ML22115A027

American Centrifuge Plant, Emergency Plan, Revision 33

ML22115A027
Person / Time
Site:	07007004
Issue date:	02/28/2022
From:	American Centrifuge Operating
To:	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
ACO 22-0038, NR-3605-0008
Download: ML22115A027 (36)

Text

Enclosure 1 to ACO 22-0038 Changed Pages of the Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Information contained within does not contain Export Controlled Information Reviewer: #1038 Date: 02/03/2022

NR-3605-0008 I

Emergency Pl~n for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio The American CentrifugerM Revision 33 Docket No. 70-7004 February 2022 Information contained within does not contain Export Contro lled Information Reviewer: # !038 Date: 02/03/2022

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Blank Page

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant NR-3605-0008 EMERGENCY PLAN FOR THE AMERICAN CENTRIFUGE PLANT in Piketon, Ohio Docket No. 70-7001 Revision 33.

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Blank Page

Revision 33 Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant UPDATED LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Revision 0- IO CFR 1045 review completed by L. Sparks on 07/27/04 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by R. Coriell on 07/30/04.

' Revision I - 10 CFR 1045 review completed by L. Sparks on 03/04/05 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by R. Coriell on 03/10/05.

Revision 2- 10 CFR 1045 review completed by J. Weidner on 05/23/05 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by R. Coriell on 05/23/05.

Revision 3 - 10 CFR 1045 review completed by J. Weidner on 06/17/05 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by D. Hupp on 06/17/05.

Revision 4 - IO CFR I 045 review completed by J. Weidner on 08/30/05 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by D. Hupp on 08/29/05.

Revision 5 - IO CFR 1045 review completed by J. Weidner on 10/05/05 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by D. Hupp on 10/04/05.

Revision 6 - IO CFR I 045 review completed by J. Weidner on 11/04/05 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by D. Hupp on 11/04/05.

Revision 7 - 10 CFR 1045 review completed by J. Weidner on I 1/17/05 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by D. Hupp on 11/17/05.

Revision 8 - 10 CFR 1045 review completed by J. Weidner on 02/17/06 and the Export Controlled Information review completed by D. Hupp on 02/17/06.

Revision 9 - 10 CFR 1045 review completed by J. Weidner on 06/01/06 and the Export Controlled Infonnation review completed by G. Peed on 06/01/06.

Revision IO - IO CFR 1045 and the Export Controlled Information reviews were completed by R. Coriell on 07/11/06.

Revision 11 - IO CFR I 045 and the Export Controlled Information reviews were completed by R. Coriell on 06/26/07.

Revision 12-10 CFR 1045 and the Export Controlled Information reviews were completed by G. Peed on 01/11/08.

Revision 13- 10 CFR 1045 and the Export Controlled Infonnation reviews were completed by G. Peed on 01/24/08.

Revision 14- 10 CFR 1045 and the Export Controlled Infonnation reviews were completed by M. Basham on 06/05/08.

Revision 15- 10 CFR 1045 and the Export Controlled Infonnation reviews were completed by R. S. Lykowski 01/27/09.

Revision 16- 10 CFR 1045 and the Export Controlled Information reviews were completed by R.S. Lykowski on 9/24/09.

Revision 17 - 10 CFR I 045 and the Export Controlled Information reviews were completed by R.S. Lykowski on 1/7/10.

Revision 18 - IO CFR I 045 and the Export Controlled Infonnation reviews were completed by R.S. Lykowski on 4/22/10.

Revision 19- 10 CFR 1045 and the Export Controlled Infonnation reviews were completed by R.S. Lykowski on 7/23/10.

Revision 20 - Reviewed and determined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 2- I 6-11.

Revision 21 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 4-19-11.

Revision 22 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive information reviews completed and approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 4-17-12.

Revision 23 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 8-27-12.

Revision 24 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 2-20-13.

Revision 25 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 10-18-13.

Revision 26 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved, for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 11-22-13.

Revision 27 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 2-13-14.

Revision 28 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier R.S. Lykowski. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed arid approved for public release by R.S. Lykowski on 7/28/15.

Revision 29 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier John Lockwood. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by John Lockwood on 6/17/16. ,

Revision 30 - Reviewed and detennined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier #4769. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by Reviewer#l014 on 01/31/2020.

Revision 31 - Reviewed and determined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier #4769. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by Reviewer# IO 14 on 06/10/2021.

Revision 32 - Reviewed and determined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier #4769. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by Reviewer#l014 on 07/06/2021.

Revision 33 - Reviewed and determined to be UNCLASSIFIED. Derivative Classifier #4734. Sensitive infonnation reviews completed and approved for public release by Reviewer# I 038 on 02/03/2022.

ULOEP-1

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 Page Number Revision Number Page Number Revision Number Cover Page 33 38 19 Inside Cover Page 33 39 19 ULOEP-1 33 40 19 ULOEP-2 33 41 19 ULOEP-3 33 42 19 ULOEP-4 33 43 19 Table of Contents 19 44 29 19 45 19 11 19 46 30 iii 19 47 19 iv 21 48 26 V 33 49 19 vi 19 50 19 I 15 51 22 2 8 52 26 3 15 53 19 4 21 54 19 5 8 55 19 6 8 56 30 7 26 57 31 8 8 58 19 9 8 59 19 10 33 60 19 II 33 61 24 12 19 62 29 13 19 63 26 14 19 64 19 15 19 65 19 16 19 66 19 17 19 67 19, 18 . 19 68 19 19 19 20 19 21 26 A-I 33 22 26 A-2 33 23 19 A-3 33 24 19 A-4 33 25 32 A-5 33 26 30 A-6 33 27 24 A-7 33 28 19 A-8 33 29 24 I 30 26 31 26 32 26 33 19 34 25 35 19 36 19

37 19 ULOEP-2

Revision 33 Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Page Number Revision Number Page Number Revision Number B-1 33 D-1 8 B-2 33 D-2 26 B-3 33 B-4 33 B-5 33 E-1 8 B-6 33 E-2 26 B-7 33 B-8 33 F-1 21 F-2 21 F-3 21 F-4 17 C-1 33 G-1 33 C-2 33 G-2 33 C-3 33 G-3 33 C-4 33 G-4 33 C-5 , 33 G-5 33 C-6 33 G-6 33 C-7 33 G-7 33 C-8 33 G-8 33 G-9 '33 G-10 33 G-11 33 G-12 33 G-13 33 G-14 33 G-15 33 G-16 33 G-17 33 G-18 33 ULOEP-3

Emergency Plan for the American Centriji,ge Plant Revision 33 Blank Page ULOEP-4

Revision 33 Emergency Plan/or the American Centrifuge flant APPENDICES APPENDIX A ....................................................................................................... :......................... ,A-l APPENDIX B .................................................................................................................................. B-1 APPENDIX C ..... '. ........................................................................................... .'................................ C-1 APPENDIX D., .........................................................................................................................................................D-1 APPENDIX E ....................................................... :........................................................................... E-l APPENDIX F .................................................................................................................................... F-1 APPENDIX G .....,. ............................................................................ ;......................... :..................... G-1 LIST OF TABLES Table 3.2-1 Alert - Emergency Action Level Criteria ................................................_................. 23 Table 3.2-2 Site Area E;mergency - Emergency Action Level Criteria ....................................... 24 V

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Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 2.0 TYPES OF ACCIDENTS Emergency planning at the DOE reservation consists of analysis of the potential hazards associated with ACP operations, as well as hazards associated with GDP activities, and ongoing DOE activities. The analyses also include consideration of the risks associated with the potential release of other hazardous radioactive and non-radioactive materials stored or used on-site.

Other hazardous materials are identified in the Material Safety Data Sheets/Safety Data Sheets (MSDS/SDS); chemical inventory; information from the Safeguards and Security Plan; Spill Contingency, Control, and Countermeasures Plan; and Hazardous Waste Contingency Plans.

Both radiological and non-radiological accidents or other emergencies that could occur on the reservation, include the following:

• Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) releases involving toxic or radioactive materials; Equipment failures and industrial accidents;

• Natural phenomena (i.e., tornadoes and earthquakes) and fires; and Security-related events (i.e., bomb threats and civil disturbances).

American Centrifuge Plant Hazards and consequence analyses reflected in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA)

Summary for the American Centrifuge Plant form the basis for emergency preparedness planning. Emergency preparedness at the ACP is intended to prevent, mitigate, and minimize the consequences of an accident.

Emergency planning for the ACP is based upon an evaluation of the risks associated with various accident scenarios identified in the ISA. Those analyses concluded that the most extreme credible scenario would be an accident involving a large uranium hexafluoride (UF6) release. The ISA included consideration of the risks associated with the potential release of other hazardous radioactive and non-radioactive materials stored or used at the ACP.

Each type of credible accident or event that could result in an emergency associated with these hazards has been identified and analyzed to assess the potential consequences to plant workers; public; environment; and on-site and off-site property. Section 5.0 of this plan describes emergency response measures in detail, including on-site and off-site protective actions. Table A-4 (located in Appendix G of this plan) contains a summary of the event scenarios that, if unmitigated, could result in potential off-site consequences. The events listed in Table A-4 (located in Appendix G of this plan) require crediting of Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS). The IROFS reduce the event likelihood and/or consequences to meet 10 CFR 70.61 Performance Requirements.

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Activities Hazards and consequence analyses reflected in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA)

Summary for the American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility (Lead Cascade) form the basis for emergency preparedness planning. Emergency preparedness at the Lead Cascade is intended to prevent, mitigate, and minimize the consequences of an accident.

Emergency planning for the Lead Cascade is based upon an evaluation of the risks associated with various accident scenarios identified in the ISA. Those analyses concluded that the most extreme credible scenario would be a UF6 release occurring in the X-3001 Process Building. Due to the small quantity of licensed material, the consequences of any accident postulated in the ISA would be small when compared to postulated accidents at the GDP or the ACP. Large quantities of other hazardous materials are not present in the Lead Cascade. Only small quantities of chemicals and materials (e.g., acetone, solvents, oils) are used during assembly and maintenance activities.

Each type of credible accident or event that could result in an emergency associated with these hazards has been identified and analyzed to assess the potential consequences to plant workers; public; environment; and on-site and off-site property. Section 5.0 of this plan describes emergency response measures in detail, including on-site and off-site protective actions. Table C-3 (located in Appendix G of this plan) contains a summary of the event scenarios that, if unmitigated, could result in potential off-sit~ consequences. The ev,ents listed in Table C-3 (located in Appendix G of this plan) require crediting of IROFS. The IROFS reduce the event likelihood and/or consequences to meet 10 CFR 70.61 Performance Requirements.

Gaseous Diffusion Plant Hazards and consequence analyses reflected in Section 4.0 of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certification, Safety Analysis Report (USEC-02) (hazards analysis) form the basis for emergency preparedness planning at the GDP. The NRC notice promulgating 10 CFR Part 76 indicated that tpe regulatory analysis for the emergency preparedness requirements for other nuclear fuel cycle facilities regulated by the NRC "concluded that off-site emergency preparedness should be based on chemical toxicity from a large UF6 release."

Emergency planning for the GDP is based upon an evaluation of the risks associated with various accident scenarios identified in the site-specific hazards analyses and other potential emergency situations. Those analyses concluded that the most extreme credible scenario would be an accident involving a large UF6 release.

Credible accidents or events that coulp result in an' emergency associated with these hazards have been identified and analyzed, to assess the potential consequences to plant workers; public; environment; and on-site and off-site property. Section 5.0 of this plan describes emergency response measures, including on-site and off-site protective actions. Table B-4 (located in Appendix G of this plan) contains a summary of the postulated events that could result in potential off-site consequences from the GDP.

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Emergency Plan for tlie American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022

(. APPENDIX A AMERICAN CENTRIFUGE PLANT LICENSED ACTIVITIES

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A-1

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 American Centrifuge Plant Licensed Activities The mission of the American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) is the enrichment of uranium with the isotope necessary to produce fuel for nuclear reactors (2 35 U) using the gas centrifuge process.

A basic summary of this process follows.

The uranium element appears in nature in numerous isotopes; the three major isotopes of interest have atomic weights of 234, 235, and 238. The three isotopes are fissionable; however, only 235 U is capable of sustaining a critical reaction in most applications. Natural uranium contains 0.711 weight (wt.) percent 235 U isotope. Isotopic separation processes separate uranium (e.g., its compounds) into two fractions, one enriched in the 235 U isotope, and the other depleted.

Prior to the enrichment process, uranium is combined with fluorine to form uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The ACP receives uranium in solid UF6 form, in 10- or 14-ton cylinders in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations.

In the gas centrifuge process, the isotopic separation is accomplished by "centrifugal force," which uses the difference in weight percent of the different uranium isotopes to achieve this isotopic separation. UF6 is fed into the system in the gaseous state and is enriched up to 10 wt. percent assay 235 U. The ACP withdraws the enriched (product) stream and the depleted (tails) stream in the gaseous state. The product and tails streams are then sublimed into a solid state for handling/movement. The ACP minimizes the amount of UF6 in the liquid state.

The ACP operates two process buildings containing the centrifuge machines arranged in cascades to produce an initial target of 3.8 million Separative Work Units.

Based upon the hazards and consequence analyses reflected in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), the Licensee has concluded that UF6 is the only material in sufficient quantity used at the ACP that poses a potential off-site hazard. Upon release to, the atmosphere UF6 reacts with moisture in the air to produce two highly toxic substances, uranyl fluoride particulate, and hydrogen fluoride (HF). The following provides a brief description of each of these substances, the manner in which it is used in the enrichment process, and the locations where it is stored or used at the ACP.

UF6 on-site is stored in solid form until it is heated, sublimed, and fed to the enrichment process. After enrichment, the UF6 gas is sublimed as product and tails.

The assay of the product can be adjusted by blending. Only the sampling operations require that UF6 be heated at a high enough temperature and pressure to liquefy the material. UF6 is located in the X-2232C Interconnecting Process Piping; X-3001 and X-3002 Process Buildings; X-3344 Customer Services Building, X-3346 Feed and Withdrawal Building; X-3346A Feed and Product Shipping and Receiving Building; X-7725 Recycle/Assembly Facility; X-7726 Centrifuge Training and Test Facility; X-7727H Interplant Transfer Corridor and ACP cylinder storage yards.

HF is not used in the ACP operations nor are significant quantities stored at the ACP.

However, HF is produced during a release of UF6. UF6 reacts with moisture in the air resulting in the formation of HF and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). At room A-2

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 temperatures and at high humidity, UO2F2 hydrates and an HF-H2O fog develops that results in an easily visible, buoyant cloud. HF is irritating to skin, eyes, and throat.

Table A-1 (located within Appendix G of this plan) lists the primary locations of these chemicals.

American Centrifuge Plant Description

'J:'he ACP uses existing former U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant buildings. A brief description of primary ACP buildings and their purpose is provided below.

The ACP includes two process buildings: the X-3001 and X-3002 Process Buildings.

The primary purpose of the process buildings is to house the centrifuge machines and the support systems necessary to perform the enrichmertt. At the north and south ends of the X-3001 and X-3002 Process Buildings are equipment/utility bays and mezzanines where auxiliary equipment is housed. Building vents for the purge and evacuation vacuum systems are also located in the buildings. Due to the nature of centrifuge operation, a vacuum is maintained on the centrifuge casings to remove air or gas that leaks into the machine thereby minimizing drag on the internal rotor.

The process is controlled by Local Control Centers (LCCs), which are located in the process buildings and are designed to control a portion of a process building. The LCCs are connected to the Area Control Room (ACR) located in the X-3012 building. In addition, the centrifuge process alarms relevant to emergency management are monitored in the X-1020 Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

The X-3012 Process Support Building is located between the X-3001 and X-3002 buildings. The X-3012 building is divided into three functional areas: an operational area, maintenance area, and a machine transfer corridor. The operational area is located in the north section of the building and includes the ACR for the X-3001 and X-3002 buildings; offices; lunchroom; restrooms; battery room; switchgear room; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) rooms. A mezzanine above the north section contains the mechanical equipment room for the building.

The ACR provides the central operating functions to monitor and control both the X-3001 and X-3002 buildings machines and process. The maintenance area is located in the south section of the building and includes: maintenance shops, storage areas, a battery charging room, offices, men's and women's locker rooms, restrooms, and a mezzanine area with additional office areas, and HV AC rooms.

The X-3346A Feed and Product Shipping and Receiving Building is located south-southwest of X-3001 building. The X-3346A building serves as the focal point for receipt and shipping of natural and enriched uranium.

• 'The X-3346 Feed and Withdrawal Building has two distinct areas of operation. The first area, also referred to as the Feed Area, supports the front end of the overall enrichment process A-3

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 by housing the equipment necessary to provide UF6 feed to the enrichment process. This area also supports UF6 cylinder blending/transfer operations. The second area, also referred to as the Withdrawal Area, houses the equipment necessary to withdrawal enriched and depleted UF6 from the process. The X-3346 building is connected to the X-3001 and X-3002 buildings by the X-2232C Interconnecting Process Piping.

The X-3344 Customer Services Building is located to the north of the X-3346 building and west of the X-3001 building. The X-3344 building houses equipment necessary to sample UF6 cylinders from the process.

The X-7725 Recycle/Assembly Facility is a very large multiple level building used for the assembly of centrifuge machines. Completely assembled centrifuge machines are tested in the Gas Test stands using UF6 to verify the correct placement of machine components and the proper operation of the centrifuge machine. The Gas Test is performed in the X-7725 facility prior to moving the centrifuge machines to the process building for installation. This building may also be used for centrifuge manufacturing. Wrecked centrifuge machines are also stored in this building after removal from the process buildings. Areas of the X-7725 will be utilized for shipping, receiving, and storage of mate~ials.

The X-7726 Centrifuge Training and Test Facility is located in the northwest corner of the X-7725 facility. The X-7726 facility is the area where material and components are received; components or subassemblies are inspected and tested; the components are assembled as centrifuge machines; the final assembly is evacuated and leak checked; and repairs are performed to the machine or subassemblies.

The X-7727H Interplant Transfer Corridor provides an enclosed north-south throughway from the X-7725 and X-7726 facilities to the X-3001 and X-3002 buildings. The corridor is wide enough to accommodate bi-directional passage of two fully loaded centrifuge transporters.

The ACP cylinder yards provide storage for natural feed uranium, depleted (tails) uranium, and enriched (product) uranium-awaiting shipment. There are four cylinder storage yards that support the ACP. Two of the yards are located adjacent to the X-3346 building (X-77 46S and X-7746W), and the other two are located just north of the reservation Perimeter Road to the north ofX-344 facility (X-745G-2 and X-745H).

ACP operations are monitored continuously from the X-3012 building ACR. ACP alarm systems are duplicated in the X-1020 EOC. In the event of an emergency condition, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) located in the X-300 building is notified. The PSS assumes Incident Commander duties in the unlikely event of a declared emergency. Communications between the ACP .and X-300 building consist of a radio system, conventional telephone system, public address system, and evacuation alarm system.

Continuous vent sampling systems monitor emissions from ACP enrichment process vents. The continuous vent samplers draw a flow-proportional sample of the vent stream through two alumina traps in series by way of an isokinetic probe. These vents 'meet the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requirements.

A-4

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 There are nine vents that are monitored for radionuclide emissions. Although none of these atmospheric radionuclide emission sources were identified to have the potential to exceed a 0.1 millirem/year dose to the most exposed member of the public during normal operation, continuous vent monitors have been installed to quantify plant radiological airborne emissions.

Table A-2 summarizes stack heights and flow rates.

The health protection program provides services for individuals to meet regulatory requirements and to maintain a high level of employee health. The X-1007 Fire Station maintains a first aid room and provides ambulance service for emergency conditions.

The primary radiation alarm system is the Criticality Accident Alarm System. This system is designed to detect a nuclear criticality and provide audible and visual alarms that will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate area.

Other support includes protective force, fire department, health physics, industrial hygiene, industrial safety, environmental compliance, waste management, records management, and document control. The primary facilities on the DOE reservation associated with the ACP are shown in Figure A-1.

• Possession limits for radioactive materials are summarized in Table A-3 (located within Appendix G of this plan).

Table A-4 (located within Appendix G of this plan) contains a summary of the event scenarios that, if unmitigated, could result in potential off-site consequences that exceed the 10 CFR 70.61 Performance Requirements. The events listed in Table A-4 (located within Appendix G of this plan) require crediting of items relied on for safety to reduce the event frequency and/or consequences to meet the performance requirements. Further detail of each event scenario is located in the Integrated Safety Analysis Summary for the American Centrifuge Plant.

A-5

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 0 500 1000 1!500 SCALE FEET II PRIMARY ACP FACILITIES

~ SECONDARY ACP FACILITIES II EW PRIMAR ACP FACILITI ES ml NEW SECONDARY ACP FACILITIES Jf,. ACP Monitored Ven t s INfORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN 00£S NOT COIHAIN UPORT CONTROU[O INflltlWATION

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1-1-B-4, R2 Figure A-1 American Centrifuge Plant Layout A-6

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 Table A-2 Summary of Continuous Monitored Stack and Vent Characteristics-American Centrifuge Plant Control Stack Height (feet) Flow Rates Device Efficiency Monthly Diameter Above Above Vol. Percent Location Vol.

(in.) Roof Ground (ft/min)

(SCF)

(%)

X-3001 North Vent 4 11.5 97.5 3,394 l.30E+7 95 X-3001 South Vent 4 11.5 97.5 3,394 l.30E+7 95 X-3002 North Vent 4 11.5 97.5 3,394 l.30E+7 95 X-3002 South Vent 4 11.5 97.5 3,394 1.30E+7 95 X-3346 Feed and Withdrawal Area 6 7 62 2,243 l .94E+7 95 Vent*

X-7725 Gas Test Stands Vent 4 4 79 3,959 l.5IE+7 95

• The evacuation system heads used to support process piping connections and disconnections in the X-3346 and X-3344 building are connected to the evacuation system and exhaust through the permitted vent. The portable gulpers used to support activities like maintenance in any of the ACP buildings are not connected to a permitted vent and exhaust into the building in which they are used.

A-7

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 Blank Page A-8

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 APPENDIXB GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT CERTIFIED ACTIVITIES

,r B-1

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant I I Revision 33 February 2022 Gaseous Diffusion Plant Certified Activities The primary mission of the plant is the enrichment of uranium with ihe isotope necessary to produce fuel for nuclear reactors using the gaseous diffusion process. The enrichment operations were _shutdown by the, United States Enrichment Corporation in 2001. Enrichment sufficient to allow for a stand-alone enrichment capacity of 3 million Separative Work Units per year was placed in a "cold standby" condition. This equipment"is currently maintained in cold

, standby with some chemical treatment for removal of residual deposits and some equipment removal and decontamination is in progress. The remaining cascade equipment is being maintained in a "cold shutdown" condition with some chemical treatment for deposit removal.

A basic summary of this process follows. /

• The gaseous diffusion enrichment process employs a series* of compressors and converters to enrich uranium hexafluoride (UF6) in uranium-235 hexafluoride (2 35 UF6) molecules. The fundamental building block of the process consists of a compressor and a converter that form a stage. Stages are grouped together to form cells. The cells are then interconnected to provide what is known as a cascade. The compressors, which are driven by electric motors, are used to circulate the process gas and maintain flow through the cascade. The converters contain porous tubes called barriers through which the process gas is diffused. In each converter, a portion of the process gas diffuses through the barriet and is fed to the next higher stage, with the undiffused gas being recycled to the next lower stage. The diffused stream is slightly enriched in the 235 U isotope, while the undiffused portion is slightly depleted in the 235 U isotope to the same degree. Each stage also contains a gas cooler to remove the heat of compression from the process gas and a control valve for process control. The process is repeated through numerous stages until the desired enrichment level is reached. Enriched UF6 or depleted UF6 is stored atthe plant for future use or disposition.

The gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) receives uranium in solid UF6 form, which is shipped by truck and rail in 10- or 14-ton cylinders in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations.

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Based upon the hazards artd consequence analyses reflected in the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certification, Safety Analysis Report (USEC-02), the United ,States Enrichment Corporation has concluded that besides UF 6, there are five other chemicals required to support the gaseous diffusion plant that are in sufficient quantities to pose a potential off-site hazard if released. The following is a brief description of each of these substances, the manner in, which it is used in the enrichment process, and the locations where it is 1stored or used at the plant.

UF6 is stored in cylinder yards as a solid until it is heated to liquefy the cylinder contents so that the UF6 can be fed for enrichment, sampling, and/or transfer.

• In gaseous and liquid forms, UF6 could present a hazard. Material in these forms is primarily located in the X-326, X-330, and X-333 Process Buildings, the X-343 Feed Vaporization and Sampling Facility, the X-344A Toll Enrichment Facility, and the X-342A Feed, Vaporization and Fluorine Generation Building.

B-2

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 Chlorine Trifluoride (ClF3). Chlorine trifluoride is delivered to the plant in 160-pound (lb) cylinders and is stored' in 160-lb cylinders at the X-742 Gas Cylinder Storage Facility and in two 2,000-ft storage drums located in the X-330 and X-333 buildings. Chlorine trifluoride is used for cell treatment on an as-needed basis in the process buildings.

Nitric Acid (HN03). Nitric acid is transported to plant site by tank truck and is stored in two tanks, 1,500 gallon and 3,000 gallon located_ 60 feet east of X-705 Decontamination Building and directly nortn of the incinerator building. 'Nitric acid is pumped to a 100-gallon storage _tank in X-705 building and gravity fed to various systems, such as small parts, the neutralization sink, and spray tanks. Nitric acid is also stored in glass bottles in the X-720 Maintenance and Stores Building toxic materials storage area. Nitric acid is used to decontaminate uranium-contaminated metal surfaces and in electroplating.

Fluorine (F2). Fluorine is generated from hydrogen fluoride gas in X-342A facility and is pumped-'to storage tanks in the X-342B Fluorine Storage Building. The three F2 storage tanks measure 8 feet in diameter and 220 feet long. Fluorine is useq to pacify and condition metal surfaces prior to exposure to UF6 and for cell treatment on an as-needed basis.

Chlorine (Cli). Chlorine is used in the treatment of the sanitary water supply and for sewage treatment at DOE reservation. The function of chlorine in the water and wastewater treatment processes is as a disinfectant for removal of disease-carrying organisms. Chlorine on plant site is found at the X-61 lE Water Treatment Plant in 1-ton cylinders, at the X-6619 Sewage Treatment Plant in 150-lb cylinders, and in the X-742 Gas Cylinder Storage Facility in 150-lb cylinders.

/

Hydrogen Fluoride (HF). HF is used in the production of fluorine. Liquid HF is delivered to the plant in' 850-lb cylinders and is stored in the X-342A facility.

Therefore, the HF is vaporized and piped to four fluorine generators, where it is dissociated to produce fluorine.

Table B-1 (located within Appendix G of this plan) lists the primary locations of these chemicals and their typical inventories.

Gaseous Diffusion Plant Facility Description' I

/'- The three GDP process buildings account for 8 million square feet (ft2) of the total 10 million ft2 of floor space at the GDP. The plant also includes, a series of electrical switchyards; storage areas; cooling towers; a steam- plant; water treatment plant; sewage disposal plant; pollution abatement facility; service and maintenance buildings; and facilities for administration, medical, fire, and security.

B-3

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 The X-326, X-330, and X-333 process buildings, are steel-framed transite-covered two-story buildings that house the gaseous diffusion cascade and withdrawal equipment. Three smaller buildings, X-343, X-342A, and X-344A, house the GDP feed and sampling and transfer facilities. Some of the instruments and controls in these buildings are duplicated in the X-300 Process Control Facility.

The X-300 facility (function described in Section 6.1.2 of this plan) also serves as the alternate Emergency Operations Center and the headquarters of the Plant Shift Superintendent.

A description of the cascade/process buildings, key support buildings, on-site emergency facilities, and airborne effluent controls follows. The X-300 facility, also houses power operations personnel, the Cascade Controllers/Coordinators, and other cascade operations personnel. The X-300 facility provides centralized communications, information processing, and support services capabilities associated with GDP operations.

The process buildings (i.e., X-326, X-330, and X-333 buildings) contain UF6 as a gas in the cascade equipment and as both gas and liquid in the withdrawal stations housed in each building. Most of the process equipment is operated at sub-atmospheric pressures. The withdrawal stations are operated at pressures greater than atmosphere. In addition, the buildings contain ClF3 and F2 in significant quantities to support operations.

UF6 feed is supplied from the X-342A and X-343 buildings. Cylinders containing solid UF6 are placed in autoclaves and heated to liquefy the UF6. The UF6 is then fed as a gas to the process building via interconnecting piping, The X-342A building also houses the fluorine generation cells where HF is converted to fluorine and then stored in the X-342B storage tanks.

In addition, shipping and receiving of UF6 cylinders may be performed at the X-343 building.

The X-344A Toll Enrichment Facility is the central receiving and shipping point for large-cylinder toll enrichment entering and leaving the plant. Small-cylinder shipping and receiving activities are performed at the special nuclear material storage facility (X-345).

Cylinders containing UF6 are stored at several locations near the processing areas served.

Large cylinders (10-ton and 14-ton) are stored in the X-745B, Toll Enrichment Process Gas Yard, X-745F, North Process Gas Stockpile Yard, and X-745G, Cylinder Storage Yard and at two additional processing lots (X-343N and X-343S) at the X-343 building. Empty feed cylinders can be stored east of X-343 in a gravel lot to await eventual return to the supplier.

Product cylinders (2-1/2-ton) are stored at the X-745B, X-343N, and X-343S storage lots. Small (less than 2-1/2-ton) low assay UF6 cylinders and empty small cylinders are stored in the X-344 miscellaneous storage area. The X-344A vault is used for storage of 5-, 8-, and 12-inch UF6 cylinders.

The plant decontamination facility is located in the X-705 b~ilding, which is designed for the safe disassembly and decontamination of process and support equipment. Contaminated emergency equipment and supplies that are not decontaminated at the emergency scene are sent to the X-705 building for decontamination. Wastewater from the decontamination process, which requires treatment prior to discharge, is collected in a separate drain system.

B-4

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 The X-720 building contains several types of maintenance shops. The south side of the building contains the Main Stores Area, and a Toxic Materials Storage Area. The building and its facilities are necessary to provide services for maintenance of the plant. The work activities involved within this facility have the potential of dealing with radioactive contaminated materials and process related equipment.

The X-710 Technical Services Building, Analytical Laboratory performs environmental, chemical, and isotopic analyses for the GDP. F2 gas is provided to select areas from a F2 supply cabinet also located directly west of X-710. _ The licensed materials are bounded by the quantities listed in Table B-3 (located within Appendix G of this plan).

Sanitary water is treated by chlorinl:!,tion, providing microbiological control. The primary components of the X-61 lE Chlorine System are chlorine containers, a feed manifold, chlorinators; chlorine injectors, and chlorine leak detectors and associated alarms.

The X-6619 Sewage Treatment Plant services the DOE reservation. Sewage is fed into a series of underground sanitary sewer~. Post-chlorination followed by de-chlorination with sulfur dioxide is used to meet National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) effluent standards. The treated effluent is discharged to the Scioto River.

The XT-847 Waste Management Staging Facility is located near the southern end of the DOE reservation. ;J'he facility is a steel structure with concrete floors and is divided into three major staging areas: The northern and southern sections are separated from the center section of the facility by concrete block, four-hour rated firewalls, and steel fire doors.

The facilities on the DOE reservation associated with the GDP _are shown in Figure B-1.

)

Airborpe effluent monitors cover the enrichment cascade and the supporting systems that are potentially significant contributors to total plant _emissions. Gaseous radionuclide emissions from1 the purge cascade vents; tlJ_e cold recovery and wet air evacuation vents; the sampling and transfer evacuation vent; and continuous vent samplers monitor the seal _exhaust vents. The continuous vent samplers draw a flow-proportional sample of the vent stream through two alumina traps in series by way of an isokinetic probe.

Fifteen United States Enrichment Corporation emission sources at the GDP have been identified as potentially signifi~ant contributors to the total plant radionuclide emissions.

Although none of these atmospheric radionuplide emission sources were identified to have the potential to exceed a 0.1 millirem/year dose to the most exposed member of the public during normal operation, continuous vent monitors have been installed to quantify plant* radiological airborne emissions. Table B-2 summarizes stack heights and flow rates.

Possession limits for radioactive materials are summarized iri Table B-3 (located within Appendix G of this plan).

Table B-4 (located within Appendix G of this plan) contains a summary of the postulated events that could result in potential off-site consequences from the GDP.

B-5

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 Table B-2 Summary of Continuous Monitored Stack and Vent Characteristics-Gaseous Diffusion Plant Control Stack Height (feet) Flow Rates Device Efficiency Monthly Diameter Above Above Vol. Percent Vol.

Location (in.) Roof Ground (ft/min) (%)

(SCF)*

X-326 Top Purge Venth 5 103 165 2,779 l.47E+07 99.99 X-326 Side Purge b 5 103 165 4,588 2.46E+07 99.99 X-326 E-Jet b 5 103 165 6,372 3.54E+07 99.99 X-330 Cold Recovery Vent 4 12 78 4,753 1.57E+07 90 X-333 Cold Recovery Vent 3 15 97 8,746 1.50E+07 99 X-333 Building Evacuation Vent 4 15 97 10,508 2.27E+06 90 X-333 Seal Exhaust System Area 1 6 6 72 293 2.20E+06 99 X-330 Seal Exhaust System Area 2 4 6 72 424 l.71E+06 99 X-330 Seal Exhaust System Area 3 4 6 72 347 1.22E+06 99 X-326 Seal Exhaust System Area 4 8 6 72 87 l .22E+06 99 X-326 Seal Exhaust System Area 5 8 6 72 77 1.35E+06 99 X-326 Seal Exhaust System Area 6 8 6 72 83 I .20E+06 99 X-343 Cold Trap Operations Vent 3 68 I IO 1,033 2.19E+06 99 X-344 Cold Trap Operations Vent 3 12 58 1,033 2.19E+06 99 X-344 Gulper 16 8 58 322 2.8 1E+06 99

• Monthly volumes are based on an average of data from 1992 to 1994.

b These three vents physically discharge through four interconnected pipes of the listed dimensions.

8-6

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 A B C D E F G H I J 8 8 6

~

\ -~,Y

• +*

r 7

6 l

5 5 4 4 3 3 2 ----

2 A B C D E F G H I J Figure B-1 Gaseous Diffusion Plant Layout 8-7

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 Blank Page B-8

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 APPENDIXC AMERICAN CENTRIFUGE LEAD CASCADE LICENSED ACTIVITIES C-1

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Licensed Activities The.mission of the American Centrifuge Lead Cascade (Lead Cascade) is to demonstrate the enrichment of uranium using the gas centrifuge process. In the gas centrifuge process, the isotopic separation is accomplished by "centrifugal force," which uses the difference in weight percent of the different uranium isotopes to achieve this isotopic separation.

The Lead Cascade occupies a very small fraction of the area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reservation (Figure C-1 located within Appendix F of this plan) and the Lead Cascade has a modest possession limit of 250 kilograms (kg) UF6. The type, quantity, and form of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-regulated source material, byproduct material, and special nuclear materials are shown in Table C-2 (located within Appendix G of this plan).

The Lead Cascade receives uranium in normal form (approximately 0.711 wt. percent 235 U) UF6 in either a Model 5A/B, SA, or 12B UF6 cylinder from the gaseous diffusion plant (GDP). The UF6 is fed into the system in the gaseous state and is enriched up to 10 wt. percent assay 235 U.

The Lead Cascade is operated on recycle where the enriched product stream is recombined with the 1depleted stream prior to being re-fed to the cascade. No product withdrawals are made from the Lead Cascade other than the samples that are taken for laboratory analysis.

Due to the small quantity of licensed material, the consequences of any accident postulated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) would be small when compared to postulated accidents at the GDP or the American Centrifuge Plant (ACP).

UF6 leak detection instrumentation and criticality accident detection instrumentation are not utilized in the Lead Cascade. The Lead Cascade is small in area and manned on a continuous basis while UF6 is present in the system. Abnormal operating conditions and accidents are identified by human observation, based on installed instrumentation and routine operator rounds of the facility.

Based upon the hazards and consequence analyses reflected in the ISA, the Licensee has concluded that UF6 is the only material in sufficient quantity used at the Lead Cascade that poses a potential off-site hazard. Upon release to the atmosphere UF6 react~ with moisture in the air to produce two highly toxic substances, uranyl fluoride particulate, and hydrogen fluoride (HF).

The following provides a brief description of each of these substances, the manner in which it is used in the enrichment process, and the locations where it is stored or used at the Lead Cascade.

UF6 on-site is stored in solid form until it is heated, sublimed, and fed to the enrichment process.

HF is not used in the Lead Cascade operations nor is significant quantities stored at the Lead Cascade. However, HF is produced during a release of UF6. UF6 reacts with moisture in the air resulting in the formation of HF and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2).

At room temperatures and at high humidity, UO2F2 hydrates and an HF-H2O fog C-2

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 develops that will result in an easily visible, buoyant cloud. HF is irritating to skin, eyes, and throat.

Table C-1 (located within Appendix G of this plan) lists the primary locations of these chemicals.

American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Description

_ The Lead Cascade uses existing former DOE Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant buildings.

A brief description of primary Lead Cascade buildings and their purpose is provided below.

The Lead Cascade operates up to 240 centrifuge machines in the recycle mode as a "closed loop" system, where the enriched product stream is recombined with the depleted streain prior to being refed to the cascade. Additional centrifuges may be available for other uses, but are not installed for operation (e.g.,. spares). The Lead Cascade uses full-scale equipment and laboratory samples are withdrawn to obtain information on American Centrifuge enrichment technology. The Lead Cascade is operated so that no enriched material is withdrawn, other than laboratory samples. No finished product is produced by the Lead Cascade.

Facility Layout The Lead Cascade facilities shown in Figure C-1 (located within Appendix F of this plan) includes the X-3001 Process Building, which houses up to 240 operating centrifuge machines, associated process piping, instrumentation and controls, computer systems, and auxiliary support equipment. Other facilities include the X-3012 Process Support Building, the X-7725 Recycle/Assembly Facility, the X-7726 Centrifuge Training and Test Faci_lity, and the X-7727H Interplant Transfer Corridor.

A small portion of the X-3001 building houses the Lead Cascade. The centrifuge machine is connected to a service module position where the centrifuge is supplied with auxiliary utilities, power, controls, and UF6. The Lead Cascade is supplied normal (approximately 0.711 wt. percent mu) UF6 from either a Model 5A/B, 8A, or 12B UF6 cylinder through a feed system consisting of a portable cart capable of heating the solid material to a gaseous state.

After the initial fill from the portable feed cart, the centrifuge machines operate on a recycle mode as a "closed loop" system in the gaseous state, and the feed cart is on "standby."

This recycle mode in the "closed loop" causes the enriched material within the cascade to be mixed with the depleted material within the cascade prior to it re-entering the feed stage.

Laboratory quanjities of UF6 are sampled froll}- the Lead Cascade in order to perform analyses.

No enriched product is withdrawn from the cascade, except for the samples. Samples are processed in the X-710 Analytical Laboratory. The cascade enrichment is normally less than 5 wt. percent assay. However, testing of the cascade may result in some material being enriched above 5 wt. percent, with a licensed limit of 10 wt. percent mu.

A dump cart is provided to remove the contents of the cascade in the event inventory must be reduced for normal operations or because of upset conditions. A local control center C-3

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 (LCC) at the cascade provides operator interface through controls and instruments with the centrifuge machines, and an area control room (ACR) located in the X-3012 building also provides limited control of the centrifuges remotely.

The Lead Cascade operational area [area containing Lead Cascade licensed material listed in Table C-1 (located within Appendix G of this plan)] is located in a small portion (approximately one-eight) of the X-3001 building. The Lead Cascade operational area is identified as the Contamination Control Zone (CCZ) shown in Figure C-2 (located within Appendix F of this plan). The primary purpose of the process buildings is to house the centrifuge machines and the support systems necessary to perform the enrichment. At the north and south ends of the X-3001 building -are equipment/utility bays and mezzanines where auxiliary equipment is housed. A building vent for the purge and evacuation vacuum systems is also located in the building. Due to the nature of centrifuge operation, a vacuum is maintained on the centrifuge casings to minimizing drag on the internal rotor.

The process is controlled by the LCC, which is located within the Lead Cascade operational area and is designed to control the Lead Cascade centrifuge process. The LCC is connected to the ACR located in the X-3012 building.

The X-3012 building is located between the X-3001 and X-3002 buildings. (The X-3002 building is described in Appendix A of this Emergency Plan; however, is not a Lead Cascade facility.) The X-3012 building is divided into three functional areas: an operational area, maintenance area, and a machine transfer corridor. The operational area is located in the north section of the building and houses the ACR for the Lead Cascade; offices; lunchroom; restrooms; battery room; switchgear room; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) rooms. A mezzanine above the north section contains the mechanical equipment room for the building.

The ACR provides the central operating functions to monitor and control the Lead Cascade machines and process. The maintenance area is located in the south section of the building and includes: maintenance shops, storage areas, a battery charging room, offices, men's and women's locker rooms, restrooms, and a mezzanine area with additional office areas, and HVACrooms.

The X-7725 facility is a very large multiple level building used for the assembly of centrifuge machines. A small portion of the X-7725 facility, shown in Figure C-1 (located in Appendix F of this plan), provides administrative facilities; buffer storage area for storage, handling, and assembly preparation of centrifuge components; and completed machines, as well as training rooms, and the storage and maintenance areas for the transporter. Areas of the X-7725 will be utilized for shipping, receiving, and storage of materials.

The X-7726 facility is located in the northwest corner of the X-7725 facility. The X-7726 facility is the area where material and components are received; components or subassemblies are inspected and tested; the components are assembled as centrifuge machines; the final* assembly is evacuated and leak checked; and repairs are performed to the machine or subassemblies.

C-4

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 The X-7727H corridor provides an enclosed north-south throughway from the X-7725 and X-7726 facilities to the X-3001 and X-3002 buildings. A transporter moves centrifuge machines between the X-7726 facility and X-3001 building through the covered X-7727H corridor. The corridor is wide enough to accommodate bi-directional passage of two fully loaded centrifuge transporters.

GDP facilities that provide support to the Lead Cascade include the XT-847 Waste Management Staging Facility and X-710 Technical Services Building (these facilities are discussed in Appendix B).

Lead Cascade operations are monitored continuously from the X-3012 building ACR. In the event of an emergency condition, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) located in the X-300 Process Control Facility is notified. The PSS assumes the Incident Commander duties in the unlikely event of a declared emergency. Communications between the ACP and X-300 facility consists of a radio system, conventional telephone system, public address system, and evacuation 3:larm system.

A four-inch continuous vent sampling system with a total stack height of 97.5 feet located on the X-3001 building roof, monitors emissions from the Lead Cascade enrichment process vent. The continuous vent sampler draws a flow-proportional sample of the vent stream through two alumina traps in series by way of an isokinetic probe. The process flow rate from this vent is a maximum of 256 cubic feet per minute. This vent meets the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency requirements.

This vent is monitored for radionuclide emissions. Although no atmospheric radionuclide emissions from the Lead Cascade have been identified to have the potential to exceed a 0.1 millirem/year dose to the most exposed member of the public during normal operation, the continuous vent monitor has been installed to quantify plant radiological airborne emissions.

The health protection program provides services for individuals to meet regulatory requirements and to maintain a high level of employee health. The X-1007 Fire Station maintains a first aid room and provides ambulance service for emergency conditions.

Other support includes protective force, fire department, health physics technicians, industrial hygiene technicians, environmental monitoring, waste management, records management, and document control. The primary facilities on the DOE reservation associated with the Lead Cascade are shown in Figure C-1 (located within Appendix F of this plan).

Table C-3 (located within Appendix G of this plan) contains a summary of the event scenarios that, if unmitigated, could result in potential off-site consequences that exceeds the performance requirements of 10 Code of Federal Regulations 70.61 Performance Requirements.

The events listed in Table C-3 (located within Appendix G of this plan) require crediting of items relied on for safety, which reduces the event frequency and/or consequences. Further detail of each event ~cenario is located in the ISA Summary for the Lead Cascade.

C-5

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 Large quantities of other hazardous materials are not present in the Lead Cascade area.

Only small quantities of chemicals and materials (e.g., acetone, solvents, oils) are used in the X-7726 facility and X-3012 building, primarily for assembly and maintenance activities. Storage of the chemicals and materials is in approved containers. Those items are listed in the Hazardous Material Inventory Control System.

C-6

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 The information within this figure has been determined to contain Export Controlled Information and is located in Appendix F of this plan Figure C-1 Lead Cascade Facility Layout C-7

Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant Revision 33 February 2022 The information within this figure has been determined to contain Export Controlled Information and is located in Appendix F of this plan Figure C-2 Contamination Control Zone (Lead Cascade Operational Area)

C-8