ML23019A026

Staff Presentation - Public Meeting to Discuss Potential Options for Security Requirements for Category II Quantities of Special Nuclear Material - 1/30/23

ML23019A026
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/30/2023
From:	Marshall Kohen NRC/NSIR/DPCP/MSB
To:
References
Download: ML23019A026 (1)

Text

Public Meeting to Discuss Potential Options for Security Requirements for Category II Quantities of Special Nuclear Material (SNM)

January 30, 2023

What are the proposed issues to be considered in the Commission paper?

A. Security for Category II quantities of SNM B. Security for spent nuclear fuel (use and storage /

transportation)

C. Security for alternate nuclear material D. Security for Categories I and III quantities of SNM 2

What is the purpose of todays meeting?

• Engage stakeholders regarding potential revised security for Category II quantities of SNM

• This is the first of three public meetings to discuss various aspects of potential enhanced security of SNM

• This is a Comment-Gathering meeting

• Attendees will have the opportunity to ask questions and/or make comments about the issues discussed; however, the NRC will not provide written responses to comments or questions raised

• Later opportunity for stakeholder review if Commission directs rulemaking

• Comments/questions must involve only publicly-available information 3

Current NRC SNM Categorization Category I Category II Category III Plutonium and U-233 2 kg < 2 kg and > 500 g 500 g and > 15g U-235 20% enriched 5 kg < 5 kg and > 1 kg 1 kg and > 15g U-235 < 20% and 10%

10 kg > 10 kg and < 1 kg enriched U-235 < 10% enriched 10 kg

• From 10 CFR Part 110, Appendix M. Also see 10 CFR § 73.2, Definitions.

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Why focus on Category II quantities of SNM?

• Current regulatory framework (regulations + supplemental security measures (SSM) in license conditions) provides adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security.

• In response to Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)-SECY-19-0095, Discontinuation of Rulemaking - Enhanced Security of Special Nuclear Material (ML21217A065), the staff is evaluating the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework

• Facilities using and storing Category II quantities of SNM have been licensed through this integrated regulatory framework

• Regulations for protection of Category II quantities of SNM and SSNM* have not been updated since 1979

• Strategic Special Nuclear Material (SSNM) - U-235 (contained in uranium enriched to >=20%

in the U-235 isotope), U-233, or Pu 5

Examples of potential direct or indirect applicability Company Technology X-Energy Pebble-bed reactor TerraPower / General Electric-Hitachi Fast reactor Eden Radioisotopes Radioisotope production Kairos Power Low-power test reactor 6

What are the options the staff is considering for security of Category II quantities of SNM (topic A)?

1. No Rulemaking - Continue case-by-case approach

2. Rulemaking - Take into consideration SNM attractiveness

3. Rulemaking - No consideration for SNM attractiveness 7

What is meant by SNM Attractiveness?

• Dilution Factor - proxy for attractiveness

• The weight of U-235, U-233 and Pu divided by the total weight of the SNM material and non-SNM materials (that are not mechanically separable from the SNM, for solids)

• Non-dilute

• Moderately dilute

• Highly dilute

• Risk-informed concept

• The less dilute the material, the more attractive it is to adversaries 8

What would happen if there were no rulemaking (Option 1)?

• Applicants would propose security plans based on current regulations (and potentially, pre-application discussions)

• Staff would employ a case-by-case approach to determine whether SSMs, beyond the security requirements in the existing regulations, were needed

• Staff could use SNM attractiveness concepts in analyzing needed SSMs 9

Examples of potential outcomes of Option 1

• An applicant would have to establish a Safeguards Information protection program to permit discussions on any SSMs needed to supplement the security regulations.

• The applicant would incorporate site-specific SSMs into the physical security plan that the NRC would review and approve.

• In general, fewer SSMs would be required for facilities that do not process material or where the form of the material is not altered.

• Additional SSMs would be required for facilities with larger quantities of material.

• Changes in dilution factor as material is processed could obviate the need for some SSMs.

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Advantages/Disadvantages of no rulemaking (Option 1)

• Advantages

• No resources expended on rulemaking

• Allows for a licensee-specific analysis of any necessary SSMs

• Disadvantages

• Limits transparency of security measures such that external stakeholders may not understand what is required for various applications

• Limits regulatory reliability and clarity

• Would not address 2022 National Academies report recommendation: [NRC] should initiate a rulemaking to address the security and material accounting measures for high assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and other attractive nuclear materials that may be present in advanced reactor fuel cycles.

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What would happen if rulemaking proceeded, with consideration of SNM attractiveness (Option 2)?

• Staff would recommend security measures to be added to the regulations

• These measures would be graded, based on dilution factor

• Staff would develop new or revise guidance to accompany revised regulations 12

Examples of potential outcomes - Option 2 Category II - Non-Dilute Category II - Moderately Dilute HALEU Protective

• Immediately detect/assess unauthorized

• Promptly detect/assess unauthorized Strategy access or activities access or activities

• Prevent removal of SNM (containment

• Delay an external adversary from strategy) completing a gross theft (recapture/

recovery strategy)

Barrier

• Controlled access area within a protected area

• Controlled access area (no protected area)

Detection and

• Redundant alarm stations

• Single alarm station Response

• Armed response force

• Local law enforcement response 13

Advantages/Disadvantages of rulemaking with consideration of SNM attractiveness (Option 2)

• Advantages

• Rulemaking process allows for broader engagement with stakeholder community on potential improvements to risk-inform security

• Increases regulatory reliability and clarity for applicants and licensees

• SNM attractiveness can provide gradation of security measures by dilution (risk-informed)

• Disadvantages

• Rulemaking requires significant time and financial resource expenditure 14

What would happen if rulemaking proceeded, without consideration of SNM attractiveness (Option 3)?

• Staff would recommend additional security measures to be added to the regulations

• These measures would apply consistently to all Category II quantities of SNM, regardless of dilution factor

• Staff would develop guidance to accompany revised regulations 15

Examples of potential outcomes - Option 3

• Immediately detect and assess unauthorized access or activities (containment strategy)

• Controlled access area within a protected area

• Redundant alarm stations

• Armed response force 16

Advantages/Disadvantages of rulemaking without consideration of SNM attractiveness (Option 3)

• Advantages

• Rulemaking process allows for broader engagement with stakeholder community on potential improvements to security

• Increases regulatory reliability and clarity for applicants and licensees

• Disadvantages

• Rulemaking requires significant time and financial resource expenditure

• Not fully risk-informed (could result in excessive requirements for low attractiveness, i.e., lower threat risk, material) 17

Tentative Schedule

• 1/30/23 - Public meeting on Category II SNM (Issue A)

• 2/21/23 - Public meeting on Category I and III SNM and alternate nuclear material (Issues C & D)

• 3/21/23 - Public meeting on 1 gray at 1 meter external radiation threshold (Issue B)

• 10/2/23 - Commission paper due 18

Summary

• Current options under consideration for Category II SNM security

• No rulemaking - Staff continue case-by-case approach

• Rulemaking with consideration of SNM attractiveness

• Rulemaking with no consideration of SNM attractiveness

• All options and security measures are pre-decisional and are subject to change

• Further opportunity for stakeholder review if Commission directs rulemaking

• Are there other aspects of security of SNM on which NRC staff might benefit from hearing stakeholder views?

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Marshall Kohen Tim Harris Marshall.Kohen@nrc.gov Tim.Harris@nrc.gov 301-287-3689 301-287-3594