ML22263A412
| ML22263A412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/2022 |
| From: | Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22263A410 | List: |
| References | |
| L-22-129 | |
| Download: ML22263A412 (3) | |
Text
Attachment 1 L-22-129 Information Removed from DBNPS, Unit No.1 UFSAR Page 1 of 1 In accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 98-03, Revision 1, Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports, licensees periodically report a brief description of information removed from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the basis for its removal. The following provides a summary of the information removed from the UFSAR and the basis for removal.
- 1. Section 1.6 of the DBNPS UFSAR provides a cross reference to specific UFSAR figures that are also controlled drawings. These UFSAR figures provide duplicate information and are removed from the UFSAR with the controlled drawing referenced in the applicable section.
Attachment 2 L-22-129 Commitment Change Summary Report Page 1 of 2 COMMITMENT COMMITMENT NUMBER / SOURCE / DATE DESCRIPTION CHANGE REASON FOR CHANGE DB-O01501 QCI 3070 establishes NOP-LP-2020 establishes The actions of GL 83-28 were intended to Serial 1000, 11/7/1983 guidelines of receipt guidelines for conduct of address issues related to reactor trip inspections performed. All Q- receipt inspections performed. system reliability and general management List, fire protection and/or All safety-related components capability of understanding the causes of ASME items are receipt are receipt inspected. unscheduled reactor shutdowns. The inspected. scope of required actions associated with Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface was limited to safety-related components; however, the original committed response transcended safety-related components to include all fire protection and/or ASME items, which may or may not be safety-related. This change realigns with the original scope of the GL required actions.
DB-O05414 Threaded fasteners of closure All threaded fasteners within The original commitment was created Serial 1-0284, 8/4/1982 connections in the scope of the scope of IEB 82-02 will be based on Action 2 from the IEB, which was IEB 82-02 will be inspected inspected in accordance with a one-time action that was completed each time when opened for ASME Code Section XI 1974 almost 40 years ago. Since that time, a component inspection or or later requirements. better understanding of the degradation of maintenance. threaded fasteners has been developed and ASME Section XI code requirements have changed. A graded approach is used based on leakage and visual signs of degradation. This change aligns with current inspection requirements.
L-22-129 Page 2 of 2 COMMITMENT COMMITMENT NUMBER / SOURCE / DATE DESCRIPTION CHANGE REASON FOR CHANGE DB-O21576 Implement mitigative strategies Implement mitigative The updated SFP mitigation strategy Serial 3157, 5/31/2005 as described. strategies as described. (The reduces risk associated with fuel (NRC Order Section B.5.b- change for this commitment is movements, while still providing an related commitment) in the detailed description of effective mitigation of fuel damage. Refer the SFP mitigation strategy, to Commitment DB-O21806 below.
which is contained in a separate document from the commitment.)
DB-O21806 Procedures revised to require Procedures revised to provide The updated SFP mitigation strategy Serial 3238, 2/27/2006 that the discharge fuel SFP makeup of 500 gpm and credits SFP makeup and spray capabilities (NRC Order Section B.5.b- assemblies will be stored in the SFP spray of 200 gpm within and SFP level instrumentation installed in related commitment) SFP in the appropriate 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s/120 minutes from the response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi event dispersion pattern as soon as time personnel diagnose in March of 2011. The updated strategy possible but no later than 60 actions are required. reduces risk associated with fuel days following shutdown for movements, while still providing an refueling, or prior to reactor In the event this effective mitigation of fuel damage.
restart (Mode 2) following makeup/spray capability is not refueling, whichever is later, available, procedures are also unless other factors make this in place to require that not readily available. discharge fuel assemblies will be stored in the SFP in the appropriate dispersal pattern as soon as possible but no later than 60 days following shutdown for refueling or prior to reactor restart (Mode 2) refueling, whichever is later.
List of Abbreviations Used:
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers NOP Nuclear Operating Procedure GL Generic Letter QCI Quality Control Instruction gpm gallons per minute SFP Spent Fuel Pool IEB Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin