Text

PR-070,072,073,074 - 50FR34708 - Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements
	ML23151A707
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/27/1985
From:	Roe J; NRC/EDO
To:	;
References
	50FR34708, PR-070, PR-072, PR-073, PR-074
	Download: ML23151A707 (1)
	v • d • e

DOCUMENT DATE:

TITLE:

CASE

REFERENCE:

KEYWORD:

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 08/27/1985 PR-070,072,073,074 - 50FR34708 - CHANGES TO SAFEGUARDS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS PR-070,072,073,074 50FR34708 RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

.DOCKET FILE INVENTORY In the Matter of Docket No. PR-70,72, et al.

( 50 FR 3470f)

CHANGES TO SAFEGUARDS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS VOLUME 1 Document Docket Date of Title or No.

Date Document Descr1~tion of Document 01 08/22/85 08/06/85 Federal Register Notice - Proposed rule (published 08/27/85) 02 10/21/85 10/15/85 Comments General Electric Company

( Fol eek) (1 )2 03 10/28/85 undated ColTITlents Marvin I. Lewis (2) 04 11/05/85 11/04/85 Ltr Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge (Silberg) on behalf of Physical 05 Security Coordinating Group request for extension of comment period 11/07/85 11/05/85 Comments Consumers Power Company (Berry)

(3) 06 11/12/85 11/08/85 Ltr Baltimore Gas & Electric (Bowmaker) requesting extension of comment period 07 undocketed 11/18/85 Federal Register Notice - Proposed Rule:

Extension of comment period 08 11/25/85 11/21/85 ColTITlents Northern States Power Company (Musolf) (4) 09 11/29/85 11/22/85 Comments GPU Nuclear (Thorpe) (5) 10 12/02/85 11/21/85 Comments Northern States Power Company (Musolf) (6) (Duplicate of #4) 11 12/02/85 11/26/85 ColTITlents Florida Power Corporation (Westafer) (7) 12 12/03/85 11/27 /85 ColTITlents Alabama Power (McDonald) (8) 13 12/03/85 11/25/85 Comments Louisiana Power & Light (Cook)

(9) 14 12/09/85 12/03/85 Comments Virginia Electric and Power Company (Stewart) (10) 15 12/09/85 12/04/85 Comments Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Keiser) (11) 16 12/24/85 12/24/85 ColTITlents KMC, Inc. (Knuth) (llA) 17 12/26/85 12/20/85 Comments Baltimore Gas and Elecyric (Bowmaker) (12) 18 12/30/85 12/27/85 Comments Portland General Electric 19 Company (Withers) (13) 12/30/85 12/23/85 ColTITlents Houston Lighting & Power (Wisenburg) (14) 20 12/31/85 12/23/85 ColTITlents ColTITlonwealth Edison (Alexander)

(15)

PR-70, 72 et a 1.

21 01/02/86 12/31/85 Comments Southern California Edison Company (Medford) (16) 22 01/02/86 12/31/85 Comments Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Edwards) (17) 23 01/02/86 12/31/85 Comments Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (Reynolds) {18) 24 01/03/86 12/30/85 Comments Florida Power & Light Company (Woody) (19) 25 01/03/86 12/30/85 Comments Wisconsin Public Service Corporation {Hintz) (20) 26 01/06/86 12/31/85 Comments Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Mittl) (21) 27 01/06/86 12/31/85 Comments South Carolina Electric & Gas Company {Nauman) (22) 28 01/07/86 01/07/86 Note DSB to Receipients re comment No.

11 from KMC, Inc. should be comment No. llA 29 01/08/86 12/31/85 Comments Northeast Utilities (Opeka)

(23) 30 01/21/86 01/15/86 Comments Georgia Power Company (Gucwa)

(24) 31 02/03/86 01/31/86 Comments Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

(Williams) (25)

. 32 02/07/86 01/30/86 Convnents Kansas Gas and Electric Company (Koester) (26)

GLENN L. KOESTER VIC E PRESIDENT

NUC LEAR January 30, 198~ 6 i:-FR - 7 Pl? :JS Secretary of the Connnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connnission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Sir:

KMLNRC 86-014 Attn:

Subj:

Docketing and Services Branch Comments On Rulemaking Changes Relating To Safeguards Reporting Requirements On August 27, 1985 a proposed rulemaking on changes to safeguards reporting requirements was published in the Federal Register for comment (SOCFR34708).

The proposed changes woulq clarify reporting requirements and require more uniform safeguard event reports.

Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E) supports this effort to unify report requirements and eliminate unnecessary reporting.

However, KG&E has the following comments:

1.

The Summary and Supplementary Information sections accompanying the proposed rulemaking identify that the benefits of this proposed rule "are the elimination of unnecesary reporting *** ""*** an approximate 80% decrease in the number of telephonic and written reports because the twenty-four hour telephonic notification and associated follow-up written report requirement has been deleted."

An initial review of the new rule appears to support these statements although certainly at a level much lower than an 80%

decrease.

However, a

review of proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62, which defines "an approach acceptable to the NRC staff" for implementing the new

rule, very clearly shows that reporting required by the new rule will significantly increase rather than decrease.

In fact, most items previously requiring reporting on a

24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months basis have merely been shifted to the one hour report category and many new items based upon "suspicion of intent" have been added as required one hour reports.

Many of these items will dramatically increase the number of unnecessary reports since the one hour report requirement allows no time for investigation and evaluation to determine whether the event is actually reportable.

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...... f 201 N. Market-Wichita, Kansas -Mail Address: P.O. Box 208 / Wichita, Kansas 67201 -Telephone: Area Code (316) 261-6451

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission KMLNRC 86-014 Page 2 January 30, 1986

2.

The proposed 10CFR73, Appendix G, item I(c) requires a one hour report and a 30-day LER for "any unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is properly compensated)".

This requirement should apply only to undetected or uncompensated entries.

The proposed wording would result in a substantial rise in the number of reportable incidents without a corresponding increase in the safety of the plant.

The increased number of reportable incidents could dilute the importance of more safety significant items.

3.

The proposed Section 73.71(c)(2) would require submittal of Safeguard event logs.

These logs typically do not contain detailed information relating to these events but are supplemented by additional information kept in the licensees files.

Submittal of these logs would either require adding substantially to the details in current logs or would result in a submittal which would provide little information to the NRC.

Yours very truly,

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Glenn L. Koester Vice President - Nuclear GLK:see cc:

PO'Connor JCummins

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Dear Sir:

Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814-4891 Telephone: (301) 654-9260 TWX 7108249602 ATOMIC FOR DC J anuar y 31, 1986 The NRC published in the August 27, 1985 Federal Register, proposed rule, 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74, "Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements," (SO FR 34708-34711) and solicited comments on the proposed amendments to its regula-tions.

The Atomic Industrial Forum's Committee on Power Plant Design, Construction and Operation has reviewed the proposed rule and offers the following comments for your consideration.

General Comments We support those proposed changes to the regulations which tend to reduce reporting requirements, eliminate duplicate reporting, and which make reports more useful.

However, we are concerned that some aspects of this rule may not achieve these goals.

For example, it is our opinion that the requirement to submit copies of safeguard event log entries every three months is unnecessary and adds a non-productive administrative burden on the licensees and the NRC.

Also, there is concern that submitting safeguard event reports on License Event Report (LER) forms (366 and 366A) could compromise some security information that should not be made available to the public.

NRC should insure that such safe-guar ds information is not made public.

Specific Comments We recommend the following changes to section 73.71:

(c)

(2)

Delete all of this paragraph.

(This paragraph refers to submitting copies of the safeguards event log to the NRC quarterly.)

Reason:

This is an unnecessary and duplicate administrative burden.

These logs are available for

U S~~lJCI.EAR REGUL/IT ____

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Secretary (d) January 31, 1986 review by the NRC and are periodically examined by regional inspectors.

One of the NRC's goals for the proposed rule is to eliminate unnecessary reporting.

By requiring submittal of the log, the NRC is increasing reporting requirements.

It is our belief that this additional reporting will result in a large collection of data by the NRC involving events of low significance.

We do not believe that this new reporting requirement will result in significant additional protection to public health and safety.

Delete the following phrase on lines 3 and 4:

"and copies of the safeguards event log entries".

(This refers to submitting copies of the safeguards event log to the NRC quarterly.)

Reason:

As stated above.

(d)

Add a sentence at the end of the paragraph as follows:

"Licensees will insure that Licensee Event Reports containing safeguards information are protected in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73.21 so that they are not routinely made available to the public".

Reason:

LERs are available to the public.

Some LERs on safeguards events could disclose proprietary security information and possibly compromise plant security.

Therefore these LERs should be properly protected and withheld from public disclosure.

We recommend the following changes to new Appendix G:

I (a)

Change sentence to read as follows:

"Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has intentionally committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:"

Reason:

We believe the one-hour report should be limited to cases where the licensee believes the events indicated in the subsequent paragraphs were intentional.

Secretary January 31, 1986 i

(c)

Change sentence to read as follows:

II "Any wiauthorized entries through a required barrier by unauthorized personnel (whether or not the event is properly compensated)."

Reason:

The rule should be clear to exclude cases involving entry by authorized personnel via unauthorized means such as "tailgating".

Change title to read as follows:

"Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months " Delete phrase in title:

"and submitted in quarterly log" Reason:

This i s an winece ssary and dupli cate administrative burden as stated above.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule.

JWW:abb J.W. Williams, Jr.

Chairman, Committee on Power Plant Design, Construction and Operation

Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526 Mailing Address Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta. Georgia 30102 L. T. Gucwa Manager Nuclear Engineering and Chief Nuclear Engineer

'86 JAN 21 A10 :57

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Georgia Power t11e c;ourhern elecr11c system NED-85-759 2208N January 15, 1986 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

Re:

Comments on Proposed Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements, 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73 and 74 On August 27, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission {NRC) published in the Federal Register a proposed rule which would make changes to the existing safeguards reporting requirements.

The notice indicated that the rule changes would lead to improvements in the NRC safeguards data base by requiring more uniform safeguards event reports.

Georgia Power Company (GPC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule and provides the comments listed below.

In general, GPC concurs with the intent of this rulemaking; however, the following comments highlight areas which require change or further clarification:

1.

The phrase "safeguards system" should be defined in the definition section of Part 73.

The absence of a definition could cause problems after the rule change is implemented.

For example, should failure of a safeguards system refer to the inoperability of the total system, or the failure of single component parts, i.e., a TV camera, a card reader, door alarm, etc.

2.

The term "required barrier 11 requires clarification as it could be interpreted with considerable variance.

NCI,

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Georgia Power 700775 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission January 15, 1986 Page Two Your consideration and incorporation of these comments relative to the proposed changes to the proposed safeguards reporting requirements wi 11 be appreciated.

SHC/mb xc:

J. P. O'Reilly J. T. Beckham J. R. Roberts H. C. Nix G. Bockhold Very truly yours, j_ -r ~~1 J-c____

L. T. Gucwa

NORTHEAST UTILITIES

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THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY HOLYOKE WATEA POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST UTM.ITIES SERVICE COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Secretary of the Commission MJ 8£RPR

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P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 (203) 665-5000 OOCi<,ETll'd.J & ~t.r vi BRANct>ecember 31, 1985 Docket No. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-425 Bl 1940 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements On August 27, 1985 a proposed rule was noticed in the Federal Register (50 Fed.

Reg. 34708) which would revise 1 OCFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74. The comment period expiration date of November 27, 1985 was subsequently extended (50 Fed.

Reg. 48220) until December 31, 1985. Accordingly, Connecticut Yankee AtorriTc Power Company (CY APCO) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) hereby provide comments on Section 73.71 of the proposed rule and proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62.

On December 24, 198j(l) the Physical Security Coordinating Group provided extensive comments on the proposed changes to safeguards reporting requirements (1 OCFR73.71 and Regulatory Guide 5.62). CY APCO and NNECO are both represented on this Group by Northeast Utilities Service Company and have provided input utilized in formulation of the comments provided on December 24, 1985.

CYAPCO and NNECO both endorse and reiterate the comments provided by the Physical Security Coordinating Group.

CY APCO and NNECO also endorse and reiterate the comments being provided this date by the Nuclear Utility Backfitting Reform Group (NUBARG). As noted by NUBARG, the NRC should be commended for recognizing the importance of reasonable reporting requirements and for finding that a fifteen day period for filing written reports may not be a sufficient period of time to gather all relevant facts.

CY APCO and NNECO note that the portion of the NUBARG April 20, 1983 petition granted within the proposed change to 10CFR73.71 required over two years time to disposition.

We urge the Commission to act promptly on the balance of the NUBARG April, 1983 petition.

(1)

D. F. Knuth letter to Secretary of the Commission, dated December 24, 1985.

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In addition CY APCO and NNECO have also reviewed the proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62 on "Reporting of Physical Security Events". CYAPCO and NNECO conclude that the proposed Regulatory Guide Revision, in conjunction with the proposed rule change, will serve to increase the amount of reporting required. As detailed in the December 24, 1985 comment letter, the Physical Security Coordinating group and CY APCO and NNECO have a number of concerns with the proposed change to 10CFR73.71.

We recommend that the proposed rule be rewritten to disposition these comments and that the proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62 be rewritten to reflect the final version of the proposed rule.

In particular, we conclude there is a need for a glossary of terms in Regulatory Guide 5.62 and/or additional definitions in 10CFR73.2 and that clarification be provided for many of the examples in Sections 2.6 and 3.2 of the Regulatory Guide.

We are willing to work with the Staff, through the Physical Security Coordinating Group, to develop a mutually agreeable revision to 10CFR73.71 and Regulatory Guide 5.62.

As always, CY APCO and NNECO are available to answer any questions you may have on this subject.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YAN KEE A TO MIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY J. F.

a Senior Vice President

January 7, 1986 TO RECEIPIENTS OF PR-70,72 et al. (50 FR 34708)

'86 JAN -7 A10 : 19 uFFILl:. vt..>t--"L ;...,*

DOCKETING & SER Vlf.f BRANCH Please note that comment no. 11 from KMC, Inc. (Knuth) should be comment no. llA

Docketing and Service Branch Office of the Secretary of the Commission

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SCE&G A-Ca,_iy South Carolina Electric & Gas Com P.O.Box764 JVl:.htt ER R ~7A i~ ~/

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission (1/2 qw.

116 JAN... 6 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu lation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis sion Washington, D.C.

20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Proposed Rule Comments On August 27, 1985, a proposed rule entitled "Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements" on 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74 was published for comment in the Federal Register.

Subsequently, draft Regulatory Guide 5.62, "Reporting of Physical Security Events," was issued for comment supplying supporting guidance for the proposed rule.

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) has reviewed these documents and hereby provides the following comments applicable to the reporting requirements of nuclear power reactors.

The "Supplementary Information" portion of the Federal Register Notice states that "10 CFR 73. 71 establishes an event reporting program to inform the Commission of safeguards events to permit timely response to incidents".

SCE&G contends, contrary to this, the requirement for a one hour telephonic report (10 CFR 73.71[b] [l]) could actually impede the Licensee's ability to respond to an event in a timely manner.

The immediate reporting requirement could require more of the Licensee's immediate time and attention determining the need for notification rather than mitigating and understanding the consequences of the event itself.

Timely response to a substantiated safeguards event is only possible through preplanning and liaison with support agencies.

This need is met by the Licensee through commitments to 10 CFR 73, Appendix C, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans."

In the event of a serious safeguards event, initial support would be the responsibility of local law enforcement agencies, followed by the FBI, who might assume primary jurisdiction at the time they became involved.

It is SCE&G's understanding that in these cases the NRC would respond only in an assessment/advisory role to the FBI, and would actually have no jurisdictional responsibilities in contingency responses.

Ack'nowlc

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Proposed Rule Comments December 31, 1985 Page 2 SCE&G contends that the first hours of a safeguards event should be spent dealing with the situation itself rather than determining the need for immediate notification to the NRC.

Therefore, it is recommended that the one hour reports contained in 10 CFR 73.7l(b) be changed to require reporting as soon as practical, but in all cases within twenty-four hours.

A safeguards reporting time limit of one hour would only render that report inconclusive, raising more questions from the NRC than the Licensee would have had time to answer.

In the "Summary" portion of the Federal Register notice it is stated that "the benefits to be derived from this action are the elimination of unnecessary reporting *** ".

SCE&G contends, contrary to this, the proposed requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(c) add an unnecessary, non-productive administrative burden upon the Licensee.

Reports of security events are presently available to the NRC during their unannounced inspections which normally occur on a three month cycle.

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(b)(l),

copies of these reports could be obtained during those inspections.

SCE&G recommends that if the intent of this reporting is to track and trend events, the current methods established between the Region and Headquarters should be used.

Establishing new lines of communications would only delay analysis and identification of potential threats.

Region personnel are more familiar with the site specific personnel and physical facilities involved, and because of this knowledge, the Region is better equipped to perform an analysis and forward unclassified information to Headquarters through established channels of communication.

If, however, log entry copies are deemed necessary, submitting these copies directly to the Region might help to minimize the exchange of safeguards information

Please find attached a proposed comparative text to the proposed rule.

By copy of this letter SCE&G is also providing these comments, which are applicable to Regulatory Guide 5.62, to the Rules and Procedures Branch of the NRC.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these important documents.

AMM:DAN/dwf Attachment c:

see Page Three

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Proposed Rule Comments December 31, 1985 C:

v. C. Summer

o. w. Dixon, Jr./T.

E. H. Crews, Jr.

E. c. Roberts

w. A. Williams, Jr.

Group Managers

o. s. Bradham

c. A. Price

c. L. Ligon (NSRC)

Rules and Procedures NPCF File Page 3 C. Nichols, Jr.

Branch

COMPARATIVE TEXT TO THE PROPOSED RULE I 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments, suspected thefts, or unlawfu l d i versions and other safeguards events.

(a)(l) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c}, 73.37, 73.67(e}, or 73.67(g} shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any shipment of SNM or spena ~nt fuel, and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment *

(2) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter via the Emergency Notification System, if the licensee is party to that system.

If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic systems or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center 1 within one hour.

The exemption of§ 73.2l(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.

(3) The licensee shall, upon request of the NRC, maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center.

(4) The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of thirty (30) days by a written report submitted to the

!_£propriate U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Beeament 8entrel Bes~,

Washingten, BG 29§§§,

Tae lieeaeee shall alee sahmit ene eepy eaeh te the appropriate NRO Regional Office listed in Appendix A to this part and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.

(5) Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter and also submitted in a revised written report to the Regional Office, the >>eeement Geatrol Desk and if applicable the appropriate Resident Inspector.

Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a revised report.

The revised report must replace the previous report; therefore, the update must be a complete entity and not contain only supplementary or revised information.

Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three years from the date of the report.

(b)(l) Each licensee subject to the provision of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I.(a)(l) of Appendix G to this part.

Licensees subject to the provisions of§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.55, 73.60 and each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and subject to§§ 73.67(d) and (e) shall notify the NRC Operations Center witbia eae beu£ as soon as practical, but in all cases within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs I.(a)(2), (3), (b), and (c) of Appendix G to this part.

(2) This notification must be made in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.

(c)(l) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to

§§ 73.67(d), and 73.67(e) shall maintain a current log and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II.(a) and (b) of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee employee or member of the licensee's contract security organizations.

The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section as a record for three years after the last entry is made in each log.

(2 ) Every three eathe, eaea liGaDaaa ahall auomit te the N&~ aepiea ef all safegaarde e,ent log entries not pre,ioasly sabmitteda Bach liceaeee ehall submit one copy each ef ite leg entries t o the 9. B.

Naclear Regulatory eommission, Boca eat Goatrol Beak, Washington, Be 28555, and if applicable the appropriate NRG Resideat Iespeetor.

(d) Each licensee shall submit to the Commission the 30-day written reports aaj eepiee of the safegaar4e auaDt log eatriee required under the provisions of this section that are of a quality which will permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.

If the facility is subject to§ 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall prepare the written report on NRC Forms 366 and 366A.

If the facility is not subject to§ 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall not use these forms but shall prepare the written report in letter format.

In either case the report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.

(e) Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also reportable in accordance with§§ 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.

Appendix G -

Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10CFR73.7l(b) and (c), licensees subject to the provisions of 10CFR73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events.

I. Events to be reported vithia eae aeur as soon as practical, but in all cases within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery, followed by a written report within thirty days.

(a) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:

(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or (2) Significant physical damage to any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses; or (3) Interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.

(b) Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered noninherent vulnerability in a system that could allow unathorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have not been established.

A "proper compensatory measure" for a particular safeguards event as used in this Appendix means a measure that is specified in a security or contingency plan or security procedure.

If the particular safeguards event is not described in a plan or procedure, then a "proper compensatory measure" means a measure implemented within 10 minutes of an event's discovery that provides a level of security essentially equivalent to that existing before the event.

(c) Any unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is properly compensated).

II. Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . and submitted 10 quarterl 1 ttt*

(a) Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulnerability in a system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have been established.

(b) Any other failure of a safeguards system not included in paragraph II.(a) of this appendix if the failure degrades the effectiveness of the system.

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80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101 / 201 430-7000 MAI LING ADDRESS/ P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 December 31, 198s.86 JAN -6 All :24 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Attn:

Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE CHANGES TO SAFEGUARDS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 50 FR 34708-34711 I F f: .,,.

V, ll, l_ ~, r ct, 1 ! r.,

OOCKE ! ING & SE, vir BRANCH We have reviewed the proposed rule to amend the NRC regula-tions for the reporting of safeguards events.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company is a member of the Physical security Coordinating Group (the Group) and supports and adopts the comments dated December 24, 1985, submitted by KMC on behalf of the Group.

We recognize and appreciate that the NRC is attempting to introduce greater specificity into the safeguard reporting rule.

However, our reading of the proposed rule indicates that, as written, it will lead to an increased, unnecessary burden on licensees, and that this burden is not compensated by an increased level of protection of the public health and safety.

The increased burden which the proposed rule would impose is caused by the need for greater internal review by licensees of more events to determine which events require reporting, and the addition of a completely new and "stand alone" logging system.

We request that the NRC give careful consideration to the specific comments and recommendations contained in the Group submittal, particularly the comparative text of Section 73.71 included as Attachment 2 to that package.

The Energy People 95-0942

u. s. NUCLEAR RCGUI A ro~Y COMMfS ~

DOC1<ETING & SEPVJ(C SECT IO O~F*:r-c--

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 2

12/31/85 We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rulemaking.

JCR:mw AB2 1/2 Very truly yours, R. L. Mittl General Manager -

Regulatory and Environmental Support -

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P.O. Box 19002, Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 December 30, 1985 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sirs:

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Comments to Proposed Rule 10CFR73.71

'86 JAN -3 A11 :06 NRC-85-187

Reference:

10CFR70, 72, 73 and 74 Proposed Rule, FR Volume 50, No. 166, Dated August 27, 1985 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) is currently one of twenty-six member utilities of the KMC Inc., Physical Security Group.

This group has sub-mitted comments pertaining to the proposed rule and associated draft regulatory guide for 10CFR73.71 (referenced above).

The proposed rule would amend NRC requirements with regard to the reporting of security safeguards events.

Although WPSC is represented by the KMC group and is in full support of the group's conments, we have found it necessary to offer additional comments to stress those concerns which we view as most significant.

To this end, the following comments are provided for your consideration.

The supplementary information accompanying the proposed rule concludes that the adoption of the revised reporting requirements would:

1) clarify the reporting requirements, thus avoiding misinterpretations,

2) improve the NRC database by promoting uniformity in reports, and

3) eliminate unnecessary written and telephonic reports, thereby assuring an efficient use of both the licensee's and the NRC's time and resources.

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Docketing and Service Branch December 30, 1985 Page 2 WPSC both applauds and supports the objectives of the rule as described by the supplementary information; however, we question the extent to which the rule (and regulatory guide) actually accomplishes these tasks.

The NRC attempted to clarify the reporting requirements by removing ambiguous terms (such as explicit and potential threats, and major and moderate losses) and replacing them with descriptions in Appendix G of 10GFR73.71.

WPSG agrees that the current rule demands clarity; however, our review of Appendix Gindi-cates that, as written, the rule continues to lack the specificity necessary to avoid misinterpretations by licensees and overly conservative interpretations by NRC inspectors and reviewers.

Examples of broad or ambiguous descriptions pre-sented in Appendix G include items I.(a)(3), I.(b) and II.(a).

We recommend that the proposed rule be further amended such that reporting requirements can be obtained from a direct reading of the rule without interpretations.

In addi-tion, we also believe that by presenting distinctive descriptions of reportable events, the NRC will realize greater uniformity of their events database.

The NRG has attempted to reduce the burden for both the licensee and the NRG on reporting requirements by eliminating unnecessary written and telephonic reports.

To achieve this objective, the proposed rule deletes the 24-hour reporting requirement and replaces it with a requirement to submit security logs (to support the NRC database) on a quarterly basis.

The one-hour reportable events were also revised such that they should include only those events which require immediate NRC response.

WPSG supports the NRC's efforts of reducing the unnecessary security reporting burden; however, we contend that the proposed rule will, in actuality, lead to an increased burden on licensees.

The requirement to submit quarterly logs will necessitate the development and maintenance of a new and independent logging system.

(Such information is available to reviewers and inspectors through existing logs and maintenance records.)

In addition, the events which have been placed in this category are of such broad terms that the licensee will be faced with the tremendous burden of determining the appropriate reportable event to support the NRG's analysis activities.

The NRC has also attempted to reduce the reporting burden by revising those events which would require one-hour telephonic and thirty-day written reports.

Section I of 10GFR73.71, Appendix G, provides a description of these events.

WPSG questions the basis used in developing events of this category and main-tains that, as proposed, a greater burden will be placed on the licensee as a result of the reportable events of items I.(a)(3) and I.(c).

Item I.(a)(3) requires reporting any event causing the "interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system". Although WPSC supports the reporting of incidents where sabotage is evident, we believe that the proposed interpretation is far too liberal and will require unnecessary, extensive internal reviews of innocent occurrences.

We further believe that the blanket requirement to report events in which normal operations are interrupted through the unauthorized use of components or con-trols is grossly inappropriate.

Such occurrences do not represent a security safeguards event and should be deleted from the proposed rule.

Docketing and Service Branch December 30, 1985 Page 3 Likewise, the requirement of item I.(c) to report within one hour 11 any unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is compensated)" is both inappropriate and non-productive.

Unauthorized entries are often unintentional and illlTlediately compensated.

Such incidents do not represent a decrease in security effectiveness and should not dictate illlTlediate NRC att ention. Typical examples of such incidents are an escort forgetting to obtain authority prior to entering a specific vital area with a visitor, or two employees entering a vital area in which one of the individuals is not authorized.

In both cases, an escort is available at all times and in the latter, the security system would detect unauthorized use of a badge.

Neither incident threatens the security effectiveness at the plant to the extent in which NRC immediate attention would be necessary.

WPSC encourages the NRC to consider deleting the requirement to log events for quarterly submission and to further revise the one-hour reportable events in order to achieve its objective of reducing the reporting burden.

Finally, we have reviewed proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62, "Reporting of Physical Security Events".

The guide provides the NRC's interpre-tation of its proposed rule.

Our review of this document supports our conten-tions that the reporting of events will escalate as a result of the NRC's proposed revisions.

We hope you will consider the colllTlents we have presented, as well as those sub-mitted by the KMC Security Group.

We further appreciate the extension of the comment period to December 31, 1985.

Very truly yours,

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D. C. Hintz Manager - Nuclear Power MSL/wf cc - Mr. Robert Nelson, US NRC Mr. George Lear, US NRC

a6 JAN -3 AlO :12 liFFICt. n1

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DOCKETING & SEHV!f BRANCH P. 0. BOX 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 33408 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DEC S O 1985 L-85-475 Office of the Secretary of the Commission

u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 ATTN:

RE:

Docketing and Service Branch 10 CFR 73.71 and Regulatory Guide 5.62 Safeguards Reporting Requirements

Dear Sir:

Florida Power & Light Company has reviewed the proposed changes to subject topic published in the Federal Register on August 27, 1985 (SO Federal Register 34710).

Florida Power & Light Company has participated in the preparation of comments submitted by the KMC, Inc. Physical Security Coordinating Group and thereby supports the con-sideration of these comments.

General comments are directed as follows:

1.

2.

We support the change in written reporting requirements from 15 days to 30 days.

We support prompt reporting of theft or diversion of nuclear material as well as incidents where sabotage is committed or when credible threats to commit sabo-tage exist.

3.

We recommend that several phrases be eliminated or more clearly def ined.

These phrases, seemingly vague, within the context of their respective paragraphs, could be construed to include purely accidental damage resulting from normal work activities with no threat to the health and safety of the public.

Examples of some of these phrases are as follows:

I. (a) (2) - "Significant physical damage" I. (a) (3) - "Interruption of normal operation" I. (b) -

"Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered noninherent vulnerability"

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We recommend that proposed reporting requirements be substantially revised to lessen the impact on the collection, retention and dissemination of un-needed information which does not relate to an increased level of protection of the public health and safety.

Primary concerns are as follows:

a.

A new independent logging system seems to be required -

We believe this to be unnecessary and to serve no valid purpose.

b.

The submittal of detailed quarterly reports covering all problems related to safeguards does not seem justified.

All such material is presently available for review and audit.

c.

The establishment of a three (3) year minimum record retention time period for event log is opposed as ample opportunity exists to review all such material within the initial year.

Retention following review of documents relating to each safeguards failure seems unduly burden-some.

The foregoing comments apply as well to proposed Regulatory Guide 5.62 which closely parallels 10 CFR 73.71.

Please refer to the comments of the KMC, Inc., Physical Security Coordinating Group for recommended specific changes to the proposed revision.

Sincerely,

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ce President Nuclear Energy COW/KLC: jb

u NUCLEAR UTILITY BACKFITTI NG AND REFORM GROUP

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6 JA -2 P 2 :20 December 31, 1985 r,

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WASH I NGTON, D. C. 20036 TELEPHONE (202) 857-98 17 Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Subj:

Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements SO Fed. Re g. 34708 (August 27, 1985)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On August 27, 1985 the Commission published for comment proposed changes to safeguards reporting requirements (50 Fed.

Reg. 34708 (1985)).

The date by which comments were to be filed was extended from November 27 until December 31, 1985 (50 Fed. Reg. 48220 (1985)).

The following comments are submitted on behalf of the Nuclear Ut i lity Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG or the Group).1/

Additional comments on other aspects of the proposea regulations are being filed separately by members of NUBARG.

On April 20, 1983 NUBARG f i led a petition for rulemaking.

I t requested the modification of certain reporting

.!I NUBARG is composed of the following power reactor licensees and the Edison Electric Institute:

Alabama Power Company, Arkansas Power & Light Company, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Commonwealth Edison Company, Detroit Edison Company, Duke Powe r Company, Duquesne Light Company, Florida Power & Light Company, Georgia Power Company, Houston Light i ng & Power Company, Long Island Li ghting Company, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Northeast Utilities, Northern States Power Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Portland General Electric Company, New York Power Authority, Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation, Southern California Edison Company, Texas Utilities Electric Company, Toledo Edison Company, and Washington Public Power Supply System.

10

requirements (PRM 50-36).

One of the suggested modifications was the amendment of 10 C.F.R. §73.71 to provide that written reports be submitted by the licensee within thirty days of initial notification.

Section 73.71 currently provides a fifteen day period for doing so. The proposed changes to safeguards reporting requirements would grant this aspect of the petition.

NUBARG endorses the proposed changes to the extent that they grant its petition.

The Group agrees with the finding of the Staff that a fifteen day period for filing written reports may not be a sufficient period of time to gather all relevant facts.

This is particularly the case when the licensee is devoting its resources to solving the problem that resulted in the reportable event.

NUBARG does not question the need to provide NRC with written repo r ts, as called for in Section 73.71.

However, licensees should be free to devote their resources first to solving problems that arise in connection with plant operation and then to submitting written reports to NRC.

This is particularly true when (as is the case with Section 73.71) licensees orally advise NRC of the matter and keep the NRC apprised of significant subsequent developments.

The NRC should be commended for recognizing the importance of reasonable reporting requirements.

Nevertheless, the Group feels compelled to note that it filed its petition for rulemaking over two years ago.

NUBARG urges the Commission to act promptly on the balance of its petition.

The Group appreciates this opportunity to submit comments on the proposed regulations and trusts that/

he comments will be considered.

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YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY/cAdJ !Ltl7of'.1 Telephone (617) 872-8100 l~,-,c,.;rr

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TWX 710-380-7619 16 71 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts 0 1701 FYC 85-14 GLA 85--.1'"""4... 8--

December 31, 1985 Secretary of the Commission

a6 JAN-2 P2 :12 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:

Subject:

Dear Sir:

Docketing and Service Branch Comments Pertaining to the Proposed Rule on Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements, 10CFR, Parts 70, 72, 73 and 74 (50FR34706, August 27, 1985)

Yankee Atomic Electric Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject proposed rule. Yankee Atomic owns and operates a nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts.

Our Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services for other nuclear power plants in the Northeast including Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee and Seabrook.

Yankee Atomic is a member of the Physical Security Coordinating Group and we endorse the comments filed on our behalf by that group. In addition, we have several views which we feel should be highlighted.

The changes these new provisions backfit onto nuclear plants create an increased burden on licensees.

For sometime the stated position of the Commission towards changed requirements has been that any increased burden on licensees should be compensated by an increased level of protection to the public. This concept was strengthened and formalized last summer by the establishment of a rule to control and test backfits.

The test established by the rule emphasizes substantial increase in overall protection and requires a cost-benefit justification for all new requirements.

Despite this long-standing policy and the clear direction provided by the new rule, there has been only token evaluation of this proposed rule in this context.

The requirements for the quarterly reports specified in Appendix G to 10CFR73.71 are intensely prescriptive.

This seems widely divergent from stated Commission policy and philosophy as provided, in the 1985 Policy and Planning Guidance Document (NUREG-0885, Issue 4). Information that will be required quarterly, under the proposed rule, concerning interruptions of normal operation and/or security system faults has always been available in logs and maintenance records at each plant site and has been subject to routine inspections.

But these occurrences do not usually represent a safeguards event, and should not be the subject of a specific reports unless they do.

The requirement to log all faults and interruptions in a dedicated safeguards event log and to send a package of these logs to the NRC at three month intervals constitutes an unnecessary burden which has not been evaluated in an overall impact-benefit context.

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Docketing and Service Branch Page 2 The proposed rule establishes awkward reporting requirements for safeguarded information by adopting NRC Forms 366 and 366A the Licensee Event Report (LER) forms, (73.71 (d)).

Safeguards events reported under Section 73.71 are and should be distinctly different from the events reported as LERs involving plant safety equipment and systems.

There is no need for including safeguards events in the LER system and the impact of this complication of an established reporting system has apparently not been fully evaluated.

Finally, we believe that the rule, in its present form, presents potential ambiguities which will likely result in confusion upon implementation because of varied interpretations possible for many of the terms presented.

As an example, Item I(a)(3) in Appendix G uses the term, "tampering." As used in the rule, "tampering" could well be in the eye of the beholder.

The same observation applies to the term, "discovered noninherent vulnerability," in Item I(c) of Appendix G and "required barriers," in Item I(b) of Appendix G.

We urge that all such vague and unspecified terminology be clarified.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rulemaking.

~~~

D. W. Edwards Director of Industry Affairs DWE/djw

b!!9l. thern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O. MEDFORD MANAGER, NUCLEAR LICENSING December 31, 1985

a6 JAN -2 P 2 : 11 TELEPHONE (8 1 8) 302-1749 Secretary of the Conm1ss1on Attent1on : Oocket1ng and Serv1ce Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm1ss1on Wash1ngton, o.c. 20555 Gentlemen :

Subject:

Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361 and 50-362 San Onofre Nuclear Generat1ng Stat1on Un1ts l, 2 and 3 The Southern Cal1forn1a Ed1son Company (SCE) hereby prov1des conments on the proposed rule "Changes to Safeguards Report1ng Requ1rements," 10 CFR 73.71, and Proposed Rev1s1on 1 to Regulatory Gu1de 5.62, "Report1ng of Phys1cal Secur1ty Events. " SCE has concluded that the adopt1on of the proposed rule and regulatory gu1de would have substant1ally more 1mpact than bel1eved by the Conm1ss1on, and would result 1n the 1mpos1t1on of a costly and s1gn1f1cant adm1n1strat1ve report1ng burden w1th no s1gn1f1cant 1ncrease 1n secur1ty effect1veness.

SCE has cooperated 1n the preparat1on of the Secur1ty Coord1nat1ng Group conments concern1ng the proposed 10 CFR 73.71 and Regulatory Gu1de 5.62, wh1ch were subm1tted to the NRC by letter from Mr. Donald Knuth (KMC) dated December 24, 1985.

SCE agrees w1th the conments prov1ded by the Secur1ty Coord1nat1ng Group and 1s emphas1z1ng 1n th1s letter the follow1ng comments wh1ch are most 1mportant to SCE.

Spec1f1c conments on the proposed rule and draft regulatory gu1de are prov1ded 1n Enclosures l and 2, respect1vely.

1.

SCE recogn1zes that the NRC 1s attempt1ng to 1ntroduce greater spec1f1c1ty 1nto the rule, and to create a new f1le of techn1cal data wh1ch can be exam1ned for gener1c 1nd1cators of system performance and "mon1tor trends 1n safeguards systems effect1veness. " The proposed requ1rements for 1nformat1on collect1on would lead to an 1ncreased burden of report1ng, and 10 CFR 73.7l(c)(2) would requ1re the add1t1on of a completely new and "stand alone" logg1ng system for safeguards events.

SCE recommends that the Conm1ss1on requ1re report1ng of only the 1nformat1on 1t needs to evaluate events that potent1ally threaten the nuclear s1te or decrease the effect1veness of the secur1ty system below the capab111ty spec1f1ed 1n 10 CFR 73.55(a).

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Docketing and Service Branch SCE 1s recolllllendation aga1nst 1n1tiat1ng quarterly reports does not imply equipment and/or personnel failures should be ignored.

Applicable events w111 continue to be reported or recorded, and records will continue to be ava1lable.

However, a requirement for a licensee to log each security system fault in a dedicated log and forward these reports to the NRC every three months would not provide the deta11 necessary to evaluate each fault as is currently provided for by the present system of onsite review of security records conducted by regional safeguards inspectors.

2.

10 CFR 73.7l(d) would require the use of NRC Forms 366 and 366A for reporting of security events. These forms were created for reporting operating events and equipment failures of safety s1gn1ficance, therefore, SCE cons1ders that NRC Form 366 to be inappropriate for use 1n reporting security events.

Events reported under 73.71 are of a separate and dist1nct character from those reportable as LERs, and there 1s no reasonable basis for including them within the LER system.

The use of a common reporting form blurs this important distinction, and would probably result in continued use of the current safeguards event form in addition to the use of Form 366.

3.

It is requested that interruption of normal operation, as specified in Appendix G,Section I(a)(3), not be considered in determining reportability of a safeguards 1nc1dent because there is no general relationship between normal operation and a safeguards incident. It is agreed that the following should be reported as safeguards incidents: (1) where a person or persons either conmitted sabotage or threatened to conm1t sabotage, and (2) security system {equipment or people) failures which persist for some threshold period of t1me after discovery, currently accepted as ten minutes, which would allow unauthorized persons undetected access into protected or vital areas.

4.

SCE recommends that in 10 CFR 73.71(c)(l) the 11censee 1 s security organization-make the determination if a safeguards event has occurred.

Any licensee employee or member of the 11censee 1s contract security organ1zat1on should report any event suspected to be a safeguards event to the security organization who would then make the determ1nat1on.

Oocket1ng and Serv1ce Branch 5.

SCE reconmends that Regulatory Gu1de 5.62 be rewr1tten to be cons1stent w1th the f1nal vers1on of the rule.

Should you have any quest1ons or need clar1f1cat1on of any of the above comments, please contact me.

Enclosures cc:

H. Rood (NRC Project Manager)

F. R. Huey (NRC Sen1or Res1dent Inspector, Un1ts 1, 2 and 3)

J.B. Mart1n (NRC Reg1on V Adm1n1strator

§ 73.71 ENCLOSURE l COMPARATIVE TEXT COMMENTS ON 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments, suspected thefts, or unlawful diversions and other safeguards events.

(a)(l}

Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment.

(2)

This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter via the Emergency Notification System, if the.licensee is party to that system.

I£ the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic systems or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour.

The exemp-tion of§ 73.21(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.

(3)

The licensee shall, upon request of the NRC, maintain an open and continuous coumrunications channel with the NRC Operations Center.

(4)

The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of thirty (30) days by a written report submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555.

The licensee shall also submit one copy each to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix'A to this part and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.

(5)

Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telepho.nic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter and also submitted in a revised written report to the Regional Office, the Document Control Desk and if applicable. the appropriate Resident Inspector.

Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a revised report.

the-revieee-repere-BMse-rep~aee-ehe-previe~s

~epe~er-ehereiere 7 -ehe-~peiaee-BMse-ae-a-eempleee-eReiey-aae-Ree eeaeaiR-eRly-s~pplemeBeary-er-revisee-iaie~eieRT Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three years from the date of the report.

(b)(l)

Ea.ch licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60 and 73~67 shall notify the NRC Opera-tions Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I.(a)(l) of Appendix G to this part.

Licensees subject to the provisioni of If 73.20, 73.37, 73.55, 73.60 and each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and subject to§§ 73.67(d) and (e) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs I.(a)(2), (3), (b), and (c) of Appendix G to this part.

(2)

This notification must be made in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.

(c)~+/-

Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and each liceneee possessing SSNM and

subject to §§ 73.67(d), and 73.67(e') shall mai:aeai:B-a-e\\:t~J!el'\\1!-leg afta record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II.Ca) and (b) of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee~ empleyee-e~-memJ,eJ!-ei-eke-li:eeaseels-eeae~aee see\\:t~i1!y-e~gal'\\i2aeieBT security organization to include the licensee's contract security base if applicable.

The licensee shall retain the leg-ei-eveBes record ~eee~eea-l:l!lae~-ehi:s-seeei:el'\\

as-a-~eee~a-ie~-ea~ee for one years. aiee~-eae-lase-eaeey-i:s-maae i:s-eael\\-l:eg-:-

f2 --Eveey-ehree-meaehsT-eaea-lieeaeee-ehall-s~emie-~e-ehe NR.6-eepiea-ei-all-saieg1tares-eveae-leg-eneries-aee-previe~sly s~amieeea~--saea-lieeasee-shall-a't!Bmie-eae-eepy-ei-eaeh-ei-ies-leg eREFies-~e-ehe-YTST-N~elea~-Reg~laeeey-6eBl!llssiea,-9eel!Blefte Seaerel-9esk,-WaskingeeaT-9T6~--29555T-ane-ii-applieahle-eae apprepriaee-NR6-Resiaeae-iaspeeeer~

(d)

Each licensee shall submit to the Commission the 30~day written reports aae-eepies-ef-eae-saiegll4rea-eveae-leg-eReriee required under the provisions of this section that are of a quality which will permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.

If-eae-iaeiliey-ie-s~ejeee-ee-f-59~~3-ei-£his-ehap-eePT-ehe-lieeRsee-saall-~repare-ehe-Wl!'ieeen-repere-ea-NR6-¥erms 366-ana-366AT--+/-f-ehe-iaeiliey-is-ae~-s~efeee-ee-f-59~~3-ei-eais eaapeerT-ehe Each licensee shall nee-~se-ehese-ieR1s-e~e-shall prepare the written report in letter format unless the event is of such nature that NRC Forms 366 and 366A are submitted tmder

§ 50. 73 of this chapter.

lft-eieher-ease-ehe-repeFe-Bll:lse Repo~ts written in letter format shall include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.

(e)

Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also reportable in accordance with S§ 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.

4.

A new Appendix G is added to read as follows:

Appendix G - Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR §73.71(b) and (c),

licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and.73.67 shall report or record, as appro-priate, the following safeguards events.

I.

&veftea-ee-&e-~epe~eeerwi:ehiB-efte-he~~-eE-aiaeeve17 7 -iei~ewea Upon discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a credible threat to the facility, the following events must be reported within on hour, followed by a written report within thirty days.

(a)

Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:

(1)

A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear mater-ial; or (2)

SigRiiieaft& Intentional physical damage to any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses,-e~, whereby the public health and safety could be endangered by exposure to radiation,

(3) iRee~i-1:tpeies-e~-Re1'11U!l-epe~aeieR-ei Malicious tampering with a licensed nuclear power reactor eh~eHgh-eke ssa~ehe~i2ea-sse-ei-e~-eampe~isg-wiek.2!. its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.

(b)

Any discovered failure of a safeguards system e~-aia-eeve~ea-seaishe~eRE-Vl!lBeFaeiliey-is-a-aya!em-ehae-ee~la-allew

~asehe~isee-e~-"t:maeeee~ea which persists without proper compensa-tion 10 minutes after establishment of a reasonable belief that it could be exploited by unauthorized personnel to gain undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport~r-ie~-vhieh-p~epe~~eempeR-saeeey-meaaH~es-kave-Ree-eees-eseaeliskeaT--A-Up~epeF-eempeaaaee~y meass~e!J "Proper compensation" for a particular safeguards event as used in this Appendix meaas-a-meass~e includes but is not limited to measures that is~ specified in a security or contin-gency plan or security procedure.

ii-ehe-pa~eiesla~-saieg11aFas eveae-ia-aee-aese~i~ea-ia-a-plaa-e~-p~eeeis~e,-ekea-a-UpFepe~

eelBJ'eRaaeeey-meaaH~eU-meaaa-a-measH~e-ll!plemeReea-wiekis-+/-9 miRsees-ei-aa-eveftela-aieeeveey-eaae-p~eviaea-a-level-ei-sees~iey easeaeially-e~sivaleae-ee-ehae-exiaeiRg-eeie~e-eae-eveRET (c)

Any lill&HERe~isea discovered entries of unauthorized persons through a-~e~Hi~ea-ea~~ie~ any required *physical barrier as defined in §73.2 of this part (whether or not the event is properly compensated).

II.

Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . ase-e~emi~~ee-iH

~~a~ee~+/-y-+/-egT (a)

Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulner-ability in a system that could a+/-+/-ew-~a~eae~i2ea-e~ be exploited by unauthorized personnel to gain undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have been estab-lished.

ie --A!ly-eekeF-iai+/-H~e-ei-a-eaieg,::ta~es-syeeem-Ree-iRe+/-Heea-ift pa~ag~apa-ii~fa -ei-ekie-appesaix-ii-eke-iai+/-H~e-aeg~aaes-eke eiieeeivesese-ei-eke-syeeemT

ENCLOSURE 2 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISION TO REGULATORY GUIDE 5.62 A.

Introduction The statement that information collecting activities have been cleared by 0MB Clearance No. 3150-0002 appears to be based on a 1981 0MB evaluation of the requirements of the current 10 CFR 73.71 and Regulatory Guide 5.62.

The proposed rule and guide substantially 1ncrease NRC's requirements for information collection and impose a new quarterly reporting requirement of substantial impact.

SCE reconvnends that the proposed revision and regulatory guide be reviewed by 0MB.

B.

Discussion This section proposes a rationale for two types of reports.

One hour reports are required for those 11 *** safeguards events (which) warrant immediate involvement by the NRC and possibly other government agencies such as the FBI.... " The second type of report covers a class of events which 11 *** could not allow unauthorized or undetected access to a facility...

11 but which would furnish the NRC with information to *monitor trends in safeguards system effectiveness.* The extension of the time for written followup from five days to thirty days will improve the value of the written reports by permitting time for complete investigation by the licensee.

The definition of *one hour events 11 is a positive improvement over the present rule, which does not state a clear general objective for reporting.

The creation of a new category of quarterly report is presented without any clear discussion of the benefit which the report will have, other than a general goal "to monitor trends in safeguards effectiveness.* In the regulatory analysis which accompanied the proposed rule (50 Federal Register 34709) the NRC estimated that costs to the NRC under the proposed rule would be decreased by 35 percent due to reduction in~... t1me spent by the NRC in documenting and analyz1ng the submittals.*

SCE wishes to challenge the worth of subm1tting this new category of reports because the planned NRC staff reduction will decrease 1ts resources for evaluation of the signif1cant amount of report data which would be generated..

And, contrary to the NRC cost-1mpact analys1s, SCE believes a substant1al 1ncrease in licensee resources w111 be requ1red to implement the rev1sed report1ng requ1rements.

C.

Regulatory Pos1t1on SCE requests that the proposed new informat1on reporting requ1rements in 10 CFR 73.Jl(c) and Append1x G to 10 CFR 73 be modified as follows:

1.

Safeguards events reportable under Paragraph 73.71(a)

No Conment.

2.

Safeguards events reportable under Paragraph 73.7l(b) 2.1 The add1t1on of the concept of *reasonable belief" 1s a sign1ficant clar1ficat1on of the current rule, and should also apply to the guidance in 2.2-2.4.

2.2-2.6 See our previous conment 1n Attachment l.

2.6 Examples of Safeguards Events That Should Be Reported Within 1 Hour 1-2 No Comment

3.

The mere act of claiming respons1b111ty for a specific terrorist organ1zat1on is a poor measure of threat credibility.

The concept of Mreasonable beliefu should apply.

4.

No Convnent

5.

6.

These events are essentially administrative events associated with the program of unescorted access authorizat1on, currently under NRC consideration.

In those cases where the lack of trustworthiness is assoc1ated w1th a threat or action against plant safety, the concept of ureasonable belief~ should be the criterion for reportability.

No Comment

7.

No Col111lent.

These events are currently covered in our procedures and would be excepted from one hour reporting.

8.

Th1s type of event does not merit the one hour inmed1acy.

In most cases of document loss an investigation is required.

Any exceptional cases which might present imminent danger would again come under the criteria of "reasonable belief" evaluation.

9.

Not applicable

10.

Only fires which are determined to be of *suspicious origin 11 should be reported.

11-12 Not Applicable

13.

Agree

14.

Agree

15.

Agree

16.

Agree

17.

Agree

18.

Reportab111ty should be evaluated as an element of secur1ty loss.

19.

Agree

20.

Agree

21.

Agree

3.

Safeguards Events Under Paragraph 73.7l(c)

4.

SCE has already reg1stered our object1on to the creat1on of th1s new category of events.

At the present t1me SCE ma1nta1ns a 11censee log of secur1ty events wh1ch do not requ1re report1ng to NRC.

These logs are rout1nely rev1ewed dur1ng NRC safeguards 1nspect1ons 1n assoc1at1on w1th other 11censee records.

SCE cons1ders the present system super1or to the system of central1zed NRC rev1ew wh1ch 1s proposed by th1s paragraph.

Events Not Regu1red to be Logged or Reported No Corrment.

Append1x Th1s report 1s exhaust1ve 1n 1ts requ1rement~. and creates a s1gn1f1cant new report1ng burden.

It also appl1es NRC cr1ter1a for evaluat1on of safety equ1pment fa1lures to the non-related area of secur1ty system fa1lures.

The NRC evaluat1on of cost-1mpact (10 Federal Reg1ster 34709) makes no prov1s1on for the analys1s of the data 1t would prov1de.

7695u:5701F

Commonwealth Edison One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk. Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:

Docketing and Service Branch 1717 H Street N.W.

Washington. DC. 20555

-*as n tG 31 All : l ?

(' :-- ~.. --

Du c

Subject:

Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirement (50 FR 34706)

Proposed Revision l to Regulatory Guide 5.62

Dear Mr. Chilk:

The proposed rule to amend the NRC regulations for the reporting of safeguards events is an attempt to introduce greater specificity into the rule.

However. the proposed rule. as written.

will lead to an increased burden on licensees without providing an increased level of protection of the public health and safety.

This proposed rule imposes a greater burden on licensees by requiring the review of more events to determine which events require reporting and the addition of a completely new and "stand alone" logging system.

We recommend strongly that the Commission issue its revised reporting requirements to require only the information it needs to perform its responsibilties and to eliminate all other unneeded or redundant licensee reporting requirements.

More specifically. all requirements for the quarterly submittals of the 24-hour log should be eliminated.

We also recommend that phrases such as "required barriers" (cf. Appendix G. paragraph I (c)) be clearly and unambiguously defined in the new rule.

Commonwealth Edison supports the change extending the submittal period for written reports from fifteen days to thirty days after initial notification.

We also support abolishing the need for duplicative reports (LERs).

However. we note that NRC Forms 366 and 366A have been created specifically to address a class of safety (in contrast with safeguards) events and to provide information for a data collection system which tracks these safety events.

Thus. we strongly believe that these forms are inappropriate for use in reporting security events which would not otherwise be reportable as LERs under 50.73.

Events reported under 73.71 only are of a separate and distinct character than those reportable as LERs. and there is no basis for including them within the LER system.

The use of a common reporting form blurs this JAN

~ 1986 A l,\\.,G *1'"*' * ~j I I,' "J~ct

~

ni l

,, ~--

I

- ,., *,., * *, * *** *-p~

u s

important distinction.

Also, certain security information must be classified as safeguards data, which requires special handling and storage practices.

LERs are not currently burdened with this requirement.

From an overall perspective, information on theft or diversion of special nuclear material should continue to have a requirement for prompt reporting.

Similarly, safeguards incidents where a person or persons either committed sabotage or provided credible threats of committing sabotage should be reported.

However, interruption of normal operation as listed in the proposed Appendix G,Section I(a}(3) should not be a threshold for reporting.

This is simply too broad a category, and such an occurrence in no way represents a safeguards event.

Security system (equipment or people) failures which persist for some threshold period of time after discovery and would allow unauthorized persons undetected access into protected or vital areas should be reported.

our recommendation against initiating quarterly reports does not imply we believe equipment and/or personnel failures should be ignored.

Applicable events should continue to be reported o~

recorded, and records should continue to be available in systems currently used by licensees such as logs, data sheets, maintenance records. and computer records.

This information should continue to be available for the NRC inspectors to review if they choose to do so during inspections.

A requirement for a licensee to log each and every security system fault in a dedicated log and send a package of such reports every three months to the NRC is non-productive and would not necessarily assist the Commission in performing its safeguards responsibilities.

Attached is a comparative text on the reporting requirements of Section 73.71, as related to power reactors. which reflects our general comments.

We are convinced that these revised reporting requirements would provide the licensee the proper incentives as they require reports that are necessary for good security, yet do not burden the system with disincentives.

For example, if NRC reporting were required for any system malfunction.

any licensee choosing to conduct added_ drills, tests, or surveillance would likely increase its reporting burden.

We would also recommend a minimum record retention time of one year rather than three years to reduce the storage of unneeded paperwork.

We have also reviewed the Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory

Uuide 5.62 on "Reporting of Physical Security Events."

That guide provides ~he staff's interpretation of the proposed revised rule.

For most utilities, it will increase -- not decrease -- the amount of reporting required.

Our comments on that Regulatory Guide are also enclosed.

Generally we note that the proposed Regulatory Guide

is very consistent with the proposed rule as now written.

We hope that our suggestions are incorporated in the final rule and that the Regulatory Guide be rewritten to reflect the changes.

Commonwealth Edison is supportive of the NRC staff's effort in working with the Physical Security Coordinating Group of KMC.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions to the re91:1lations and regulatory guide.

Attachments 1043K Sincerely,

~e~

Nuclear Licensing Administrator

73.71 ATTACHMENT 1 COMPARATIVE TEXT COMMENTS ON 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments, suspected thefts.

or unlawful diversions and other safeguards events.

(a)(l)

Each licensee subject to the provisions of 73.25, 73.26. 73.27(c). 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel. and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment.

(2)

This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter via the Emergency Notification System. if the licensee is party to that system.

If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic systems or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour.

The exemption of 73.2l(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.

(3)

The licensee shall, upon request of the NRC. maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center.

(4)

The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of thirty (30) days by a written report submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Document Control Desk, Washington. D.C.

20555.

The licensee shall also submit one copy each to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A to this part and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.

(5)

Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter and also submitted in a revised written report ot the Regional Office. the Document Control Desk and if applicable the appropriate Resident Inspector.

Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a revised report.

TMe/tevf9ed/tepott1mizt/tepZatettKe/ptewi~ia1tepott11 tMetet~te11t>>etip1ate1m>>st1>>e1a1tompletetentttttandtnot1tontat~1 onlttsupplementatttotttevtseittntotmiti~n.

Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three years from the date of the report.

\\

ATTACHMENT 1 (b)(l)

Each licensee subject to the provisions of 73.20, 73.37. 73.50. 73.55. 73.60 and 73.67 shall notify the NRC Opera~ions Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I.(a)(l) of Appendix G to this part.

Licensees subject to the provisions of 73.20, 73.37, 73.55, 73.60 and each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and subject to 73.67(d) and (e) shall notify the NRC Operations center within one hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs I.(a)(2), (3), (b) and (c) of Appendix G to this part.

(2)

This notification must be made in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2). (3), (4) and (5) of this section.

(c)(l)

Each licensee subject to the provisions of 73.20.

73.37, 73.50, 73.55. 73.60 and each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to 73.67(d). and 73.67(e) shall aalntaln/a/¢nttent/Zoff/

and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II.(a) and (b) of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee's employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization.

The licensee shall retain the Zot/of/eyenti record teeotdedl*naetltMls/settl~nlailaltee~tdltotltMtee for one year*. attetltMellastlentttlts1aadellnleatMIZ0;1 iz111EYettltMteelaont>>s11eati1zttensee1~Mazz1sn>>a!t1to1tMe1ue1 toples1ot1a111sate.-dat*sleYent1ze;1enttles1not1pteYtonsz11 si>>mttteet11zat11zttensee1s>>azz1s>>~mtt1one1toptlot1eatKlot1tts1 zo;1entttesltolt>>e1v,s,1wntzeat11e;>>zatott1e~-.isaton11>>otnment1 eontteZl>>eiK//WaiMlnit~nll>>te///Z0SSi//and/lf/appI%ta>>Ze/tle apptopttate1ne11eilient1znspettet.

(d)

Each license shall submit to the Commission the 30-day written reports and/toples/et/tMe/iatefiatas/eYent/Z~f/entties required,under the provisions of this section that are of a quality which will permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.

ltltMe/tattlittllals>>~8eitlto//S0/13/otltMlsltMiptetlltMe/Ztteniee s>>azz1ptepite1t1e1wtttten1tepott1on/.NlltlYotmd11i11an*111sAt11zt1 tMeltiiiltttlti/notls>>>>Aeit/to//i0111/ot/tMisliKiptetlltMe Each licensee shall n~tl>>se/tMeie/totmil>>*tliMill prepare the written report in letter format unless the event is of such nature that NRC Forms 366 and 366A are submitted under 50.73 of this chapter.

In eltMet/tase/tKe/tep~tt/~>>it Reports written in letter format shall include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.

{e)

Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also reportable in accordance with 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.

ATTACHMENT. 1

4.

A new Appendix G is added to read as follows:

Appendix G - Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.7l(b) and (c).

licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.20. 73.37, 73.50, 73.55. 73.60. and 73.67 shall report or record, as appropriate priate. the following safeguards events.

I.

Ewents1t.s1~e1tep~ttea1witMtn1~ie1i~it11Stldist~Yet111 flSZZ.Swed Upon discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a credible threat to the facility, the following events must be reported within one hour, followed by a written report within thirty days.

(a)

Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:

(1)

A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear materials; or (2)

$ffnititant Intentional physical damage to any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses. 6t whereby the public health and safety (3) could be endangered by exposure to radiation:

zatett>>ptf6nl6tln~t*iz1,s~etatl6nl6t Malicious tampering ldt.b. a li6ensed nuclear power plant reactor tMt.SifM/tMe/

idi~tK;ttt;*1~Bel.StlotltampetiaflwitM.c.c. its machinery.

components, or controls including the security system.

(b)

Any discovered failure of a safeguards system otl ifst~Yetedtn.sntn~etent1111zneta~tzttt1in1a1st*te*ltMat1to~z*1izzow1 nna>>tMotlted/lSi/nndettei which persists w1tbout pcopec compensation 10 minutes after establishment of a reasonable belief that it could be exploited by unauthorized personnel to gain undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport~ toi/wMftM ptopet1t~mpeaaitott1meaivtei/MaYelnot/~een/eita>>Z%iKei111A111topet ttSmpeniatott/meainteY "Proper compensation" for a particular safeguards event as used in this Appendix means/a/meaznte includes but is not limited to measures that %i.A.t.ft...Specified in a security or contingency plan or security procedure.

Zf/tle pattttnzit1pateotat*~1;Yenittntnwttdddttf>>d<<t%n1a1;zan1ot1 ptotei>>te11tien1,11ptopet1t;m>>enz;tmtttme<>tdYtse;ndtatmeae>>te iafZe*entea

ATTACHMENT l wttMtn1z01mtn>>tes1ot1inteYent1e1*litoYettltMatlft~Yt*ee1i1zeyez1ot1

-*t*tlttlei-entlalltleinlvalentlt~/tKat/exldtldil~efoteltMel eYent.

(c)

Any *na>>tMotlte* discovered entries of unauthorized persons through a/te@nitedt>>attlet any required physical barrier as defined in 73.2 of this part (whether or not the event is properly compensated).

II.

Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and/in>>mitted/in/

giittetzt1z~,,

(a)

Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulnerability in a system that could allow >>nantMotftea/otl>>e

/expZ~itedl>>tlnnantMotfzed/petionneZ/to/iain undetected access to a protected area. material access area. controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have been established.

l>>111Ant1~tMet1tiiznte1~t1a1iateftd.ateit-tstem1n~ttintz>>ae*1tn 1;ataitap>>1zzt1ta11~t1tMtdtappendltttt1t>>e1taiz>>te1*edtiaesttMe tettettiYeneiitotttMetititem.

ATTACHMENT 2 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISION 1 TO REGULATORY GUIDE 5.62 REPORTING OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EVENTS The transmittal letter provides our overall comments on safeguards reporting. and Attachment 1 provides detailed comments on the proposed rule of 73.71 in the form of a comparative text.

Regulatory Guide 5.62 should provide guidance consistent with the final rule.

Our comments on the Regulatory Guide are general in nature and do not include a comparative text rewrite.

our comments on each section of the regulatory guide are provided as follows:

A.

Introduction The introduction should delete the requirement for recording and transmitting quarterly safeguards events to the NRC.

B.

Discussion For the most part. the examples of events furnished as one hour reportables are acceptable.

However. the event involving the discovery of a criminal act involving licensee personnel or contractors etc.* presents a significant burden and could require some form of worker self reporting which currently does not exist.

In addition. there is no need to create a new record log and send copies of it every three months to the NRC.

That information identified as examples of events to be logged within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is already preserved in maintenance records. computer logs or other systems used by licensees and is available to NRC inspectors if there is a need for such information.

Examples of items for which records should be made. without specifying the specific log. should be sufficient.

1043K

The Light uU6W MJM&tff PR elllfOffl> RULE

-71, 7,t ef7U. 9

( ~ Fl!..J47tJi l!::J.I COIRpany Houston LighBneK~reoer P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 (713) 228-921 l

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as DEC 30 A11 :24 r--
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3;,A1!C*i Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch December 23, 1985 ST-HL-AE-15b2 File No.: G23.3
Subject:
Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements Proposed Rule -
50FR34706
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Houston Lighting & Power Company has reviewed the subject proposed rule regarding safeguards reporting requirements and offers the following comments.
We do not believe that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months recording and quarterly reporting requirements proposed in 73.7l(c) provide sufficient aid to the Convnission to warrant the burden being placed on licensees. It is our recommendation that licensees be required to maintain these records in a system that is convenient to the licensee (logs, computer printouts, data sheets, etc.) and have these records available for inspectors from the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to review during routine inspections. A requirement to log each and every security system fault and to transmit a package of such reports to the Commission quarterly appears to be nonproductive.
Proposed Part 73 Appendix G Part I(a)(3) identifies "interruption of normal service" as a threshold for reporting.
We believe that this should not be a threshold; rather, the rule should identify sabotage or intent to convnit sabotage as a threshold for reporting.
Proposed Part 73 Appendix G Part I(b) defines "compensatory measure".
We do not believe that it is necessary to describe this in 10CFR.
Also, this part of Appendix G would be much clearer without it.
S8/AE-1562.TXT Aok'rlawi.
U.S. NUCLFI' DOCKET or A.MISS!
'ON
Houston Llghting & Power Company ST-HL-AE-1562 File No. G23.3 Page 2 To aid in explanation of our conments, we have annotated the attached copy of the proposed changes to 1DCFR73.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 713-993-1330.
MAM/bjf Attachment cc: J. H. Goldberg J. G. Dewease G. G. Parker A. O. Hill D
E. Moore S8/AE-1562.TXT
ATTACHMENT COMPARATIVE TEXT COMMENTS ON 73.71
§ 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments, suspected thefts, or unlawful diversions and other safeguards events.
(a) (1)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss or any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment.
(2)
This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center listed in appendix A of Part 73 of the chapter via the Emergency Noti-fication System, if the licensee is party to that system. If the Emer-gency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic systems or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour. The exemption of§ 73.21(g) (3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.
(3)
The licensee shall, upon request of the NRC, maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center.
(4)
The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of thirty (30) days by a written report submitted to the U.S.
{
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555. The licensee shall also submit one copy each to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A to this part and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.
(5)
Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter and also submitted in a revised written report to the
~
Regional Office, the Document Control Desk and if applicable the appro-priate Resident Inspector. Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a revised report. The revised report must replace the previous report; therefore, the update must be a complete entity and not contain only supplementary or revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three years from the date of the report.
(b) (1)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60 and 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I. (a) (1) of Appendix G to this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of
§ § 73.20, 73.37, 73.55, 73.60 and each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material (SSMN) and subject to§§ 73.67(d) and (e) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs I. (a) (2), (3) (4),
(b), and (c) of Appendix G of this part.
(2)
This notification must be made in accordance with the re-quirements of paragraphs (a) (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.
(c) ~i~ Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and each licensee possession SSNM and subject to§§ 73.67(d), and 73.67(e) shall meffteMft-a-ettFrefte-1/4eg-fffld record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II. (a) and (b) of the Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee employee of the licensee's contract security organization. The licensee shall retain the +/-e~~-eveftee record reeerdett-ttMer-ehis-eeeefeft-as-a reeM"d-fer-Mtree one year afeer-elte-+/-aee-efteey-fs-matte-fft-eaeh-+/-e~.
~~~-Eveey-e}H,ee-meftehsT-eaeh-+/-feea~sha+/-~Ettfflme-ee-ene-NRS eepfes-e~-a+/-+/--aefegttaF~s-e'\\l'efte4eg-eMries-nee-prevfetts='=,--sttmdeeettT Eaeh-+/-ieefteee-sha+/-+/--ettb~-eae-eei,:r-ef-eaen-ef-fes4e~-efte,;afes-ee-ehe EfTST-Ntte+/-ear-Regtt+/-~eeey-6eimdl!fflfoftT-Beettmefte-6efterM-Bes1';-WaelttftgeeftT BT6.-~0555,-aftd-i£-~pp+/-feae+/-e-ehe-app~faee-NR6-Reefde~Hepeeeer.
(d)
Each licensee shall submit to the Commission the 30-day written reports afte-eepfes-ef-ehe-e~fegttards-evefte-+/-eg-efteFfes required
under the provisions of this section that are of a quality which will permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing. If the facility is subject to§ 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall prepare the written report on NRC Forms 366 and 366A. If the facility is not subject to§ 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall not use these forms but shall prepare the written report in letter format. In either case the report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and eval-uation *
(e)
Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also reportable in accordance with§§ 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.
4.
A new Appendix G is added to read as follows:
Appendix G - Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR §73.71(b) and (c), licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR § § 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events.
I.
Events to be reported within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within thirty days (a)
Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made
a credible threat to commit or cause:
(1)
A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or (2)
Significant physical damage to any facility possessing SSMN or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear facility, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses; or (3)
(4)
~fteerrttpMeft-ef-He!!'IM:+/--ettef'eMeft-e~ Sabotage a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.
Smuggle unauthorized materials into the facility where there is reasonable belief it might be used for sabotage *
(b)
Any failure of a safeguards system M"-dfeeevM-ed-fleftfftherefte
¥tt+/-ftereb~ey-fH-e-syseem-ehee-eett3:tl-e+/-+/-ew-ttftetteherfneei-er ttftdet!eeeed which persists beyond 10 minutes without proper compensation and would allow unauthorized persons undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport; fer--wnfel't-~reper eemttenseeeey-meesttres-heve-nee-beeft-es~b+/-fehedT-A-1lf'F6~P eempeHseeery-meesttrell-!E,er-e-perefett+/-BP or would allow entry
(c) of unauthorized materials into those areas. 6aie~ttttt-tts eveftes-as-tteee-fft-eftie-A~~eedh-meal'tS-a-meaettre-enae-ie epeefHee-ift-a-seettriey-er-eeHefngeney-p+/-aH-er-eeettr~ey preeeettreT-ff-t':fte-parefettfar-Sftre~ere,,9-eyene-!f:8-ftee-de-9erfeee-fft-a-p+/-&ft-6r-pr6eeettrey-t!-fteft-B-llpreper-eempeft8&eeey meeettrell-m~efte-a-measttre-fmp+/-emefteee--v~en:f:ft-i-9-Mntteee-er-an everteLe-cH:tteey~ehae-previeee-a-1/4eve1/4-ef-eeettriey-eeeeft-eia1/41/4y-~iva1/4ee~-ee-ehae-e~fee:J:ng-eefere-ehe-evene.
Any unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is properly compensated).
II.
Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months eftti-ettemi:e~ee-iB-qttareer:ry
l:eg.
(a)
Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulnerabil-ity in a system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport, or failure of equipment used in contraband search.
£.er-wnieh-preper-eempenee~meaetff'ee-heve-beeft-eeeee1/4iehed.
f1'1"---Afty-eener-rai1/4ttre-er-a-BMegtteree-eyseem-ftee-fee1/4ttdee-iB
~eragrepH-f~T-fe-ef-eMe-appettef~-f~-efte-fai:l:ttre-eegreees-eae-ef~ee efveeees-M-efte-eyeeem.
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r~ le PortlandGeneralEledricOln1)11rw Bart D. Wrthers Vice President Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 ATTN:
Docketing and Service Branch
Dear Sir:
g~ ?jJm Nuc;~ar Plant Doc~
'1 ~'344
A License F-1 Comments on Proposed Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements Portland General Electric Company (PGE) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed changes to the safeguards reporting requirements (10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74) that were published on August 27, 1985 (50 Federal Register 34710).
our comments address the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 which apply to nuclear power reactors, and for which implementation guidance is provided in proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62.
As a member of the Physical Security Coordinating Group, I<MC, Inc., PGE endorses the position taken by the Group.
We support the Commission's efforts to revise this area of regulation, however we believe that the proposed rule in its pres~nt form will lead to an increased reporting burden on licensees without a commensurate increased level of protection.
PGE participated in comments provided to the Commission by the Physical Security Coordinating Group which support this position.
We are not, however, in complete agreement with the Group's comments on safeguards events reportable within one hour.
It is our belief that the need for immediate NRC notification exists only when a security-related incident which poses a threat to the plant and/or the public health and safety has occurred or is believed to be imminent.
The event described in Paragraph I(b), Appendix G of the proposed rule revision does not meet this criterion. The discovered failure or vulnerability of a safeguards system does not of itself present an imminent threat. If the circumstances surrounding the equipment failure involve any of the other one hour reporting events (such as theft, tampering, or entry by unauthorized persons), then immediate NRC notification seems prudent.
In their absence, however, the reporting urgency lessens considerably. It 121 S.W. Salmon Street. Portland, Oregon 97204
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Portlaxt General Eledric Con 1l811Y Secretary of the Commission Page 2 December 27, 1985 is the act or imminent threat of theft, sabotage, or unauthorized access and not the failure of a particular security system component that could conceivably require immediate NRC (and other national level) involvement.
This is true regardless of when compensatory measures are implemented.
The failure of a system component should not require an emergency notification simply because compensation was not completed within 10 minutes. It is our belief that failure to meet a specific time criterion should more appropriately be the subject of a 30 day written report.
This not to say that establishing proper compensatory measures is unimportant.
Licensees are responsible for effective security programs which ensure prompt response to occasional equipment problems.
PGE supports the effort to clarify the reporting requirements for safeguards events, as well as eliminate unnecessary reports.
our specific comments, along with those of the Physical Security Coordinating Group, have been provided in the interest of achieving that objective.
Sincerely,
~
~
Bart D. Withers Vice President Nuclear
PR-7J(.Zt (5ZJ F£.J47~f)
CHARLES CENTER
P. O. BOX 1475
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 NORMAN J. BOWMAKER VICE PRESIDENT GENERAL SERVICES Secretary of the Commission December 20, 1985 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch
<S'S D[c 26 f *r, r P/2:05 octc-
' I li'IG' 8RA.ltZ,JE,~.',,
Re:
Comments Regarding: 1) Proposed Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements, 10 CFR, Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74 Published August 27, 1985, and Gentlemen:
2) Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62 -
"Reporting of Physical Security Events,"
Task Number SG-901, Published November 1, 1985 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company is pleased to submit i ts comments regarding the proposed revisions to the Safeguards Reporting Requirements.
We commend the Commission for attempting to reduce and clarify these reporting requirements and support this position.
However, we believe, as published, some of the proposed changes do not reduce, but increase, both the costs and the administrative burden on the licensee.
Additionally, while the reporting requirements are somewhat clarified by these changes, we believe they can be further improved
In particular, the requirement to establish and submit quarterly a separate log, which records events not reported to the NRC, greatly increases the administrative burden on the licensee.
Presently, the NRC reviews existing records (e.g. Maintenance Requests) as part of their routine on-site inspections and is given copies of any relevant documents.
BG&E cannot find any benefits which justify the costs associated with the start-up and maintenance of a
system that duplicates the existing documentation.
Additionally, we believe this new requirement will also be burdensome for the Commission because i t will result in a deluge of new and unnecessary Safeguards Information (10 CFR 73.21) which must be reviewed, correlated, analyzed, and stored.
U.S. NUCLEAR pr.G 1-11 /\\TORY COMMISS"ION DOCKETll'1G I' c;c.., C!i SECTION OFF!,..~ ~: T' -
~ r:ET,\\~Y OF T' ~ CCW *.: l'i3 1C N
2 -
Secondly, some of the items requiring a one hour report are not as explicit or easily determined as the theft of nuclear material.
For example, the discovery of an unaccounted card key or a fire of unknown origin both require time, which could be longer than one hour, to investigate and gather sufficient information to establish their probable cause (e.g., equipment malfunction).
The NRC itself in Information Notice 85-80, has recognized the importance of ensuring that the personnel making such reports are "sufficiently knowledgeable of the event to report it correctly." It is our belief that allowing the licensee time to investigate and establish a reasonable belief that a credible threat exists prior to making a report, will not impede reporting of clear out events, such as on-site intrusion within one hour.
It will, however, reduce the number of unnecessary or cursory reports which could be made under the proposed wording of this rule.
A third area of concern pertains to the use of a Licensee Event Report (LER) for Physical Security Events.
Since the LER is a public document, it may be difficult for licensees to adequately and accurately report the confidential and sensitive information often contained in Security reports.
Additionally, we are concerned that this information may be inadvertantly released to the public.
For these reasons, we are opposed to the use of LER's and favor the use of letters for reporting physical security events.
Finally, we have made comments regarding the sections of the proposed rule and associated regulatory guide which address the interruption of normal operation.
While we understand this terminology was added to ensure the rule conforms with the Atomic Energy Act, we believe the intent of this requirement involves an interruption of operation caused by malicious acts.
However, the wording in the proposed rule does not imply this or make it clear.
Since an LER is prepared anytime the safety system is challenged (eg. reactor trip) and duplicate reporting will be deleted, we believe the wording can be modified to better clarify and define the types of acts that should be reported.
BG&E has enclosed comparative texts of both the rule (Enclosure 1) and the Regulatory Guide (Enclosure 2) which are consistent with our general comments.
We believe the adoption of these comments will reduce and clarify the reporting requirements as well as ensure the NRC is involved in any situation that compromises the security of our facility.
My staff and I are available to discuss any comments you may have on this subject.
J. Bowmaker NJB:BFO: ja
ENCLOSURE 1 COMPARATIVE TEXT COMMENTS ON 73.71 Sec. 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments, suspected thefts, or unlawful diversions and other safeguards events.
(a)(1)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sections 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(0), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment.
(2)
This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center listed in appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter via the Emergency Notification System, if the licensee is party to that system.
If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic systems or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour.
The exemption of Section 73.21(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.
(3)
The licensee shall, upon request of the NRC, maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center.
(4)
The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of thirty (30) days by a written report submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.
The licensee shall also submit one copy eaoh to the appropriate NRC Regional Offioe listed in Appendix A to this part and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.
2 -
(5)
Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after tho oubmiesion of the WPi.tte:a report: must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter. and abo submitted If a written report has been submitted and supplemental information becomes available or an error has been discovered in that report a revised written report must be sent to the Regional Office, the Document Control Desk and if applicable the appropriate Resident Inspector.
Errera are diooovored in a tho origieal written report must be oorreotod in a revised veport.
The revised report must roplaoo tho previous report, therefore, tho update must be a Qompl'it@.inti.ty a:ed not contain only supplementary or revised information.
Each licensee shall maintain a copy of tho written report of an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three years from the date of the report.
(b)(l)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sections 73.20, 73-37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60 and 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a credible threat to the facility the safeguards events described in paragraph I.(a)(1) of Appendix G to this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of Sections 73.20, 73.37, 73-55, 73.60 and each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and subject to Sections 73.67(d) and (c) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a credible threat to the facility the safeguards events described in paragraphs I. (a) (2), (3), (b), and (c) of Appendix G to this part.
(2)
This notification must be made in accordance with tho requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.
(c)(1)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sections 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to Sections 73.67(d), and 73.67(0) shall maintain a eurrant leg and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II. (a) and (b) of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee's ampleyoe er member of the lioensee'a eontraet seeurity organi~ation security organization to include tho licensee's contract socuri ty base if applicable.
Tho licensee shall retain the log of events record reoerdod under thio oeotion ao a rooord for throe one years. after tho last entry is maao in eagh log.
(2)
Every throe months I oaoh lioonaoo shall aubmit to the NRG oopioe of all aaf0gua.rd8 avant log entries not :previl.ougl.y 8Ubmil.tted.
lfaaa lia0ns00 shall submit enc eepy of eaeh ef ita leg entries to tho 0,8, Nuoloar RagulatopY Commission, Doou-mont Cantrel Desk, Waohingten, D,G, 20555 1 and if appliaable the appropriate NRG Resiaent Inapootor.
(d)
Each licensee shall submit to tho Commission the 30-day written reports and gopilillil of t:bQ iaflilg1.1ardi1 lil\\Tlilnt log 0ntri0i1 required under the provisions of this section that are of a quality which will permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.
If tho faoility is subject to Seotion 50,73 of thia eaaptor, the lioonaee shall prepare the urithn r~port on NHG Ferms 366 and 366A, If tao facility is net oubjoot to 8ootion 50,73 of this chapter, The licensee shall not use these forma but shall prepare the written report in lotter form.
In either ease tl.:i.0 report which must include sufficient information for NRG analysis and evaluation.
(o)
Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also reportable in accordance with Sections 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.
4.
A new Appendix G is added to read as follows:
Appendix G - Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR Section 73-71(b) and (c), licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR Sections 73. 20, 73. 37, 73. 50, 73. 55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events.
I. Events to bo Poported uithin one houP of diaeovoPy, Upon discovery and the establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a credible threat to the facility, the following events must be reported within one hour, followed by a written report within thirty days (a)
Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:
(1)
A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or (2)
Intentional signifioaa'b physical damage to any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses; or whereby the public health and safety could be endangered by exposure to radiation; (3)
IntoFFuptioa of noFmal opoFation of Malicious tampering with a licensed nuclear power reactor through the uniiuthoriz~d Y.~Hi of or tampoFiag uite or its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.
(b)
Any discovered failure of a safeguards system oF diooovoFod noninhoront vulaoFability ia a oyotom that oould allow unauthoFi~ed OF undetoetoe which persists boyone without proper compensation for 10 minutes without pFopoF oemponoation aad boyone after the establishment of a reasonable
belief that it could be exploited by unauthorized persons to gain undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which proper oempoBoatory moaouroo have not boon established.
A "proper oomponliiatory measure" "Proper compensation" for a particular safeguards event as used in this Appendix moans a measure includes but is not limited to measures that is ~
specified in a security or contingency plan or security procedure. If the partieuler 3afegtterd3 event ie 0ot elesoriaed il'\\ a plaa or preeedure, thefl: a "proper eompcnsatory measure" meaas a measure implemoatoel within 10 mi0utes of a0 event's elisoovory that provieloo a 10701 of aceurity essentially equivalent to that existing eeforo the e*:ont.
(o)
Any u0autheri~oel entries of unauthorized persons through a required barrier whether or aot when the event is not properly compensated.
II. Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
anel suemittcel in ~ua.rtcrly log, (a)
Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulnerability in a system that could bo exploited by unauthorized personnel to gain undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have been established.
(b)
.n.ny other faili:1:ro of a safogua.rels system not inoluelod in paragraph II, (a) of this appenelix if the failure elegrades tho offootivonoss of the system.
ENCLOSURE 2 REGULATORY GUIDE 5.62, REV. 1 REPORTING OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EVENTS A.
INTRODUCTION In 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,"
paragraphs 73.71(a)-(c) require licensees to report to the Operations Center of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or record ~e'l!' E1t1arbel"ly f.reAamUtial t,e the NHC, certain safeguards events.
These events are those whj,ch threaten nuclear activities or lessen the effectiveness established by safeguards regulations or an contingency plan.
of a security system as approved security and/or This regulatory guide provides an approach acceptable to the NRC staff for determining when and how an event should be reported.
Examples are provided that represent the types of events that should be reported.
These examples are not intended to be all-inclusive.
The applicability of events may vary from site to site depending on the site layout
B.
DISCUSSION The NRG requires the information reportable under Section 73. 71 to keep the NRG informed of events with potential to endanger public health and safety or national security and to monitor trends in aafoguardo oyote!BB ef'feoth*enesa.
Because certain significant safeguards events warrant immediate involvement by the NRC and possibly other government agencies, such as the FBI, these reports must be telephonioally reported to the NRC within one hour of occurrence and establishment of a reasonable belief that it poses a credible threat to the facility followed by a written, detailed report within
thirty (30) days.
Certain other safeguards events which could not allow unauthorized or undetected access to a facility, either due to their nature or because they have been properly compensated, are required to be recorded. ia a log and oopi.08 of tl:l.0 P080PQQQ log submitted ta tho NRG OVOPY three IBOflths.
A chart of reportable events and reporting times is included as Table 1, to this guide.
For the purposes of this guide the following definitions apply:
Safeguards system:
The equipment, personnel, and procedures that comprise the physical protection program necessary to meet the performance objectives of Sections 73.20(a), 73.37(a), 73.50, 73-55(a), 73.60 or 73.67.
Safeguards events:
Any incident representing an attempted, threatened.
or actual breach of the safeguards system or a reduction in the operational effectiveness of the system.
Properly Compensated:
EotabliohiRg Established measures for particular safeguards events as included but not limited to measures that are specified in a security or contingency plan or security procedures.
If tho oafogyards event is not described ie tease plaRo, then. "properly oompon.oatod" moass moeoureo implemented withis 10 miRuteo of an eyent'o aieeovory that proYide a loY0l of ooourity essentially oquh*alel'.'l.t to that exieting before the e*.*cnt,.
Guidance on acceptable compensatory measures may be found in NUREG 1045.
Guidance on the Application of Compensatory Safeguards Measures for Power Reactor Licensees.
C.
REGULATORY POSITION Reports of events are required to be legible and reproducible.
Lieenoeeo subjeot to tho J)Povisioao Sootion 50.73 of 10 GFR 50 should prepare ta0:ir uritton peporto OR NRG Forms J66 and 366A.
Licensees sot aubjeat tg these
provieioae should aot use these foPJ:B:o eut prepare their reports using a letter format.
In getl'-l. QHillil, The information requested in the Appendix to this guide is considered sufficient for NRG analysis and evaluation and should be included as a minimum.
Events of a dual nature, i.e., having both safety and safeguards implications and, therefore, subject to the requirements of Sections 50.73 and 73.71, do not require duplicate reports.
However, the licensee should indicate in the written report under what requirement the report is being made, i.e., Section 50.73, Section 73.71, or Sections 50.73 and 73.71.
1.
Safeguards Events Reportable Under Section 73.71(a)
Events reportable under Section 73-71 (a) involve incidents in which a theft, loss, or diversion of a shipment of special nuclear material (SNM) or spent fuel has occurred or is believed to have occurred.
When a licensee or licensee agent discovers an actual or suspected theft, loss, or diversion, a telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A to Part 73 should be made within one hour of the discovery.
Telephone notification should be made via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) if the licensee is party to that system.
If the ENS is inoperative or unavailable, commercial telephone should first be used to ensure that the required notification is received by the NRC Operations Center withia eae he~r of
Table I. Summary Reporting Requirements REQUIRED REPORTS DESCRIPTION OF SAFEGUARDS EVENT One hour telephonic report followed by a written report within thrity days.
Safeguards event.,leg-,
oHbmitted every throe months record (1)
Lost, unaccounted for, or recovered shipments of SNM or spent fuel.
(Required by Section 73-71(a).)
(2)
Acts, attempts, or threats to commit (a) theft or diversion of SNM or spent fuel, (b) damage to facility, transport, or fuel, or (c) intoPPH~tioe of normal e~cratiofi of malicious
~ampeving with a licensed power reactor due to tampering.
(Required by Section 73-71(b)/Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73.)
(3)
Uncompensated safeguards system failures that could allow unauthorized or undetected access into PA's, MAA's, CAA's, or VA's or a transport.
(Required by Section 73.71(b)/Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73.)
(4)
Any ooauthorisod entry of an unauthorized person through a required barrier.
(Required by Section 73-71(b)/Appendix G to 10 CFR 73.)
(1)
Properly compensated safeguards systems failures that if uncompensated could allow unauthorized or undetected access into PA's, MAA's, CAA's or VA's, or a transport.
(Required by Section 73.71(c)/Appendix G to 10 CFR 73.)
(2)
Safeguards systems failures that degrade the effectiveness of the system but could not allow unauthorized or undetected
access, whether compensated or Rot.
(Required by Section 73.71(c)/Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73.
dioeev=ory ef tho event.
Commercial telephone numbers that may be used to contact tho NRG Operations Center are: (202) 951-0550, (301) 427-4056, (301) 427-4259 and (301) 492-8893.
Other methods that may be used to ensure notification within one ho'f:ir if commercial telephone is not available include telegram, mailgram, or facsimile.
Telegrams and mailgrams should be hand delivered to tho Operations Officer at tho NRG Operations Center, Maryland National Bank Building, 7735 Old Georgetown Road, Bethesda, Maryland.
For information concerning facsimiles, contact tho NRG Operations Center at (301) 492-8893.
Tho licensee (or agent) should also provide tho NRG Operations Center with telephonic notification within one hour of the recovery of or accountability for the shipment, i.e., information such as: material located, discovery of reason for loss, etc.
Telephonic reports made pursuant to Paragraph 73.71(a) may be transmitted over unprotected lines as permitted by the exemption in Paragraph 73.21(g)(3).
A follow-up written report must be submitted within 30 days of a telephonic report.
Licensees aot al:ibjoot to the previoioao of 50,73 of 10 GFH
-5G-should use letter format in preparing their reports and include all the information described in tho Appendix to this guide within their reports.
They Those lieeaoeoo should submit one copy each of their written report to tho U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, the appropriate Regional Office listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73, and, if applicable, the appropriate NRG Resident Inspector.
If pertinent information or errors are uncovered after the initial telephone report or the written report io Ol:ibmittod, the licensee should telephonically notify the NRG Operations Center of the information.
If the information or error is uncovered after written report submittal, the licensee should submit
a complete revised written reports to the Document Control Desk, the Regional Office and the NRC Resident Inspector, if applicable.
The revised report should be a aamplete entity and net contain ---eIH:Y-the supplementary or revised information.
All written reports must indicate the requirement under which the report is submitted, i.e., Section 50.73, Section 73-71, or both Sections 50.72 and 73.71.
2.
Safeguards Event Reportable Under Paragraph 73.71(b)
As required by Paragraph 73.71(b) and described in Appendix G the following safeguards events must be reported within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a credible threat to the facility: (1) acts, attempts, or threats to commit: (a) theft or unlawful diversion of SNM or spent fuel, (b) significant physical damage to a licensed facility possessing SSNM or carrier transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or (c) interruption of normal operation of malicious tampering with a licensed nuclear power plant through unauthorisoa use of or tamp0riag uith or its machinery, components, or controls; ( 2) any uncompensa tad failure or diooovered ~'1..llaeraaility of the safeguards system that could be exploited to allow unauthorized or undetected access to an area to which access is con trolled by licensees possessing or transporting nuclear fuel, spent fuel, or strategic special nuclear material in quantities greater than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium, or in a combination quantity of more than 1000 grams where computed by the equation, grams= (grams contained U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium), and (3) all uaautaori:aed entries of unauthorized persons through a required barrier when whether the event is not properly compensated or not.
All of the events
described above should be reported telephonically to the NRG Operations Center listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of the event of its discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that tho event poses a credible threat to the facility of the event, followed by a written report within 30 days.
Reports made pursuant to Paragraph 73-71(b) can be transmitted over unprotected telephone lines as permitted by the exemption in Paragraph 73.21(g)(3).
The written reports required under Paragraph 73-71(b) as described in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73 should be submitted on HHG Fo:rmo 366 and 366A if the lieeBaee i~ ~ttbjecb to the reqttirementa ef 10 GFR 50.73*
All otae:r lieonoeeo ohould ouemit thei:r repe:rts in letter format.
All reports should include the information described in the Appendix to this guide.
Licensees should submit one copy each of reports to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555, the appropriate Regional Office listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73 and the appropriate NRG Resident Inspector, if applicable.
As stated previously, pertinent information or errors uncovered after initial telephone notification or HPitton ro~ort ouemittal should be telephonically transmitted to the NRG Operations Center.
If the information or error is uncovered after written report submittal, a eomf)lete revised reports should be submitted to the Regional Office, the NRG Headquarter' s Document Control Desk and the appropriate NRG Resident Inspector, if applicable.
If the written report contains restricted data, e.g., unclassified Safeguards Information, the report must be appropriately marked. If NRG Foi"fflo 366 and 366A are used, ~rotootoe data may eo inoludod only in tho text aoatioa ef the fermo (Ihem 17).
Preteebed data onoula not ee included ia tho abstPaat oeotion (Item 16) or aay other oeetioa of 'ehe formo other than the text
segtioR.
ln a,g.ditien, the tout should clearly indiea'ee tbo iflformation. bhat io proteotod, Finally, The requirements of Section 73.21(g) must be met when transmitting written proprietary information.
All written reports should indicate tho requirements under which the report is submitted, i.e. Section 50.73, Section 73-71, or both Sections 50.73 and 73. 71.
2.1.
Guidelines for Reasonable Belief For all events that have been "threatened," the licensee should establish reasonable belief that an act of theft, damage or tampering has occurred or will be attempted.
Reasonable belief is established under the following circumstances: (1) when physical evidence exists that such an act has or may occur, or (2) when information exists that supports a belief that an act of theft, tampering, or damage has been or might be attempted.
2.2.
Acts, Attempts and Threats of Theft or Unlawful Diversion Acts of theft or unlawful diversion reportable under Paragraph 73-71(b) include any incident in which an individual has attempted, threa toned, or succeeded in stealing or unlawfully diverting SNM or spent fuel
2.3. Acts, Attempts, and Threats of Physical Damage Significant acts of damage to a licensed facility or carrier include any incident in which a person has attempted, threatened, or succeeded in destroying some part of a licensed facility or carrier whether or aot if the action would result in a release exceeding the limits of 100.11 of 10 CFR Part 100.
Minor incidents which would not have resulted in a release in excess of the limits of 10 CFR Part 100.11 should only be reported if they Thia may include miner incidents of damage whee ouch aoto are believed to be indicative of a problem that may result in more significant events.
2.4.
Interruption of Normal Operations at Nuclear Power Plants Nuclear power reactor licensees should report all events in which an individual has attempted, threatened, or succeeded in intorruptiHg the Bormal opoPatione malicious tampering of a licensed nuclear power plant thPOl:lgft tho tampoPing er uaautheril!led uoe of its machinery, components, or controls.
Reports should be made uhlither op aot if the action could result in a release exceeding the limits of Section 100.11.
Minor incidents should be reported if they are believed to be indicative of a problem that could result in more significant events.
2.5.
Safeguards System Failures and Vulnerabilities Required by Paragraph 73. 71 ( b) and included in proposed Appendix G to Part 73 as events that must be reported within one hour after discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that a credible threat exists are uncompensated safeguards system failures or discovered vulnerabilities that could permit unauthorized and undetected access to an area to which access is controlled by licensees possessing or transporting nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel, or strategic special nuclear material in quantities greater than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the 0-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium, or in a combination quantity of more than 1000 grams where computed by the equation, grams
= (grams contained U-235)
+ 2 (grams 0-233
+ grams plutonium).
Safeguards systems failures include not only mechanical or electrical system failures but also improper personnel procedures which could result in any one of the above conditions.
Dioeoyered \\"lllaeraeilitieo iaelude iaeidento uhePe the eee1:1Pity syotem hao Bot failed; however, oeme flaw ia the oeeuPity eyotom uhiab bad exist ea uitho1:1t being notiood aae boon discovered.
FoP example, if a baPPieP has boon designed with e.n opening to a vital a:i:-ea e:xoililding tbfil 96
10 -
equare ineh eriterion ~nd tni~ flaw i~ ~uddenly dioeevered, it oruet eo illlfflediatoly eomponaatod, and logged in lioonooo
PoooPda, If f)PopoP eomponoatory meaoureo aPe not implemented within 10 miButoo tac \\'UlnePability
~hetlld be reported within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , The lieeBoeo oaould prooood w~th--OoPPootive moaOUPOBo Also required by Paragraph 73.71(b) and included in Appendix Gas events that must be reported within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and establishment of a reasonable belief that a credible threat to the facility exists are l:lft0:1:1taerised entries of unauthorized personnel through a required barrier uhetheP when or not the breach is properly not compensated.
2.6.
Examples of Safeguards Events That Should be Reported Within One Hour The following list provides examples of events to be reported to the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a erodible threat to the faoili ty because of their potential to endanger public health and safety or national security.
(Thia list should not be considered all-inclusive.)
(1)
Purposefully attempted or confirmed intrusions into protected areas, material access areas, controlled access areas or vital areas.
Thia inoludos tailgating by employeeo/eontraotoro to gain aooooo to an area to uhieh they are not authorised.
(Noto:
Any unauthopiged entry of an unauthorized person through a required barrier must always be reported within one hour and establishment of a reasonable belief that a credible threat to the facility exists whether or not when the breach has not been properly compensated.)
(2)
Discovery of the actual or attempted introduction into or possession within the protected areas, material access areas, controlled access areas or vital areas of unauthorized weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices.
(3)
Substantiated bomb or extortion threats.
In addition a telephonic
11 -
follow-up report of the results of a bomb search should be made within one hour of completion.
Uneubate:ntiated bome 'ehl"M.t~ need aot be i!Bffleeiat.ely reported UI'lless a spooifio organi!i!iatioa or group claims rcapoBaibility I in this case the throat lftll t ea roportoe. within ooo aol:l.r.
( 4)
Uncompensated suspension of safeguards controls during emergency conditions which could allow undetected or unaut.horized access.
(Note:
Events reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 do not require duplicate reports under 10 CFR 73. 71.)
(5)
Discovery of an a gpiminal act involving licensee personnel or contractors with the potential to impact facility operation op an inaiviayal's*
t;puetuortbinoss or rolia'eility in tl:io nYoloaP sot ting (i.e., felonious acts, discovery of a conspiracy to bomb the facility or distrub its vital components, falsifioatioB of 'eao~EgP01.me. sorooniog ooFtifi.gat;~lil, vandalism of vital equipment, etc.).
(6)
Discovery of intentionally falsified identification badges or key cards.
(7)
Discovery of uncompensated and unaccounted for, lost, or stolen key
cards, ID card
blanks, keys, or any access device that could allow unauthorized or undetected acces to protected areas, material access areas, controlled acces areas, or vital area if use of NRG approves facility procedures cannot account for the loss.
(8)
Compromise of safeguards information (including loss or theft) which would significantly assist an individual in an act of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material.
(9)
Theft or loss of classified documents pertaining to facility or transport safeguards.
(Note:
Also reportable under Section 95.57 of 10 CFR Part 95).
12 -
( 10)
Fire or explosion of suspicious eP UrH:tR9'.Hl origin within the isolation zone, protected area, material access area, controlled access area, or vital area.
(Note:
Events reportable under Section 50. 72 do not require duplicate reports under Section 73.71.)
( 11)
Discovery of a suspicious vehicle following a licensed carrier transporting SSNM.
(12)
Mechanical breakdown of transport vehicle carrying SSNM.
( 13)
Uncompensated loss of both central and secondary alarm station ability to monitor or remotely assess alarms, or communicate with off-site sources.
( 14)
UHB:'.'B:ilability ef miRiflll:lfB Bl:HB99P ef S00WPity 1')0Pil9~Hilel 0P an actual or imminent strike by the security force.
( 15)
Uncompensated loss of all electrical power supply to security systems that would allow unauthorized or undetected access.
( 16)
Complete loss of off-site communications.
The licensee should report the complete loss of off-site communications within one hour if possible or immediately after restoration of communications.
If off-site communications are lost and cannot be restored within an hour, then the licensee should use communications located off-site to notify the NRG.
(17)
Uncompensated inability to detect within a single intrusion detection system zone.
( 18)
Member of oeourity fePee fel:fflel aeleer, at,eat.,
( 19)
Mass demonstration at plant site that may pose a threat to the facility.
(20)
Civil disturbance within one mile of plant site that may pose a threat to the facility.
(21)
Confirmed security equipment tampering of suspicious origin.
3.
Safeguards Events Under Paragraph 73.71(0)
The safeguards events reportable under Paragraph 73. 71 ( c) need only be logged recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of their occurrence.
LigQnseaa should submit ono copy each of their log entries to the U.S. HueloaP Regulatory Commission, I)ooumont Control
Dooic, Wasl=liagton, D,C,
20555, anel if applioablo the appropriate NRG Resieloat Inopeetor, Oaly those log 0ntr:i.:0s sot pPaviousl.y submitted should be provided, Tho leg maiatainod by lioonsoos must ae retained for throe years after tho laot eatry is made in eaeh log
Events reportable under Section 73-71(c) may be divided into two categories.
The first contains any properly compensated failure or diagovQrQd vulnerability of the safeguards system that if left uncompensated could be exploited to allow unauthorized or undetected access to an area to which access is controlled by licensees possessing or transporting nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel, or strategic special nuclear material in quantities greater than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium, or in a combination quantity of more than 1000 grams where, computer by the equation, grams= (grams contained U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 +
grams plutonium).
Preplanned situations that require compensatory measures, such as special outage work, equipment relocation, exercises and drills, and other situations that are not the result of a safeguards system failure, do not require l.osging reporting.
The other category that needs only to be loggeel recorded contains safeguards events involving safeguards systems failures that could not be exploited to allow unauthorized or undetected access, but do reduce tho effectiveness of the safeguards system.
Improper personnel procedures that result in safeguards systems failures as described in Section 73.71(0) should
14 -
be recorded in the log.
(See examples below.)
3.1. Safeguards Event:::69tt:Reoords In ma.inta:ining the log reqttired pttrattant to Section 1).71, it ie reeommeeded that tho lieoaooe leg the inferme.tien ae received aed then s'l:HllfflB:ri:ae arid 1:1:pdate th:e leg entry Wften tao e*t"efit termiftatee.
He\\rn*;op, Licensees are required to record log cetries within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the discovery of the event and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a threat to tho facility as required in Paragraph 73.. 71 (c).
Log entries The record should include as a minimum:
date and time (specify duration in military time) of event, brief (one-line) description of event, brief (one-line) description of compensatory or corrective actions taken.
Every three months, tho lieeaoee io roquiroel to 01:1amit to tao NRG
...Sead.gna:rteri:a,,u:i.d if appl:l.gabalo tho appPopPiato Roeielent Iaopeotor I eae eopy*
oaoh of all log entries aot previously oubmittoEl.
Eivef.l:te of s:imila.-r ne:tttre logged and eubmitted to the NHG uneler Para.grape
73,71(0) may be ooasoliElatoEl into a single log entry if they eoeur repeatedly uitaiB the quarterly oubmittal poried, 13&eh elate anEi time ef the eyeat must be spoeifioa fop oaoh oaowrronoo, For OlEa.mplo, if there is a ropoatoa oggurren00 of a oompoaeateEl aomputor failure aad eaoa fail1:1ro ie the rooult of the same f)Poelem, then oBly oae log eat:ry acoEl be made, Houeve:r, uita oa:eh oeeuPPonoe, tao sate, time, an4 eluPation of tao event must be Pooorao4 in. tao
."..s sta.toa previously, tho log must be rota.iR.od for a. peFioel of throe years after tho la.at entry to ea.oh log.
3.2. Examples of Events Required to Be Recorded In by the Licensee's-heg-(1)
Properly compensated security computer failures or security computer failures that do not assist in allowing unescorted or undetected access.
(2)
Properly compensated card reader failures.
(3) Properly compensated alarm failures.
(4}
Loss of capability to monitor or remotely assess alarms by a single alarm station but dual off-site communication capability remains.
(5)
CCTV camera failure in a single zone if intrusion detection system remains operational.
(6)
Failure of a single perimeter lighting zone if intrusion detection system remains operational *
(7)
Properly compensated loss of a single intrusion detection system zone.
(8)
~ailsating by lieenaee employee/eont1aetor to gain aeeee3 to an atea that he or she ie authori~ea to be is.
(9)
Loss of intra-convoy communications ability.
(10)
Properly compensated accidental removal off-site or loss of badge by employee, i.e.,
badge is promptly cancelled, or use of -NRG-approved procedures account for the loss.
( 11)
Properly compensated loss of all electrical power supply to security system that if uncompensated would allow unauthorized or undetected access.
(12) indiYid1:1ala.
tJBBlibatantiatod aomb or e:Ktortioa throats reoeivod from (13}
Confirmed security equipment tampering of non-suspicious origin.
(14)
Theft of security weapon at the site.
4.
Events Not Required to be Logged OP RopoPted Recorded Certain failures of the safeguards system that do not and could not reduce the effectiveness of the system have little or no safeguards significance.
Events having little or no safeguards significance need not be
reported or logged.
The following are examples of events not required to be leggea eP reported.
(This list should not be considered all inclusive.)
(1)
Burned out alarm signal bulb that has a functioning audible annunciator alarm.
(2)
If prior compensatory measures
approval, coordination with security and proper have been established, openings made by authorized maintenance personnel through a vital area barrier for a legitimate reason; e.g., to install pipe *
(3)
Child attempting to climb protected area fence *
Appendix Procedures for Proparing Written Safeguards Reports
1. If the faoility is s1:1bjeet te 10 GFH 50.73, l:l80 ef Ferm HHG 366 and J66A aro req1:1ir0d (see NUHEG 1022j "Licensee Event.
Rei,ort Sy.stem,"
a.nd Supplement 1 to UUHEG 1022, for aaditional iaformation on the use of tease f'orms).
Facilities not s1:1bjoot te Seetien 50.73 sae1:1la not 1:1oe tfwoo forms b1:1t should submit their information in a letter format.
2.
For all events include, as a minimum, the following information in the report.
If tJ;:J.0 faeility is s1:1bjeet to Section 50, 73, tl;:J.is information shoula be proviaea in tae text area t.o Form NRG J66A.
Hultil'le.sheebs of Form NRG 366A may be usoa.
a.
b *
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
n
Dato and time of event, (start and end in military time).
Event occurred or was threatened to occur in PA,
MAA, CAA, VA, or other - (specify).
For power reactors, state whether fresh fuel present on site or not.
Safety systems affected or threatened, directly or indirectly, if applicable.
Type of see1:1rity force on site, proprietary and/or or eontraet.
Number and type of personnel involved, i.e., contractors, security, visitors, NRG personnel, other (specify).
Method of discovery of incident, e.g., routine inspection, test, maintenance, alarm, chance, informant, communicated threat, unusual circumstances (give details).
Procedural errors involved, if applicable.
Immediate action(s) taken in response to event.
Corrective action(s) taken or planned.
Local, state, or federal agencies contacted, if applicable.
Description of media interest and/or press release, if applicable.
Indication of previous similar events.
Knowledgeable contact.
3. For security system failures provide the following in addition to Items 2.1. through n.
o.
Description of failed or malfunctioned equipment (including manufacturer ana moaol B1:HBbor).
p.
Apparent cause of each component/system failure.
(For security computers list specific components affected, e.g., central processors, peripheral/terminal equipment, software).
q.
Status of equipment prior to event, e.g., operating, being maintained, secure mode, compensatory measures in place.
r. Secondary functions affected (for multiple function components).
s. Effect on plant safety.
t.
Unusual conditions that may have contributed to failure, e.g.,
environmental extremes.
4.
For threat related incidents, provide the following in addition to Items 2.a. through n.
u.
Number of perpetrators.
v.
Type of threat, e.g., bomb, extortion, etc.
w.
Means of communication, e.g., letter, telephone, etc.
x.
Text of threat.
y.
Apparent method of operation (i.e., m.o. of perpetrators.)
uUeMJ. BU "PR-t1,-se f,Jd,*0
. C'Mg. (Jui.clu)
'85 DEC 24 P12.57 KMC, Inc.
December 24, 1985 Secretary of the Commission U.S£ Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wasnington, D.C.
20553 ATTN:
Docketing and Service Branch
Dear Sir:
801 18TH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 300 WASHINGTON, DC. 20006 (202) 293-4200 Comrnents on changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements
{10 CFR 73.71 and Regulatory Guide 5.62)
The Physical Security Coordinating Group is pleased to pro-vide comments on the proposed rule to amend the NRC regulations for the reporting of safeguards events.
The utility members of the Physical Security Coordinating Group own and operate nuclear power plants subject to the proposed rule and have concluded that its adoption as written will have substantially more impact than believed by the Commission.
A list of utility members is enclosed as Attachment 1.
Our comments are directed only toward those reporting requirements of proposed Section 73.71, published on August 27, 1985 {50 Fed. Reg. 34710), which are applicable to nuclear power reactors.
It has been our experience that interpretations of NRC security regulations by inspectors in the field, as well as by NRC plant security reviewers, are frequently more restrictive and burdensome than interpretations based on a reasonable reading of the regulations themselves.
In many cases, imposition of these more rigorous interpretations has been much more costly to imple-ment than was envisioned when the regulations were proposed, and has proven to be non-productive for good security at nuclear power plants.
We recognize and appreciate that the NRC is attempting to introduce greater specificity into the safeguards reporting rule.
However, our reading of the proposed rule indicates that, as written, it will lead to an increased, unnecessary burden on
r>'r.r r r>y COMMIS r "'"C~ SECTION "TA y
~N
licensees and that this burden is not at all compensated by an increased level of protection of the public health and safety.
Indeed, NRC justifies the proposed rule in large part by the need to develop "an adequate data base for generic analysis" (50 Fed.
~
at 34708).
The increased burden which the proposed rul_e __
wouTd impose is caused by the need for greater internal review by licensees of more events to determine which events require report-ing, and the addition of a completely new and "stand alone" logging system.
Therefore, the cost decrease predicted by NRC (50 Fed. Reg. at 34709) will not occur and indeed costs are likely to Increase.
We recommend strongly that the Commission revise its proposed reporting requirements to require only the information it needs to perform its public health and safety responsibilities.
Licensee reporting requirements which impose signific~t cost and resource burdens and which are needed only in order to perform "generic analyses" of unspecified usefulness, should be elimin-ated.
Specifically, all requirements for the unnecessary 24-hour log and subsequent quarterly submittals should be eliminated.
We also recommend that phrases such as "required barriers" (cf.
Appendix G, paragraph I(c)) be clearly and unambiguously defined or clearer terminology adopted.
In general, the members of the Physical Security Coordinating Group support the change in written reporting requirements from 5 or 15 days to 30 days (for example, proposed§ 73.7l(a)(4)).
We also support abolishing the need for duplicative reports (LERs).
However, we note that NRC Forms 366_and 366A (required to be used by proposed§ 73.7l(d)) were created specifically to address a class of safety (in contrast with safeguards) events and to provide information for a data collection system which tracks these safety events.
Thus, we strongly believe that these forms are inappropriate for use in reporting safeguards events which would not otherwise be reportable as LERs under 10 C.F.R. § 50.73.
Events which are reportable only under proposed§ 73.71 are of a separate and distinct character than those reportable as LERs.
There is no basis for including them within the LER system.
The use of a common reporting form blurs this important distinction.
From an overall perspective, information on theft or diver-sion of special nuclear material should continue to have a re-quirement for prompt reporting.
Similarly, safeguards incidents where a person or persons either con:mitted sabotage or provided credible threats of committing sabotage should be promptly re-ported.
However, interruption of normal reactor operation due to unauthorized use or tampering (proposed Appendix G, Section-I(a)(3)) is simply too broad in that it would treat as a report-able safeguards event a plant shutdown caused by a worker mis-takenly working on wrong piece of plant equipment.
The provision should be restricted to malicious tampering.
Security system (equipment or people) failures which persist for some threshold period of time after discovery and would allow unauthorized persons undetected access into protected or vital areas should be reported.
However, we do not believe the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months log and the subsequent quarterly reporting (Appendix G,Section II) are worth
the substantial effort or that they would assist the Commission in performing its safeguards responsibilities.
Information which would be required to be centrally logged is now available in licensee's computer and maintenance records or in other forms depending in the nature of the event being tracked.
We are not aware of any problems with the currently-used information systems, which include the logging of appropriate information without any requirement for subsequent quarterly reports.
Our recommendation against initiating quarterly reports does not imply we believe equipment and/or personnel failures should be ignored.
Applicable events will continue to be reported or recorded, and records will continue to be available in systems currently used by licensees (logs, data sheets, maintenance records, computer stored, etc.).
This information will continue to be available for the NRC inspectors to review if they choose to do so during inspections.
A requirement for a licensee to log each and every security system fault in a dedicated log and send a package of such reports every three months to the NRC is non-productive.
Likewise, the proposed requirement that a security event report be resubmitted in its entirety, rather than supple-
mented, when new information is discoveredhas not been justified and is non-productive for good security.
The comparative text (see Attachment 2) on the reporting requirements of Section 73.71 as related to power reactors re-flects our general comments.
Many of our proposed changes reflect the need to clarify vague and unspecific terminology (for example, "discovered noninherent vulnerability").
We are convinced that the revised reporting requirements set forth in Attachment 2 would provide the licensee the proper incentives by requiring reports that are necessary for good security, without burdening the system with disincentives.
One such disincentive is created by NRC's proposed requirement to report any system malfunction; any licensee choosing to conduct added drills, tests, or surveillance would likely thereby increase its reporting burden as well as give a misleading statistical appearance of increased security problems.
In our proposed revision to Section 73.7l(c)(l), we have tied discovery of a safeguards event to the licensee's security organi-zation because as written it could include any licensee employee, including those not responsible or qualified to make that deter-mination.
We would also recommend a minimum record retention time of one year rather than three years to reduce the storage of unneeded paperwork.
No basis has been set forth for three year retention.
We urge the NRC to adopt our recommended changes.
We have also reviewed the Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.62 on "Reporting of Physical Security Events."
That guide provides the staff's interpretation of its proposed revised rule.
For most utilities, it will increase -- not decrease -- the amount of reporting required.
Generally we note that the proposed Regulatory Guide is consistent with the proposed rule as now written.
As coIIHil.ented above and in Attachment 2, we have a number of concerns about the requirements of the rule and have recommended
changes in it.
We recommend that the Regulatory Guide be rewritten to be consistent with the final version of the rule.
We are willing to work with the NRC staff to accomplish this.
In particular, we believe there is a need for a glossary of terms in the Regulatory Guide and/or additional definitions in 10 C.F.R. § 73.2.
For example, in Table I what is a "recovered shipment?"
Must possession of such an item be reestablished or is an unverified telephone call from the shipper considered to be adequate?
Also, the Introduction of the Regulatory Guide should delete reference to any requirement for the recording and trans-mitting of quarterly event reports to the NRC, and the Discussion section should state that the NRC's requirement is only for the reporting of safeguards events or significant problems with the required performance of safeguards equipment or procedures.
Finally, we note that many of the examples provided in Sections 2.6 and 3.2 of the Regulatory Guide should be clarified, deleted or accorded lesser importance.
For example, what is an "incendiary device?"
(Does a person possessing a book of matches and scrap paper in one of the listed areas constitute a one-hour reportable event?)
We are similarly concerned that one-hour reporting is not appropriate for the unavailability of the minimum number of security personnel or an imminent strike by the security force, or for a member of the security force found asleep.
Nor do we believe that a general "civil disturbance within 1 mile of plant site" is sufficiently grave to require one-hour notifica-tion.
More clarification is needed for these examples.
We would be pleased to discuss our views with the staff or answer any questions you may have on our comments.
Sincerely, Donald F. Knuth President Encl.
ATTACHMENT 1 PHYSICAL SECURITY COORDINATING GROUP Arizona Public Service Co.
Carolina Power & Light Co.
Commonwealth Edison Co.
Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.
Consumers Power Co.
Duke Power Co.
Duquesne Light Company Florida Power & Light Co.
Nebraska Public Power District Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
Northeast Utilities Service Co.
Northern States Power Co.
Om.aha Public Power District Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Portland General Electric Co.
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Public Service Company of New Hampshire Rochester Gas & Electric Co.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District Southern California Edison Co.
Toledo Edison Co.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
Wisconsin Public Service Corp.
Yankee Atomic Electric Co.
§ 73.71 ATTACHMENT 2 COMPARATIVE TEXT COMMENTS ON 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments, suspected thefts, or unlawful diversions and other safeguards events.
(a)(l)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and within one bour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment.
(2)
This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter via the Emergency Notification System, if the licensee is party to that system.
If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic systems or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour.
The exemp-tion of§ 73.2l(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.
(3)
The licensee shall, upon request of the NRC, maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center.
(4)
The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of thirty (30) days by a written report submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555.
The licensee shall also submit one copy each to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A
to this part and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.
(5)
Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter and also submitted in a revised written report to the Regional Office, the Document Control Desk and if applicable the appropriate Resident Inspector.
Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in writing. a-Fevisea-Fepe~e~
The-Fevi:aea-FepeFe-maae-Fep+/-aee-eke p~evieaa-FepeFe;-eaeFeEe~e,-eke-apaaee-lHl:iae-ee-a-eemp+/-eee-eReiey aRe-aee-eeReaiR-eRly-aapplemeaeaey-eF-Fev!aea-iREeFmaeieR~
Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three years from the date of the report.
(b)(l)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60 and 73.67 shall notify the NRC Opera-tions Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I.(a)(l) of Appendix G to this part.
Licensees subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.55, 73.60 and each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and subject to§§ 73.67(d) and (e) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs I.(a)(2), (3), (b), and (c) of Appendix G to this part.
(2)
This notification must be made in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.
(c)~+/-
Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and each licensee possessing SSNM and
subject to§§ 73.67(d), and 73.67(e) shall maiRcain-a-eaF~eRc-leg aaa record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II.(a) a.Ba-f~ of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee's empleyee-e~-memhe~-eE-E&e-+/-ieeaseeLs-eene~aeE-seea~iey eFgaRisacieB~ security organization (to include the licensee's contract security force if appltcable).
The licensee shall retain the leg-ef-eveaes record FeeePaea-aRae~-eais-aeeciea-as-a-reee~e fer-caFee for one years. aser-cae-lase-eaery-ie-maae-ia-eaea-leg~
~2 --Eveey-eaFee-meacas,-eaea-lieeasee-aaall-aahmie-ee-eae NRS-eepiea-ef-all-saiegaarae-eveac-leg-eaeries-aee-previeasly sa~miecea~*--Eaea-lieeasee-eaall-saamie-eae-eepy-ei-eaea-ef-ies-leg eaeFiea-ee-eae-Y~s~-Nttelear-Regalaeeey-Sem:miasiea,-Beel:llBeRe Seaerel-BeskT-Waeaiageea,-9~s~--i9§§S,-aaa-if-applieahle-cae appFepPiaee-N.RS-Reaiaeae-iaapeeeer~
(d)
Each licensee shall submit to the Commission the 30-day written reports aae-eepiea-ef-eae-aafegttaree-eveae-leg-eacFiea required under the provisions of this section that are of a quality which will permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.
If-eae-iaeilicy-is-aahjeec-ee-f-S9~13-ef-eais-eaap-eePT-eae-lieeaaee-saall-pFepare-eke-WFieeea-~epePe-ea-N.RG-Fe~s 366-aRe-366A~--IE-EBe-faeiliey-ie-aee-aaefeee-ee-§-§9T+3-ef-eais ekapeer,-eae Each licensee shall aee-ase-eaese-feF1Bs-hae-saall prepare the written report in letter format unless the event is of such nature that NRC Forms 366 and 366A are submitted under
§ 50.73 of this chapter.
In either case the report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.
(e)
Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also reportable in accordance with§§ 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.
4.
A new Appendix G is added to read as follows:
Appendix G - Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR §73.7l(b) and (c),
licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall report or record, as appro-priate, the following safeguards events.
I.
EveRcS-ce-ee-~epeFcee-wicaiR-eRe-ae~-ef-aiseeveFy7-fellewee Upon discovery and establishment of a reasonable belief that the event poses a credible threat to the facility, the following events must be reported within one hour of detec-tion, followed by a written report within thirty days.
(a)
Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to connnit or cause:
(1)
A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear mater-ial; or (2)
SigH.i:fieaRe Intentional physical damage to any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possessesr~eP, whereby the public health and safety could be endangered by exposure to radiation; (3)
+/-Ree~Fl:lpeieR-ef-Re'PIB.a+/--epe~acieR-e~ Malicious tampering with a licensed nuclear power reactor eRPeHga-cae aBaacaeFiaee-ase-ef-eF-eampe~iag-wica or its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.
(b)
Any discovered failure of a safeguards system eP-ais-eevePee-ReRi1iRe~eRc-va.+/-ReFaeilicy-ia-a-syecem-eaae-eeH+/-a-allew 1:IBaacaePiaea-e~-aReeeeecea which persists without proper compensa-tion 10 minutes after establishment of a reasonable belief that it
-could be exploited by unauthorized personnel to gain undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport~T-EeF-wk!ek-pFepeP-eempea-aaeeey-measaFes-aave-ReE-eeea-esEae+/-iskea.--A-Up~epeF-eempeasaeeey measaFeu "Proper compensation" for a particular safeguards event as used in this Appendix meaH.s-a-measlll!e includes but is not limited to measures that is are specified in a security or contin-gency plan or security procedure.
IE-Eae-paFE!ett+/-aP-saiegaa_Fa~
eveRe-is-aeE-eeseFihea-!R-a-p+/-aR-eF-pFeeeaaFeT-~aea-a-UpFepeF eempeRsaEeey-measapeU-meaas-a-measttFe-i:.Hq)+/-emeaeee-wiekia-19 m!Rttees-e¥-aa-eveae~s-a!~eeveey-Ekae-p~eviees-a-+/-eve+/--e¥-seeaF!ey easeaeia+/-+/-y-e~ttiva+/-eRe-ee-Ekae-exiseiag-heieFe-ehe-eveRe.
(c)
Any ttaaaekePisea discovered entries of unauthorized persons through a-Fe~ai~ee-haFF!eF any required physical barrier as defined in §73.2 of this part. ~WH.eeaeP-e~-Ree-ehe-eveae-is pFepe~+/-y-eempeasa~ea
II.
Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . aRe-saemieEee-ia EfHaFeeF+/-y-leg.
(a)
Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulner-ability in a system that could a+/-+/-ew-l:lB.aaEaeFi2ea-eF be exploited by unauthorized personnel to gain undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have been estab-lished.
~e --ABy-eehe~-fai+/-aFe-ei-a-safegaaFaa-syaeem-aee-iRe+/-aaea-iR pa~agPapk-II.~a -ef-eki:s-appeaeix-ii-eke-iai+/-aPe-aegFaees-eke efieeeiveaesa-ei-Eke-syseem.
Two North Ninth Street
Allentown, PA 18101
215 / 770-5151 Harold W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 215/770-7502 DEC o 4 1985 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES CHANGES TO SAFEGUARDS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ER ~P0450 FILE 841-11 PLA-2559
Dear Mr. Chilk:
DOUi[T['
uSNRc '
as DEC -9 All :04 Docket Nos. 50-387 50-388 Pennsylvania Power and Light Company has the following comments on the proposed rules concerning changes to safeguards reporting requirements (50FR34708).
1.
The proposed 10CFR73.71(c)(2) requires that each licensee submit its safeguards event log to NRC quarterly. It is PP&L's experience that under the existing rule, most events at nuclear power plants require only that they be logged.
These logs are available for review by NRC and are periodically examined by regional inspectors.
One of NRC's professed goals for the proposed rule is to eliminate unnecessary reporting.
By requiring submittal of the log, NRC is increasing the reporting requirements.
Over the past three years. this would have required twelve reports as opposed to none for PP&L under the existing rules. It is PP&L's belief that this additional reporting will simply result in a huge collection of data by NRC involving events of the lowest significance. It is not likely that this new reporting requirement will result in substantial, additional protection to public health and safety at power facilities.
Refer to 10CFRS0.109.
If this proposed requirement is deleted or revised in the final version, corresponding revisions to the proposed 10CFR73.71(d) and Appendix G, Paragraph II, should be made.
2.
The proposed Appendix G, Paragraph I(A) requires a one-hour report when a person has caused significant physical damage to a facility or has caused interruption of normal operation of a nuclear power plant through unauthorized use of or tampering with components, controls, etc.
PP&L believes that this should be clearly limited to cases where the licensee believes that this was intentional.
An individual, through personnel error, can cause damage to a facility.
Similarly, through personnel error, an individual can inadvertently perform an unauthorized evolution as part of an evolution which is authorized.
Any reactor trip or shutdown required by Technical Specifications is already reportable pursuant to
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D£C O 4 1985 Page 2 SSES PLA-2559 ER 100450 File 841-11 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.
Therefore, PP&L suggests that the proposed Appendix G, Paragraph I(A) be revised as follows:
"Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has intentionally committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause: ** * "
3.
The proposed Appendix G, Paragraph I(c) requires prompt reporting of "Any unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is properly compensated.)"
Based on our review of the recently proposed revision to Regulatory Guide 5.62, PP&L believes that NRC intends to exclude cases involving entry by authorized personnel via unauthorized means such as tailgating. This should be clarified in the final rule.
PP&L suggests the following:
"Any unauthorized entries through a required barrier by unauthorized personnel (whether or not the event is properly compensated)."
4.
The proposed Appendix G, Paragraph II(b) requires that the licensee log any miscellaneous failure of a safeguards system which degrades the effectiveness of the system.
PP&L believes that this is too prescriptive and could result in substantial disagreements between licensees and inspectors over what constitutes degradation.
A threshold needs to be established similar to those in 10CFR50.72 and 50.73 where jud~ement ey licensees is permitted in determining "serious degradation", "significant compromises to plant safety", "events which significantly hamper site personnel", and "major loss of emergency assessment capability."
Therefore, PP&L suggests the following:
"Any other failure of a safeguards system not included in para8-i:aph II.(a) of this appendix if the failure significantly degrades the effectiveness of the system."
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the proposed rules.
Very truly yours,
~~
H. W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations cc:
Ms. M. J. Campagnone Mr. R.H. Jacobs USNRC USNRC
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VIROINIA ELECTRIC AND PowER CoMPA Y RICHMOND, VIROINJA 23 1([-:Tf' U'. RC W. L. STBWABT V I CE PBE S I D ENT NUCLEAR 0P E BATION8 December 3' rs,s DEC -9 All :Q9 Mr. Samual J. Chilk Secretary to the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn:
Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION COMMENTS ON THE NRG PROPOSED CHANGES TO SAFEGUARDS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Serial No.
'tFFtf.I-,_O.- :., 0/ JBL: acm flOCl'\\t.. I 11 J,.
!3HANt,;mocket Nos.
License Nos.85-742 50-280 50-281 50-338 50-339 DPR-32 DPR-37 NPF-4 NPF-7 Virginia Electric and Power Company is pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the proposed changes to the safeguards reporting requirements.
In general, we believe the proposed _ changes improve the intent and clarification of the rule.
However the changes may increase the telephonic and written reports but should pose no security hardship or difficulties.
Enclosed as an attachment to this letter is a summary of the proposed changes and our specific comments.
If further clarification is needed please contact us.
Very truly yours, W. L. Stewart Attachment cc:
Mr. Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Licensing Dr. J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Region II Acknowl d d by
U.S. NUCL~A r DOCK:TI. *r:;
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ATTACHMENT Comments on the NRC Proposed Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements
Comments on the NRC Proposed Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements 10 CFR 70.52 and 72.52 The NRC has clarified these sections of the regulations by defining "report immediately" as "notify... within one hour after discovery", by describing the method of notification, and by stating that "reports required under 73. 71 need not be duplicated under the requirements of this section.
10 CFR 73.67 Section 73.67(e)(3)(vii) has been clarified by defining immediately" as "notify... within one hour after the discovery".
has also better defined the reporting requirements of 73.67(g)(3)(iii).
10 CFR 73. 71 "notify The NRC section Section 73.71(a) has been rewritten to specify a telephonic notification within one hour after discovery of loss of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and within one hour after recovery or accountability for such lost shipment.
The written report is to be submitted within 30 days rather than 15 days from initial notification.
Significant supplemental information must be telephonically communicated to the NRC and then a revised written report must be submitted. The updated or revised report must be a complete entity and not contain only supplementary or revised information.
Section 73.71(b) has been rewritten to specify notification "within one hour of discovery of the safeguards events" and submission of the written report in 30 days; essentially the same as section 73.71(a).
Section 73.7l(c) and the tabl e, Reporting of Physical Security Events, have been completely revised. A log of certain safeguard events shall be maintained.
The events are to be recorded on the log within twenty-four (24) hours of discovery and submitted to the NRC every three months.
The distinction between an explicit and a potential threat has been removed for clarity.
Categories of major and moderate losses have been eliminated from this section and the t wenty-four (24) hour telephonic notification and follow-up written report requirements have been deleted.
A summary of reporting requirements and categories of safeguard events have been added in a new Appendix G to this section.
10 CFR 7 3, Appendix G Appendix G provides the licensee with a summary of the reporting requirements found in Part 73. Paragraph I. describes events that must be reported within one hour of discovery and followed by a written report
within thirty days, and paragraph II. describes those events that must be recorded in the log within (24) hours and submitted quarterly.
The verbage used in the definition of "properly compensated" has been changed to read in part "measures impl emented within 10 minutes of an event's discovery",
rather than "within 10 minutes of an event's occurrence.
11 This change should reduce the number of "one hour reportable events."
In section I. (c) of Appendix G, the reporting of "any unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is properly compensated)" could be burdensome.
The reasoning behind reporting all such events is questionable, especially within one hour when it is properly compensated for. What constitutes an unauthorized entry remains open for interpretation and should be further clarified.
10 CFR 74.11 The changes proposed to section 74.11 are essentially the same as the changes to sections 70.52 and 72.52.
Regulatory Guide 5.62, Rev. 1 The following comments or questions refer to the one-hour telephonic notification followed by a written report within (30) days.
o "Tailgating" by persons into areas to which they are not authorized access is classified as one hour reportable if purposefully attempted or confirmed.
The word "purposefully" is left open for interpretation and should be further clarified.
o Discovery of actual or attempted introduction into, or possession of incendiary devices within the PA are to be reported within one hour We routinely remove "highway flares" (incendiary) from vehicles during searches prior to entry. Flexibility in reporting these events to take into consideration if it was an innocent or intentional act is needed.
o Discovery of intentionally falsified identification badges or key cards are one-hour reportable.
The word "intentional" still requires clarification.
o Compromise of Safeguards Information (including loss or theft) that would significantly assist a person in an act of sabotage is left open for interpretation.
o A member of the Security Force found asleep on post is reportable in one hour.
Does this apply to any and all posts regardless of their safeguards significance?
The majority of the examples given for safeguard events that are to be logged for quarterly submittal, are of no safeguards significance and in most cases is so stated.
Events of the type described are already
documented in our on-site records and are routinely reviewed by NRC Security Inspectors. Redundant documentation would be an administrative burden.
MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT Ub u BULE PR-7d, 7Z ~/.
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142 DELARDNDE STREET 4" "7 F>.O BOX BOOB NEW 'SS'EW-~A.
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(504]3B8-234!5 November 25, 1985 liff l * "' ;;t c.
ooc\\,t,'1NG &. SEr< 'J1 Rt..NCH W3P85-3172 3-Al.01.04 A4.05 NQA Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Dear Sir:
Louisiana Power & Light Comments on Proposed Rule Changes in Safeguards Reporting Requirements, 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73 and 74 Louisiana Power & Light Company is pleased to provide for your consideration the following comments with respect to the above reference.
In regard to:
10 CFR 73. 71 Section (C)(l) Reporting of events within the Safeguards System
1)
Recorded in "24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months " may in some instances prove too restrictive.
We recommend a minimum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to allow adequate time for management review.
Section (C)(2) Submitting of safeguard event log to the NRC
1) It is our feeling that a log submitted without full explanations, as proposed, could result in misunder-standings about events.
Clearing up these misunder-standings would be costly in manpower and other resources to both the licensee and the NRC.
Therefore we recommend that the log remain on file with the licensee and made available for audit by the NRC Resident Inspector and Region Security Inspectors.
A k'nowl.
b DEC O 4 1 5 f Gerd.***************
U.S. NUCLF" DOCKE.
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Secretary of the Connnission W3P85-3172 Page 2 10 CFR 73 Appendix G Section l(b) Failure of safeguards system
1)
"Safeguards system" as stated is not defined within the code of Federal Regulations.
However, it is defined in a draft Regulatory Guide but the definition provided is too encompassing.
2)
The words "could allow" unauthorized or undetected access with respect to safeguards systems, as defined in the Regulatory Guide, requires a judgement determination.
Existing regulation, 10 CFR 73.71 footnote 2 of Table 1, states "security features break down without proper compensation allowing unauthorized or undetected" access.
This approach is clear and can be better understood and enforced by both the licensee and the NRC.
Section l(c) Unauthorized entrees through a required barrier
1)
The implication of "Any" unauthorized entries through a required barrier is too broad.
This would include procedural errors by badged employees which would result in a one hour reporting requirement.
We suggest that these are administrative problems and reconnnend that they be handled by the licensee.
Section II Description of events
1)
Same connnents as stated under 10 CFR 73.71(c)(l)
Section II(a)
1)
Same connnents as stated under 10 CFR 73 Appendix G, Section I(b).
In closing we are in agreement with 10 CFR Parts 70, 72 and 74 as proposed.
Yours very truly,
~(M_
K.W. Cook KWC/MEP/pcl cc:
G.W. Knighton, B.W. Churchill, W.M. Stevenson, R.D. Martin, J. Wilson, NRC Resident Inspector's Office (W-3)
Mailing Addres~
Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 783-6090 R. P. McDonald Senior Vice President Flintridge Building Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secret ary of the Commission November 27, 1985 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch GJ(.K[~fJI USNHC Alabama Power DEC
.,..he SOU[hern eteCl
-.:, A11 :02 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Alabama Power Company Comments on Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements
Dear Mr. Chil k:
In response to the Federal Register Notice (50FR166) dated Tuesday, August 27, 1985, Alabama Power Company hereby provides comments on the Proposed Rule Change to modify Safeguards Reporting Requirements.
Alabama Power Company supports the NRC efforts to coordinate reporting requirements for reactor licensees and concurs with the NRC that this proposed rule should "ensure that a 11 events requiring immediate NRC response wi 11 be reported within one hour and those pertinent to NRC analysis activities will be logged for quarterly submittal 11 The proposed Appendix G criteria, however, appear to be inconsistent with t he NRC intent of requiring significant or potentially significant events to be reported within one hour or logged for quarterly reporting.
Specifically, for events which are to be reported within one hour,Section I(b) of the proposed Appendix G of 10CFR73 requires the reporting of "any failure of a safeguards system or discovered noni nherent vulnerability in a system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or trans port for which proper compensatory measures have not been established.
11 Alabama Power Company recommends that the term "controlled access area" be stricken from this part. A literal interpretation of the term could possibly include all non-vital equipment, systems and structures located in the owner controlled area; e.g., Turbine Building, Cooling Towers, Fire Acknowfi
U.S. NUC1 DOC!-' T 0
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 27, 1985 Page 2 Protection Pump House, Security Building, Computer Building and Service Building.
It could also be interpreted to include equipment rooms and systems in the Auxiliary Building which are delineated in the Security Plan and are administratively controlled by locking, alarming and securing to limit routine access to only shift operations personnel.
No i1T111ediate NRC response is necessary for a fai lure of a safeguards system in non-vital areas such as those identified above whether proper compensatory measures are established or not; particularly, if there is no apparent intentional threat of theft of special nuclear material or threat of radiological sabotage.
Additionally,Section I(c) of the proposed Appendix G of 10CFR73 requires the reporting of "unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is properly compensated)."
No immediate NRC response is necessary for unauthorized entries through a required barrier if there is no apparent intentional threat of theft of special nuclear material or threat of radiological sabotage. Certainly, events which are properly compensated do not require "illlllediate NRC response". Examples of unauthorized entries which should not require one hour notification to the NRC are those in which authorized persons in possession of a valid security badge and a key card or mechanical key fail to comply with a security procedure that has no adverse effect on vital plant systems or the safe operation of the plant. This failure could be the badged individual failing to notify Security prior to entering or exiting an alarmed security door,
'tailgating' through a barrier portal that is supervised by a card reader, or simply forgetting to keep their security badge in their possession. Such events would be better handled administratively with Plant Security Incident Reports which are available for on-site review by NRC Inspectors. Alabama Power Company therefore recommends that paragraph I(c) be revised to read as follows:
"Any unauthorized entries through a required barrier in which there is reason to believe that an attempted theft or act of sabotage is involved."
Additionally, for events which are to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and submitted in a quarterly log report,Section II(a) of the proposed Appendix G of 10CFR73 requires logging and reporting of "any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulnerability in a system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have been established."
Alabama Power Company recommends that the requirement to report any failure of a safeguards system should be limited to those failures that are caused by a security related event. A failure caused by a temporary loss of power, acci dental damage or minor component malfunction, which has been properly compensated, should not be reportable.
The term "controlled access area" should be stricken for the reasons stated previously. Records could be maintained for all safeguards system failures and would be available for on-site review by NRC Inspectors.
Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 27, 1985 Page 3 Finally,Section II(b) of the proposed Appendix G of 10CFR73 requires logging and reporting of "any other failure of a safeguards system not included in paragraph II(a)" if the failure degrades the system.
Alabama Power Company reconvnends that the temporary failure of any safeguards system, the cause of which is not security related, has been properly compensated, and does not degrade the effectiveness of a safeguards system, should not be required to be reportable. This reconvnendation is based upon such an event not degrading the effectiveness of the safeguards system.
Records could be maintained for all safeguards system failures and would be available for on-site review by NRC Inspectors.
If there are any questions, please advise
RPM/CJS:ddb-D33 cc:
Mr. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford R. P. McDonald
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'85 OEC -2 A10 :49 Florida Power C ORPORA TI ON November 26, 198.5 3F118.5-26 Secretary of the Commission Attention: Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20.5.5.5
Subject:
Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No *.50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements as Published in the Federal Register Volume.50, Number 166, Page 34706
Dear Sir:
Florida Power Corporation (FPC) offers the following comments on the proposed changes to the Safeguards Reporting Requirements.
As a general comment, the conclusion drawn in the "Summary" that "the elimination of unnecessary reporting * *
will result in significant savings for affected licensees *** " apparently overlooks the increased burdens placed on licensees by the proposed rule. At this point, a "best guess" would say licensees may "break even" on cost of implementation of the proposed rule.
10CFR73 Appendix G I.
FPC recognizes a need for changing the safeguards event reporting requirements, but disagrees with the requirement of Appendix G to report events "within one hour of discovery". In the notice of proposed rulemaking, there is acknowledgment of the problems associated with insufficient reporting deadlines following safeguard events, and the need to "allow the licensee's staff more time during the critical period immediately following such occurrence to devote to the resolution of the problem itself". It is our recommendation that the time interval for initial reporting of an event be increased to at least four (4) hours.
The reason for this recommendation is primarily to provide licensees sufficient time after discovery of the event to:
1)
Establish immediate compensatory safeguard measures, Acknowl by r,j QE_q ? ~.'.~~5 pd GENERAL OFFICE 3201 Thirty-fourth Street South
P.0. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733
813-888-5151
U.S. NUCLE.t o ri r 1, T OOCKETI 1r. "
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November 26, 1985 3F1185-26 Page 2 I.(a)(3)
II.
2)
Determine the facts surrounding the event,
3)
Evaluate the seriousness of the event and adequacy of initial compensatory measures, and
4)
Provide an accurate report of the event.
An insufficient reporting deadline (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ), would potentially defeat the indicated purpose of the rule change, which is to improve the quality of the information provided to the NRC.
It is the licensee's responsibility to provide security at the facility; there is nothing the NRC can do in the period of a few hours immediately following an event to enhance the licensee's response. It is more important to expend licensee resources on assuring security events are properly understood and compensated immediately upon discovery, than to expend those same resources on assembling a report to the NRC that would be sketchy at best. Both better security and better information would be provided by extending the reporting deadline to at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .
This section could be made to more specifically address industrial/radiological sabotage related events. This may be accomplished by inserting the word "deliberate" between "the" and "unauthorized" such that the phrase would read: "Interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the deliberate unauthorized use *** system."
The requirement for completion and submission of quarterly logs is an addition of administrative work and not in step with "* ** the elimination of unnecessary reporting *** " as stated in the Summary. It appears the items identified as being required entries on this log are already being documented by FPC as they are corrected. Therefore, the quarterly log would be an additional record that must be produced for the convenience of the NRC.
In addition, this log is to be submitted to the NRC for use in a "data analysis system which will provide feedback to the industry". Within the ideology of 10 CFR Part 170, the cost of this feedback would have to be paid by the licensee. FPC does not believe the benefits achieved by the "feedback" from the NRC could be justified by the additional costs and added reporting burdens.
7t?.~
G. R. Westafer Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management DVH/feb
OStO RUL RPR-7b, 7.tj;fl * ~
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Noveber 21, 1985 Secretary of the co-ission Attention:
Docketing and Service US Nuclear Regulatory Coission Washington, DC 20555 OOJ~ 1cNorthem States Power Company 414 Nicollei Mall 2Mi~~i. Minnesota 55401
ss OEC -
Tel~n'orie (612) 330-5500 Branch Coents on Proposed NRC Rule Published in federal Register on August 27, 1985, Safeguards Reporting Requirements 10 ClR Parts 70. 72. 73. and 74 Northern States Power Copany appreciates the oppor-tunity to provide co-ents related to the proposed change to safeguards reporting requireents publis-hed in the Federal Register on August 27, 1985.
We welcoe the proposed rule changes and support them.
We have the following inor comments to of-fer, however :
Section 73.7l(c)(2)
The requirement to subit to the NRC every three months copies of all safeguards event log entries not previously submitted would appear to be an unnecessary administrative burden *
. We propose that this section be chan-ged to specify availability of the safeguards event log to the NRC Resident Inspector and other NRC inspectors involved in regular safe-guards inspections.
If this is not accept-able, perhaps an annual sub ittal of log entries could be substituted.
Appendix G.Section I(a)
This section is highly interpretive in nature.
The ter "credible threat" may be difficult in practice to define.
The l i censee and NRC could easily differ on whether or not a threat is credible.
Secretary of the co-ission November 21, 1985 Page 2 Northern States Power Company Wording used in item (3) related to "interrup-tion of normal operations" covers a broad spectrum as does the phrase "machinery, compo-nents or controls." It may be construed that vandalism to non-nuclear equipment or struc-tures on the plant site could require repor-ting.
This would not be consistent with the intent of the rule change.
Appendix G.Section I, Item Cc)
This ite may be interpreted to apply to failures of administrative controls such as visitor escorting and tailgating through doors.
If a security force member posted by an open barrier observes an un~adged individ-ual momentarily enter the protected area, would a one-hour report be necessary?
Some further clarification may be necessary to eliminate reporting of trivial matters.
Appendix G1 Section II This section is very general and subject to interpretation.
The NRC Staff could be forced into an overly broad interpretation of this section, resulting in increased reporting of trivial matters.
This would defeat the purpose of the rule change.
Please contact us if you have any questions related to the comments we have provided.
~
. 0 ~.J.---R David Musolf
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Manager -
Nuclear Support Services c:
NRC Regional Administrator - III NRC Resident Inspector - Monticello NRC Resident Inspector - Prairie Island NRC NRR Project Manager - Monticello NRC NRR Project Manager - Prairie Island G Charnoff
Nuclear GPU Nuclear 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 201 263-6500
as NOV 29 P 2 :46 TELEX 136-482 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the ColTITlission OF 0
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ColTITlission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Chilk:
,t M,
,,_, <'c SE. ~Vlf 3RANCH 201 /299-2272 November 22, 1985
Subject:
Request for Conwnents on Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements (10CFR70, 72, 73 and 74)
The staff of GPU Nuclear Corporation herewith submits colTITlents on the subject proposed rule.
Co1T111ents were requested in a August 27, 1985 Federal Register notice (50FR34708).
We believe the proposed rule, especial ly the changes to 10CFR73.71, provides licensees with needed flexibility in the area of safeguards reporting. Of particular importance is the clarification that provides for one hour reporting after "discovery" rather than after occurrence." Therefore, we favor this proposed rule.
RPJ:jh:2644f GPU Nuclear is a part of the Genera Sincerely, yMf~
J. R. Thorpe Director Licensing & Regulatory Affairs S st m f
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.. p November 21, 1985 Secretary of the Commission Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch US Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Northern States Power Company
, CLr CiG 4 4 t;f~tl.Jti£Mall Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401 Telephone (612) 330-5500
'85 NO~ 25 P\\2 :59 Comments on Proposed NRC Rule Published in Federal Register on August 27, 1985, Safeguards Reporting Requirements 10 CFR Parts 70. 72 1 73. and 74 Northern States Power Company appreciates the oppor-tunity to provide comments related to the proposed change to safeguards reporting requirements publis-hed in the Federal Register on August 27, 1985.
We welcome the proposed rule changes and support them.
We have the following minor comments to of-fer, however:
Section 73.7l(c)(2)
I The requirement to submit to the NRC every three months copies of al l safeguards event log entries not previously submitted would appear to be an unnecessary administrative burden.
We propose that this section be chan-ged to specify availability of the safeguards event log to the NRC Resident Inspector and other NRC inspectors involved in regular safe-guards inspections.
If this is not accept-able, perhaps an annual submittal of log entries could be substituted.
Appendix G, Section I{a)
This section is highly interpretive in nature.
The term "credible threat" may be difficult in practice to define.
The licensee and NRC could easily differ on whether or not a threat is credible.
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Secretary of the Commission November 21, 1985 Page 2 Northern States Power Company Wording used in item (3) related to "interrup-tion of normal operations" covers a broad spectrum as does the phrase "machinery, compo-nents or controls."
It may be construed that vandalism to non-nuclear equipment or struc-tures on the plant site could require repor-ting.
This would not be consistent with the intent of the rule change.
Appendix G,Section I. Item (c)
This item may be interpreted to apply to failures of administrative controls such as visitor escorting and tailgating through doors.
If a security force member posted by an open barrier observes an unbadged individ-ual momentarily enter the protected area, would a one-hour report be necessary?
Some further clarification may be necessary to eliminate reporting of trivial matters.
Appendix G,Section II This section is very general and subject to interpretation.
The NRC Staff could be forced into an overly broad interpretation of this section, resulting in increased reporting of trivial matters.
This would defeat the purpose of the rule change.
Please contact us if you have any questions related to the comments we have provided.
~
. 0 ~-.-9---R David Musolf
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Manager -
Nuclear Support Services c:
NRC Regional Administrator - III NRC Resident Inspector - Monticello NRC Resident Inspector - Prairie Island NRC NRR Project Manager - Monticello NRC NRR Project Manager - Prairie Island G Charnoff
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74 Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements AGENCY:
Nuclear Regulatory Co11111ission.-
ACTION:
Proposed rule: Extension of comment period.
[ 7590-01]
SUMMARY
On August 27, 1985 (50 FR 34708), the NRC published for public co11111ent amendments to its regulations for the reporting of safeguards events.
The proposed rule would clarify the reporting requirements for NRC licensees and would improve the NRC safeguards event data base by requiring more uniform safeguards event reports.
The comment period for this proposed rule was to have expired on November 27, 1985.
Since the supporting guidance for the rule was not available for licensee inspection for more than 60 days into the rule's 90-clay public comment period, the NRC has decided to extend the public comment period for the rule to coincide with that of its supporting guidance.
The extended comment period now expires on December 31, 1985.
DATES:
The co11111ent period has been extended and now expires on December 31, 1985.
Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received before this date.
7590-01 ADDRESSES:
Send written comments or suggestions to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.
Comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Joseph Yardumian (301) 427-4753, or Priscilla A. Dwyer, {_301) 427-4773, Safeguards Reactor Regulatory Requirements Section, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regul atory Cormnission, Washington, DC 20555.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, thi's -..a.\\& ___ day of November, 1985.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
J k W. Roe, Acting x cutive Director for Operations
' I DJUff f[r, GSNRC.
CHARLES CENTER* P.O. BOX 1475
BALTIMORE, MARYLA~
21Jl9J 12 p 1 :21 NORMAN J. BOWMAKER VICE PRESIDENT GENERAL SERVICES November 8, 1985 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
Attention:
Docketing & Service Branch Gentlemen :
Re:
Request for Extension of Comment Period for 10CFR 73. 71; Safeguards Reporting Requirements On August 27, 1985 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published the subj ect rule in the Federal Register.
Public comment has been solicited and is due November 27, 1985.
On November 1, 1985 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published the associated draft guide SG-9O1-4 for comments which are due December 8, 1985.
The purpose of the Draft Regulatory Guide is to clarify the requirements of the proposed rule.
Because of this, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company requests that the comment period for 10CFR 73.71 be extended to December 31, 1985, the same date the comments are due for Draft Regulatory Guide SG-9O1-4.
Extending the comment period will allow us to better evaluate the rule based on the guidance proposed by the commission and also allow us to combine and submit the comments together, thereby making it easie*r for the NRC to reference and review.
Sincerely,
General Services NJB/jm
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bee :
Messrs.
A. E. Lundvall, Vice President, Supply J. A. Tiernan, Vice President, Engineering & Construction G. V. Bresnick, Manager, Real Estate and Office Services R. M. Douglass, Manager, Quality Assurance W. J. Lippold, Manager, Nuclear Power D. W. Latham, Director, Security Services L. B. Russell, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear Power L. P. Gibbs, General Supervisor, Calvert Cliffs Security Operations R. C. L. Olson, Principal Engineer, Electric Engineering M. J. Miernicki, Principal Engineer, Nuclear Power J. P. Bennett, Legal Department File No. 14-12-001 14-13-003
A consumers Power comP.any JOIIIIS.,
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General Offices:
1945 West Parnell Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-1636 November 5, 1985 Mr Samuel J Chilk Secretary of the Commission US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Kenneth W Berry Director Nuclear Licensing Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch Consumers Power Company appreciates this opportunity to comment on the propos-ed changes to the safeguards reporting requirements (10CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74) that were published on August 27, 1985 (50 Federal Register 34710).
As a member of the Physical Security Coordinating Group, Consumers Power Company endorses the position taken by the Group with regard to the proposed rules.
The additional comments provided below have been provided by Consumers Power personnel that are responsible for the physical security at our operat-ing nuclear power plants and are specific to Consumers Power Company.
Proposed Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements Comment No. 1 -
10CFR 73.7l(c)(2)
Requiring all security log entries to be reported each quarter will signifi-cantly increase the cost of implementation without providing a concomitant increase in the level of security at the plant or in the level of protection to the health and safety of the public.
Since the events described is this paragraph are of a relative minor nature, all truly significant events having been reported, it should suffice to have the safeguards log book available for inspection at the plant.
Comment No. 2 -
10CFR 73.71 Appendix G I(a)(3)
What constitutes "Interruption of normal operation" is vague and would allow.
subjective interpretation by an inspector.
OC1085-0069S-NL01 NOV* 7 1g95 Acknowl~ by;an:f.. *************'nfll-
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Comment No. 3 -
10CFR 73.71 Appendix G I(b)
It is difficult to determine from the wording of this paragraph if an incident for which proper compensatory measures have been taken is or is not report-able.
Comment No. 4 -
10CFR 73.71 Appendix G II(b)
As written this paragraph would require any safeguards event, no matter how insignificant, to be recorded.
A literal interpretation of this paragraph will result in a substantial increase in the number of logged events and will leave licensees open to NRC enforcement action for relatively minor problems
General Comment Although Regulatory Guide 5.62, Revision 1, was not included in this package for review, we wish to provide these additional comments since this Guide will be used by inspectors in assessing the licensee's level of compliance with the proposed rule.
The list of one hour reportable events provided in Revision 1 of Reg. Guide 5.62 has more than doubled from the number of reportable events listed in Revision Oto the Reg. Guide.
In addition, the statement that "this list should not be considered all-inclusive" has been added to Revision 2 of the Reg. Guide.
Thus the wording of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 5.62 seems to be contrary to the stated purpose for revision of this regulation, ie, (1) lessen the workload for the NRC and licensees by reducing the number of reportable events, and (2) provide clarification of the events required to be reported.
Consumers Power Company agrees with the NRC concerning the need to clarify the reporting requirements for safeguards events.
Accordingly, the preceding comments have been provided in the interest of achieving this objective.
Kenneth W Berry Director, Nuclear Licensing OC1085-0069S-NL01
S HAW, P ITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTN E RSH IP O F PROF ESS IO N A L CORPORATIONS 1800 M STREET, N. W.
WASH I NGTON, D. C. 20036 T E LEC O P I ER 12021 822-1099 & 822-1199 T E LEX 89-2693 ISHAWLA W W SH I C ABLE " SHAWLA W "
JAY E. S IL BERG, P.C.
Secretary of the Commission
u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 November 4, 1985 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch Re:
Pr oposed Rule on Changes to T E LEPHON E 12021 822-1063 Safeguards Reporting Requirements -
Request for Extension of Comment Period Gentlemen:
On behalf of the Physical Security Coordinating Group, we respectfully request that the Commission extend the comment period on the proposed rule to amend the NRC's regulations for reporting safeguards events.
The Physical Security Coordinating Group is composed of 26 electric utilities who own and operate nuclear power reactors.
A list of the utility members is attached hereto.
The Commission ' s August 27, 1985 notice of proposed rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 34708, included a new description of the safeguards events to be reported.
Proposed App. G to 10 CFR § 73.71.
Although different from the current description of reportable events in 10 CFR § 73.71 (Table), the proposed Appendix G is quite vague.
We understand that the NRC Staff will shortly publish for comment a draft Regulatory Guide (5.62, Rev. 1) which will set forth an approach acceptable to the NRC Staff for complying with the proposed rule.
The Regulatory Guide should provide a more specific understanding of the provisions of the proposed rule.
q
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & T ROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS November 4, 1985 Page 2 Because it will be difficult, if not impossible, to adequately comment on the proposed rule apart from the Regulatory Guide, we would request that the comment period on the proposed rule be extended to coincide with the comment period on the draft Regulatory Guide.
Commenting on the proposed rule without the benefit of the Staff's interpretation of that rule would deprive affected utilities of an adequate opportunity to submit comments.
Thank you for your consideration
JES:L Attachment
PHYSICAL SECtmITY COORDINATING GROUP Arizona Public Service Colllpany Baltimore Gas i Electric Co.
Carolina Power & Light Co.
Commom,ealt:h Edison Co.
r.onsolidated Edison Co.
Consumers Power Co.
Duke Power Company Duquesne Light Co.
Florida Power & Light Co.
Nebraska Public Power Diatrict Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
Northeast Utilities Service Co
Horthern States Power Coapany OUba Public Power Ditrict Pacific Ga*, Electric Co.
Pennsylvania Power, Light Co.
Portland General Electric Co.
Public Service Co. of 5.il.
Public Service Electric, Gas Co.
Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
Sacramento ltmicipal Utility Diatrict Southern california Edison Co.
Toledo Edison Co.
Wisconsin Electric Power Ccapany Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Yankee Atomic Electric Co.
Secretary of the Commission U.S.Nuclear ~egulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555 -
Dear Mr. Secretary,
M. I. LE 6504 BRADF PHILA., PA Please accept these comments on 10 CFR 70,72,i3, and 74.
hat this rule is talking about is bomb material. Extending the reporting period to JO days could just assure that the perpetrator would have enough time to convert th material to a bomb.
Rathertha.n the peport causing essential personnel to take time off from the business of recovering the material, the report should be considered a JDUs means to aide in tracing the material. What might be better is.a -prl:'li."nary rep rt, whi h is s rtcf an immediate alertir,£; document and then a full rel)Ort to follow. Also leauing reporting go for thirty days is an invitation to the licensee to cover up the violations that ed to th shortage.
I am trying to say that the changes look stupid and counterproductive.
If you cannot explain a good r eason for them, drop the changes.
Very truly yours,
(__
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PHILA., PA. 19149 Ackn
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DOCKETING & ~~"!r~ (;VTl0"4 OFFI -~
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NUCLEAR FUEL MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
P.O. BOX 780
WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA 28402 October 15, 1985 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch
<:::,'-\\
~oC
Subject:
COMMENTS TO PROPOSED NRC RULE FOR CHANGES TO SAFEGUARDS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Reference:
Federal Register, Vol. 50, No. 166, Tuesday, August 27, 1985 In response to the NRC's invitation for comments to the above referenced proposed rule, General Electric Company submits the following:
1.
General Electric Company's Physical Security Plan (PSP) for the Wilmington, N.C. LEU fuel fabrication plant was developed pursuant to 10 CFR 73.67 and approved by the NRC on 11/4/81.
The PSP specifically identifies the reporting requirements for shipments that have not reached their destination by the estimated time of arrival.
The requirements of this plan were the result of thorough review by the NRC and were determined to be appropriate for our operations.
They have worked well during implementation.
Based on this experience, General Electric requests that requirements for 10 CFR 73.67 facilities not be changed since changes produce no benefit but would result in added costs.
2.
Revised sections 73.67 and 73.71 use the words "lost" and "unaccounted for" in relation to shipments.
However, it is unclear what the distinction between these two words are within the context of the requirement.
Possibly, a shipment that has not arrived at its destination by the ETA is unaccounted for until such time as the required investigation is completed and establishes that it is either lost or accounted for.
Because of the opportunity for mul tiple interpretations, General Electric requests that the terms "lost" and "unaccounted for" be defined.
S. NUClEA~ p~r., 'l T0 v COMMISSIOH DOC f C
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. GEN,ERAL. ELECTRIC Secretary of the Commission October 15, 1985 Page 2
3.
Revised section 7 3. 71 ( a) ( 1) states that "Each 1 icensee subject to the provisions of 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall. ** "
Revised section 73.71(b)(1) states that "Each licensee subject to the provisions of 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60 and 73.67 shall *** "
General Electric interprets the use of "or" in 73.71(a)(1) to mean that the requirement applies to licensees subject to any one of these sections but not necessarily all of them.
General Electric interprets the use of "and" in 73.71(b)(1) to mean that the requirement only applies to licensees subject to all of these sections.
If these interpretations are not correct, General Electric requests a public re-notification of the NRC intended meaning and an added time for public comment since interpretations other than that applied by General Electric have a significant bearing on our comments and the applications of the rule.
4.
In revised section 73.71(a)(1), line six, the word "spend" should be "spent".
I hope these comments will be useful to you.
If you have any questions or would like to discuss these comments further, please contact me.
Sincerely, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
~~Q~~~--
R. H. D. Foleck, Sr. Specialist Licensing Engineering
/ sbm
,I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74 Changes to Safeguards Reporting Requirements AGENCY:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:
Proposed rule.
[7590-01]
SUMMARY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to amend its regula-tions for the reporting of safeguards events.
The proposed rule would clarify the reporting requirements for NRC licensees and would improve the NRC safeguards event data base by requiring more uniform safeguards event reports.
Licensees who will be affected are power and nonpower reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and some transporters, importers and exporters of special nuclear material.
The NRC uses the reported infor-mation to respond to incidents and to identify potentially generic safe-guards problems.
The benefits to be derived from this action are the elimination of unnecessary reporting (which will result in significant savings for affected licensees and the NRC) and a more uniform and detailed reporting and data analysis system which will provide feedback to the industry for improving safeguards systems.
l
[7590-01]
DATES:
Submit comments by OV 2 7 1985 Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given unless comments are received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES:
Send comments to:
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch.
Deliver comments to:
Room 1121, 1717 H Street NW.,
Washington, DC, between 8:15 am and 5:00 pm.
Examine comments received and the regulatory analysis at:
The NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Joseph Yardumian- (301) 427-4010 or Priscilla A. Dwyer, (301) 427-4773, Reactor Regulatory Requirements Section, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nucl ear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
10 CFR 73.71 establishes an event reporting program to inform the Commission of safeguards events to permit timely response to incidents.
The data from this reporting program allows the Commission to determine the significance of events to identify possible generic problems in safeguards systems.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of§ 73.71 were first published in December 1973 {38 FR 35430).
They requi re reports of unaccounted for shipments of special nuclear material, incidents or attempts of theft or unlawful 2
[7590-01]
diversion of special nuclear material, and incidents or attempts of sabo-tage.
Subsequently, the Commission determined that it also needed reports of events which could be indicative of a loss of safeguards capability or circumstances which*could be part of an overall plan to commit an act of theft or sabotage.
In response to the Commission concern that a substan-tial public hazard could occur as a result of a deficiency in a gi-ven licensee 1s safeguards program, an amendment to 10 CFR 73.71 was pro-posed in October 1979 (44 FR 60743) that requires reports of events that threaten certain nuclear activities or lessens the effectiveness of a safe-guards system.
This amendment was published in January 1981 (46 FR 4858) in final form, as a new paragraph (c) to§ 73.71.
Since the promulgation of 10 CFR 73.71, the NRC staff has found that the requirements are frequently misinterpreted, that reports sub-mitted pursuant to the regulation lack uniformity, and that insufficient detail is reported for NRC analysis.
Unless these problems can ~e corrected, the usefulness of th~se reports in developing an adequate data base for generic analysis is limited.
For these reasons, the Commis-sion is proposing clarifying amendments to 10 CFR 70.52, 72.52, 73.67, 73.71, and 74.11 and issuing revised guidance to assist licensees in determining which events should be reported and to provide a format for doing so.
J For clarity, the distinction between an explicit and a potential threat has been removed.
This distinction is now made clearer in the descriptions of reportable events.
The categories of major and moderate losses have been eliminated and replaced by the descriptions of each type of loss.
The losses are:
11failures of the safeguards system that could 3
[7590-01]
allow unauthorized and undetected access 11 and 11 failures that degrade the effectiveness of the system.
11 Events that must be reported are described in a new Appendix G to Part 73.
The primary impact of the revised reporting requirements on licensees will be an approximate 80% decrease in the number of telephonic and written reports to the NRC because the twenty-four hour telephonic notifi-cation and associated follow-up written report requirement has been deleted.
This requirement can be deleted because the revised requirements will ensure that all events requiring immediate NRC response will be reported within one hour and those pertinent to NRC analysis activities will be logged for quarterly submittal.
The requirements of§ 73.71 are consistent with those of§§ 50.72 and 50.73.
Events reported under§§ 50.72 and 50.73 are safety-oriented in nature; those reported under§ 73.71 are security-oriented.
Proposed changes to§ 73.71 do not alter commitments made in response to the requirements of Part 50.
Events of a dual nature, having both safety and safeguards impact, do not require duplicate reports.
Information on how to report events of a dual nature is provided in a revised Regulatory Guide.
This proposed rulemaking also contains conforming amendments to 10 CFR 70.52, 72.52, 73.67, and 74.11 to provide further consistency among reporting requirements.
The Commission received a petition for rulemaking assigned Docket No. PRM 50-36 from the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group, (NUBARG).
As discussed below, this proposed rule would grant a portion of the petition.
The petitioner has requested that the Nuclear Regulatory 4
:);
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[7590-01]
Commission amend 10 CFR §§50.54(p); 50.54(q); 50.55(e); 50.59(b); 50.72(a);
Part 50, Appendix E,Section V; section 73.71; and the Commission's NUREG 1 s on Standard Technical Specifications with respect to certain reporting re-quirements.
The members of this petitioner are constructing and/or oper-ating nuclear power reactors used for the production of electricity under licenses issued by the NRC.
Utilities licensed by the NRC to operate nuclear power reactors are currently subject to a variety of reporting requirements in connection with licensed activities.
The petitioner sug-gests that the majority of these reporting requirements are valid and the purpose they serve justifies the considerable time which must be devoted to meeting them.
However, some of these requirements are, in the opinion of the petitioner, excessive and/or duplicative.
Accordingly, the peti-tioner has proposed that the Commission modify the various reporting requirements discussed in PRM 50-36 in order to promote more efficient use of licensee time and resources.
This proposed rulemaking responds specifically to Section VI of the petition, Reporting Requirements Asso-ciated with 10 CFR 73.71.
In this section, the petitioner suggests that this regulation be amended to provide that the required written reports be submitted by the licensee within 30 days of initial notification rather than within 15 days.
According to the petitioner, this would allow the licensee's staff more time during the critical period immediately follow-ing such occurrence to devote to the resolution of the problem itself and would minimize interference with daily operations.
The Commission agrees that it is desirable to extend this particular reporting period from 15 to 30 days and has included provisions to do so in this proposed rulemaking.
5

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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT:
CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION The NRC has determined that this proposed rule is the type of action described in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3).
Therefore neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed rule.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION STATEMENT This proposed rule amends infonnation collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of the paperwork requirements.
REGULATORY ANALYSIS The costs to industry will decrease from the current cost of $972,000 per year to $317,800 per year, or a net decrease of over 66 percent.
This is due to the decrease in the number of reports that must be made or sub-mitted by affected licensees.
The costs to the NRC will decrease from the current cost of $72,000 per year to $46,800 per year, or a net decrease of 35 percent.
This is due to the reduction in telephone and written reports which will result in less time spent by the NRC in documenting and analyzing the submittals.
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REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION Based on the information available at this stage of the ru1emaking proceeding and in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that if promulgated, this rule will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities and should result in a reduction in burden to affected licensees.
Some transporters, importers, and exporters of stra-tegic special nuclear material (SSNM) and spent fuel may be affect~d by this rule.
Each year out of approximately 600 reported events, about three come from this group which includes small entities.
The NRC invites comments from these parties.
The proposed rule also affects licensees who operate nuclear power plants and fuel facilities under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73.
The companies that own these plants and facilities do not fall within the scope of the definition of 11small entities 11 set forth in § 6_05(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, or within the definition of Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administra-tion in 13 CFR Part 121.
lIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PARTS 70, 72, 73, AND 74 Part 70 - Hazardous materials - transportation, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Security measures, Special nuclear material.
7
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Part 72 - Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, Reporting and record keeping requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel.
Part 73 - Hazardous materials - transportation, Incorporation by ref-erence, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactor.s, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
Part 74 - Accounting, Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Special nuclear material.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 74 is contemplated.
PART 70 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL N'UCLEAR MATERIAL
1.
The authority citation for Part 70 is revised to read as follows:
AUTHORITY:
Secs. 51, 53, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 204, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1245, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 15842, 5845, 5846).
Section 70.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851), Section 70.21(g) also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat.
939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).
Section 70.31 also issued under sec. 57d, Pub. L.93-377, 88 Stat. 475 (42 U.S.C. 2077).
Sections 70.36 and 70.44 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234).
8
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Section 70.61 also issued under secs. 186, 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C.
2236, 2237).
Section 70.62 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273); §§ 70.3, 70.19(c), 70.21(c), 70.22(a), (b), (d)-(k), 70.24(a) and (b), 70.32(a)(3), (5), (6), (d), and (i), 70.36, 70.39(b) and (c),
70.41(a), 70.42(a) and (c), 70.56, 70.57(b), (c), and (d), 70.58(a)-(g)(3),
and (h)-(j) are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2201(b)); §§ 70.7, 70.20a(a), and (d) 70.20b (c), and (e), 70.21(c),
70.24(b), 70.32(a)(6), (c), (d), (e), and (g), 70.36, 70.Sl(c)-(g), 70.56, 70.57(b) and (d), 70.58(a)-(g)(3) and (h)-(j) are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and§§ 70.20b(d) and (e),
70.38, 70.Sl(b) and (i), 70.52, 70.53, 70.54, 70.55, 70.58(g)(4), (k),
and (1), 70.59, and 70.60(b) and (c) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat.
950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).
2.
Section 70.52 is revised to read as follows:
§ 70.52 Reports of accidental criticality or loss or theft or attempted theft of special nuclear material.
(a)
Each licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour after discovery of any case of accidental criticality or any loss, other than normal operating loss, of special nuclear material.
9
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(b)
Each licensee who possesses one gram or more of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, or plutonium shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour after discovery of any loss or theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material which the licensee is licensed to possess or any incident in which an attempt has been made or is believed to have been made to commit a theft or unlawful diversion of such material.
(c) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System if the licensee is party to that system.
If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the iicensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center1 within one hour.
The exemption of §73.21(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.
(d) Reports required under. §73.71 need not be duplicated under the requirements of this section.
PART 72 - LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL AT AN INDEPENDENT SPENT-FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION
1.
The authority citation for Part 72 is revised to read as follows:
AUTHORITY:
Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62,63,65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, 1Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (202) 951-0550.
10
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sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2282); sec. 274, 73 Stat, 688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Section 72.10 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.
2951 (42 u.s.c. 5851).
2.
Section 72.52 is revised to read as follows:
§ 72.52 Reports of accidental criticality or loss of special nuclear material.
(a) Each licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery of accidental criticality or any loss of special nuclear material.
(b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System if the licensee is party to ~hat system.
If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or any other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center1 within one hour.
The exemption of §73.2l(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.
(c)
Reports required under §73.71 need not be duplicated under the requirements of this section.
1Convnercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (202)951-0550.
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PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
1.
The authority citation for 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as fol lows:
AUTHORITY:
Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).
Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273); §§ 73.21, 73.37(g), 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); §§ 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec.
161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and§§ 73.20(c)(l),
73.24(b)(l), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f),
73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(iii)(B) and (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended {42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).
2.
In §73.67., paragraphs (e){3)(vii) and (g){3){iii) are revised to read as follows:
§ 73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance.
(e)
(3) 12
[7590-01]
(vii) Notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after the discovery of the loss of the shipment and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment in accordance with the provisions of §73.71 of this part.
(g)
(3)
(iii) Conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after the discovery of the loss of the shipment and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment in accordance with the provisions of §73.71 of this part.
3.
Section 73.71 is revised to read as follows:
§ 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments, suspected thefts, or unlaw-ful diversions and other safeguards events.
(a)(l) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(9) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and within one hour after recovery of or accountability for such lost shipment.
(2) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter via the Emergency 13
[7590-01]
Notification System, if the licensee is party to that system.
If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic systems or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center1 within one hour.
The exemption of§ 73.21(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.
(3) The licensee shall, upon request of the NRC, maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center.
(4) The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of thirty (30) days by a written report submitted to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555.
The licensee shall also submit one copy each to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A to this part and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.
(5) Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter and also submitted in a revised written report to the Regional Office, the Document Control Desk and if applicable the appropriate Resident Inspector.
Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a revised report.
The revised report must replace the previous report; therefore, the update must be a complete entity and not contain only supplementary or revised 1Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (202) 951-0550.
14
[7590-01]
information.
Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three years from the date of the report.
(b)(l)
Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of dis-covery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I.(a)(l) of Ap-pendix G to this part.
Licensees subject to the provisions of§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.55, 73.60 and each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and subject to§§ 73.67(d) and (e) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs I.(a)(2), (3), (b), and (c) of Appendix G to this part.
(2) This notification must be made in accordance with the require-ments of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.
(c)(l) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to
§§ 73.67(d), and 73.67(e) shall maintain a current log and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs 11.(a) and (b) of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee employee or member of the licensee 1 s contract security organization.
The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section as a record for three years after the last entry is made in each log.
(2)
Every three months, each licensee shall submit to the NRC copies of all safeguards event log entries not previously submitted.
Each licensee shall submit one copy each of i'ts log entries to the U.S. Nuclear 15
[7590-01]
Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, and if applicable the appropriate NRC Resident Inspector.
(d)
Each licensee shall submit to the Commission the 30-day written reports and copies of the safeguards event log entries required under the provisions of this section that are of a quality which will permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.
If the facility is subject to§ 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall prepare the written report on NRC Forms 366 and 366A.
If the facility is not subject to§ 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall not use these forms but shall prepare the written report in letter format.
In either case the report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.
(e) Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also reportable in accordance with§§ 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.
4.
A new Appendix G is added to read as follows:
Appendix G - Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR § 73.7l(b) and (c), licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events.
I.* Events to be reported within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within thirty days.
(a) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a cred-ible threat to commit or cause:
16
[7590-01]
(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or (2) Significant physical damage to any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses; or (3)
Interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.
(b)
Any failure of a safeguards system or discov~red noninherent vulnerability in a system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have not been established.
A "proper compensatory measure" for a particular safeguards event as used in this Appendix means a measure that is specified in a security or contingency plan or security procedure.
If the particular safeguards event_is not described in a plan or procedu*re, then a 11proper compensatory measure 11 means a measure implemented within 10 minutes of an event's discovery that provides a level of security essentially equivalent to that existing before the event.
(c) Any unauthorized entries through a required barrier (whether or not the event is properly compensated.)
II.
Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and submitted in quarterly log (a) Any failure of a safeguards system or discovered vulnerability in a system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which proper compensatory measures have been established.
17
[7590-01]
(b)
Any other failure of a safeguards system not included in par~graph II.(a) of this appendix if the failure degrades the effective-ness of the system.
PART 74 - MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
1.
The authority citation for Part 74 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY:
Secs. 53, 57, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282); secs. 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C.
5842, 5846).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273), §§ 74.31, 74.81, and 74.82 are issued under secs. 161b and 16li, 68 Stat. 948, 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b), 2201(1)); and§§ 74.11, 74.13, and 74.15 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 u.s.c. 2201(0)).
2.
Section 74.11 is revised to read as follows.
§ 74.11 Reports of loss or theft or attempted theft of special nuclear material.
(a)
Each licensee who possesses one gram or more of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, or plutonium shall notify the NRC Operations Center listed in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter within one hour of discovery of any loss or theft or other unlawful diversion of special 18
I,.
[7590-01]
nuc1ear material which it is licensed to possess, or any incident in which an attempt has been made to commit a theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material.
The requirement does not pertain to measured discards or inventory difference quantities.
(b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System if the licensee is party to that system.
If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center1 within one hour.
The exemption of§ 73.21(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.
(c) Reports required under§ 73.71 -need not be duplicated under the requirements of this section.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this ~Y of ~1985.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
J W. Roe, Acting E ec tive Director for Operations.
1Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (202)951-0550.
19

ML23151A707

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