ML23073A143
| ML23073A143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 99990008 |
| Issue date: | 03/14/2023 |
| From: | Blake Welling Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch |
| To: | Anosov V Felman Production |
| References | |
| EA-23-022 IR 2022001 | |
| Download: ML23073A143 (1) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD, SUITE 102 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415 March 14, 2023 EA-23-022 Vitaliy Anosov, Plant Manager Felman Production, LLC 4442 Graham Station Road, Letart, WV 25253
SUBJECT:
FELMAN PRODUCTION, LLC-NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO.
99990008/2022001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Vitaliy Anosov:
This letter refers to the NRCs review, starting with the initial communications by outside legal counsel for Felman Production, LLC (an unlicensed entity) on November 3, 2022, and continuing with an in-office review through February 14, 2023. This review included an on-site inspection conducted by the NRC on November 15 and 16, 2022. The NRCs review and later inspection consisted of an examination of devices containing radioactive material found at Felman Production, LLCs facility in Letart, West Virginia, the facilitys interactions with these devices, and the timelines associated with these devices as best could be determined. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of interviews with personnel, independent radiation measurements, and a walkdown of the facility. Preliminary inspection findings were discussed with you following the conclusion of the on-site inspection on November 16, 2022. A final exit briefing was conducted telephonically with you on February 22, 2023. The enclosed reports present the results of the inspection (Enclosure).
Based on the results of the inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements was identified involving the possession of byproduct material that was not authorized by a specific or general license issued by the NRC. Specifically, on November 2, 2022, Felman Production, LLC discovered 11 fixed nuclear gauges in storage that were believed to contain radium-226 (Ra-226) sources and, on November 16, 2022, discovered 3 additional fixed nuclear gauges in storage, also believed to contain Ra-226 sources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Act) subjected all discrete sources of Ra-226 to NRC licensing requirements. As of August 7, 2010, all persons possessing such material within NRC jurisdiction were required to apply for an NRC license, as stated in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 30.3(c)(3).
The NRC normally considers issuing a citation, at minimum, for violations involving the unauthorized possession of radioactive material. However, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Manual, Topical Chapters, Section 3.9 Dispositioning Violations of Naturally Occurring and Accelerator-Produced radioactive Materials (NARM) Requirements, the NRC determined it was appropriate to use enforcement discretion to not cite a violation of the above-quoted regulatory requirement. Specifically, the NRC considered that: (1) the violation did not result in any actual safety, health or security consequence because the nuclear gauges have been in locked storage since approximately 2003 (prior to the current site owner acquiring the
V. Anosov 2
facility in 2006); (2) the violation was not willful; (3) Felman Production, LLC was unaware of the requirement to obtain an NRC license; and, (4) upon identifying the gauges, Felman Production, LLC promptly notified the NRC and arranged for the timely transfer of the gauges to an authorized recipient. Namely, on February 1, 2023, the radium-containing devices were removed from Felman Production, LLCs facility by a suitably licensed third-party service provider and transferred to a licensed entity. The NRC verified the receiving entitys license authorizations were appropriate, and the receipt of the devices were confirmed by the licensed entity as received.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, should you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room and from the NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Jason vonEhr of my staff at (610) 337-5256.
Sincerely, Blake D. Welling, Director Division of Radiological Safety and Security Region I Docket No. 99990008 License No. N/A - Non-licensee
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No. 99990008/2022001 cc (w/Enclosure):
State of West Virginia Blake D.
Welling Digitally signed by Blake D. Welling Date: 2023.03.14 12:08:32 -04'00'
V. Anosov 3
FELMAN PRODUCTION, LLC-NRC INSPECTION REPORT 99990008/2022001 DATED MARCH 14, 2023 Distribution:
RI/CIRDA RI/EAGL ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER:
SUNSI Review:
ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: JEV Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive OFFICE RI:DRSS RI:ORA RI:DRSS RI:DRSS NAME JvonEhr M McLaughlin CGCahill BWelling SIGNATURE JEV MMM CGC BDW DATE 02/23/2023 02/23/2023 03/10/2023 03/14/2023 OFFICAL RECORD COPY
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket:
99990008 License:
N/A - Non-licensee Report:
2022-001 EA No:
EA-23-022 Non-Licensee:
Felman Production, LLC Locations Inspected: 4442 Graham Station Road, Letart, WV Inspection Dates:
November 15 and 16, 2022, with in-office review through February 14, 2023 Inspector:
Jason vonEhr, Health Physicist Commercial, Industrial, R&D and Academic Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Christopher G. Cahill, Chief Commercial, Industrial, R&D and Academic Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Approved By:
Christopher G. Cahill, Chief Commercial, Industrial, R&D and Academic Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Attachments: Supplemental Inspection Information
2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Felman Production, LLC NRC Inspection Report 99990008/2022001 Program Overview Felman Production, LLC was a ferro-alloy metal foundry, one of only two within the United States which produced ferrosilicomanganese. The foundry used raw bulk material inputs within a submerged arc furnace to produce the ferrosilicomanganese. At the time of the inspection, Felman Production, LLC was not an NRC-licensee but used a variety of non-nuclear technologies to assist in automating its production processes. (Section 1)
Inspection Findings The NRC determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred, however following a review of the facts and circumstances the NRC determined it was appropriate to exercise discretion to not cite the violation, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Manual, Topical Chapters, Section 3.9 Dispositioning Violations of Naturally Occurring and Accelerator-Produced radioactive Materials (NARM) Requirements. (Section 2)
Response to Discovery Felman Production, LLC, took appropriate and timely action to protect its employees and the general public by securing and limiting access to the radioactive devices. Furthermore, Felman Production, LLC, procured the services of an Ohio-licensed service provider to evaluate the radioactive devices and later the services of Tennessee-licensed service provider to safely remove the radioactive devices from the facility. (Section 2.6)
3 REPORT DETAILS
- 1.
Program Overview (Inspection Procedure 87103)
Felman Production, LLC was a ferroalloy metal foundry, one of only two within the United States which produced ferrosilicomanganese. The approximately 190-acre foundry used raw bulk material inputs within a submerged arc furnace to produce the ferrosilicomanganese. At the time of the inspection, Felman Production, LLC was not an NRC-licensee but used a variety of non-nuclear technologies to assist in automating its production processes.
- 2.
Observations and Findings 2.1.
Inspection Scope The inspection consisted of an examination of the discovered devices containing radioactive material found at Felman Production, LLCs facility in Letart, West Virginia, the facilitys interactions with these devices, and the timelines associated with these devices as best could be determined. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of interviews with personnel, independent radiation measurements, and a walkdown of the facility.
2.2.
Observations and Findings 2.2.1. Initial Discovery and Follow-up Felman Production, LLC initially discovered the devices on November 2, 2022, while organizing and cleaning out an older, unused section of the facility. This portion of the facility used to support arc furnaces that no longer were in use, and the specific area in question consisted of three locked cabinets/lockers adjacent to the old arc furnaces control room (see Figure 1 below; unused control room was through the open door in the middle right of Figure 1). Each cabinets lock was removed in turn. When the facility personnel reached the foremost cabinet of the three shown in Figure 1, they saw the radioactive trefoil symbol and a metal identification plate which read Caution -
Radioactive Material, and ceased additional interactions with the cabinet while communications were made with other parts of the Felman Production, LLC organization.
The discovery of these devices resulted in communications internal to Felman Production, LLC, including its third-party environmental consultant. Felman Production, LLCs legal counsel first contacted the State of West Virginia, Radiation, Toxics & Indoor Air Division, on the same day of discovery, which referred the facility to the NRC.
The NRC was first contacted by Felman Production, LLCs outside legal counsel on November 3, 2022, to communicate the discovery of the materials. Felman Production, LLC, initially communicated the discovery of 15 devices believed to contain radioactive materials. The NRCs staff communicated that the facility should return any devices to storage that had been removed since discovery and secure that storage area from further access to the extent possible. The NRCs staff further emphasized that the facility was not to transport the materials from the site, to limit any additional movement of the devices due to concerns of radioactive contamination and encouraged a search of the
4 remainder of the facility for any other stored or installed devices of a similar nature.
Given the facilitys cooperation with these matters and the facilitys intention to bring a service provider to the site, the NRC did not believe an on-site inspection was necessary at this time.
Felman Production, LLC procured the services of a third-party licensed service provider to evaluate the condition, type, and radioactive strength (activity) of the devices, as well as the suitability of the devices for removal from the site. The third-party licensee agreed to evaluate the devices but was unsure if its Agreement State license would authorize (under reciprocal recognition by the NRC under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 150.20) licensed activities with the devices, such as the performance of leak tests or removal of the devices from the facility, as the device model, isotope, and activity were not known with any certainty.
Figure 1 - NRC photo of the cabinet (foreground) which contained the radioactive devices initially discovered by Felman Production, LLC.
5 The third-party service provider initially arrived at the site on November 14, 2022, and performed radiation surveys and evaluated the devices to try to identify the device manufacturer and model, as well as the radioactive isotope and activity. These activities were considered activities that did not require a license, and therefore did not require filing for reciprocity with the NRC.
The service provider determined, in part, the following radiation levels: (1) within the cabinet approximately 50 millirem/hour; (2) the highest level at the surface of the cabinet approximately 14 millirem/hour; and (3) at 4 feet from the cabinet 2 millirem/hour. These measurements were reported to have been taken using a Ludlum Model 3 with a side window probe, with a calibration date of September 2022. The service provider further determined that, where legible, the metal identification plates on the devices appeared to read that they were In-Val-Co Model B-20-25 and Shaw Model SH-501 fixed nuclear gauges containing radium-226.
The service provider performed, with the assistance of facility representatives, surveys of various portions of the facility to try to identify any undiscovered nuclear gauges, without any results. Following the service providers conclusion that the devices all likely contained radium-226, the service provider, in coordination with NRC Region III, which administered reciprocity reviews for the subject Agreement State license, determined that no licensed activities (e.g. removal of the devices from the facility) could commence due to the limitations of its State of Ohio radioactive materials license.
Based on these radiation levels and the description of the area in which the cabinet was within the facility, the NRC determined that an on-site inspection was appropriate and necessary, and so was launched the next day.
2.3.
NRC On-Site Inspection The NRC personnel arrived at Felman Production, LLC on November 15, 2022, and remained through November 16, 2022. The NRC evaluated the location of the cabinet containing the gauges relative to the remainder of the facility, observed the measures taken by the facility to limit access, took independent radiation measurements, interviewed personnel at the facility, and walked down other storage areas and the materials process flow in attempt to identify any further undiscovered devices.
The NRC personnel determined that the adjacent rooms were, presently, only infrequently used and the hallway behind the cabinets was currently used only as a pass through between other portions of the facility. Facility employees did not appear, in the time that the NRC was present and through interviews, to linger around the cabinets to cause any radiation safety concerns.
The control room, the entrance to which is visible in the middle right of Figure 1, was last used in approximately 2017/2018. Prior to this, employee interviews described that two staff would be assigned to the control room at any given time, and that these staff would be located diagonal and opposite of the door shown in Figure 1. Radiation levels at these locations were negligible and indistinguishable from background radiation levels, and thus did not appear to be a radiation safety concern.
The NRC determined that the facilitys initial discovery and reporting of 15 devices included several non-radioactive components, and that the actual number of radioactive-
6 containing devices amounted to 11 nuclear gauges within the cabinet, in addition to four components which appeared to be the electronic detector side of the nuclear gauge, and did not contain radioactive materials (see Figure 2 below). Of the 11 devices, 8 appeared to be In-Val-Co Model B-20-25, and the remaining three appeared to be Robert Shaw Model SH-501. Identification plates, where legible, suggested these nuclear gauges were initially manufactured between 1967 and 1974, well before the NRC established licensing and authority over naturally occurred radioactive materials, such as radium-226.
Figure 2 - NRC photos of inside the cabinet containing the radioactive materials. Left image includes the four detector components of the nuclear gauges (bottom left partially obscured by metal plates). Right image includes the bottom two detector components (on the shelf) and the eleven nuclear gauges. The eight nuclear gauges on the left were In-Val-Co Model B-20-25, the three nuclear gauges on the right were Robert Shaw Model SH-501.
Radiation levels measured by the NRC generally were consistent with those taken by the service provider: maximum on-contact radiation levels on the cabinet were approximately 25 millirem/hour in the lower corner of the cabinet, with levels dropping to 20 millirem/hour after the NRCs review and re-organizing/replacing the contents.
Radiation levels at the top of the cabinet were approximately 3 millirem/hour. The facility placed red Danger tape at a 10-15 foot distance from the cabinet (visible in Figure 1) following initial discovery, with radiation levels at the nearest distance accessible with the tape of approximately 0.2 millirem/hour. These radiation levels were measured using a Ludlum Model 2401-P, serial number 344918, with a calibration performed on January 11, 2021. The NRC further took contamination wipes on the accessible portions of the nuclear gauges and measured the resulting wipe to ascertain if any removable radioactive material could be measured. While the equipment in-hand by the NRC would
7 not be sufficient to establish a minimum detectable activity to demonstrate the nuclear gauges were not leaking (i.e. removable contamination in excess of 185 Becquerels or 0.005 microcuries), the wipes were performed and measured in order to dispel any concerns about gross levels of contamination. The wipes were measured using the aforementioned Ludlum Model 2401-P and a Ludlum Model 3 with a pancake probe. No measurable radiation was identified on the wipes taken by the NRC.
Felman Production, LLC personnel had replaced the padlock on the cabinet following its initial discovery and retained and controlled the key with the facilitys maintenance manager. Facility staff appeared to respect the red Danger tape while the NRC was on-site, and were instructed to use other routes (i.e. not to cut through the unused control room). Areas above and below the cabinet containing the nuclear gauges either were generally inaccessible or at a great enough distance with intervening shielding (e.g. thick concrete floors) to reduce radiation levels to be indistinguishable from background radiation levels.
The NRC interviewed facility employees, particularly requesting interviews with staff who had been at the facility for an extended period. For example, one staff member worked at the facility since 1973, a nearly 50-year period (with occasional layoffs during this tenure). This staff member and others provided descriptions of past processes where nuclear gauges of this sort may have been used previously. Material mixing chutes were identified as the likely facility component where these nuclear gauges may have been installed. Interviews further suggested the nuclear gauges were likely deinstalled on or around 2003, nearly twenty years prior to discovery. Staff further described current processes to identify likely components or processes where a nuclear gauge may be installed or in use that had not yet been discovered.
Lastly, the NRC performed a walk-through of the facility. This included a tour following the pathway that the raw material inputs follow or used to follow, as well as the performance of radiation surveys throughout the time the NRC personnel were on-site, with an emphasis on other storage cabinets to try to identify any as-yet undiscovered devices. No radiation levels were identified to suggest any nuclear gauges throughout the walk-through.
The NRC completed its on-site inspection on November 16, 2022. At the conclusion of the on-site inspection, the facilitys management committed to contacting a second suitably-licensed service provider to establish quotes for the performance of leak tests and removal of the nuclear gauges from the facility. The NRC personnel provided descriptions and contact information for two government administered programs that may be of assistance: the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Off-Site Source Recover Program (OSRP), managed by Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) Source Collection and Threat Reduction (SCATR) Program.
The NRCs preliminary conclusion with the completion of the on-site inspection was that Felman Production, LLC was suitably equipped to and was in practice providing adequate control and limiting access to the identified radioactive materials, and no further NRC controls were deemed necessary (for example, mandating Felman Production, LLC apply for and receive an NRC license) to provide reasonable assurance of the protection of the public and the environment.
8 2.4.
Device Information Figure 3 - NRC photos of the partially legible nuclear gauge identification plates. Top Left: 8.0 milligrams of radium-226 (Note: a milligram of radium-226 is approximately equal to a millicurie), Model B-20-25, manufacture date June 1973, and what appears to be a serial number: R980. Top Right: S.H (Source Holder)
Model B-20-25, manufactured December 1970, serial number R 1127. Bottom: Manufactured May 25, 1967, radium-226, activity: 1 millicurie, Model SH-501, serial number S1063.
Both the NRC personnel and the service provider were able to read some of the identification plates affixed to the nuclear gauges. These plates all appeared to quote the sources within as radium-226, though in varying quantities (and using different radiological units, such as millicuries, versus milligrams of radium). The nuclear gauges, as already covered in Section 2.2 and 2.3 of this report, appeared to be In-Val-Co Model
9 B-20-25 nuclear gauges (8 devices) and Robert Shaw [Controls Company] Model SH-501 nuclear gauges (3 devices), for a total of 11 nuclear gauges. Some of the identification plates are shown above in Figure 3.
The NRC performed a search of the Sealed Source and Device Registry and was able to identify an entry for the In-Val-Co Model B-20-25 (Registry Entry NR-804-D-801-S) under the NATCO (National Tank Co., formerly C.E. In-Val-Co) manufacturer/distributor. While the Registry entry doesnt include radium-226 as an allowable isotope, this is likely due to the lack of jurisdiction of the then-Atomic Energy Commission over naturally-occurring radioactive material such as radium.
2.5.
Post-Inspection Discovery Figure 4 - Felman Production LLC photos following the discovery of three additional nuclear gauges. Left Image:
photo from outside Substation No. 5 Transformer Room. Right image: discovery of three additional nuclear gauges (one foreground, two background); foreground nuclear gauge identification plate: Radium-226, 1.5 milligrams (equivalent to 1.5 millicuries), serial number R-358 Felman Production, LLC communicated to the NRC inspector on November 17, 2022, that three further nuclear gauges matching the description of the In-Val-Co/NATCO Model B-20-25 were identified at the facility following the departure of the NRC on November 16, 2022. These devices were found in a substation transformer room, a room that was reported as not generally visited unless maintenance/repair was necessary (see Figure 4). Following identification, Felman Production, LLC cordoned off the room and directed employees not the enter the area.
10 The NRC telephonically interviewed the staff involved both in the initial discovery and the post-inspection discovery. Some of the staff appear to have been generally aware of the presence of nuclear gauges at the site and that prior first-line supervisors did not believe any action was necessary. These staff further confirmed that the use of the substation transformer room was sporadic and was locked as a safety concern due to the high voltage hazards within the room.
2.6.
Removal of the Nuclear Gauges Felman Production, LLC contacted the Department of Energy, NNSAs OSRP to assess their anticipated costs and timeline for the removal of the gauges compared to a privately licensed commercial entity (i.e. another service provider). Felman Production, LLC elected to contract the services of a commercial service provider licensed out of the State of Tennessee to evaluate the nuclear gauges, perform leak tests, and remove the devices for transfer to a licensed third-party. These evaluations demonstrated the devices were free of removable contamination.
On January 31 and February 1, 2023, all 14 of the identified nuclear gauges were packaged for transport and the licensed commercial service provider removed the devices from the facility. The nuclear gauges were transported from Felman Production LLCs facility to a third-party with a specific license with the NRC sufficient to authorize the possession of the nuclear gauges and their associated radium-226 sources. The licensed third-party acknowledged receipt of the nuclear gauges in writing.
2.7.
NRC Findings The two regulations of concern with regards to the NRCs observations were 10 CFR 30.3(a) and 30.3(c)(3), which collectively describe the activities which would require an NRC license and the time period for persons possessing discrete sources of radium-226 which would require a specific license to apply for this license, respectively.
Consistent with the NRC Enforcement Manual, Topical Chapters, Section 3.9 Dispositioning Violations of Naturally Occurring and Accelerator-Produced radioactive Materials (NARM) Requirements, the NRC determined it was appropriate to use enforcement discretion to not cite a violation of the above-quoted regulatory requirements. This discretion was based on the four factors discussed in the Enforcement Manual, which included: (1) the failure did not result in an actual safety, health, or security consequence; (2) the failure was not willful; (3) the licensee (or non-licensee) has provided a reasonable argument that they had reason to believe that the new requirement did not apply to them, or that they were unaware of the new requirement; and (4) the licensee (or non-licensee) has committed to submit an initial license application within 60 days; or to submit a license amendment request within 30 days; or confirms that all existing NARM activities will be included with the existing byproduct material licensed activities and will meet all the existing commitments of the current license within 30 days.
With respect to the above factors, the NRC determined that: (1) there were no material concerns regarding actual safety, health, or security consequences; (2) there were no indications of willfulness on the part of Felman Production, LLCs apparent noncompliance; (3) Felman Production, LLC was not, at a managerial or organization level, aware of its possession of the radioactive materials, and therefore it is reasonable
11 that they were unaware of the applicability of this regulation to their organization; and (4) Felman Production, LLC committed to the disposal or lawful transfer of the radioactive materials upon discovery of this materials. This disposition was accomplished via a licensed service provider between January 31 and February 1, 2023, as described above in Section 2.6.
2.8.
Conclusions From initial discovery on November 2, 2022, through final disposition on February 1, 2023, Felman Production, LLC took reasonable and appropriate steps to respond to the situation: external contacts were made with government authorities, controls implemented to reduce radiation safety and security concerns, and a high level of priority and resources were allocated to actively managing the situation. Felman Production, LLC leadership emphasized to the NRC at multiple points their priority to dispose of the unwanted material in a safe and timely manner.
- 3.
Exit Meeting Summary The NRC performed a final exit briefing with Felman Production, LLC on February 22, 2023, and provided the final results of the NRCs inspection. Attending the call for Felman Production, LLC, included Mr. Vitaliy Anosov, Plant Manager, Mr. Andrew Johnston, Health and Safety Manager, and Mr. Nick Paasche, M.S., Project Geologist with LAN Associates, Inc., Felman Production, LLCs third-party environmental consultant.
Attachment SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Vitaliy Anosov, Plant Manager Jacob Sayre, Maintenance Manager Andrew Johnston, Health and Safety Manager Nick Paasche, M.S., Project Geologist, LAN Associates, Inc.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 87103 - Inspection of Materials Licensees Involved in an Incident or Bankruptcy Filing ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed 10 CFR 30.3(a) - A regulation requiring that no person shall manufacture, produce, transfer, receive, acquire, own, possess, or use byproduct material except as authorized in a specific or general license issued in accordance with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 30.
10 CFR 30.3(c)(3) - A regulation requiring, in part, that persons possessing discrete sources of radium-226 for which a specific license is required under 10 CFR 30.3(a) must submit a license application within 12 months from the waiver expiration date of August 7, 2009, or within 12 months from the date of an earlier termination of the waiver as notified by the NRC, whichever date is earlier.
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRCPD Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors LLC Limited Liability Corporation NATCO National Tank Co. (device manufacturer)
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration, part of the U.S. Department of Energy NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSRP Off-Site Source Recover Program PEC Predecisional Enforcement Conference R&D Research and Development SCATR Source Collection and Threat Reduction Program