ML23048A117

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Staff Presentation - Public Meeting to Discuss Potential Options for Security Requirements for Category I and Category III Quantities of Special Nuclear Material and Security and Safeguards Requirements for Alternate Nuclear Material - 02/2
ML23048A117
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/28/2023
From: Marshall Kohen
NRC/NSIR/DPCP
To:
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Download: ML23048A117 (1)
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Public Meeting to Discuss Potential Options for Physical Protection Requirements for Category I and III Quantities of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and Physical Protection and Safeguards Requirements for Alternate Nuclear Material (ANM)

February 28, 2023

What are the proposed issues to be considered in the Commission paper?

2 A. Security for Category II quantities of SNM B. Security for spent nuclear fuel (use and storage / transportation)

C. Security for ANM D. Security for Categories I and III quantities of SNM

What is the purpose of todays meeting?

3

  • This is the second of three public meetings to discuss various aspects of potential enhanced security of SNM
  • This is a Comment-Gathering meeting
  • Attendees will have the opportunity to ask questions and/or make comments about the issues discussed; however, the NRC will not provide written responses to comments or questions raised
  • Later opportunity for stakeholder review if Commission directs rulemaking
  • Comments/questions must involve only publicly-available information

Current NRC SNM Categorization Category I Category II Category III Plutonium and U-233 2 kg

< 2 kg and > 500 g 500 g and > 15g U-235 20% enriched 5 kg

< 5 kg and > 1 kg 1 kg and > 15g U-235 < 20% and 10%

enriched 10 kg

< 10 kg and > 1 kg U-235 < 10% enriched 10 kg

4

What is meant by Attractiveness?

Dilution Factor - measure of attractiveness The mass of the fissile material divided by the total mass of the fissile material and non-fissile materials (that are not mechanically separable from the fissile material, for solids)

Non-dilute Moderately dilute Highly dilute Risk-informed concept The less dilute the material, the more attractive it is to adversaries 5

Issue D Physical Protection for Category I and III SNM

Why focus on Category I and III SNM?

Current regulatory framework (regulations + orders + voluntary upgrades) provides adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security.

Facilities with Category I quantities of SNM Make generally applicable existing exemptions; reduce need for future exemptions Additional flexibility to reduce physical protection for material with lower improvised nuclear device (IND) risks, i.e., via dilution factors Facilities with Category I and Category III quantities of SNM Address current understanding of the threat environment Improve regulatory reliability and clarity for licensees and potential applicants Facilities with Category III quantities of SNM Ensure that physical protection regulations fully consider International Atomic Energy Agencys Information Circular (INFCIRC)/225/Rev. 5 7

Facilities potentially affected by changes to requirements for Category I and III quantities of SNM 8

Licensee Type Naval Fuel Facilities / Future Reprocessing Facilities Other Fuel Cycle Facilities Research and Test Reactor facilities Greater than Critical Mass licensees Limited number of Agreement State Licensees

NO RULEMAKING FOR CATEGORY I OR CATEGORY III SNM Option 1 OPTION 2A Consider SNM attractiveness, Category I and III orders, and INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 OPTION 2B Performance-based regulations for Category I SNM; account for security orders and SNM attractiveness RULEMAKING Options 2A and 2B What are the options the staff is considering for physical protection of Category I and Category III SNM (Issue D)?

9

What would happen if there were no rulemaking for Category I and III SNM (Option 1)?

10

  • Staff would use existing regulations and guidance to conduct licensing reviews
  • Security orders would remain in place
  • Staff would employ a case-by-case approach

Advantages/Disadvantages of no rulemaking (Option 1) 11

  • Advantage
  • Involves no expenditure of resources for rulemaking
  • Disadvantages
  • Limits regulatory reliability and clarity with a mix of regulations and orders

What would happen if rulemaking proceeded considering SNM attractiveness, security orders, INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 (Option 2A)?

12

  • Staff would recommend that a small number of new measures be added to the regulations to make the existing Category III SNM regulations more complete in describing a comprehensive security program and fully consider INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5
  • Staff would recommend using SNM attractiveness, via dilution factors, to allow licensees to reduce the level of protection for Category I quantities of SNM commensurate with the lower IND risk associated with that material

Examples of potential outcomes for Category III SNM (Option 2A) 13 Additional Comprehensive Program Items Consideration of INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 Issue tracking system Safety-security interface Identify security manager and individual responsible to direct security activities Security implementing procedures Secure and monitor openings in barriers Trained and qualified security organization Document access authorization program Limit access to Controlled Access Area Escorted access permitted Control of keys, locks, and passwords Communication capability with onsite and offsite resources Establish a maintenance, testing and calibration program Agreements of local law enforcement Familiarize response forces with the site Establish eminent threat procedure

Examples of potential outcomes for Category I SNM (Option 2A)

  • Security order requirements would be made generally applicable in the regulations
  • Security orders would be rescinded
  • SNM attractiveness would establish three levels of protection correlating to the dilution factor approach (non-dilute, moderately-dilute, and highly-dilute)
  • Voluntary upgrades would remain in place outside the regulatory framework 14

Advantages of rulemaking considering SNM attractiveness (Option 2A) 15

  • Rulemaking process allows for broader engagement with stakeholder community on potential improvements to risk-inform security
  • Increases regulatory reliability and clarity for applicants and licensees
  • Ensures full consideration of international guidance

Disadvantages of rulemaking considering SNM attractiveness (Option 2A) 16

  • Requires significant time and financial resource expenditure for rulemaking
  • Does not permit all voluntary Category I enhancements, i.e., not associated with orders, to be added to the regulations

What would happen if rulemaking proceeded, implementing performance-based regulations for Category I SNM (Option 2B)?

17

  • Staff would recommend more performance-based regulations than the series of prescriptive measures staff proposed in previous analyses
  • Physical protection system would be based on threat and site-specific vulnerability assessments

Examples of potential outcomes - Revise regulations to be more performance-based (Option 2B) 18

  • Licensees/applicants would need to perform analyses to support documentation of physical protection systems
  • Security plans would need to be revised based on performance objectives rather than existing requirements

Advantages of rulemaking implementing performance-based regulations for Category I SNM (Option 2B) 19

  • Increases regulatory flexibility for Category I licensees to implement facility-specific security based on site specific vulnerability and diversion path analyses
  • Permits Category I security orders to be rescinded and allows the inclusion of voluntary upgrades into the regulations, per Commission direction
  • Involves a risk-informed approach

Disadvantages of rulemaking implementing performance-based regulations for Category I SNM (Option 2B) 20

  • Requires expenditure of NRC staff resources for rulemaking
  • NRC inspection program would need to be adjusted to account for performance-based flexibility

Issue C Alternate Nuclear Material

Why focus on alternate nuclear material?

  • ANM can be used to create an IND
  • Not currently possessed by NRC licensees in sufficient quantities to consider IND risk
  • Reprocessing activities could produce kilogram quantities of separated ANM
  • In SRM-SECY-09-0123, the Commission deferred the staffs recommendation to develop regulations for physical protection and material control and accounting (MC&A) for ANM

22

  • See DOE O473.1A and O474.2

Why focus on alternate nuclear material (cont.)?

  • In the past, advanced reactor applicants indicated limited near-term interest (within the next decade or two) in the use of reprocessed spent fuel
  • More recent staff interaction with advanced reactor stakeholders indicates an interest in using reprocessing technology
  • 2022 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine report*

recommendation: [a rulemaking]would provide an opportunity to clarify the attractiveness of all materials that may be present in advanced reactor fuel cycles and the appropriate levels of security to apply to them.

23

OPTION 2A Rulemaking for PP and MC&A for ANM OPTION 2B Rulemaking for PP of ANM; Defer MC&A RULEMAKING FOR ANM Options 2A and 2B What are the options the staff is considering for physical protection and MC&A for ANM (Issue C)?

OPTION 1A Status Quo - No Rulemaking for either PP or MC&A OPTION 1B Defer rulemaking until there is an application for reprocessing NO IMMEDIATE RULEMAKING FOR ANM Options 1A and 1B 24

What would happen if there were no rulemaking for ANM (Option 1A)?

25

  • If the NRC received a license application for a reprocessing facility, staff would continue to employ a case-by-case approach to determine the appropriate physical protection and MC&A requirements
  • Physical protection and MC&A could be applied based on the characteristics of ANM (potentially considering attractiveness) rather than the facility that possesses it
  • Staff could consider supplemental security measures via orders

Advantages/Disadvantages of no rulemaking for ANM (Option 1A) 26

  • Advantages
  • Disadvantages
  • Decreases regulatory transparency and clarity for applicants and licensees
  • Could result in extended staff review time and additional resources for an application due to development of orders, exemptions and/or license conditions

What would happen if rulemaking for ANM were deferred until an application was submitted for a reprocessing facility (Option 1B)?

27

  • Licensing a future reprocessing facility may require orders, exemptions, and license conditions to address any regulatory gaps
  • Staff would leverage the gap analysis as referenced in SECY 0026, Discontinuation of Rulemaking - Spent Fuel Reprocessing, dated March 19, 2021 (ML20301A388)

Advantages/Disadvantages of deferring rulemaking for ANM (Option 1B) 28

  • Advantages
  • Allows staff more time to assess industry interest in reprocessing facilities
  • Disadvantages
  • Decreases regulatory transparency and clarity for applicants and licensees
  • Could result in extended staff review time and additional resources for an application due to development of orders, exemptions and/or license conditions

What would happen if there were a rulemaking for physical protection and MC&A for ANM (Option 2A)?

  • The staff would specify the nuclides constituting ANM in regulations 29

Advantages of rulemaking for physical protection and MC&A for ANM (Option 2A)

  • Rulemaking process allows for broader engagement with stakeholder community on potential measures to risk-inform physical protection and MC&A for ANM
  • Increases regulatory reliability and clarity for applicants and licensees
  • Incurs minimal additional NRC staff resources for physical protection - staff has analyzed technical information
  • Aligns with 2022 National Academies report recommendation to conduct a rulemaking on weapons-useable materials 30

Disadvantages of rulemaking for physical protection and MC&A for ANM (Option 2A) 31

  • Addressing the MC&A for ANM in a rulemaking effort would incur additional resources for staff to perform associated technical analysis
  • No immediate benefit (no current application for a reprocessing facility)
  • Requires modifications to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) reporting system
  • If combined with an SNM rulemaking, could increase the complexity and delay the process

What would happen if there were rulemaking for physical protection for ANM, but MC&A were deferred (Option 2B) ?

32

  • Staff would likely propose physical protection for ANM be regulated similarly to Category I or II quantities of HEU

Advantages of rulemaking for physical protection for ANM, but deferring MC&A (Option 2B)

  • Rulemaking process allows for broader engagement with stakeholder community on potential measures to risk-inform physical protection for ANM
  • Increases regulatory reliability and clarity for applicants and licensees

- staff has analyzed technical information

  • Avoids rulemaking costs for MC&A aspects
  • Aligns with 2022 National Academies report recommendation 33

Disadvantages of rulemaking for physical protection for ANM, but deferring MC&A (Option 2B) 34

  • No immediate benefit (no current application for a reprocessing facility)
  • If combined with an SNM rulemaking, could increase the complexity and delay the process

Schedule 35

  • 1/30/23 - Public meeting on Category II SNM (Issue A)
  • 2/28/23 - Public meeting on Category I and III SNM and alternate nuclear material (Issues C & D)
  • 3/21/23 - Public meeting on 1 gray at 1 meter external radiation threshold (Issue B)
  • 10/2/23 - Commission paper due

Summary 36

  • Current options under consideration for Category I/III SNM
  • No rulemaking - Status quo
  • Rulemaking with consideration of SNM attractiveness, program enhancements and INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5
  • Rulemaking with performance-based Category I SNM regulations
  • Current options under consideration for ANM
  • No Immediate Rulemaking
  • Status quo - Case-by-case
  • Defer rulemaking until receipt of a license application for a reprocessing facility
  • Rulemaking

Summary 37

  • All options, definitions and physical protection measures are pre-decisional and are subject to change
  • Further opportunity for stakeholder review and input if Commission directs rulemaking

Marshall Kohen Marshall.Kohen@nrc.gov 301-287-3689 Tim Harris Tim.Harris@nrc.gov 301-287-3594 Beth Reed Elizabeth.Reed@nrc.gov 301-415-2130

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