ML23156A105

PR-011, 025, 095 - 5FR38863 - Credit Checks - Expanded Personnel Security Investigative Coverage

ML23156A105
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/21/1989
From:	Taylor J NRC/EDO
To:
References
PR-011, PR-025, PR-095, 5FR38863
Download: ML23156A105 (1)

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DOCUMENT DATE:

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ADAMS Template: SECY-067 09/21/1989 PR-011,025,095 - 54FR38863 - CREDIT CHECKS -

EXPANDED PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE PR-011,025,095 54FR38863 RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

PAGE 1 OF 2 STATUS OF RULEMAKING RECORD 1 OF 1

PROPOSED RULE:

PR-011,025,095 RULE NAME:

CREDIT CHECKS -

EXPANDED PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE:

54FR38863 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE:

09/21/89 NUMBER OF COMMENTS:

4 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 11/21/89 EXTENSION DATE:

I I

FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: 55FR11572 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 03/29/90 TES ON: VOLUME 1(9/6/89 - 11/21/89). FINAL RULE PUBLISHED AT 55 FR 11572.

TUS EFFECTIVE: 4/30/90.

RULE FILE LOCATED ON P-1.

PRESS PAGE DOWN OR ENTER TO SEE RULE HISTORY OR STAFF CONTACT PRESS ESC TO SEE ADDITIONAL RULES, {E) TO EDIT OR {S) TO STOP DISPLAY PAGE 2 OF 2 HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-011,025,095 RULE TITLE:

CREDIT CHECKS -

EXPANDED PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER:

FINAL RULE SECY PAPER:

CONTACTl: BETH BRADSHAW CONTACT2:

PROPOSED RULE SRM DATE:

I FINAL RULE SRM DATE:

I STAFF CONTACTS PRESS PAGEUP TO SEE STATUS OF RULEMAKING DATE PROPOSED RULE I

SIGNED BY SECRETARY:

DATE FINAL RULE I

SIGNED BY SECRETARY:

ON THE RULE MAIL STOP: MNBB5721 PHONE:

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PHONE:

PRESS ESC TO SEE ADDITIONAL RULES, {E) TO EDIT OR {S) TO STOP DISPLAY 09/06/89 03/19/90 492-4120 PAGE 1 OF 2 STATUS OF RULEMAKING RECORD 1 OF 1

IIPROPOSED RULE:

PR-011,025,095 II

DOCKET NO. PR-011,025,095 (54FR38863)

In the Matter of CREDIT CHECKS - EXPANDED PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 09/21/89 09/06/89 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - PROPOSED RULE 11/01/89 10/29/89 COMMENT OF DONALD LIGHTFOOT (

1) 11/17 /89 11/17/89 COMMENT OF WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (DANIEL POPEO, GENERAL COUNSEL) (

2) 11/21/89 11/15/89 COMMENT OF UNITED ASSOC. LOCAL #50,... PLUMBING (DAVE LAPLANTE, BUSINESS MANAGER) (

3) 11/21/89 11/20/89 COMMENT OF NORTHWESTERN OHIO BLOG/CONSTRUCT.COUNCIL (JAMES SALISBURY) (

4) 03/27/90 03/19/90 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE

DOCKET NUMBER PR i.,O!J\\' lo Ser.y--

CJi *,>,~! s:: '.l.o t\\~e "'---

!J:ice of li;:> Federal Registt:

tnr pub\\ic,r~icn PROPOSED RULE

//, 2-51-q.5 C 5'/ PR.. 31g1o3)

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[7590-01]

10 CFR Parts 11, 25 and 95 RIN 3150 - AD28 Credit Checks - Expanded Personnel Security Investigative Coverage AGENCY:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION:

Final rule.

DOCKETED USNRC

• 90 HAR 27 A 8 :44 r;. I,::- f'. :* -, ;::

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SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory CoDlllission is amending its regulations to (1) expand the investigative scope for licensee "R" special nuclear material access authorization and 11L 11 security clearance applicants by adding a credit check; and (2) revise the corresponding fee schedules to recover the additional cost of each credit check and cost of newly imposed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) fees for processing fingerprint cards. This amendment is necessary to achieve a higher degree of assurance that licensee "R" and "L" applicants are reliable, trustworthy, and do not have any significant financial problems which r

may cause them to be susceptible to pressures, blackmail, or coercion to act contrary to the national interest.

Effective Date: A?R 3 0 19g(f FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Duane G. Kidd, Division of Security, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone:

(301) 492-4127.

~------

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

On April 12, 1989, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) approved the immediate addition of a credit check to the scope of the initial investigation coverage required for an NRC 11 L 11 security clearance for NRC employees, contractors, and other non-licensee personnel.

The EDO also approved the initiation of rulemaking to implement the same investigative scope change for "R 11 and "L 11 licensee applicants.

The current investigative coverage for 11R 11 and 11L 11 applicants normally consists of a national agency check (NAC) conducted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

While a NAC provides important coverage of an individual's background (e.g., FBI criminal history, fingerprint, and name checks; record checks with OPM, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other applicable agencies), it does not provide information concerning an individual's financial situation. The NRC, therefore, is amending its regulations to expand the present investigative scope for an 11 R 11 special nuclear material access authorization and "L 11 securify clearance by adding a credit check.

The addition of the credit check is necessary to achieve a higher degree of assurance that "R" and "L" licensee applicants are reliable, trust-worthy, and do not have any significant financial problems which may cause them to be susceptible to pressure, blackmail, or coercion to act contrary to the national interest. In October 1987, OPM added several significant financial questions to its SF-86, "Questionnaire For Sensi-tive Positions," which the NRC currently uses as a basis for its per-sonnel security investigations.

OPM added these questions in order to identify security related concerns and possible exploitable weaknesses in a person's background.

In view of recent espionage for money cases, it is important to identify those individuals who have serious financial difficulties and are, therefore, more susceptible to committing espionage or similar activities against the United States.

Furthermore, the NRC has found, based on actual case experience, that an individual's financial difficulties may be an indicator or result of other more serious problems such as drug abuse, alcohol abuse, or dishonesty.

In addition to providing greater assurance of an "R" and "L" licensee applicant's eligibility, the credit check will achieve greater compara-bility between NRC's requirements and those of the Department of Energy and other agencies which require the credit check for their "L" and Secret clearances. The requirement will also be more consistent with the investigative coverage proposed in the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) guidelines for licensee personnel with unescorted access to protected and vital areas of nuclear power plants.

On November 30, 1989, the FBI notified all Federal non-law enforcement agencies, including the NRC, that they would, effective January 1, 1990, begin charging a $14.00 fee to process fingerprint cards related to security clearances.

Previously there had been no charge for this service. This means the cost to NRC for processing a licensee "R" special nuclear material access authorization and "L" security clearance is increased. Because the fees NRC charges licensees for these clearances are dependent on NRC's costs to process them, it is necessary to increase the fees to recover these additional costs.

The applicable fee schedules have been revised to reflect the additional cost associated with the conduct of the credit check and the FBI fee for processing fingerprint cards. Specifically, the total fee for an NRC 11 R" special nuclear material access authorization or 11 L 11 security clearance is increased from

$15.00 to $40.00.

Public Comments On September 21, 1989, the proposed rule was published for comment (54 FR 38863).

The convnent period expired on November 21, 1989.

Four comments were received from the public.

One comment, from a public interest law and policy foundation, supported the addition of credit checks to the investigations of individuals being considered for access to classified information or special nuclear materials. This commenter believed that individuals with serious credit problems created a higher risk to the security of such information and materials.

Two trade unions, whose members work for nuclear power plants or are employed by contractors at such plants, and a private citizen, disagreed with the addition of a credit check to the investigations on the basis that it constituted an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of workers at nuclear power plants and was overly broad in its application to all workers at nuclear power stations.

Additionally, it was stated that (1) there were no procedures to ensure the privacy of the records that would be collected, (2) there were no standards for the evaluation of information that would be collected and (3) there was no established time limit on how far back information could be collected. All three of these convnenters presumed that this rule applied to large numbers of workers at nuclear power stations. This is not so. These rules only apply to individuals who are being considered for access to U.S. Government classified information or access to or control over formula quantities of Special Nuclear Material. With the exception of Fort Saint Vrain, which uses high enriched uranium fuel, classified information or formula quantities of Special Nuclear Material are not normally present at a co!Tlllercial power reactor. Fort Saint Vrain is permanently shut down and is reducing its staff. That licensee is attempting to dispose of its remaining non-self protecting high enriched fuel and, when it does that, will no longer be subject to these rules. Until then it is possible that a few additional security personnel (due to attrition, etc.) may need to be cleared. At other power plants there have been cases where a few senior management and safeguards related personnel have been cleared for access to classified information.

However, to the best of NRC's knowledge, these rules will not apply to any tradesperson at any commercial U.S. light water power reactor.

Though the three objections were clearly related to the presumed impact on tradespeople working at nuclear power plants, a situation not created by these amendments, NRC has reevaluated the concerns they raised. First, there is no e

question that any investigation of a person's background involves a degree of invasion of privacy, and an additional check, such as the credit check discussed in this amendment, increases the impact.

The NRC has decided that the National Security and public health and safety concerns for assuring the integrity, trustworthiness and reliability of individuals who have access to classified information or access to or control over formula quantities of Special Nuclear Material warrants these amendments.

This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the checks are required for its own employees and are generally required throughout the U.S. Government.

Second, there are procedures to ensure the privacy of records that may be collected under the provisions of these rule changes. Specifically, such records are protected from public disclosure under the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, and are subject to the routine uses and safeguards enumerated for NRC Systems of Records, System NRC-39, "Personnel Security Files and Associated Records-NRC.

11 Third, 10 CFR Parts 11, 25 and 95, which are affected by these rule changes, clearly indicate that any unfavorable information developed would be evaluated in conformance with the procedures and requirements of 10 CFR Part 10 11Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Restricted Data or National Security Information or an Employment Clearance" or 10 CFR Part 11 "Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear Material." 10 CFR Parts 10 and 11 have specific procedures both for evaluating such information and for assuring due process for any individual about whom the NRC may develop adverse information.

Fourth, and finally, the commenter is correct in the assertion that there is no limit on the age of the records that could be collected. However, under the standards of 10 CFR Parts 10 or 11, which would be used to evaluate such information, the age of the information would be relevant and decide the weight it would be given in the final determination.

The NRC is, therefore, publishing this final e

rule as originally proposed {with the addition of provisions necessary to recover the cost of FBI charges for processing fingerprint cards.)

Environmental Impact:

Categorical Exclusion The NRC has determined that this regulation is the type of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22 {c) (1). Therefore, neither an environ-mental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this final rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 {44 U.S.C. 3501 et.seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0046, 3150-0047, and 3150-0062.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this final regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alter-natives considered by the Commission.

The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, Room ll6, 2120 L Street, NW. (lower level), Washington, DC.

Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Duane G. Kidd, Division of Security, Office of Adminis-tration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone:

(301) 492-4127.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Colllllission certifies that this final rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rulemaking only applies to those licensees and others who need to use, process, store, transport, or deliver to a carrier for transport formula quantities of special nuclear material (as defined in 10 CFR Part 73) or generate, receive, safeguard, and store National Security Information or Restricted Data (as defined in 10 CFR Part 25). Approximately 31 NRC licensee and other license related interests would be affected under the provisions of 10 CFR Parts 11 and/or 25.

However, 20 of these licensees, or other interests, have only a limited number of active clearances, e.g., one or two each, relating to classified safeguards activities.

Because these licensees are not classified as small entities as defined by the NRC's size standards (December 9, 1985; 50 FR 50241), the Commission finds that this rule does not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.

Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this final rule, and therefore, that a backfit analysis is not required for this final rule, because these amendments do not involve any provisions which would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l).

List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 11 Hazardous materials - transportation, Investigations, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Special nuclear material.

10 CFR Part 25 Classified information, Investigations, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

10 CFR Part 95 Classified information, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amend-ments to 10 CFR Parts 11, 25, and 95.

PART 11 - CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO OR CONTROL OVER SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

1.

The authority citation for Part 11 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Sec. 161, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

Section 11.15(e) also issued under sec. 501, 85 Stat. 290 (31 U.S.C.

483a).

2.

In§ 11.7, paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:

§ 11.7 Definitions.

(d) "NRC - 'R' special nuclear material access authorization" means an administrative determination based upon a national agency check and credit investigation that an individual in the course of employment is eligible to work at a job falling within the criterion of§ 11.ll(a)(2).

3. In§ 11.15, paragraphs (e)(l) and (f) are revised to read as fol lows:

§ 11.15 Application for special nuclear material access authorization.

(e)(l) Each application for special nuclear material access authori-zation, renewal, or change in level must be accompanied by the licensee's remittance, payable to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, according to the following schedule:

i.

NRC-U requiring full field investigation ************************ $2,415 ii.

NRC-U requiring full field investigation (expedited processing) ** $2,932 iii. NRC-U based on certification of comparable full field background investigation **************************************************** 1 $0 iv.

1 NRC-U or R renewal **......*..**....*..*.*....**...**..**.......** $40

v.

NRC-R 1

$40 vi.

NRC-R based on certification of comparable investigation ********* 2 $0 1 If the NRC determines, based on its review of available data, that a full field investigation is necessary, a fee of $2,415 will be assessed prior to the conduct of the investigation.

2 If the NRC determines, based on its review of available data, that a national agency check and credit investigation is necessary, a fee of $40.00 will be assessed prior to the conduct of the investi-gation; however, if a full field investigation is deemed necessary by the NRC, based on its review of available data, a fee of $2,415 will be assessed prior to the conduct of the investigation.

(f)(l) Any Federal employee, employee of a contractor of a Federal agency, licensee, or other person visiting an affected facility for the purpose of conducting official business, who possesses an active NRC or DOE-Q access authorization or an equivalent Federal security clearance granted by another Federal agency (

11Top Secret 11

) based on a comparable full field background investigation may be permitted, in accordance with

§ 11.11, the same level of unescorted access that an NRC-U special nuclear material access authorization would afford.

(2) Any Federal employee, employee of a contractor of a Federal agency, licensee, or other person visiting an affected facility for the purpose of conducting official business, who possesses an active NRC or DOE-L access authorization or an equivalent security clearance granted by another Federal agency ("Secret") based on a background investigation or national agency check and credit investigation may be permitted, in accordance with

§ 11.11, the same level of unescorted access that an NRC-R special nuclear material access authorization would afford.

An NRC or DOE-L access authoriza-tion or an equivalent security clearance (-'Secret"), based on a background investigation or national agency check, which was granted or being processed by another Federal agency prior to [effective date of final rule] is acceptable to meet this requirement.

4.

Section 11.16 is revised to read as follows:

§ 11.16 Cancellation of request for special nuclear material access authorization.

When a request for an individual's access authorization is withdrawn or cancelled, the licensee shall notify the Chief, Personnel Security Branch, NRC Division of Security immediately, by telephone, so that the full field investi-gation or national agency check and credit investigation may be discontinued.

The caller shall provide the full name and date of birth of the individual, the date of request, and the type of access authorization originally requested (

11U 11 or "R").

The licensee shall promptly submit written confirmation of the telephone 11 -

notification to the Personnel Security Branch, NRC Division of Security. A portion of the fee for the "U" special nuclear material access authorization may be refunded depending upon the status of the full field investigation at the time of withdrawal or cancellation.

PART 25 - ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FOR LICENSEE PERSONNEL

5.

The authority citation for Part 25 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Secs. 145, 161, 68 Stat. 942, 948, as amended {42 U.S.C.

2165, 2201), sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841); E.O.

10865, as amended, 3 CFR 1959-1963 COMP., p. 398 (50 U.S.C. 401, note),

E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874, April 6, 1982.

Appendix A also issued under 96 Stat. 1051 (31 U.S.C. 9701).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), §§ 25.13, 25.17(a), 25.33(b) and (c) are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended {42 U.S.C. 2201 (i)), and§§ 25.13 and 25.33(b) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

6. In§ 25.5 the definition of "L" is revised to read as follows:

§ 25.5 Definitions.

"L 11 access authorization means an access authorization granted by the Commission which is normally based on a national agency check and credit investigation (NAC&C) or national agency check, inquiries and

• credit investigation (NACIC) conducted by the Office of Personnel Management.

7.

Section 25.25 is revised to read as follows:

§ 25.25 Cancellation of requests for access authorization.

When a request for an individual's access authorization is with-drawn or cancelled, the requester shall notify the NRC Division of Security immediately, by telephone, so that the full field investi-gation or national agency check and credit investigation may be discontinued.

The caller shall supply the full name and date of birth of the individual, the date of request, and the type of access authori-zation originally requested ("Q" or "L").

The telephone notification must be promptly confirmed in writing.

8.

Appendix A is revised to read as follows:

Appendix A - Fees for NRC Access Authorization Category Fee Initial "L" Access Authorization...............................

1$40 Reinstatement of "L" Access Authorization......................

1$40 Extension or Transfer of L" Access Authorization..............

1$40 Initial "Q" Access Authorization...............................

$2,415 Initial "Q" Access Authorization (expedited processing) *************** $2,932 Reinstatement of "Q" Access Authorization 2

$2,415 Reinstatement of "Q" Access Authorization (expedited processing) ************************************ 2$2,932 Extensl*on or Transfer of "Q" 2$2,415 Extension or Transfer of "Q" (expedited processing) ************ 2$2,932 1 If the NRC determines, based on its review of available data, that a full field investigation is necessary, a fee of $2,415

~ill be assessed prior to the conduct of the investigation.

Full fee will only be charged if investigation is required.

PART 95 - SECURITY FACILITY APPROVAL ANO SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ANO RESTRICTED DATA

9. The authority citation for Part 95 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Secs. 145, 161, 68 Stat. 942, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2165, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841); E.O.

10865, as amended, 3 CFR 1959-1963 COMP., p. 398 (50 U.S.C. 401, note);

E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874, April 6, 1982.

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), §§ 95.13, 95.15(a), 95.25, 95.27, 95.29(b), 95.31, 95.33, 95.35, 95.37, 95.39, 95.41, 95.43, 95.45, 95.47, 95.51, 95.53, and 95.57 are also issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)).

10. In§ 95.5 the definition of "L" is revised to read as follows:

§ 95.5 Definitions.

"L" access authorization means an access authorization granted by the Commission which is normally based on a national agency check and credit investigation (NAC&C) or national agency check, inquiries and

• credit investigation (NACIC) conducted by the Office of Personnel Management.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this d~ of __

'.?t...__

.... ~-~---

, 1990.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ~

GEORGE RAY MEDLIN, J R.

President ALLAN J. SEGUR Vice President GERALD R. HALL Recording Secretary AR AYMONDSCHLAGHECK

~

- Secretary-treasurer THOMAS F. J ACOBS Sergeant-at-Arms DONALD R. DeBOLT Trustee WILFREDO HINOJ OSA Trustee ROGER KERNER Trustee Secretary United states Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 November 20, 1989 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Re:

Proposed Rule(s) Which Seek to Expand the Investigative Scope for Security Clearance Applicants by Adding a Credit Check

Dear Sir or Madam:

I am the Executive Secretary-Business Manager for the Northwestern Ohio Building and Construction Trades Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Council").

The Council is an affiliation of labor organizations in the building and construction industry in the Northwest Ohio area.

The Council serves as a channel for the voicing of opinions and comments on legislation, public policies and other matters which impact or otherwise have an effect upon working men and women who depend upon the building and construction industry for their livelihoods.

In this regard, through the various unions which compose the Council, the Council serves as a

united voice for approximately ten thousand (10,000) building trades men and women in the Northwest Ohio area.

A substantial number of the members of unions affiliated with this Council work for employers who perform building and construction work at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power station in Port Clinton, Ohio.

Thus, it is these men and women who will bear the brunt of any rules or regulations which seek to expand the investigative scope for security clearances by adding a credit check.

In this regard, I have recently become aware that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed to amend its existing regulations to expand the investigative scope for "L"

security clearance applicants by adding a credit check and investigation into the financial situation of employees working for contractors performing work at nuclear power Id"'

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plants.

See 54 Fed Reg. 38863 (September 21, 1989).

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "NRC") has attempted to justify the proposed rule by stating that "the credit check is necessary to achieve a higher degree of assurance that... licensee applicants are

reliable, trustworthy, and do not have any significant financial problems which may cause them to be susceptible to pressures, blackmail or coercion to act contrary to the national interest." Id. at 38863.

The NRC goes on further to state that "[i]n view of recent espionage for money cases, it is important to identify those individuals who have serious financial difficulties and are, therefore, more susceptible to committing espionage or similar activities against the United States. Id. Finally, the NRC states that based on actual experience it has found that "an individual's financial difficulties may be an indicator or result of other more serious problems such as drug abuse, alcohol abuse or dishonesty."

Id.

While the council and its affiliated unions are equally concerned with and in no way condone drug use in the workplace, espionage and/or terrorism, it is the Council's position that the addition of a credit check requirement for employees of contractors at nuclear power plants goes far beyond the bounds of permissible government inquiry.

Specifically, it is the Council's position that the proposed rule constitutes an undue and arbitrary infringement upon the rights of members of unions affiliated with the Council to privacy and/or to keep certain aspects of their lives private.

Furthermore, it is the Council's position that the proposed rule is irrational in that there is no standard which would determine what degree of financial debt would place an employee at risk.

Moreover, the Council believes that the proposed rule, as stated in the NRC's supplementary information in 54 Fed. Reg. 38863, would stamp individuals with financial debt as being espionage agents, terrorists, drug abusers, alcoholics, or simply dishonest. Thus, The Council believes that the proposed rule amounts to NRC overkill;

and, believe that the following discussion supports the Council's position.

It is well established that there are certain personal rights which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and that are so fundamental that the "shadows" cast by the several provisions of the Bill of Rights provide them with constitutional protection.

See ~,

Palco

v.

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113, 152-153 (1973); Whelan v. Rowe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977).

One of the personal rights which is entitled to

constitutional protection is the" right to privacy".

See Whelan v. Rowe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 605-606 (1977).

See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

Implicit in the right to privacy "is the individual's interests in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."

See Whelan, 429 U.S. at 599.

In Whelan v. Rowe, the United States Supreme Court recognized, "the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files."

Id. at 605.

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that even the Presidents of the United States are "not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity,"

including "matters concerned with family or personal finances."

Nixon v.

Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).

Other courts have also recognized the existence of a

right to privacy in personal matters which is an interest protected by the United States Constitution.

See ~,

Barry v.

City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2nd Cir.) cert denied. 464 U.S. 1071 (1983) (financial information); Plante

v.

Gonzalez, 575 F. 2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) (personal financial information); ~

v.

Westinghouse Electric Corp.,

638 F. 2d 570 (3rd Cir.

1980) (medical information); Dow v. Webster, 616 F. 2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (criminal record); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F. 2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976) cert denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977)

(patient's communication of psychotherapy).

It is clear, then, that individuals have a right to the privacy in personal matters,

and, this right to privacy which is of constitutional dimension.

This right to privacy certainly includes the right to avoid disclosure of financial matters.

See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2nd Cir.

1983);

Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F. 2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).

In light of the recognized right to privacy in financial matters, the NRC's proposed rule unnecessarily and arbitrarily impinges upon this right.

To assume that persons with debt may be susceptible to "pressures, blackmail, or coercion" is akin to assuming that persons of Irish ancestry are susceptible to pressures from the Irish Republic Army and/or that persons of Puerto Rican ancestry are subject to pressures from the National Armed Liberation Front and/or that persons of Arabic ancestry are subject to pressures from the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

certainly, such assumptions cannot be made.

Likewise the proposed rule is irrational because it assumes that persons who have financial problems are not reliable and

trustworthy, while it assumes that persons who do not have such financial problems are reliable and trustworthy.

In this

regard, there is simply no connection between reliability and truthfulness and financial matters.

Indeed, it is the Council's belief that the NRC would be hard pressed to demonstrate any correlation between financial condition and reliability and trustworthiness.

Indeed, it is my understanding that the owner of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, the Toledo Edison Company, has a very substantial debt.

Notwithstanding this debt, I

do not believe that the NRC has had any reason to not credit the reliability and trustworthiness of Toledo Edison.

As I mentioned earlier, the proposed rule is simply an administrative overkill.

Any questions which may exist regarding the reliability and trustworthiness of an individual can already be identified through the presently existing background investigations which are required by NRC regulations.

These thorough investigations can readily identify individuals who have a background which may make them questionable security risks (~, drug abuse, political sympathies, etc).

In sum, while the Council sympathizes with the security concerns expressed by the NRC, the Council cannot endorse the NRC's position that Americans shed their constitutional rights at the doorstep of a nuclear power plant.

There is no rational reason, much less a compelling one, which would require an individual to disclose potentially embarrassing financial debts solely because the NRC believes that persons with debt problems are to be branded as security risks.

This is especially so when the council does not believe that the NRC has any evidence that financial difficulty indicates susceptibility to disloyalty, drug

abuse, alcholism or dishonesty.

Thus, the Council would object to the proposed rule and request that the NRC keep the views expressed in this letter in mind when deciding whether to make the proposed rule a final one.

Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated.

If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours, NORTHWESTERN OHIO BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL

~E)~h James Salisbury Executive Secretary

United Associatio1f 1Local No. 50 Bus. Mgr.

Fin. Sec.*Treas.

Bus. Agents 476-5821 476-1693 476-7741 Secretary

.89 NOV 21 p 4 :25 Plumbers a 5050 Bennett Road November 15, 1989 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, DC 20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir/Madam:

CD Toledo, Ohio 43612 This comment is being submitted on behalf of the United Association Local No. 50 Journeymen and Apprentices of the Pl umbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada (hereinafter "Local 50") regarding the Proposed Rules promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hereinafter "NRC") con-cerning the NRC's proposal to amend its regulations to expand investigative scope for licensee "R" special nuclear material access authorization and "L" security clearance applicants by adding a credit check and correspondingly revising the fee to cover the additi onal cost for each credit check.

Local 50 is comprised of approximately 1,200 men and women who reside and work in Northwest Ohio.

Approximatel y one-half of i ts members work at various nuclear power stations in Northwest Ohio and Southeast Michigan.

In addition, Local so refers out many other individuals of the United Associ at i on, its parent International Union, who are members of other l ocals to nuclear power stations within the geographic jurisdi cti on of Local so.

Local 50 and its members have performed a great deal of work on various nuclear power stati ons and in particular the Davi s Besse Nucl ear Power Station owned and operated by the Toledo Edison Corporation and its parent organi zation Centeri or Energy Corporation.

Based upon the work of i ts members and its i nvol ve-ment as the labor organization, Local so opposes the NRC 1 s proposed amendments.

This opposit i on i s based upon several reasons.

NOV 2 7 1989

1,1.S. r*UCLEAR REG' L roiv COMMISSloti C~ Tl G & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF HiE SECRETARY OF Tl,E COMMISSION Doc*J:-,I Stat isl ics Posrmark DJt::

Copies r~~ *.'

A&d'I C-:

5pecial Dis r i

u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 15, 1989 Page 2 First, Local 50 believes that such credit checks are an undue intrusion in its members* personal affairs and violates their rights to privacy.

The proposed rule making is expansive and does not limit the credit checks to any particular period of time (for example, within the last year) or financial institutions.

In addition, it does not limit the credit checks to individuals who will be working at nuclear power stations for extended periods of time.

Over the many years that Local 50 has referred individuals to nuclear power stations, individuals average less than two months on the job.

To allow credit checks for individuals who work short periods of time are too persuasive and unnecessarily burdensome.

Secondly, one of the reasons indicated by the NRC in favor of its proposed rule making is to determine if individuals are financially insecure which may make them susceptible to com-mitting espionage or similar activities against the United States.

Local 50 members are construction workers and do not have access to plans, details, procedures or methods which are secret or classified in nature that could harm the United States.

Local 50 members perform mechanical construction work and the work that they perform at nuclear power stations is, in theory, not that different from other mechanical work that they perform on non-nuclear power stations.

Since the members of Local 50 would not have access to such secrets and therefore not be susceptible to espionage, there is no reason to burden the individuals with credit checks that would result in their privacy being invaded.

The proposed rule does not differentiate between long and short term employees.

Thirdly, a second reason given by the NRC is that "individuals who have financial difficulties may be an indicator or result of more serious problems such as drug abuse, alcohol abuse or dishonesty".

This bald statement unsupported by any fac-tual evidence, scientific studies or documentation is overbroad and unreliable.

In addition, as stated above, the Local 50 mem-bers are mechanical construction workers.

They are closely super-vised and work under the scrutiny of not onl y the supervisors of the contracting company by which they are employed, but also engi-neers and supervisors of the owners of the nuclear power station.

It is not practical that Local 50 members, even if they would so chose, would be employed while involved in any drug abuse, alcohol abuse or dishonesty. If the Local 50 members do become involved in such improper activities, there are ample ways of discovering this because of the close scrutiny under which Local so members work.

There are better ways to identify those problems rather than requiring all of the employees who perform work on the nuclear power stations to subject themselves to financial credit checks.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 15, 1989 Page 3 Fourthly, the NRC has failed to establish any need for this information.

There has not been any indication by the NRC that espionage has been committed by construction workers in general or United Association members in particular on any nuclear power station.

In addition, there has not been any supporting evidence that construction workers have been found to be drug abu-sers, alcohol abusers or dishonest.

To establish these require-ments of credit checks on individuals who have performed ably and loyally on various nuclear power stations is unnecessary.

Fifthly, the proposed rule does not indicate how the information obtained from the credit checks will be kept confiden-tial.

The information gained from credit checks is personal in nature and individuals who obtain that information should be under strict requirements to keep the information private.

Sixthly, the NRC proposes to increase the fee of the licensee in order to pay for this additional cost.

This addi-tional fee will then in turn be passed on by the licensee to the consumer.

When this additional cost is passed on to its custo-mers it will include individuals and businesses.

This will cause greater expense to business manufacturers in the cost of producing their product as well as an additional financial burden on indivi-duals.

Local 50 and its members are strong proponents of ensuring that the United States and its manufacturers remain competitive.

By increasing the expense to doing business by manufacturers will lead to a continuation of the erosion of the manufacturing strength of this country and lead to greater foreign imports by manufacturers of foreign nations.

The NRC should not burden con-sumers to pay for unneeded credit checks.

For all the reasons stated above, Local 50 objects to the proposed rule making.

Local 50 believes:

1.

That this is an invasion of privacy of the workers on nuclear power stations;

2.

That the proposed requirement of the credit checks is overbroad as it includes all workers even though construction workers do not have access to infor-mation which is secretive, are closely supervised and any action taken by construction workers can be easily identified by others without the necessary of credit checks;

3.

That there is no factual evidence or documentation to support the proposed requirement to show a direct correlation between unfinancially secure individuals and espionage, drug abuse, alcohol abuse and disho-nesty.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 15, 1989 Page 4

4.

That the proposed rule making is unnecessary and the NRC has not established any need for this additional requirement;

s.

There are no procedures to ensure that the infor-mation obtained through the credit checks will be kept confidential.

6.

This additional cost will ultimately be passed on to the individuals and manufacturers thereby creating unnecessary financial burden on them and weakening the manufacturing strength of this nation.

If you desire any additional information concerning this, please contact me.

Thank you for your attention to this.

JJA/DL/pnr Sincerely, 8~ W}?_A~

Dave LaPlante Business Manager cc:

John Glenn, United states Senator Howard Metzenbaum, United States Senator Marcy Kaptur, United States Congress

ER WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 1705 N STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036 202-857-0240

~515 November 17, 1989

, cs 'fr~ 3 ~rt3 )

Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555

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I_N;,

• a9 NDV 17 P2 :55 Re: Proposed Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 11, 25 and 95 54 Fed. Reg. 38863 (September 21, 1989) Docket f RIN 3150-AD28 To the Members of the Commission:

The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) wishes to express its support for the proposed amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 11, 25 and 95

[54 Fed.

Reg.

38863 (September 21, 1989)]

involving the authorization of credit checks for persons seeking NRC "L" and "R" security clearances. WLF is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest law and policy center with 120,000 members and supporters nationwide. WLF engages in litigation and participates in the administrative process regarding matters which affect the broad public interest and welfare.

In particular, WLF has devoted a substantial portion of its resources to supporting a strong national security apparatus. WLF has appeared as amicus curiae in many cases dealing with the security and defense of the United States, including United States

v. Whitworth, No. CR 85-552 JV (N.D. Cal 1985) (trial of a former Navy petty officer accused of espionage for the Soviet Union).

Based on our experiences in the national security field, WLF wholeheartedly supports all efforts to more closely monitor the access of individuals to important national security information and materials. Massive security breaches over the past several years have not occurred because of the ideological or political convictions of the traitors, but rather because of the lust for money. Hostile intelligence organizations offering large sums of money have successfully procured classified information from individuals with security clearances.

This being the case, the risk is certainly higher that a person having serious financial problems would engage in a secrets-for-money swap than would a person without financial problems. By permit ting the NRC to conduct credit checks into applicants for "R" and "L" clearances, potentially disastrous events can be avoided before they ever occur.

Clearly, the trust and responsibility that the Government ov 19 1989

.kn w\\edaed by card ** * * * *

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.. places upon an individual when granting a security clearance should in part be based upon that individual's conscientiousness and honesty when dealing with others, including financial institutions.

Persons who habitually fail to live up to the legal requirements of borrowing and repaying money are very likely to be less honest and reliable than those who make good-faith efforts to live up to the terms of their loans. WLF does not mean to imply that persons who have had credit problems because of divorce, illness or unemployment should automatically be denied access to security clearances. In some cases, unfortunately, persons simply fail to repay loans without any good reason. The reliability and integrity of such deadbeats should be weighed by the NRC when making decisions about security clearances.

Very often, credit problems are a symptom rather than a disease. Alcoholism and drug addiction often lead to very serious financial problems. By allowing NRC to investigate into clearance applicants' credit histories, other derogatory information may come to light in a way impossible under the current system of making only a National Agency Check. No reasonable person can argue that drug addicts and alcoholics are deserving of the trust of the Government to keep secure the nation's sensitive information and materials.

The use of credit checks in uncovering deeper indications of unreliability among clearance applicants would be a valuable tool.

Access to our nuclear facilities by terrorist groups, the loss of state secrets to hostile intelligence organizations and potentially the very safety of our nation is at stake when an unreliable or dishonest person is given a security clearance. NRC has wisely sought to broaden the scope of the investigations performed on applicants for security clearances. WLF strongly supports the adoption of the proposed amendments.

Respectfully Submitted, l2~lr~

General Counsel l

Paul Executive Legal Director

~/!{5 Legal Clerk

October 29, 1989 570 Candyce ct.

Perrysburg, Ohio 0

~~~~51:i~Jtf PR / llJ 7S (5VFR ~?f63) 43551.89 NOV -1 P 4 :31

,_ r r !

Secretary GUCh~ 1 i:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.c.

20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Commission Members,

t f At I have been in the Nuclear Power Industry for 20 years and have always supported greater involvement by the NRC into commercial nuclear power generation matters.

However, after reading your proposal to require that credit checks be performed for personnel having access to nuclear power generation plants, I find that I am unable to support your current propsal.

I feel the current Fitness For Duty policy scheduled to go into effect in January, 1990, should be able to uncover the person who would be subject to blackmail or coercion.

I also believe that the current MMPI exam would and should uncover any aberrant behavior, thus providing the same results.

In conclusion, I am opposed to your new proposal to require credit checks as I feel a program is already in place to give the same results without burdening the licensee's with more expense and without the preception that "Big Brother" is watching.

Sincerely, Urul~~-

Donald R. Lightfoot NOV -6 1989- *-...

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AGENCY:

ACTION:

SUMMARY

DOCKET NUMBER ff J / d-5 q 5' PROPOSED RULE l ~'I rR 3fr63)

[7590-01)

• a9 EP 21 Pl2 :os NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 11, 25 and 95 RIN 3150 - AD28 Credit Checks - Expanded Personnel Security Investigative Coverage Nuclear Regulatory Cormiission.

Proposed rule.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission proposes to amend its regulations to (1) expand the investigative scope for licensee "R" special nuclear material access authorization and "L" security clearance applicants by adding a credit check; and (2) revise the corresponding fee schedules to recover the additional cost of each credit check. This amendment is necessary to achieve a higher degree of assurance that licensee "R" and 11L" applicants are reliable, trustworthy, and do not have any significant financial problems which may cause them to be sus-ceptible to pressures, blackmail, or coercion to act contrary to the national interest.

DATE:

Coment period expires

• Conments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Comis-sion is able to assure consideration only for conments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES:

Mail written coments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, DC 20555, ATTENTION:

Docketing and Servi~e Pwb JisJ.ol it, f},. -t Branch.

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Deliver CoRlllents to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Copies of the regulatory analysis and coR111ents received may be examined at:

Room LL6, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Beth Bradshaw, Personnel Security Branch, Division of Security, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CoR111ission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone:

(301) 492-4120.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

On April 12, 1989, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) approved the immediate addition of a credit check to the scope of the initial investigation coverage required for an NRC "L" secur;ty clearance for NRC employees, contractors, and other non-licensee personnel. The EDO also approved the initiation of rulemaking to implement the same investigative scope change for "R* and "L" licensee applicants.

The current investigative coverage for "R" and "L" applicants normally consists of a National Agency Check (NAC) conducted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

While a NAC provides important coverage of an individual's background (e.g., FBI criminal history fingerprint and name checks; record checks with OPM, the Department of Defense (DOD) and other applicable agencies), it does not provide information concerning an individual's financial situation.

NRC proposes, therefore, to expand the present investigative scope for an "R" special nuclear material access authorization and "L" security clearance by adding a credit check.

2

The addition of the credit check is necessary to achieve a higher degree of assurance that 11R" and "L" licensee applicants are reliable, trust-worthy, and do not have any significant financial problems which may cause them to be susceptible to pressures, blackmail, or coercion to act contrary to the national interest. In October 1987, OPM added several significant financial questions to its SF-86, "Questionnaire For Sensi-tive Positions," which the NRC currently uses as a basis for its per-sonnel security investigations.

OPM added these questions in order to identify security related concerns and possible exploitable weaknesses in a person's background.

In view of recent espionage for money cases, it is important to identify those individuals who have serious financial difficulties and are, therefore, more susceptible to committing espionage or similar activities against the United States.

Furthermore, NRC has found, based on actual case experience, that an individual's financial difficulties may be an indicator or result of other more serious problems such as drug abuse, alcohol abuse, or dishonesty.

In addition to providing greater assurance of an "R" and "l" licensee applicant's eligibility, the credit check will achieve greater compara-bility between NRC's requirements and those of the Department of Energy and other agencies which require the credit check for their "l" and Secret clearances. The proposed requirement will be more consistent with the investigative coverage proposed in the Nuclear Management and Re-sources Council (NUMARC) guidelines for licensee personnel with unescorted access to protected and vital areas of nuclear power plants.

3

The applicable fee schedules will be revised to reflect the additional cost associated with the conduct of the credit check.

Specifically, the fee for an NRC "R" special nuclear material access authorization or "L" security clearance wi 11 increase from $15.00 to $25.00.

Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion The NRC has determined that this proposed regulation is the type of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (1).

Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environ-mental assessment has been prepared for this proposed rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et.seq.) Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0046, 3150-0047, and 3150-0062.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this proposed regulation.

The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alter-natives considered by the Co1T111ission.

The analysis is available for 4

L inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, Room LL6, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Beth Bradshaw, Division of Security, Office of Adminis-tration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co11111ission, Washington, DC

20555, telephone:

(301) 492-4120.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification Based upon the information available at this stage of the rulemaking proceeding and in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission certifies that, if promulgated, this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rulemaking activity applies only to those licensees and others who need to use, process, store, transport, or deliver to a carrier for transport formula quantities of special nuclear material (as defined in 10 CFR Part 73) or generate, receive, safeguard, and store National Security Information or Restricted Data (as defined in 10 CFR Part 25).

Approximately 31 NRC licensee and other license related interests would be affected under the provisions of 10 CFR Parts 11 and/or 25.

However, 20 of these licensee or other interests have only a limited number of active clearances, e.g., one or two each, relating to safeguards activities. Because these licensees are not classified as small entities as defined by the NRC's size standards (December 9, 1985; 50 FR 50241),

the Co11111ission finds that this rule will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.

5

Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this proposed rule, and therefore, that a backfit analysis is not required for this proposed rule, because these amendments do not involve any provisions which would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l).

List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 11 Hazardous materials - transportation, Investigations, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Special nuclear material.

10 CFR Part 25 Classified information, Investigations, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

10 CFR Part 95 Classified information, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping require-ments, Security measures.

6

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 11, 25, and 95.

PART 11 - CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO OR CONTROL OVER SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

1.

The authority citation for Part 11 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Sec. 161, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

Section 11.15(e) also issued under sec. 501, 85 Stat. 290 (31 U.S.C.

483a).

2.

In§ 11.7 paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:

§ 11.7 Definitions.

(d) 11 NRC - 'R' spec.ial nuclear material access authorization" means an administrative determination based upon a national agency check and credit investigation that an individual in the course of employment is eligible to work at a job falling within the criterion of§ 11.ll(a)(2).

3.

In§ 11.15 paragraphs (e)(l) and (f) are revised to read as follows:

7

§ 11.15 Application for special nuclear material access authorization.

(e)(l) Each application for special nuclear material access authori-zation, renewal, or change in level must be accompanied by the licensee's remittance, payable to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, according to the following schedule:

i.

NRC-U requiring full field investigation------------------ $2,127

11.

NRC-U requiring full field investigation {expedited processing)

---

$2,645 iii. NRC-U based on certification of comparable full field background investigation----------------

o1 iv.

NRC-U or R renewal-----------

251

v.

NRC-R ------------------------

251 vi.

NRC-R based on certification of comparable investigation----- o2 1 If the NRC determines, based on its review of available data, that a full field investigation is necessary, a fee of $2,127 will be assessed prior to the conduct of the investigation.

2 If the NRC determines, based on its review of available data, that a national agency check and credit investigation is necessary, a fee of $25.00 will be assessed prior to the conduct of the investi-gation; however, if a full field investigation is deemed necessary by the NRC based on its review of available data, a fee of $2,127 will be assessed prior to the conduct of the investigation.

8

(f)(l) Any Federal employee, employee of a contractor of a Federal agency, licensee, or other person visiting an affected facility for the purpose of conducting official business, who possesses an active NRC or DOE-Q access authorization or an equivalent Federal security clearance granted by another Federal agency ("Top Secret 11 ) based on a comparable full field background investigation may be permitted in accordance with

§ 11.11 the same level of unescorted access that an NRC-U special nuclear material access authorization would afford.

(2) Any Federal employee, employee of a contractor of a Federal agency, licensee, or other person visiting an affected facility for the purpose of conducting official business, who possesses an active NRC or OOE-L access authorization or an equivalent security clearance granted by another Federal agency ("Secret") based on a background investigation or national agency check and credit investigation may be permitted in accordance with§ 11.11 the same level of unescorted access that an NRC-R special nuclear material access authorization would afford.

An NRC or DOE-l access authorization or an equivalent security clearance

("Secret"), based on a background investigation or national agency check, which was granted or being processed by another Federal agency prior to [date final rule is published in the Federal Register] is acceptable to meet this requirement.

4.

Section 11.16 is revised to read as follows:

§ 11.16 Cancellation of request for special nuclear material access authorization.

9

When a request for an individual's access authorization is with-drawn or cancelled, the licensee shall notify the Chief, Personnel Security Branch, NRC Division of Security immediately, by telephone, so that the full field investigation or national agency check and credit investigation may be discontinued.

The caller shall provide the full name and date of birth of the individual, the date of request, and the type of access authorization originally requested ('1U 11 or 11R 11 ).

The licensee shall promptly submit written confirmation of the telephone notification to the Personnel Security Branch, NRC Division of Security.

A portion of the fee for the 11U 11 special nuclear material access authori-zation may be refunded depending upon the status of the full field investigation at the time of withdrawal or cancellation.

PART 25 - ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FOR LICENSEE PERSONNEL

5.

The authority citation for Part 25 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Secs. 145, 161, 68 Stat. 942, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2165, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841); E.O.

10865, as amended, 3 CFR 1959-1963 COMP., p. 398 (50 U.S.C. 401, note);

E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874, April 6, 1982.

Appendix A also issued under 96 Stat. 1051 (31 U.S.C. 9071).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958 as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), §§ 25.13, 25.17(a), 25.33(b) and (c) are issued under sec. 16li, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201 (i)); and§§ 25.13 and 25.33(b) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

6.

In § 25.5 the definition of 11l 11 is revised to read as follows:

§ 25.5 Definitions.

11l 11 access authorization means an access authorization granted by the CoR111ission which is normally based on a national agency check and credit (NAC&C) investigation or national agency check, inquiries and credit (NACIC) investigation conducted by the Office of Personnel Management.

7.

Section 25.25 is revised to read as follows:

§ 25.25 Cancellation of requests for access authorization.

When a request for an individual's access authorization is with-drawn or cancelled, the requester shall notify the NRC Division of Security immediately, by telephone, so that the full field investi-gation or national agency check and credit investigation may be discontinued.

The caller shall supply the full name and date of birth of the individual, the date of request, and the type of access authori-zation originally requested (

11Q 11 or 11L 11 ). The telephone notification must be promptly confirmed in writing.

11

8.

Appendix A is revised to read as follows:

Appendix A - Fees for NRC Access Authorization Category Fee Initial "L" Access Authorization **************************** $251 Reinstatement of "L" Access Authorization ******************* $251 Extension or Transfer of "L" Access Authorization *********** $251 Initial "Q" Access Authorization............................. $2,127 Initial "Q" Access Authorization (expedited processing) ******* $2,645 Reinstatement of "Q" Access Authorization Reinstatement of "Q" Access Authorization

.****.***.*.**.****. $2,127 2 (expedited processing)....................................

Extension or Transfer of "Q"................................

Extension or Transfer of "Q" {expedited processing)

$2,6452

$2,1272

$2,6452 1 If the NRC determines, based on its review of available data, that a full field investigation is necessary, a fee of $2,127 will be assessed prior to the conduct of the investigation.

2 Full fee will only be charged if investigation is required.

12

PART 95 - SECURITY FACILITY APPROVAL AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA

9. The authority citation for Part 95 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Secs. 145, 161, 88 Stat. 942, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2165, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841); E.O.

10865, as amended, 3 CFR 1959-1963 COMP., p. 398 {50 U.S.C. 401, note):

E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874, April 6, 1982.

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended {42 U.S.C.

2273); §§ 95.13, 95.15(a), 95.25, 95.27, 95.29(b), 95.31 1 95.33, 95.35, 95.37, 95.39 1 95.41, 95.43, 95.45, 95.47, 95.51, 95.53, and 95.57 are also issued under sec. 16li, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)).

10. In§ 95.5 the definition of "L" is revised to read as follows:

§ 95.5 Definitions.

13

"L" access authorization means an access authorization granted by the Co1m1ission which is normally based on a national agency check and credit investigation (NAC&C) or national agency check, inquiries and credit (NACIC) investigation conducted by the Office of Personnel Management.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 6~ day of &ef~A/, 1989 For the Nuclear Regulatory CoRIJlission.

cting Executive Director 14 J