai n statutes of limitations . See 42 U.S.C. 2210.n ( l).

Th~ NRC is proposi ng changes to the ENO c~iteria as a result of perceived difficulties in applying the existing criteria after the accident at Three Mile Is land ( "TMI" ) (which was determined not to be an ENO). 50 Fed. Reg. at 13979-80.

The Commission published for public comment three options for revising the ENO regulations.

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On behalf of the nuclear utilities listed below, 1 we respectfully submit the following comments. In sum, the utilities do not endorse any one of the three options for ENO criteria proposed by the Commission. However, if the Commission believes some change to the ENO criteria is necessary (a proposition each of the utilities do not necessarily share), the Commission should adopt a new standard developed from the best features of Option 1 and Option 3.

1. General Comments As will be discussed below, the utilities have some concerns with each of the proposed options for the ENO criteria. The NRC should not alter the existing criteria absent a thorough consideration of these potential problems and all implications of any changes. The Commission proposes changing the ENO criteria due to perceived difficulties in applying the present criteria in the case of the TMI accident. However, the ENO criteria are intended to assure both that there has been a substantial release of radioactive material from its intended place of confinement and that non-trivial damages have resulted. Also, these standards must serve for a wide variety of circumstances.

Some difficulty in application of the damage standards should be expected in a case where there has been no significant release or contamination offsite. Indeed, although the damage standards may have been difficult to apply to the TMI facts, the Commission does not question the final result of their application in that case. The standards carry important implications and should not be altered based on an incomplete analysis, or based upon the facts of only one event.

A determination by the NRC that a nuclear incident constitutes an ENO triggers the waiver of defenses provisions of the Price-Anderson Act. The legislative history is clear that Congress, in amending the Atomic Energy Act to incorporate the ENO concept, wished to establish a threshold to prevent the waiver of defenses provision from applying in cases "where nothing untoward or unusual has occurred in the conduct of nuclear activities."

1/ Boston Edison Co., Carolina Power & Light Co.,

Commonwealth Edison Co., Florida Power Corp., Middle South Services Inc., Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Southern California Edison Co.,

Virginia Electric & Power Co.

S. Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3201, 3211. The committee wrote:

[T]he committee is of the op1n1on, on balance, that there is no pressing need to invoke the mechanisms and procedures of the special waivers in situations which are not exceptional and which can well be taken care of by the traditional system of tort law. Accordingly, in the absence of some extraordinary occurrence involving a nuclear facility or device or nuclear materials, traditional concepts should be allowed to prevail. For this reason, and for the additional purpose of helping to assure that the waiver system will not be invoked in case of nuisance suits, the committee believes that a reasonable threshold should be satisfied before the special waiver provisions of the bill become operative. In reaching this determination, the committee is also mindful that the special waivers authorized by this bill would deprive a defendant of certain defenses which might well be available to him even in a jurisdiction which would apply the doctrine of strict liability to a minor nuclear incident.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, the committee recognized the complexity of the task of defining an ENO:

This threshold is identified by the term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." After considerable study, it was determined advisable to vest the [Atomic Energy Commission]

with authority to determine whether an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" has taken place, rather than to define such an occurrence in the bill. This decision rested in large measure on the difficulty of fixing a definition which would be suitable

for a wide variety of circumstances, and the need for application of informed judgment to the facts of a particular case.

Id. at 3211-12 (emphasis supplied).

In sum, the ENO regulation must satisfy two Congressional objectives. The regulation must establish release levels-and damage criteria which, first, create a clear threshold to be overcome, and, second, which apply meaningfully to a variety of potential accident scenarios.

For example, the criteria should not establish release or damage levels intended for commercial power reactors but which would not establish a proper threshold for transportation accidents or incidents at small research reactors. In all contexts, the nuclear occurrence must inde,ed be "extraordinary". Any amended criteria should be fully evaluated before they are promulgated in order to assure that the statutory objectives are met. Simply stated, perceived difficulties in applying the existing regulation at TMI do not justify adoption of anything less than a fully developed amendment.

2. Comments on Option 1 The Atomic Energy Act establishes that a nuclear incident constitutes an ENO if there is a "substantial release" of radiation or radioactive material offsite and the releases result in, or probably will result in, "substantial damages" to persons or property offsite. See 42 u.s.c. S2014.j. The statutory scheme is thus a two-part test, in which both tests must be met. The Commission has implemented the statute in its regulations by establishing two separate criteria. Criterion I defines a "substantial release" and is set out in 10 C.F.R. S 140.84. Criterion II defines "substantial damages" (either to persons or to property) and is se*t out in 10 C.F.R. S 140.85. For the sake of simplicity in these comments, reference will generally be made to the criterion designation rather than to the regulation citation.

Option 1 is the Commission majority's proposal for revising the two ENO criteria. Under Option 1, Criterion I would be met if:

"[O]ne or more of the persons offsite has been or probably will be exposed to doses in excess" of specified doses to the whole body or in excess

of corresponding specific doses to specific organs; or specified levels of surface contamTnation have occurred.

See 50 Fed. Reg. 13978, 13984. The utilities have three basic comments on Option 1, Criterion I.

First, Option 1 would lower the specified whole body dose from a present 20 rems to 5 rems, and would similarly lower the organ doses. The Commission proposes this change in order to make the doses consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency's current Protective Action Guidelines.

The utilities believe, however, that the need for a change from the current dose levels has not been shown. The Commission cites to no difficulties in applying the current standards to TMI and does not dispute the outcome of the TMI determination with respect to Criterion 1. In addition, the Protective Action Guidelines are not necessarily appropriate in the context of the ENO determination. The protective Action Guidelines are driven by prudency, and are well below levels that would represent even the low end of a "some damage" range. As such, they are not pertinent to the issue of distinguishing "extraordinary" accidents from off-normal but non-accident conditions. As proposed, Option 1 would establish dose levels for Criterion I which would be, as the Commission recognizes (50 Fed. R~g. at 13980, col. 2), in the range of permissable occupational doses. The e doses are too low to constitute "substantial releases." 2 For example, this proposed test is especially low for a transportation accident scenario in which a few emergency workers receive once-in-a-lifetime doses equivalent to doses long deemed permissable annually for nuclear employees.

In addition, the proposed Option 1 dose levels are not time-dependent. The utilities believe that any radiation dose levels used as a measure of radiation release should include an appropriate time interval, such as integration over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. 3 Without such a time dependancy, the Option l standard does not assure that there has been a release of radiation or radioactive material substantially in excess of normal operating limits for commercial reactors and therefore does not serve the Congressional purpose of creating a threshold to be met prior to triggering a waiver of defenses.

2/ Compare 10 C.F.R. § 100.11; 10 C.F.R. § 20.403.

3 Compare Option 3 which is properly time-limited.

Finally, a release in the range of the Protective Action Guidelines does not necessarily create a potential that there will be "substantial damages" offsite. As stated by the Commission in its Statement of Considerations for the current ENO criteria:

[T]he first part of the test is designed so that the Commission can assure itself that something exceptional has occurred; that something untoward and unexpected has in fact taken place and that this event is of sufficient significance to raise the possibility that some damage to persons or property offsite has resulted or may result.

33 Fed. Reg. 6978, 6979 at col. 1 (1968) (emphasis added).

Option 1 would not create a high enough Criterion I threshold to warrant going on to Criterion II, which may (as the TM! experience demonstrated) require the exercise of judgment as to the validity and value of claims.

Second, Option 1 would replace the words," . . . one or more persons offsite were, could have been, or might be exposed * * . ," in the current Criterion I, with the words,

" . *

• one or more persons offsite were or will probably be exposed * * . . " The utilities support this aspect of Option

1. The Commission correctly states that this proposal removes the speculative "might have been" condition of the present rule. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13980, col. 2. In addition, by this change, the ENO determination will not include consideration of hypothetical unclothed, unsheltered persons shackled to the site boundary, and will not invite speculation as to how persons offsite who wire not exposed could have been or might have been exposed. This will simplify the Criterion I determination and will make the criterion more consistent with the statutory language.

Finally, Option 1 would preserve the existing Criterion I surface contamination levels and does not amend 10 C.F.R. S 140.84(b). This aspect of the proposal is appropriate. See 50 Fed. Reg. at 13980, col. 2-3.

4/ Compare Option 2 which appears to include consideration of hypothetical people in determining whether substantial releases have occurred.

-7 Under Option 1, Criterion II (substantial injuries/damages) would be met if:

1. "Five or more people have received a radiation dose . * .

to the whole body or any organ" in excess of 100 rads; or

2. "Offsite property having a value of $2,500,000 is contaminated with radioactive material" in excess of specified levels; or

3. "Employment loss of at least 25,000 person-days has occurred"; or

4. "Evacuation of at least 100,000 person days has occurred as a result of an evacuation ordered by a State or local official with the authority to make such an order."

50 Fed. Reg. at 13984. The Commission has explained that its reason for adopting this four-part criterion would be that, based upon its TMI experience, the Commission no longer believes that it is practical or necessary to base its determination regarding substantial injuries or damages upon objective clinical evidence of radiation injury or upon different amounts of monetary damages to different numbers of people. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13980-81.

The utilities do not dispute the Commission's objectives. Objective clinical evidence of radiation injury can often be inconclusive. As the Commission points out, some physical symptoms of radiation injury are the same as those associated with psychological stress. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13979, col. 3. As is borne out by the Statement of Considerations for the current rule, the ENO determination was never intended to include consideration of "psychological effect [associated not with injury but stemming from apprehension of injury] or injuries not due to exposure to hazardous properties of nuclear material." 33 Fed. Reg. 6978, 6980 at col. 3. Moreover, monetary damages Incurred by real (as opposed to hypothetical) individuals admittedly will be difficult to timely assess. Adjudication or investigation may often be required before the value of a claim is established. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13979-80. However,

despite its objectives, the Option 1 alternative to the current rule is not without its own problems.

The first two damages standards pose no major conceptual problems, but need minor adjustments. First, Criterion II(l), relating to human injury, should be limited to individuals offsite. The focus of the statute is that substantial injuries occur offsite prior to triggering waiver of defenses in private legal actions. See 42. u.s.c.

2014.j. This clarification should be added to the proposed standard. Second, Criterion 11(2), relating to property damages, provides no guidance as to how property values will be determined or what standard will be used. This is an issue courts often are confronted with in assessing compensation for governmental exercises of eminent domain.

Commission guidance should be provided in this regard.

Moreover, no justification is provided for the reduction in the damage level from the current $5,000,000 to $2,500,000.

The third and fourth damages standards are extremely problematic and should not be adopted. Criterion II(3) and Criterion 11(4) would utilize employment loss and evacuation as standards for substantial damages. However, absenteeism and evacuations are (a) functions of one another and (b) not matters within the control of the licensee or the NRC. An evacuation may be unnecessarily ordered by the State or local authorities or may be spontaneously and unnecessarily undertaken by residents not ordered to evacuate. Criteria II(3) and II(4) could require declaration of an ENO in the case of a protective evacuation urged by a local opinion leader where no major release occurred. For example, in a case where an emergency worker responding to a transportation accident receives a dose comparable to that long recognized as an appropriate annual permissable dose for radiation workers, the dose would satisfy the unduly low release levels proposed for Criterion I under Option l; the unnecessary evacuation or the consequential absenteeism would satisfy proposed Criterion II. Such a result is unwarranted. Similarly, Criterion II(4) could potentially be met where many times more people evacuate than are ordered to do so by the duly constituted authorities.

Consequently, we cannot recommend use of employment loss or evacuations as measures of damages. At a minimum, any standard incorporating such measures should include strict definitions as to the types of evacuations contemplated (these should not include evacuations where no major releases occurred) and as to the evacuees who will be counted (these should not include spontaneous evacuees).

3. Comments on Option 2 Option 2 is Commissioner Asselstine 1 s proposal. In many ways it is similar to Option 1, and in those cases the above comments apply. However, Option 2 makes two changes to Option 1 which merit specific comment.

First, in Criterion I, the whole body doses, corresponding doses to specific organs, and the specified suface contamination levels from Option 1 would be adopted. 5 However, the criterion would be met if doses in excess of the specified levels "were or could have been received by a person or persons located on or near any site boundary throughout the duration of the accident. 11 50 Fed. Reg. at 13985, col. 1. This language replaces the Option 1 language that "[o]ne or more persons offsite were or probably will be exposed to doses 11 in excess of the specified amounts. Thus, Option 2 (as does the present Criterion I) improperly deals with hypothetical people, unnecessarily complicating the ENO determination.

Furthermore, because the only time limitation on Option 2, Criterion I is the 11 duration of the accident, 11 the standard is not properly time-limited. In carrying out an ENO determination, establishing the duration of the accident could be extremely difficult and imprecise. Compare "Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the Staff Panel on the Commission's Determination of an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO) , 11 NUREG-0637, at 12-13 (1980). Moreover, consideration of total releases throughout the accident (which may be defined to last for many days) does not assure that release rates have, on average, been substantially in excess of normal operating conditions for a power reactor.

Second, under Option 2, proposed Criterion II(l) from Option 1 (substantial human injury) would be replaced by a standard that 11 a calculated dose of 100,000 person rem has been delivered within a 50-mile radius during the course of the accident. 11 50 Fed. Reg. at 13985, col. 1. This change has the same objective as Option 1, i.e., it is intended to move away from the requirement in the existing standard for objective clinical evidence of radiation injury suffered by a few exposed individuals. However, the utilities oppose the particular approach proposed in Option 2 to meet this otherwise accep~able objective. Option 2 1 s approach of aggregating the collective dose to the population in the 50 1/ As discussed above, the Option 1 dose levels are unduly low and not properly time-dependent.

mile ingestion pathway planning zone, id. at 13981, col. 1, does not fit the circumstances of all reactor sites equally well. For example, in a densely populated area, this test could be met where average doses, without credit for shielding, never exceed a fraction of a rem. Making the person-rem exposure high enough to solve this problem might not be appropriate for remote sites.

4. Comments on Option 3 Option 3 is Commissioner Bernthal's proposal and represents an approach to the ENO criteria that differs from both the existing criteria and the first two proposed Options. Under Option 3, there would not be separate criteria for substantial releases and for substantial damages. Under the Option 3 single standard, a nuclear incident would constitute an ENO if:

"[T]here has been a substantial release of radioactive material offsite, or * *

• there have been substantial levels of radiation offsite such that substantial injuries or damages have resulted or will probably result when the radioactive material is released from its intended place of confinement and, as a result of the event,.

any of the following conditions is satisfied:"

a) Real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination" at an exposure rate of 10 millirads per hour; or b) The "integrated air dose which could be received by an individual, over any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period," exceeds 10 rads; or c) "Real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination for each square meter of any 100 square meters" in excess of specified levels.

50 Fed. Reg. at 13985, col. 2. Thus, under Option 3, specification of actual injuries or damages is not required.

The intent of the proposal is to determine that substantial releases have occurred such that substantial damage will consequently probably occur. Id. at 13981, col. 2-3.

At the outset, the utilities acknowledge that this proposal on the surface has many features to recommend it.

For example, the proposed dose levels in standards (a) and (b) are properly time-dependent. In addition, there is a superficial attractiveness to totally eliminating the injuries/damages determination, in that the ENO standard would undoubtably be simpler to implement. However, it is in precisely this latter respect that Option 3 is inappropriate. The ENO threshold was intended to be a two-part test, where both tests must be met prior to applying the waiver of defenses. Option 3 does not carry out the sound statutory requirement for both a substantial release and non-trivial consequences.

The Act defines an ENO to require a finding that substantial releases have occurred and that the releases have "resulted or probably will result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite." 42 u.s.c.

2014.j. By inclusion of the words "probably will," the Act implicitly recognizes that not all damages or injuries resulting from the release will be manifest contemporaneously with the release. However, Option 3 stretches the statutory words "probably will" even farther.

Option 3 assumes that if substantial releases have occurred, substantial damages will probably occur. This assumption is inappropriate. The Act contemplates a Commission determination, based upon the facts of each case, that there is a basis for the finding that the releases "will probably" result in substantial damages or injuries. Otherwise, the criteria would be overly generalized. For example, the Option 3 presumption of damages ought not apply to contamination of an unpopulated area which is readily cleaned up at minimal cost. Under Option 3, waivers of defenses would in such a case be triggered for persons 50 miles away. In sum, even if releases meeting Criterion I may have occurred, waivers ought not be invoked where there are only minor immediate consequences and with no potential long-term consequences. Under the intent of the Act, such an event should not be an ENO.

Similarly, standards (a) and (c) of Option 3 may be unduly low for certain scenarios such as a transportation accident having very localized effects. The elimination of the separate damages/injuries determination would result in

an inappropriate ENO finding applicable to persons and property at great distances. 6 Therefore, if the Commission were to adopt the Option 3 standard for substantial releases, it should be merged with a separate test for substantial injuries or damages in order to assure a proper determination in the full variety of factual circumstances.

Finally, the preamble to Option 3 appears to be unnecessarily confusing and perhaps unnecessary. The phrase, "when radioactive material is released from its intended place of confinement," appears to be a drafting error. If not, it would qualify potential releases under the ENO criteria. Such a result would contradict the statute which requires that there be an actual, substantial release of radiation or radioactive material for an event to be classified as an ENO. In addition, the preamble repeats the statutory language with respect to damages (" * *

• there have been substantial levels of radiation offsite such that substantial injuries or damages have resulted or probably will result * * * "). The preamble could therefore be interpreted to create a separate test for substantial damages apart from the three itemized substantial release standards. While such a result might be appropriate, it may have been unintended and it would in any event be better practice to include all intended tests in proposed criteria rather than the preamble.

5. Conclusion None of the three options proposed should be adopted by the Commission in its present form. A modified Option 1, which includes some of the features of the Option 3 release standard, and which incorporates the above comments on the proposed injuries/damages criterion, would be the most acceptable approach. The utilities recommend that the Commission consider this issue carefully and publish a revised proposal (making the minimum changes in the present criteria) for further public comment.

~/ The Commission states that standard (a) was intended to apply primarily to accidents at commercial power reactors. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13981, col. 3. At a minimum, this standard should be explicitly limited to such scenarios.

We greatly appreciate this opportunity to provide comments on this issue.

Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585 AUG 7 19~

Secretary of the Commission DOC:KET EO USNRC Attn: Docketing and Service Branch u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 -SS AUG-8 P12 :25

Dear Sir:

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Reference:

Proposed Rule, 10 CFR Part 140, "Criteria for an *c:~ *... ~~*-

Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence," Federal Register, Vol. 50, No. 68, Pgs. 13978-13985, April 9, 1985 The proposed 11 Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO)," published in the Federal Register, April 9, 1985, has been reviewed extensively by the Department of Energy Headquarters, field offices and contractor staffs.

One of the positive steps taken by the Commission in recent years has been to insist on a sound technical basis and technical community reviews before acting on requests for changes to rules.

Unfortunately, we feel that the technical underpinning for this particular rule has not been adequately developed or scrutinized.

The benefits derived from a uniform set of ENO guidelines for NRC and DOE have both a technical and public perception base. In this context, we are concerned with the application of low dose limits derived from the projections of future risk. We believe that the proposed criteria should be focusing on immediate observable effects. Unfortunately none of the options, as proposed, fulfill the intent for which the ENO was established.

Accordingly, for reasons stated in the enclosed comments, we cannot agree with the options as proposed. However, we do agree that the current criteria for the declaration of an ENO should be reviewed. On this basis, we recommend that a committee

~cknowt*d by card .*.*

l,J S, NU CLEAR REGULATORY C ',1MISSION DO CK - I ' ~ & * '. E f ' :-.JCt-i o,

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2 be established comprised of selected NRC and DOE technical staff to address whether a revision to the ENO criteria is warranted, and if so, to develop criteria that are technically sound and acceptable to both agencies. This committee should address specifically the problems encountered in the past that neces-sitate a change to the ENO criteria, and how a proposed solution will avoid these problems in the future.

Ji\erely, 4j.d_;:m ~- Va ug;an Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety, a Enclosure cc w/encl:

Chairman Palladino, NRC Commissioner Roberts, NRC Commissioner Asselstine, NRC Commissioner Bernthal, NRC Commissioner Zech, NRC William J. Dircks, Exec. Dir.

for Operations, NRC

bee: ES&H Safety Directors William F. Savage, NE-1 3

c. Edward Kay, RW-3 J. w. Thiessen, ER-71 Neal Goldenberg, NE-74 Jonathan Kiell, NE-60 John R. Longenecker, NE-30 A. Bryan Siebert, DP-6 Susan K. Kuznick, GC-31

1 Department of Energy Comments Proposed Rule, 10 CFR Part 140, "Criteria for an

• Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence," Federal Register, Vol. 50, No. 68, Pgs. 13978-13985, April 9, 1985 The most significant finding -in the Department of Energy's (DOE) review is that NRC fails to present a valid technical justification or rationale for changing current criteria and that the proposed changes fail to accomplish the stated objective, namely, to simplify these criteria to avoid problems such as those encountered at Three Mile Island (TMI).

For example, no valid reason, is given for the reduction of numerical criterion from 20 rem to 5 rem. It is far from clear how a factor of four lower in the numerical threshold for exposure used to declare an ENO would have simplified the matters at TMI. Rather, for a range of accident scenarios with offsite radiological conditions significantly more severe than TMI, such a reduction in criteria would accomplish nothin g more than to build defense s against a broader range o f claims that .would be related to trivial risks of radiation injury.

It is the DOE's position that criteria for an ENO must be consistent with the definition in the Atomic Energy Act that specifies an event that results in substantial damages to persons or property offsite. Such criteria must be maintained as a definitive set of guidelines expressed in terms of:

(1) offsite radiation exposure that approaches the threshold of observable injuries, (2) offsite contamination levels sufficient to render real and personal property unfit for its intended use, (3) objective clinical evidence of physical injury relatable to acute radiation exposure, and (4) property damage denoting a large dollar loss. The Department strongly opposes ENO criteria related to increased risk of delayed effects or to other issues such as public opinion, decisions of public officials related to evacuation, and actions of workers related to loss of employment. Certainly, the introduction of a criterion specified in terms of person-rem that is related to risk and not injury, is not a simplification. Additionally, the Atomic Energy Act criteria defines an ENO in terms of nuclear or radiological events, not in terms of administrative actions taken as a result of concerns over potential events. The proposed changes represent a significant deviation from the current definition and would seem to complicate, rather than simplify the process. Further, the proposed changes may in fact not be in accordance with the original intent of the regulations.

The benefits of a uniform set of ENO guidelines for use by NRC and DOE are obvious. However, DOE would have difficulty in changing its criteria such that incidents having little or no adverse impact on health can be classified as an ENO. For

r 2

example, to develop criteria which considers an impact that is based only on BEIR III statistics and is not measurable in the population for 10 to 30 years, if at all, is inconsistent with the intent and objective of the end which deals with immediate effects. In our view, the criteria for discharge and for damage must be roughly equivalent. The health impact that would be associated with a whole body equivalent dose of 5 rem does not remotely equate to substantial damage to persons.

This* is a level of exposure considered to be quite safe for occupational workers by national/international authorities and clearly a level of exposure where no clinical manifestations would be observed. Much higher exposures would be required if evidence of substantial injury is to be - monitored in the context of an ENO.

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• PH OENI X, ARI Z ONA 85036 August 6, 1985 DOCKETED USNRC AUG -8 P12 :22 Secretary of the Commission

u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. c. 20555 Re: Request for Public Comments on Proposed Change to 10 CFR Part 140; Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence Gentlemen:

The Federal Register of April 9, 1985, published a notice of proposed rulemaking ("Notice") by the u. s. Nuclear Regulatory commission ("NRC") which advised that NRC was con-sidering a revision of its regulations, 10 CFR §§140.84 and 140.85, establishing criteria for use in determining whether any specific nuclear incident that may occur is or is not an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" ("ENO"). The establish-ment of such criteria was required by the 1966 amendments of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("Act") which, among other things, require persons held liable for an ENO to waive cer-tain defenses against claims covered by either the financial protection or government indemnity provided pursuant to Sec-tion 170 of the Act.

The Notice states that consideration is being given to the revision of the existing ENO criteria to simplify their administration and to avoid three of several problems encountered in their application to the Three Mile Island

(

11 TMI 11 ) nuclear incident as reported in NUREG-0637-"Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the Staff Panel on the Commission's Determination of an Extraordinary Nuclear Occur-rence (ENO)", December, 1979. No explanation is given in the Notice why only three of the problems identified in NUREG-0637 are addressed in the revisions of the criteria under consideration.

The Notice requests comments on three different options for revision of the existing ENO criteria. Options

1. 1 and #2 would retain the framework of the existing criteria and require two distinct determinations be made as to ( 1)

"substantial releases" and (2) "substantial damages". Option

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Secretary of the commission August 7, 1985 Page 2

1. 3 would require only a single determination that releases of radioactive material during an accident resulted in specified property decontamination threshold dose levels or threshold integrated air dose to individuals. In such cases the proba-ble occurrence of substantial damages or substantial injuries would bvresumed on the basis of unidentified correlation studies.

The following comments of Arizona Public Service Company are limited solely to Option #3 which in concept would provide quantifiable, objective criteria for determin-ing whether or not an ENO has taken place. In our view Op-tion #3, with certain modifications that would retain the quantifiable, objective criteria, is preferable to either Option #1 or Option #2. We concur with the additional com-ments of Commissioner Bernthal which persuasively articulate the potential problems associated with Option #1 and Option

1. 2, and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat such com-ments here.

General Comments First, we would urge that any revision of the ex-isting ENO criteria address two problems reported in NUREG-0637 in applying the existing criteria to the TMI incident:

1. The need for defining the duration of the accident.

2. The need for defining 11 offsite 11

• Second, the phrasing of Option #3 should be modi-fied to make it explicit that the three alternative condi-tions apply only ( i) to the contamination of 11 offsi te" real and personal property or (ii) integrated doses received by 11 offsite 11 individuals as a result of the release of radioac-tive materials during the course of the incident.

Third, some provision for the quantification of "substantial damages" must be added to conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Option #3 to meet the legislative mandate.

!/ Counsel has advised us that such studies should be iden-tified in future rulemaking notices if the problems asso-ciated with Table S-3 of 10 CFR Part 51 are to be avoided.

Secretary of the Commission August 7, 1985 Page 3

1. Definition of the "Duration of the Accident."

NUREG-0637 reports (pages 12-13) that the Staff Panel, for purposes of the ENO determination only, assumed the TMI incident to have terminated when the reactor was placed in a configuration for natural cooling and all dis-charges were within the dose levels and concentrations speci-fied in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 20. This postulation of limited accident duration was considered nec-essary to make a timely ENO determination as required by pub-lic interest considerations and was justified on technical grounds. We would add that a timely ENO determination is re-quired by law and practical considerations even though there may be a possibility of additional releases after the termi-nation of the accident.

In our view the criteria used by the Staff Panel to define the duration of the accident were proper and should be codified in the revision of the ENO criteria.

2. Definition of "Off-Site".

No definition of "off-site" is found in the ENO criteria or elsewhere in 10 CFR Part 140. The problems asso-ciated with this oversight are highlighted at pages 14 and 15 of NUREG-0637. It appears, though not explicitly stated, that the Staff Panel initially tried to utilize the defini-tion given in Section ll(j) of the Act, i.e., by using the definition of the II location II described in the TMI indemnity agreement. Unfortunately, the description of the "location" in the indemnity agreement was vague and ambiguous. This lead the Staff Panel to consider several alternative defini-tions of "offsi te". In the end the Panel adopted the "most conservative II definition, i.e. , 11 all areas, whether or not owned by the licensee, outside of the owner-controlled area enclosed by the permanent fence on Three Mile Island."

There is no justification for permitting such ambi-guities to persist in the revision of the ENO criteria. A definition of 11 offsite 11 that can be applied simply and objec-tively and without subjective judgments of "conservatism" should be incorporated either in the ENO criteria or else-where in 10 CFR Part 140.

Most, if not all, licenses include a description of the site or site boundaries by use of a map or by reference to a description in the license application. This descrip-

Secretary of the Commission Augu s t 7, 1985 Page 4 tion is provided in order to define the "restricted area" and "unrestricted areas" for purposes of limiting releases from normal operation to levels permitted by Part 20. It seems appropriate, then, to define 11 offsite 11 in Part 140 in a con-sistent manner as being "all areas outside the boundaries of the site described in the applicable license or license application."

If for some reason it is considered that the Part 140 definition of 11 offsite 11 must be the same as the statutory definition in Section ll(j) of the Act, then it is suggested a caveat or proviso be added to the regulatory definition, such as:

"provided, if the 'location' described in the applicable indemnity agreement is ambiguous, then, 'offsite' shall mean all areas outside the boundary of the 'site' described in the applicable license or license application."

Adoption of either of these alternative definitions would obviate the problems found after the TMI incident where the definition of 11 location 11 was ambiguous.

3. Phrasing in Conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Option #3.

The phrasing of conditions (a), (b) and ( c) of Option #3 is such that they could be interpreted to apply to contamination of 11 onsi te 11 property and to integrated doses received 11 onsite 11

• This result would be contrary to statuto-ry intent and presumably Commissioner Bernthal's intent as well. The potential for misinterpretation can be easily elim-inated by simply inserting the word 11 offsite 11 at the begin-ning of conditions (a) and (c) and after the word "received" in condition (b).

Further, conditions (a) and (c) are phrased in a manner that they would be triggered by the accumulated con-tamination of property from the material released as a result of a particular nuclear incident and prior contamination from sources independent of the facility involved, ~-9-, operation of a nearby waste storage or disposal facility. Such a re-sult would also be contrary to the statutory intent and pre-

Secretary of the Commission August 7, 1985 Page 5 sumably Commissioner Bernthal's as well. This unintended result could be precluded by the addition of the underscored language to conditions (a) and (c) as indicated below:

u(a) Offsite real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination with radioactive materials released during event which would produce .*. "

11

( c) Offsi te real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination with radioactive materials released dur-ing the event which would produce radiation emissions . . . 11

4. Quantification of Substantial Damages or Injuries Option #3 is premised on the presumption that sub-stantial damages or injuries will probably result from releases of radioactive materials offsite which meet the con-ditions specified in conditions (a), (b) or (c). Thus, Com-missioner Bernthal included in his additional comments the statement:

11

2. For a wide variation of accidents of accident conditions, the postulated de-contamination threshold dose rate of 10 millirad/hr (0.10 milligrayjhr) covers cases where costs of decontamination would be significant (i.e., at least a few million dollars)." - -

This statement can only be true, however, if the postulated decontamination threshold dose rate exists over some identifiable area of offsite property or if decontamina-tion costs are escalated because of the nature of the contam-inated property or the contamination itself.

Consequently, in order to meet the statutory re-quirements for ENO determinations, it is necessary to add to conditions (a) and (c) a conjunctive requirement that the decontamination threshold dose rate exists over some speci-fied area (certainly an area larger than 100 square meters) or the estimated decontamination costs exceed a specified value. For example, for some remote sites an appropriate

Secretary of the Commission August 7, 1985 Page 6 area specification might be that the decontami~tion thresh-old dose rate exists over two square miles. Such a requirement may not be appropriate for sites located in con-gested areas. Consequently, an alternate threshold stated in terms of estimated decontamination costs in excess of a spec-ified amount should also be included. We consider the addi-tion of the following clause to conditions (a) and (c) of Option #3 would be appropriate to accomplish the objective of making Option #3 compatible with statutory requirements.

11

, and such contamination exists over an area of square miles or any smaller area if the costs of decontamination are estimated to exceed $______ 11 In setting the threshold amount of estimated decon-tamination costs the Commission should be mindful that the Joint Committee report accompanying the 1966 amendments re-flects a Congressionayview that $5,000,000 would constitute 11 substantial damages II and that one of the more cogent arguments for increasing the Price-Anderson limitation on liability is that inflation has eroded the protection afford-ed by the current limitation.

With respect to condition (c) a similar problem exists -- if in fact no people were subject to exposures greater than the threshold dose levels, there could not be substantial injuries, and no presumption based upon measured exposures at a fencepost will save Option #3. As a minimum, some determination will have to b\;nade as to the number of people who were or might have been- subject to the threshold exposure level from the postulated noble gas plume. In this y Approximately equivalent to the area of a 90° segment of a circle with a radius of 1.6 miles.

U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 1966, page 3223.

Y Realistic assumptions should be used in this estimation; ridiculous assumptions, such as a child engaged in a 24-hour aerobic exercise on a site boundary fencepost should be pro-scribed.

Secretary of the Commission August 7, 1985 Page 7 connection, we would concede that where protective action is required to preclude exposures to the threshold air dose, a determination that an ENO had occurred would be appropriate and that the fact of actual exposures should be left to the courts.

Accordingly, we suggest that consideration be given to adding the following clause (or something comparable) to condition (b).

"and it is determined that _____, or more individuals residing or engaged in normal pursuits in areas where they might have received such air dose if no protective actions were taken."

In our view the threshold number of individuals should be not less than ten.

In conclusion, Arizona Public Service Company rec-ognizes the need to simplify the existing ENO criteria. In accomplishing such task, we prefer the adoption of the con-ceptual approach espoused by Commissioner Bernthal, because i t relies upon quantifiable, objective tests. Nevertheless, we consider some modifications must be made to Option #3 so that its objectives can be achieved in legally sustainable manner.

If you have any questions regarding our comments we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very t r ,ull yo~ ,

~ .~ .VQt.A__~~~

Executive Vice President -

YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY Telephone (61 7) 8 72-8100 TWX 710-380-7619 1671 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts 01 WtKETEO USNRC August 2, 1985 FYC 85-11 GI.A 85-78 '85 AUG - 8 P12 :20 OFF 1*J_ 1 ,. ~E.(.,,~ .In OOChl 11,,n_; '-"' Scf<Vlt Secretary of the Commission BRANCH United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (ij)

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments Pertaining to the Proposed Rule on Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (50 FR 13978)

Dear Sir:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Rule on Criteria for an ENO. Yankee Atomic Electric Company owns and operates a nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts. Our Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services for other nuclear power plants in the Northeast including Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee and Seabrook.

First and foremost, Yankee Atomic does not believe that the Proposed Rule is timely. Congress is actively considering several amendments to the Price-Anderson provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Such considerations will necessarily include examination of the mechanism which provides recovery for persons who might be injured in a nuclear accident, and thus, the triggering of ENO criteria. Congress could well determine that a new statutory criterion is warranted. Unless Congress does amend the statutory definition of an ENO, any amendment to Price-Anderson will be based upon the Congressional assumption that the ENO criteria remains unchanged. In order to avoid any conflict with the ongoing Congressional debate, we suggest that the Commission defer to the Congress, and postpone consideration of the ENO criteria until final action on the Price-Anderson amendments. If the Commission believes that ENO rulemaking is still warranted at that time, it could proceed with enlightened knowledge as to the extent of liability that such an ENO determination will trigger.

Secondly, Yankee Atomic does not believe that difficulty in applying ' the existing criteria to the accident at the Three Mile Island plant provides sufficient justification to revise the criteria for an ENO. No matter what the criteria become, parties could always be found who contend that any nuclear event should be deemed "extraordinary". The difficulty experienced in the Three Mile Island context arose not from the regulatory criteria, but simply because the accident was not serious enough to meet the statutory requirements of substantial off-site release and substantial off-site damages. No change in regulatory criteria can relieve the Commission of the obligation to determine whether both the off-site release and off-site damages were substantial, even if such determination proves difficult on occasion.

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 2, 1985 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Page 2 For these reasons, Yankee Atomic urges the Commission to leave the existing ENO criteria intact , at least pending related Congressional action.

In so urging, we wish to point out that even when a nuclear accident does not meet the ENO threshold, traditional legal principles provide an adequate and effective remedy to any injured person, as demonstrated in the case of the Three Mile Island accident.

We have prepared several comments relating to more specific aspects of the Proposed Rule, and present these in the attachment to this letter.

v-;;;;~

D. W. Edwards Director of Industry Affairs

- MJH/dps Attachment

.,.. I

ATTACHMENT to FYC-85-11 Additional Comments of Yankee Atomic Electric Company on the Proposed Rule on Criteria for an ENO I. Use of EPA and FDA Protective Action Guides The Counnission proposes that the ENO criterion which establishes a substantial off-site release be equated with Protective Action Guides both proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency and issued by the Food and Drug Administration. Yankee Atomic has reviewed the subject Action Guides and believes that such use is improper.

First of all, the Action Guides are prospective, whereas an ENO determination must be retrospective. The Action Guides are intended to project what may happen in the future based upon minimal available data during the early stages of a nuclear accident. On the other hand, the determination that an ENO has taken place removes several defenses from the path of a person who is seeking judicial relief for the damages which he has incurred. Because the injured person must still prove both the personal injury and monetary loss, even when an accident is declared to be an ENO (see 50 FR 13978, at Column 3), such declaration can be of no use to him until after the accident. The need to make immediate decisions while a situation is unfolding, which forms the basis of the Protective Action Guides, is simply not present with an ENO determination.

Secondly, and closely related to the prospective nature of the guides, is that they are intentionally conservative. The Protective Action Guides seek to avoid potential harm associated with possible doses which may result from highly uncertain estimates of plant conditions or even with regard to the type of incident that has occurred. Since there would be little such uncertainty after the accident, the inherent conservatism of the guides is not appropriate in the ENO setting.

Thirdly, the Protective Action Guides are drawn to a much lower threshold than the "substantial" standard imposed in the statutory definition of an ENO. The guides seek complete protection of the population via actions that could be as minimal as asking people to remain indoors. In contrast, Congress has dictated that the waiver of defenses is only to be triggered by substantial off-site releases which cause substantial off-site damage.

Finally, it must not be overlooked that the Protective Action Guides are merely intended to be suggestions to state and local authorities, and do not have the force and effect of a binding regulatory requirement. As such, the guides were subjected to fewer procedural safeguards than might otherwise be appropriate in consideration of their use in the instant Proposed Rule.

II. The Requirement of Substantial Damage Proposed Option 3 seeks to simplify the ENO determination by presuming that substantial off-site damages have occurred based soley upon the evaluation of off-site releases. Yankee Atomic believes that such a proposal would violate the Atomic Energy Act.

The Act "clearly calls for a two-pronged determination: (a) substantial off-site release or substantial off-site radiation, and (b) actual or prospective substantial off-site damages" (quoting from 50 FR 13979, Column 1). In so doing, we believe the Congress contemplated that there may be fortuitous situations in which damage is not substantial even where the r elease is. Such an event may well occur when a plant is geographically remote from population centers or valuable land; or, even if the plant is close to a population center, when the release is blown away from the center or out to sea; or the area has a low seasonal population.

We believe that any modification of the ENO criteria must maintain both prongs of the two-prong analysis.

III. Impact on Insurance Rates By the text accompanying the Proposed Rule (at 50 FR 13982, Column 2),

the Commission states that none of the proposed criteria would be expected to affect insurance premiums. This conclusion is based upon 1966 congressional hearings on the ENO. In those hearings, representatives of the insurance industry testified that experience with claims would be the principal determinant of insurance premiums.

Yankee Atomic agrees with the Commission's determination that any change in the ENO threshold should be evaluated in light of its expected impact on the cost and availability of private insurance, particularly since Congress has given the private insurance industry such a major role in the Price-Anderson mechanism.

We disagree, however, with the Commission's prediction that premiums will not be increased by this Proposed Rule. Almost twenty years have passed since the congressional testimony relied upon. Since that testimony, the insurance industry has greatly increased its claims experience base, particularly in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident. We believe that should similar testimony be taken today, it may well contradict the 1966 testimony. We suggest that this is an appropriate area for further investigation.

P. 0. BOX 029311 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33102 August 7, 1985 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR §§140.84 and 140.85 (50 Fed. Reg. 13978 (1985)).

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On April 9, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

("NRC") publi shed i n the Federal Register a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking entitled "Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" (the "Notice"). The Notice proposes changes to the cri teria defining "substantial discharge" and "substantial damages," which are used in determining whether a nuclear inci-dent is an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" (ENO); these changes would revise 10 CFR §§140.84 and 140.85. The Notice also invited comments on the proposed changes. In response to that invitation, FPL respectfully submits the comments which follow.

I. BACKGROUND ON FPL FPL is an investor owned utility providing electric service throughout a large portion of Florida. In 1984, it had an investment of approximately $8 billion in utility operations with operating income of approximately $550 million. FPL owns and operates four nuclear power generating units. Because of AUG 12 l\~~nowled~ed by eard . .......;.......... *"- .,=;j

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 2 its substantial involvement in nuclear power, FPL is vitally interested in the NRC's criteria defining ENOs.

II. COMMENTS FPL shares the concern expressed by the NRC that _the existing ENO criteria may be difficult to apply and that delays in determining whether an ENO exists could work to the detriment of everyone involved in a nuclear incident. Accordingly, FPL applauds the NRC's attempt in this rulemaking to clarify the ENO criteria. In general, FPL finds what the NRC has identified as Option 1 to be *the most desirable proposal, although it also sees merit in the approach which Commissioner Bernthal has suggested as Option 3. However, FPL believes that there are problems with each of those options which the NRC should rectify if it decides to revise the existing criteria. Each of the three options is discussed below.

A. Option 1 As indicated above, FPL believes that Option 1 may be the most workable of the three proposed in the Notice. However, there are several details in Option 1 which require comment.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 3

1. Measuring offsite exposure (proposed §l40.84(a))

The existing wording of §l40.84(a) requires the NRC to consider radiation doses received by persons off site who "were, could have been, or might be exposed to radiation or to radioactive material" in determining whether a "substantial discharge" has occurred. This wording makes the determination unrealistically theoretical. Option 1 proposes to replace that wording with the phrase "has been or probably will be exposed to radiation or radioactive materials." FPL supports this change because it would substantially reduce the uncertainty involved in making the "substantial discharge" determination.

Of particular importance is the proposed elimination of the phrase "could have been." With a "could have been" standard, one presumably must include the most heavily contaminated off site locations, even if it is extremely improbable that anyone was there throughout the period of exposure following the discharge. This ignores the existence and purpose of evacuation plans; the whole point of such plans is to exclude people from or limit their stays in highly contaminated areas following a nuclear incident.

FPL also strongly supports the proposal in Option 1 to replace "might be" with "probably will be." This change would make it clear that a realistic assessment of future exposure is

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 4 to be used in determining if a "substantial discharge" has occurred rather than a worst case analysis. Again, a worst case analysis would ignore the efforts of emergency workers to restrict people from entering highly contaminated areas.

While the proposed revision to the language of

§140.84(a) is extremely helpful, FPL suggests that one additional change be made to recognize another problem with the existing wording. Neither the current wording nor the proposed revision distinguishes between emergency workers and the general populace.

Option 1 proposes to tie the "substantial discharge" criterion to exposure levels set at the upper limit of EPA Protective Action Guides.* FPL supports this approach as to the general populace. However, the NRC has failed to recognize an important distinction in those guides: they allow exposure limits that are considerab_ly higher for emergency workers (e.g., 25 rems vs.

5 rems for whole body exposure). Tlle higher exposures are necessary in order to implement the sheltering and/or evacuation-plans which help to ensure that the general populace will not receive exposures in excess of the EPA guidelines.

The NRC should not rely on the unusually high exposure of emergency workers* in concluding that a "substantially discharge" _has occurred, when the general populac.e might have received only insignificant exposures. Accordingly, FPL suggests that the NRC change the phrase in proposed §140.84(a)

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 5 which reads "one or more of the persons offsite" to "one or more of the persons offsite, other than emergency workers, .... "

2. Table 1 dose levels (proposed §l40.84(a))

In addition to revising the language that describes how

- radiation exposure must be measured, Option 1 also revises the values in Table 1 to which those measurements are to be compared.

The Notice states that the proposed values are representative of the upper end of the EPA's Protective Action Guides. 50,Fed.

Reg. at 13980. FPL agrees that the upper limit of the G~ides should be used. This change would fit well with the approach currently used in emergency planning for nuclear facilities.

Sheltering and evacuation are employed to help limit exposure of

,the populace to levels within the Protective Action Guides range.

Thus, exposure of the general public to levels exceeding that range would indicate a "substantial discharge."

However, it appears that there are two of the values appearing in the revised Table 1 which are lower than the upper limit of the Guides, and which therefore should be revised upward. 'l;'he upper limit specified in June 1980 by the EPA for the thyroid is 25 rems, 1/ whereas the value proposed in Table y EPA-520/1-75-001, Manual of Protective Action. Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (-rev. June 1980).

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 6 1 is only 15 rems.Y Similarly, the value for "other organs or tissues" is specified as 10 rems in Table 1, whereas the EPA recommends that a 5 rems whole body dose equivalent be used instead.Y If determining the whole body dose equivalent is too complex, FPL recommends using a 15 rems dose for "other J

organs or tissues," consistent with NCRP 43.1/ and ICRP 15.Y 3* Quantitative standard for physical injury (proposed §l40.85(a))

Currently, §140.85(a)(l) contains a qualitative standard for assessing whether physical injuries constitute y The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") Protective Action Guide for thyroid exposure due to ingestion of contaminated food is 15 rems, as the NRC has proposed. See 47 Fed. Reg. 47073 (October 22, 1982). However, ingestion of contaminated food is easier to control and, in any event, is a much less likely pathway of exposure than the direct exposure to which the EPA's 25 rems limit relates. FPL recommends that the EPA value be used because it is representative of a more likely scenario or, at the least, that the EPA and FDA* limiting values be differentiated to distinguish the pathway* to which they apply.

y The EPA, in September 27, 1983 draft revisions to Chapters 2 and 5 of EPA-520/1-75-001, recommends that exposure of "other organs or tissues" be used as a weighted component of the whole body dose equivalent.

y National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Report No. 43, Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection Philosophy (March 1, 1982).

y International Commission on Radiological Protection, Report No. 15, Protection Against Ionizing Radiation from External Sources (November, 1969).

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 7 substantial damages: it requires the NRC to determine whether "objective clinical evidence of physical injury" exists. Option 1 would replace that standard with a more quantitative one:

exposure of five or more people to a radiation dose equivalent of 100 rads.

FPL supports this approach because it would reduce the

- subjectivity of the existing standard. Of particular signifi-cance is the ambiguity inherent in interpreting the term "physical injury." There is considerable dispute within the medical community over what constitutes physical injury from radiation exposure and how to measure it. This lack of consensus would necessarily put the NRC at a great disadvantage in trying to apply the existing standard.

While the test proposed in Option 1 effectively addresses the uncertainty inherent in the existing "objective clinical evidence" test, it has been rightly criticized by Commissioner Bernthal in the Notice for being too inflexible.

50 Fed. Reg. at 13983. The principal problem stems from the high threshold level chosen (100 rads) and the requirement that five people exceed that threshold. Accordingly, FPL proposes that the test be revised to require that one or more persons other than an emergency worker receive during the course of the nuclear incident a whole body radiation dose equivalent that is greater than some value between 50 and 75 rems. FPL has no

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 8 strong position about what the value should be in the 50-75 rems range. The reasons for FPL's proposed revision are:

100 rads is too high as a threshold limit. As stated in NCRP 39,§/ exposure to more than 75 rads is likely to produce symptoms requiring hospitalization.

Exposure to 50-75 rads is about as low as can be detected by conventional laboratory means such as blood cell changes. FPL believes laboratory tests would be the principal means of detection because it is unlikely that exposed individuals other than emergency workers would have been wearing dosimeters during their exposure.

Exposure to less than 50-75-rads is also unlikely to result in acute radiation symptoms and would require minimal, if any, medical care. Consistent with the *current philosophy of looking to "death or hospitalization" (§140.85(a)(l)), the threshold

§/ National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Report No. 39, Basic Radiation Protection Criteria (January 15, 1971).

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 9 exposure level should coincide with the level at which acute symptoms and hospitalization would probably be required.

A whole body dose equivalent expressed in rems rather than rads should be used, as this would take into account the different biological risks associated with different types of radiation. FPL also recommends that the NRC review its ENO criteria generally to reduce the inconsistency in usage of rems and rads as units of radiation exposure; a discussion of the circumstances under which each is appropriate would be helpful.

Emergency workers should not be considered in determining whether an ENO exists. They might have to be exposed to high levels of radiation to accomplish important safety-related objectives, and their actions should not be influenced by the ENO determination.

4. Property damage standard (proposed §140.85{a)(2))

Option 1 would replace the current requirements of $2.5 million of damage to one person's property or $5 million of

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 10 total damage with a standard which looks,only to the value of the property contaminated. This is not consistent with the Atomic Energy Act. While it may be difficult to determine the amount of property damage, looking only at the value of the property ignores entirely the direction in the Act that an ENO must involve substantial damages to persons or property off

- site. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §ll(j), 42 U.S.C. §2014(j).

Taken to its logical extreme, a piece of undeveloped property worth $2.5 million could be contaminated with short-lived radioactivity that either quickly decays to insignificant levels or can be cleaned up at minimal cost. The economic consequences of the contamination would be minimal, yet it would still constitute "substantial damages" under the Option 1 proposal. FPL urges the NRC to reject this part of the proposal and retain the existing property damage tests of

§140.85(a)(2) and (3).

5. Employment loss and evacuation standards (proposed

§l40.85(c) and (d))

Option 1 also would count lost employment time

(§140.85(c)) and evacuation time (§140.85(d)) as "substantial damages." FPL agrees with Commissioner Bernthal's observation in the Notice that both subsections (c) and (d) could create undesirable and counterproductive incentives. 50 Fed.Reg. at

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 11 13983. The number of days of lost employment or evacuation time would be largely a function of decisions made by employers and governmental authorities in the area surrounding the site of a nuclear incident. One can envision political or other pressures leading those persons to increase the number of days of employ-ment loss or evacuation time slightly in order to exceed the thresholds established. Id. FPL sees no benefit and considerable potential for detriment in defining "substantial damages" so that incentives of this sort are created.

6. Other comments on Option 1 Finally, two brief comments regarding Option 1 should be noted. First, Option 1 includes a proposed §l40.84(a)(4) that defines one of the four locations for measuring exposure to radiation as "radiation from sources internal to the body."

There is no equivalent provision in the current §140.84, and FPL is unaware of the NRC's reasoning for including the new provision. Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of §140.84 cover the pathways and sources of internal radiation exposure with which FPL is familiar; accordingly, FPL questions whether the proposed subsection (a)(4) is needed. FPL also notes that the word "radiation" has been used in proposed subsectionl? (a)(2) and (a)(3) where it appears the word "radioactive" should appear, as it does in the existing subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 12 Secondly, the NRC has used the term "accident" rather than "incident" in proposed §140.SS(a) of Option 1. This is not consistent with past NRC terminology, and FPL recommends that it be eliminated. Similar references appear in proposed

§§l40.84(a) and 140.SS(a) of Option 2.

B. Option 2 While FPL understands the con~erns which Commissioner

• Asselstine is attempting to address in his Option.2 proposal, FPL recommends that the NRC not adopt it. There are two differences between Option 1 and Option 2 which are especi.ally significant and which make Option 2 less desirable. These are the use of the phrase "were or could have been" to describe the radiation doses received by the off site populace during a nucle~r incident (§140.84(a)) and the collective dose standard used in *defining "substantial damages" ( §140. 85 ( ar).

1. Measuring offsite exposure (proposed §l40.84(a))

In Option 1, the NRC has proposed to eliminate some of the uncertainty concerning the.determination of radiation exposure to the off site populace by revising the current wording of "were, could have been, or might be exposed" to "has

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 13 been or probably will be exposed." As discussed above, FPL b'elieves that this revision would represent a substantial improvement. In Option 2, however, the proposed change is to the phrase "were or could have been received." This retains the speculative uncertainty as to past exposure inherent in the phrase "could have been." Trying to predict where people could

- have been exposed and at what levels necessarily leads to a worst case analysis that ignores the impact of emergency planning efforts. The wording proposed in Option 1 is superior and should be adopted.

2. Collective dose standard (proposal §l40.85(a))

Option 2 also differs from Option 1 in its proposed criterion for personal injury. Commissioner Asselstine indicates that his "collective dose" approach is intended to reflect the "findings that the latent effects of a serious nuclear accident could far outweigh the observable acute effects." 50 Fed. Reg. at 13981. FPL urges the Commission not to involve the definition of "substantial damages" in the debate over what causes and constitutes "latent effects." The uncertainty concerning this subject is so great that there is practically no exposure level the NRC could pick for which there

Mr. Samuel J~ Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 14 would be general agreement that exposure below that level did not lead to "latent effects."

The "collective exposure" approach should be rejected for practical reasons as well. The calculated collective dose will be dramatically dependent on the number of people living near a facility. If a facility is located in a high density

- area, collective dose levels in the range proposed by Commissioner Asselstine could be exceeded with ridiculously low individual exposures. For example, if one million people lived within the 50 mile radius proposed by Commissioner Asselstine, an average exposure to only .1 rem would yield a collective exposure of 100,-000 person-rem. In contrast, the average annual dose to an individual of the U.S. population from exposure to natural background radiation is on the order of 0.1 rem. 11 Thus it is feasible under Option 2 for one million people to receive a dose of the same amount as received from natural background radiation *and yet nonetheless qualify as h~ving been 11 11 substantially damaged. In addition, the NRC has set a standard of .5 rem as the allowable yearly off-site exposure to an individual from normal operations. 10 CFR 20.105(a).

1/ National Academy of Sciences, Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, The Effects On Populations of Exposure To Low Levels Of Ionizing Radiation (1980).

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 15 The foregoing example is hardly extreme. Even in relatively low density areas, the collective exposure adds up quickly~ FPL's St. Lucie nuclear plant is situated on a barrier island with few large population centers nearby. Nevertheless, during the peak season, the population (permanent plus transient). is about 135,000 within just a 10 mile radius of that

- plant. Exposure of this population to an average of less than

.8 rem would exceed Commissioner Asselstine's standard.

The "collective exposure" approach is misguided and simply unworkabie. FPL urges the Commission not to adopt it.

C. Option 3 FPL sees merit in Commissioner Bernthal's proposal to combine the "substantial discharge" and "substantial damages" criteria. It would avoid the political pressures* which would inevitably descend upon the NRc*once it made a determination that a "substantial discharge" had occurred. Under those circumstances, FPL suspects that the NRC would be hard pressed not to conclude that there had also been "substantial damages."

This would be particularly true*if, as is almost tnevitable, the "substantial damages" tests involve an element of subjectivity.

However, notwithstanding the appeal of this unified approach,

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 16 FPL believes there are at least two flaws in Option 3 that would have to be addressed if it were selected.

1. Property damage standard (proposed §l40.84(a))

First, the standard for property damage in proposed

- §l40.84(a) is unrelated to the level of actual economic loss experienced. This problem is similar to that discussed earlier with respect to Option 1. While subsection (a) requires that property be rendered unfit for its normal use, it says nothing about how much property has to be involved or about the economic consequences thereof. In the extreme case, this condition would be satisfied by contamination that left one square meter of property temporarily unfit for some low-level usage. The economic consequences of that contamination would be trivial.

Moreover, the test fails to account for the possibility that property might be cheaply decontaminated to acceptable levels.

For these reasons, FPL believes that §140.84(a)*of Option 3 is simply unworkable, and suggests that the NRC retain a standard which looks to the actual damages suffered by property owners, such as existing §l40.85(a)(2) and (3).

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 17

2. Radiation dose level (proposed §140.84(b))

The second major concern about Option 3 is the low level of the radiation dose used to define substantial personal injury in §140.84(b). Receiving a dose of 10 rads certainly qualifies as significant exposure, but FPL does not believe that

- it would create a high probability of physical injury.

Commissioner Bernthal seems to admit as much in his comments in the Notice. He defends the 10 rad level as a dose that "can be considered substantial since it is twice the value that triggers protective action as established by the FDA and the EPA." 50 Fed. Reg. at 13964 (emphasis added). The test for ENOs is not whether a radiation dose is "substantial," but whether there have been substantial damages as a result of the exposure. FPL is also unaware of anything which correlates exposure to twice the EPA Protective Action Guide levels with a conclusion that the exposed person has been physically injured.

If the unified approach of Option 3 is to be realistic, the radiation exposure level chosen must reflect a reasonable probability of substantial damages. The radiation exposure standard which FPL proposed above would be appropriate. That proposal requires that one or more persons other than an emergency worker receive during the course of a nuclear incident

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 18 a whole body radiation dose equivalent that is greater than some value between 50 and 75 rems.

III. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS FPL applauds the NRC's attempt to refine the ENO

- criteria. If the NRC concludes that one of the three options proposed in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking should be adopted, FPL recommends that Option 1 be chosen. However, if Option 1 is adopted, it should be revised to reflect the concerns FPL has expressed herein.

If the NRC believes that combining the "substantial discharge" and "substantial damages" criteria into one is desirable, FPL recommends that Option 3 be revised to reflect property damage and personal injury tests which more realistically represent a risk of substantial damages. The I

tests proposed in Option 3 could be met with little, if any, risk of substantial damages. A personal inj~ry'test similar to that FPL has proposed in its discussion of §l40.85(a) under Option 1 and a property damage test similar to the existing

§140.85(a)(2) and (3) would be appropriate.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk August 7, 1985 Page 19 FPL respectfully requests the NRC to consider and reflect the foregoing recommendations in any revisions to the ENO rule which it decides to adopt.

Respect22:rnitted, 7?6iburg? J President

f liJOCICI IUMBiR PIODID IUt!

PR- / 4~ [7590-01]

(.5'1JF£ /3'1 7¥J NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKE-TEO lJSNRC 10 CFR Part 140 Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence *as AUG -5 p4 :23 AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Conmission.

ACTION: Proposed rule: Extension of comment period *

SUMMARY

On April 9, 1985 (50 FR 13978), the Nuclear Regulatory Commi ssion published a proposed rule to amend its regulations defining an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" (ENO). The proposed changes are designed to simplify the administrative criteria used by the Commission in making an ENO dete rmination and to avoid the problems encountered by the Conmission in applying the exist-ing criteria to the accident at Three Mile Island. Several groups have expressed interest in an extension of the conment period in order t o* f ully eva luate the issues raised and develop comments on the proposed rule. In particular, the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) requested an extension of the comment period in order for AIF's Insurance and Indemnity Committee to discuss the proposed rule at its scheduled August 20, 1985, meeting. In vi ew of the significance of the proposed rule, in which three alternatives were given, and the desirab ility of developing a final rule as soon as practica ble, the NRC has decided to extend the comment period for an additional 30 days. The or iginal comment period for this proposed rule is due to expire on August 7, 1985.

DATE: The extended comment period expires September 6, 1985. Conmen ts received after that date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before that date.

f ADDRESSES: Submit written corrments to the Secretary of the CorTmission, Washington, DC 20555, Attent ion: Docketing and Service Branch. Copies of comments received may be examined and copied for a Fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: H. T. Peterson, Office of Nuclear Regulatory

• Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co1J1T1ission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone 301-427-4353.

Dated at Washington, DC, this -5/4 day of ~ 1985.

For the Nuclear Regulatory CorTmission.

Samuel J Chilk,

• Secretary of the Commission.

~~

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY 1901 Gratiot Street St. Louis Donald F. Schnell Vice President July 31, 1985 0 C:KETED USN C Secretary of the Commission ULNRC-1147 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 *ss AUG -2 A11 :21 A tention: Docketing and Service Branch

• ear Sir :

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISION TO 10 CFR PART 140 CRITERIA FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE The purpose of this letter is to provide comments on the proposed revision to 10 CFR Part 140 as published in the Federal Register Vol. 50, No. 68, Tuesday, April 9, 1985.

Concerning the "problems with the existing ENO criteria" identified in the proposed revision, the following comments are provided :

1) The Protection Action Guides (PAGs ) have been revised since devel opment of t he pre sent ENO cr iter ia - The intent of PAGs i s to r educe exposure o f the public to ALARA by providing a predetermined "action level" for implementation of planned protective actions. The PAGs are not correlated to levels at

• which actual injury is expected. The waiver of defenses at dose levels corresponding to the PAGs is in total contra-diction with the probability, as well as detectability, of physiological injury corresponding to such doses, and is clearly not a valid basis for the proposed revision .

2) The current criteria requ i res ob j ective clinical evidence of radiation i njury , a nd ava ilable te s ting cannot provi de conc l us i ve proof o f such i njury - It i s obvious f rom the present criteria and the comments above that the ENO criteria was originally based on the probability and detectability of injury as a prerequisite to waiver of defenses . The proposed revision would eliminate this basis and require waiver of defenses when the possibility of injury is so low that current technology cannot conclusively identify any injury. Again, this proposal is in direct opposition to the original criteria and basis for defining an ENO.

Mailing Address: P.O Box 149, St. Louis. MO 63166

Pos:m, r Cciprcs ,

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Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 July 31, 1985

3) Monetary damages are difficult, if not impossible, to accurately evaluate in a timely manner - The current wording provides flexibility in estimating damages, establishes a fixed level for determining that damages are "extraordinary" and provides a valid basis for waiver of defenses. It is agreed that this is one area wh ich can be improved by revision to allow a simpler, more definitive criteria for determining "substantial offsite damages."

The above general comments concerning the basis for proposing the revision to 10 CFR 140 will be addressed in detail in the following discussion of each option proposed. The existing regulation requires fulfillment of two criteria for declaration of an ENO, that being: (1) s ubstantial offsite release of radioactive material has occurred or

• he re has been a substantial level of radiation offsite and (2) substantial injury or substantial damages have occurred offsite. It is essential that this basic approach be maintained in any revision to Part 140, to assure that waiver of defense is predicated on solid legal and scientific/technical grounds. Changes to this dual criteria philosophy would most surely result in unjustified waiver of defense and costly litigation regarding damages arising from such. The discus-sion of each option proposed will include comments concerning this dual criteria principle.

Proposed Option 1 - The discussion for this option indicates the following basis: (1) numerical consistency with the PAGs and (2) any nuclear accident in which PAGs are implemented automatically satisfies the first of the two criteria that a substantial release of radioactive material offsite has occurred.

Comments: Option 1 - As mentioned previously, PAGs are based on the LARA principle not on the probability or detectability of physio-

• ogical injury. The changes to Table 1 are totally inconsistent with the relative organ dose limits in the existing criteria, ICRP 2 limits, and ICRP 30 limits. The proposed Table 1 revision is apparently a mix of ICRP 30 and the proposed revision to 10 CFR 20, without consistency with any existing limits or scientific information. It is obvious that "numerical consistency" with the PAGs had virtually no influence on the changes to the Table 1 values, otherwise the thyroid limit would have been set at 25 rem to be consistent with the PAGs. If the desire is for simplification of the criteria, t he proposed Table 1 accomplishes just the opposite by requiring determination of both bone marrow and bone surface dose. Finally, there is no justification for lowering the existing dose limits which are at the threshold of detection of physiological changes due to radiation exposure. The proposed limit of 5 rem whole body is substantially below the current annual occupational limit of 12 rem (3 rem/quarter) and cannot be related to a "substantial release of radioactive material" or "substantial injury."

Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 July 31, 1985 Current regulations and guidance require declaration of Site Area Emergency and General Emergency for several situations or plant conditions in which there is no release of radioactive material.

Consistent with declaration of a General Emergency, Protective Actions are often recommended by utilities and/or state and local governments.

The stated objective of this proposed option is to assure that if PAGs are implemented the first criteria for an ENO declaration is met. It is thus possible that the first criteria for waiver of defenses is met when there is no release of radioactive material. This has the effect of simply eliminating the dual criteria, which is stated in the proposed revision to be retained for Options 1 and 2.

This option proposes the addition of 140.84(a) (4) as an additional xposure mechanism to account for, namely, "radiation from sources

• nternal to the body." There is no explanation provided for this addition and no obvious change from the existing three mechanisms.

This proposed addition of a fourth mechanism should not be considered in that it is merely a restatement of existing items (2) and (3) and serves only to confuse the evaluation process and increase the difficulty of application of the criteria.

The proposed wording for Criteria II 140.85(a) is that five or more people receive a dose equivalent in excess of 100 rads. It is agreed that this is more definitive than the wording "objective clinical evidence" and 100 rad is a dose at which clinical indications are detectable. However, the existing wording contains some important clarifications which should be added to the proposed wording. Namely, that the exposure applies to offsite members of the public and that the dose equivalent value is individual versus collective. Thus, the wording should be: "Five or more people located offsite have individually received a radiation dose equivalent to the whole body or ny organ in excess of 100 rad (1 gray) during the course of the cc ident."

The proposed wording of Criteria II 140.85(b) is acceptable as proposed. The addition of Criteria II 140.85(c) and (d) is not only unnecessary, but it is not a valid indication of damages sustained. As indicated by Commissioner Bernthal's remarks (FR, Vol. 50, No. 68, pg. 13983), the addition of employment loss and evacuation time criteria could actually be an incentive to stay away from work and home. Additionally, the waiver of defenses applies to utilities and operators of nuclear power plants who have no control over evacuation or work requirements. State and local governments may require evacuation even when there is no valid reason or regulatory requirement for such, resulting in the fulfillment of the proposed (c) or {d) criteria.

The above comments clearly show that Option 1, as presently proposed, could result in waiver of defenses without a release of radioactive material, and without damages sustained due to the accident situation.

Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 July 31, 1985 This negates the dual criteria principle and subjects plant owners and operators to unjustified risk of damage claims/liability and attendant litigation.

Proposed Option 2 - The discussion for this option indicates the following basis: (1) exposure at the site boundary only and (2) collective dose within a SO-mile radius.

Comments: Option 2 - This option modifies the first option by specifying that the dose limits apply to the site boundary and apply for the period of the duration of the accident. Many plant sites are such that the closest residence is a mile or more from the site oundary , and the population density out to two or even five miles is

• ery low . The extremely conservative wording of this option could easily result in waiver of defense even though the risk to the public and the number of people actually exposed is extremely small. The existing criteria properly allows consideration of these factors by allowing for a real estimate of dose rather than the "fencepost" person assumption. The existing wording should not be changed as proposed.

The proposed Criteria II 140.BS(a) has been changed to reflect collective exposure versus individual exposure. Current scientific information, including the BEIR report, does stress the importance of maintaining collective exposure ALARA, but there is no scientific data which accurately correlates collective exposure to "substantial injury," and risk estimates have significant associated errors.

Additionally, the location of the plant could easily result in waiver of defense for one plant and not for another just based on the population within the SO-mile radius, even though the risk of injury is extremely small. Finally, for purposes of defining "substantial nj ury," the collective dose to the SO-mile radius is very ue stionable. If used at all, collective dose should be applied no

• far ther than the 10-mile EPZ, as exposure to the distances beyond 10 miles is based primarily on long-term parameters related to the ingestion pathways and cannot be related to "substantial injury" due to exposure.

Proposed Option 3 - The discussion for this option indicates the following basis: (1) simplified approach to determining an ENO, (2) elimination of the dual criteria, (3) elimination of dose evaluations and estimates of injury for individuals and damage, (4) the assumption of a "strong causal relation between release of radionuclides and damages," and (5) elimination of conditions affecting actual exposure such as occupancy time, building shielding, etc.

Comments: Option 3 - This option eliminates the dual criteria and therefore subjects plant owners and operators to an unnecessarily high risk of waiver of defense. Additionally, the conditions specified in this option for declaration of an ENO do not represent or indicate

Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 5 July 31, 1985 "substantial offsite release or substantial offsite radiation," and "actual or prospective substantial offsite damage," as will be addressed specifically below.

The proposed wording of Option 3 part 140.84(a) could lead to declara-tion of an ENO based on a single or point source since no area is provided over which measurements are to be made. Although implied by the footnote to part (a), this part could be applied to an incident such as loss of a radiography source or calibration source instead of accidents resulting in releases from the operation of a nuclear power plant. The proposed 10 mrad/hour at 1 meter could be acceptable criteria if defined in terms of surface area and in the manner of the existing wording of Criteria I 140.84(b). However, there is no obvious eed to redefine the measurements at 1 meter versus the existing

• efi nition of measurement at 1 cm over a 100 m2 surface area offsite.

The proposed wording of Option 3 part 140.84(b) is unacceptably conservative. Although the limit has been increased to twice that of Options 1 and 2, it is still significantly below the annual occupational dose limit of 12 rem (3 rem/quarter) and half of that specified in the existing Criteria I. The wording also does not specify if the dose is whole body, organ or combined, nor does it specify if it is only external or a combination of external and internal exposure. Finally, the wording does not specify that the dose is to an offsite member of the public and at what location the hypothetical individual would be to receive it. Therefore, it is not a measure of actual or substantial injury but a "fencepost" person assessment as commented on before.

The proposed wording of Option 3 part 140.84(c) is not merely a "minor clarifying modification" of the existing criteria (140.84(b)2) as ommi ssioner Bernthal states, but constitutes a major deletion in that t el iminates the distinguishing between offsite property which is

• cont iguous to the site versus that which is not. Again, this proposed wording does not provide criteria which clearly indicates a "substantial release" or "substantial damages or injury."

Summary Comments The basis for change of the existing criteria should be simplification and protection. The criteria should allow a relatively easy and rapid determination of the fact of an ENO. However, it must be borne in mind that rapidity and ease of determining an ENO should not be at the sacrifice of appropriate judicial defense of plant owners and operators. The existing 10 CFR 140 provides protection both to the public and plant owners/operators through the dual criteria approach, which should not be eliminated.

Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 6 July 31, 1985 Changes considered to 10 CFR 140 should be based on required evidence of "substantial releases or radiation dose" and "substantial damages or injury" incurred. Proposed changes must consider "clinical evidence" as required by the existing criteria, and current technical knowledge of the biological effects of ionizing radiation. The existing criteria are based on the approximate threshold of somatic clinically observable effects (20 rem whole body). There is no technical justification for lowering this value or the other Table Values (140.84(a)), and the stated objective of "numerical consistency with the PAGs" is not provided by the proposed options nor is it a valid reason for lowering the dose values.

The existing guidance of 10 CFR 140 is more than adequate. Although it ou ld perhaps be streamlined to reduce the time for determination of an

• NO , the time presently required is not inappropriate considering the legal and financial impact of declaring an accident an ENO.

The following comments are changes to 10 CFR 140 which should be considered if it is deemed necessary to simplify the current regulations.

1) Change the existing Table (140.84(a)) to reflect only thyroid and whole body dose values. These are the primary dose projections made during an event and are readily available and calculable. Concurrent with this would be elimination of items (a) (2) and (a) (3) and addition of a statement requiring inclusion of thyroid dose determination based only on air exposure (inhalation exposure pathway). The current dose values for the thyroid (30 rem) and whole body (20 rem) should be retained. These changes would greatly simplify dose determination and certainly de crease the dose assessment time

• 2) in determining if an event is an ENO. The practical applica-tion of these dose determinations should continue to include occupancy time, location, building shielding factors, etc.

The proposed Option 1 provides a good basis for determining injury but should be reworded as follows: "Five or more people located offsite have individually received a radiation dose equivalent to the whole body or thyroid in excess of 100 rad (1 gray) during the course of the accident." This would replace the existing wording of 140.BS(a) (1) and provide both definitive and technically valid proof of physiological injury.

3) The proposed Criteria II 140.BS(b) of Option 1 provides a good basis for determining property damages and simplifies the assessment of such damages by removing the assessment of individual property. However, collective assessment will still require some degree of individual assessment. If it is determined that a change is needed to the existing 140.BS(a) (2), the only change should be to delete the wording

Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 7 July 31, 1985 concerning individual damages. The aggregate damage value of

$5 million should not be changed. No other changes should be made to the existing 140.85.

Your consideration and incorporation of these comments relative to the proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 140 will be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

~/L.dL Donald F. Schnell

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Mississippi State Department of Health P.O. Box 1700 - 2423 North State Street Jackson, Mississippi 39205 601/354-6612 Alton B. Cobb, M.D., M.P.H.

State Health Officer DOCKETED USNRC July 29, 1985 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -SS AUG -1 AlO :30 Secretary of the Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 FFIC[ OF SECRt. TA, ,

Attention: Docketing & Service Branch DOCKET /NG ;, SER VI('

BRANCH

• Gentlemen:

• RE: FEDERAL REGISTER/VOL. 50, N0.68/TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 1985/PROPOSED RULES We are pleased to submit these comments concerning the referenced proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 140:

(1) Any of the three options is an improvement over the existing regulation.

(2) We favor option #3 to the others presented because it is more simplified, straightforward and easily implementable.

(3) As a suggested improvement, NRC may wish to consider addition of another item to option #3 which addresses the remote case of a sufficient quantity o f spent fuel being atomized as particulate in an explosion to create a lung burden of long-lived transuranics in the affected p op ulation; but, which may not roduce the contamination levels re qu ired by item (c) of option 3 and may not deliver the 10 rads per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period called for

• i n item (b).

We recognize the highly unlikely probability of such an event, especially in view of recent reports reflecting the difficulty of atomization of transuranics (NUREG/CR-2472 and SAND 82-2365).

Nevertheless, it would be conservative to consider this scenario, for which we propose the following addition:

(d) Evidence that at least one person has received a body burden of radionuclides which will result in a calculated 70 year dose commitment of at l east 50 rem.

We are con~erned that under certain meteorological conditions, the deposition rate may be very low , yet substantial exposure to airborne particulates may occur over the applicable time interval.

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Admittedly, the "have received" is a deviation from the "may receive" format of option #3. Howev e r , it protects members of the public who can be shown by whole bo d y counter methods to have definitely received an appreciable dose commitment.

Sincerely ,

c6~x1~

Eddies. Fuente, Director Division of Radiological Health ESF:wg Mr. Ron Forsythe, MDE&T

Wayne Gaul 1350 S. Greenwood Wichita, KS 67211 July 25, 1985 Docketing and Servi ~.? B~ All ,04 Secretary of the Commission US Nuclear Regulatcti.' o'liinfi.~ *~o Washington DC ?Q555-KET NG & SERVl[:f

' - BRANCH I would like to take this opportunity to comment on the proposed rule for 10 CFR Part 140 Criteria for an

• Extraordinary Nuclear Occurance.

the present legal and The declaration of an ENO is an occurance that cannot be taken lightly, especially with journalistic bias against anything even remotely associated with the nuclear industry.

The industry as a whole is safe and the current methods of ,./

determining an ENO are adequate to give individuals more of a chance to make a rational appraisal of the situation instead of going to a "cookbook" type of mechanism that hastely comes to a conclusion. The options proposed do have merit to clean up some of the uncertainties in the determination process but there are deficiencies in the options that I would like to address.

Option 1 This option proposes to change the criteria for determining a substantial discharge of radioactive material or radiation offsite from 20 rem whole body projected radiation dose to one person offsite to 5 rem whole body projected committed dose. This proposal to lower the dose limits are actually lowering the limits below the occupational dose limits already in use since the occupational dose limits are calculated on an annual basis instead of a committed dose basis. The implications of this can become rather severe when long lived nuclides are present or even suspected. The use of committed doses has not been endorsed totally by all professionals in the Health Physics area and the issue is currently highly debated. The use of a dose equivalent calculation method that is contrary to current regulatory practices is harmful, at best. The use of the committed dose as a criteria for waiving of defenses would allow the legal profession to apply these type of criteria to industry workers who have left the industry and attempt to sue at a later date. Maintaining the current offsite dose numbers but changing them to committed dose equivalent would add the long term health risk factor to the determination of the

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The dose limit of 20 rem is in the area below any threshold for biological effects to be noticed A statistically small amount of biological effects might be noticed at the 20 rem level, but only in very extreme cases. Therefore lowering the dose limit to 5 rem would add statistically nothing to the health and safety of the public, which is the main concern being addressed (as opposed to the health of the legal profession).

The change would greatly impact the nuclear industry by having the ENO defense waiver limit actually below the occupational dose limit. The public would suffer from the

• increased insurance cost and legal council the nuclear industry would suddenly be burdened with and therefore have to pass these costs on to their customers.

The useage of the more appropriate terminology from "That one or more persons offsite were, could have been, or might be exposed *** " to be changed to" *** one or more persons offsite were or will probably be exposed " is good in that it removes the II might II criteria presently in use that can be used on hypothetical people.

Option 2 This option proposes the useage of committed doses at the same levels as are in option 1 and therefore is opposed for the same reasons. More approproiate terminology is offered here by stating" *** a person or persons on or near any site boundary throughout the duration of the accident *** ". The

• criteria for recognizing "substantial injury" is proposed to become a calculated 100,000 person-rem collective dose within a 50 mile radius during the course of the accident.

This criteria is not appropriate in the context that 99 people could get 1000 rem (lethal dose) and not trigger the criteria for "substantial injury", yet a large population close to the plant could get less than one rem each and trigger the criteria.

Option 3 This option takes a "will probably result" approach to determining substantial injury or damage and offers one set of criteria for the magnitude of release and doses. A danger in this simplification is that an ENO could be triggered without having establishing substantial injury or damages.

This option would initiate an ENO if real or personal property is rendered unfit for use as a result of

contamination at levels of greater t han 10 mrad/hour at one meter. No mention is made to the position of this property in relation to the release but the e xposure rates will meet the criteria for an ENO, i.e. if an onsite vehicle was found to have this contamination level an ENO would be declared even if no contamination traveled of fsite, defen ses would be waived and the defendent would be open to any legal whim.

This option has taken great steps to simplify the procedure for determining an ENO but leaves too much open, especially under circumstances where a hasty decision, based on quick rules can lead to severe problems.

I wish to thank the commission for taking these comments

• into consideration and am available to answer any questions concerning these comments.

Sincerely,

~o.y~ C. q ~

Wa y ~ G~

Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. ~ KUMBfll PR-7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814-4805 Telephone : (301) 654-9260 PIIIIJl!D "UL£

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Linda L. Hodge General Counsel July 25, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

• Gentlemen:

Re: Criteria for Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence, 50 F.R.

13978-85, April 9, 1985.

On April 9, 1985, the Commission published for public comment a proposal to revise its criteria for defining an "extra-ordinary nuclear occurrence". The Federal Register notice specified that comments should be filed on or before August 7, 1985.

The Forum's Insurance and Indemnity Committee will be dis-cussing this proposal at its regularly scheduled meeting on August 20, 1985, and intends to file its comments shortly thereafter. We respectfully request an extension of tim~

until Thursday, August 29, within which to file our comments.

We do not believe that this brief extension will adversely affect the Commission's current schedule for this rulemaking.

Thank you for your consideration of our request.

LH:mm cc: Harold T. Peterson Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 JOSEPH A. TIERNAN L 25 P4 53 MANAGER NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT July 22, 1985 Secretary of the Commission

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION:

REFERENCE:

Docketing and Service Branch Request for Public Comments on Proposed Change To 10 CFR Part 140; Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence Gentlemen:

The following comments are submitted by the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company in response to the Federal Register notice of April 9, 1985, regarding criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO). We welcome this opportunity to comment on the Commission's proposed revisions to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) covering financial protection requirements and indemnity agreements. We request you consider the following comments on the specific items addressed in the proposed rule change *

• We firmly believe that this aspect of NRC Regulation warrants critical examination.

However, as will become apparent from our responses to your proposed changes, we believe that most of the existing rule is reasonable and effective and that adoption of any proposed option would put the nuclear utility industry, and our nuclear insurers, in a worse position as compared to the present ENO criteria. Lowering the threshold for an ENO would lead to higher insurance premiums and could, at some point, endanger the availability of insurance coverage.

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO 10 CFR 140 10 CFR 140.84 Criterion I - Substantial discharge of radioactive material or substantial radiation levels offsite.

1. In Part 140.84(a), the words "* ** one or more persons offsite were, could have been or might be exposed ***" would be changed by Option l to"* ** one or more persons offsite were or will probably be ***" This proposal would change the subjectivity of JUL 26 1

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Secretary of the Commission July 1O, 1985 Page 2 this criterion little. We acknowledge that eliminating the "could have been" or "might be" is advantageous, but replacing them with "will probably be" is not more objective. We feel that the determination of an ENO should be based on actual events and occurrences, not subjective predictions. We recommend changing this such that persons who~ exposed to radiation specified is the only criteria.

2. Option 2 proposes a similar change to Part 140.84(a) as described above except that this option would specify not only "could have been" but changes the location of the individual from offsite to "*** located on or near any site boundary throughout the duration of the accident." The elimination of "offsite" as a condition for location suggests that an individual onsite could qualify for Criterion I. We believe that defeats the purpose of this criteria by allowing a potentially insignificant event to meet the first ENO requirement.

3. The proposed Criterion I for Option 3 suggests a different approach to decide whether an ENO should be determined, in that it emphasizes the "will probably result" aspect in dealing with substantial injury or damages. Rather than requiring enumeration and evaluation of actual damages and identification of actual injuries, Option 3 oversimplifies the Commission's task and introduces an element of subjectivity. Our opposition to this philosphy is discussed in items l and 2 above.

4. Criterion I in Option 3 departs from the "two-tiered" approach which first requires a finding that substantial releases (or doses ) occurred and then determines that substantial injury or damages resulted. Instead, just one set of criteria is given for the magnitude of the releases and doses that the Commission believes will satisfy the conditions for both substantial releases and "will probably result" in injury or damages. This again leaves the determination of injury or damage up to a subjective evaluation that could adversely affect the industry. We believe that enumeration techniques should be required in determining anything as controversial as an ENO *

• For example, if an event at a Nuclear Power Plant produces "substantial releases",

and meteorologic and plume conditions are just right, no substantial injury or damage may take place, yet in accordance with the proposal, an ENO could be ascertained.

5. In both Options l &: 2, the proposed change to the table on Total Projected Radiation Doses shows a significant reduction in the various dose levels. These proposed reductions would lower the existing dose levels to values not much different from the current 10 CFR 20 limits. We believe that these level reductions seriously lower the threshold of an ENO and that the original purpose may be somewhat diminished by the adoption of these reduced limits. In the original conception of 10 CFR 140, "Congress intended that the waiver of defenses be limited to incidents resulting in significant (italics mine) injury or loss" and that current ENO criteria should be consistent with this. It is possible that the seriousness or significance of an ENO may be lessened somewhat by this lower criteria. We recommend retention of the current criteria.

Secretary of the Commission July 1O, 1985 Page 3 10 CFR 140.85 Criterion II - Substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.

1. Option 1 proposes that the existing definition of substantial damage to persons be changed from the current "death or hospitalization" requirement to one where a radiation dose equivalent to the whole body or any organ in excess of 100 rads is received by five or more people. We could support this change, however we recommend that the dose be clearly stated as 100 rads/person in order to avoid any confusion about the dose and how it is to be applied.

2. Option 2 proposes a different way to measure "substantial damage to persons" by the use of a calculated collective dose of 100,000 person-rems delivered within a 50-mile radius of the site. We believe that this alternate is significantly more restrictive than Option 1 and difficult to calculate for an area of 7,854 square miles. A demographic study of the area around Calvert Cliffs shows that this collective dose would work out to be approximately .1 rem/person. The projected population growth would only lower the dose per person even further. Although the knowledge of meteorlogic and plume conditions would help concentrate a release over a known area, this is still subjective and difficult to determine accurately. Because of the low dose levels and inexactness of the calculations, we suggest that a criteria for determining substantial injury similar to that espoused in Option 1 be adopted with the recommended alterations we discussed in item 1 above.

3. We believe the changes proposed in Options 1 & 2 for determining substantial property damage to be completely different and unrelated to the existing criteria.

The elimination of a requirement to assess the cost of recovery or decontamination in 10 CFR 140.85(b) omits or fails to recognize the cost of substantial property damage to the owner. Property value is independent of the recovery, repair, or decontamination cost. A one-for-one substitution of property value for property damage neglects that the cost to the owner is based upon what it takes to replace or restore the property to the original value. Therefore, offsite property having a value of $2,500,000 is not totally or completely lost under all credible scenarios of contamination. It is l?ossible that this property could have a recovery or decontamination cost of S25,000 for example. The determination of an ENO should be based upon replacement and decontamination cost to the owner, not the value of the property. We recommend retention of the current criteria in 10 CFR 140.85 (a)(2).

4. Option 2 proposes an additional criterion for determining substantial damage offsite by counting or estimating lost employment and the number of people evacuated.

Even though unemployment and evacuation are certainly potential damages brought on by "nuclear occurences", there is significant subjectivity involved in measuring the degree or magnitude of this damage. We feel this alternate means is inappropriate. Evacuation could result from various rational or irrational responses to an occurence, or may even be unwarranted or unnecessary. In short, we agree that evacuation and unemployment are damages that could potentially result but because of the inexactness and conjecture involved in estimating this amount, we

Secretary of the Commission July 1O, 1985 Page 4 feel an inappropriate conclusion could be easily reached. A criterion such as this could actually encourage hostile intervenors to precipitate actions leading to an unwarranted evacuation. An irrational, unnecessary evacuation may even result in more damage than the alternative of not evacuating. Therefore, we believe that the current criteria for measuring substantial damage should be retained.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, our Company acknowledges that weaknesses in the present criteria for determining an ENO do exist, however, the options proposed could lead to an inadvertent and unwarranted decision. Although the technique currently used is complex and involved, we feel that it is fair and devoid of subjectivity. The proposed options could lower the threshold of an ENO and may actually impact public safety negatively.

Should you have questions regarding these comments, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, dr~

JAT /SRC/sjb/dlm cc: Messrs* A. E. Lundvall, Jr.

R. E. Denton L. B. Russell J.P. Bennett R. C. L. Olson M. J. Miernicki/L. E. Salyards B. S. Montgomery G. B. Gammie

STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE OOC.KETEO USNRC SPRINGFIELD 62704 (217) 546-8100 TERRY R. LASH -SS JJL -8 Pl :36 DAN L. WILLIAMS DIR ECTOR DEPUTY D IRECTOR July 2, 1985 OFFICE ~ : r1t 1At OOCK £TlfH, ' ~ER VI( f Secretary of the Commission BRANCH U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• Attn:

Re:

Docketing and Service Branch Proposed rule "Criteria for Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence",

10 CFR Part 140 (50 Fed. ~ 13978-13985; April 9, 1985.)

Dear Sir:

The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety hereby submits its comments on the above-identified proposed rule, which would modify Sections 140.84 and 140~85 defining the conditions under which an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO}

would be declared.

"Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" is a term of art which triggers the application of the Price-Anderson Act to an incident involving a nuclear power plant. Once an incident has been characterized as an ENO, individuals who complain of personal injuries or property damages need not prove negligence by

• the nuclear utility in order to recover for these injuries or damages; they need only prove the existence and extent of injuries or damages and a causal connection between the nuclear incident and these injuries or damages. In accordance with Section ll{j) of the Atomic Energy Act, in deciding if an incident is an ENO it is necessary to ascertain if there is substantial offsite discharge or dispersal of radioactive materials which has resulted or probably will result in substantial personal injuries or property damages.

The Commission's present rule and two of the three proposed options which would modify this rule adopt a two-pronged approach to determining whether an incident is an ENO. The Commission must establish (a) that a substantial release of radioactivity has occurred, and (b) that substantial injuries or damages have resulted from this release of radioactivity.

The incident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station was .not declared an ENO because there was no significant release of radioactivity. Individuals who have raised claims for compensation due to diminution of property value, JUL

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business losses, et al. after the events at Three Mile Island have not been able to rely upon--:rheprovisions of the Price-Anderson Act and have had to litigate these matters.

The Commission recognizes the difficulties incurred under the current rule and proposes to modify the rule to make it easier to establish injuries and evaluate monetary damages, as well as to respond to recent reductions in acceptable individual dose levels in accordance with the Protective Action Guides which have been proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency and issued by the Food and Drug Administration.

The Commission has presented three options for consideration by the interested public (see Attachment) and solicits comments and recommendations on these options. The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety applauds the initiatives of the Commission in proposing to modify this rule, and recommends that the Commission adopt Option 3, the option presented for consideration by Commissioner Bernthal.

The current rules and two of the options presented for consideration incorporate a two-pronged process for ascertaining whether an incident will be declared an ENO. The Department does not believe that this two-pronged process is necessary, and agrees with Commissioner Bernthal that the process is unnecessarily complicated and time consuming and has inherent problems regarding accuracy and subjectivity of the standards of measurement.

Commissioner Bernthal recommends what is in essence a one step process for ascertaining whether an incident should be declared an ENO. The approach presumes that if an unacceptable level of offsite contamination has occurred, it is predictable that substantial personal injuries or property damages will or may occur. This approach does not require an evaluation of doses to individuals, estimates of property damages, or evaluation of exposure conditions, and, as such, affords a simpler procedure for determining whether and when an incident should be declared an ENO than does the current rule or the other options which have been presented for consideration.

1 We note that while the adoption of modifications to the rules is intended to address some of the practical problems which have been incurred since the incident at Three Mile Island, the proposed rules would not affect, nor would they have affected, the declaration of the incident at Three Mile Island as an ENO since the releases from the nuclear power plant did not exceed the dose criteria or surface contamination criteria being suggested in the proposed rules.

Commissioner Bernthal s approach establishes three criteria for determining 1

whether an incident is an ENO, two of which are based upon contamination to real and personal property and one of which is based upon the air dose which could be received by an individual. These criteria provide clear, measurable standards which, if they are met or exceeded, are presumed to render property unfit for use or to reflect an unacceptable dose to human beings. If any one of the three criteria is met or exceeded, an incident will be declared an ENO. While the Department supports Commissioner Bernthal s proposal, we 1

believe that criterion (a) is not as specific as desirable and recommend that the words for each square meter of any 100 square meters be added to 11 11 criterion (a) to provide more specificity in the standard of measurement. As modified, the rule would read as follows:

(a) Real and personal property is rendered unfit for normal use as a result of contamination with radioactive materials at levels which produce gamma exposure rates at 1 meter above the surface equal to or greater than 10 millirads per hour, (0.1 milligray/hr) for each square meter of any 100 square meters.

The Department believes that all of the proposals presented for consideration are preferable to the current rules. However, if the Commission does not see fit to adopt Option 3, the Department prefers Option 2, Commissioner Asselstine's proposal, over Option 1. The Department prefers Option 2 because the first criterion of Option 2 is stated in terms of the possible dose to an individual rather than in terms of an actual or probable dose to an individual. That is, Option 1 states that if one or more persons has been, 11 or probably will be **. exposed to radiation in excess of certain levels, then 11 criterion two will be applied; Option 2 states that if one or more persons 11 were or could have been .*. exposed in excess of the same levels, then 11 criterion two will be applied. Optimally, if effective emergency safeguard measures are taken during a nuclear power plant incident, no individual would be exposed to doses of radiation above the acceptable level. Therefore, under Option 1, the second criterion would not be applied in a given incident.

Option 2, Commissioner Asselstine 1 s proposal, makes inherently possible the application of the second criterion since the dose limits are stated in terms of possibilities. The Department also supports the application of the collective dose in the second criterion of Option 2 because it makes possible the consideration of latent effects of radioactive contamination.

In each of these two options, the Department supports the dose reduction from 20 rems to 5 rems to make the standard consistent with the occupational dose limit which has been established in the Protective Action Guides proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency and issued by the Food and Drug Administration.

In sum, the Department supports the Conmiss ion 's decision to modify t he rul e and prefers al l of the three options over the current rul e. The Department specificall y reco11111ends the adoption of Option 3, particularl y with our proposed change.

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ATTACHMENT Current:

Section 140.84 Criterion I-Substantial discharge of radioactive material or substantial radiation levels offsite.

The Co1T111ission will determine that there has been a substantial discharge or dispersal of radioactive material offsite, or that there have been substantial levels of radiation offsite, when, as a result of an event comprised of one or more related happenings, radioactive material is released from its intended place of confinement or radiation levels occur offsite and either of the following findings are also made:

(a) The Commission finds that one or more persons offsite were, could have been, or might be exposed to radiation or to radioactive material, resulting in a dose or in a projected dose in excess of one of the levels in the following table:

TOTAL PROJECTED RADIATION DOSES Critical Organ Dose {rems)

Thyroid .................................. . 30 Whole Body .*.**.*.*.*..........*..*.**.*.* 20 Bone Marrow . .....*..................*.**.* 20 Skin . .................................... . 60 Other Organs or Tissues .*.*.*.*...*..****. 30 Exposures from the following types of sources of radiation shall be included:

(1) Radiation from sources external to the body; (2) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in air or water; and (3) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in food or terrestrial surfaces.

(b) The Commission finds that:

(1) Surface contamination of at least a total of any 100 square meters of offsite property has occurred as the result of a release of radioactive material from a production or utilization facility and such contamination is characterized by levels of radiation in excess of one of the values listed in Column 1 or Column 2 of the following table, or (2) Surface contamination of any offsite property has occurred as the result of a release of radioactive material in the course of transportation and such contamination is characterized by levels of radiation in excess of one of the values listed in column 2 of the following table:

1 Total Surface Contamination Levels Column 1 Offsite property contiguous to site, Type of emitter owned or leased by Column 2 Other person with whom offsite property an indemnity agreement is executed Alpha emission 3.5 microcuries per 0.35 microcuries from transuranic square meter. per square meter.

isotopes.

Alpha emission 35 microcuries per 3.5 microcuries from isotopes square meter. per square meter.

other than transuranic isotopes.

Beta or gamma 40 mill~rads/hour@ 4 millira~s/hour mission. 1 cm ** @ 1 cm **

1 The maximum levels (above background), observed or projected, 8 or more ho~rs after initial deposition.

Measured through not more than 7 milligrams per square centimeter of total absorber.

Section 140.85 Criterion II-Substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.

(a) After the Commission has determined that an event has satisfied Criterion I, the Commission will determine that the event has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite if any of the following findings are made:

(1) The Commission finds that such event has resulted in the death or hospitalization, within 30 days of the event, of five or more people located offsite showing objective clinical evidence of physical injury from exposure to the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material; or (2) The Commission finds that $2,500,000 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by any one person, or $5 million or more of such damage in the aggregate has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such event; or (3) The Commission finds that $5,000 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by each of 50 or more persons, provided that $1 million or more of such damage in the aggregate has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such event.

(b) As used in paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) of this section, "damage" shall be that arising out of or resulting from t he radioactive , toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material, and shal 1 be based upon estimates of one or more of the foll owing:

(1) Total cost necessary to put affected property back into use, (2) Loss of use of affected property, (3) Value of affected property where not practical to restore to use, (4) Financial loss resulting from protective acti ons appropriate to reduce or avoid exposure to radiation or to radioactive materials.

Option One:

• Section 140.84 Criterion I-Substantial discharge of radioactive 11aterial or substantial radiation levels offsite.

(a) The Comission finds that one or more of the persons offsite has been or probably wi ll be exposed to radiation or radioactive materials which would result in esti mated doses in excess of any one of the levels in the following table:

Table 1.--Total Projected Committed Radiation Dose Dose Dose Organ (rems ) (sieverts)

Total Body **.*..*****..**** 5 0.05 Thyroid . .................. . 15 0.15 Bone Marrow **************** 5 0.05

• Bone (surface or mineral) ..

Skin . ..................... .

Other Organs or Tissues ****

15 50 10 0.15 0.50 0.10 Exposures from the following types of sources of radiation shall be included:

(1) Radiation from sources external to the body; (2) Radiation material that may be t aken into the body from its occurrence in air or water; (3) Radiation material that may be t aken into the body from its occurrence in food or on terrestrial surfaces; and (4) Radiation from sources internal to the body.

Section 140.85 Criterion II-Substantial da11ages to persons offsite or property offsite.

After the Commission finds that an event has satisfied Criterion I, the Conmission will determine that the event has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite when any of the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) Five or more people have received a radiation dose equivalent to the whole body or any organ in excess of 100 rads (1 gray) during the course of the accident.

{b) Offsite property having a value of $2,500,000 is contaminated with radioactive materials in excess of the levels in Section 140.84{b). The valuation shall be based on market value taking into account the ratio of assessed value/market in each tax assessment jurisdiction.

(c) Employment loss of at least 25,000 person-days had occurred.

{d) Evacuation of at least 100,000 person-days has occurred as a result of an evacuation ordered by a State or local official with the authority to make such an order. For the purpose of this regulation, the evacuation period will end when the evacuation order is rescinded by this or another responsible official and when it is determined that the evacuated area may be reoccupied.

Option Two:

Section 140.84 Criterion I-Substantial discharge of radioactive material or substantial radiation levels offsite.

(a) The Commission finds that any of the following doses were or could have been received by a person or persons located on or near any site boundary throughout the duration of the accident:

Table 1.--Total Projected Co11111itted Radiation Dose

• Organ Dose (rems)

Dose (sieverts)

Total Body................. 5 0.05 Thyroid.................... 15 0.15 Bone Marrow................ 5 0.05 Bone (surface or mineral).. 15 0.15 Skin....................... 50 0.50 Other Organs or Tissues.... 10 0.10 Exposures from the following types of sources of radiation shall be included:

(1) Radiation from sources external to the body; (2) Radiation material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in air or water;

(3) Radiation material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in food or on terrestrial surfaces; and (4) Radiation from sources internal to the body.

Section 140.85 Criterion II-Substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.

After the Commission finds that an event has satisfied Criterion I, the Commission will determine that the event has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite when any of the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) A calculated collective dose of 100,000 person-rem (1000 person-sieverts) has been delivered within a SO-mile radius during the course of the accident *

• (b) Offsite property having a value of $2,500,000 is contaminated with radioactive materials in excess of the levels in Section 140.84(b). The valuation shall be based on market value taking into account the ratio of assessed value/market in each tax assessment jurisdiction.

(c) Employment loss of at least 25,000 person-days had occurred.

(d} Evacuation of at least 100,000 person-days has occurred as a result of an evacuation ordered by a State or local official with the authority to make such an order. For the purpose of this regulation, the evacuation period will end when the evacuation order is rescinded by this or another responsible official and when it is determined that the evacuated area may be reoccupied.

Option Three:

Section 140.84 Criterion for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence .

The Commission will determine that there has been a substantial release of radioactive material offsite, or that there have been substantial levels of radiation offsite such that substantial injuries or substantial damages have resulted or will probably result when radioactive material is released from its intended place of confinement and, as a result of the event, any of the following conditions is satisfied:

(a) Real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination with radioactive materials at levels which produce gamma exposure rates at 1 meter above t~e surface equal to or greater than 10 millirads per hour, (0.1 milligray/hr).

(b} The integrated air dose which could be received by an individual over any 24-hour period exceeds 10 rads (0.1 gray), or (c) Real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination for each square meter of any 100 square meters (as a minimum) at levels in excess of:

Transuranic Alpha-particle- 0.35 microcuries per square emitting radionuclides. meter (0.013 MBq/m2).*

Non-transuranic alpha-particle- 3.5 microcuries per ~quare emitting radionuclides. meter (0.013 MBq/m ).*

Beta-ganwna-emitting radio- 4 millirads per hour (0.4 milli-nuclides. l gray/hr)@ centimeter above t he ground.

• Megabecquerel where 1 MBq=l0 6Bq and 1 beiauerel (Bq) is 1 disintegration per second. A curie is 3.7 x 10 Bq or 34,000 MBq.

1 Measured to exclude very short-lived radionuclides (those having half-lives less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) either by measurement at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after the cessation of abnormal releases of radioactive materials or by making mul ti ple measurements and compensating or correcting for the contributions from these short-lived radionuclides

• Section 140.85 (Reaoved)

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Board 2600 Bull Street Moses H. Clarkson, J r., Chairman Columbia, S.C. 29201 Leonard W. Douglas, M.D., Vice-Chairman Gerald A. Kaynard, Secretary Barbara P. Nuessle Commissioner Oren L. Brady, Jr.

Robert S. J ackson, M.D. James A . Spruill, Jr.

William H. Hester, M.D.

0 CKETE0 tJ SNRf' June 20, 1985 15 JJN 24 AlO :41 Secretary of the Commission

• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D. C. 20555 ,.*. '

• Re: Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 140 OFFICE OF S!:.CRt 1At-OOCKETING & SERV ICf iRANCH

Dear Si r:

The Bureau of Radiological Health of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control is responsible for providing technical support to the State Radiological Emergency Response Plan and for monitoring environment al levels of radionuclides around fixed nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission. In these roles, the Bureau is concerned with provid i ng prompt protective actions whenever radioactive releases which exceed normal operating conditions occur. We are also committed to educat i ng the public and public officials about post-accident responses.

• It is our opinion that Option III as set out in the Commiss i on ' s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is the preferred option. The trigger levels are set at levels which correspond to proper degrees of concern, and the conceptual simplicity of the criteria make it easier to explain to the public and to state and local officials. We urge its ado ption.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this.

Very truly yours,

/,/w.~-/A __,a_£,__

'~:r,J G. S;ea~;~ ~

Bureau of Radiological Health HGS:SLF:bo cc: G. Wayne Kerr, Director Office of State Programs JUN 2 4 198!

Acktlowledp(! by IMd. --*rl1ll'l~~5ii'ttF,=I

U. $. NUC .E D01.,

0 11 CJ, D

Postma rk D Co 1es Arid' ! C

County of Monroe, Michigan Board of Commissioners 106 EAST FIRST STREET, MONROE, MICHICAN 48161 Telephone: 013) 243-7081 RICHARD E. PETTICREW, Cha i rman DOCKC:TU USNRC 15 JUN - 3 Atl :25 Ma.v 21, 198~ OFF /Ct OF s:::ct{t'/ ' ~

00Cl~E7/NG & SERv)r*r BRANCH _,

Secretary Nuclear Regulatory Corrmissi on Washington, D.C. 20555 Att: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

The Monroe County Board of Commissi oners, would like to go on record in opposition to your written corrments on prooosed Amendments to Part 140.

We feel the present rule is much more adequate for the protection of the general oublic.

Sincerely,

~FR~

Richard E. Petticrew Chairman REP/jfu Attachments cc: Sen. Carl Levin Sen. Donald Riegle Rep. John Dingell

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IIRC COIISJ[JERS REGIJLATIONS I/RC f P.OPOSES TO REVISE EXTAAOi"DJIIAP.Y IIUtl.E.t.R OCtU<~EhCE CRITERIA OIi UELL lO\;GlllG OPE?ATIO~S Th! huclear Regulatory t°"""lssion is propo-slng to revise Its criteria for The kucle>r R~_,.htnry C0t,"11Hion 1s conHder!ng tl"'!id1n9 I ts re9ulat!on5 detemlnlng that a nuclear accident at a 11cense<I nucle1r po1<!r phnt, or to lncludt sp*, lf1c uhty requirC!!'?nts for the u,e of redloocthe NLeridlS certe In other 11 cennd fac!l ltles, Is an "extr~ordlnJry nuclear occurrer,ce*

1n wll-1099109 oi,era~lons. (EhO).

T~e oil ~nd 91s industry US'!S 1-'t'll-logglng technl~s~s to obtain TIit! test for an EllO, as deftr.ed In th Ato1ic Erersy Act of 195~. as lnfonoa t ion on tb<t pr,,p,rtles of und~rground foriutlons--such as the type of i,,nend~d. h whether there wu ~ubstanllal nleise or dlspernl of radl0.1ctlv!

rock, po*oslty l*y,Jro<drbM cont'!nt and dtns1ty--1n n1w and existing \.tlls. iaaterhls ofhlte and whethtr there wu substanthl parsonal fnjurfH !)1' O~e tecnn1~ue i,.volvss lowering

• sealc,j red1cattlve soorce, with an associated pro~rty dai:wge offsHe. The existing criteria ar11:

redlat1an d~t*ctor, tnto a "~II rrn a wlr" line. lnforrut!on collected by the

~~:~ctor ls unt t:, th! ,11rhce throu3h the wirehne ~Ile the rad1oictlve 1. "That one or more persons offs It!' ~ni. covld have been, t>r 1ght b~

S.:,,JrCe ~~d delerlo* ** e sl.,,..ly ralstd fron, the bottOII'. The log of thie well h e.posed to nd,atlon or to radl * ""ter-!al, resulting In

• dou or in t pro-:lu:e~ by r.c,,J10~ u,~ "J In "Inch rad1H1on emitted by the sosrce proj~cted t!ose 1n exces\ of... 20 re to th~ i,holt body or corrtspor:llng 1nt~r,ct~ .. 1th t~: ur.J,,~~01,oj for::'lllon. dO$teS to specific organ~; or s;p c 1e le*111ls of s~rfdte conta;:ilnatlon have occurred.

/,--,rlclu,,. aoJ c,s11,, ore the r*d1tioctlve ~terhls oost c0"'"1110J>ly used for this ~u,,,*.~. S1n1 l,r use 0f tat n.ster hh h nide in co*l and otn~r ntnu!l 2. "Tm: event ho resulted In tb.e de*th or liosp1Ullut1on, within JO c::..r,hr,~1-:i.,. days of the event, of five or 11><1re ptople 1:x:Hc<l ,,ffslte sh,,....lng obJtct!v,.

clinical evidence of l)hytlcal lnjur, ...

• fr1><1 e,q,osurt to radiation; or As of N~ve-1>-!r l'l114, 173 IPC l lcenseu were authorized to use rad101etlve io.teruh 1n >'rll-lo(J'Jlng c,perltlon1. In *<ldltlon, 27 sutes have re,chid an *sz,sco,ooo or J>Ore of da,,a;e offs1te hn been or will prc~a!>ly ~ sus-ogreeN:n~ with th nor, under which t"*Y re;ulat~ well-los91ng (n ><ell is tllned by any one parson or $5 Mil1l011 or !"Ort or su~h d.,...g~ In toul hs ble cutaln ot~,r ictlvftl,s Involving CvO:OJ~rcnl use or nd1oacthe naterfals}. or w1ll prob*hly ba sustained .** "; or Thes* /.9rttm1nt St*t~s h*~e about 400 "'ell-logging llcersees._

"$5,000 or r,,ore of d,a:age offslte has b*en or will probably b~ sust*ln*d Current NQC reouhtlons do not cont~ln radiation stf*ty requ1r-.nts by uch of SO or r:,or* pu sons, provided that SI nl 11 Ion or *-ore of such c,i:-,;t spaclflcally reht'!'<I to the use c,f nuclear lllllterlah In wel1-l~9gl~g In the aggregate has been or i,111 probably bl, susul"ed, as tht result of s~ch optrHlors. Instead these OP""ratlons are regulated through the gen*ral safety events.*

requlrecn~nts for use of nuclear r;,aterhh and through cordltlons of each ir-dwlduol license il"'?Oltd on 11 case-by-cue ba,sh. The proposed rule i,culd If th~ Ccn:ilssfon deitmlnes th1t ,1 nuclnf' 1ccident was 1n EhO, persons provide conprehens1ve and con~IH~nt regulations in this are4 and is d~signed with clzins for Injuries ~ould not ne~ to prove t~t the llcens!!e \.U to* re<luce tll, rlst of 1n accident in*,olving ndloacth'!: mterhl. negllgtnt. Hc,,.ey~r, those persons would ~ave to pro*e th*t tnHe V4S lnj,.,ry or dama~e, the amount of nonetary loss and the l Ink behn!en the lo,s and th~

S~Hlc r~u1,-.,.,.,,nts of the proposed rule would incl~de: rodloactlve .. aterhl released during th!! accident.

{l) The l lctnsee (,,.el1-lo99ln9 CW"pany) would bt required to enttr into After the !larch 1979 accident at the Thre* lllh hhnd nuch*r p(>o(er a ~rltten il!Jr<'entnt with the "'ell owner or opuator tn ~~lch the o-ner or station, the Co.~isslon encou"tert.>d problt:lS In applyl~9 existln; EtrJ crHtrli operator ct>nTJlts to rn.11<.e I reasonable effort to recover any radloacth~ source One of thr pro!>le<1s was U>at It WIS i:tfflcult to detenn1ne rN>nttary !!,.,!,es, that gets stw.~ In the ~11. Tt-e 0>1n9r or op,,rator wwld 1lso agree not to pther than those directly rel~ted to evacuJtlon, lrn!, fn St,ne uses, these r~luse contaailnated equlpntnt or property surround1n3 the \.ell for u~restrlcted du,ages were resolved only aft~r utended lltlg*tlon. This difficulty ~!d f'<)i use until th~ equl~nt or prop!rty h~s been cecontar,lnH!d. This agreer'l1!nt Is 1ffect the Three P.lle Island EIIO dt~trmnltlon as It i;u t\e1r l~at tl-e need~ b~cause the v~ll-logglng COOl!>any itself r,IJltt n~t h3ve the le91l ~~!sting criteria for substantial rele3SH or offs1!e (Y.)SU were Mt .-.,t er

• uthorlty or resources to reeover I radioactive source that 9ets lost tn a we]I. uceeded.

(Z) lk;:nse!s w.iuld be prohibited fr0111 forcln9 a stuck soled ThrH options for a""n1ing the pres~~t crlterh are beln~ proposed. tni ndioact1n source out of Its holdu In e i::anrH th*t cculd enca*~~r the suhd the present criteria, th~ ;,roposed criteria Stt forth 1n any of th~ thrt¢ sou*ce's integrity unhss the ectlon -.as specifically authorized by the l,'l.C. o,tlons i,.:,,Jld ba used by tht Coc,:plnlon In saklng a hg41 decision which "°"l' hptur~ of th* s.aled source could cause radioactive cor,ta.,.fr.*tlon or the 1ffect procedures fer han,llng chlr,s for d11N,<1 er injuri~s. They v.,*Jld no!

hc1hty, pus!lnn1:l and em1lroment. repreHnt ello-.iable or sar.. 1,.,lts for us-. by N?.C licensees.

(3) Ptrfom.ince erlterh "'i)Uld be established for th~ sealed radioactive Opf1o l. Th* first crlterlon--for ddemlnfo;i that then~ has be~n !

$ources. H:H a ph*H*ln period, t~~ Staled sources us*d by well-log9fo9 11cenH~s* wt>uld h*ve to be doubly encapsulated, conh1n ~vcle;ir ...,terhl that 1

subshn.,a release of r~dhtlon offs!tt--"o~ld b*

• Co=nhllt>ll d~tenoln:tlon

• *** that on~ or nore of th~ persons *.* hn been or prolably will be **.

• ex~~s~

1s rehtlvely lnsobble and rondhperslble and elth!r h1vt 1ndlvldv~ll1 pHstd to a whole body dose of radiation ln ncen of five reris with correspon:!in; e prts\ure tnt or be sh*1hr to t prototype that has passed tests co."'Plylng doses for sptclflc orgJrl. Speclf!~d levels of surf!:! tontamlnatlon \t;,uld n; "Ith st,r.d*rds of the ~gerlc*~ NHlonal St11n:lerds Institute. bl! ch~ng~d fr0111 those currently contained ln th! IBC's regulations.

lntertH!d persons are invited to subni!t >'rltten CO""htnts on the proposed The second crlterlon-*for na~lng e finding of substanti,1 parsonll ln!lir; rule. "h!ch would bt cont*ln!d In a n..., Ptrt 39 of th! Co,*nssion's to i,erso"s or da"~se to prop!rty off.s1te--,.oold rM;*ilre a Cc=lsslon det,,..,,n, ngul,tlons. Co,-,-tnls should be sent to the Secretary, U. S. ~uclear tion thH one or 1:1ore of the following tondltloos are utls~1ed:

P!9ula~ory Co,nlsslon, l/,sh1ngton, I>. C. 20555, Attention: Oocl.etlng ind Servlas 8°,n~h, ~y July 8, 1985 (90 days *ft~r MJ..,1 iut*C\n In th* Feder*l h91sur on Apdl 8, 1935).

I*> *Five or r-ore peo;,le hAve receln~ a r~jfatlon dost ... to tr~ ,-,.,1~

body or ony orgo1n *.* * .,..,,ch is In excess or too rads.

(b) *cffslte prop!l'rty h,,ir9 a valua of S.!,S00,000 ls cont=lnlttd "It'<

r;idlo,ct1v., <>aterhls ***

• in excess of sp~dfle~ lt-veb.

(cl '(vacuHlon of lt least 100,000 person*d!ys hH occurred i s l nsult of in t*lCU!tlon ordutd by a StHe or local official with the &uthorlty to Nke such ln order.*

('~tltn 2. The f,rst cr>terlon .-ould require a Coorn,sslc,n dtttnn1nH1~.,

that ~ r s o n t'r ~rsons lC>Clted on or nur bny site boundary throu9hc,ut th* ~~rHfon of the &ccillent" could have received , wl!()le body do<t of rad,&*

t1on In oa,s of hve rems with corresponding doses for specific organs.

SptcH1e<1 levtls of su*hce contamination ~ould r-ln tl.e S!JJ!l!, ;is ,n Opllcr. 1

• ~d the u!stlng crlterh.

Tl-! SttN>d criterion - l d require 1 {o-nnslon d*~*r111lnation that one or C'Ort of t~e following conditions are ntlsfled:

(a} *~ calcuhte1' dose of 100,000 p*rs~n-rea has been d*llv*red within 1 50 . .,11, radius curln~ t'>l! couru, of the accident.*

(b, c, d) San<? H Opt lc,n 1.

(l;,t Ion 3. ihls option 1JOUld not use two stp1r1te crlterh for subsuntlel relta~substlrtial dan15es. A Ctwllsslott d~tenal!'litlM 1<Wld be required

• *** th1t thrre ha< b~tn a substantial r~lease of radioactive Nt~rial offsltt>,

or that t~tre hve b!-tn !i.ubst.nllel h>els of rtdhtlon offsite such that su~-

sunt 111 Injuries or svbstanthl dan,;iges have resulted or will :,robibly result "hen rl~liactlve Nt~rhl h releastd *** and, u a result of th~ event, any o!

the follo,,lng corn:lltlons Is satisfied:*

{a) "Pul and p1rson11 property Is rendered unfit for its ru:,mal use ~s

• result of conta11lnttlon with r.dtOllttive Nhruh ~t. .. * , speclf,ed e,po!i.urt nte.

{b) The radlatlo~ dose * ... which could ~ recehl!!d by on individual, over any 24-*csir ptriod, ex,ueds 10 rads ***

• A (cl "Roi and person1l pro~rty I; rendered unfit for lh normal use es a

'WI t of cont*Mlniltlon for e~ch squue t-.eter of any 100 si;u,re r,eters (as a ninll!'lll:l) ***

• In ucen of speclflt'!d levels.

1,;1:ten coar-ents on the proposed a.,err<!r.ients to Part 140 of the Cornils-s Ion's re;ulatlons should be received by August 7, 1985. They should be addrHstd to the Secretary of the CO!'Phslon, 11\11:leilr Peguhtory Comisslon, l-luhlr>gton, l).C. ZOSSS, ~.ttentlon: Oocketlng ~nd Sl!rvlce Branch.

IU UNITED STATES FlflST CLASS MAit

.y CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION* PUST AGE & FEESPAID' WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 USN RC WASH O C Pf RM!T ko .Q..5.L Oft*CIAL BUSINESS fOil PRtVA TE USE. $:lOO

In an effort* to assess potential chrqnic health effects from the TtvU-2

~cc5~ent, several citizenR groups have been conducting door-to-door surv~ys on the west bank of the S*1squehanna River between O. 5 and 5 n1iles from TMI.

An effort was *made to select subdivisions which are_ high in elevalion. lvlany of U1e -p_eoplc remember metallic t:rnte or odor 28-30 lvlarch .1979 .lnd some had n1ore acute syrnptorns. Three such areas are reported here:

tf/le.4- (1)

1-fl.e,A- (2)

(3)

.,4/3e.Jl-In each case over half the households were surveyed. Sometimes data was collected for other homes from neighbors. Total populations were estimated for ~a.ch a.:rca asau.rning 3 persons per u.ncontacte<l household.

'I'he populatio~ .

tnean age for all three' groups was' 35-39, not atypic:il for un average U.S. populatior.. Hence, , the reported cancer morta.lHy rates have*-not been age adjusted, althou*~h this procedure is recomm.endeo for any r;ubsequent followup studies. Followup is urged. .Althongh the state reports it has ~urveyecJ 95 peri::ent of persons residing within a 5 mile radius of Twll, OtL1.y n out of 62 :rt!sponding to this question upon survey {18 percent) said they had been contacted.

i'

• j I

The southeastern Pennsylvania cancer mortality rate is 163 per 100,000 por year. Of these

• 183 cases, 40 will be lung, 28 breast, 8. 5 leukemia, 6 lympr.on:1ap 5. brain and l. 3 muscle (tissues of origin). These baselines of expected cases will be .compared with, those found during the surveys. If anythi.ng snch survey results represent r.ninimal cancer m.ortality frequencies, since many households were not queried and in some of those queried there

• was reticence to discuss cancer.

• t Arca 1 84 persons were surveyed in 28 homes. For the 7 homes uncontacted, if one assumes 3 per household, the pc,pulil.tion base of this area is 105. This b an elevated section J , J I [I 5 miles northwest of T1v1!. Cancer n10rtalitics are shown in Table 1 an~ a m:ip of these fatalities in Area ff-1. In addition *to the 5 confirrncd cancel:_, a previous owner of house Ill 70 died of lung cancer iu 1981 and the rnother in hou9e # 158 (80 years old) died of J eukemia in 1980. Five additional residents havP. cancer di-a~nosed between 1979 and J 984,

' including one additional muscle cancer.

• J.ren 2 145 per sono were surveyed in 49 homes. It is estimated that l 27 live, fo homes not surveyed (43) for a total population of 272. This section -

Ill is 2. 5 miles !.southwest of TMI. Cancer mortalities

.' .. \

mortalities for a re shown in Table 2 and a rnap of these fotalities in Area 112. In addition to these 5 confirm~d cases; 6 other cancer I

deaths have been reported between 1979-84 for a total of 11 cancer deaths in this neighborhood.

Area J This area is approximately 6 miles northwest of TML Fourteen households with 52 residents were qucst:ionned. One case of lymphoma is,'

living. 0£ the three reported cancer deaths 1979-84, one was leukemia

{death in 1982) and two others were in a father (41) and his son (Zl).

The lymphoma and leukemia* occurred in individuals 53 and 54 years of age, respectively: Sin~e information is less complete than for the other two areas, no table or map is shown for Schuey Road.

Epidemiology of cancer mortalities Table 3 summarizes the cancer mortalites fo\lild in each of the three areas surveyed compared with those expected for the five year period _mid-1979 to mid-1984, It may be seen that Area i would. b_e expected to incur one cancer fatality in its population of 105 .

over the five year period, but 7. cancer fatalities were found. Similarly

2. 5 c~ncer fatalities were exp~cted along .Area 2 r , but 11 cancer deaths were found. Along Area 3 the story was the same with 0. 5 cancer fatalities expected (e; g., a 50 percent chance that there would be one fatality) but 3 cancer fatalities were found.

Overall, in these three areas which reported ~igns of contanunation by TMI during the 1979 accident (metallic taste., skin' burns, etc.). whereas 4 cancer fatalitea would have been expected in the Hve years since the accident, 21 cancer deaths have actually occurred. This five-fold increa.se

• e*

over expected cancer mortality rate is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level and indicates that some carcinogenic insult 1nay have occurred as a result of the TMI accident.

Table 1 Cancer Mortalities 1979-84 Case* ~ Date Type of cancer A 40  ? col.on

• • B C

72 54 1981 1980 renal muscle

-- D 33 1980 muscle j

E 68 1980 muscle I

l I

Table 2 Cancer Mortalities 1979-84 Area 2 I -. =* - - ;:::_ ---~* ~*-...,*-*,.~-

Case ~ Date Ty:pe of cancer

.A B

C 31 70 48 7/81 1979 1981 multiple 1nyel0ma breast brain D 48 1981 lung

' )

E 60  ? breast r'

. I

Table 3

,l!!xpected v. .Actual Cancer Mortalities*

in Communities near TMI (1979-84)

Cancer Mortalities Actual/ Excess

,Communitr, Expected Actual Expected I

Deaths l .. Aro!i 1 1.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 Area'~~ 2. 5 11. 0 " 4.4 8. 5 Area 3 *0.5 I . ' . 3. 0 6.0 2.5 TOT.AL 4.0 21.0 s.a 17.0 I ,

• UNITED STATES OF A.~ERICA

' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COM..~ISSIONERS:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky James Asselstine Thomas Roberts Frederick Bernthal I ,

In the Matter of \ I METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPMIY Docket 50-289 Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 AAMODT MOTIONS FOR INVESTIGATION

• OF LICENSEE'S REPORTS OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASES DURING THE INITIAL DAYS OF THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT AND POSTPONENENT OF RESTART DECISION PENDING RESOLUTION OF THIS INVESTIGATION

151 ABSTRACT Interviews with residents in tvo areas which were in the path of radioactive release* from TMI-2 Karch 28, 29 and 30, 1979 demonstrate

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cancer deaths *even times greater than the Pennsylvania avarage.

Interviews with residents in these areas reveal that radiation-related health effects were experienced on March 28, 29, 30 and April 2, 1979 which could have resulted from exposures of 5 to 100 reina or more.

Analysis of flora growth abnormalities observed in the same geographic area are demonstrably * 'the result of severe radiation expoaure.

These three sets of observations are compelling evidence of release of airborne radioactive material* during.the accident at TMI-2 order* of magnitude greater than have been acknowledged by the

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Licensee, the NRC Staff or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

The sig~ificance of this conclusion~ in the context of the kestart Proceeding, is thatt

1. the records of airborne releases of radioactive materials during the early hours, of the accide.nt",which the Licensee asserts were "lost", were more likely intentionally destroyed ~-o prevent disclosure of the hazard the accident posed to the health of the residents of the region.

2. the estimates of core damage and resultant source terlns were intentionally minimized on March 31, *1979 to similarly deceive the public, and

3. although residents have attempted to raise the issue of serious health effects which occurred during the early days of the

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accident as well as illnesses which have subsequently developed, the Licensee has maintained its posture of deception to this day, asserting as recently as April 1984 in a newsletter to stockholders that no human injury has been caused by the TMI-2 accident.

Therefore, we herein motion the Commission.to stay its decision in rendering a judgement as to this licensee's fitnes to operate the T~I-Unit 1 until these allegations are fully examined.

2,0 INTRODUCTION Restart of TMI-1 is pendant upon a judgement that the Licensee's management possesses the integrity needed to safeguard the public

'from the potential dangers of plant operation. We herein present evidence that, in the early days of the accident, people who lived at high elevations in a generally northw~sterly direction from the plant were subjected to radiation exposures of 100 rems or more. The significance of this evidence lies in the fact that the 'Licensee, as well as the,NRC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, holds a publicly stated position that r~adiation releases at the time of the accident were negligible *and that this position is supported by the willful withholding of data by Licensee which would prove this position false.

Licensee asserts that missing radiation records from the first day of the acciddent and the missing vent filters were "lost", We believe that they were intentionally destroyed.

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Beyond this, we believe that the subsequent venting - with helicopter measurements of 1200 mr directly over the plant on March 30, 1979 - demonstrate the presence of hazardous doses to the population. These measurement~ were grossly optimistic for two reasons: First, the helicopter blades forced the plume away from the measuring instrument and, secondly, the measuring device did not measure beta and alpha emissions from particulates, which, we believe, comprised a significant portion of the releases.

Finally, no dosimetry was on the ground in the areas we have

- surveyed where we found severe health effects. Yet, despite repeated assertions by residents of the areas over which plumes passed that significant radiation effects were experienced by them, not a single evaluation of these claims has appeared on the record of the Restart Proceeding.

Following is a'swnmary of the results of only a few weeks of surveying the population in areas where several plumes passed in the early days.

,3,0 THE HEALTH SURVEY 3.1 METHOD A group of women*, several of whom had expertise in conducting survey, went frora door-to-door. A form, organized on the basis of information provided by Dr. Carl Johson of Denver, Colorado was used, (See Attachment 1.)

• The primary interviewers were Francine Taylor, Norma Ritterspach, Jane Lee and Marjorie Aamodt. Assisting were Joyce Corradi, Linda Barash, Sally Stephenson, Drenda Witmer, Marie Inslee, Paula Kinney, Susan Folta, Helen Hocter, Mary Osborn, and Erma Weaver. Also interviewing were Austin Ritterspach and Cory Folta.

The areas selected were ones where residents had experienced erythema and metallic taste during the early days of the accident.

One of these areas was six miles northwest of the plant(Area l)and the other, three and one-half miles southwest (Area 2). A third area, .seven miles northwest of the plants, was chosen because of its high elevation (Area 3) and clear view of the TMI plants. Figure 1 summarizes these area characteristics as well as age distribution of the re~idents.

Amost every household was willing to provide the information

- solicited. There were no refusals in Ar~a 1, four in Area 2 and 2 in Area 3. The interviewers represented themselves as a group of citizens interested in health issues.

Several other residents of the TMI area, not in the precise areas surveyed, but residi~g or working in the area northwest of the plants were also interviewed because we learned of their unique experiences.

While the questionnaire did 'suggest' symptoms, the interviewers found, without exception that this did not more than reraind the

/ participant. All interviewers were of the opinion that the residents were conservative in their provision of information and that what was obtained was less than actually existed. For instance, a woman with an obvious lwnp in her ar~ did not mention it until the interviewer questioned her about it.

Figure 1 - DESC!UJ:.J.'lON Ul' A.liliA ~~'UlJJ.J!,S

' t-iBDIAN P0PLLATI0N LOCATION 5 YEAH AGE AGE ltANGB RANGE Aree 1 Elevated area N6 miles 35-39 1-80+

Northwest of TNI

.Atrea 2 Elevated area N31/4 miles 35-39 1-80+

Souttwest of TMI Area 3 Short road high elevation 35-39 1-80+

N? miles Northwest of TMI

3.2 RESULTS OF SURVEY

' The survey produced the following significant informations

a. a cancer death rate for each area from six to over eight times greater than expected,

b. a large number of cancers and other tumors diagnosed after 1979,

c. a number of other serious health effects, and

d. first-hand accounts by residents of exposure to plumes in

• each of the areas surveyed

• 3.21 CANCER DEATH RATE Figure 2 presents the cancer death rate analysis. Based on data obtained concerning only those 313 persons about which information was obtained, the overall cancer mortality rate for the five year period since the accident was 6.5 times higher than expected. Even if it were assumed that there were no cancer deaths among the 144

-persons about whom no infonnation was obtained, the mortality rate is

• 5.2 times higher than expected.

and 3.

The highest.rates were in Areas 1 These areas also provide the most reliable data since essentially the entire poptllations vere surveyed.

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FIGURE 2 - CANCER DEAIB RATE ANALYSIS AREA 1 2  ; ALl.

~umber of houses in Arec: , 35 93 15 14 3 Total Number of houser,olds , (

1979 - 1964 42 17 Number of Household abput which Information was obtained 40 56 14 110

- Nurr,ber of Persons about which Information was obtained Estimated ~umber of Persons in all E*ousebolds 1979' - 1%4 112 116 <<

156 28"'

45 51-k 313 457*

Expected,Cancer Deaths 1

• 2 based on All Persons in All F.ouseholds 1'.27 3.10 C.55 4. 93 Persons atout which Information was obtained 1.21 1.68 0.4B 3~37 Actual Cancer Deaths 7 9 4 20 Ratio of Actual to Expected Baeed on -AlJ Persons 5.51 2. 90 7.26 5.22 BBsed or. Ie1s0Ps Surveyed 5.79 5.36 8.33 - 6.4 7

• + Estimated on basis of 3.1 persons/family not surveyed

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215.6/100,000/yr. - r.onthly Vital Statistics Report, Table 21, Vol. 31, No. 6, Supplement 9/30/82 2

For five year period 1979 - 1984

-E-3.22 OTHER HEALTH EFFECTS - DIAGNOSED CANCERS AND TUMORS

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Shown below are the number of diagnosed cancers and other tumors among living persons in each of the three areas. These data would suggest a continuing cancer mortality rate far in excess of that expected.

FIGURE*3* - CANCERS AND TUMORS DIAGSOSED - PERSONS LIVING AR.EA NUMBER 1 6 2 10 3 3 ALL 19 3.23 OTHER HEALTH EFFECTS Other health effects picked up by the survey were ~ost notably five cases of anenia, four cases of spontaneously ruptured or collapsed organs, seven persistent rashes and eleven birthing

• abnormalities in nineteen pregnancies

• Three of the four cases of ruptured or coll~psed organs occurred in Area 3; the fourth case was in Area 1. A fifth case (subject of Affidavit 6) occurred out of the areas surveyed but in a northwesterly direction from T~I and to an individual who was subjected to fallout from a plume on Friday, March 30, 1979.

FIGU~E f-COLLAPSED AND RUPTURED ORGANS i

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Effect YeJlr Age Lung Collapsed 1980 19 Aortic Valve Ruptured 1981 43 Spleen Ruptured 1983 53 Kidney Collapsed 1983 55 (Approx.)

Artery to Heart 90% Blocked 1984 29 The eleven birthing abnormalities were as follows i one birth defect, miscarriage (fetus outside of uterus), four other miscarriages, one stillbirth, three Caesareart Sections and one premature. The dates of these occurrences were not identified in all cases, however all occurred since March 1979. The birth defect and the pregnancy outside the uterus occured in 1979.

3. 24 STATEMENTS OF RESIDENTS \~HO EXPERIENCED A RADIOACTIVE PLUME DURING THE I~ITIAL DAYS OF THE ACCIDENT Affidavits. l through 7 present first-hand accounts of the

- touchdown of plumes. The individuals supporting Affidavits 1 through 4 reside in the three areas surveyed, Affidavit 5 presents additional evidence of plume touchdown near Area 3. Affidavit 6 presents the account of a resident' insult from a pl~e several miles beyond Area 1 on a northwesterly line fron TMI. Affidavit 7 presents an individual's experience with a plUJJe six and one-half miles north northwest of TMI before 8 a.m. March 28, 1979.

Figure 5 summarizes the date, location and extent of each individual's experience.

4.0 RADIATION EFFECTS ON PLANTS

, Affidavit 8 was provided by Dr. James E. Gunckel, the world authority on radiation effects on plants. Dr. Gunckel's affidavit provides an explanation for the numerous abnormalities observed in a variety of plants by local residents.

Dr. Gunckel examined plants and leaves provided by Mary Osborn of Swatara. The flora* ~ere gathered in the area of her home, approximately six and one-half miles north northwest. of TMI. Other specimens were provided by Helen Hocker from her yard which is

- approximately three miles northwest of TMI. Also considered vas Affidavit 9 of a farmer located two miles west of the plant.

S.O DISCUSSION The suggestion that the cancers present in the areas surveyed were initiated by radioactive releases fro~ the TMI accident defies the generally accepted theory of a period of considerable. latency following exposure., We suggest that this theory is not viable in the present case, We believe that the critical exposure ~as to beta and

• alpha particulates and that the general biological effects qf this irradiation were similar to that described by Dr. Gunckel as effective in plants. (See Affidavit 8.)

• The hypothesis of particulate exposure is supported by Affidavits 1, 2, and 6. The reddening of skin occurred on exposed areas. According to Dr. Edward Branigan of the NRC, the dose would be in excess of 100 rems. (Verbal communication with Mary Osborn)

Although we present no baseline for cancer deaths ,for the selected areas for the five years prior to the _accident, we beli,eve

' that the residents reached back to recall 'recent' cancer deaths. In Area 2 two cancer deaths prior to 1979 were reported. We conclude that there were few cancer deaths (as would be expected in a population of this size), possibly ohly the two reported in these areas in the five year pre-accident period. This conclusion is supported by the frequently-expressed opinion of the residents as I

well as a medical doctor, a paramedic and' two nurses we met in the area that, since the THI accident, the ocurrence of cancer has increased enormously on the west shore and that life is terminated in a more rapid fashion than would be* expected.

Although no data is available for expectations of cancer and other tumor diagnoses, as well as the other health effects, the

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numbers of ocurrences of serious health problems in a population of this size is alarming. ParticularQy so, when according to the residents, all of these effects ocurred after March 1979, We attempted to have soil samples from the areas analyzed. A spectral analysis has not been completed. EPA soil sampling since the accident was recently puplisryed, however we have not had an opportunity to view the data. This information has not been provided in the Restart Proceeding. The only infonnation concerning soil 1

sampling that we have found in the studies of the accident is an assertion in the Rogovin Report (Vol, II, Part 2, p. 389) that although several radionuclides were detected in some samples, they could not be attributed to the accident. ~lpha particulate comtamination was not determined since it was assumed that uranium

and plutonium isotopes had not escaped in view of the Licensee's

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representation of only one to two percent core damage, These positions are no longer tenable in view of the.more recent recognition of extensive core damage. Alpha emitters, if ingested or inhaled, can produce severe health effects. ( See Attachment 2.)

Aside from the failure of NRC or the Licensee to sut'Vey for alpha particulate contamination, we have little confidence in any official data so far provided. An independent dpse assessment study commissioned by the Burger Fund about two years ago arid conducted by Jan Beyea may soon provide some more reliable information. This study has been completed and has received peer review,. however it is, unfortunately, languishing in the court in Harrisburg.

Although the Beyea study may provide conclusive evidence to support our position that the the serious health effects on the west shore are related to radioactive releases during the initial days of the accident, consideration of our motion need not await its publication. The 'personal affidavits provide clear evidence of high radiation dose to residents of the west shore. The health data shows severe effects on the health of the residents.in the areas studied.

According to an authority (See Attachment 2, p. 151) "Whereas the effects of radiation are nonspeciflc, i.e., other agents or diseases can cause the same damage **. where the effects of radiation ~re being studied, conclusions can (only) be drawn on the basis of incidence of a particular type of damage above that normally occurring in a cor:iparable poulation." Clearly the incidence of cancer deaths in the*

areas studied far exceeds the expected, and this high incidence is clearly tied to _the TMI-2 accident by the personal experiences of the residents with high radiation exposure.

It is a fact that the Licensee, the NRC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have no data in their possession which can define the quantity of radioactive materials emitted over the areas of this study during the early days of the accident. On the other hand, the record is replete with evidence of radiation release records being "lost", filters being "lost" and calculations and measurements of high dose rates being explained away or denegrated. (See NUREG-0600,11-397; II-3-18; II-3-77; NUREG-0760 at 31-33.)

6.0 CONCLUSION

S The evidence is here. A grossly high cancer mortality rate is present exactly where plumes traveled in the early days of the accident. The fact that radiation monitoring data and THI plant records have been "lost" or misconstrued only emphasizes the point that the Licensee conspired to hide the seriousness of the accident.

The Licensee alone monitored radiation.releases during the initial days of the accident

• 7.0 MOTIONS

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1. We move that the Commission act immediately to investigate the circumstances surrounding the falsification of radiation emission information in the early days of the accident and during subsequent investigations of the accident. We move that the Commission take a prime role in this investigation.

2. We move that the Commission postpone any decision relativ~ to restart of Unit 1 until the matter of Motion 1 has been fully resolved.

Respectfully submitted, Marjorie M. Aamodt Norman O. Aamodt

• June 21, 1984

AFFIDAVIT 1 On April 24, 1984, I, .. *.:. . . . . ... - *, '.* :*. . : .... *.. . - ... ,

..... :, . *,* - ... : .... , .** provided the folloving information in re1pon1e to a que1tionnaire presented by Francine Taylor of Lancaster,. Pa. and to

' Hu.1orie Aamodt ln a 1ub1equent interview that aame day. I al o provided Ka. Aamodt with a letter vhich va1 addre11ed to Governor Thornburgh and 1* dated November 19, 1981. I never received an anaver to this letter. The letter i* attached to thi1 affidavit and 11 to be coneidered a part of it.

At the time of the TM1 accident, 1 vaa living at not far frqm my present home. Thia area ie approximately four mile*

northve1t of THI Concerning my experience follovins the accident at TKI: On Thruaday, March 29, 1979, I va1 working all day vlth my 10n in our garage. The garage door* vere open. That night vhen I took a ahower,,

my face, neck and hands looked like I va1 at the aeaahore and got burned real bad. I felt nauseous. My eyes were red and burning. I felt like I wa1 looking 'through water. Friday morning vhen 1 got out of bed, my ~ipl and no1e were bliatered, and my throat and inside my chest felt like fire .

It tasted like burning galvanized 1teel. My son had 1imilar experiences He vaa 22 year1 old at the time. On Friday we decided to evacuate. ~ile packing our truck, a townahlp police officer, inf clo1ed car, 1houted over hie loudspeaker syatem, "Bill, don't breath hh air Get inalde'"

We spent the firat night in Mechanicsburg with relative,. We convinced nther family aembera to go vith us and traveled to Front Royal, Va on Saturday. We stayed at a camp ground in Front Royal for about one veek During thia time I experienced aevere diarrhea vhich cauaed rectal bleeding We took one of our dog* with us, a German Shepherd, female. Following our arrival in Virginia, the dog paeaed only blood from the rectum'and

£teed from the noae and mouth. Since I felt that these conditions may have been caused by nervousness due to our flight, I gave her a 1edative When ve returned home, we vent in*the, garage first and found our male German Shepherd had aied. Hi* eyes were milky white. We had provided about 100 lb. of food and 50 gallons of vater, however, he had only drunk water, about five gallons. It appeared that he had thrown up IOJle of thi water before he died. We had five cats that lived in a box on the back porch. All but one vas dead. All cata had milky vh,ite eyea. The one living cat had one eye ~hat was milky white: 1kin grew over thi1 eye during the fol loving weeks. This cat lived for about ix months after the accident.

• She had kittens prior to her death. The kitten* vere born dead and hairle11

• I should al10 note that we noted a metallic ta1te vhen ve entered our ta home after the evacuation.

My 10n and I have both experienced hair 1011; mine vas on *Y head, arms, legs and tor10 Thia hair haa regrown. My aon lost hair on. hi ann1 and tor10, vhich has alao regrown. In 1981 a 1ore developed on my leg.

The tore remained for two yeara, healing .after we moved to Florida The effected area 11 still detectable 11 a faint diacoloring. The akin vas inflammed, open, and raiaed: the doctor'* diagnoaia was uncertain. Aleo in 1981 ~y wife.**** va1 diagnoaed aa having paroxy1mal tachycardia and in 1982 aa having an underactive thyroid. I have al10 experienced problem, vith my heart. Although I had had a alight 1DU11mer prior to the accident, I. had paued a phyaic:al required for racing car a. However* In, December 1980 1 needed to undergo an aortic valve replacnieot. Iva*

_ 43 years old at the time.

The spring following the accident, our walnut tree did not produce any leave , and there were no valnuta. There vere no fliea or other flying in1ect1 until July 1979. There were no bird1, *,qulrrel1 or phea1ant1

The apring following the accident, our walnut trees did not produce any leave,, and there were no vatnut1. There vere no flie1 or other flying insecta until July 1979. There vere no birds, 1quirrel1 or phea1ant1 for about a year and one-half following the

' accident. 1 found a number o.f dead bird1. A number of neighbor*

died of cancer.

In 1983, I felt that I could not continue to live in thit neighborhood, *o cloae to the TMI plant,. I eold my hOIH and bu1ine11 at conalderably lesa than ita apprai1ed value and oved to Florida.

However, we returned thi1 year and are living in a nev home at

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• near our previous home. We got homeaick. My daughter and grandchildren live in thh area, ** vell ** other relative , and telephone co11111nmication with *them va1 not eufflcient contact. My *on left vith u1 for Florida and baa atayed there.

I had been in buaine11 in Fairviev*Tovn1hip, York County, for tventy-tvo years. 1 operated an,automobile aale1 and 1ervice ahop.

I va1 involved in community affair*** a ju1tice of the peace and in po.Utica ** a committeeman.

All of the above information Val provided voiuntarUy, and 1 atte1t to it* tfuthfulne11.

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/ AFFIDAVIT 2 On May 5, 1984, I, , l)rovided the fo 1 loving information to Marjorie Aamodt at ay place of reaidence on My residence ii approximately .Z..-3 ailea aouth velt of THI and 11 at a high elevation, On Monday evening, April 2, 1979, after returning from West Virginia vhere I had evacuated with *Y family, 1 worked out1lde on ay camper from approximat~ly 6 until 7 p. ** My family atayed ln1tde. When my vife

- called me in for aupper, my akin vaa burning. My face, arlia and handa vere reddened and remained that vay for a. b.rur l:J. ~/"$. I had a etal Uc taste.

I felt nauaeous, I felt "funny ln the head". I took a ahover that evening before going to bed. Since I had a head cold, I vent to the doctor's the next day. I told y doctor about my eJq>erience1 the following evening. Re read from a book vhat aymptom1 are related to radiation expoaure. We noted that theH ymptom* matched vhat I had experienced, however the doctor reas1ured me that nothing had come out of the.plant. Concerning the weather conditions on the Monday evening, April 2, 1979, I remember that there va1 a light milt over the area .

• Date Sworn

AFFIDAVIT 3 I, provided th*

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following in~ormation to Marjorie Aamodt 1n a telephone converaatlon on June 18, 1984. I was 111 with the flu at the ti.me 6f the THI accident. I was in bed mo1t of the time. However, one day, vhicb I believe was Friday, March 30, 1979, I was out of bed and decided to shake out a throw rug. I went out on the porch. It aounded aa if it*

vaa raining. The sound appeared to be in the trees. I could not aee any rain so I reached out beyond the porch roof to try to feel it. I did not feel any*rain on my hand& or at1U. I vas extremely puzzled, I waa impressed by the* stillness except for the sound of rain. There were no 1ounde of birds or other aound1 to which we are accustomed.

Thie all seemed very strange, however I was too sick at the time to pursue the matter further, 10 I returned to bed. Hy certainty in dating thia event on Karch 30, 1979 1* tied to a telephone call I received later that same day. A neighbor called to tell me that my son had been taken from his school to Dillsburg because of the TMI.

accident, and she volunteered to pick him up.

I could never get the experien?e of the a1lence and the rain-like sound out of my mind. Subsequently, several of my f:riende told me about similar experiences at the same time. ,One of theee friends is I and my aona remained during the accident. We would have chosen to leive, howev~r I am a widow, and I did not have suffienc~ent financial resources to leave.

Date----------------1 r

' AFFIDAVIT 4 On April 28*, 1984, at my home, M I, I related the following experience9',that I had at the tl.Jle of the accident at TMI. On Wednesday evening, March 28, 1979, unaware of any problems at the TMI plante, ay wife and l,ware outside in the evening to take a walk on oUT *traet. The walk lasted approximately ten minutes. That evening, my eyes began to water and burn, .Hy eyes watered throughout the entire night.

In the fall of 1982, I began to have problems with my eyes, Hy eyes felt like they were burning. About three months after this occurred, I decided to see a doctor. At this time the akin around my

• eyes was irritated and red, and there was a distinct red mark on the innerside of my nose. Although the redness around my eyes has disappeared, the mark on my noso-has remained.

The first doctor appeared unable to help, and since I was troubled about my eye condition, ~ique to\me during my lifetime, I saw a second doctor. I also h~d a rash on my forearms which had come and gone since shortly after March 1979. This rash is particularlynoticeable after showering and in warm weather. The dermatologist prescribed Prednizone.

In 1981, my w i f e - - was diagnosed as having fibroid tumors in her uterus. _These tumors were large, but were successfully removed in September of 1982.

I believe that my skin conditions and possibly my wife's tumo~s are related to some exposure we may have gotten from the accident at THI. We were unaware of the problems there or any dangers to ourselves until several days after the accident. Actually, it was a THI worker who is a neighbor and who evacuated early on.the first day of the accident who. returned on the weekend to warn his neighbors to evacuate.

Dated-----------------------

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' AFFIDAVIT 5 On Friday, April 2t, 1984, I provided the following information to .Marjorie Aamodt in my dental office in 16 IIAMJJJ -

• located at Ai S ?!Ii 1Ji1J IDIHF. Thia information co_:ncerned my experience, on dllcovered that the X-ray filtu in my dental office in;:::;=z::::

Wedne1day and Thruaday, March 28 and 29, 1979. On thoae day

• l vere fogged, Thi* office it located on the corner of -**-M* *--- -

and.r.(g Lill I *in a atone building .$" mile* north vest of TMI.

The film fogging can be described aa alternately tight and dark banding.

acrou the entire film. Approximately 75 films we.re "fogged". Theae film*

had been placed in a little container for eaay acce11 in the X-ray room The X-ray room has an outvall of cinderblock and gypaum board. The film i* #2 oral film, fa1t D film, 0.2 mr expo1ure. The machine ia marked aa 70 KV, 7.5 m.amps, 3/10 tee., for jav exposure On Friday folloving, March 30, 1979, I posted new film outside the building each day for an entire week, however theae film vere not exposed. On Wednesday and Thru1day, March 28 and 29, 1979, I experienced a metaliah ta1te and a queasy tomach. I felt "funny" and expre19ed thh feeling to my receptioni1t. At that time I had no knowledge of the accident at THI Date Sworn I

AFFIDAVIT 6 I.

provided the following information to Jane Lee and Marjorie Aamodt on

\ May 11, 1984.

On Friday evening, March 30, 1979, I was atanding on the front porch of my home. Hy home faces south. It was raining, and the vind vas blowing. All of a sudden the cat that had been let out began to howl in a most unusual way. I had never heard a *ound 11.ke that from this or any other cat. I called the cat by name, however it did not come home, From the direction of the howling, I could tell that the cat wa1 under the porch. I vent over to the bannister and leaned over to call the cat again, While standing in this position at the east aide of the porch, I experienced a most unusual sequence of events.Suddenly, the wind etopped1 there was a movement in the limbs of the trees next to the porch, ~nd a vave of heat engulfed me. The gust of'heat brought the rain over me. Then the wind started again.

Thia all happened in about one minute. I was so startled that I went ln, taking the cat, who had by now come up on the porch. I wiped the

• cat's wet coat and then washed my hands and face. My face felt tingly, About an hour later, I washed Hy face again and wiped my arms and legs with the towel, I noticed that my arms and face were pink~ I applied a lotion because my akin felt tingly.

On Saturday morning, my skin was a darker pink, and there was an itch at the front of my scalp. This was the only part of my scalp that was not covered by a scarf. When I went to church on Sunday, my friends commented that I looked healthy and sunburned. On this day, hard little lumps, a little bigger than a pinhead appeared on my forehead and into the hairline.

On Tue1day, my scalp felt prickly and tingly, so I washed my hair again, shampooing it three times which is more than I customarily do. (I generally wash my hair once a week,) About three weeks later, I noticed that a lot of gray hairs had appeared across the front of my hair. When I washed my hair that week, my comb was full of hair. The next week, the losa of hair increased. I called my hairdresser,g 94,. who subsequently applied treatments which he believed would arrest the loss of hair. The hair loss did appear to stop. The gray hairs have also disappeared, and my tiAir is now uniformly brown as it was before the events described.

In the 1ubaequent weeks, the skin on my foreanns and neck tu~ed darker and was scaly. This condition lasted for several years.

There is however some permanent discoloratton however it not prominent. Hy forearms were, and continue to be. very *ensitive to the sun, becoming itchy with exposure. I try to avoid sunlight. I have also noticed that if my arms are injured, the bruise will last longer than was normal for me prior to the events described above.

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A number of spots have appeared on my face and chest. These appeared after the tiny hard bumps went away. Six of these spots, or pimples, remain. Some of the pimples have yellow centers. The size of these pimples appears to have diminished somewhat, and they are

, not aensitive, however I am uncomfortable with this condition of my akin, unlike its condition prior to the events described above.

Of greatest concern to me presently is the loas of the fm1ction of a kidney. Toward the end of November 1983, I was in renal failure. My doctor described my condition as an unu*ual case. He atated that one of my kidneys had died. I was in Holy Spirit Hospital under the care of Ors. Bean and Eaton. I have not fully recovered, and I have not been able to reswne my customary social and houaehold activities.

I live on a farm with my husband. We were not able to evacuate during the accident, al~hough I wanted to leave, because my husand would not ask anyone else to stay to do his job of caring for the animals. Despite our continual attention to the cattle, we experienced the first deformed calves ever born on our farm the following spring. The calves' heads hung to one side until they were six months old. Their necks appeared twisted. I also noted that the Norvay maple by our home had deformed leaves which were curled at the edges.

Date------------------------

AFFIVADIT 7 I, reside at aix and one-half miles north northwest of TMI. Thia va* also my resldence at the time of the TMI accident as well as that of my husband, son and daughter.

On the morning of March 28, 1979, my husband was putting hie tool into hia truck. It was six o'clock in the morning when he came in to aak me to go out and amell the air. I vondered to myself whether it would be the Hershey chocolate mell or the aroma qf Capitol Bakers* bread. This ti.me the air was different. The air smelled like metal. It was overwhelming. I could taste metal in my mouth, It seemed as though as every taste bud in my mouth could sense this metal. We were very puzzled.

• Later that morning, at 8 o'clock, my son and I walked my daughter to the bus atop. There was no metallic smell in the air.

Date--------------------

AFFIDAVIT 8 I, of provided the following lnformation to Jane Lee,* neighbor, and Marjorie Aamodt at ay

• home o n - - - - - - on Monday, May 7, 1984. I provided thil-lnformation

' v o ~ t to it* truthfulneaa.

Hy hoae ia approxifnately 2 ilea from the THI planta. Hy houae facea in that direction and ia north ve*t of THI. I have aeveral trees in ay frontyard. One of these, a maple at the aou~h corner of the yard next to a wooden fence appeared to be affected by the accident at TMI.

Thi tree h about .:3o years old and ii still living, however it baa undergone con*iderable changes. About a veek after the accident, I noticed that the leaves in the center of the tree were turning brown.

The leavea then dropped off leaving a circle of defoliation about twelve feet in diameter. The'next year the barked dropped off many branches.

Thi caused these branches to die. About one-fourth of the limbs are nov gone. The top of the tree, which vas the area that vaa affected after the accident. nov has few teavea. Tvo pear treea. one a Keifer and the other a Harve1t, both planted in the late 1920'** have died ,,

.,Sr~ tre~a had been good bearing tree prior to the accident, however they a.II produced dwarfed pear* after the accident. The number of ~ears decreased alao. Since the accident, I _can no longer grov clover seed. because the clover yield* 10 few aeeda .. In 198f,* the laat year I grew clover, there vere only O **l(] aeeda per item, whereas i .got about fS- tA5 aeeda per item before the accident. Thi problem has affected other farmer in my area, but ia not a problem on a farm ln thi1 area but at a greater distance from the TMI plant*, approximately/2-o-at lea.

I attribute the decreaae in aeed production to the di1appearance of bumble bees that pollinate clover. Laat year ve had no apple, from our .3 trees.

One apple tree, in the yard, started 'going back' after the accident.

Laat year, it only had a couple of leaves, three bloaaoma and no apples.

The only crop that 'does good' 11-potatoea. We have had a number of problem* with livestock including sows that did not come into heat. Theae 1ov1 were not born on my fann, but were purchased from a farm near here, I wa* inside my house on the day of the accident and atay~ in moat of the time. I have a rash 'back of my. ear'and down on the aide of ay face' ever since the Krypton venting began. '

I have lived in thh area all of my life* and have farmed aince /q 1~.- *

..' The Bulletin of the Torrey Botanical Club Ed1tor-in-Ch1tf

• Jamc-s E. Gunckel

~Q Cu ~lt..ll'()ltl n, 811J<<r~ hf  :'\-I~;

\ 1.'(ll * ,.'ti !::!'>I'

},~a:r 11., 1984 AFFIDAVIT 9 l hPve care.fully examined a few specimens of ca,nnm plants *collected shorU;r after the accident at 'lllI and canpared theru w1 th specimens collected more recentl,r. The current abnonnali ti es are probably *earn ed forward b,-

inducad chrcntsomal aberrations. There were a number of ananalies entirely 1

canparable to those induced b;y ionizing radiatim -- stem f&scietions, trow-th

- sti.mulaticn, induction* of extra veeetati ve buds and stem tumors.

l;ost of the sten abnormalities described in the literature, and in m1 own experience, are induced by relativPJ.:r high doses of I or famma rays extending over a period of usually 2-J months. rota.ble exceptions, however, are 'similar responses to beta ray exposure fran radioisotopes (P3 2., zn65, ca45) and for onl!r-' 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Jn <-ther words, it would ha.VA been possible for the tn,es of plant al::noraali ties observed to have beeh induced by racit oacti ve falloot I

on J*farch 29, 19 79.

In discussing the f;eteral tiolo~cal l!ffects of irradiation, sane clari-fication may be helpful. In plants, t h e ~ rate (e.g., mr/hr) is JT!UCh more impcrtant than total dos!' (e.g * ., mr/;rr) in inducing abno~aJ.ities. F\:.rtrer.,

the 11quali ty factor for r.amrna and beta radiation is not the same as gJ!l'l.erally assumed. In fact, I have incontro1,-ertible experimental resu.l ts to show thE.t beta rays are at least a quill ty factor of two in plar..ts.

I am the world authori t:.r on modifications of plant growth and develoµnent induced b;r ion:!. z:.nc radiations., having researched this area for 34 7ears at the Brookhaven 1-:ational Lc:.boratory and st Rutr;ers University. The three

• review papers appende~ attest to ~1 expertise.

fo.-!}L.._,k{

, \

J James Y. Guncl:el

ATTACHMENT Ill Case number f 1t?

A. VOLUNTARY COMMUNITY HEALTH SURVEY Date:

Locations

\ I. Have you been contacted by the Pa. Dept. of Health survey on TMI?_When?_ _

Family name ___________ Willinq to participate? yes_ _ _ no_ __

J. Family members: status ~ ~- 3/28/79~7!9;'9~ 3/3009 (doctor) r f deeease,d, when?_ _ _ _ Onset of illness_ _ _ _ __ DiaQnosis_ _ __ Dr. _ __

4. Address current on address _ _ _no.:

and phone 3/28/1979, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

r,, Persons outdoors? ~ 3/28-hours 3/29-hour~ 3/30-hours

h. If vacated the e.rea: who .!:Q ~ ld!m .lill--when returned 7t( Did anyone notice (indicate date, time, who)

a. unusual atmospheric ~onditions_________________________

b. metallic taste, smell_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

c. eye

d. skinirritation, rritation, b u ", rreddening n i n g . ._, ,_._

e. irritation of nose,throat,chest________________________

f, experience nausea________________________________

g.

h. experience experience vorniting _______________~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

diarrhea.______________________________ _

i. experience headaches ______________________________

j. develop hypothyroidism.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _hyperthroidism.__ _ _ _ _ __

k. within 2-4 wks unusual hair loss or color change _______________

l. red spots under skin_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _b.leeding QWM ____________

m. unusual bleeding__________________________________

n. cancer_ ___,,_____ form....., _ _ _...,____ treatment_ _ _ _-,--_ doctor~......,,.---,-

0. later was there confirmed (doctor)anemia blood or thyroid disorder g women: If pregnant, date of last menstrual per1od before 3/28/79________

Complications w~th pregnancy? stillbirth_____m.isc.arriaQe _______

~::~:~u~~ ~~ri~-s~i_n_c_e_,b_i_r-th,-- Date of birth_____Wt. at birth________

caesarean section ___________ Date of birth wt. at birth_ _

health ofc:hild since birth _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ crib death._ _ _ _ _ __

'1,lhstory of disorders in family tree (leukemia, cancers, thyroid,etc.)

fO.Animals. parne age in 3/79 inside/outside alive/dead health problems I I, .A.dd1 ti on al comments _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

FIGURE 5 INDIVIDUALS' RADIATION EXPOSURE AFFIDAVIT AREA DATE .,PtOMS I I 'J/29/79 Erythemia Metallic Taste Burning Throat Hair Loss Rashes 2 2 4/2/79 Erythemla Metallic Taste Nausea 4 3 3/28/79 ~aring Eyes (evening) \

- 5 6

Near 3 Beyond 1 3/28, 29/7'9 3/30/79 Nausea Metallic Taste Exposed Film Erythemia Tingling Skin Hair Greying and Loss Discoloration of Skin Skin Cysts

I

.Attachment 2 J

I I '

}

It I.

.: rI . Dangerous I.

I:

• Properties of I.

1*:

I I lndustria~ Materia!s I .

I Fifth Edition

' .I

!I N. IRVING SAX Assisted by:

Marilyn C. Brack~n/Robert D. BrClce/W1lllam F Durham/Benjamin Fetner/

Edward G. Fitzgerald/Joseph J. Fitzgerald/Barbara J Goldsmlth/John H. Harley/

Robert Herrick/Richard J. Lewis/James A Mahoney/John F Schmutz/

E. June Thompson/Elizabeth K. We1sburger/Oavld Gordon WIison

~ ~w~O~~~D}~~~tJH~L~~ C£~~

LONDON TOAOHTO MELBOURNE

' ' I 150 SECTION 5A would be completely absorbed o~ I. I g cm- of alummu1 it would also be absorbed by I. I g cm' of air HO\i.e,c the absorber thickness would be only about 0.25 inch fc

\

the aluminum and over 30 feet for au The result of ionization i1 merely a cometsion ol th rad1atioq energy into another form of energy within th absorber, and it is these secondary effects which are o the greatest importance in radiation protection work.

The rnmary effects of ionization and the dismbutio1 of this ionization over various path lengths m differen absorbers have been mentioned previously. The differ ent types of radiation also show different degrees o absorption and these differences also are biolog1call1 significant. Alrha i,articlcs are ~cavy, slow movmg. anc expend their energy in a relatively shon path They arc therefore, sroken of as showing high specific 1omza11on.

i.e., a large number of 10ns are formed per unn length o1

• path in the absorber. Gamma and x-rad1ations. on the other hand, require a great thickness of absorber tor complete absorpuon. Gamma rays and x-rays have 1 low specific ionization, I.e., the loniuuon i~ spread out over the relatively fong path required for complete ab-sorption. Beta particles are intermediate m their spectfie ionization.

Biolockal FJTects The biological effects of radiation ere considered here only in sufficient d~tail to be of assistance m problems of radiation protection. Some of the infonnauon 1s also required tor an understanding ol tne concept~ that have gone into the formulation of permissible le\el~

X-rays or -y rays, because of their renetratinf? nature, may dissipate only a fraction of their energy in pa~smg through the body. This is particularly true of h1gh-ener@~

ra),s. The energy dissipated is. of course, the absorbed dose delivered to the body or portion ol the bod~

Radio1sotor,e1. m contrast, may present a further haz-ard when the material 1s taken mto the body where rt ir-radiates the tissues or organs intematty. The most ~mous eflects from this standpoint are produced by the o emn-I ters such ai, Ra, U, apd Pu. They are part,cularl), marked r" becau!.e o im1tters outside the bod) expend their enetg).

enher in pel'letratlng the clothing or the dead cells of the epidermis; usually the rad1a1ton cannot pcncrrare 10 1!;-

,n~ celh On,ce they are taken mto the body via rngemon or inhaldllun, this same propeny of short-range ,rnd high specific 1omzauon mcreues their relative ellect consider-abl). Em1ttt1"$ located in a small section of tissue \a.Ill ir-radiate that small section very heavily.

Beta emitters can be both an internal and an external hazard The range of most external /3 rad1at1on ,~ great enou!!h that the outer lls~ues. 111 leul. will be penetrattd The most comm~n cxtemareffect~ ha\C been rad1ai1on

~n~ ,md mal1!-nancre~ cil the ~k111 Internal!~ !~~ rr.~\

RADIATION HAZARDS 151 produ~. a considerable eftect Their spec11tc mni1at1on oone structure. ~:~s!,!i~,_.ri 1 t h ~ usu~U~* 35~

IS h11h although not as p?reat a~ that tor o radiation. tmUO!.Jl,x)SCTCtlOn..£!"_ the ISOlC? which aduall . ~d ces The preceding paragraphs have emphasized the 1on- 1hiim9,MQl,P..t~m1. e excretion rate of such materials iution effects. r,articularlv s~c1!1C 1omzat1on. Manv has been com1dered to follow much the same pattern as secondary effects can be caused bv th(' 1oni1at1on the radioactive decav of an isotope. The ume tc.QUJred process. It may disrupt m9leculcs. It may destroy bodv hv t_he body to eliminate one--half the totaLquantity- at

.. et!ls, or the energy may merelv appear in final form ai, contains is thus rcfcrrcif_i_ois"'6iologkafhalf*life." Most

, . Jieat released within the absorber. Dependm~ on the lo- nt the experimental data on excretion seem to fit a power

,~-~~- o~_thc absorbin2 ato~ within the molecule the function "h,ch 1r the resultant of a number of exponefl-

~*:~~mayor mav not disrupt the molecule II this tutl~ rather than II simple exponential function. but the

-~JUule is in

• crillcal place within the cell, lhl* cell. concept of h10l0J?tcal half-life ii still used m denvmg

.r~1Ls function. or its ability to reproduce nselt mav oc' permissible levels.

de1troyed Many qf these processes are reversible: that Such body,deposits may depend on many physiolog-is. damage aiu~ by molecule disruption or cell dest ruc- 1cal Iactors both in the process of deposition and of excre-tion can be revrrsed by _!_he usual reparative mechanism creuon For manv vears a high calcium diet was recom-of the bodv. This' 1s. ~!!fr~~9 J>~ Sf.t'~!!HSJl!~L.l1!!a mended for radium workers. as It wa!- supposed that a

• hich show thatafixecj _t_pJaLdnsc...sp_r~ad auJ ro*er .a large execs~ ot calcium entering the bod; would reduce periodor~eck;~p.rodu<;es. a...!mal~L~tkcl lhao \be. 1erne th'-' ::imnunt ol Ra dcpo~illon. Actually, the relative dose delivcfecl in ..1 f("W minutg. However.

_........__.._.;r,,,.~ .. -- '\. __... - * - - ... '"'(~ -

in I he case ot l'"<f""" ' * \,

raclium depo!>1t1on 1s e function of the ratio of radium

,a large acute dose or conti!!llg!,"?h"ronic overexpo~ure. to calcium in the blood stream. Unless the calcium level iherc 1s the I?<?Ssibihty that non-reversible damage ,\ di of the blood 1s maintained at a very high value there will

-occur. still be denm,ition ol radium. The increase m the blood

• Another type of cell change which 1s possible is that calcium required 10 cut the radium deposition by even a the regul4,iive functions of a ti,;,;uc may be destro~ed In factor of I hree "nuld he impossihle to attain.

this ca\e a carcinoma (cancer) may be produced Al* lk~1dc.:~ the bone structure. common sites of deposition

!, lho\t~h 1he mechanism ic. not full} unders1ood, there is are the lung~ :wd J..):~p.!J .n_Q,!;1es !or in baled particles. and duect..;,-v,dence that continued ms ult to a ttS~uc: ma\ spe~1!11:**o~~an~ !or cenain isotopes. such 11:i the thyroid

_produce 'this result. The htgh rates of leukemia among lor u1dine and spleen for iron '

I* rad1olQi1Sts. bone cancc-r among Ra dial painters. and A !>econd cons1derauon 1s that cert am organ1> or, 1ic;-

lunt cancer among miners of the Czechoslo\akian. suei. are more rad1osensiuve than others. l"he membranes German. and L.S. uranium mines all point to rad1at1on hnm~ the bronchi a_~os~~h_q!;>ll_e~nsll1\e I_V. u1-as the causative agent l_h1!' irrever~ible damage in d1at1on anJ tfus is the pr1mar! site of many luniz cancers c!i~r:!.!£_!a_d!_ation ~osur~. ~~_8£11~.!!!'.iliSJIDluJa.ill£ attributed to inhaled rad1oacme material. The srleen h

~~~ve efiects led t o_J l]i:.J.Uoro.c.s, also ~cnsit1ve to radiation and ~!LJma.ll ..doses lnltrnal Emitters. The biological effects of rad1auon ha,e owduced more irreversihle dctmage 1 in that prgao from rad101sotopcs in the body are complicated b, sev- than m_ ~ilie_c.i~1Ji oJ :ttie i,ocly-.. ._._~ , * ,. ,

eral factors. In any det.crm1riation of rai:liauon effects. The or'gan mo)t likely to be damaged because of the

'ilhether m workmg populations or m animal experi- comhmed effecu 01 concentration and rad1osens1t1, it,*

ments. the following factors must be considered: r ll the is i..nov. n a~ the cnt1c11l organ for a particular i~olope

'~ location of specific isotopes m the bodv. and 111 the In general. an\ cell m the process of dmsion (mttos1s)

I relative sensitivity of different tissues to ;adiation 1s radiosensltn e and for that reason a person 1~ more I

The general effects of external radiation have been sensitive to radiation during his growing period than as I

pm1ously de.scribed but there are certam modifications an adult.

m the consideration of radiation from internal sources Radiation lnjut). The effects of Eg,a_ti.o.i:i. ar!=_nonspe-The first is that different elements tend to localize in cific: i.e .. other agents or diseases can cause the l>ame different organs of the b,~d,. e.~ . calcium or strontium damaf!e .I-or example. 11 1~ imposs1'2k to distiof11ish m bone. iron in the red blood cells. and iodine in the Ix-tween rad1a11on-mduced anemia and normal I: m.::1dent 1h~To1d. This is true for anv material which is metabo- anemia Other ru~sihle effects such as lung cancer: leu-lized foUowing either inhalati~n or ingestion. Of.@urse- kemia. and bone cancer pre~ent similar difficulties

... many 00.1.rcadjly soluble substances will remain .1n the In anv case. where the effects of rad1at10n are being lung~!~ IO_l}g periods after inhalatio;. Th;s~;ans that studied. conclusions can only ~ _!lr~~n an .lbe_hasl.Ulf the total amount of such a radioactive materi~i" IS not mcidcnceof a-pait1culai _i5-'fl~.Pf..d.sUD..a~ abo\e thauuu:.:-

distnbuting Its dose umformi-~ but rather is concentrat- mal~ccurrmi in** a comparable population If tabu-ing its effect on a rela11~*elv s~ail fracuon ot ihe bodv fa.tionsaremade of incidence In Zl particular group. such Most of the hea\'y metais tend to be diposited m the o.!> chemical onerator~ exposed to radiation m a process I ,J

Attachment 3

- - - - - - - State ffepresetative Stephen Reed's Letter to the NRC

,.I Aui;,.a t a, 19 7, Honorable Jo*eph M. Hendrie, Chairman o.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commi**ion Hashinc;ton, Ciatrict of Columbia

Dear Chairman Hendrie,

I am entirely baffled by the apparent refiaal o! the o.s.

Nuclear Regulatory Commisaion to have extensively reviewed the reports by hundred* of Three Mlle Ialand area resident* who, during March 28-31, 1979 pr:Lm&rily, and at time* *ub*eguent, exp41rienced1 (al metallic taste in their mouth (b) metallic or Iodine-like odor in the air (c) irritated and watery eyes (di moderate or aevere respiratory intlammation tel gaatro-intestinal dysfunction and diarrhea (fl disruption of the menatral cycle in females

{g) ski, rashes (soma appearing as radiation burns)

(hl sh~rp, abnormal pains in joints.

The o.s. Public Health Service and Pennaylvania State Oept.

of Health are joint!~ conducting a survey of TMI area residents to record medical hi*~~**** so that the full health consequences of TMI'*radiation releases in the next 25 years will be documented.

~hat is all fine and should be done. But why is there a eoJn;)lete dismissal by the NRC of any immediate indications of exposure to levels of radiation higher than wbat were immediately thouqht th*

first date* of the aeeident? P1yeho1omatieally induced ailments

• r* poasi.ble with soma, but not with hundred* or avan more parsons end I auggeot this Clatter haa been conveniently laid aaide.

The NRC is charqed with ascertaining fuil details a.bout~~*

~'MI ace1dent. You are further charged with knowing t.~* full effeets cf even low level radiation on populations near to nuclear reaetors.

l'ailure to pu.r1ue the* aforementioned reports from TMI area residents

.; a dismal failure of you;- moat important safety responsibilities tu the tens of millions of people living near reactors, not to 111en-ti,n the people around TMI.

• I therefore recommend that all available expertiae be applied to aacertaining the cause of th*** phyaieal ailment* associated with th* TMl accident and a complet*lY accurate public disclosure made of its eau1e and the level of radiation or contamination that people may have been expoaed to, The inability of both Metropolitan Edison and the NRC to knov even to this day (or at l*aat to have diseloaed if you actws.lly do know) the lovels of expo1ure 1* in itself a major, IIIOat aeriows failinq of pre-TMI accident obligations by both parties. And H it ii determined that th* e:uet cauu of th*** physical ail.menu cannot be determined due to the lack of adequate research on the 1ubjeet pre-TMI, then th* public should know the extent to vhich we indeed a.re unprepared to deal with nuclear plant emissions.

Y~ur* ainc*.:*ly,,

STEPHEN R. llE~

State Representative 49 II

• www.xw:u,

1978-714 ~ 1980-477

• 1982-501 AGE*

J_00 Ballets, Martha X JO 1 Bamberger, Carrie 96

,o:: Dr1Lwbaugh, Alda 'Mae 64 3P3 Derrick, Robert 60 Lung X

Oli Ensminger I oo*a Pancreas ~-~ - .,.... .;. r.

_ *-=< ** ___ ;;. . *  :;

lQC. Gross, Athea 53 . Benign Bre~st~'Tumor/ova.ry* removtl 39""- Gross, 53 Spi'nal Stignosis/disabled JO? George, Eva 53 -*x" C X 20? JI.a.ring, Walter 81 Stomach/liver X g(I 109 Henry, Forothy 51

.:.::-~~,-~ ;,: .

\ ... ....{ ,*~-.-*

'110 Hillman, Anne 70

]11 K~ng, Francis

1? King, Irene

'11 '= Krone, Re:na JV~ Kunkle, Paul Dr.

115 Lehman, Henry

~; -~w.r..,

• • ~-b ..

"l ( Miller, Harry _:.;_.,..*,.._x,;.

-::.~-~- -~.

!'/ MUler, Preston

,,f_;,<1~ i~ 1

, 11. Park, Frank Jr.

. "" ,...,....:,_;.~rt;. ~ ~~ ~  ;::- ..,:: ~.. ,-* ~ .,

Shuler, Cora 78 12-18-80 --.. ~- ~ ... ~. .. Thrga.t -X

.-*; *._:~_

• - - 1

-: '-:~~ CEP.

- ~ i.1,_"'£'..,. ........

J22 Rosinski, Frank _,

es,_

-: ,i'fc '

24 Toomey, Dani el : R. -

Tusing,. ... r _

• X 26 Yinger, X 1 Yinger, 2

-l  :--"""=' .:..., : -~ - r' - *

-_ .. -_ "1 * ---..: --~ .~x ~,=*~-. ~" r * ~x 1 Richards,

Animal Cancer '

AHEA 2 Blood disorders Cysts Caesarean Heart Leukemia 0 0 Mi sca.rriage

-....:> CD Thyroid Zl ll~Imll , Offil Unabl~ to Contact Anemia

' Died of Cancer Living Cancer No Code# Died of Cancer Family moved 1520 ,....

0 II-fil§~

u ms{

2180

_2i9_ 0

~-3.

221a.

Page 1

,AREA_# 2 hesidents Yr. Birth 'flnmors. ,<'ffeta.llic

~ 'f'1u,1+.A 051 Husbann 10~1 Beverlv 1911 HusbaM 1Q18 Wife_* 1Q?1 U,, "'1,,,,, ,..;t 1Q41:j 1 Oll.O Thvro1di8J!l t.;;* * *. * * -,

w-\f'"" iu:i1'1tiea

• fu~vere hA::idaChes/,H OP""',, .. *- Y ,.. ..

Son 1974 Daughter 1971 '*. fl l-n1-,,hi:iTin 194?

' i-' ~ -<. .._ - - ..... ..... -

Wife 1Q'i? Two *.mi._.._....*:1.aoes since accident TIRrn:rhter 1Q'n Hut=iband 1'112 H'.1f e 1c;16 1 O? Hu ..ba.nd,. 194?

t.A fe 194,;

101 *' Husband 1C>~0 Wife 1Q10 NO Husband 19 Wife 19 vom1.\1-~i~toalunable to retai food Yes Iam:hter 24 '.VX'B Vaughter '30 :v:rs.

Son 11 yrs, Son 4 yrs.

106 ,. Huslun,n 1,11-f'E!

• Resident moved. Information obtained from other sources . -*,_.

"'u~.j!.;s*~~

, ** i-"

• • • New J1es1dent since accident. - -'

• • • !18sioents unavailable or refused to ~ p a t e Case# Represents a single household.

t'R'- ,,

.r :l,.,,_,. ...,,,._

..... ~.

it. .. ~ -

• ~*=~7t:::1

. * -- r Metallic Skin/Eye . .J

• h , "t- I I.. Health Dept.

1se l: hesidents Yr. Birth Tumors Taste lrri tat.i*ons Circulat0rv Pa. Survev 108 lJl'I iJi fA 1942

., \ ... ~ .........

Son

• PsvcllolOli:1:cal damage ~

Da.up;hter 1972 109 Husband 1942 Wife 1938 son 17 yrs.

Son 11 yrs.

Da.un:hter 12 yrs.

• Son 9 yrs.

107 Wife ves

.Husband ves 110 NO

\iife's~ oond also di ed from ca 1ncer 1945 NO 115 P.usba.nd

.'Wife 1946 l)aW!'.'hter 1969 Dalli!'hter 1974 ThlUllhter 1982 no Husband 1911 NO iiife 1931 111 refused 4 family members Yes

• Resident moved*. Information obtained from other sources "*':.

• • New Hesident since accident.

-~R~sidents unavailable or refused to pa.r~te

• C.ise f Represents a single household.  :

• • • -~ ,., ,'i.-t :.

Page '.3 AREA# 2 Metallic

• Ski Eye** .. ,* ~ ~ . is ,, Health Dept tse fl besicents Yr. Birth Tumors Taste Irri +J:1.ti nns Ci rcula t. nl"V *"'Pa Survev L44 Husband 1Q40 Wife 1945 liffi§&,

Son 1967 Son -

.Da.ulil'.hter 1968 Son 1970

• ' ' ."I

'\. * - - 1'

~ ~ '

14"i Rusband 1939 .~ .~ -  : Yes tires.at cy :rt.s .J,;eJUCJVtm. l~O\I n ( )

• 'Wife 1941

• Y8S face/~s/ax. tns :.- * ; ' Felt funnv; in the' bead diz!':V

• n,ma-hter

Son 1966 tau1Zhter 1962 NOI'R One daughter. breast cyst remove Ii 8'3

.46 Husband 1941 Wife

. r~n,,.hter Da.U1Thter 1961

~rn:!'hter 1962 r.,,,n 17hter Ha.s had tbyroidism since BRe 3

., Son 196?

Son 1970 52 Husband 1917 9'ife 1922 Jeff 1960 Pro-nuclear/PPL emnlovee NO Husband 1923 "

\.:ife 1948 - .I Son

.Son

• Resident moved. rJ?Jmation obtained from other sources ' *:$,:':r.

"New Resident since accident.

-!Ht-Re~idents unavailable or refused to par+te Ca~e # Represents a single household.

AREA II 2 Metallic Skin/Eye* ._g. - ~;;.- " j: '

~ * .q:~ . . . ..;.~~* ~ . ,. . H8Jl.].th Dept.

me II . hesidents Yr. Birth Tumors * 'Taste lrri +_i:i+:1 nn<<t'. e1 rcula.torv ' *Other* Iniiica.tions- * -.,*"'

Pa Survev

- . **-* . --~ .., " ....... ,.. ,~:r.*

l.f :;: :';:

.. . , NO 1928 - i;' . a ';'.::?£_*.::-:-.;~~--, ii'" *. 1

.'!of.-.

154 :Husband

. -ves .... _-i,** -~ -1 ,;.

~~.

~

- ~ - -~\, :.: . ~,Si. *--~ -~:-:.,,. :,.t,.. -r:~

-J* ._. ~ ~;~t.~ ~-

Wife 1928 yes yes >"'".f:i'l:1f*. :;,.-,; ' :J-'. detects* ,1dd..-ut..s1lvery*powder .  ::;..*.

. *. ., ,.' . -~ ..,:~. 1.:.4ri.f~ ?t;~b *'!: ~£---~~~ :.J;:~~..fr*

,.~,.. ,, - *~_:*~.J Susan 21*yrs. ... .,, t~-.. - - t!-::>~-C't ~

~-t _.~~-

....*-- ** - ,.._ - .. .-ti._~ ' ;t't."'l; .. -

_Jere 23 yrs. r

~ 3/4;.*~* ""~~~; "1/4;!~,;#~~:

• ,... "~-f't,... ~\~::

..,..,,.;-. -~*

--J'f lf',l!i' ~~jl_,.,,.

r~

?°!"-~.+;.:-'~~;,--.j..,." ~'r....r-'X-

.ti:¥~~,; ,5 .r.. .:..,1\tf:}f; f - ,_ ,-.!. h ,,......

.. *;: £~

1 i;r:; Hm:ihAnd 1949 'S\ - r<YA* .:._ ::1'1_..: f ..,,.,,..,... **~*v ,.-,. ** ,.* "l::'~f'l!i:*

......,.~ -1; ... ,r'1=_.  : :c~ .

• Tii!!=:

W1fe 1. Qt:;1 - '!-;~~- ~~~:: !' ~

., ., t~ -~->f;< ._...

-- -~ ... ~: ; ~ ~~ ,Bed cell* ~5.. 50 DW008~X ~*nrv! couRt"'"',, /;,.,,,,,.,,

I

- '. -~ :t': --...~.r,._.~_-* W"'

Son 1980 '

I CUl!!lll . .. /J.? _,::;_

157 Husband 1955 *

• --c - ...

-*. 1;.;...

~

!~~i.;/~- ,,,:t .

... - * - ,I.-#

>',)',.. ,,: ~ ,- .r-; * -~*>> ' " ~ ~ ~ ,

f . . - ,., *-..-..::'\, .....

,r ,'P' *.. .: ..

NO Wife 1956 - ' 'Ji._'

--_i_ ~~

-*-- "!',:- --:  :~ -:. -1. ~ -~~?fa .

Son 1979

- - ... -~-. -:,.

' ~~~~r~;'

_... two caesarean --sections .,

.Con 1982 J

200 Husband 1922 . . - ,,. .- Heart Heart by-bass/deceased 1982 NO

-wife . 1919 -

' . _,,.., ... ~ ~ ; .... ,-.. _,.

Thyrcl.d 5*iiroblem/takes medicine 201 Husband 1922 NO Wife 1925 anemia severe arthritis

~02 Husband 1919 -* NO

. _... f _,_

.;+';,

Wife 1922 1'-:f

. ,, 1.

.;f\;_:--rot_..

201 Eusba.nd 1941 -- .. ~*.--i:

- '., "' ~

NO

• -~-* -'!c-  ; .. - .,

Wife 1945 T-.

- Thvroid *disorder/Dr.' a ca.re Son 197"3 ' * ~ -a:..

W4 Husband 1920 lliPn cer .--:,::;. -* ...-~-~:..- ...... . .;.,; ,

,., clostomy -!!,k:* *-:: NO Wife 1918 rn!W1er -

-=i

~~ . :, . -;..r-chem~theraw, 7began 1983 .

?05 Widow 1923 ' **

.r:. .- \:....r1,. ' .

~} J

~.,_,.. ,!.

~-~O~J\,, ~o nD,OJrt~de r,

i,n ,~¥ng+, r . . ,,., ... ,. NO

. - ~ ~--~ -:>-t" ~--: ,;~.- --- . ~--i *. - ;:,,:: ~>---:

Son 1962 .;;,;.~-:r-:- ~ .,

Son 1952 - ...-r*...,

• Resident moved. Information obtained from other sources

• • New Resident since accident.

Ht*~~sidents unavailable or refused to p a r . t e

• - - c ~.. --;,r.. :..~-

• Case I/ .Represents a single household. .. t '" - ~:: ...: ,-

age 5

~e II hesidents Yr. Birth Tumors 06 Husband 1Q10

-Wife 1911 07 .refused

~, ,-* ,,,.

38 Husband 1923 -yes

.. *- '\,,..... ~  : 1~

• Hife 192? - ';\ ' ...::~ -=:*~

J9 Husband 1914

.ves

• ., Wife 1919 :ves 10 Father 1914 Son 1941

. ~

t1 Widow 1912 l2

. Susband 1906

'. Wife 1914

-Gra:ndamrhter 19,r;

- *Husband 10LL1 Wife 1Q16 y,:,,:,

_<

in.., 10h?

r'leanvh+ .,,.. 1Q6':1 Gr- f'i:i+h...,. 1Q01 4 Husband 1945 - -- \ Nn Wife 1047 Son 197?

Da.llil'hter 1980

- H's father 65 yrs stroke/died 1Q?Q 5 Husband 1948 cvst-like eru-ntin;, .. a month i:1-f'+ .,,.. ,JR.., n,:,nt_

Wife 1950 have since disappeared t~orma.tion obtained from other sources -

,..New Hesident since accident.

• • Residents unavailable or refused to parti.te Case# Represents a single household.

Metallic He,µth Dept i,esidents Yr. Birth Tumors Ta~te ~ Survev

• Husband 1Q47 -. '* NO Wife 1952 Da.UJ2:hter 1977 Son 1975 18 -~t (f) 1940 NO

• 1:la.w.hter 1971 Son 1961 19 :Husband 1Q41!i NO

'Wife 1Cll.ih

~hter 197.5

.,, UQg d.1ecl. I.t'Olll. *p..(UD cancer ,

'Dall.!z-hter 197? aiscovered. -wnit.e -oower in dcw:s d1':ih1aT1n b.r JI.I 'l"la,.,, i!L, ,.,+_ 19'i1 fla.~ter 1971

-: Son 1982 D's Father on.set of 111ness ? /81 died 82

'1 RusMnii 1 Ol.i.t:; MO

... _.....y ~"'le *-- - ,

W-tf~ 1948 Tl4r! .... ~ ,c*.:::. i..--- _.i:t4-- _.,. ___ i .:i---'

Son 1q70

... fl n

.l.n.Loat. .,,__

• 2 1-.u~h~nn 1Q1? 00'1"1 cancP.-r W-\fp 1000 cancP.-r 6 Eusband 1924 ' l-*

Wife 1924 psycholog ca.l damage from ac~iderii- strong. ta~~- -~ .- - -

,of iodine/gritty....

in mouth J/28/7~

3 P.usband 1g10 Yes li/ife 1cr:-io

• Resident moved. Information obtained from other sources . ~-.,.. -~--

• ! ~ --_-_ h* -

"'.H'"New Resident since accident. * * *r ,. * ~ ,;f __ _., ~.

• tHH-Residents unavailable or refused to partA1-pa.te

- tase _// .Represents a single household.

• age 7 AREA# 2 Metallic se /I hesidents Yr. Birth Tumors Taste Pa. Survev Not intervi ewed cancer ti . cancer II II

~er

" cancer

" " cancer II

" cancer

<t'I II cancer

" " cancer 5 .Husband 19 Wife 19 Son 21 yrs.

Son 17 yrs,

• Resident moved. Inf orma.tion obtained from other sources -r..,_

~-'..l;~~a~~ r~

H-New Hesident since accident. .. 71*' :: J":.~~~~ w ~

-IHl'R~~idents unavailable or refused to pa:rte Guse# Represents a single household.

- ,::,.J\

j \ .1. l

>A fl 1 Anima Blo Cysts 1 Cancer rs od disorde

?.!1 (AA) lB)c) )

cc (P.)

( L)

• .'19#002 0#022

1. 001

1. 001 .,,, *

1. 004,U

---

- a Ceasare *

• .#005 ------021

' Heart Leukemia (T}i)

( ) p#006 Miscarriage (uc)

Thyroid Contact (A) Jll#OOB Unabl: to

• Anemi Died of Cancer l2)

<7.1t)f.h Ton 11.i.llg canc;r Lied of .;cer ~?1.,.,

,>}'.!?

Minus code Frunily moved ' CJ #225

• ~l_?,2. -* 0

?o* <;..'0i\ $ 224 c:("<:>~

- ~

"~

• #226

• 0

1. 101 ff.i* f009

• L!

,, #160 a r

II ts]

Page 1 19f4 AREA # 1 APPROX. SIX MILES NORI'lllEST OF TMI Metallic Skin/Eye c.,:-:c // hesidents Yr. Birth Tumorn Taste Irritations Circula torv G'ther Indications *n :*:.~.Y 042 ?IJOther 1913 her,ca tea chr.f>l* col'cs Nl Son 1937 04J Husband 1916 former TMI w('rker *c Wife 1Q1Q Breast Breast cancer/rrm sd ectomy / cher..o ..... l ' ) .-..~,

161 1943

---

Husband Wife 1939.

160 Husband

- 1943 ~~ 8 y ~cu~ted at 7:00 7 ~. ~:. -

Wife 194'.3 Son 1963 I.laughter 1968 Son 1971 162- Refused 1 t:formation Former residents Burns (male/ 1eart attack) :New l1esi dent 170 -1(-!I- uwner/ l*al e l~ew Rcsj rlcrt PrF!v1 n, 1,! Owner/f'lale "; tMBger  :"orr:!er csident ,-: I Pd 1°~'1 C~en heart *c 171 Husband 1917 Yes Yes SU gery See affl davit Wife 1941 Yes Hypothyroi c: i sra Son 1957 OR'< Hi1!!!r,:::i nd 1959 Wif'P 1959 Tumi:rhter 1980 StlTI 1980 m¥~Bi~ Unus11.:=11 order *C

(!ct;,n_

150 Huic:ru:. nd 1QO? !'.' -n, ,.,-L WH'p 1Q10 5£lon ncer :iftuu; r

ter .from

• • • I.owns

~,hi~err.ar:~town, :,,\

svn rome/ car.cer ( 1 Cl I:~ (1~*, *

• I 1:--.,,.crh+.Pr 1Q4c;

• Resident moved. Information obtained from other sources

• • New liesident since accident.

• ~Residents unavailable or refused to pa;r~pa.te Case# ~c~sents a single household.

Page 2 19t'.il-AREA # 1 -APP:ROX. six MILB:3 J'~ortl'WESI' OF TMI Skin/lye

' Metallic Cn:-.e ff hesidents Yr. Birth Tumors Taste Irritations Circula tor:v C~her Indications a .,urvc 1918 .

009 Sister Brother 1912 heart attac~ Sued en death/no ~~fii£hY n~~hlcrn 101 Husband 1946 Wife 1952 Son 1976 Ia.ughter 1979 I

1 'i8 Husband 1918 \

I Wife 1928 ' --

Son 1966 Son 19Ei0 r Mother Died 19eo Leuken-.ia  :: C 159 Husband 1924

. Wife I 1924 Yes . (_

112 Husband

\

colg~

can colostomv - I

\

Wife . 19.54 021 Husband 1922 *c Wife 1925 008 mffle 1940 Mother 1909 ~8g~s Dii2rl .i-l-~I ti.

137 Husband 1940 co5tncer on C.,r!)eratr-c on 19P"

Wife 1941 Da.u~hter 1964

. Daughter

{

1961

&~ast: opera tee'/ q /  ?' _.

Da.u.rmter 1962 nee 1~8-!HI- Number of p aople unkno-wh no information

• Resident moved. Information obtained from other sources

• • New liesident since accident.

~~*Residents unavailable or refuse~ to :par-pate Case# ~eni:-esents a single household.

AREA # 1 APPROX. SIX MIL.ESNorth WEST CF TMI Metallic Skin/E.ye C.,~e H hesidents Yr. Birth Tumors Tast.e Irri +At.ions Circula torv Other Indications a ~;i.;rvov 1 Q":i1 0?2 Ht1-ch:an~

Wife 1932 Daughter 8 yrs. .

Da.Wl:hter 12 yrs, 004 ~le 1911 L

• c m~le muscle 001 54 yrs. cancer died 1980 002 Husband 1911 I

~: (

Wife 19~1 '

Da.uahter 195?

Granda.ur;hte t 1972 E~ttion 00~,.._ T-li,~n:anil 1 QC:1 l,[1 f'p 10C:?

8nT'I 10,:,h To11i:rht_,,,... 1 QP.(\

Former Itesi :lent 11 vre .~RRg~ ' Died 1980 Feir.ale 005** Husband 1947 :l Wife 1953 Two miscarriages 19tl1 & 82 Son 1983 Female died J9PO Former fiesi 1ent 68 yrs , muscle cancer 006*-+i- Husband 1914 Wife 1916 Dausrhter 1960 J '

Tum.<rhter 1961 Son 1966 ,

007 Husband ~R8~te Died 19A1 diarnosed 197P . '

• Resi~fi{ moved. f ~/Jorma.tion colosto:J' obtain from other sources colostomy 1'174

• • New Hesident since accident,

• • ~Residents unavailable or refused to parti.te r

-case# HeprE;Sents a single household.

• 1ace Li 1984 ARFJ\ #1 APPROX .six MILES lWRTHWEST OF TMJ Sld.n/ l!.'ye Circulatory other . /,

Case# Residents Yr. Birth Tumors M.rllilic as e Irr1 tat1ons Indications ~'t:rv;

, 223 Husband 5-11-42  : , *:- -

I

?-??-I.LR i 1,H .f"~

Son 1_2-17-71 J,

SQP R- 1-71:j Pet dO£: una'ble to delivc!'.' lith lHti r . ] . J __ _

I I 224 Husband 1-23-21 '

Wife 8-24-06 eve ves A~~so ~f{rf1°e1:ti s 1 ca ce 'thf:Jt1i'J'~

IJ£,Cl* ~*! rC c;a~T('Lr.

o'.rm,..,_:,

• 22c; HuM::i.nd  ?-211-a? ,.

t.rl fp 12-17-1.J.h Son Q- i:;-6c; .

Son ' 8- 1-71 .

Son 12- ,-?'> - *---

226

• Husband ---

Wife Laughter . -

Son - __ .., -

l

-~ ~--

~ -- .

• Resident moved. Information obtained from other sources.

• ~Kew resident since accident,

• • ~~esidents unavailable or refused to participate.

Ca$e # represents a single household.

• nv1, , . , .... Vl,JIL..n \.rflL..1,..,,n, 11VVL..1-.Mf'\ ui..,,~nMl11'tU ;)JM11Vf1 DANIEL PISELLO, Ph.D.

Director of Research, Accord Research and Educational Assoclates, Inc.

RICHARD PICCIONI, Ph.D.

Senior Research Scientists, Accord Research and Educational Associates, Inc.

Department of Blologlcal Sciences, Hunter College of CUNY New York, New V ork I NTRODUCTI OH Nuclear power plants release releases are not available. There- th,: shore of Barnegat Bey. The site radioactive materials Into the envir- fore, reliance on the licensee's moni- Is s I tuated 11'.S km south of Tom's onment In the course of normal oper- toring program for protection against R Iver* Hew Jersey, and 56 km north of ations. Federal regulations require excessive doses Is unwarranted. Inde- Atlantic City *. It ls bounded on the the licensee to monitor all such pendent monitoring ls needed both as a east by US Route 9, on the 'west by releases at the point of discharge check during routing operation and for the Garden State Parkway, on the and to limit these releases so that early warning at the onset of a radio- north by the south branch of Forked the total dose delfvered to Indivi- logical emergency. RI ver, and on the south by Oyster duals off-site through all exposure Creek, The station Is located patm.iays Is kept as low as reasonably One form of Independent off-site approximately 100 km south of New ach I evab 1e.( 1)* This dose, wh !ch In- monitoring carried out by a group of York City. Figure 1 ls a map of the c ~ s both external and internal concerned citizens living near the Oyster Creek vicinity showing '43 cd91 but Ions, Is not measured. 1 n- Haine Yankee nuclear po.,,er plant In numbered loeat Ions where measurements stead, It Is calculated fro111 the Wlcasset, Haine. was to manufacture were made.

measured release rates us Ing an ap- and dep 1oy a network of cont I nuous 1 y proved set of formulas that model the recording electronic radiation moni- Several pathways exist for the dispersion of plant effluent In the tors.( 4) Another method Is to d I scharge of a I rborne eff 1 uent from environment. Large uncertainties &etlvely track and measure the plume the Oyster Creek plant~(&)- The main Inherent In such mode 11 ng may cause of airborne effluent using a mobile sources of gaseous waste ,are: 1.

significant discrepancies ~tween the radiological monitoring unit. This offgas from the main steam conden-actual and the calculated dose.(2) type of monitoring was carried out by sers, 2. leakage from the turbine AREA researchers at THI during the gland seals, 3. building ventilation The licensee Is also required to venting of the Unit 2 containment 'air. and 4. exhaust from the mech-carry out an approved'off-slte envi- atmosphere during the summer of anical vacuum pump.

ronmental mpnltorlng program for the 1980(5) and In routine monitoring of purpose of checking the model used to several nuclear po.,,er plants. The mechan I ca 1 pump Is used calculate off-site dose. Such a during reactor startup to remove program usually consists of a fixed In this paper the equipment and offgas from the main condenser. The array of thermolumlnescent dosimeters procedures developed by AREA for offgas ls vented through a short..._

and a set of sampl Ing stations from mobile monltorlg are described and the ( 1.75 minute) delay 1 lne to the plant which environmental samples are col- results of monitoring In the vicinity stack without filtration. Building lected for laboratory analysts. The of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating ventilation air from the reactor typical environmental monitoring pro- Station In Tom's River, New Jersy are bul ldlng, the racho1aste but ldlng, the g,a Is not designed to provide reported. Th~ monitoring method 'w18S turbine building, and the offgas p.W,t discovery of significant designed to determine the external building Is vented to the stack with-changes In off-site dose rates.(3) dose rate due to gamma radiation from out delay or filtration. The tur-Excess Ive off-s I te dose rates due to the plume, to measure the short-lived bine, radwaste, and offgas bul ldings plant effluent could therefore per- air particulate activity In the field, are also ventilated through rooftop sist for weeks without being detected. and to sample airborne particulates vents. In a 1971-73 study of the for laboratory* analysis for long-I tved Oyster Creek plant by the United An even greater lag exists be- radlonucl ides. A novel and Important States EnvlronmentalProtectlonAgency tween the time monitoring results are feature of the method employed in this (USEPA), It was 'round that the turb:ne obtained and the time they are made study is the ab i 1 i ty to detect the building was the second largest source available to the public, The results radioactive plume without pr;or back- of airborne emissions, due to leaks in of environmental monitoring by the ground measurement by observing the steam systems.(]) The steam 1 i censee may not be ava 11 ab 1e for a fluctuations In the environmental leakage rate was found to be sub-year or more after the monitoring was radiation field caused by the s tant i a 11 y greater than the 770 kg/hr performed. The results of on-site meandering motion of the plume. value assumed in the plant Environ-monitoring of releases at point of THE OYSTER CREEK NGS \ mental Statement(B)i Xenon-133 and discharge are also available only T~e Oyster Creek plant Is a Xenon-135 emission release rates from after a similar delay. Then only the bolling water reactor (B~R) manu- the turbine building were measured at total amount of each Isotope released factured by the General Electric 31 and 94 mlcrocurles per second, 25 during a three month period Is re- Company for the Jersey Central Power times greater than the rate predicted ported, Data on specific releases, and Light Company. The station began In the Environmental Statement. The Including time of release, are pub- ope rat Ing In 1969 and reached I ts main condenser offgas Is the largest lished only In the case of unplanned present *naximum power level of 1930 source of radioactive gas. Prior to releases. Detailed data on routine rt1 e g aw t. t t s t her ma 1 I 11 I '3 71 * . T ht: 1977 th~ m.a.in ~ondense.-. Q.ffg.,~ "'IH, station is located In a relatively passed through a 30-mlnute delay line, fl at marshland area of Ocean Co1.111ty,

• Refer to references at end of text. Ne .. Jersey, about ).2 km Inland from

r  !> '1 tf i '}

Figure 1

-MqHITOfffllG THEOYST!R f-wed by particulate air filters, top es to 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> and for Xe Isotopes B\JR 1 s typically employ dilution of before being discharged through the ~to--zcr-dciys:--,;,henrunct Ton Ing ac- offgas with steam and ma*y be operated 112 ni. high plant stack. *cord Ing to specifications, the AOG down to zero power level.) The by-eliminates virtually all short-lived pass valve also opens automatlcalJy In August 1977 the augmented noble gas Isotopes from the main con- if excessively high temperature, high offgas treatment system (AOG) was put denser off gas d 1scharge, reduc Ing the hydrogen concentration, or high Into ope rat I on at Oyster Creek.(6) I ts total gaseous activity released by a radiation level Is detected in the purpose ls to reduce airborne radio- factor of 150, The AOG has no effect AOG system.

active releases and to reduce the on emissions from other sources Tiithe volume of offgas processed and elimi- plant. A bypass va-1 ve miy be opened Table contains a list of nate the possible explosion hazard of 'Tnorder to shunt the offgas waste radlonucl Ides reported released In hydrogen and oxygen formed by the stream around the AOG. During start- the airborne effluent from the Oyster radiolytlc decomposition of the up the bypass va 1ve is kept open Creek plant during the third and reactor water. The AOG system con- until the power level gets above SO% fourth quarters of 1979.(9) During sists of a series of subsystems, of the rated capacity. \Jhen the most of this period the reactor -,as hydrogen recomblner subsystem, water power level decreases, the bypass operating at nearly maxi mu~ power and removal subsystem, charcoal absorber valve ls opened when the power level It may be assumed that the AOG was subsystem, and high efficiency partic- goes below ~5%. The AOG cannot be functioning most of the time.

ulate air filters. Offgas from the ,::,perated at low power leve 1 because main condenser ls diluted with air, of the difficulty in controlling METHOD passed through the AOG, and t~en water level flow In the recombiner vented through the plant steck. The  :~r1J!:'"1srr. *r~ s  :,r:-,ble:ri is soec1f 1c A Spt"c\all., *"101**f'ed \.'cUi.~,.ag-en cha~c~al abs~~ct~on ststen, ~hich cor1- ~G the oes Jr or the AOG at Oyster ilabbit conta1n1ng radiation slsts of a series of four six-ton beds  :"e""k. 1n r-~*C'h ~ht:: ~ondense .. ,:-f'fga;: detectvrs. a k;g~-r~t~ narta~*e of act l vated c-h,vcoa 1

• is des I g"led tc , 1 .;tt"" * ... ,.. ,. 1.,"'r tc  ;):US.::..~iJt. vacu..im oumu, and ,Jtner equ *p"'len:.

increase the aelav time for ,r :~o- t r1r r1111Jh th'Z  :.:: ..; ,10:::; 1 s 3':. othe"" carried a ~woman ~rew.

energy gamma sc Int 111 at I on probe Reported airborne rad1onu~l1des rele1sed from O~stcr Creek Nuclear Gener~tin~ Stltion (HEG SP)*{ Lud I um Measurements, Sweet- durin~ the third and fourth quarters of 1979.

water'. Tx., Model No. 44-2) connected to a portable digital ratemeter/ Nucl1des Released Half-Life Third Quarter Fourth Qu:trt>'"

scaler (Ludlum Hodel No. 2200). The (Curies) (Cur1esl probe was sealed Inside a foam rubber- Noble Gasea:

lined Lucite housing that was ~ounted on the roof of the mon I tor Ing krypton-85m 4.4h 1.07xl0 4 9.04'<104 3

krypton-87 76. Otn 4 vehicle. 3.60x10 J.34xl0 krypton-88 2.Sh 4 1 3.55-:104 3.13-:103

\ Air particulate samples were ,:enon-133 5.27d 1.15xl0 8,54xl0 xenon-135 9.2h 6,10x10 4 5.45xl0 4 collected on 47 mm membrane filters xenon-135m 15.6m 2, 70x10 4 2.28"<10,I 4

(Hllllpore Corporation, Bedford, HA. xenon-138 17.0rn 4 9.03xlO 7.59xl0 Cat. Ho. HAWP-047-00) havlno a pore krypton-89 3.2m 8. 16 -8 5.65 -8 size of 0,45 111lcrons. F llters were xenon-133m 2.26d <l.47'<102 <.1.47'<10 2 xenon-137 3. 9ra 1. 78x10 1,33xl0 held ln "Sterlfl1 11 filter holders

( H 1111 pore Ho. XX I 1-0117-02, -04

• and - Total for period: 2. 72x10 5 2.36xl0 5

o]). Tygon tubing was used to connect the outlets of three filter assemblies Iodines:

In parallel to three 11 rota,.er 11 flow iodine-131 8.05d 2.67 1.44 meters graduated to 120 standard cubic 1od1ne-133 21.0h 9.26 l 4.46 feet per hour (scfh) (Hatheson Instru- l.Od1ne-l35 6. 7h 1.3lxl0 5.55 ments, Horsham, PA) and then to the Total for period: 2.50xto 1 1.15x10 1

Intake ports of a portable high-volume constant displacement air pump (Gast Particulates:

Hfg. Col, Benton Harbor, HI, Hodel No.

strontium--89 50.4d 12x2440-101A) driven by a 3 horsepower stront1UM-90 28.2y gasoline engine (Briggs and Stratton, cesium-134 2.19y H11 waukee, WI). The pump was capable ces1um-l37 30.0y of iAtalnlng 120 scfh through each barium-140 12.8d la.nthanum-140 40.2h fll- chromium-51 27.Sd manganese-54 291.0d cobalt-58 71.0d One of the fllter'holders was iron-59 45.0d modified to clamp onto the front face cobalt-60 5.27y of a Gelger-Huller 1 pancake 1 probe etrontium-91 9.7h niobrnm-95 35.0d (GHP) (V lctoreen, Cleveland, 00, Hodel molybdenum-99 66.0h No. 1'89-110) with a thin mica window technet1um-99m 6,0h (1.li-2.0 m9/crt2 thickness, 4,45 cm rutbenium-103 40.0d d I ameter ). Holes were cut In the iodine-131 8.05d iodine-133 21.0b sides of the filter holder to allow lOOlne-135 6. 7b unimpeded air flow as shown In Figure ceriwn-141 32.Sd

2. The distance between the filter cerium-144 285.0d and the probe wlndo\oi was 2,7 c111. A protact1n1um-233 27. 4d neptunium-239 35.0m sl ml lar fl lter holder assembly, not Total for period:

connected to the air pump, was clamped to a sec-ond I dent I ca 1 reference +~*years, d=da* s, bchours, m=m1nut~s.

'pancake' probe. and the standard deviation, S , of Poisson statistics. This ls the five reading about the mean was reflected In an R which Is signifi-Each GM probe was connected to a calculated using cantly greater than 1, As a practical separate portable ratemeter criterion adopted In this study an RF (vtcAeen, Hodel No. li90, Thyac 111) greater than 2 was taken as Indi-couJ9to digital accumulator/timer. cation of the presence of the radio-The counts accumulated by the act Ive plume.

reference probe were subtracted from The ratio of the standard dev I at I on the counts accumulated by the probe to the square root of the mean was The gamma detector count rate facing the pumped filter in order to calculated, This rat lo Is known as was measured In several plumes while determine the net activity due to the reliability factor, simultaneous measurements were made particulate raioactive material accu- with a calibrated high-pressured ar-mulating on the filter. RF: 8 ,~x 9on-fl l led Ionization chamber, (Reuter/Stokes, Cleveland, Ohio, Model The counts recorded by a pro- RS-111) on loan from the New Jersey The following procedure was used perly functioning radiation detector Department of Environmental Protec-to detect the radioactive plume, exposed to a constant source of tion, It was found that the excess Small helium-filled balloons were re- radioactivity obey Poisson statistics gamma dose rate in the plume could be leased near the plant to determine and the expected standard dev I at ion estimated using, local wind direction. Using the roof- of a series of readings equals the mounted gamma detector, a search for square root of the mean, The mean- DR= 2 7x 10- 3 T the plume was made downwind from the dering motion of the radioactive plant. If the presence of the plume where T ls the count rate above back-plume causes a variation In the radi- ground in counts per minute (cpm), and at a particular location was ation itensity at the detector on a suspected 5 consecutive 2 minute DR is the dose rate in mlcror?entgens time scale of ml~utes, while changes per hour (R/t,).( 11) readings were taken, The mean, X, of in background radiation intensity these reading X (1*1.5) was calcu- occur on a time scale of hours,(10)

'aled *~cord:nq to, Rout i rie ver i f icat i :,r, of th~ re-

- h*}.- t. h~ rr11..>~ : o:--- nf t *,i-: ;t 1 tP"tlf ~ends to sponse of th'!! G"':: a*,,: ~(;;st* ;:,robes increase the standard oeviation of ~as performed using low-intensity,

~~ ~c* ,es o* 2-m:~ute readings above  ::=e:-le':"!d u""a~*u,-,, a ~ : , : ' ~*.:.-oc!J""1~

t1,e .. ,_oec~eo ,al_ie predl .... ted b~  :: o::- a 1 :. -~ '): "'ec k s :- L: r.: ~ !. ... es re~ ! 1 Y JI!" I y.

f i*l trat ipn system was set up to draw air tt)ough three membrane filter!.. In 1

• order to measure short-lived part I-cu 1 ates present In the p 1ume, one of  :,i:or. tub1ni::

1/4 J.!: ..

the fi 1 ters -.*as monitored with II GHP, using the modified filter holder de,-

crlbed above, while simultaneous read- c-orJ ings were made with the reference GMP. ..?'

The number of counts accumulated on X"'.11-047-02 each GMP was recorded in consecutive ".1llipore two-minute Intervals for at least ten Millipore - ci~rane filter "Ster1!1l" (HAl."P-04 7-00) minutes before starting the pump In filter order to check the rel at l ve response bolder XXI I-047 ~

of the two probes. Then counts accu- assemhl:

mul ated by the HEGSP and both GMP I s were recorded every two mi nut es d ur 1ng U!I-047-04~

(mod1f1ed) ,1ctoreen 0 ()

the pumping. If significant particu- G~ Pancake Probe late activity was measured on the f _..,,=-----! (Model *489-1101 mon 1 tared f 11 ter, the mon I tared f 11 ter was disconnected from the pump. Read-ings of both G~P's were continued for at least one hour In order to deter-mine the rate of decay of the short-lived particulates, During the mea-

~---

surement, wind direction was periodi-cally observed and recorded by release a helium-filled balloon, Flow s through each f 11 ter were recor-

• and start and finish times of pumplna were noted, ~hen the HEGSP count rate Indicated that the plume had moved, pumping was discontinued, and the search for the plume began again, Except for five upwind reference to Victoreen Thyac samples, all samples were collected ratemeter (Model No. 490)

In the plume In order to Increase the possibility of detecting long-lived particulates In the plant effluent.

All the downwind samples were com- Figure 3 bined and subjected to gamma-ray emission spectroscopy, The com-posited sample was also subjected to a radiochemical analysis for Gamma radiation levels at two locations strontlum-89 and -90, Laboratory along Haines Road near Route 9 on 25 June 1981, analyses were performed by Teledyne measured with HEGSP (l"xl" NaI) detector.

Isotopes, Westwood, HJ, Distance to Oyster Creek stack is 5.2 km.

During this period the wind shifted so that

-TS first site 12 and then site 8 was downwind Figure 3 shows two series of frow the reactor.

two-minute HEGSP readings taken In the early morning of 25 June 1981 on Ha Ines Road near Route 9 about three miles north of the plant, In the 4000 first series taken at site 12 the first five readings averaged 2378 cp~

with an RF of 13,8, Then as the wind shifted to a few degrees to the west CIJ

....i:: 3000 carrying the plume away, the readings ~

decreased, The average of the last I,,

five readings was 861 cpm with an RF CIJ p,,

of 3 .6. A t O3 4 O the mo n I tor I n g vehicle moved along Haines Road and ...

Cl) i:: 2000 the plume was found again at sJte 8,  ::, si~e 12 By Oli50 the plume had again drifted 0

u stack stack bearing bearing out of range of the detector, p,., ( )

CIJ 206° 203° \

~ 1000 Detector moved Tab 1e II cont a Ins a record of to new site radiation measurements taken at each dur.l.ng this of the sites shown In Figure 1, The interval.

date and time of each measurement are given along with the average HEGSP and GMP count rates for a selected 0240 0300 0300 OMO 0400 0420 0440 0500 ten minute period. The HEGSP readings were recorded as a series of Time' (EDST) five two-minute readings, and the RF for this series Is also entered In

• ,radlat.fon field proved to be an ef- M;,usurP'llent of short lived air particulate ~ct1Vlt).

fect)ve means of detecting the plume Effect ne when pr1or'knowledge of background Stnrt of Duration ,\\erap:e Maximum llal!-l1fe radiation was not available.. Site Pump mp: of Pumping+ HEGSP Excess Filter First ! Hr.

Date ~ (lDST) <min> (cpm) Activity (cpm) of D~ca,* pqnl Using the conversion factor ob- i /11 31 0320 201 802 51.2 tained by comparison of the scintil- 7/11 1637 58 636 36.9 42 lation detector with the cal lbrated lonlzatlo11 chamber (Methods), It Is 7/18 4 0143 92 2380 81:J.6

'possible to convert scintillation 1276 92.9 7/16 4 0430 161 detector count rates to external gamma dose rates, The lower limit of 7/18 4C 1144 67 5989 433.4 37.0 detection for radiation from the 7/18 1 1633 75 4038 92.9 plume corresponded to a dose rate of 1 uR/hr. A maxlmu111 ten minute dose 7/19 20(231°) 2353 97 2985 39.3 rate above background of 21uR/hr was i/19 31 0827 46 4874 595,5 25.3 observed 1 km northwest of the plant (site 40, 7/18/82, Table 11). An 7/19 31 1623 100 683 49.3 55.7*

average dose rate of 11uR/hr above background over a period of 46 7/19 43 2116 92 641 67.3 62.4*

minutes was observed In a populated area 1.9 km from the plant (site 31, 7/19/82).

Using the air filtration system

+Flow rate was 120 scfh for all samples *

• upwind sample.

with fl lter and reference GM probes, It was possible to observe the bulld-u . decay of radioactive airborne p ulate on the air filters. The effective half-lives for the upwind particulate samples are about one hour for pumping times of approx-imately 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The effective half-lives of the two highest TABLE I\'

activity particulate samples col-lected In the plume (37 minutes and 25 minutes) are significantly shorter Long-lived nuclides 1n air particulate samoles collected do11.nv.ind of Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station and Indicate that a significant por-tion of the effluent airborne parti- ldeasured Average air culate radioactivity Is probably a Activity concentra~ion**

Half-Life ( J2Cl) (fCi/m )

mixture of rubldlum-88 (half-life Gamma ray emission 17.2 minutes) and ceslum-138 (half- Ge(Li2 s12ectrasco12r:*

1 lfe 32.2 minutes). These Isotopes are produced In abundance by the berylliurn-7 53.6d 10 5!:I decay of krypton-89 and xenon-138. potassium-40 1.3xl0 9 y 40 110 Krypton-89 and xenon-138 constitute a manganese-54 291d 1 3.1 significant' fraction of gaseous releases that have been reported (see cobalt-58 71d 1 4.8 Table 1 ). Because of the half-1 Ives iron-59 45d 3 20 o . e krypton-88 and xenon-138 cobalt-60 5.27y 2 5.5 p s of the observed particulates ar only 2.80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> and 14.2 minutes, zinc-65 245d 3 9.6 utilization of the AOG with design zirconiurn-95 65d 2 10 hold up times of 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> for krypton rutbeniurn-103 40d 2 15 and 20 days for xenon, would rutbenium-106 1.0y 10 30 eliminate these Isotopes from the effluent stream. Thus, the results iodine-131 8.0d 2 470 reported here l nd I cate that a cesium-134 'L t9y 2 5.7 significant portion of the Oyster cesium-137 30y 2 5.4 Creek gaseous ~ffluent was not being barium-140 12.8d 2 103 processed through the AOG. On the day these results were obtained the cerium-141 32.5d ,2 19 *I plant was operating at between 50%

and 60% of its rated capaclty.(12) cerium-144 radium-226 285d 1C22; g

30 28 81 I

The low power level suggests that the AOG had been bypassed, accountin~ for thorium-22E: 1. 9ly 3 86 the presence of short-1 lved noble gases and their particulate daughters Rad1ochem1cal an::. l n;u,:

• in the plume.

~trontium-84 50. ~d l,?=1.0 17.5!:9.2 By positioning the air filtration 'ltront 1um-qf, 28y 0.7 19 system  ;.., :he plume, effluent airt>orne partkulates were collected at a maximum rate along with a

~;":mun ~uantitv ~r background par

~:c.ilates. This method tfelds a **\ . r.::u:--:l~~ * ~ . .::-*~lr: \ .. r ~,::-:-.-~*r:1,ttldr. 1:i:- -t1..!- :- ...  ::.J~ (,!"r,.,.,tf"'~

sanple with the best plume volume to '*:*rtl**-::n* t l._~r-rc It":~* t ~,,.1,.:.l..: "';"L""t *~,t !r,- 1&;.:a1!!:--

H~nsured with 2" GH proheq.

Lighthouse Road and Routt' 9, 1. 9 km south of Oyster Creek rlant, 19 Julv 1981. Flow r:ite is 120 11cfh.

700 filter probe counts

- - - - -* r<!ference probe counts 600

....,:, 500

....C:I!

0..

., 400 u

§ 0

Ell C5 300 200 0900 0920 0940 IOOO 1020 1040 II 00 1120 1140 1200 1220 1240 Ti11e (EDST) 9000 *Figure 6

~ Ga11UM radiation level!I at Lighthouse Road and Route 9, 8000 1,9 km south of Oyoter Creek plant, 19 July 1981, 7000 4J

...s C:

6000

.,c.. 50<XJ

\.,

u C:

'.)

u 4000~

r~ I

,.,w

\/'l I

r I I

3CXX).J I

I 20007

. ....... .... ------........._,-..-- -- *~ ............ -~**"***--,,.- . , .. -.. ,,, ...

1.."*"' t - l

,lh"*nn,*ct fllt~r t..---...,

I [1<1\,N\.'I \n ~1,lldur Jnd derav 0f radio>active 11irbornf' p11rtirulat<'q 1-'>',H,11rr,d with 2" GI-! pr0b<1~.

.. ,. -, "r~* r .. * - I hththouse Road and Rout<' 9, 1.9 km south of Oyster Creek

,,J,111t, 1q -Tulv l<l8l. Fl<'W rntP Jq 12D ~crh, filter prnhe counts

- - - - -* reference probe counts

.,OJ 500

l

....BC:

.... 400

§ 0

tJ

~

rs 300

• 200 0840 0900 0920 OlHO IOOO 1020 1040 1100 1120 l!40 1200 1220 1240 Time (EDST) 9000---------------------------------------------, *Figur.- 6

~ GmmM radiation levels at Lighthouae Road and Route 9, 8000 1.9 km 1outb of Oyater Creek plant, 19 July 1981.

7000 6000 u

I ti

-a_5000 GI Ill u

! -4000 tJ VI

"'::r:w 3000 2000 1000 Tillle (EDST)

~9*)0 . -

~

Bui!,1Jp cf r.1c!i<'1ctive '*lr'>0rnc ;-,,rt!ct.:ltcs ncn<1urc<l wltl, 2" r*: rr.*u<*~.

F'ir,urc -

Lig'1thous~ Ro,,d ;1r.d Rtute 3, J ,q h, south of Oystt>r Cn:l"k f!lnnt, 19 J1Jly \0!\I.

Flow rlte is 115 scfh.

700 ------ filtc1 probe counts

- - -- -- referenca probe counts 600 ilJ

...a C

!500

~

0.

.J

§ 400 0

u

~

300 200 r

connect filter to pump 100 PVIIJ>Off r--:-,

pump off r----, .C- disconnect filter from pu11p

..;::,-~~..,,.... ,.Je ....,.......__.,.-*........_,....__,.../,..-.,,-_......,...,,_. ......._._,.,.. ........~ ......>-,,,................

o----------------,~---.-----,,---,.....----r---....---.....----,.----,-.--1 1600 1620 1840 1700 1720 1740 1820 1840 1900 1920 1940 2000 Time (!!DST) sckground a1r volume ratio In the REFERENCES 7, Blanchard, Richard L., Brinck, hortest possible time, The con 1. Code of Federal Regulations. 10 \./11 l lam L., Kolde. Harry E., Krieger, entratlon of stronttum-89 In air CFR 50,36a, p. 334. Herman L., Montgomery, Dani el H.,

easured by the New Jersey Department January 1, 1981 ed. Gold, Seymour, Hartin, Alex and Kahn, f Environmental Protection at 2. Franks, Bernd.* "Radiation Bernd. "Radiological Survel 1 lance everal locations In the state, Exposure and Health Damage Due to Studies at the Oyster Creek B\.IR urlng the saine period, was Nuclear Power Production, Nuclear Generating Statton." EPA-

,mp~l e to the va 1 ue reported The Question of Standards and the 520/5-76-003. U.S. Environmental

~re. 91s background con centratlon Need for Comparative Health Damage Protection Agency, June 1976.

f stront 1 um-89 Is due to an Analysis~* Paper presented to the B. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,

mospherl.c nl)clear bomb test carried Annual Meeting of the American "F lnal Environmental Statement 1t by the People's Republic of China Association for the Advancement of Related to Operation of Oyster Creek

, October 1980. Thus, the Science, Washington, D,C., 3-8 Nuclear Generating Station," AEC January 1982. Docket No. 50-219 (1971t),

rontfum-89 1n the sample could not attributed to plant effluent. 3, Beck, Harold L., McLaughl In, 9. Oyster Creek Hue tear Gener at Ing James E. and Lowder, Wayne M,, Station Semi-Annual Radioactive "Shielding and Dosl111etry, Effluent Release Report, 79-2.

In conclusion, mob I le radlologt- Environmental Radiological 10, M11 ler, K~vln H., Gogotar, Carl 11 monitoring' units can be used ef- Monitoring." AlfS Transactions 23 V. and Raft, Peter O. 11 F Ina I Report ictlvely to monitor routine dls- (1976)1597-5981 and Beck. Harold L. on Continuous Monitoring with High 1

1arges of radioactive airborne ef- 'Technlques for Monitoring External Pressure Argon Ionization Chambers uent from nuclear fac 111 t I es. Such Environmental Ra<!latlon Around near the Millstone Point Bolling ilts can also be used to monitor Nuclear Facllltles.11 Paper presented Water Power Reactor." HASL-290,.

,sslble offslte releases of airborne at the 8th Annual Conference on February 1975.

,dloactlvlty during an emergency. Nuclear Sa,fety Research. Tokyo, 11, Plsello, Daniel, Piccioni,

,tectlon of the radioactive plume Japan.* Hay 12-T3, 1975. Richard and Putz, Robert.

,n be accomplished* without prior It

• K I n.g , E II z a b e th. 11 C I t I z en I s 11 Callbratlon of the Sodium Iodide rvey of background radiation levels Honltorlog Network." Environmental HEGSP with the RE-111 Ionization \

the plant vicinity. The results Impact Assessment Review 2. 2 Chamber ln Environmental Radiation such measurements can reveal { 1981)1198-201. Fields In the Vicinity of the Oyster anges In the operating status of 5. Harvey, Joan, Piccioni, Richard Creek NGS. 11 Accord Research and e plant -such as changes In power and Plsello, Daniel, 11 Strontlum-90 Educational Associates, AREA-TR-=82-1, ve I , or abnorma 1 occurrences. They Released In THI Venting." Slcherhelt 15 July 1982, n also. provide the fastest way for In Chemie und Umwelt, Harch 1982, 12. Un I ted States Nuc 1ear Regulatory community to discover a gradual In- 6. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Commission. Licensed Operating ease In released, lono--llved radlo- Station. 11 Augmented Offgas System Reactors, Status Summary Report, tlvlty from a nuclear facility. (AOG) Handout. 11 Xerox copy of Oyster NUREG-0020, Vol. 5. No. B. Aunu<<t-cr@,-.Lt anr.. 1 .... .,.__ .- * ~, ... _ ,,. -

• Special Report IIARANIINEI

• There's only one drng in the* world known to block radia-tion's effect on the thyroid-and the U.S. government has been trying to keep it under wraps. Why? 1*

• By .John Grossmann HREE DAYS AFTER THE WARNING WAS SOUNDED AT THE CRIPPLED THREE MILE ISLAND PLANT IN PENNSYLVANIA, AIR FORCE JETS FLEW IN EMERGENCY SUPPLIES OF A DRUG THATCANOFFERSIGNIFICANTPROTECTIONINTHEEVENTOFASERIOUSACCIDENTATA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THE DRUG IS INEXPENSIVE. IT HAD BEEN DEEMED SAFE AND EFFECTIVE BY THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND APPROVED-FOR ,

SALE WITHOUT A PRESCRIPTION. IN ALL, SOME 236,000 BOTTLES WERE DELIVERED TO A WAREHOUSE IN HARRISBURG, WHERE THEY SAT UNDER ARMED GUARD.

THE DRUG WAS*NEVER DISTRIBUTED.

MANY EXPERTS SAY THE DRUG COULD BE NEEDED UPWARD OF 100 MILES FROM AR UPTURED NUCLEAR REACTOR. ALTHOUGH AS MANY AS THREE-FOURTHS OF ALL AMERICANS LIVE THIS CLOSETOONEORMOREOFTHENATION'S630PERATINGNUCLEARPOWERPLANTS,ONLYAFEW THOUSAND AMERICANS CURRENTLY HAVE THE DRUG IN THEIR HOMES, AND. ONLY LIMJTED SUPPLIES ARE NOW ON HAND AROUND THE COUNTRY. WHYT The drug is called potassium iodide, v,;thin her childbearing years. Morris plant could release several kinds of radi-or KI for *short, and the first question lh*ed in Manhattan, some 160 miles from oactive particles into the air. Among Alan Morris asked was: Where could he the accident site, buf he knew that the these would be radioactive iodine, one of a

get some? Morris, then 36-year-old Indian Point nuclear power plant was the most abundant fission products in a marketing specialist for Publishers' only about 30 miles away. Unlike most reactor, and additionally worrisome be.'.

Clearinghouse, first read about the Americans who heard about Kl, Morris cause of the peculiar workings rJ. the drug in newspaper accounts of the did not forget about the drug when body's thyroid, a tiny gland weighing Three Mile Island accident. He read Three Mile Island faded from front- less than an ounce. The thyroid is re-that Kl could be especially important in page news. By virtue of his job, he had sponsi ble for secreting important \

safeguarding young children and un- subscriptions to numerous magazines. growth hormones. It is also very effl.

born babies. Morris looked at his 1-year- One of them was Science News, which cient at absorbing iodine from the old son and at his wife, who was still well told him enough about the drug to pro- blood-and would gather radioactive pel him to the library to do more re- iodine just as proficiently. Acting like a John Grossmann is a contributing edi- search. What he learned was this: sponge, the thyroid would concentrate tor of HEALTH. A major accident at a nuclear power the body's exposure to radioactive

!LLl STRATIO:O,. BY THOMAS \\OOlJRl fF HEALTH

• 61

iodine; in bnly a few hours the concen-tration rrnght be 1,000 times the leYel his voice. That got him the name and the Brooklyn telephone number of Con Ed's agement Agency (FEMA) and the Nu-clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ij el~ewhere in the body. The effects of ra- chief medical officer. Mo1Tis tried to call how much longer they thought it would dioactive iodine on the thyroid range him, but ended up speaking with some- take to fully coordinate a federal policy from mild inflammation of the gland to one else in the department. "At first he on KI. All said six months. Some three hypothyroidism (a loss of function) to denied they had the drug," Morris re- weeks later came the third anniversary

' benign thyroid nodules and thyroid can- calls. "Finally he admitted they had it." of Three Mile Island.

cer. BC{:ause of their small body size, But Morris wouldn't be needing any KI, A fourth anniversary has now infants would be especially at risk of de- he remembers the Con Ed employee passed-still without a coordinated veloping thyroid-related problems. And saying-there would never be an acci- federal policy. This indecision has af-a baby In its mother's womb would run dent at Indian Pojpt (the nuclear plant fected state health officials, who have an increased risk of cretinism, severe ii1 upstate New York owned by the util- been confused by conflicting federal sig-congenital retardation. ity). "If I don't need it, then why do you nals. To date, only one state has dis-You could guard against these have it?" asked Morris. The employee's tnbuted KI to residents living close to a effects, Morris learned, by taking po- reply, says Morris, made reference to nuclear power plant. Fbr t.b,e most pm, tassium iodide, a so-called blocking the "image" of Con Ed. Every day, he the medical oomnnimfi has remaineg_

agent. If swallowed immediately before said, Morris and others who kept the _strangely silept. Neither of the nation's or within 30 minutes of exposure to radi- drug in their medicine cabinets would most prestigious medical journals, The oactive iodine, the thyroid gland would New England Journal of Medicine and become saturated with the drug a*nd The Journal of the American Medical have little room left to absorb the harm- ASSociation, has published a sinm edi-ful radioactivity. Timing was important, Joria1 or article on the subjec~. Most AJugh: If taken at the time of a radioac- Americans remain woefully unin-WPe release, KI could block approxi- formed-and perhaps disastrously: de-mately 90 percent of the radioactive .e_rived-oF what may be an important iodine: if taken only a few hours later. nuclear antidote.

the drug's effectiveness would be cut in HEALTH has learned that if a severe half. Potassium iodide was no magic bul- nuclear accident were to occur today-let. It offered no protection against more than four years after Three Mile other radioactive particles such as J:,f- Island supposedly shocked the country 111w1 and tellurimn. It did not shield into a more thorough appraisal of nu-ilie body from the effects of radiation; it clear power-it is doubtful that officials protected only one small gland. But it be reminded that nuclear power plants could amass a supply of KI as ~ as appeared likely to do that well. Noting can be dangerous. (When a Con Ed *was rushed to Harnsbwg. Again, the these caveats, the FDA had given the spokesman was later presented with question: Why?

green light to non-prescription sale of this conversation, he said that it seemed .-Alan Morris probably brushed very Kl and had granted marketing approval "unrealistic that a Con Ed person would near the heart of the KI debate in his to the pharmaceutical firm of Carter- talk like that.") exchange with Con Edison, but to ap-Wallace. Morris was furious. He fairly preciate this requires some backtrack-Morris had soon read enough. He de- shouted: "Y@'re more concerneQ..!WIDlt ing. Nuclear bomb testing in the South citied he \\!tnled the drug to protect his ~ur image than t.!}g §aj'ety of my on!: Pacific first spotlighted radiation ilr and himself. He tried sernral year old! Nuclear accidents are possi- , damage to the thyroid. Years after a f rmacies, but none stocked the ter-Wallace product. No pharmacist he \ isited had even heard about a dl1l!,!

ble. We had Three Mile Island only a few months ago. - Not long after he hung up, Morris made a remarkable decision: He 1954 blast over the island of Bikini, thy-roid tnroo'l"S began appearing among

'"people exposed to radioactive fallout on that might offer radiation protection vowed to manufacture the drug himself. islands some 100 miles away. From H(' 1ra::, a-;ked if he had a prescripthm. With that vow, Alan Morris became study and treatment of these tumors I\ h1C'h sermed 1<tl'l:lllf,!e. since he kne1, an unlikely player and, indeed, a cata- came the notion of employing potassium Kl 11a,- appmwil for non-pre:<c11ption lyst, in a health debate of national im- iodide, used for decades in bronchial

-:ale. Baftll*d, Morri;; decided to call portance: Should KI be made available medications. as a blocking agent. A Carter-Wallace and order the drug: to the general publiC'? And ifit is, when? quick KI chronology:

di!'t'ttly from them. He asked for the How? The debate is crisscrossed by sci- 19i5. The NRC receives a recommen-product b;,- nnme-Th:;ro-Rloek-and entific uncertaintif's and controversies; dation from a study group of the Amer-

\\'m- told thr cumpan:v did makf' thl:' seemingly biased by deeply rooted pro ican Physical Society that ~a national

<Ii 111!, hut C'ould nut sell 1t to him. "It ha;:. and con nuclear sentiments, and thus polic~* of stockpiling thyroid-blocking bl'l'll appro1 ed fo1* 01*cr-the-counter highly political; and bogged down by bu- chemicals for possible emergency dis-

~all*. Jia-,n*t 1l" }lonis mquired *Ye, " reaucratic inertia and indecision at both tribution should be established.~

lw 1H1:-: told. hut it \\!I:- compan:, pol!c:~ the federal and the state levels. More 197i. A nonprofit organization char-nnt t" ,,_.11 it directly to tht> public H(* than a year ago. Representative Ed- tered by Congress, the National Com-

' 11:i, d11*1*ttl'd to rnll his lol*Hl ut11itY. Con .,.,-arcl Markey, a Democrat from Mas- mittee on Radiation Protection. advo-Ld1,n11. th1*1 l\<Jllld han* a ,-upplr. sachusetts, called Congressional hear- cate;: KI as ~a major protectt\e action to

\I .. , 11, h*q*l"'ill'd tn li\l* 1ll-' :lllllll!l 111g::- tn try tn .,p,:,Pd up tlw dl*hatt* on Kl IK* ,_ .. n,-1,krl',I .1.ftt-r a :-t*11ou,., al.'l 1di>nt nt 1I" "*"", ,, .. p1 l n11 J:d,.,11n- \lm1h:1'.-  :,.; t>ar the end of tho:::,* 11arch l!JX~ hPal- a nudt'ar pu\1 t'r fac1lit,1" inrnlnng the 1,,.1 1... .1,!.1*1.,* ,,., - H,* *,1:ilk1*d ,*1\*1* :11*rl in1-r::: hl' a::-krd n,1,1~*::,1*:1tat1\\*:-- of th,* n*l, ,,.~,, .,f r.id1uwdrn,, ...

, 1, * ,: .. : , ... 1.,--1um 1, .. 1i,1, II, l!**: l -~ Food and l!rug- Admm1.stration 1!17:,,.. The FDA ~b drng- companies 11n11l, .. 11 \ll\l'j Ill !111,11at111 1 L lh' 1'al-1*d t FDA l. th<' Fedl:'ra! E'.mt*rgl'nc~ l\hm- t11 ,,;i:>mn -1w,1 drug apphcau.,n," 1;,r Kl

i most responsible for framing national policy re~ding KI.

TH FIA. The FDA's position is for the most part clear. It recommends that state and local public health officials

\

should consider advocating KI in radia-tion emergencies for people likely to re-ceive radiation exposure of 25 rems or greater. (A rem is a measurement of radiation exposure.) A year ago, by the time the FDA finalized its position on KI, two manufacturers-Carter-Wallace and Roxane Laboratories, Inc.

-had FDA approval to sell the drug.

But then things become a bit murky, in part due to the unusual reason for taking the drug. In order to make dis-tribution of the drug practical, es-pecially in time of an emergency, the FDA had to give it non-prescriP.tion sta-tus. But the FDA did not want the drug W be directly available to the pub)k.

Officially, the FDA's stand is that Car-ter-Wallace and Roxane yeed to vol-untarily limit sale of the drug ta state

~=ocal officials awl nuclear plant op-

.--:~=1to""-""~><;*"" This, of course, is why Alan 1 Morris was unable to purchase the drug. Asked about this paradox-the public unavailability of a drug with OTC status-one FDA offlciitl seemingly in-advertently exposed what may be the agency's true feelings when he said, "We requested-no, I wouldn't say that-they voluntarily agreed to limit sales of the drug."

Last November, Alan Morris's newly formed New York-based company, Anbex, Inc., made this distinction moot. Soon after receiving FDA ap-proval to sell the drug, Morris, who had made no limiting agreement with the FDA, began a public sales campaign with newspaper ads in the Harrisburg area. The ad pictured his company's to spur manufacture of the drug. Frank van Hippe!, PhD, predict that product, IOSAT, beside this heading:

19i9. ThP accident at Three Mile Is- had there been a large release of radi- "If You Live in Harrisburg This Could land occurs before any companies have oactive iodine at Three Mile Island, de- Save Your Life. It's True. A Tablet That approY-al to make the drug, and so a pending on the wind direction at the Could Save Your Life in a Nuclear frantic effort, complete v.ith middle-of- time, between 3,500 to 450,000 peo- Accident."

the-mght telephone calls to drug com- ple-some living well in excess of 100 With that ad, announcing mail-order pan.,* offiC'1al:;. is neceRsary to ha..,tily ar- miles awa)*-might later have suffered distribution of the drug, Morris an-range for manufacturing the 2:3fi,OOO thyroid damage. gered FDA officials."Some charged him bottle" of Kl then flown to Harnsburg. <JonC'urrent \\7th this growing belief with "hucksterism." Then, too, the Following Three Mlle Island. The in the value of a nationwide KI policy, agency was obliged to free the tw9 other 0ffic1al inn*:sti)Zation of the Three Mile countervailing voices and studies began companies from their earlier promise Island accident. thP Kemcny Commis- emerging. challenging the likelihood not to sell the drug directly to the pub-sion 'rep,,rt. arl\ OC'ate~ a KI strategy the drug ,,.. oulrl e,*er he needed and ciis- lic. Since then, Roxane hru; begun trial

S1m 1 lar rrcornmernlat10ns emerge from misf.ing the ,*alue of KI strategies with distribution of its Potassium Iodide Oral a ,turl~ donl* for the l'res1dent'c; Crrnncil c~!Lkc'.n~!l_~ial.,*,,es t)l&.~E'..~tedpo- Solution to a limited number of P~nn:syl-

,,11 f,"\*,1*"1111ir-1:*,1l <i*:alil\. ( ,tlc1tlat11*'.1-  !*:111 rnl_ 1_*.i~G utJliir,11!.i1c.,n.1>1,'r t}_i.)-ro1rl \ a111a pharmaC'1e:; Carll'!'* \\"allHu_. ha~

<lu111* Jt l'l111rl'lo11 L'111\1*1*,-1t,\,; <*enter n~~!~~ J>re\~~*J Befun* plunp:ing al:,o con~1dc*red OTC market m~ of KI.

iri) } 1 11"\.~\ 111 1 I I* 1,v1rori111,**1rHl ~tud1u ... h1*adl11n,r 1111" 1 1,1 \ .. ,.ttii,* I\ I ,1,.i.att, it lJII! ha:< a:- ,\it ~h1*n 11" *,!ti, 1,d ir,*lll a,,,'"

'Ind,. r,r-<<r 1

• l hP-(' n*t*o1111:1,*1Hl:1t1rin..; i- important ,,, *ir-t -k1'l<'h th(* ('rnerg- 1t intends to dn :-11.

l'r,n,.,.,.,,*, in* ,*-til!at11r~. h,*;-11l"cl h,\ llll'." pnlH*1,*- ,if tli1* 'h1 **t* f, tl**1 al agL*nch*,a

• 0 1QeJ xti"',d PIOOIJCfl Co l ~ rCl , l Sin -

iv*

agency's Office of Natural 'Thclmologica.l' Grimes, then director of NRC's Division QUARANTINED MEDICINE Hazards, explained the change in policy of Emergency Preparedness, stated continued from page 5.; by restating concerns about the *false there seemed '"no compelling reasons to FOIi. While the FDA was proclaim- sense of security" and by hinting at an reeommend potassium iodide for the ing Kl safe and effective and providing admission stated more bluntly by an- ** general public" (this despite agency re-threshold exposure limits suggesting other agency official: Namely, that to quirements that all nuclear plants con-when the drug be taken, a second purchase KI and then make it available sider stockpiling KI for their workers; federal agency, FEMA, was mapping to the states implied too much of a most, if not all, plants do). Apparently policies for emergency preparedness f~eral endorsement for a drug still COI}-l this sentiment underlies the NRC's around nuclear reactors. As with FDA sidered quite controversial. position. Repeated attempts by recommendations, FEMA's policies HEALTH to secure an agency policy would serve to guide the decision- Ill IIBC. Who considered it contro- from officials proved unsuccessful. ,

maldng of state and local health offi.. versial? Not insignificantly, a third From recent studies prepared for the cials-those ultimately respo1Jsible for federal agency, the NRC, which is re- agency, it appears that the NRC's ra-the public welfare. In addition to such sponsible for licensing and ensuring the tionale is tied to a dual skepticism: that protective measures in a nuclear acei- safety of the nation's nuclear plants. It is not only are serious nuclear accidents dent as evacuation and sheltering in- also largely responsible for the lack or a highly unlikely, but a significant release doors, FEMA pointed strongly, at least unified federal KI policy, for It has de- of radioactl\'e iodine would also be initially, to the value of KI. Amid some layed signing such a policy statement highly unlikely. (See box, "Scientific concern that people might misunder- drafted by a FEMA-ehalred group Controversies Blur the KI Picture.")

stand the drug's limited application to known as the Federal Radiological Pre- But many observers diecern other the thyroid and "develop a false sense paredn ess Coordinating Committee. motives at work.

of security," FEMA nevertheless bud- The statement mirrors the gradual * "Basically the NRC has oeen ex-geted some $100,000 in 1980 to purchase federal distancing from potassium tremely negative ahout off-slte pre-potabsium iodide destined for states iodide. It says little beyond calling Kl paredness. I think they have been very \

interested in stockpiling the drug. An- "an effeetive ancillary protective action" effective at talking states out of this,"

~ ~ther $350,000 was projected for sup- and leaving all decisions pertaining to says Frank von Hippel, the Princeton

' ' _,.,ntal purchase1!. 'public distribution of the drug to state University physicist who has long advo-

.... ir.:ture clouds again, for nei- and local officials. The NRC, however, cated that KI be widely available. Three

..mounts was spent on KI. presently refuses to sign even this wa- years ago The Bulletin or the Atomic usome\\ hat of a reversal," tered-down policy statement. Scientists printed a paper of his, en-mm, 1:111 administrntor of the In Congressional hearings, Brian titled "The NRC and thyroid protec-56 * * ,TH

lion-one ~x~uso after another." A former colleague of VQn Hippel'is. Jan Beyea, PhD, now a senior staff scientist with the Audubon Society, feels the KI debate boils down, in* essence, to nu-clear politics: "I think it's pretty clear a lo~ofpeople are afraid that widespread distribution of the dntg would make people believe that nuclear accidents are much more likely than we've been IMAGINE

... anythin~ so delicious

. ,. Also bein~ nutritious!

f Here's a naturally delicious supplement to any diet.:,

PERCEN-AGE OF U S. RECOMMENDED Gourmet Nut Center

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~*

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-*(92) fl Ma~ 20 Great for salads, entrees and told in the past. But the important thing Niacin 4 Zinc I desserts . . . or crunchy munching, C.lelua, I Copper 15 here is not to protect the nuclear indus-try but to protect people.~

PER SERVING OF just as they come from the tin.

WHOLE SHELLED ALMONDS That sentiment, relayed to a FEMA Bonrlng om 1 ,unco Fa! 14 gr11m11 Available ln 4-ounce tins, (ob<lllt IO*H ketn.ls) Po~-,.,_

official privy to the vacillating federal ~ 170 k!\1,-ta,f"' 1 ..... vacuum-sealed to preserve fresh-lings on KI, prompted these Proi.la *ora- C!>o-ol"' 0 c.n,o11,.i.-- 5 9f8t1111 Sodluln 4 "'II ness and natural flavor.

• : "I think that's pretty close to it. 'Conlala 1- ttian 2% of h US There is a feeling that the NRC is being ROA of these ~ Buy them because

-n,i. lnforwafon i. ~ d blot- cA 1h11 strong!~* pressured by the utilities." The , , , , , _ of mo411Jlnll lllt kllal - of 1111 ....i they're delicious and nutritious NRC, he said, "is areal powerful bunch, -lllfOI In rHny dleto ... give them for tl'!e same rew,on.

and people over here [FL\IA] are very leeQ* of putting any pressure on them.

T,her \\ ere here first. so to speak.~ *.,,

J_Gordon MacLeorl. ;,ID. Pennsyl-

\"lmia's commissioner of health at the time of the Three Mile Island a<:eident, worrici:. that "the whole i:-sue of health has been lost. The deci,-ions are being made in too man,\* ra!-e:- by nuclear engi- Prleeo 1ndad4' shlP!'"'9 US A.,A P.O II: F.PO ac!drn""

ne en: and nuclear phy::,ici;.;ti:." The

~RC. he complain:- c<Jrreetly. cannot Pack of sii< ,--------------------------.,

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- /OJf'" _,..,. a,31 *SJ/

.Ju:-t a:; the anti-Kl camp ha,- had pro- II Please send r: 'o ~~ - io anache-d hst (ltem:JAJ Your sanslacllon IS  : _ _ 5,..ru,g,"c*:*s "reoo ______

nuclear leanin!!:' attn Luted tn it. ,-o han~ uncond1t1onall}.

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r ht*t*n, alil*d ant1-11udL*,tr A:,,IH! ~he \\II~*. I ...,<'i,..IP

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\

t faac1n.at1ng realm on earth-the human

' \ mind Here, you'll diaooverthe Bea.oti:v8 II I

M1nd. where all your pbysJ.cal and eiµottonal

\ l&lnB are stored. Lea.rnhow this Reaot1ve Mind.can I suppress your strong, i

ealtbyllfe farces a.ndmalm you less than you couldbe.

ia.rnbowto ga.tn control of his enemywith1n to eajoy bappiness and oonfldence in.life.

., ..,...,. =11ll Ul1S Bead !fHB DYNAIIIOS introduooory OF Lll'B. $6.9B vohune. at bookstores everywhere inauskas, co-author of a recent report state's four operating nuclear plants. consent forms, to those individuals revising downward the likelihood of The latter supplies are eannarked for whose evacuation' path may have ex-harm from nuclear accidents: "The patients too sick to be evacuated in case posed them to radioactive iodine above whole Kl is.sue is really sort of a snow of an emergency and for a skeleton hos- the FDA standard of 25 rems.

job to undermine the public\:i confidence pital staff who would also remain. 'lb date, only ,one state ~ adopted in nuclear power.* The policy in Illinoil'j is similar: Kl the protective planning that is nation-Such sniping, the rec:urring scientific only for emergency workers and a lim- wide policy in Sweden: predistributing *

~greements and the confusing sig- ited "immobile" population. Officials the drug to nearby residents of a nu*

9s out of Washington are reflected,. there say the state's decision not to clear plant. The state is Tunnessee. In coast to coast, in widely diverging state make KI available to the general public addition to stockpiling Kl for emergen-policies. Ohio is one of a few states that was infil,lenced by intertwining ethical cy workers and for possible distribu-has decided it wants nothing to do with and legal questions about whether the .ti on, as in Alabama, at mass care KI. The state has no written explana- state should in effect be prescribing and centers, Tennessee health officials went tion of this policy, but former state di- distributing medicine. door to door within a five-mile radius of rector of health John Ackerman, MD, Alabama has readied a plan that the Sequoyah plant in the fall of 1981, accounted for Ohio's decision by saying, includes distributing KI "to any individ- explaining about the drug and supply-

"At the time we made the decision there ual who might be exposed to a poten- ing KI to those residents who wanted it.

was still a great deal of controversy at tially harmful dose." County health Only a handful of residents decided not the national level. .. We took our lead departments in five strategically lo- to accept the drug. State officials term largely from the federal government." cated cities have from 500 to 950 bottles the program highly successful and re-California officials simply haven't made of KI tablets. Noting that ~the ,nncl can port they are likely to repeat it when a .

up their minds yet. In New York, lim- only blow one way," James Mc.Nees, di- second nuclear plant comes on line next ited supplies of the drug are stored at rector of the division of Environmental year.

police and fire stations near nuclear Monitoring and Emergency Planning in Tunnessee's policy came largely at the

*_

• power plants; ..The supplies are to be the Alabama Bureau of Radiological urging of Eugene Fowinkle, MD, the

..: used by emergency workers who would Health, explained; If it appears there':,i former state commissioner of health, remain in the area supervising the evac- going to be iodine in the air. ernehrenc.v now an associate vice chancellor for uation of everyone <'l;;e. Pennsylrnnia workc-rs would tran .. ferthc Kl 11,,m tht:- medical affairs at Vanderbilt Univer-has ,-tockptll!d supplies at local civi~ de- local stockpiles to the prPde:~11matt*d sity. Dr. Fowinkle served on the Kem-fense C!'nter:-- again for emergt>ncy c*rncuation center~-1,K:atl*tl in h*,1:-t 17 eny Commu,s1on and heard, firsthand, 11t:n;unnd only-and at half a dozen miles from a reactor. The drni[ woulcl much of the early discussion on the pro-hospitals located within 10 miles of the then be offcreel, compl!:tL' \\ n h rnr, w111NI * '°'~~;.,~,., l, r,

five-mile,'radius w11S chosen "not very scientifically,-; but has clear thoughts on the need for predistributlng the drug.

The-truth "We did three evacuation drills testing emergency planning, M the NRC re-quires, and found there is really no prac-about condoms tical way to distribute the drug after the

' fact. Unless you predistribute KI you do not have the option to use it." Ten-nessee's supplies of Kl came from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the local utility-at first reluctantly. Fowin-kle says the "initlal position of the TVA was that potassium iodide would frlght 0 and herpes.

It's been estimated that up to 20 million people In the U.S.

en people. My response was, 'I'm not have genital herpes. The figure is growing in epidemic frightened when an airplane stewardess proportions. _

tells me haw to use an oxygen mask.' I At the moment, Herpes Simplex II ls incurable. However, think there's a tendency to underesti- there is a product which will significantly reduce your mate the intelligence of'people. All chances of contracting and transmitting this d1seas~.

these arguments about a false sen8e of A Trojan~ brand condom.

security-in fact, every objection I've Many public health authorities and private physicians now heard-have rational answers. A lot feel that the condom, when properly used, effectively remains to be worked out, though. This aids in preventing the transmission of herpes of the penis, cervix and vagina.

Use Trojan condoms. No other condom has been proven more effective. You'll find them in the Trojan display at your local pharmacy. ,

process is now going on around the country."

Indeed it is, albeit in fits and starts It marked by controversy, confusion,

. delay-and a rather striking irony. The ois policy, for instance, suggests the

. , eral public, unprovided for in state ID YOUNGS DRUG PRODUCTS CORPORATION i ns, consult their family doctor. v~ P.O. Box ~5. Piscataway, N J 08854 e Y.D.P.C. 1983 f "We're gingerly handing it off to the ~ Whole no contracffllM1 prOYldn 100% pntaCbon, Tropn brand condomt. ""-

prope,ty <.-d .itechvelvald., the pm,wtbon of ()l'UQllanCYand-d,.....i

~ medical profession," admitted Philip Gustafson, PhD, until recently the di-rector of the Illinois Department of Nu-clear Safety. In so doing, a non-pre-scription drug returns, in effect, to prescription status. An already confus-ing situation thus becomes even more tangled, especially when it seems clear SPECIAL SECTION:

that the medical profession and the gen- The Great Male/Female Debate eral public are both misinformed.

"In part," notes Audubon Society sci-entist Jan Beyea, "this shows how diffi-

• Why do women wear lipstick? Why don't men fold the cult it is to get a novel public health laundry? The real differences between the sexes.

measure started. There was tremen-

• Snips and snails and sugar .and spice: What are little boys dous opposition to covering open sewers and girls made of'l A guide for puzzled parents.

in the nineteenth century." He fear.s, as .

• Dustin Hoffman: How he became she for "Tootsie" do many other~. that potassium iodide -plus-mav n*1t be rarne.::tlv con:-.iden*1l or

• What to do when diabetes touches your family.

widely distributed until after we've had

• Hair analysis: Are you being scalped?

another. perhap<< far mure :-:rriou;;,

• A cynical look at dieting by Naomi Bluestone, MD. I /

I nuclear accident. -----------------------------

HEALTH

• t>=l

.(

FRED v.1Illl.AMS RP.DIC INTERVIEW (19 July 84) l~\."

\

@* Planning m reroving head Aug. 6th (39th anniv. H:!.r:oshima). t\" .

-Head & possibly plenu:n (upper core support) warped fran H explosion\,"(30 l-1ar 79?).

That n:eans will be very difficult to rerrove & then can't get back en.

Inside, 100 tons disintegrated fuel rods, crunbled uraniun fuel.

Don't knCM configuration of last 4 feet of rubble.

• Very dangerous material - 350 lbs. plutoniun, 180 other kinds radiorruclides.

Since 1 pg plutonium = carcinogenic dose, enough for 150B cancers (30 F.arths:

Th.:ink of reactor as giant cookie tin Originally contained 100 tons of cbocolate chip cookies But sanebody dropped the cookie tin, bending _its lid Inside all the cookies crunbled - 100 tons of cookie cnirbs H1at 's ,;;orse, a fcW cockroaches slipped into bent top, rmtl.tiplied for 5 yeru NcM you' re going to pry open that lid ...

Point of no ret:1.D:n - once get head off can't recap (~aran wrap?)

@* HRC regulations allw each worker to receive 3 rem/quarter o~ S, lem/year.

Revised EIS says maxim3.l radiation during cleanup 46K rem to ~rkers.

Gofman says 1 cancer/268 person-rems, hence= 170 cancers.

1 birth defect/134 person-rems, =z 340 birth defects.

Horkers paid by hour (ave. $5. 50, not nruch for hazardous duty)

Often inadequately m:mitored After receive 3 rem, sit out rest of quarter?

Leave badges outside/switch badges Internal vs. external dose Brainwashed by industry to minimize radiation risks + Macho image Accidents during 'IMI cleanup James Roeers (15 Oct 79)

'Il-11 make-up filter (15 Apr 80)

WIU.J:Al',S - 2

@They _say it's in the best interest ~f the public "to preserve public health" This is the only real NRC mandate (not to be advocates of llllClear industry!)

Yes, we've heard this before Containnent building still held 43K Ci Kr-85 year after accident NRC said had to get it out - it m4,ht endanger public i£ leaked out Studied 5 options for cleanup - Resolution? leaked it all out in 2 weeks!

Now we're hearing it again The core contains dangerous ela:oonts which might contaminate the public We've got to get in t.1-iere and clean it up But the ~eatest danger to the public is during the cleanup (core stable}

lvhere are they going to put 100 tons highly radioactive debris?

Real reason for rushlng.the cleanup?

NRC afraid GPU Nuclear will go bankrupt & fed will be stuck with the bill

@ First of all, 1 should wait tmtil have hig.li. level ~lear waste repository.

~*

NRC ccrnnissioners recently approved search for national 'site (not in PA)

Until then IIDSt spent fuel (30 tons/year frcm each of 70 reactors) stored in spent fuel pools adjacent to reactors (on-site).

to put it.

So I recama1d not getting the cru:nbled fuel out of there until sane place

- A Secondly, many experts (Bob Pollard UCS, Tom Cochran NRDC) recamEt1d entCIID11a1t Does the utility seriously consider restart of 'Il{[-2??

O::mtairnnent as secure as any proposed high level waste site.

Technology exists for neutron adsorbers in concrete.

Ca:lprcrnise* (third alternative) - ren:::we fuel, entanb rest.

,~/' -...

~*Yes, ner.,., knowledge of extent of core damage increased max. 13K -~ 46K person-rans.

As mentioned, increases potential number cancer cases in ~rkers 50 --:3> 170.

But still don't know condition of bottcr.i 6.' of core or its supporting elarents Will there be another increase in person-rem estimates when get inside?

WTILIA'1S - 3

\

~) There is every reason to believe that the 'Il1I managa:nent temn was directly

. too responsible for the accident 5 years ago which carre within 30-60 nrins of carplete do They rushed to get 'INI-2 up to full power before 31 Dec 78 (tax deduction)

They falsified PORV release rates into Susquehanna to prevent shutdc,;.m.

It was that PORV which led to I.OCA which led to near meltdown (no intact r Even a£ter accident startedmana.ge:rent refused to close FOR.VI New - who was that tmnageiret1t team who directed the 'IMI operation?

Utility changed narre after accident Met-Ed --) GPU Nuclear

.e But still Kuhns & Diekamp :/i=s 1 & 2 in co. with Bob Arnold fr3.

6 m:mths ago, with m..tch fanfare, annotmeed NEW 't-"'*.ANAGEl1ENT But still Kuhns & Diekamp #s 1 & 2 Who'd they replace? Bob Arnold (Sacrifial Ianb)

See Bob .Arnold living in his trailer en the island -

See Bob Arnold drinking water cleaned by EPICXR-II -

See Bob run, fran Middletown to Parsni.Ppinay NJ (HQ) i.3ho replaced #3? Phil Clark (yes man from Parsnippinay)

Shellgarre.

Satre day they announced m.:w MANAGF11ENT were indicted for leak rate falsifications not-in-the-old-days but in Aug. 19831

(!j; 100 tons rubble in cote. If only one ounce evenly distributed to 36,000 persons who reside within 5 miles of 'IMI, all would develop hmg cancer fran plutoniun alone.

But in addition to 150K Ci Pu: 745K Ci cesiun-137 (t!D..1Scle ca.?)

679K Ci Strontium-90 (bone ca, leuk.)

180K Ci ceriun-144 744K Ci pranethium-147 P.11-in-all over 4i."1 Ci of over 150 radionuclides each with their o;~n tiss:.:.e speci:icity & carcinogenic potentia

WILLIAMS - 4

@nrr-1, like 1MI-2, contains about 31.K steam generator *tubes. Inside these

\

tubes circulates primary coolant - highly radioactive superheated water under pressure. Outside these tubes circulates cool water which will be heated into steam to drive the t;urbines for making electricity. So the steam generator tubes have to withstand thermal stress and pressure, and to accanpash this reliably over the long haul, they are made of special carbon steel. 1w things are wrong about the design at 'Il-!I-1: 1) as in other reactors, this carbon steel begins to granulate under constant radiation banbarc1IJEnt fran primary coolant (grarrulations are weakening of structure, the begimtlngs of cracks) and 2) specifically at 'IMI-1, these tubes haye been idle for 5 years during mi.ch t ~ they have corroded. i-llen GPU tested these 31.K tubes last year, t.hey discovered that BK of them leaked. If you or I had been running

. the show*, vve probably would have ordered q. new steam generator - but not this manage:nent. GPU management decided to try a netv 11Ethod of repairing defective steam generator tubes en IIlciSse called kinetic expansion, 1i-which fl.u!ik\

• means setting off an explosion inside the tubes causing to suddenly balloon A

and fuse small cracks on the inside .

• wts of rroney and time has been spent arguing about the nerits or deficits of using kinetic expansion to repair defective steam generator tubes.

It seems a little bit to rre like pouring Stopleak into the radiator of an aging car to see if you can' t get a fewllf?lfes out of it without spending

' ~

too trllch mmey (and this car hasn't been driven for 5 years) . The difference between a car and a nuclear reactor is that if the radiator repair fails in your old car, you migi.t-it get stranded on the expressway, but if a stear:1 generator rube fails - as it did at the Girma plant in Rochester, NY, causing the "WOrst nuclear pa:rer accident since 'Il1I then you' re endangering thousands of people.

It doesn't seC:'Pl to have worked too ,-:ell. In a recent test, one tube failed badly (like Gilma) and was plug,ged. Seven rrore leaky rubes were left damaged.

WIILIAMS - 5

@k>. The 100 tons of fuel contain only about 3 tons of t.rraniun-235 (3%) which has to be aver 90% to explode in a flash as in a rruclear ,;.;,eapcn. But there is a

\

danger o f ~ other types of explosicms:

1) A steam explosion if caqJlete meltd.o;.m occurs and roolten fuel falls through the bottan of cont:a.inrent intercepting gromdwater beneat.'1 the Susquehanna. ("O:tina Syndra:.:e")

2) A hydrogen explosion fran hydrogen generated when the zircortlun cladding of fuel rods corrodes to becane zircaniun oxide -which then can generate hydrogen when reacting with water in the pri-mary coolant. (Zirconitm is used to encase fuel rods, despite this liability, because it is transparent 'to neutrons virl.ch sus-tam the fission reaction in the core.)

We came within 30-60 mins of a steam explosion at 1?11 in 1979. If 100 tons

• of nnlten fuel had intercepted the Susquehanna River bed, highly radioactive debris would have been thrc,;-m up in huge clouds of .

stea:n carrying pli:t"ticles and dissolved gasses for hundreds of miles downwind. Thousands of perscns would be killed by such a st~ explosion.

A hydrogen explosion did occur during the TI1I-2 accident. It severly damaged reactor superstructure, but, as far as is known, did not breech conta:innent.

Its worst effect is probably to interfere with cooling water access to the core, potentiating the !IlJre serious stegn explosion rrentioned above.

/-- /This often repeated conclusion has little basis

~2 in fact. Inadequate radiation rronitoring during the initial and nnst dangerous stages of the accident coupled with lost records and misinterpretation of what little data has survived have all conspired to underestimate actual doses frcn. the accident.

WllLL.AM3 - 6 The following considerations :tead ~ to conclude that official estimates of

\

radiation exposure fran the 'IMI accident have been nuch too lOW":

1) At least 17 radiation m::mitors in the plant went off-scale high during the accident. For these nxmitors, then, all we

• know is. the minimal anutmt of radiation released, with no idea at all of maxima.

2} Radioiodine filters becsn:e, quickly clogged since they were never designed to entrap so nnch iodine. They were then bypassed.

Sare even burned due to the intense radioactivity on the filters.

1'brmally much of the iodine becares dissolved in primary 'coolant, but during p~ iodine releases IIUCh of the core was tm~red and iodines were carried upward by rising steam and hy~en.

It should also'be mentioned that radioiocline isotopes such as iodine-132 released during the early hours of the accident (4-7 a.m. on 28 'M:trch 1979) were by far the m::>st dangerous.* Later iodine measuremmts could only detect iodine-131 (of which officially 24 Ci escaped). Many nearby residents tasted iodine throughout the tt-x:, weeks of the accident; Q:ie wanan three miles west of the reactor, at, 6: 30 a.m. on the 28th, said the icx!ine taste *was "as if she had stuck her finger in a bottle tt. cl1-Cp .

of iodine and put -i-E otJ. her tongue."

3) Met-Ed has ttlost" all records of radiation 11lJiri.toring fran 28 March 1979, ,;.;hen the majority of the radiation releases occurred.

4) Helicopter readings over Goldsboro prior to 8 a.m. on l'f..arch 28th showed 40 ra:n/hr .' ,This reading was later changed to. 10 rem/hr:

and then ~tually discounted as altogether too high by the NRC.

WILLIAMS - 7

/ ~- r:*;., :

', *-;,* 1 /J~r.,ii.l',;'~h*

\* ), l, lt 'r, *t.'~~*~,L', *,,, 5) Qmt

ainnElt dare. readings of 300 rem/hr on the m:mrl.ng

. r l * , !: . . 1~11"' ~'\ ,

1 ,r} J '"I, *i \ r*fJ, , \\ of March 28th were later interpreted by the NRC as having

,, t I l ,ti l;~ t' *.* '

j j t :  : been 400 milliran/hr. 11 (NUREG-0600) i&.t was the basis

'I ' '

for this interpretation 750 times lower than initial readout?

,, So I think there is every reason to assune that less than 100 mra:n maximal exposure :fran the 'IMI accident is IlllCh. too, lrM a figure. AsStEle

• for exanple that the '40 ran/hr figure at Goldsboro was correct. hrjone outside during

, - r .

that period for tv.U and one-half hours would have received 100 ram (unre than 1000 times official estimates).

@Yes, <:f ~se.~ And people all- over the reg~ did experience gtheF

/ n ,t.Mwen--. -to sensations ~ just metallic and iodine taste and smtll. Sare of. the acute radiation effects reported by rmny persons during the first days of the accident were:

~

, I/ a) skin rashes (saretimes through pants or in one Mfe fitJJe (t,{!l{k ( s father and son mechanis_ who spent all day in their garage}.

e ,ttdti~ fui~ e(/cctr '\ b) nausea (saretimes ac~anied by vanitting) rep_ ,L1 ,'e cdJi'l,d- . )

c) diarrhea J2, / {nt (;)J;'(((l(C(

, d) eye and mucous IIBiirrane burns (s~t:irr.es accanpanied I\ by blistering) Jfr1rl1,J c/~r11*1*(cpcc c-l*;! l1.Jf-k,.1tNV___ 1d:/IU.;

ltd .r}I.J-, r:le.C-t.kr-/f rut tt f a IYr r 7/tC:.{ r.rtp*ry Many.of the severe radiation health effects cannot be measured until many ~ t J ?,

years after radiation exposure, such as cancers or birth defects . However, there is one type of ger-etic effect seen within 9 nonths of radiation ex- *-* _

posure. 'That is the so-called teratogenic effect of radiation on the developing -

hunan fetus. So* also we saw two inrnediate effects of TI1I on the n~rn:

1) infant rrortality rates doubled within 10 miles of ~

2) neonatal hypothyroidism increased. 4 -~ 14 in ,c0tmties

WIILIAMS - 8

\

I t3hould also tra1tion one other possibility as to how so nuch radiaticn got out into the envirormait. Dave Campbell, a nuclear engineer at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, calculates that as nuch as 1 ton of nuclear fuel left the core during the accident. Fbw nuch of this fuel entered the atmJSt>here or the Susquehanna as particulates? Sane persons who BI!l:?lled or tasted iodine strongly also reported a grittiness in their teeth. Grittiness indicates the presence of particulate matter.

• ~ As I mentioned ""I'lier, you """1d expect cancers and birth defects to increase in the exposed populatial. It is only 5 years since the .a.cc.:ident, so any study ncM is still premature. But in a preliminary study by Marjorie Aam:xit, Jane Lee, Francine Taylor and scroo of their friends, asking questions of over 100 families in areas mi.ch experienced sane of the acute radiation symptans mentioned above, indeed there has been a five-fold increase* in cancer nnrtalities following the 'IM! accident.

@ Am::mg these cancers are those you'd expect earliest, such as leukemias and lyrrphonas. The worker I mentioned earlier mo got trapped in the auxiliary building during the cleanup operation was diagnosed as having acute leukania within a few m::m.ths and died 2. 5 years later. After the atcr'lic borrbing of Hiroshima, leukemia incidence rose after the first year and peaked ~levenyears later. So if t."1ese statistics are correct, we should see increases in cancer incidence aver the next six years.

One statistic found in the preliminary cancer surveys was very

r. *f. ,

interesting: three deaths due to nruscle cancers within a half-block area.

'These sarcanas are extranely rare, normally 111 only 0. 7'/o of cancer cases

\\J\'/

-/., ,)

~ (_ (

. , j-.,\1(.,

reported. They are sirr.ilar to Kaposi I s sarcana in AIDS patients, and like l, \ . (

sarccr.ia.s in AII:6, developed very quickly. Perhaps radiation exposure has ~ ::*'

WilLI.AMS - 9

@At least 17 studies reported stress not cnly during 1979 around 'JMI but

' lingering through 1,980 (cont:a:irmmt atJmsphere venting) and subsequent years (furtiler radiation leaks). Everyone agrees that the TI1I rom,mi.ty was severly stressed. Unfortunately, as the only officially recognized health.

effect fn:m the*accident, this pronotmcanent tends to shift blme to the victims of the accident (It's all in your head." Or the patronizing "We tmderstand that you're upset, but if you'd just pay attention to the data, you would knc:M there is no health risk.")

Stress has many harmful medical effects, :including hypertensicn

'Which exacerbates cardiovascular diseases and reduced :inm.lrtological can-petence. The latter is especially pernicious for the 'JMI C".(J)))J!mity stnce J the inmme systen also is sensitive to radiation injury and has the responsibility, mvng other tirings, of rejecting cancerous cells as they pop up. (You can see this in organ transplant recipients who nust be :immmosuppressed and wind up

• 4-'

with 10-100 titres. the cancer frequency as the nonna1. population) .

• So this appect may help explain higher cancer incidence in such a-short time - the carbination of radiation carc:fnogenesis, radiaticn-induced inn:unosuppression and stress-induced imm.mosuppression.

'~ .

( 15)) Virtually everyone knCMS ho;., poor1y rruclear power is faring in the U.S .

~ It's been da-..mhl.11 ever 'since the 1MI accident; which may go down in history as the deatlmell of the 'industry. Projections of energy demands in the early 7'J's ttrrned out to be way to optimistic (6% per armun increase, vilen the actual rate has been IIXJre like 2%). This coupled with long delays in con-struction and concanitant enorroous cost overnms have conspired to kill the future of the nuclear power :Industry. In our capitalistic, ciem::lcratic society t:wo forces control 'ciecision-maldng: profit and public opinion.

ruclear pc,wer has failed dismally in both arenas.

WILLIAMS - 10 G I ~ Reag~' s recent trip to China was one of the nost incredible

' activities for a U.S. President of all time. He was virtually acting as an arrbassador for Bechtel P<:Mer Corp., that giant U.S. coopany which builds nost ruclear.facilities in the world. Of course, it is no wonder that Reagan wcu.1.tl

.wi:H. go abr~d on behalf of Bechtel. A huge portion. of his cabinet; are ex-Bechtel executives, (Schultz, Weinberger, Clark). Should the U.S. tax-payers sponsor bis trip to Orlna to sell* Bechtel reactors? It will probably cane out to be no sale atrjWay, not because of poor salesmanship (the Chinese 4t were clearly flattered and had m:mey-in-hand) but due to technicalities of the rruclear anns proliferation treaty.

@ Again, we have to realize that our~ growing demands for electrical~

have not been increasing as fast as 'anticipated. It may well be that we can reach an energy plateau in this corntry, especially if we practice nore energy conservation. Ch the other hand, power stations wear out (especially

~

nuclear~ stations which have a life expectancy of only 30 ye.n-s). I suggest replacing these with coal-fired generators. Obviously, burning coal

_po l..lu.ftm.

• has its own envirartnental problems, mainly1 exacerbating acid rafn"due to sulfur emissioI1$.

For lc,r.,, sulfur coal, lilrestone scrubbers can be added which reduce sulfur emissions by 90% ~d only increase the price of coal energy by 30%. For high sulfur coal, there is a novel technique utilizing mi.crc:Ma:Ves in alkaline slurries v.hich ramves 95% of the sulfur and doubles the price of coal. Even at dauble the price, coal is ~ t i t i~ with rruclear fuel as practiced by the industry today.

( 18) When Eisenhpwer la:tmched Atans-for-Peace 30 years ago, nuclear energy seered a:lb::>st too good to be true. 1 million tir.es as IlllCh energy frcm each atan of tn:'aniu as fran each atom of carbon I Energy produced so cheaply, it won't be* metered I I think this ,:.,as a public relations exercise which has, suddenly gone very sour. It was originally designed to get our minds off atanic, i:veaJJOns, Hiroshima and mutually asstu-ed destruction. lnfortunately for the ::>efense !)ept. and the rruclear industry, due to 'il-.!I and other accidents, the awareness of dangers in nuclear power have alerted the country to* greater dangers in nuclear weapons: a PR di!=!aste1: ~~ rnp;-e-

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June 1 - 85 USNRC from the pen of EMERY NEMETHY l~C )LP(; /.\LEHT -SS JUN-6 P2 :37 BOX 621 BLOOf,lSBURG 1 781 5 OFF ICE Of- SE. CRl f~ 1 DOC KETING & SERV ICI Sec'y - NRC Re : Proposed Rule - BRANCH ATT: :OOCKETING & Extraordinary Nuclear Occur-SERVICE BRilCH rence - Fed Reg - Apr 9-85, p 13878 Gentlemen =

We endorse Commissioner Bernthal's propmsal .

The idea of using a fixed dose rate, measured 1 meter from the ground surface, to establish whether there has been a "substantial discharge" of radiation seems to us logical, simple, and easy to determine .

We do have a question about the rate he pro-poses - 10 millirad/hr (p 13983, col 3) .

Should this read one-tenth rnillirad/hr?

He says studies show decontamination s hould be required if the integrated dose over 30 years will exceed about 25 rem .

30 years

• 262,800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> . When you divide this into 25 (rem) you come up with the figure of . 0001 (rad} approximately.

Can present detectors measure this rate of o~r?

Se c ' t kitnow1qeo JUN 3 1985 by C.rd... .*

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UNITED STATES .

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION"-80IOIU RUt~

. - /4:J@

- '" . /fl WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 (.S-tJ F~ I 3 i Apri 1 29, 198 5 DOl t< ET ED USNRC

• as APR 30 AlO :58 OFF ICE OF SE CRt)Af,

• NOTE TO: Secretary of the Commission DOCKETING & SEfiVIC f.

Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission BRANCH Attention: Docketing and Service Branch FROM: G. E. Edison, Chief Technical and Operations Support Branch Planning and Program Analysis Staff, NRR

SUBJECT:

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PART 140 The purpose of this note is to provide a comment on the proposed amendment to Part 140 (Revision of Criteria for Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence).

Comment I do not believe the Commission's regulations should specify limits that are undefined and which are continually changing. Specifically, in this particular proposed change,~ damage limit specified in terms of dollars should define those dollars ,n such a way that they have the same meaning several years from now as they do today. Are they 1960 dollars, 1985 dollars or 1995 dollars? There is a very significant difference.

I recommend the Commission either (a) delete the use of a changing and undefined unit of measure, such as dollars, from its regulations, or (b) define the unit of measure uniquely so that it is not changing.

G. E. Edison, Chief Technical and Operations Support Branch Planning and Program Analysis Staff, NRR cc: J. Funches

ROBERT R. LOUX RICHARD H. BRYAN STATE OF NEVADA Director Governor NUCLEAR WASTE PROJECT OFFICE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR Capitol Complex DOCKCEr Carson City, Nevada 89710 USNRC (702) 885-3744

• May 29, 1985

• as HAY 31 P12 :1 s Secre tary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Stre et, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Dear Secretary:

Enclosed please find comments of the State of Nevada regarding the Commission ' s Proposed Criteria for Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely ,

7.6e----t<'~

Robert R. Loux Director RRL/gjb Enclosure

U. S. NUCLEAR RcG' ILATC ' IO N DOCKET NG P, OFF ll,.: C C.

Postm.:irt Co l"S Add 1 C

~Pe~! ' t

COMMENTS REGARDING PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCES 50 FR 13978 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has requested comments on proposed amendments to the criteria for the determination of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. The State of Nevada is a party with interest in the outcome of these proposals inasmuch as Nevada anticipates that the Price-Anderson Act, in which the extraordinary nuclear occurrence concept is created, will be amended by the Congress to address the issue of the liaibility arising from the Department of Energy's high-level nuclear waste program and that the definition of extraordinary nuclear occurence may be incorporated therein in some fashion.

It is interesting and important to note the statement made at 50 FR 13981 that "a principal basis of an ENO determination is that an event occurred which released radioactive materials in such quantities that the event is clearly

'extraordinary' compared to normal operation." It is this principle which leads to the conclusion that the absolute liability which follows from the waiver of defenses whenever an ENO is determined should apply as a matter of statute in the nuclear waste context. The "normal operation" of a nuclear waste repository is to completely isolate radionuclides from the general environment. Any failure of a repository to perform such normal operation is extraordinary and the government should be liable without defense in the event of injuries resulting therefrom.

Similiarly, the transportation of radioactive waste to a DOE facility and its implacement therein is operating normally when waste is contained. When, by accident, containment is not accomplished an extraordinary event has occurred.

The State of Nevada heartily endorses the proposal of Commissioner Bernthal that "a release of radioactive materials which results in doses or dose rates offsite 1

of a magnitude equal to or greater than the proposed criterion will suffice to demonstrate that substantial releases of offsite doses have occurred and that substantial damage will occur." This straight forward approach to the measurement of extraordinary occurrence could apply directly in the nuclear waste repository context. The Environmental Protection Agency will have in place generally applicable standards for protection of the general environment from offsite releases from radioactive material in repositories. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has criteria establishing acceptable release rates for the conduct of transportation and handling of all nuclear materials including radioactive waste.

Commissioner Bernthal's proposal that an extraordinary event has occurred whenever the established criterion has been exceeded provides a bright line which can be instantly evaluated to determine whether liability is absolute. The beneficial effect of such a bright line is to compensate injury whenever established limits are exceeded and to assist radioactive materials possessors in deligently avoiding liability by maintaining the established limits. The concept promoted by Commissioner Bernthal is valuable not only because of its ease and utility of application in the power reactor setting, but also because of its general applicability to all radioactive materials handlers including the Department of Energy in its high-level nuclear waste program.

The State of Nevada encourages the Commission to adopt option number three-Commissioner Bernthal's proposal as described at 50 FR 13981-13984.

2

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• r o.:, [pi.

10 CFR PART 140 9:32

(., c:--,,.=- ~.

Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear O~~.r.encec, t

<: -t

.. i..

AGENCY : Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering amending its regulations to revise the criteria for an 11 extraordinary nuclear occurrence 11 (ENO). If a nuclear incident were found by the Commission to be an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," several legal defenses would be waived including the necessity of persons with damage claims to prove negligence . The proposed changes are designed to simplify the adminis-trative criteria used by the Commission in making an ENO determination and to avoid the problems encountered by the Commission in applying the existing criteria to the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant (TMI). These proposed changes will affect applicants for and holders of NRC licenses for production and utilization facilities and other persons indemnified as to such facilities.

DATE: The comment period expires on AUG: OJ'l. Comments received after that date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given unless the comments are filed on or before that date.

1

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ADDRESSES: All interested persons who desire to submit written comments or suggestions in connection with this proposed rule should send them to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Copies of all documents received may be examined and copied in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: H. T. Peterson, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 427-4578.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background In the event of a nuclear incident, claims for injuries or damages can be brought against the plant licensee and other partfes considered responsible for the incident. The Price-Anderson provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, (Section 170) provide a system of private insurance and electric utility funds totaling over $560 million to pay public liability claims. One of the principal obstacles to a claimant's recovery for injuries. or damages could be the necessity for the claimant to prove negligence on the part of the defendants or the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the claimant. Congress attempted to remove this obstacle in 1966 by amending the Price-Anderson Act to require the waiver of certain defenses by an indemnified person when the nuclear accident magnitude 11 triggered 11 the ENO criteria.

When the Commission determines that a nuclear incident is an 11 extraordinary nuclear occurrence 11 within the meaning of the Act and the 2

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Commission 1 s regulations, the waiver of defenses provisions contained in the insurance policies and indemnity agreements implementing the Price-Anderson system are activated. As provided by Section 170n(l) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the waived defenses include:

(i) Any issue or defense as to the conduct of the claimant or fault of persons indemnified, (ii) Any issue or defense, as to charitable or governmental immunity, and (iii) Any issue or defense based on any statute of limitation if suit is instituted within three years from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably could have known, of his injury or damage and the cause thereof, but in no event more than twenty years after the date of the nuclear incident.

The waivers of defenses, once triggered by an ENO determination by the Commission, relieve the claimant of having to prove negligence by a defendant and of having to disprove defenses such as contributory negli-gence. Whether or not an ENO is declared, however, a claimant would still have to prove: (a) personal injury or damage, (b) amount of monetary loss, and (c) the causal link between the claimant s loss and the radio-1 active material released.

The term 11 extraordinary nuclear occurrence 11 is defined by Section ll(j) of the Atomic Energy Act as follows:

The term 11 extraordinary nuclear occurrence 11 means any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct 3

[7590-01]

material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, whi'ch the Commission determines to be substantial, and which the Commi~sion determines has resulted or probably will result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.

This provision clearly calls for a two-pronged determination: (a) sub-stantial offsite release or substantial offsite radiation, and (b) actual or prospective substantial offsite damages. This section also requires the Commission to 11 establish criteria in writing 11 for application of these tests to specific events.

The Commission's present regulations were established in 1968 (33 FR 15998) and are found in 10 CFR 140.84 and 140.85. Consistent with the statutory definition, for the Commission to determine that there has been an ENO, the Commission must find that both substantial releases of radio-active materials or substantial offsite doses and substantial injury or substantial damages have occurred (both Criterion I and Criterion II must be met). The language of the regulation, especially that related to Criterion I, is rather technical and precise.

Criterion I Criterion I relates to whether there has been a substantial discharge or dispersal of radioactive material offsite, or whether there has been a substantial level of radiation offsite. Criterion I calls for such a finding when radioactive material is released from its intended place of confinement or radiation levels occur offsite and either of the following findings are also made:

4

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a. That one or more pe~sons offsite were, could have been, or might be exposed to radiation or to radioactive material, resulting in a dose or in a projected dose in excess of one of the levels in the following table:

TABLE I - TOTAL PROJECTED RADIATION DOSES Critical Organ Dose (rems)

Thyroid 30 Whole body 20 Bone Marrow 20 Skin 60 Other organs or tissues 30 In measuring or projecting doses, exposures from the following types of radiation shall be included:

(1) Radiation from sources external to the body; (2) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from air or water; and (3) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in food or on terrestrial surfaces.

or

b. (1) Surface contamination of at least a total of any 100 square meters of offsite property has occurred as a result of a release of radioactive material from a production or utilization facility and such contamination is characterized by levels of radiation in excess of one of the values listed in column 1 or column 2 of the following table, or 5

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(2) Surface contamination of any offsite property has occurred as the result of a release of radioactive material in the course of transportation and such contamination is characterized by levels of radiation in excess of one of the values in column 2 of the following table:

TABLE II. TOTAL SURFACE CONTAMINATION LEVELS*

Column 1 Column 2 Offsite property contiguous to site; owned or leased by a Type of person with whom an indemnity Other offsite emitter agreement is executed. property Alpha emission 3.5 microcuries per square 0.35 microcuries from transuranic meter per square meter isotopes Alpha emission 35 microcuries per square 3.5 microcuries from isotopes meter per square meter other than trans-uranic isotopes Beta or gamma 40 millirads/hour at 4 millirads/hour emission 1 cm. (measured through at 1 cm. (measured not more than 7 milligrams through not more per square centimeter of than 7 milligrams total absorber) per square centi-meter of total absorber)

• The maximum levels (above background), observed or projected, 8 or more hours after initial deposition.

If Criterion I is satisfied, Criterion II must then be applied.

Criterion II Criterion II is satisfied if any of the following findings is made:

(1) The event has resulted in the death or hospitalization, within 30 days of the event, of five or more people 6

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located offsite showing objective clinical evidence of physical injury from exposure to the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material; or (2) $2,500,000 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by any one person, or $5 million or more of such damage in total has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such event; or (3) $5,000 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by each of 50 or more persons, provided that

$1 million or more of such damage in the aggregate has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such events.

The term 11 damage 11 refers to damage arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material, and shall be based upon estimates of one or more of the following:

(1) Total cost necessary to put affected property back into use, (2) Loss of use of affected property, (3) Value of affected property where not practical to restore to use, (4) Financial loss resulting from protective actions such as evacua-tion appropriate to reduce or avoid exposure to radiation or to radioactive materials.

7

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II. Problems in Application -

The accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, on March 28, 1979 uncovered several problems in applying the existing ENO criteria in 10 CFR 140.84 and 140.85. The Commission 1 s determination that the accident at TMI was not an 11 extraordinary nuclear occurrence 11 was published in the Federal Register on April 23, 1980 (45 FR 27590).

This determination was based in part on NRC staff report NUREG-0637, 11 Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the Staff Panel on the Commission 1 s Determination of an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (EN0) 11 ,

dated January 1980. This report is available for inspection in the Commission 1 s Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC.

A single copy of the report NUREG-0637 may be obtained free upon request from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Publication Services Section, Washington, DC 20555.

Basically, there are problems with the existing ENO criteria. These problems are:

1. Several of the dose criteria for 11 substantial releases 11 in the present regulation were formulated in part to be consistent with the then effective Protective Action Guides. Since 1968 proposed Protective Action Guides have been reformulated at lower dose levels.

2. The current Criterion II for 11 substantial injury 11 requires objective clinical evidence of radiation injury. However, tests for evidence of such injury are not necessarily con-clusive proof of radiological injury. For example, psycho-logical stress can manifest some physical symptoms similar to those associated with acute radiation injury.

8

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3. Monetary damages in Criterion II were difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate accurately in a timely manner. For example, in the ENO determination for the Three Mile Island Accident, compensation costs such as payments for evacuation were evaluated and tabulated. However, many damages, such as

<liminution of property values and business losses, required court adjudication before the proper compensation could be awarded.

III. Proposed Criteria The Commission is proposing for comment three different options for determining whether an accident was an extraordinary nuclear occurrence.

The first and second options retain the structure of the existing criteria and contain explicit criteria for both substantial releases and substan-tial damages. These options employ estimates of offsite doses and ground contamination as indicators of substantial releases but have separate cri-teria for substantial damages. These two options also seek to avoid the measurement problems encountered in applying the present criteria for "sub-stantial damages by focusing the criteria on costs which can be readily counted or estimated. The first two options differ in that the Commission is proposing alternative wording of these criteria for public comment.

The Commission is also interested in obtaining public comments on a third option for defining an ENO. This third option represents a new and arguably more simplified approach to arrive at ENO criteria which could be readily evaluated following a nuclear accident. This option focuses on establishing that a major release of radioactive materials has occurred with concomitant high offsite radiation levels or contamination. It does 9

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not require that doses to ind-=ividuals be evaluated, nor does it require that property damage estimates or evacuation characteristics be evaluated.

Further, this criterion for substantial releases does not require the NRC staff to evaluate exposure conditions such as occupancy time or buildfng shielding factors for actual or hypothetical individuals and, consequently, would simplify the data collection and analysis following an accident.

Thus, this option may be viewed as more straight forward than the other option. It allows for direct measurement of discharge of material or radiation levels, and by virtue of the strong causal relation between release of radionuclides and damages~ it defines, by direct measurement, the conditions under which the Criterion II requirement of substantial damages is met. Therefore, its intent is that procedural barriers to a rapid determination should be minimized.

OPTION #1 Criterion I is a mechanism for determining that a substantial release of radioactive material or radiation offsite has occurred. Currently Criterion I specifies a 20-rem (0.2-sievert)* whole body dose to one person offsite with higher values for specific organs. The proposed regulation would lower these levels to a 5-rem whole body dose with correspondingly lower organs doses. This proposed modification has been selected to be numerically consistent with Protective Action Guides proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency 1 and those issued by the Food and Drug Administration. 2 This ensures that any nuclear accident which would have 1 Envir6nmental Protection Agency, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" EPA Report EPA-520/

1-75-001 (Revised June 1980) 2 Food and Drug Administration "Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds; Recommendations for State and Local Agencies," published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1982

( 47 FR 47073).

• A sievert (Sv) is the SI unit of dose equivalent: 1 Sv = 100 rem; 1 rem= centisievert (1 cSv) or 0.01 sievert.

10

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warranted protective actions-will be found to involve a substantial release of radioactive materials which would satisfy the first condition for an ENO determination.

The proposed dose levels for Criterion I, which would define levels of 11 substantial releases or substantial offsite doses 11 for screening purposes, are in the range of the occupational dose limits and hence could be regarded as too low to be viewed as being 11 substantial. 11 However, these dose criteria are substantially above the doses to the general public expected from normal operation of NRG-licensed facilities as limited by §20.105 of 10 CFR Part 20 and, in that sense, constitute criteria for 11 substantial releases. 11 11 The words *** one or more persons offsite were, could have been or might be exposed II in the current criterion would be replaced with the proposed words: II one or more persons offsite were or will probably be exposed . . . 11 This proposal will remove the necessity to evaluate highly improbable 11 might have been 11 conditions in favor of conditions which would be more likely to occur.

The surface contamination levels in Criterion I will not be changed as those levels are consistent with proposed emergency response levels.

The existing procedures in §140.84(b) are inexpensive and can be performed rapidly. Although more sophisticated measurement techniques are available and specific radionuclide levels could be measured, the existing simpler tests provide adequate indication of contamination levels for an ENO determination.

Criterion II, which defines substantial damages, would be changed extensively. Instead of the present criterion based upon the total monetary worth of damages or clinical evidence of radiation injury, the proposed Criterion II for the amount of damages represents items for which information is readily available within the time frame for an ENO 11

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determination. For each of the monetary requirements, the total valuation is assumed to be equivalent to a loss of $2.5 million. This value is in the present ENO criterion as the amount of loss to a single individual which would constitute an ENO. The Convnission no longer believes it necessary or useful to specify different amounts of monetary damages depending upon the number of people affected.

Criterion II (1) accounts for human injury. One alternative that the Commission is considering would replace the current criterion for clinical injury to 5 or more people with a requirement that 5 or more receive radiation doses which are in the range that would produce symptoms of "radiation sickness. 11 For the purpose of this evaluation,

.clinical findings of radiation injury in the current criteria would not be required, only a showing that five or more people received doses in excess of 100 rads (1 Gy).* This is expressed in rads because the unit of dose equivalent (rem or sievert) requires a dose quality factor (QF) be used. In the range of doses which could cause acute injury such as the 100-rem (1-sievert) dose, the appropriate quality factor is dependent upon the specific biological end point.

In evaluating the doses for defining "substantial injury 11 , the Com-mission intends that the methodology used for the evaluations be realistic rather than overly conservative. Parameters and models used in Regulatory Guide 1.1093 are suitable for this purpose to the extent that they apply to accident conditions.

3 Regulatory Guide 1.109, 11 Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 111

• AvailaDle from Director, Division of Technical Information and Document Control, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555.

• Gray is the SI unit of absorbed dose. 1 Gy = 100 rads; 1 rad= 0.01 gray.

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In this proposal, the present monetary values for property damage in the existing Criterion II would be replaced by things that could be readily counted or estimated within a relatively short time following an accident, such as tax assessments, numbers of people unemployed, and numbers of people evacuated. In Criterion II (2), the assessed value of property requiring decontamination is used as an index of damage. Criterion II (3) is based upon an assumed loss (to the person directly affected and others) of $100 per person-day of lost employment. In Criterion II (4) a cost of $25 per person-day for evacuees is used to arrive at the number of evacuees equiv-alent to the $2.5 million loss.

OPTION #2 - COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE 1 S PROPOSALS Commissioner Asselstine has proposed alternatives to criteria for defining substantial releases and for specifying substantial injury. In Criterion I, in place of the change proposed in Option #1 for redefining substantial releases, Commissioner Asselstine would prefer that, instead 11 of the present Part 140 wording: *** one or more persons were, could have been or might be exposed . . , 11 the text would read:

11

• a person or persons on or near any site boundary throughout the duration of the accident . . . 11 This permits the Commission to make the ENO evaluation based upon the estimated dose to an individual who possibly was at or near the site boundary throughout the course of the accident. As was the case with Option #1, this proposal also eliminates the uncertain 11 might have been 11 condition and employs the proposed revised dose criteria.

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An alternative criterio~ for defining substantial injury has been proposed by Commissioner Asselstine. This alternative represents a change from using acute injury, such as in the present criterion for 11 objective clinical evidence of radiation injuri' to five people or the death of five people, or using a high dose to a few exposed individuals such as the 100-rem (1 sievert) dose to five people proposed in Option #1.

Option #2 would use a requirement that a 100,000 person-rem (1,000 person-sieverts) collective dose delivered to the population within fifty miles as only indication of the potential impact of the accident on the surround-ing population. This is consistent with findings that the latent effects of a serious nuclear accident could far outweigh the observable acute effects.

The proposed ,changes to the criteria for substantial damage are those proposed in Option #1.

OPTION #3 - COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL'S PROPOSAL The rule presented as Options #1 and #2 resemble the existing ENO criteria in 10 CFR Part 140, Subpart E in several respects. The proposed organization is similar in that separate.criteria are retained for sub-stantial releases and doses and for substantial injury or damage. Both sets of criteria require the evaluation of doses to people. This might require that data on occupancy times, food consumption, and movement be collected for those people living in the immediate vicinity of the facil-ity or accident site. Both Option #1, Option #2, and the existing criteria require enumeration and valuation of damages. Although these options restrict the damages that the Commission must consider to those which can be more readily evaluated, the time and effort required fpr such an analysis 14

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could still be large. Moreover, damage costs or values could be required for property other than taxable property such as municipal utilities, churches, and schools. Although Option #1 and Option #2 would rectify a number of the problems with the existing ENO criteria, they do not represent a radical departure from them and fail to solve totally the problems associated with evaluation of damages.

The statutory definition of an ENO permits the Commission to make a definition that an ENO has occurred if there have been substantial releases of radioactive materials or substantial offsite doses which have resulted or will probably result in substantial injury or substantial damages.

The current criteria and the revisions proposed above place more emphasis on releases of radioactive materials 11 which have resulte~* in substantial injury or damage and thus require a detaiTed enumeration of such injuries or damages as have occurred. Option #3 proposed by Commissioner Bernthal suggests a different approach to decide whether a nuclear accident is an extraordinary nuclear occurrence in that it emphasizes the 11 will probably result 11 aspect in dealing with substantial injury or damages. Rather than requiring enumeration and evaluation of actual damages and identification of actual injuries, the Option #3 simplifies the Commission 1 s task to identifying those conditions which could lead to injury or damages.

The ENO criteria in Option #3 depart from the two-tiered approach which first requires a finding that substantial releases (or doses) occurred and then determining that substantial injury or damages resulted.

Instead, one set of criteria is given for the magnitude of releases and doses that the Commission believes will satisfy the conditions for both substantial releases and will probably result in injury or substantial damages.

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A principal basis of an-ENO determination is that an event occurred which released radioactive materials in such quantities that the event is clearly 11 extraordinary 11 compared to normal operation. This provides the 1 -

threshold level to ensure that the waivers of defenses and other legal provision_s of the Price-Anderson amendments of 1966 are not activated as a result of minor expected operational occurrences. Options #1 and #2 and the present criteria for substantial release set this threshold at a low level to provide a 11 trigger 11 for identifying events which might be classed extraordinary nuclear occurrences. Section 140.81(a) of 10 CFR Part 140 clearly states that the present criterion is below that where substantial injury or damage would result. This is also true for the proposed revisions especially as the numerical criterion for substantial releases is less than in the existing Part 140.

For Option #3, a release of radioactive materials which results in doses or dose rates offsite of a magnitude equal to or greater than the proposed criterion will suffice to demonstrate that substantial releases or offsite doses have occurred and that substantial damage will probably occur. Enumeration of actual damages is not required to satisfy the criterion. Based upon the experience with the ENO determination for the Three Mile Island accident, this simplification would be of great value to a prompt ENO determination. The Commission believes that such simpli-fication warrants the issuance of this novel proposal for public comment.

Of the three conditions associated with Option #3, Conditions (a) and (b) apply primarily to accidents at commercial light-water reactors.

Condition (a) applies to surface contamination which would result from deposited radioactive materials from serious accidents releasing particu-lates or semi-volatile materials. Condition (a) is considered a threshold 16

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for damage requiring extensive decontamination. Damage requiring inter-diction or damage resulting in significant harm to people (early injuries, early deaths and latent effects) is considered well above this threshold and, therefore, is adequately covered by this condition. Con-dition (b) uses a 24-hour integrated dose of 10 rad (0.1 gray) as a mea-sure of the dose which could be received by an individual from releases including those from accidents from which only the noble gases are released.

This dose criterion does not use the dose received by a specific individual or group of individuals. Rather, it is the dose which could have been received during the duration of the accident. The values of these con-ditions were selected to be far above doses or exposure rates which could occur from normal operation under existing radiation protection standards.

Commissioner Bernthal 1 s proposal (Option #3) reiies on the "will probably occur" aspect of the statutory ENO definition. It should be noted that this option would trigger the waivers of defenses and other resultant actions of an affirmative ENO determination without first hav-ing to establish that substantial injuries or damages have actually occurred.

The criterion in Option #3 should ensure that an affirmative ENO determi-nation will be reached in any situation which would give rise to substantial injury or damage, and, conv~rsely, that it would be difficult to exceed the criterion in situations where accident consequences were minor. This should provide the threshold intended by the ENO concept.

IV. Petition for Rulemaking In a petition (PRM-140-1) to the NRC, the Public Citizens Litigation Group and Critical Mass Energy Project requested that the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit No. 2 be found to be an ENO. This 17

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portion of the petition was considered as part of the ENO determination already initiated by the Commission. The Commission later determined (as published in the Federal Register on April 23, 1980 [45 FR 27590]) that the Three Mile Island Accident was not an ENO as defined in the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's regulations.

The petitioners also requested that the Commission make the criteria for determination of an ENO more in line with the intent of Congress. No-tice of receipt of the petition and a request for public comment were pub-lished in the Federal Register on August 28, 1979 (44 FR 50419). One public comment was received regarding the ENO criteria. The convnenter, an official of a nuclear utility, believed that the current criteria for determining an ENO are reasonable. The commenter stated that Congress intended that the waiver of defenses be limited to incidents resulting in significant injury or loss and that the current criteria are consistent with this. The commenter also believed that lowering the threshold for an ENO would lead to higher premiums for insurance coverage and could at some point endanger the availability of insurance coverage.

The Commission believes that the existing ENO criteria are consistent with the Atomic Energy Act definition of an ENO. However, based upon the experience during the Three Mile Island ENO determination, the Commission is proposing revised ENO criteria which are more practicable than the pre-sent regulation. Because the proposed regulations revise the standards against which an ENO determination will be made, the PCLG-CMEP petition for revised ENO criteria is granted in part.

The Commission believes that none of the proposed criteria will af-fect insurance premiums. During the 1966 Congressional hearings o~ the 18

[7590-0lJ ENO, representatives of the insurance industry testified 4 that experience with claims would be the principal determinant of insurance premiums and that institution of the waivers of defenses would not be expected to have any effect on premiums.

The proposed modifications to the ENO criteria would not have changed the outcome of the ENO decision for the Three Mile Island accident. That accident would not have exceeded the proposed dose criteria or the surface contamination criteria and, consequently, would not have been found to be an ENO under existing or any of the proposed regulations.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OF COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL Although the proposed criteria for an ENO in Option 1 are improve-ments to those currently in Part 140, substantial problems remain, problems that would be largely eliminated by the inherent simplicity of Option 3.

The basis of Option 3 is the definition of two simple, objective dose measurements that directly satisfy the requirement of Criterion I; i.e.,

they are a measure of "Substantial Discharge of Radioactive material or Substantial Radiation Levels Offsite. 11 Moreover, these two measures are sufficiently correlated with 11 Substantial Damages to Persons Offsite or Property Offsite 11 (the definition of Criterion II)' that there is no need for further considerations in order to satisfy Criterion II. For the special case of release of radionuclides that produce little or no gamma radiation, Option 3 here incorporates, with minor clarifying modifications, the relevant part of the existing rule.

4 Testimony of D.C. Thomas with E. A. Lowie, R. Fisher, L. Senger, W.M. Smith and J.H. Merritt, 11 Proposed Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses, 11 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th Congress June, 1966. Superintendent of Documents, GPO 1966, page 120.

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In justifying this approach, it is useful first to consider some of the specific problems in Option 1. Second, the characteristics of damages to people and property must be considered, in order to establish what con-stitutes 11 substantial 11 damages. Finally, analyses which correlate 11 sub-stantial damages 11 with the measures of radionuclide release recommended here will be discussed.

Option 1 of the proposed Part 140 rule is evidently complicated, and unnecessarily so. Demonstrating that the criteria for an ENO have been met may be difficult under Option 1, and the proposed rule itself suffers from inconsistences. For example, with reference to:

A. Criterion I (Defined as 11 Substantial Discharge of Radioactive Material or Substantial Radiation Levels 11 ) Part (a):

In order to 11 measure 11 Part (a), one must be able to track two paths: the path of the persons at risk and the path of the plume of radionuclides. It is the intersection of these two paths that will determine the dose to persons, but the two path-ways may never be known well enough to make a reliable deter-mination of dose. (Doses cannot be measured after the fact.)

It is doubtful one would know the compositions of the plume (radioactiv~ cloud) in terms of radionuclides, particle sizes, and chemistry, sufficiently well to rely on them for calculat-ing the critical parameters, i.e., damage to human beings and the dose to specific human organs.

Since persons must actually be exposed to meet this criterion (e.g., 15 rems (0.15 sieverts) to the thyroid), it is a measure 20

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of exposure and po~sible damage (cf. Criterion II), not a measure of discharge or radiation level. Must people be present before a discharge or radiation level threshold can be established?

[This problem is also addressed in the proposed revision to Criterion I(a) found in Option 2, but the problem of identify-ing the intersection of the two pathways remains.]

8. Criterion I Part (b)(l):

For nuclear power plants, the breakdown into two alp~a-emmission groups is unnecessary.

It is not clear whether each of the 100 square meters must be contaminated in excess of those levels in the table, or whether there need only be some contamination evident over 100 contigu-ous square meters. In the latter case, a single localized pocket or object of radioactivity could cause the criteria for an ENO to be met, even though the median and modal contamination per square meter might be very low.

C. Criterion II (Defined as II Substantial Damages to Persons Offs i te or Property Offsite 11 ) Part (1):

• This is the only criterion for substantial radiation damage to persons, and the threshold is very high. Consider, for example, that the exposure of 5000 people to 80 rads (0.8 grays) each would still fall below the threshold criterion for radiation damage to persons.

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If four persons we~e exposed to 600 rads each (6 grays) (lethal dose), the criterion would not be met.

D. Criterion II Part (2):

The valuation itself of taxable property could be time-consuming and cumbersome, and leaves open the question of how one would quickly establish the value of items other than taxable property (e.g., cemeteries, municipal sewer systems, churches). The ENO finding must be made within a reasonable period of time.

E. Criterion II Part ( ~):

11 An Employment Loss 11 criterion could act as a disincentive for employees to return to work or for employers to require return to work. In any case, such numbers may in practice be difficult to measure.

F. Criterion II Part (4):

This criterion depends more on the declaration of a general emergency than on damage to persons. There may well be declara-tions of general emergencies (with accompanying evacuation) without any release of radionuclides. The criterion could act as an incentive (or disincentive) to declaring a general emer-gency. There could also be an incentive to stay away from home in order to contribute to the threshold for waiving defenses.

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In summary, it seems clear that Option 1 is so flawed as to call into question its practicality and applicability in any realistic circum-stance. On the other hand, to demonstrate the suitability of an alterna-tive, Option 3, it is important to establish a realistic definition of "substantial damages" to persons and property, and to relate that defini-tion to a readily measurable radiological release.

Radiological releases from nuclear power plants under accident con-ditions are expected to fall into two categories: 1) releases character-ized by a mix of particulates, volatiles, and gases; and 2) releases con-sisting principally of noble gases (Xe, Kr). For the first category, significant contamination of property would very likely be evident and dominant long before direct health effects are determined to be present and would therefore represent a conservative and early indicator of harm.

Literature 1 on the subject suggests a hierarchy of "damage thresh-olds11 that can be reasonably correlated with dose rates in the case of property, and with integrated doses in the case of persons. For example, the literature suggests readily measurable criteria as follows, in order of increasing severity: 1) damage not requiring decontamination, such as that to milk and crops; 2) damage requiring decontamination; 3) damage requiring interdiction; i.e., physical isolation and exclusion of the public from contaminated areas for an indefinite period of time; 4) early injuries; and finally, 5) early fatalities.

Latent (cancer) fatalities or genetic effects are not included in such a tabulation because neither has a "threshold"; both are normally treated in a probabilistic fashion. Moreover, the incidence of these important latent health effects is characterized by doses well above the threshold for decontamination. The first item (milk and crops), on the 23

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I other hand, involves relative-ly low cost damages (e.g., contaminated milk and crops are purchased and disposed of) and having costs that are unam-biguous (e.g., the cost of buying milk and disposing of it can be clearly documented). Thus, there is little reason to set the threshold of 11 sig-nificant11 damage this low.

On the other hand, costs become much more significant when decontam-ination becomes necessary. Decontamination may involve repaving roads, putting new roofs on homes, and deep plowing of farm lands and/or soil removal. Such costs very quickly would escalate to many millions of dollars--certainly 11 significant 11 as defined in this proposed rule. Costs involved in interdiction are still higher. Thus, a reasonable threshold to establish 11 significant damages 11 to property for ENO purposes is that level of damage which requires decontamination.

The remaining question is whether the 11 decontamination threshold 11 for significant damage correlates with an easily measurable dose-rate or integrated dose. As a guideline, studies 2 have proposed that decontamina-tion should be required if the integrated dose over 30 years is expected to be greater than about 25 rem (0.25 sieverts). For a representative mix of radionuclides such as that expected to be released in an accident, such an integrated long-term dose would be indicated by 10 millirad/hr (0.10 milligray/hr) measured at 1 meter from the ground surface within a few hours after the release. Dose rates substantially higher than this would require interdiction, and could lead to significant latent and genetic effects and even risk of early injury or death.

Of course, the relation between the damage measures described above and the doses at various offsite locations are a function of variables such as meteorological conditions, plume characterizations, population 24

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distribution, and isotopic mixes of radionuclides. Specifically, studies show that:

1. Surface contamination dose rate is a good general dose measure--

it correlates well with damage measures.

2. For a wide variation of accident conditions, the postulated decontamination threshold dose rate of 10 millirad/hr (0.10 milligray/hr) covers cases where costs of decontamination would be significant (i.e., at least a few million dollars).

3. For virtually all conceivable accident conditions, the threshold rate of 10 millirad/hr (0.10 milligray/hr) would envelop interdic-tion and all health effects (cancers, genetic effects and early casualties). The exception is the case of release of noble gases only. This case is addressed in category 2, described below.

4. TMI-2 accident releases resulted in surface contamination dose rates well below the 10 millrad (0.10 milligray/hr) threshold.

5. Accidents characterized by containment building failure (other than basemat melt-through) all are expected to result in peak surface dose rates well above 10 millirad/hr (0.10 milligray/hr).

6. Accidents characterized by no containment building failure all are expected to result in peak surface dose rates well below 10 millirad/hr (0.10 milligray/hr).

For the second category of release, that of only noble gas release, there is no lasting ground contamination and the damage to persons as a consequence of plume exposure dominates. An appropriate threshold dose 25

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for damage in this case can be as low as 10 rads (0.10 gray) integrated over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, since a noble gas plume passage is highly likely to be concluded within a few hours. This dose can be considered substantial since,it is twice the value that triggers Protective Action as established by the FDA and the EPA.

Key to the entire approach suggested here is the fact that the pro-posed threshold surface contamination dose rate can be easily measured and confirmed by NRC shortly after an accident; the integrated dose would be monitored by the network of 40-50 TLD 1 s located at each reactor site.

(Needless to say, adequate dosimetry equipment in the vicinity of nuclear power plants is essential.)

For completeness, Criterion (c) has been included to cover the special cases where a radionuclide release might not involve significant gamma radiation, but might instead produce surface contamination by alpha and/or beta radiation emitters. Such hypothetical releases will be limited to events that might be associated with transportation of nuclear materials, operation of certain non-power plant reactor facilities, or operation of certain other special production and utilization facilities. Criterion (c) in Option 3 is taken directly from 10 CFR 140.84(b)(2) with minor clarifying modifications. The footnotes in that part of the existing rule have also been omitted because they are subject to misinterpretation and appear to be unnecessary.

In summary, radionuclide releases are sufficiently correlated with expected damage from such releases to establish a causal relationship between Criterion I and 11 Substantial Damages to Persons Offsite or Prop-erty Off site. 11 Therefore, no Criterion II as such is needed. The ex-pected correlation between Criterion I and 11 substantia1 damages 11 suggests that the advantages to this approach far outweigh the disadvantages.

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FOOTNOTES -

1 a. Food and Drug Administration, Emergency Protective Action Guides, Federal Register, Vol 47, #205, October 22, 1982, [47 FR 47073].

b. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 11 Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 11 WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), Appendix 6, October 1975.

C. Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Report #9, September 1985.

ct. Federal Radiation Council Staff Report #5, 1964, 11 Background for Development of Radiation Protection Standards. 11

e. Medical Research Council of Great Britain, 1975, 11 Criteria for Controlling Radiation Doses to the Public after Accidental Escapes of Radioactive Material ,i* Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

2 a. Ibid, 2 b.

b. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Overview of the Reactor Safety Study Consequence Model 11 (NUREG-0340), October 1977.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The proposed rule contains no new information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduc-tion Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.).

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rule could affect NRC licensees of produc-tion and utilization facilities and the nuclear liability insurance under-writing pools. The companies that own the production and utilization facilities and the insurance pools do not fall within the definition of a 27

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small business found in section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121.

LIST OF SUBJEC1S IN 10 CFR PART 140 Part 140 - Extraordinary nuclear occurrence, Insurance, Intergovern-mental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 140 is contemplated.

PART 140 - FINANCIAL PROTECTION REQUIEMENTS AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS

1. The authority citation for Part 140 is revised to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 161, 170, 68 Stat. 948, 71 Stat. 576, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201, 2210); secs. 201, 202, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244 (42 u.s.c. 5841, 5842).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273); §§ 140.ll(a), 140.12(a), 140.13 and 140.13a are issued under sec.

161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l(b)); and §140.6 is issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OPTION #1

1. In §140.84, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:

§140.84 Criterion I - Substantial discharge of radioactive material or substantial radiation levels offsite.

(a) The Convnission finds that one or more of the persons offsite has been or probably will be exposed to radiation or radioactive materials which would result in estimated doses in excess of any one of the levels in the following table:

TABLE 1 - TOTAL PROJECTED COMMITTED RADIATION DOSE Organ Dose (Rems): Dose (Sieverts):

Total Body 5 0.05 Thyroid 15 0.15 Bone marrow 5 0.05 Bone (surface or mineral) 15 0.15 Skin 50 0.50 Other organs or tissues 10 0.10 Exposures from the following types of sources of radiation shall be included:

(1) Radiation from sources external to the body; (2) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in air or water; (3) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in food or on terrestrial surfaces; and*

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(4) Radiation from sources internal to the body.

2. In §140.85, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows and paragraph (b) is removed:

§ 140.85 Criterion II - Substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.

After the Commission finds that an event has satisfied Criterion I, the Commission will determine that the event has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite when any of the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) Five or more people have received a radiation dose equivalent to the whole body or any organ in excess of 100 rads (1 gray) during the course of the accident.

(b) Offsite property having a value of $2,500,000 is contaminated with radioactive materials in excess of the levels in§ 140.84(b).

The valuation shall be based on market value taking into account the ratio of assessed value/market value in each tax assessment jurisdiction.

(c) Employment loss of at least 25,000 person-days has occurred.

(d) Evacuation of at least 100,000 person-days has occurred as a result of an evacuation ordered by a State or local official with the authority to make such an order. For the purpose of this regulation, the evacuation period will end when the evacuation order is ~escinded by this or another responsible official and when it is determined that the evacuated area may be reoccupied.

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OPTION #2

1. In Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 140, §140.84 is revised to read as follows:

§140.84 Criterion I - Substantial discharge of radioactive material or substantial radiation levels offsite.

(a) The Commission finds that any of the following doses were or could have been received by a person or persons located on or near any site boundary throughout the duration of the accident:

TABLE 1 - TOTAL PROJECTED COMMITTED RADIATION DOSE Organ Dose (Rems): Dose (Sieverts):

Total Body 5 0.05 Thyroid 15 0.15 Bone marrow 5 0.05 Bone (surface or mineral) 15 0.15 Skin 50 0.50 Other organs or tissues 10 0.10 Exposures from the following types of sources of radiation shall be included:

(1) Radiation from sources external to the body; (2) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in air or water; (3) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in food or on terrestrial surfaces; and (4) Radiation from sources internal to the body.

2. In §140.85, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows and paragraph (b) is removed:

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§ 140.85 Criterion II - Substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.

After the Commission finds that an event has satisfied Criterion I, the Commission will determine that the event has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite when any of the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) A calculated collective dose of 100,000 person-rem [1,000 person-sieverts] has been delivered within a SO-mile radius during the course of the accident.

(b) Offsite property having a value of $2,500,000 is contaminated with radioactive materials in excess of the levels in§ 140.84(b). The valuation shall be based on market value taking into account the ratio of assessed value/market value in each tax assessment jurisdiction.

(c) Employment loss of at least 25,000 person-days has occurred.

(d) Evacuation of at least 100,000 person-days has occurred as a result of an evacuation ordered by a State or local official with the authority to make such an order. For the purpose of this regula-tion, the evacuation period will end when the evacuation order is rescinded by this or another responsible official and when it is determined that the evacuated area may be reoccupied.

OPTION #3

1. In Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 140; §140.84 is revised to read as follows:

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§140.84 Criterion for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence The Commission will determine that there has been a substantial release of radioactive material offsite, or that there have been sub-stantial levels of radiation offsite such that substantial injuries or substantial damages have resulted or will probably result when radio-active material is released from its intended place of confinement and, as a result of the event, any of the following conditions is satisfied:

(a) Real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination with radioactive materials* at levels which produce gamma exposure rates at 1 meter above the surface equal to or greater than 10 millirads per hour, (O.l milligray/hr). 1 (b) The integrated air dose which could be received by an individ-ual, over any 24-hour period exceeds 10 rads (0.1 gray), or (c) Real and personal property is rendered unfit for its normal use as a result of contamination for each square meter of any 100 square meters (as a minimum) at levels in excess of:

Transuranic Alpha-particle-emitting 0.35 microcuries per square meter radionuclides (0.013 MBq/m 2 )*

Non-transuranic alpha-particle 3.5 microcuries per emitting radionuclides square meter (0.13 MBq/m 2 )*

Beta-gamma-emitting radionuclides 4 millirads per hour (0.04 milligray/hr)@ 1 centi-meter above the ground 1

• Megabecquerel where 1 MBq = 10 6 Bq and 1 becquerel (Bq) is 1 disintegra-tion per second. A curie is 3.7 x 10 10 Bq or 37,000 MBq.

1 Measured to exclude very short-lived radionuclides (those having half-lives less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) either by measurement at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after the cessation of abnormal releases of radioactive materials or by making multiple measure-ments and compensating or correcting for the contributions from these short-lived radionuclides.

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2. Section 140.85 is removed.

Dated at Washington, DC tMs ,)..J_ day o f ~ 1985.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Convnission.

y of the Commission 34