ML23090A159
| ML23090A159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/2023 |
| From: | Russell Felts NRC/NRR/DRO |
| To: | Keehner D, Sullivan G Environmental Protection Agency, US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics |
| References | |
| Download: ML23090A159 (1) | |
Text
March 31, 2023 Denise Keehner Director, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Mailstop 7101M Washington, DC 20460 Greg Sullivan Director, Waste and Chemical Enforcement Division U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Mailstop 2201A Washington, DC 20460
SUBJECT:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) IN AN EMAIL DATED FEBRUARY 1, 2023, REGARDING POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE EPA RULE BANNING DECABDE ON THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
Dear Ms. Keehner and Mr. Sullivan:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has developed answers to questions asked by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staff regarding the impact on the nuclear industry of the 40 CFR Part 751 rulemaking that restricts the manufacturing, processing, and distribution of DecaBDE. The distribution-related provisions of this rulemaking have been highlighted as having an adverse impact on the ability of nuclear power plants to maintain or replace equipment needed for continued operation. The EPAs questions were discussed in a February 6, 2023, meeting between NRC and EPA staff. The NRCs answers and a high-level discussion are provided in the enclosure to this letter.
Additional information regarding the impact of the DecaBDE rulemaking to the nuclear industry may also be obtained from the Department of Energys Office of Nuclear Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and nuclear industry groups such as the Nuclear Energy Institute and Electric Power Research Institute.
Please contact Greg Galletti at 301-415-1831, or via electronic mail at greg.galletti@nrc.gov, if your staff has any questions or need additional assistance regarding this matter.
Sincerely, Signed by Felts, Russell on 03/31/23 Russell Felts, Director Division of Reactor Oversight Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ML23090A159 NRR-106 OFFICE NRR/DRO/IQVB NRR/DRO/IQVB NRR/DRO/IOEB NAME MFitzgerald GGalletti PLaFlamme DATE 3/31/2023 3/31/2023 3/31/2023 OFFICE NRR/DEX/ELTB NRR/DEX/EMIB NRR/DRO/IQVB NAME MMcConnell for JPaige TScarbrough KKavanagh DATE 3/31/2023 3/31/2023 3/31/2023 OFFICE NRR/DRO/IOEB NRR/DEX/EMIB NRR/DEX/ELTB NAME LRegner for KKavanagh SBailey JPaige DATE 3/31/2023 3/31/2023 3/31/2023 OFFICE NRR/DEX NRR/DRO NAME EBenner RFelts DATE 3/31/2023 3/31/2023 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) response to questions presented by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in an email dated February 1, 2023, regarding potential impacts of the EPA rule banning DecaBDE on the Nuclear Industry As a result of a February 1, 2023, email sent by the EPA to the NRC and at the request of the EPA, NRC staff participated in a Teams teleconference with representatives of the EPA on February 6, 2023. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the potential impacts to the nuclear industry because of the EPA rule (86 FR 880) that prohibits the manufacture, processing, or distribution of DecaBDE, a fire-retardant compound that is used in a variety of components across the nuclear industry. During the meeting, the NRC and the EPA discussed certain questions, which the EPA subsequently emailed (from Scott Drewes, EPA, to Greg Galletti, NRC, and Michael Fitzgerald, NRC, dated February 1, 2023, Monday Meeting Proposed Agenda ML23090A121). This document provides the NRC staffs responses to the EPAs emailed questions.
The following NRC regulations and terminology apply to the NRC staffs responses:
The NRC licenses and regulates the Nation's civilian use of radioactive materials to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and to promote the common defense and security and to protect the environment. Adequate protection is presumptively assured by compliance with NRC requirements.
Environmental Qualification 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants, requires that holders or applicants for an operating license issued under 10 CFR Part 50 shall establish a program for the environmental qualification (EQ) of electric equipment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b). 10 CFR 50.49 also requires that holders of a combined license or a manufacturing license issued under Part 52 shall establish a program for the EQ of electric equipment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b).
10 CFR 50.49(b) specifies that electric equipment important to safety covered by this section is:
(1) Safety-related electric equipment1.
(i) This equipment is that relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure -
(A) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (B) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (C) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guidelines in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.
1 Safety-related electric equipment is referred to as Class 1E equipment in IEEE 323-1974. Copies of this standard may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017.
Enclosure
(ii) Design basis events are defined as conditions of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents, external events, and natural phenomena for which the plant must be designed to ensure functions (b)(1)(i) (A) through (C) of this section.
(2) Nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions specified in subparagraphs (b)(1)(i)(A) through (C) of this section by the safety-related equipment.
(3) Certain post-accident monitoring equipment2.
Per 10 CFR 50.49(l), replacement equipment must be qualified in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49 unless there are sound reasons to the contrary. The NRC staff considers the following to be sound reasons for the use of replacement equipment previously qualified in accordance with the NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," and the DOR Guidelines, "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" in lieu of using equipment qualified in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49. One reason listed in RG 1.89 is:
Replacement equipment qualified in accordance with the provisions of § 50.49 is not available to meet installation and operation schedules. However, in such case, the replacement equipment may be used only until upgraded equipment can be obtained and an outage of sufficient duration is available for replacement.
General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, Environmental and dynamic effects design bases, of Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50, states, in part, that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, requires in part, that the pertinent requirements of this appendix apply to all activities affecting the safety-related functions of those SSCs; these activities include designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, erecting, installing, inspecting, testing, operating, maintaining, repairing, refueling, and modifying.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979, applies to licensed nuclear power electric generating stations that were operating prior to January 1, 1979, except to the extent set forth in 10 CFR 50.48(b). With 2 Specific guidance concerning the types of variables to be monitored is provided in Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident. Copies of the Regulatory Guide may be purchased through the U.S. Government Publishing Office by calling 202-512-1800 or by writing to the U.S. Government Publishing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082.
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respect to certain generic issues for such facilities, this appendix sets forth fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
Safety-Related The regulation in 10 CFR 50.2, Definitions, defines safety-related SSCs as those SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to assure:
(1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (2) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth in § 50.34(a)(1) or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.
Class 1E The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard (Std.) 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.89, Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1 (ML003740271), defines Class 1E as the safety classification of the electric equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal, or otherwise are essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment.
The use of the terms safety-related and important to safety hold important meanings on how SSCs for nuclear reactors are regulated by the NRC. In NRC Generic Letter 84-01, NRC use of the terms, Important to Safety and Safety Related, the NRC noted that pursuant to its regulations, nuclear power plant permittees or licensees are responsible for developing and implementing quality assurance programs for plant design and construction or for plant operation which meet the more general requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1 for plant equipment important to safety, and the more prescriptive requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR part 50 for safety-related plant equipment.
The NRCs regulations in 10 CFR Part 110 govern the export and import of nuclear equipment and material. The export of nuclear equipment and material is controlled under 10 CFR 110 and regulated by the NRC. Export and import of items that have a dual use is regulated by the Department of Commerces Bureau of Industry and Security. Dual-use means equipment and materials that may be used in nuclear or non-nuclear applications, as defined by 10 CFR 110.2.
NRC response to EPA information requests:
- 1. NRC progress identifying if any suppliers in the industry are available to supply non-DecaBDE 1E and 1E EQ cables.
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The NRC staff notes that licensees are not required to submit to the NRC the type of information requested in this question. Thus, the following response is based on the NRC staffs general knowledge and informal review of information collected from publicly available sources.
The NRC staff is aware of several wire/cable vendors that supply or have been known to supply non-DecaBDE Class 1E and Class 1E/non-Class 1E environmentally qualified wires and cables. Each of these vendors advertise a range of available products on their respective websites. However, the staff notes that NRC licensees would need to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether these products can satisfy applicable NRC requirements and design specifications for their facilities. For example, while an alternative non-DecaBDE wire/cable may be available, a licensee may determine that the alternative is not in the same voltage class or an adequate form or fit for a specific application for its reactor.
Additionally, the NRCs understanding is that some of these vendors have not supplied an environmentally qualified product to the nuclear industry in many years and their products may not be currently available to procure. Furthermore, as these vendors supply products to other industries (including the military), in the near term, the lead time to procure any required wires/cables may be extensive, further limiting access to the required wires/cables.
Therefore, while the NRC staff is aware that some that vendors have an alternative non-DecaBDE product, without additional information, the staff cannot confirm whether these products are readily available and can meet NRC licensing and plant-specific design requirements.
- 2. What is the currently known impact to the operating fleet and supply chain as a result of rule implementation? Does the rule implementation potentially cause operators to run afoul of NRC regulations?
One potential impact is a delay in finding replacement components needed for nuclear power plants. If qualified replacement components that do not contain DecaBDE are not available, one aspect the EPA rule could impact is the ability of nuclear power plant licensees to satisfy the NRC regulations governing environmentally qualified components (10 CFR 50.49 and GDC 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50). Based on the NRC staffs experience, the EQ process can take licensees and vendors 2 to 3 years to qualify a component.
An additional six months to a year may be required for licensees and vendors to establish adequate inventory prior being able to ship a component to a nuclear power plant. Once a component has been received, the nuclear power plant operator must ensure that the component meets their plant-specific requirements, which would require additional time.
Furthermore, when a qualified component is used inside of a second component that must be environmentally qualified (e.g., wiring/cabling inside a detector or valve actuator), the second component would need to undergo its own EQ process, with similar timeframes to those already discussed to assure that there are no adverse interactions and that the component will be capable of performing its design function under the expected environmental conditions through its qualified life.
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Another impact is on the ability of nuclear power plants to perform routine maintenance of existing components when that maintenance is performed by a third party. The NRC staffs understanding is that the EPA rule prohibiting the manufacture, processing, and distribution of DecaBDE prevents the shipment of cable, wire, and components that contain DecaBDE to and from nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants use components that include cable/wire for safety-related and important to safety applications across all modes of operation. The NRC staff has been informed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) that more than 200 devices at each nuclear power unit contain DecaBDE (e.g., quick disconnects used in EQ applications for transmitters, Remote Temperature Devices (RTDs),
Motor Operated Valves (MOVs), circuit breakers, Motor Control Centers (MCCs), etc.).
Some of the items that nuclear power plants currently rely on that contain DecaBDE perform a broad range of safety functions (e.g., achieve and maintain safe shutdown). The transportation provisions in the ban may prevent licensees from performing maintenance that licensees are unable to perform on-site. As noted above in the response to Question 1, even if a non-DecaBDE wire/component is available, a licensee may determine through a case-specific evaluation that the alternative, non-DecaBDE wire/component does not meet NRC requirements or design specifications. Given the supply uncertainties created by the ban, some nuclear power plants may elect to utilize the flexibilities that exist under their license to defer some maintenance practices (e.g., delaying refurbishment or scheduled replacements). Not replacing or refurbishing equipment might result in the equipment being unable to perform its intended function, e.g., not being able to operate in an emergency.
However, the NRC's regulations (e.g., 10 CFR 50.65) set forth requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. A decision not to replace a wire or cable or equipment containing such wire or cable could not go forth if it was counter to 10 CFR 50.65 or other requirements in the license and regulations. Furthermore, absent a suitable non-DecaBDE alternative, availability of spare equipment at the site, or regulatory relief (e.g., an exemption or license amendment), nuclear power plant licensees may not be able to replace equipment that can no longer perform its safety function. This could lead to requests for temporary relief from the requirements until acceptable wire, cable, or equipment is available and, in extreme cases, extended shutdowns due to inability to meet NRC requirements for operation. A nuclear power plant is usually required to shut down the reactor, ceasing the generation of electric power, if components are unable to meet their design functions, including meeting all EQ requirements.
For example, actuators with DecaBDE wire are used to open and close MOVs to perform safety functions during normal operations (which includes shutdown), abnormal conditions, and accident conditions at nuclear power plants. Because actuators are used to open and close MOVs during reactor shutdown at some plants, shutting down the plant may not fully resolve the safety impact of an MOV that cannot perform its function. If an actuator is determined to be incapable of performing its safety function and the licensee is unable to obtain a replacement because of the EPA rule, this would result in a reactor shutdown and a subsequent extended offline period at the nuclear power plant. This scenario could happen simultaneously at multiple nuclear power plants, especially during refueling outage season when numerous actuators undergo required maintenance, inspection, and testing. Nuclear power plants typically operate on either 18 or 24 month fuel cycles, and refueling outages 5
are generally scheduled for the spring and fall when electric demand is lowest; therefore, approximately 25% of the nuclear fleet enters a refueling outage each spring and fall, aggregating the impact of the issue at each plant.
Thus, operating nuclear power plants unable to timely replace components due to the EPA ban may be required to shutdown based on the inability to meet NRC requirements for operation. For perspective, based on information provided to the NRC by EPRI, there are currently 92 commercial nuclear power reactors at 54 locations/sites in the U.S. that contribute approximately 96 Gigawatts of power to the electrical power grid. Unplanned down-powers and/or shutdowns (possibly for extended durations) at one or multiple nuclear power plants would reduce the amount of electric power available, potentially impacting electric power grid stability. Electric power grid instability itself may adversely impact operations at nuclear power plants because loss of power from the grid requires a plant to shut down using backup diesel generators.
If qualified replacement components that do not contain DecaBDE are not available, the impact to NRC licensed activities may be larger than just power reactors and may include research and test reactors, nuclear production and utilization facilities, as well as DOE or DOD facilities and activities. This currently includes 32 non-power research and test reactors and other nuclear production and utilization facilities in the U.S that are under NRC oversight. The NRC does not have any information regarding the impact of the EPA rule on DOE or DOD facilities and activities at this time. The following table represents data that the NRC has received from EPRI with regards to the near-term impact of the EPA rule on nuclear power reactors (each nuclear reactor is considered a nuclear power unit - a nuclear power plant is a site that may consist of one or more nuclear power units). The staff notes that this information was provided voluntarily by EPRI and not through an official NRC process requiring submission under oath and affirmation.
Reactors Reactors Reactors Reactors Reporting reporting Reporting Reactors reporting Postponement Spring or Major / Reporting Impacted potential of planned Fall outage Significant Potential No. U.S. Reactors shutdown work if no impacts Equipment degraded Operating Reactors Reporting or inability solution is identified so Replacement cable impact Reactors Reporting to Date to restart available far Delays reported 92 87 65 7 16 34 8 2 or or or or or or or
% of Total No.
Reactors 95% 71% 8% 17% 37% 9% 2%
Estimated Impact (GWe)
(see note
- 1) 93.72 Gwe 70 8 17 37 9 2 Note 1 - Based on EIA 2022 data indicating total US Nuclear Generation Data (nameplate rating) of 99.101 GWe 6
- 3. Does NRC regulate the export of 1E and 1E EQ cables? If so, how?
The NRCs regulations in 10 CFR Part 110 govern the export of nuclear equipment and material. These cables would fall under the NRCs exporting licensing authority under 10 CFR Part 110 if they are especially designed or prepared for use in a nuclear reactor.
Generally, Class 1E and environmentally qualified cabling do not fall under the NRCs export control authority because they are dual-use. However, there may be specific components that have Class 1E and environmentally qualified cabling that fall under the NRC's export control authority of 10 CFR Part 110 due to the components performed functions.
The NRC is not aware of any cabling that is especially designed or prepared for use in a nuclear reactor and therefore subject to 10 CFR Part 110. However, the NRC is aware of one specific international impact at this time for a dual-use item. One vendor has provided correspondence to the NRC indicating that it will not be able to fulfill a specific international order because of the EPA rule banning DecaBDE.
- 4. How does NRC define emergencies? Are there scenarios in which wire/cable must be replaced on an emergency basis?
NRC regulations do not provide a definition for the term emergency in 10 CFR 50.2; however, the term is used in a variety of ways in the NRCs regulations as highlighted below.
For example, at times, licensees may need to take prompt remedial actions to maintain defense-in-depth to ensure continued safe operation of a nuclear power plant. Depending on the circumstance, these remedial actions may require prior NRC approval through the issuance of a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED), an Exigent License Amendment (10 CFR 50.91(a)(6), or an Emergency License Amendment (10 CFR 50.91(a)(5)). These remedial actions could include expeditious repair or replacement of equipment.
The NRC regulation in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) states, in part, that:
Where the Commission finds that an emergency situation exists, in that failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, it may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or for public commentWhenever an emergency situation exists, a licensee requesting an amendment must explain why this emergency situation occurred and why it could not avoid this situation, and the Commission will assess the licensee's reasons for failing to file an application sufficiently in advance of that event.
NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.103 contain provisions for suspension and operation in war or national emergency.
10 CFR Section 50.34(f)(2)(ii) requires licensees to [e]stablish a program, to begin during construction and follow into operation, for integrating and expanding current efforts to improve plant procedures. The scope of the program shall include emergency procedures, reliability analyses, human factors engineering, crisis management, operator training, and 7
coordination with INPO and other industry efforts. (Applicable to construction permit applicants only) (I.C.9). As such, licensees are required to develop and implement emergency operating procedures (EOPs) based on control of plant safety functions such as reactivity control, and inventory control to ensure these transients and accidents are adequately mitigated to ensure protection of the public health and safety. Any SSCs relied on by the licensee are explicitly called out in EOPs for use in mitigation.
Nuclear power plant licensees are required to develop emergency plans in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. These plans include emergency action levels based on conditions at the plant. Two standard action levels are called Site Emergency and General Emergency.
Regarding the replacement of wire, cable, or components on an emergency basis, the NRC does not generally require nuclear power plant licensees to replace equipment on an emergency basis, such as to maintain safety in response to an event. Nuclear power plants are designed to withstand transients and accidents using installed equipment that is required to be Operable in accordance with the nuclear power plants Technical Specifications required by 10 CFR 50.36. This regulation requires licensees to maintain at least the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility, which includes responding to design basis events.
However, NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.155 require, in part, that nuclear power plant licensees have the ability to acquire and use offsite assistance and resources to among other things, maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities in response to a beyond design-basis event (extreme and rare events). To comply with 10 CFR 50.155, the nuclear industry maintains offsite locations, known as SAFER facilities, that are located in Phoenix, AZ, and Memphis, TN, that contain equipment necessary for multiple nuclear power plants to mitigate the consequences of beyond-design-basis events simultaneously. The equipment is readily available and capable of being mobilized promptly such that it can be delivered to any plant within the U.S. within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and deployed in accordance with the plant-specific strategies for maintaining safe conditions. These facilities are routinely inspected by the NRC to ensure equipment availability and readiness to deploy.
- 5. What is the lifetime of wire/cable [and associated components] in nuclear facilities? What would happen if aging wire/cable [and associated components] were not replaced during planned maintenance (both from safety, regulatory, and compliance perspectives)?
Wire/cable and other components life is regulation-, plant-, and technology-specific. From a regulatory perspective, the expected lifetime of a wire/cable or component could be described in terms of its service life or qualified life. For NRC purposes, service life is a term with various meanings based on context and situation. As described in IEEE Std. 323-1983, it is generally used to describe the period of time for which satisfactory performance can be demonstrated for a specific set of service conditions and is related to terms qualified life, shelf life, designated life, design life, and installed life.
IEEE Std. 323-1974 defines qualified life as the period of time for which satisfactory performance can be demonstrated for a specific set of service conditions. This definition is applied to criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.49(b)(1)(i)(A), (B), and (C). Unless otherwise specified, the clock for qualified life begins when a component is installed and placed into 8
service in a nuclear power plant. Qualified life is determined through qualification processes described in various consensus standards (e.g., IEEE Std. 323-1974 as endorsed by RG 1.89, IEEE Std. 383, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Electric Cables and Splices for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, as endorsed by RG 1.211, Qualification of Safety-Related Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Plants, etc.) (ML082530205). No matter the term, expected life will depend on a multitude of factors including installed location and application (i.e., required safety function(s)) during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Relevant factors include whether a cable or component is typically electrically energized or de-energized, exposed to water submergence, and environmental parameters (e.g., radiation, temperature, pressure, chemical spray, and humidity). Regarding technology specific factors, expected life depends on the cable/component material type/chemical composition, voltage/current level, manufacturer, and vintage.
Various regulations require the licensee to maintain its licensing basis and to assure that equipment can perform the intended functions, or else to shut down. Licensees are presumed to follow their licenses, and those licenses and regulations will not permit a licensee to operate while failing to maintain and/or replace certain wire/cables or other affected components. Controlling regulations include 10 CFR 50.49, 10 CFR 50.65, GDC 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and many other design specific requirements. However, the NRC's regulations include provisions for a licensee to make changes to its facility and procedures without prior NRC approval provided certain criteria are met (see 10 CFR 50.59). The NRC's regulations also include provisions for a licensee to request an amendment to its license (see 10 CFR 50.90-92) when the criteria in 10 CFR 50.59 show that prior NRC approval is required. A licensee could also request an exemption or seek another form of regulatory relief if needed during the period of replacement equipment unavailability.
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