ML22111A260

Report - Analysis of Potential Effects of Waterborne Traffic on Plant Safety (Hope Creek Generating Station)

ML22111A260
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek  (NPF-057)
Issue date:	09/30/1974
From:	Mittl R Public Service Electric & Gas Co of New Jersey
To:	Anthony Giambusso US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Kim J, NRR/DORL/LPL1
References
Download: ML22111A260 (111)

Text

Public SeMNt Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000 M:r. A. Giambusso Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing U. s. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C.

20545

Dear Hr. Giambusso:

REPORT - ANALYSIS OF POTE~~IAL EFFECTS OF WATERBORNE TRAFFIC ON P!.&~T SAFETY HOPE CREEK G~"ERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-354 AND 50-355 Included in "Additional Informacion. - Site and Environment" e:ubmitted to the staff by.letter dated January 4, -1974, was a commitment by Public Service Ele~tric and Gas Company to conduct a study to es~imate the probabilicy o£ impal£~~ut of functivn to safaty ~elated structurce or components resulting fro~ the accidental explosion of waterborne ship cargo in ~~e vicinity of the Hope Creek plant.

This commitment was in response to the requirement stated by. the staff in Question 2.47 transmitted by letter dated December 21, 1973.

The subjects of explosives carried on the Delat~are River including Anchorage No. 2 and the ability of the plant to ~rlthstand the detonation of such cargo was addressed in "Applicant's Anst~er to Staff's Inter-rogatories Dated April 11, 1974", transmitted to the staff on April 25, 1974.

Ihe conclusion, as stated in the abovementioned document, is that safety related structures and equipment Cqn t~thstand a detonation in the river channel or ~,chorage No. 2 of the largest quantity of explosives permitted to be shipped.

In discussions with the ACRS on ¥ebruary 8, 1974, Public Service Electric

~d Gas Company agreed to study the effects of ntunerous additional typas of 'potentially hazardous occurrences o~ the river.

In their report on the Hope Creek plant dated February 12, 1974, the ACRS stat~d that th~

matter of potential effects on plant safety due to waterborne traffic on the Delaware River should be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff.

The Energy P~op le

'BLANK PAGE

Mr.

• 9/30/74 A comprehensive study bas been conducted by Arthur D. Little, inc. to dete~ne the.potential effects of a broad spect~ of waterborne tralf~e on plant safety. Enclosed are ten (10) copies of the report of that study, entitled "Analysis of Potential Effects of Waterborne Traffic on the Safety of the Control Room and Water Intakes at Hope Creek Generating

• Station".

The re,ults of the study show the probability of risk to plant safety due to waterborne traffic is sufficiently low that no special provisions or additional requirements need be in~luded in the Hope Creek Generating Station design to insure the ability to safely shutdown or maintain the

~lant in *a safe shutdown condition.

Very truly yours, 1:-ft.~t~-rl R., L. ~littl General Manager - Projects

~gin~er~ng and Construction Department CC G. Lear, Atomic Energy Commission

w. Butler, Atomic Energy Commission

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ANAL OF POTENTIAL 'EFFECTS OF

ATIRIORNE TRAFFIC ON THtiAFETY OF THE CQNTROL ROOM AND WATiR INTAKES AT HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

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[J 1.0 IN I i'IGDUC110N 1.1 IACICGROUND 1.2 OBJECTIVE 1.3 APPROACH 1.4 PRE.NTATION 1M RlaiL11 2.1 lARGE RELATED.IL~ RISKS 2.1.1 FnRIIb 2.1.2 V.-D......... RIIb 2.1.3 ExploelanRIIb 2.2.1 FnRIIb 2.2.2 v..-D........,. Rllb 2.2.3 Expbion Rllb 2.3 RAMMING OF INTAKES 2.4 BLOCKING OF INTAKES 2.1 NQN.COLLISION RELATED SHIPPI~ H~RD 2.1 RISKS PRE.NTED IV LNG TRANSPORTATION U

TRAPFICIACCIDINT DATA IAIE 3.1 'TRAFFIC ON THE DELAWARE RIVER BY HOPE CREEK 3.1. 1 Genlrll 3.1.2 Dlta Souras Dim~~.,. of..... ()pntlt*ln the VIcinity of Hope Creek on the Dllasn i

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~---~-----..;..-----.. --~-- --- -***- *- *-*---~--~ I TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

3.2 ACCIDENT DATA FOR THE DELAWARE,.IVER 19 3.2.1 Ships 19 3.2.2.......

21 3.2.3 LNG Sh~

22 3.3 SPILL STATISTICS 22 3.3.1......

22 3.3.2 Tin._ (Other tlw1 LNG end LPG) 22 3.3.3 T~nken (LNG) 23 3.3.4 T~nken (LPG, Anhydrous Ammonia, etc.)

23 4.0 EFFECTS OF VIOLENT WEATHER UPON ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES 26 1.0 AIIEaNENT OF HAZARD 28 6.1 DEFINITION OF CATCHMENT DISTANCE 28 6.2 CATCHMENT DISTANCES FOR POOL FIRES 28 6.3 VAPOR DISPERSION 30 6.3.1 Flammable Vapor DIIPif'llon (other tlw1 LNG) 30 6.3.2 Toxic Vapor Dilpenion 30 6.4 CATCHMENT DISTANCES FOR CORROSIVE LIQUIDS

• 31 6.6 CATCHMENT DISTANCE FOR LNG SPILLS 33 1.0 BLOCKING AND RAMMING OF INTAKES 34 8.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 34 8.2 BLOCKING OF INTAKES 34 8.3 RAMMING OF INTAKES 38 APPENDIX 1 Analysis of Spread lnd Ignition of Flammable Liquids on Water APPENDIX 2 Vapor DIIP,Iflion ii 41 47 Arthur D IJttle Inc.

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APPENDIX3 APPENDIX4 APPENDIX&

APPENDIX I APPENDIX7 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I TABLE OF CONTENTS CCont.t Shipment of HI-" Explosives on the DeiiiWint 63 Ship Groundl"fi 82 Energy Avlillble for Rnmlng Colllllor*

70 Blocking of Wltlr lntlke Structure 72 r

I I Effect of Fire on Intake Structure 77 i

Analysi1 of Weterbome Commerce" Om for Delaware River In 1872 80 Spill Stltiltk:l for U.S. Wltln1871)..-1872 88 ill

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1.1 BACKGROUND

Dudiii the ~ra' of their JeView of the COIIItrUctlon pennlt IPPIJcation for Hope

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• Creek Generatina Station, the Atomic 1!neJJY Commillion S~

ttatecl tbe JeqUirement that a determination be m1tde of the problbility of ICCidentll expiOiion of wa~

lhip caqo in the vJcinity of,\\rtiflcialllllnd, mel the IIIOClatecl pJObabDlty of impairment to llfety-JelateclstJUctuna or components e.entill to IChJeve a safe lbutdown. The Adv:isory r

Committee on Relctor Safeaumls JeCOIIUDendocl that the study also include the probabDity of spills or NIUltina flrel of oil or LNG and baqe collilion with th" emice water intake atructure. Public Semce Electric and Gas Company (PS&lG) qreecl to W!'~uct such a study and provide a report of the results to the AEC Staff.

In order to comply with this commitment, PSFAG retained Arthur D. Uttle Jnco~

poratecl (ADL) to conduct the required stu~.

This report provides a descdption and the results of the study.

1.2 OBJECTIVE The objective of thJs study is to quantify the risks presented* to the Hope Creek Station safety-related stnactures and equipment due to maritime traft'ic on the Delaware River in the vicinity of Artificial Island. The potential risks presented by the maritime activities con-sidered are thoee due to Oammable vapor diJpenion, toxic vapor dispersion, pool fires, exploliona, corrosive chemiCils, and nmmlna and blockap of the intake structure.

t3 APPROACH The waterfront structure, by virtue of its proximity to the river, is more vul~terable to the effects of waterborne hazardL However, since occupancy of the intake structure is not required for maintenance of plant safety, hazards effectina only personnel occupancy were not considered.

The poaibility of a ship or barae coWdina with the intake structure was studied and an estimate of damqe was made. The possibility of blockage of the intake stnacture due to a madne accident was also studied.

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D 80o feet from the mer, timer ore molt or the liver traft1c 8Cddena, conald~ would have ao effect. 1be p~ty or ~tl r.aitina*iQ ~*.rete~~e of ftammable or toxic vapor

• ~~--due to the potentill dlk to occup-.ncy of1he station control room.

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or dlk,._ted Jn tblJ tepOit ere ~eveloped in accordance to the rollowbalttepa:

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1be trafllc biltoly Ilona the Dt!aware w* establilhed by utmzina data from the CO.,. orEq~Deen, WateJbome Commerce or U.S. data base (supplemented by mronnation fiom the Pbblelphla Maritime Exchanae).

2.

1be probability or I collillon occur:dna or suflicient severity to C8Uie m.or n1eue or I8Vel'a1 types of CillO was estimated usina the u.s. Coast Guard accident recordl, world-wide tanker experience and a simplified statistical modeL

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For eldl ~or type of caqo, the distance from the plant withirt which the

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accident could poee a threat wu estimated.

4.

Tbe prob8om~ of each type of caqo presenting a risk to plant safety wu determJnecl.

In evaluatina the many estimates of risk, several simplifications and assumptions were Jlllde. However, thele simpUfications and..umptions were made in a conservative fashion 10 a not to unclerestimate the risk.

1.4 PRESENTATION The resultl or this study are presented in Section 2. The detan data and calculations in support of the results are presented in Sections 3, 4, S, and 6 plus appendices.

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2.0 RESULTS This section contains the results reprdina risks presented to the w1ter intakes and the control room at Hope Creek by waterborne traftlc on the Delaware. The risk considerations

.are arranaed by category of. traffic. For baqe related spill risks, hazards presented by spills that result in rue, toxic or flammable vapor clouds, explosive and cori'Osive chemicals are considered and the actual risk quantified. Simllarly, for tanker related ipiDs, we have pre-sented risks due to spillage resulting in fire, toxic or flammable vapor clouds, explosives and corrosive chemicals. In addition to the spill related risks, maritime traffic could potentially post'\\ l'roblems of ramming the intakes and/or blocking of intakes. The risk presented to the intakes by these occurrences is evaluated. Non-collision related shipping hazards are also con-sidered :md the risk presented to Hope Creek evaluated. Finally, the risk presented to Hope Creek by possible future shipments of liquifled natural gas on the Delaware is also evaluated.

There is presently no shipment of LNG on the river.

2.1 BARGE RELATED SPILL RISKS

2. t 1 Fire R"i'sks The following calculation yields the risk of fire from barge accidents. The ignition of a spill of f"Jve million gallons or more of a flammable liquid within one nille of the water intakes (catchment distance*of2 miles) is required to pose a potential threat to the water intakes.

Annual barge trips of flammable cargo Catchment distance (miles)

Accicl~nts per barge nille Spills per accident Spills of S X 1 0' gallons or more/spill Ignition per barge spill*

Probability of aitical incidents/year =

390 X2 X 0.42Xl0-6 X0.4S X 1.2Xt0*3 X 7Xl<<r2 1.2Xlo-'

Risk of Severe Fire at Intake = 1.2Xl0"1 occurrences/year

• • 'The Probability of TrenspatUtl~n Accidents,.. W.A. Brobst, Chief* TransportatiOn Branch, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Wllhlngton D.C. Paper pr.. nted at the 14th Annuli Explosives Safety Seminar; New Orleans, louisiana, Nov. 10, 1972.

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1'ldl GCCU~RDCe pn1111t1 a lilt oaly to tbe intakes. The control room is too far II Diwd 1om tbe water to be afft!cted by spill fins.

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• potential risk to the intake structure aftct the caataalroca if tilly.. ftwmiNe IDd a poteatial rilk to the control~oc.n if they ue n *pwhJe or toxic....._both flammable aad toxic liquefied-are shipped by PI

~ 1.3 &plalion Rilb No hiab exploiiiva 11e Jmown to~

in the W:iDity of ArtificJaJJ.-. 'Ibis bas been

• lfled by..rdlina tile records kept by the U.S. Corps of EnaJneen and the Bureau of Cudoa& Ia addition. the U.S. Coast GUII'd offices in PhDadelphia and New York c:onfinned tldl fact. Finally, no known industry or military actiYitiea in tbat reP<m would warrant Jbipment ofhiab explosha by baqe. Anc:llonle 2, which is northwest of Artificial Island,

._been d ~ i)n*ted

• suitable for sbips c:arryina not more than 800 tons of explosiv~ In the pilt, ships haft ancbored tbere and explolives were loaded from baqes. Ho~ever, there me no plans to ship explolives on the Delaware of use Anchonae 2 for any loadina of explo-sifts. Seftnlletten coofirm tbe above statements. (See Appendix 3.)

The ODly corrosive liquid moYma in bups by the Hope Creek site is dilute IPI(uric ~d.

As shown in Section 5.4, the catchment distance for sulfuric acid is one-hAlf mile and the

• ipm must occur within 200 feet of the shore line to work its way into the intake. The cal-culation for c:orrolive liquid inpstion is

• follows:

Annual baqe trips (sulfuric acid)

Catchment distance (miles)

CorrectiOn for name~~ to shoreUne Probability of accident per baqe mne SpiiJI per accident Spills of 1 0' piJons or more/spill 4.

160 xo.s X0.02 X0.42XJ0-6 X0.4S X 7Xto*s

Probability of critical incident/year=

2.1X101 Risk ofln&estina Corrosive Uquid = 2.1X101 occurrences/year 2.2 SHIP/TANKER RELATED SPILL RISKS 2.2.1 Fire Ri*s A total of 1440 loaded tanker trips of flammable liquid cargos pass Artificial Island each year. Once again, as in the case of barges, only spills and ignition of five million gallons of fuel or more are potentially threatening to the water intakes. The rue risks presented by flammable material shipping is calculated as follows:

Annual tanker trips Tanker accidents per mile Catchment distance (miles)

Spills per accident Spills of S x 1 0' gallons or more/spill Probability of ignition/large spill Probability of critical rue/year 1.44XI03 X l.SXJ0-6 X2.0 X0.20 X4Xto*3 X lXto-2

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3.4Xto*a Risk of Large Fire at Water Intakes= 3.4X10"8 occurrences/year This occurrence presents a risk only to the water intakes. Note that there have have been very few tanker related spills of flammable materials where cargo in excess of S million gallons was released. In the limited nwnber of such spills that have occurred (on a world wide basis) there is no record of the spill having ignited. In. attempting to deter-mine the probability of ignition of spill given a. release of over S million gallons discus-sions were held with several offices of the U.S. Coast Guard. The consensus of opinion was that the probability of ignition for such cases Was unde; S%. In the calculation above, a 1% probability of ignition has been assumed. If a probability of ignition of S% had been utilized the risk of a c-.~ tical rue would have been 1.7XJ0-7 9.CCUrrences per year.

2.2.2 Vapor Dispersion Risks

'There are two classes of vapor dispersion risks: those due to flammable vapors, and thole due to toxic vapors.

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~-~ 0 fl 2.2.2.1 Flammable Vapor;Cioud Th~ tw~ '-liquefied ~s, butane and LPG, ire shi~ped by Artificial iiiirid. They constitute a total of 121oaded ship movements Per year. Based 'on this traffic," the risk

.of having a flammable vapor cloud covering the plant is calculated as foUows:

Annual tanker trips 12 Tanker accidents per mile X l.SOXJ0-6 Catchment distance (miles)

X22 Spills per accident X0.02 Probability of cloud not having ignited prior to arrival over plant X 0.1 Probability of the lethal wind direction X 2.8XJ0-2 Probability of adverse weather condition xo.s Probability of critical incident/year l.IXIO-a Risk of Flammable Vapor Cloud Over Plant= l.IXIO"' occurrences/year This occurrence presents a risk to both the control room and the water intakes.

Note that unlike the gasoline products, liquefied gases are highly volatile. They vaporize rapidly and the probability of ignition due to collision itself is likely to be high.

• If ignition occurs at the accident site, the gas would be consumed quickly and there would be no vapor dispersion problem. Furthermore, even if the cloud did not ignite immediately, the probability of the flammable vapor cloud's igniting prior to moving any slgnificant distance, is great. Any ignition source (such as a match or a motor boat) could ignite the cloud and eliminate further downwind travel.

2.2.2.2 Toxic Vapor Cloud

• The only toxic gas shipped by Artificial Island is liquid ammonia. Three loaded ships~ each carrying about 7000 tons of liquid ammonia, move by Artificial Island each year. The risk due to such movement is the *accumulation of gaseous ammonia in the con-trol roonl, in the event of an accident that results in a gaseous cloud ~er the plan.t. The Catcwation of risk is as follows:

• s.e statement of AdiTfiql W.M. Benkert undw his comment u. u reported In the Federal POwer Commission Final Impact Statement on Docket Nos. CP73-47, CP73-88, CP73-139, CP73-197, CP73-199, August 1974.

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Tanker accidents per mil~.

X l.SXl0-6 Catchment distance, based on 400 ppm X28 Spills per accident X0.02 Probability of lethal wind direction X 2.8Xl0-2 Probability of adverse weather condition X O.S Probability of critical incident/year

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3.SX10-a Risk of Ammonia aoud (400 ppm) QV~r rtant = 3.SXto** occurrences/year This occurrence presents a risk only to the control room. Note that. the ~uman nose can detect ammonia at 20 ppm, well below the 400 ppm level that is severely irritating and that would require pe~~el to leave the control room. The risk calculated above is based on a realistic toxic concentration of 400 ppm. The risk calculated on the very conservative catchment distance corresponding to a 100 ppm concentration would be 8.8XIQ"8 occurrences per year.

2.2.3 Explosion Risks No high explosiws are known to move by ship in the vicinity of Artificial Island.

This has been verified by searching the records kept by the U.S. Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Customs. The U.S. Coast Guard offices in Philadelphia and New York also conf"mned this fact. F1J13lly, no known industrial or military activities in that region would warrant shipment of high explosives by ship. Anchorage 2, which is northwest of Artificial Island, has been designated as suitable for ships carrying not more tlwi 800 tons of explo-sives. In the past, ships have anchored there and explosives were loaded from barges. How-ever, there are no further plans to ship explosives on the Delaware or use Anchorage 2 for any loading of explosives. Several letters (see Appendix 3) conrmn the above statements.

2.2.4 Corrosive Chemical Risk Whereas large tonnages of sulfuric acid are barged by Artificial Island, there is no.

record of corrosive chemicals being moved by ship on the Delaware by Artificial Island.

2.3 RAMMING OF INTAKES The size of tlie ships wh;ich could conceivably ram into the water intake structure is limi~ by the tidal conditions. Under the normal tidal range, ships in ex~ of 7

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approximately 1 S,000 tons would likely ground on the shoal areas outside the river channels before reaching the intake structure. Under extreme tidal conditions, however, such as the design high-water level corresponding to hurricane conditions, the largest ships transiting the Delaware could reach the intake without grounding.

The kinetic energy levels associated with these postulated rammings have been determined to be of the same order of magnitude as those from ~or ship collisions.

From ship collision studies, however, it can be argued that the expected structural damage from ship rammings of the intake structure will be mostly damage to the ship structure, and furthermore, that the damage will not be extensive enough to block the intake with structural rubble.

A further qualitative comparison of the seismic design input and the inertial loadings of the intake structure and its components caused by rammings indicates that the intake structure will likely suffer only local damage from the ramming accident. Details are pro-vided in Appendix S.

2.4 BLOCKING OF INTAKES Our analysis has concluded that blockage of the intake structure opening by a runaway ship or barge is not possible. Under the most extreme low-water conditions assumed in the design of this facility, the water intake area required to maintain non-cavitating flow during auy plant operating mode is less than the area provided by the fiSh escape opening. Since these openings are at the sides of the intake structure, they cannot be* blocked simultaneously with the blocking of the main intake area. Furthermore, con-sideration of the main intake area alone showed that the required blockage (97% of the area in the extreme low-water level condition) could not be accomplished by a conven-tional vessel with hull curvature, nor by '.tny barge currendy transiting the Delaware River near the Artificial Island site. Further details are provided in Section 6 and Appendix 6.

2.5 NON-COLLISION RELATED SHIPPING HAZARD The most frequent source of risk presented by maritime activity is collision between two \\iessels, between a vessel and a bridge or pier, between the vessel and the water in*

takes, or between vessel and* the river bottom (grounding). There is, however, one other 8 *.

potential source of risk - problems that a ship may encounter from internal causes whlle it is underway. Examples of this are rue in the living quarters of the crew or an eqine-room fire. If the fire gets out of hand. it could result in a release of hazardous CIJ'IO materiaL Such a release. may in tum, IJ'lSe a p-otential'threat to the water intakes or to the control room.

In the yean 1968-1973 there have been no,-;ported incidents of cargo release due to intemal causes while a ship was underway on the Delaware. On the averqe, 9500 c:aqo ships moved by Artificial Island each year. Even if an internal problem, such as aa eqine-room rue, were to occur and cause the release of some carao, it is doubtful that a Jaqe release would occur. Every Jarse spDI in U.S. waten (over 100,000 saUons) recorded by the U.S. Coast Guard for the period 1.970-1972 was caused either by colli-sion or JI'Oundina (see Appendix 9) and not as a result of internal problems on the ship. As a result of these observatio~ we conclude that the probability of a non-coUision related shippina hazard threatenina the water intakes or the control room is nealilibly a,nall.

2.8 RISKS PRESENTED BY LNG TRANSPORTATION At pment no Bquefted natunJ 111 (LNG) is tnnsported by harp or by ship on the Delaware River. Howewr, proposals to import LNG have been filed with the Federal Power Commiaioo by both E1 Paso Eastern Co. md TI'IIIICO Eneray Co. Under these proposed projects up to 106 LNG ships would enter the Delaware and mcwe by Artificial Island ach year to a TI'IIIICO terminal in Gloucester County (Riccoon Island), NJ.

In tbe remote event of an accident's relellina Jup quantities or LNG on water, a double hazard exisb. Fint, the LNG relelle could be accompmied by Immediate ilnilion, ill wbicb ca~e a Jarp pool fire or short duration would result. second, ipition could be delayed, in which ca1e a llrp vapor cloud wD1 form aad dilpene downwlad. The larle pool file would Jat lal than S minutes and would not threaten tbe water Intakes or the conbOI room. If a fire did not occur

• a result or the LNG spill lftda qpor cloud or......,_ wm formed, a small pollibility exists that a flammable npor cloud could cower the pllat.

Tbe lilt or a f1lmmlble methane npor cloud's cowerina the pllftt can be alcullted

• follows:

9 Arttur Dlicdelnc

Annual LNG tinker trips Catc:hment diltance/trip (miles)

Collilionl/mDe Spills/collilion ProbabWty of lethal wind direction ProbabWty of doud not lanitina prior 106 X24 X I.SXI0"6 xs.oxur*

X 2.8XICJ1 to arrival over pllftt X 0.1 ProbabDity of ldvene weather condition X 0.5 Probability of flammable vapor illcident/year 2.7XICJ4 Rilk of flammable methane vapor coverina the pllftt

• 2.7XICJ4 occmrencet/year

~occurrence pments

• potentill risk to both the Wlter intlkes lftd the control room. Note that the above estimate of risk or fluuuble methlne vapor*s ccwerina the pllnt is 1 c:onteiYitive ovemtimlte. If 1 coiUsion Ievere eftOUih to nlae LNG~ to occur, there 11

• aood poelibWty lhlt imiMdiate ~

would occur a a result or the colli-lion itlelf.

• Ewn if immediate lpltloa did not occur, tbe chlncela.e dllt tbe film.

llllble vapor cloud would ilnlte prior to Nlc:lllaa the plant. Aay ilnltiOa IOUI'CI, such a a Ut a~~tcb, could lanite tbe cloud, caUiiq tbe cloud to be COftiUIIIIId quicldy IDCI pre-dudina MY further tnwel. Furthers **

t* *t USCG...... for......... LNG tblps into I lwbort......, deal or tnfllc eaatrol........ ill.............. USCG boat achlllly eecorta the LNG llalp Into Its berth. UDder tlllee ln1r.-d OCIIId.._ ol tnfl'lc U\\)' M II 111011..ulcely dalt a.... LNG.._ could occw

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3.0 TRAFFIC/ACCIDENT DATA BASE 1'ldl*llaa caatlinl the basic data aeedecl to eatimate the potential hiZIIds that may 1le Imp a.d 011 tbe Hope Cleek power plant by the maritime tramc Jn the Delaware River.

We1111 ctlld 1m satiltica for llllly8l becal110 tbele are the latett yean for wblcb com*

...... data..

..a.~*. ba tbia IICtioD we flm develop a deiCI'iptlon of the hazardous ma-tldll tralllc Pllt Arti&cillllllnd ill 1972. Next, we enmJne the relevant accident dati 01er a ftwe-,ar pedod to obtlin estimates of accident probabilities. Finally, we analyze the

........ JDfOIQiadoD on spDis ofhazanlous matedals to estimate the likelihood of spills big

..,...., to potentially affect the operations of the nuclear power plant advenely.

3.1 TRAFFIC ON TH_E DELAWARE RIVER BY HOPE CREEK 3.1.1 Genenl BICkground 1be maritime traffic that paas Artificial Island consists of the following:

1.

Ships from foreip ports which proceed direcdy up the Delaware to ports north or Artificial Island.

2.

Ships from domestic ports which proceed direcdy up the Delaware to ports IIOrth of Artificial Island.

3.

TIDkm from foreip ports which di.tchaqe some of their cargo at Anchorage

.. A" in order to match their drafts (currendy CJUde oil) to that of the Delaware.

4.

Baqes (non<<lf-propelled) which transport Jjghtered cargo from Anchorage

.. A" to aflnedel north of Artificial Island.

5.

a... (botb lelf-propelled mel noJHelf-propelled) which carry clean petroleum ptOductllftd sut{udc ICid between ports on the Delaware and ones beyond the DelawlaeCapa.

6.

Sldpl between ports on the Delaware and ones outside the Delaware Capes.

1'bae iDclu4e brakbulk CillO *~**ds, tanken Jn ballast and tanken with clean petroleum praducta.

7.

FOielp and domestic COIItwile traffic which uses the Delaware River in trips to

.... from tbe Schuylkill or the Delaware and Chesapeake canal.

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There are no ports of any lipificance whatloeYer between Artificillllllnd IDd the Delaware Capes. Moreover, except for pleasure craft, there il no smllkelel commeJCial traffic such as filhina boats in the area. Furthennore, except for the biiPI which Uahter tanken at Anchorqe "A", no internal1 traffic paKeS the illand.

Some observations about operations within.ute Delaware north of Artificialllland are relevant to understanding the data. Iron ore is a mldor commodity on the river. Some of this ore is l.ightered north of Ai1ificial Island to reduce vessel draft or is tranllhippecl to nilroad at PhDadelphia. Neither distillate nor residual fuel oD is liahtered south of the island. Residual is often disclwged directly to consumen from a sinJie tanker that makes a number of stops. Distillate is often ligbtered from tanken at anchoraps well north of Artificial Island.

The exposure of the cold water intakes of Hope Creek on Artificial Island dePends upon the numben and types of vessels which pass the island and the commodities which they carry. No single sources supply this infonnation. Consequendy., the deecription of the traffic must be built up from the incomplete infonnation which is available. The approach to this building up was first to obtain a general picture of shippins in the Delaware from local shipping interests. The next step was to detennine annual commodity flow by IDiiyz*

ing the data collected by the Corps of Engineen and reported in their publication "Waterborne Commerce of the United States." Data from the PbDadelphia Muitime Ex*

change, supplemented by infonnation from the Intentate OD TranJPOrt, w* u.cl to comert commodity flow into numben of trips for the vadous commodities of interest 1be JeiUlt is a table showing for the principal hazardous commodities, the annual tdpl, and the average lot size. In the following sections we wD1 describe the data bile Cram wJdcb tbe calculations were made, descn"be how the calculations were cmiecl out, and flully,._t the results.

3.1.2 Data Sources The principal data resources were the WateJbome Colnme.rce of tbe Uaitlld Statel" and the PhDadelphia Madtime Conunlaion. Waterborne Colnnaea"ll pulllllhecl _.,

1"1ntemll" II defined by the CorpS of EnglnMn

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12

by the U.S. Cotps of Enaineen and contains two sets of tables for the various individual waterways of the nation; one set showing annual freight traffic accordina to a four-digit commodity clasification and the other set showin& annual movements in the waterways by veael draft. Examples of these two data sets, are given in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.

The Cotps ofEnaineen collects data for every movement of vessels within U.S. waters.

Carrien are leaaDy required to report infonnation and are subject to penalties if they do not.

Data for forei&n vessels are supplied to the CoJPS of Enaineers by the Bureau of the Census baed on Customs Bumau ~eeeipts. The responsibility for submitting infonnation about domestic movements ~

with the shippJna operator. The Cotps reports unofficially that Jt punues viaorously operaton who do not fully meet its requirements and that 10% would be a very liberal estimate of unreported freight traffic. The standard fo1111_* <figure 3.3) paepiNd by the operaton are mailed to the local division of the Cotps, which then forwards them to New Orlems where the finll processing is done for publication.

The ptdladelphia Maritime exchanp, located at 7th and Chestnut Streets in Philadelphia, maintlins lop on alllbips that caD at the Port of Phlladelphia to dischaqe goods of foreign odaln. The Exchmae ~eeeives infonnation when the veael enten the Delaware Capes from the IOL The lop contlin the name of the veael, its resistry, and the kind and amount of its CillO to be clilcbalaed In Phblelphla. The lop for the entire year of 1972 were provided to ADL by the Exchmae. AI mentioned before, this infonnatiQn applies only to Phlladel*

pbia. No other harbor on the Delawire malntalnlsr.ach data. Therefore, by itself it does not PJ0Vk1e the entire data.,_ for detenninina the tratllc In the Artiflclai.Jsland area.

The Excb*p'a data for 1972 conelatel wry weD with the Corpa of Enafneen data for the ume year, althOUib 10me dilcrepanclol vme appamat. For example, fUel on from the Vbsin lllandleppeara* fcnqnln the Exch.... 'alop whelell the Corps claalflet it a domeetic coiltwilo. Moseonr, foaelp 0111\\" that illllbterecl from albip flter enterina the Delaw* II tlelted *

• intemll naipt by the COIPI wbema the Exchanp'a data Indicates it to be,....._ How"* the fow important clilclepaDc:lel that appelltd wtiO JtldDy

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• J barge services on the Delaware River, including the J.ightering operations ira Delaware Bay for the cmde oil tankers with drafts too large for the upper Delaware channels. Interstate Oil gave us infomiation on the sizes of the vessels which it operates in the vicinity of Artificial Island and also estimates for other carriers which use that stretch of the river.

Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard, Philadelphia, confinned the general picture we developed of the ship traffic in the area of interest 3.1.3 Commodity Movements Past Artificial Island Several commodities were selected as a basis for detennining annual freight volumes in the Artificial Island area. These volumes are not given directly in any single one of the

'~Waterborne Commerce" tables but must be infe~ from all the tables for the Delaware River. There are several reasons for this. For example, the table "Delaware River, Trenton

(

to the Sea, Forei@t and Coastwise" contains data about traffic which enters the Delaware

.... ~

~

River through the Chesapeake *and Delaware Canal and then proceeds north, thereby bypas.c-ing the Artificial ISland stretch of the river. However, cmde on that is 'ligh tered from tankers at Anchorage "A" appears in the "Internal" table which follows the one cited above.

The analysis of the Waterborne tables necessaJY ~o obtain the required numbers is described in detail in Appendix 8.

Commodity volumes were converted into vessel trips by dividing them by the average shipment size for that commodity on the Delaware. Average shipment size was deriv~

mainly from the Maritime Exchange data. Foreign and domestic cmde were treated separately beca~ smaller ships are used:for domestic movement of this commodity. Crude oil also passes Artificial Island.in barges and this was taken into account. for domestic movement of refined petroleum products, the average shipment si~ w~ J>ased' on infonna-tion given to us by Interstate on Transport

. Table 3.1 summarizes the results of the analysis. This table contains for each of the commodities. deemed potentially hazardous of spills, the numbers ofvessel trips~ the ave. lot size and the total 19',:-! tonnage as derived from the Corps of Engineers data.

The commodities.shown in Table 3.~ represent over 83% of the tonnage on the Delaware during the year in question.

17*..

~ u TABLE3.1

';D HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRAFFIC PAST ARnFICIAL ISLAND* 1872 Numa.r Awe,...

of LotSia1 Annuli Ton,....2 v.....

,......... of taM)

Cmlllona)

TANKERS Foreign CNde 011 710 49 34.9 I_

Domestic CNde 011 470 26 11.8 r

k,.

Fuel 01.13

~

1,024 26 26.6 I 1 GISOiine 212 26 6.3 l

Butane 10 13 0.14 l

TANK BARGES I

l Clean Products 210 8

1.7 CNde

• Llsl\\ters 860 6.8 4.9 Jet Fuel 180 1.4 0.2 Sulfuric Acid 160 0.8 0.1 OTHER Ammonia5 3

7 0.021 Naphtha 20 1B 0.3 Benzene & Toluene 20 10 0.2 Liquid Sulfur 20 10 0.2 Basic Chemicals 70 10 0.7 Kerosene 40 10 0.4 Lubricating Oils & GreiMI 110 10 1.1 Asphalt, Til'S & Pitches 70 10 0.7 LPG 2

12 0.02 1Philldelphia M*itfme Exchange* 1972 Oat..

2Corps of Engineers, Wa*rborne Commerce of 1he U.S., 1972," DetawM"e River, Trenton, N.J., to the

• • (adjusted).

\\

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WI18rbome ComrMf'ce.,

4Liquefied G....

5Delaware River Port Au1horfty.

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.*~ * -

...o.-w.

dimensions of these vessels. These data are shown in Table 3.2.

3.2 ACCIDENT DATA FOR THE DELAWARE RIVER 3.2.1 Ships The accident data are derived from U.S. Coast Guard investigations of all accidents involving either loss of life or damage amounting to S 1,500 or more. We have obtained the data, in the fonn of abstracts maintained on magnetic tape, covering the period 1 Jmy 1968 to 1 July 1973. The S-yearhistory contains 302 individual records, with one record for each vessel involved in an accident. The rec.ords on tape do not specify the exact location of the accident, beyond noting that it occurted in the Delaware River. The narrative files, tefetenced on the. tape by serial number, do specify the precise location.

Most of the incidents involve single vessels only, and these in miscellaneous difficulties.

The lipificant incidents, from the ptesent viewpoint, amount to the following:

CoiUsions be"iween Moving Vessels:

Tanker-Tanker Tanke~Fteiahter 1

2 Tanke...other 2

Ftefahter-Other 2

Tank B~o Barp 3

Groundinp, Capsizinp, and Foundednp:

Barges Tank en Other Total Groundinp Without Dmuae 4

21 24 49 With Dmuae 4

.7 2

13 19 Capdzlnp Founderinp 6

0 4

10 Total 14 30 72 Arthur D LJttle Inc.

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c-o TABLE3.2 BARGES OPERAnNG IN HOPE CREEK AREA OF THE DELAWARE RIVER 1 Ocean250 90 96 Tide Mar 19 Rob. Poling Albany Sun Toledo Sun Geo. Tilton Prov. Getty Offshore 2401 ArGon 185 176 160 130 lnterstl18 60 62 63 64 66 48 38,37,36 34 30 19 18 17 12 8

Oro~~ Tons 16,000 6,400 6,300 7,200 4,200 2,300 2,300 600 3,200 1,400 1,160 931 931 820 3,700 2,940 2,700 2,000 1,800 1,100 1,100 1,000 1,000 800 1Source: lntersute Oil TrMIPOrt, Inc.

2Drlft..,med equal to 80% of depth.

Length 646 400 400 390 333 300 300 130 311 236 219.

200 200 196 300 310 285 266 240 220 216 210 230 190 20 85 66 66 68 64 43 43 40 48 60 42 43 43 40 62 83 60 64 68 42 42 42 42 40

~

41 28 28 40 24 22 22 11 22 14 14 12 12 13 21 18 19 17 16 16 16 14 13 13 Dmt2 32 22 22 32 19 18 18 9

18 11 11 10 10 10 17 14 16 14 13 12 12 11 10 10

. }

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[J The "Other" category includes vessels of all sorts not in the first two cl~s, ie.,

freighters, dredges, pleaswe boats, ferries, etc.

Consequendy, during the five years from July 1, 1968, through Jwte 30, 1973, there were tluee collisions of big ships with one another, or on the avenae 0.6 collision per year.

This value agrees well with the value computed by the method developed by ADL and sub-mitted in evidence before the Federal Power Commission in the Eascogas and Distrigas hearings (Dockets Nos. CP-73: 47, 88, 132). 148, 230, 122); that is, according to the more general theory the expected number of collisions per year in the Delaware River is 0. 7. We thmefore take the 5-ye~ er.perience as valid for the derivation of empirical constants.

In computing the number of collisions we must include not only the ~

occurring between big ships, but also the two collisions with dredges and o~er such vessels. This brings the S-year total to 7. The number of ship trips per year can be taken as 9,5 53* and the length of the Delaware River as 100 miles. Then the number of collisions per ship-mlle is l.S x UT6

• 3.2.2 Barges Historical accident experience in the Delaware River cannot be used to derive useful accident rate estimates for barges, because exposure data in such tenns as annual n~nes of travel in the river is impossible to obtain. An ocean-going ship moves directly up and then down the river between the PhDadelphia-Wilmington area and the Delaware Capes. Since the "Waterborne Commerce" provides the number of annual trips for such ships, an annual miJea&e estimate is possible. However, baqes on the Delaware vary ~derably in size, and in the distance which they move on the river. Co.-uequendy, there is no way to infer their annual mileap from Corps of Engineers data.

In connection with a study for the Maritime Administration t on the Inland Watenvl)'!

of the United States we found that the nature of the baqe traffic wu such that estimates of annual exposure data were reasonably feasible. We found that the accident rate varied

• Sllf,.propelled vntela wfth dmts greiW thin 18 feet ICCOUn18d for In W11Mbome Commerce," 1972.

f,.A Model Economic end s.fety Analysis of the TrlftiPC)rtltlon of HIZirdoua SubstiUCII In Sulk" by Arthur D. Uttle, fnc. July 1974. Study prepnd for Office of Domntfc Shipping, M_.dme Admlntltrltfon, Deplrtment of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

21 Artt.Jr D IJttle Inc.

L LJ from 0.099 to 2.4 per million miles with an average of 0.42 per million miles. The spill rate per accident was 0.45. We propose to use these values for the Delaware River.

3.2.3 LNG Ships No historical data are available on the accident of LNG ships for the simple reason that no accident has yet occurred to them. Inasmuch as they are large ships, we.have assumed that their accident rate is :he same as for tankers and freighters. Such a rate is probably high for LNG carriers for several reasons. First, these ships have many safety features not usually found in the average tanker or freighter. Second, special procedures are required by the Coast Guard when these ships enter ports. In Boston, for example, they have to move in dayliabt under good visibility conditions and with all other traffic movements forbidden.

3.3 SPILL STATISTICS 3.3. 1 Barges The distribution of spill sizes was detennined from the data furnished by the U.S.

Coast Guard covering the period 1970-1972 (Appendix 9). The spill size was assumed to be independent of the nature of the cargo and of the cause of the acciL,ent. Those spills for which the size is unknown were assumed to be less than 1000 gallons. The resulting spill size distn'bution is approximately log-nonnal with 1. median of about 1000 gallons and a standard deviation of 2.8. The estimated probability of a five million-gallon spill, given that a spiJ1 has OCCUJred is 1.2 x 1 o-3

• That is, in about one spill out of I 000 at least five million pllons will be released.

3.3.2 Tankers (Other than LNG and LPG)

Porrk:eDi, Keith, and Storch ('7ankers and the Ecology," SNAME Transactions, VoL 79, 1971) reported on 338 tanker collisions that occurred during the calendar years 1969 and 1970 whne the tankers were underway. Eighty-two of these collisions resulted in pollution. Since 13 were regarded as ~al, we will take the probability of a spill due to coiUiion of 69/338 or 0.20.

In An ANilym of 011 Out/Iowa Due to Tanker Incidents (delivered to a Joint Confer*

enc:e Prevention and Control Oil Spills, March 1973) Keith and Porricelli present detailed data, includina spill size, for 72 of these bicidents. The distribution of spill size appears 22 Arthur D l.Jttle Inc

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to be ICJI'IlOIIIIII willa a media ofS3,800........Sa............._ oll.70. II we

-(*Kelda..... Pomcel!laG) lbat....................... 100.000... -.

tbep~ofatpill...-tta.Snaillioa..... ll4.0x l<<rr _......,.pratrt!

Jty t11at &com+-.-111 ill Mila IPIIIII.O x ICJ4. Tbele....ats

• aot a.c a ulla.t witlt u.s. COIIt Guild data of Appeadix 9.

3.3.3 Tanun (LNG)

The spDI problbJiities oftbele thiplba coOIIioa

• dlfreleat r....._.for,.._

Tbe problllilitiei !ad in this report naalt 6om *....,. wldch cnrl~ued ltltill wloc:ity, -ale ofimpct llld tbe<<IIUil COIIIbUctJon oldie LNG lldp llldlll.......

Tlldna into ICCGUilt the II'CJIDOby or the Delawlre OaiiUIII ourtllllaate oldie problbility of a spDI followfna a coflision is 5.0 X lf11* The efrect of tile -by It to Bmit t11e poalhle 11111a of iml*t to tba. wttbib t4SO or the bow................. 111e lbip is DOt iulstant to peaetradoa.

3.3.~ T.._. (LPG, Anhydraus Ammonia, etc.)

1'bele waell are pl.:ed In a.. DG in tbe P10P0M laternalloall Maddllle CoaiiiiiM OJpnization Gil Code. AccorcUna to tbil code, tbey must be lble toiUitlln......,

• miDor side damlle without release of cawo IDCI remain afloat no matter what lulppens.

The US.. eo.t Guard hllllreldy impaled tbia code on IIIIUCb lldpl wldcb..t entry to U.S. './afea.

Since LNG a.bls belana In tbil cafeiDIY, it would paoblbly be IPPftJPdatl to we the_. spill problbility for Ill the a. DG lldpa. Howewer, our LNG....,. ** cloae wltb respect to lldps that.,. the latest tecbnoloiY for CillO coa..,....t Mdlhlp ety.

~. tbe LNG thipl are mucb 111181' IDCiaabject to certlln Collt Gunl opendonll pm.

c:edUJa which do not nec**r0y IPPIY to tbe otberO.IIG tMaken. Tllelef'ore, U'a llqer spill problbility woulcl~eem justified. In Section 3.3.2 the piOblblllty of a IPIDin a tanker coiJhim ** estimated to be 0.20. 'Ibis is to be contnlted wltb 0.005 for tbe LNG lbip in the Delaware a..met. dtecllbon. The VII* for C*IJG lhipl, other tta.n tlnkerl, lhoulcl lie between these vllua. We are *ttiaa It at 0.02, four tim* peater thin that for LNG, to~

tbe IIIIIIJer size of tbae lhipllllclan enllqement or pollible 23 Arthar D IJttle lric.

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U IPPECTIOF VIOLENT WEATHER UPON ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES Ia 1M pacuiuw cblpter we pJIIODtecl cllculations which led to the:

,..,...., per... of*ICCid*t,

,........, perK cldeat of a spill, and prCIIII l!bllty per IPiD olalalle Jpill.

,._.......... weae Cllculated for both baqes and Jarae ships. The question arises of

...... to wldcb Yialeai weadler phenomena such a hurricanes or tornados could change

.._ II'Dhll*ltles 'Ibis cblpter pzaent110me IOJili.quantitatm observations on this 1'M flat.,.,_,alloa to be made II that all these probabilities are based on historical except f<< LNG type lbipa whete the leCOild and third probabilities were based on 111 al'ldcll ccwidealioal. The question then becomes with respect to the other probabilities oldie..... to whicb Ylolent weather occurrences would modify them.

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molt lltely to be afl'ected by violent weather is that for accident per

... far.... lbipl. The data period for this probability wu 1967 to 1972. It can be safety o aed lbat for molt of the c:cxnmoo types of violent weather - such as wind stonns, C

'uiiWIIII.IDOW llld ke - tbele wete not puticulady abnonnal years and thetefore,

... etrect or............, inberent in the probabDities.

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• we bow, dime were neither hurdcanes nor tornados in the Artificial Island oftt. Delanle dudaa thai time. Ne.erthelea thae events sometimes occur in this

..,., laow OIUCh lbould we modify the probability to take them into account? First let

• c a 'kr the tom8do. Tbe Cootinelltll United States with 3.6 x tel square miles is Yllllld by llfPIOXimately 1000 IUCh ltonnla yeu. Let us asume the averap tornado has allotpdat of 2.5 1q11a1e mDea ( 1/4 mDe wide and I 0 miles toni). Assuming tornadoes are

.. IJ prab8ble tlaft1ulbout the United States (which they are not), the probability that a

...... poiDt Ia die nation wll experience one annuaUy is 2.5 X 100

• 7 X 10""

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0 Heuce, of the 100 miles by 1/3 mBe channel area of tbe Delawue, 2.31 x 10"1 mBa would annually expelience tornados on averaae. On the bllil of 10,000.._lbip movements per year up and down the Delaware and a speed of 8 knots, the delllity of lbipl II 36~~-~x 8 = 0.14 ship permDe which is equivalent to l/2 ship per square mDe of channel. If we fiDIJiy Ma~~De that a tbJp visited by a tomado would appear in our accident statistics, the annual contribution made by tornados to these would be 0.14 x 7 x 1 0"" = 1 <r' ship per year.

The accident statistics of Section 3 for larp ships were based on ~eVen ICClclentl over a 5-year period. Tornados would add only O.OOOS to this flaure. Consequently we can.U.

miss them as a factor in our larp ship accident calculations.

Hurricanes were not a factor in our lugeosbip data base because none occurred in the time period. Now the average number of big ships in the river at a afven time II appJOxi-mately 14. Let us assume one hurricane per SO years which would invoiYe the entire 100.

mile stretch of the river from the Delaware Capes to Phlladelphia and that evezy one of these 14 ships was a casualty. This would only change our annual casualty rate of 1.40 to 1.68, a change which would have no effect upon our conclusions.

F"mally, we consider the other probabilities - baqe accident rates and the spill rates and sizes for both luge vessels and barges. The data on which these ~

based come from all parts of the United States (but mostly east of the Rockies) and therefore, have embedded in them the effects of all the varieties of weather which North America is capable of produclna.

It may be argued that the Delaware is different from the rest of the nation insofar a weather is concerned. This is probably true. However, the Delaware is probably on the benfan side for it generally escapes the hurricanes which plague the GUlf Cout and certainly escapes the tornados of the Mississippi Valley. Tsunamis, seiches, earthquakes, iceberp and severe Ooods have never played any significant role on Delaware maritime traffic in modem times.

We therefore conclude that for probability calculations our data bue already adequately iDcludes the effects ofviolen.t weather phenomena assuming no m.Qor climactic chanpa occur in the next SO years.

26

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.S pmeat any further traftlc Jn 1bo channel. Sbipl Jn tbe outer hllbor could bo liked to ID out to.. or..t other harbon. Sbipallld.,_ Ia the ilmer hartKir could be liked to

..., -' borda. With ttae. lllety mtiiUI'II iD force the Ukollhoocl ofeeme collillonl in Jncllment weather wDI be mbdmlzecl.

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&.0 AaEIIMENTOPHAZARD

&.1 DEFINITION OF CATCHMENT DISTANCE In Section 3, probabllitlel of spiJia of bazudoua chelrtlclle occumaa OD the DeJawin Rher wwe dert¥ed on a per-mDHf.. imway baa However, we are lntenlted Oilly iii ipW.

wldcb occur dole enouah to the plant to po1e potential prob_, to the wat.lntake l)'ltem or the maJn control~ DependJDa on the cbemk:ll re1euecl and the quantity rele**d, then Ja a maximum ctiltance within which the IPiD must occur to po1e a potential ttu.t. 1bia maximum distance, which varies with chemical and quantity apDiect, Ja ref'emcl to hen u the "catcbment dJitance."'lbe catchment distance, then, defines the distance, upstream and dOWDJtream from the water intakes, witb!n ;.:hich the release of a certain qumtity of a chemical would be potentiaDy harmful to the plant.

In **n*lina the hazards preamted by maritime activity on the Delaware we wDI consider the known variety of chemicals shipped and wm evaluate a catchment distance for each pneric clus of chemical which presents a hazard. Catchment dJstallces are evaluated for pool fires, toxic and flammable vapor dispenion, soluble corrosive chemicals in intake, and explosions. A non-chemical related ~

Js the potential blockqe of the water intakes caused by barge collision and sinking in the cJose.~dnity of the intakes.

Catchment distances for blockage of intakes by barges are not presented becaUJe the desip of the intake structure makes blockage impossible. (See Appendix 6.)

5.2 CATCHMENT DISTANCES FOR POOL FIRES Should an accident release a flammable, li&hter-than-water chemical on water, a potentiai :Pool rn hazard exists. Gasoline, liquefied natural gas (LNG), certain oils, and methanol are examples of chemicals which present a pool fire hazard. When the chemical is released on water, it will spread on the water surface. If it is ignited immediately upon release, the chemical will be consumed at a high rate and i JUab-intensity but short-duration fire will result. If unignited upon release, the chemical will spread on the surface until it is spread so thin (or has evaporated completely, as in the case of LNG) that it will no lonpr support a stable flame in the liquid pooL 28

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c lbucture, the control room beiDa too far from the mer bank to be threatened by such fireL As far u the water mtalte structure is concerned, the Janited pool cannot be drawn into the pump bays bec:a1110 of the preaence of skimmers at the bay entrance. However, if the ~

pool were to remain in the vicinity of the intake structure lona enouah, tlie fiie could eventualJy threaten the concrete intake buildfna.

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~

in~e structure planned for Hope Creek can withstand envelopment in a fire (of effectiYe black body emittina temperature of 1600°F) for over 20 minutes.

• Under conditions of instantaneous spill and bnmectiate i&nition 5 mDlion aaUons of psollne would be required for a fire of about 20 minutest duration rme. We need only be concerned, thetefore, by spills involYfna 5 miDion pllons or more of a flammable chemical in the imnw:liate vicini~ of the intakes. Furthermore, since most fl'lJIUDible liquid pool fires that can be expect~ on the Delaware bafe physical characteristics and severity levels simllar to or less than thOle presented by psoline, we need consider only gasoline.

1be catchment distance for the 5-million-gallon spill would be somewhat less *than 2 miles. Instantaneous spDis u large u 5 million gallons are theoretically possible, and for this case the catchment distance is taken as 2 miles. How~, spills occurring more than 1 mile from tM intake, if bnmectiately i&nited, would not continue to bum for 20 minutes after reacbiq the mtake, even with the most favorable mer current. If i&nition were delayed until the spm moved to the intake, sufficient spreadina would have occurred to reduce subsequent rae duration to less than 20 minutes.

So far, we have only been discussing instantaneous spills. If a somewhat siower leak were to occur near the intakes, fires of longer duration would result. For example, if a barp carrying 5 mDiion ~9ons of psollne were to strike the intake structure and release psoline at 50,000 p)lons per minute and if immediate Janition were to occur, a 100-minute fire could result. However, fires imoiY:ina small quantities of fuel can be easily controlled

• mel simple water ~Y can protect Jhe intake buiJdina. Manually opentecl water sprayjna capability wDI be available at the Hope Creek plant. Furthermore, the catchment cUstance

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for tbae llowrate continuous spDis is small (on the order or a hundred feet). COJIIOClueDtly' tbe probabmty or such nenta occurrina is rare.

For purpoaes or quantifyina the risk from pool fires, we haTe considered only spilll of 5 mmion pJlons or more occurrina wf.thin J. mile of the water intake structure. Details of the spmad and fire calculations are praentecl in Appendix 1.

6.3 VAPOR DISPERSION If an accident on the Delaware were to release a cold liquefied gas or a compressed ps, a npor clo~ of the gas would form and disperse downwind. Vapor clouds that contain.

toxic gases could pose a threat to operators in the control room and a vapor cloud of flammable jas could pose a rue hazard of sufficient severity to threaten the security of the control room. The gases that are currently shipped on the Delaware by Hope Creek and that pose a flammable-vapor dispersion problem are butane, LPG, and potentially LNG.

Anhydrous ammonia is the only toxic liquefied gas being shipped by Artificial Island.

It is estimated that some 21,000 tons of liquefied ammonia are moving in ships with each ship carrying about 7,000 tons. There is no known moveD)!*.tt of chlorine.

5.3.1 Flammable Vapor Dispersion (other than LNG)

Rather than treat each flammable gas separately, we will consider the risks presented by the worst case, which is represented by the 123,000 tons of LPG c8rgo. This cargo represents 12 ship movements a year with a maximum forseeable spill of 10,000 tons per ship. Under the most adverse weather conditions, ari ttistantaneous I 0,000-ton release of LPG would form a vapor cloud which could disperse up to II miles downwind prior to dilution below it:~ lower flammability limit. In this case, the catchment distance for an LPG

• J spill resulting in a flanur.able vapor cloud over the plant is 22 miles. Details of the dispersion methodology are presented in Appendix 2.

5.3.2 Toxic Vapor Dispenlon The only sas cf concern in this category of hazard is ammonia. The total annual traftlc consists of three shipments of 7,000 tons each. Under the most adverse wind conditions, an instsntaneous release of 1,000 tons or ammonia would result in a vapor cloud that could disperse 35 miles downwind before the ground level concentration c:UminJshecl 30

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to a level below the AEC suaested* toxic limit of 100 ppm. In this case,. the catchment distance for an ammonia spill resulting in a toxic vapor cloud over the plant would be 70 mDes. However, a more realJstic toxic l!mit is 400 ppm. This fiinit is more in keepina with practices in industrial safety. The catchment distance for a 400 ppm vapor cloud is 28 miles.

Details of the dispersion methodoloay used are presented in Appendix 2.

6.4 CATCHMENT DISTANCES FOR CORROSIVE LIQUIDS-

=-

Spills of soluble corrosive liquids could work their way into intakes and into the cooling water system. The only chemical shipPed on the Delaware that poses this problem is sulfuric acid. The concentrations of sulfuric acid necessary to cause various levels of corrosion to carbon steel pipes are reported in !he Corrosion Handbook. Modeling studies**

of water flow into the Salem intakes have. shown that all the water entei:fng the intakes' comes from within 200 feet of the intakes in the nonnal direction. The same should apply to Hope Creek if a sulfuric acid spill were to occur within a quarter Qf a mile upstream or downstream of the intake it would be diluted in approximately 5.3 x 1 0' ft3 of water.t The largest spill would constitute 800 tons or about 1.3 x 1 Q4 ft3

• The concentration of sulfuric acid being shipped by Artificial Island is low, generally below SO% by vollime.

Consequently, the concentration entering the water intakes would be 1.3 x 104 x O.S + 5.3 x 106 or 0.12% volume. If sulfuric acid of this concentration (0.12% by volume) were to pass through the service water system the maximum amount of material removed on the pipe walJs.because of corrosion would be less than 0.003 mm-(0.2 mil). (See Figure S.l.) This degree of degradation is very small and for all practical purposes we may consider the catchment distance for sulfuric acid to be 1/4 mile. Only spnts within 1/4 mile of the intake and within 200 feet of the bank pose potential problems.

• s. AEC document "Regulator Guide 1.78," June 1174.

• • "Circullting Wltlr Intake Hydr1ullc Mode Studlll Sllem Station Hydro*Ritllrd'l.scfenoe. USAEC Docket Nos. 6().272, 6().311. August 1988.

tGood mixing wauld occur IIIUiphwlc ICfd Is lbout tf.-.*~eta hiiVY 11 Wlttr 1nd would tend to link.

HcwuMr, aslt Is highly 10IUibleln wetw, It would mix well a It movtt down.

31 Arth.lr D lJttle Inc.

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0 "CORROSION RATE OF CARBON STEEL BY 0.12 VOLUME PERCENT. SULFURIC ACID AS A FUNCTION OF FLOW*

RATE INSIDE 20.1NCH I.D>TUBE."*

2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 GALLONS PER MINUTE IN 20.1NCH I.D. TUBE 12,000

• W. Whltmlf1, R. Russell, C. Welling, and J. Cochrane, Ind. Eng. CMm., 15, 672 (1923).

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5.5 CATCHMENT DISTANCE FOR LNG SPILLS At present, there is no movement of liquefied natural gas (LNG) on the Delaware.

However, El Paso Natural Gas, Inc., bas ftled plans for a major importation project with lhe Federal Power Commission* which could result in up to 106 ships carzying LNG moving by Artificial Island in the future. As a result of these known plans for LNG impor-tation, the risks due to LNG shipment are also evaluated.

The -release of a large quantity of LNG on water presents two basic hazards. Either the spill will be accompanied by immediate igniti,ln, in which case a pool fae will result, or else a vapor cloud ~~~ethane will form and disperse downwind. In the event of an*

accident and immediate ignition of 10.000 tons of LNG, a high-intensity, short-duration fue will result. Because of the rapid spread and evaporation of LNG, the fire duration will be about S minutes. Neither the water inteke system nor the control room will be adve~Jy affected by the rae.

In the event of an accident resulting in the instantaneous release of 10,000 tons (one tank of a typical, new, LNG ship) of LNG without ignition, a large vapor cloud will form.

nus vapor cloud will be flammable wherever the concentration of methane in air is between S and 1 S% by volume. The cloud will disperse downwind and dilute itself as more air is entrained into the cloud. Under the most adverse weather conditioras a 1 0,000-ton release of LNG could produce a vapor clo:Jd that remains flammable for a distance of 12 miles downwind. Of course, the chances of the cloud's igniting as it moves downwind are great, and once the cloud ignites it will bum rapidly and all further h~

wiD be alleviated.

How~er, since the cloud could remain flammable for 12 miles the catchment distance for an LNG vapor cloud covering the plant is 24 miles. Details of the LNG vapor dispersion calculations are shown in Appendix 2.

• FPC Docket No. CP-73-258.

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8.0 BLOCKING AND RAMMING OF INTAKES a1 GENERALBACKGROUND Some of the potential hazards to the service water intake structure are due to ramming collisions Qr groundings of the ships transiting the Delaware River. In a grounding collision, the water intake structure might not be able to provide cooling water under emergency conditions because blockage of the intake area has reduced the water inflow below critical limits, or has significantly impaired the pump efficiency by reducing the water head below the net pressure suction head (NPSH) of the pump. Similarly, a ramming collision could conceivably penetrate the intake structure to a sufficient depth to impact and destroy the pumps themselves, or create enough structural rubble to block the entry of water in sufficient quantities.

6.2 BLOCKING OF INTAKES Blockage of the intake structure by a sunken or grounded vessel could restrict the normal access of water to the pump inlet, and thereby reduce the head available to the pump.

If the loss of head due to blockage is sufficient to reduce the head available at the pumps to less than the net positive suct~on head (NPSH) requirements of the pumps, cavitation could result, water flow could ~ec:rease sharply, and destructive damage could be caused to the pump. The criterion established for safe operation, therefore, has been set as the blotkage which reduces the head available to the pumps to their NPSH requirements, in the case in which the river tidal level is at its minimum credible low low water. (See Appendix 4.)

Two cases have been examined: one for continuous safe operation of the plant, with each of the ei&ht service water pump5 delivering its normal design flow rate of 10,875 GPM; and the other for the safe operation req\\lim.4ents durin& plant shutdown in the LOCA mode.

The results of these analyses, which are described,.!1t Appendix 6, indicate that the minimum flow area required for normal continuous plant operations is 3S ft2, while that required for the plant shutdown condition is 12 ft2

• These correspond, respectlYely, to about three percent and one percent of the total intake area at the design low low water condition.

These values suaest that it is just about impossible to block the intake structure to the degree necessary to pruduce an unsafe plant operational situation because of insufficient 34

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service water flow. This degree of blockage would require a vessel, the draft of which is equal to or shallower than the water level at the intake structure, to penetrate up to the intake structure without grounding on the dred&ed side slopes, tum parallel with the intake opening, and in the case of those vessels with drafts shallower than the water depth, sink immediately in front of and close up against the intake opening. The length of these ves$els must be less than 125 feet so that they can maneuver into the appropriate position, but longer than approximately 75 feet to block three of the four intake bays.

There is no conceivable circumstance under which a conventionally-shaped ship, with hull curvature at the bow and stem, could block the intake structure to the necessary degree.

The curvature itself would prevent it.

Barges with squared bows and stems and with essentially flat rectangular sides could co~~~~bly block the frontal intake area. A listing of those barges which make up the bulk of the barge traffic past Artificial Island was obtained from the Interstate Oil Transport Company of Philadelpllia. This listing (presented in Table 3-2) is comprised of 30 barges, raJlling in size from 500 to 15,000 gross tons. Out of these 30, only one is less than 200 feet long. This particular one, the Georae nlton, is 130 feet long, but is only 11 feet in total height and hence could block the water intake structure only if the water level were lower than the lowest level ever recorded.

Two of the specific desip features of the intake structure, which have not been con-sidered in the analysis or discussion up to this point, would essentially preclude the pos-sibility of blockqe of the water inflow to the depee necessary under any conceivable situa-tion. These design features are the fish escape area and the marine dock bumpers. The pro-posed desi&n of the intake structure for the Hope Creek Station incorporates fish escapes at the sides of the structure. This amnaement is possible because the intake structure extends 25 feet into the river past the shoreline. Thus, even if the frontal area of the intake structure opening were completely blocked, water could flow into the intake through the fish escape areu. These areas, one on each side, are approximately 5 feet wide, and are open up to an elevation correspondina to approximately mean high water level. At the design low low water level, Uled in the blockap analysis, about 40 ft2 of flow area would be avail-able throuah each of the two fish escape areas - an amount considerably greater than the minimum flow areas required for safe plant opention.

35 Arthur D lJttle Inc.

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The marine dock bumpers are resilient structures nonnally positioned at several eleva-tions on each of the protruding structural walls or buttresses to prevent impact damage from service ships. These bumpers, which typicatiy extend 2 or 3 feet from the concrete wall, could also serve to hold a stranded or grounded vessel away from the intake structural walls, and hence provide i water flow area around and under the vessel. Conceivably some of these bumpers may be broken or sheared off by the oncoming vessel; it is not likely, how-ever, that a sufficient numbe!.of them would be damaged to the degree required for the vesset to approach the intake for close-to-total blockage of the frontal intake area.

6.3 RAMMING OF INTAKES Impact of the intake structure by a ramming ship could conceivably destroy some of the pump systems or biock the water intake opening sufficiently to impair the efficiency of the water inflow.

Ramming collisions would be, as discussed in Appendices 4 and 5, limited to relatively shallow draft v~ls under the normal range of tidal conditions, since the larger ships would likely ground on the shoal areas outside the river channels. The analysis of the potential for such groundings indicat~s that the largest vessel capable of reaching the intake for tides up to the high high water level {i.e., the highest tidal level ever recorded in the vicinity of Artificial Island) would have a displacement of approximately 100 million ft-lb. {See Appendix 5.) At a mean tide level, the largest vessel capable of reaching the intake without grounding would have a displacement of approximately 9000 tons, and a maximum kinetic energy of about 60 million ft-lb. At low low water conditions the largest vessel would be approximately 3000 tons and have a kinetic energy of about 30 million ft-lb. At the extreme design high water condition, corresponding to potential hurricane tidal levels occurring once in a thousand years, the largest vessels transiting th: Delaware River would be capable of reaching the intake without grounding. These, as indicated in Appendix S, could impact the intake structure with as 1nuch as 200 milllon ft-lb of kinetic energy. Thus, the analysis indicates that even over these extreme tidal conditions the magnitude of the kinetic energy of such potential ship ramming incidents would be in the 20 to 200 million ft-lb with the most probable value being on the order of 100 million ft-lb.

36 Arthur D I.Jttle Inc.

f

l.

I I I I

1'-

~.,...

'""* *. *C$f"

_-: 1 *'7:"'~"1" :*~**.,., ** ~. *' ' ;~i **

................. _................. _...... __..__... ____....... _...... _liiiilllill..__~-----~...... - ------*-----~ l The resistance of the intake structure to this eneqy input durins impact will be developed by various energy storage and dissipatiw mechanisms, such u elastic and plutic strain energy in the structural components, shear and frictional forces in the soiktructure interface, and shear and compressive forces in the underlyin& and sunoundina son materials.

An analysis of the resi>>onse of the intake structure to such ranunina inputs - severe enough to produce plastic or e~o-plutic behavior, or some mode of structunl failure -

cannot be determined analytically in a strai&htforward manner. Fint, most of the mech-anical work, or absorption of the impact energy, takes place in the plastic region of the structural materials, so the applicability of analytical techniques is. limited. Second, the actual mechanisms of the structural failure are complex; they involve bending, twisting, bqckling, crushing, etc. and frequently progress from one of these failure modes to another.

Two approaches have been used to study the structural deformation effects of ship collisions: (I) empirical methods using data about actual collisions to defme relationships between the energy of the collision and the degree of structural damage, and (2) model studies, in which scaled structural models simulating vessel bows in collision with vessel side-walls or other structures have been fabricated and tested in the laboratory.

Each of these approaches has produced results which have applicability to the present study. The empirical approach by Minonky* evaluated the extent of structural damage in major ship collisions and the magnitude of the energy lost in those collisions. The energy of the major collisions which occurred over a 12-year period was datermined to be between 100 and 400 million ft-lb. As an example of the relation between energy and structural damage, one case, which involved approximately 270 million ft-lb of energy, consisted of a high-speed collision at sea of a 22,000-ton vessel and a 20,000-ton vessel, and resulted principally in the destruction of a 60-fQOt by 60-foot portion of the 7/8-inch thick main deck of the struck vessel. From this case, it is apparent that a considerable amount of energy can be absorbed by ptastic deformation of structural elements, particularly if such elements have an appropriate confJIUI'8tiOn and orientation for effective input resist&nce.

• "An Analysis of Ship Collisions with Reference to Protection of Nuclt*r Power PIMts," by V.U. Mlnonky, J. of Applied R.. en:h, October 1959.

37 Arthur D IJttle Inc.

\\._.)

. u 1

j I

i u

L_)

fj

[~

( l I

I

---

~-----------------------------------------------------

When the collision eneqy and the extent of damlp from thJa ship collilion are com-

.-ed to the eneqy potentially available for ranunJna collisions of the intake structure, it can be concluded that the depee of damqe required for a hazardous bloc:tlna or destruction of the water intake structme is unlikely to result from the Jftllftitude of the eneqles aftil.

able from tile postulated I'IIIUiliDa conditions.

The model studies, particularly those by the Japanese inftltiptors,

• have shown that in the collision of two deformable bodies, the distribution of the structural damqe between the two bodies was quite sensitive to the relative strenath or resistance of the two bodies, with the weaker of the two ab59rbing most of the eneray and hence bein& destroyed one-sidedly. On this basis, it would seem reasonable to conclude that if a vessel collided with the relatively massive reinforced concrete intake structure, most of the impact enei'IY would be dissipated in damage to the vessel. In such a case, the essential hazard would arise from blo-:ldng of the intake by the structural failure and defonnation of the vessel components and the resulting rubble and debris. As indicated in Sectio,_ 6.2, the intake opening cannot be blocked to the degree necessary to prevent safe operation of the plant during its normal or shutdown conditions, even under the relatively ideal blockina coruJgUration provided by a Oat-sided barge. Structural rubble would be relatively inefficient in this regard. Further-more, the magnitude of the input energy, as indicated earlier, is related to the l111est size of the vessel reaching the intake, which in tum is'a function of the tidal level. Thus, the effec-tive intake opening (intake width times height of water level) will increase as the magnitude of the impact enii'IY available to create structural rubble increases.

Another approach that can provide a qualitative assessment of the structural resistance of the service water intake structure is to compare the accelerations due to the ramming with the seismic design req~Prements. The intake structure has been designed as a seismic Class I structure in keeping with its vital role in the safe operation of the facility. As such, its design is based, in addition to the usual structuralloadin& conditions, on a dynamic analysis utilizing earthquake response spectra and/or earthquake time-history ground impact.

The peak acceleration ground motion input values in the horizontal direction are 0.1 Os for *

• A Study on Collision bv an Elastic Stem to a Side Structure of Ships" bv Y. Akita and K. Kltemwa, Journal of the Society of Naval Architects of.laPin, Vol. 131, June 1972.

38

! i l:

)

u f

l 0

0 0

the Operatina Basic Earthquake. In the vertical diJection, the general motion input values are spedfted I'.S two-thirds of the horizontal input values, acting simultaneously.* For rein-forced cona-ete structures, the damping is specifled as two percent of critical damping for the Operatina Basic Earthquake, and seven percent for the Design Basic Earthquake.

The acceleration response spectra to these inputs indicate that over certain frequency ranaes, these input values will be amplified by as much as a factor of 3. 7 in the case of the Operating Basic Earthquake, and by 2.1 in the case of the Design Basic Earthquake. Under these inputs, the structural components and the structural system as a whole must not develop sbesses above specifled limits.

Structural loadings due to impact from a ramming collision are of course quite differ-ent from system ground motion inputs from seismic forces. One of the major differences is that whiie seismic inputs are applied to the entire structure through soil-structure inter-action, the impact loads due to collision are essentially local and progressive as the penetra*

tion or deformation proceeds to adjoining structural elements. With this type of structural loading pattern, many complex structures, including inany vessels and confJgUrations such as the intake structure, which consist of a large number of interconnected structural components in grid-like or honeycomb deiijfis, will exhibit a relatively constant resisting force, and hence produce a relatively constant deceleration of the ramming ship and of the impacted structure. Assuming the case of constant deceleration, the deceleration magnitude is given simply by the relation a= v2/2s where:

a = deceleration, ft/sec2 v = ramming velocity*, ft/sec s = maximum penetration, ft Using this formulation, one can determine the value of deceleration of the ramming ship for prescribed penetration depths and ramming velocities. For example, for penetration sufficiently deep into the intake structure to directly affect the pumps requires that s be about 55 ft. Assuming a high high water condition, with a maximum vessel size of 26,000 39 Arthur D IJttle Inc.

. ~*

-~*....

tons and speed at six knots, leads to a deceleration of about 0.03a. For a maximum pene-tration of, say, 10 feet, the deceleration is about 0.16g.

The corresponding accelerations imparted to the intake structure would be extremely difficult to determine because the effective mass of the intake structure, includin& the sur*

rounding earth and foundation, resisting the impact force is not easily determinable. It

• would appear intuitively clear, however, that the velocity, and hence acceleration, imparted to the entire intake structure would be much Jess, perhaps orders of mqnitude less, than that of the ramming ship.

On the basis of this qualitative argument, damage to the structural elements of the intake structure due to inertial loadings is not a conceivable occurrence from a ship-ramming accident. Whatever damage is incurred by the intake structure is more likely to arise from stress development as a result of local loadings from the impact. From prior arguments, however, it is not conceivable that ramming collisions by such local loadings and structural failure could cause the magnitude of damage to the service water intake system necessary to preclude safe operation of the plant during its normal or shutdown modes.

40

APPENDIX 1 ANAL VIIS OF atREAD AND IGNITION OF FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS ON WATER Pdor to deteanfnina tho probability that a spill ofvolwno V or areater, at a location x 111111 fMIIl tbe water intakes, will antve at tho intake wbDo stiU flammable, it will be necoa-

_, to nnino tbe phylica or oil spleld on water.

1be spleld of mOlt flammable liquid materials on water is sfmDar to that or on. Tho wovement of oil and other petroleum products releaecl in waterways is controlled by tluee 1-* mechmJwns: (I) tho propensity or oil to spread becaule or density and surface tension ofroc1l, (2) tbe effec11 of wind. and (3) the effects of water current. Dependina on the size of IPiO, the natwe of the waterway, and the time frame or interest, one or more or these mechaniwrm would play a dominant role in detonninina extent or spread. While spreadfn&

dae ail Clll evap.xate mel even sink, prorided it combines with enough contaminants to became effectiftly heavier than water. In aenerat the released on will spread (because or deDiity IDd surface tension effects) to a minimum thickness or about 0.1 mm for most common oil and peboleum prodw:tl. When an oil slick hits the shore Hne it starts being abiOJbed by the boundary at a relatively slow rate dependina on the kind of soil involved.

For lhort periods this absOrption can be neglected.

A. PHYSICS OF OIL SPREAD 1be natural tendency for oil to spread on water by virtue or density and surface tension effec11 has been the subject or much study. Fluids with Yiscosities much laqer than water (such

• oil) spread in three p~

(l) pavity-inertia; (2) gravity-viscous; and (3) surface teDIIioiHilcous For 1D instantaneous spiD of volume V the radius of spill r, these phases CID be exprened*

• r*1.14 (GV) */* t*h r* 0.98 (G' V') */1 2 t*l*

Gravity-inertia Gravity-viscous Surface tension-viscous

.,......,,J.K., lftd Wlldrn8n, G.D., "Dyrwnla of 011 Slicks", AIAA JourmJI, Volume 10, April 1972, p.IOI.

41 Arthur D IJttle Inc.

0:

.~

~' *"

[]

[]

where p is the density of water, t is the time after spill, 11 is the kinematic viscosity of water and G is the gravitational constant multiplied by the non-dimensional density defect.

B. SAMPLE CALCULATION Consider the spill of one million gallons of on in a wide river (no shore lines effects) with mean current of 1.5 knots and wind of 30 knots from one direction. Let us track the movement of the oil spill in the fust hour after spill (Fjgute A* I). The spill. occurs at site X at time t = 0. We show the current direction and wind direction by sectors at the site. One hour later the slick is at site Y. It has spread to a radius of 1330 feet because of density effects and moved 1.5 nautical miles in the current direction and 0.9 nautical mile (30 x 0.03) in the wind direction. The dotted lines show the net movement of the oil.

C. OIL MOVEMENT IN THE FLAMMABLE RANGE In order to assess the probability of oil fires in plant water intakes, we need to deter-mine the condition of flammability of on on water and apply this to detennine the likelihood of oil in intakes while it is still flammable.

WIND

/

30KNOTS CURRENT 1.6 KNOTS

/

/

106 GAL.

1.6 MILES SPILL e

\\*

FIGURE A*1. SCHEMAnC OF OIL MOVEMENT 42

When on II spilled on water it spleldl, thereby canmna the conatant volume alick to become thinner. Eventually the lllck become~ too thin to bo ipltecl and support a stable fire. In thJa IPpendix we calculate the cdticll tbJcknell for bumbla of oD on water and UJe the time a amn volume takes to acbleve thiJ tbicknea u the Oammable Hfe time of the oil. On the b.. of tbil time, we evaluate the probabDlty of oll'1 reacbtna the intake whDe still flammable.

D. CALCULATION OF THE CRITICAL THICKNESS FOR BURNING FUEL OIL ON WATER Conslder a pool of oil bumlna on top of a water b*. A cdtical tbicknea is achieved when the heat radiated from the t1ame to the swface (which 1011 Into evaporating the fuel) is equal to the heat ctiJlductecl throuah the on film into the water; that Js where:

WATER 1rad

• intenaity of radiation from the Oame to the swface (calaec** cm-2)

• thennll conductivity of the fuel on (cal sec** em**

0 C"*)

Ty

• vaporization temperature of the on rc)

Tw

• watertemperaturerc>

de

• cdtical tbJcknea of the oil lUck (em)

When bumina il tl1dna place at ateady ltate, the back radiation from the Oame to the pool equlll the heat needed to eYIPonte an amount of oil equal to dtat bumina In the Oame; that II:

43

~~

L c

I D

0

[J i

L r

• LJ

(

LJ f

I LJ

( '

I I

.._..s r-i L

[

l whe!e:

v

• linear ~qression rate of the surface (em sec**)

p

= deDsity of the an (Bm cm*3 )

4lly = latent heat of vaporization (cal am**)

For a typjc8i. uJ1 01\\ sea water we can substitute the following values:

v

= 4 mm/min* = 0.0067 em sec**

p

= 0.9 IIJl cm*3 411y = 80 cal sm**

= 3.7 x 10"" cal sec** em** "'c-*

Tv

a 24<fC Tw

• 100C 1be critical thiclmea can then be evaluated

• IC(fy*Tw)

=----

vp411y 3.7 X 1~ (240-10)

= ------....;,_~~.....

0.00667 X 0.9 X 80

= 0.18 em 11Us checks YeJY weD, with 1he value of de- 0.13 em found expcdmentaDy* for butanol, isopentanolmd hexanollaym on water.

It is clear then that an on stick on fire will not bum to a slick thickness less about 0.2 CDJ. We utilize this result to hypothesize that 9i1 slicks thinner than 0.1 ~- (for a con-erYative estimate) wD1 not sustain stable combustion.

E. CALCULATION OF TIME TO REACH CRITICAL THICKNESS Utiliziq the equationspeming the spJead of oil on water, we calcula~ the time nece rruy to miCh a cdtical thicknea of 0.1 em. The results me shown in Table A-1.

• • tncw. V.l.lftd Khud)llcor, e.N., "Dfffuslon Burning of Uqufdl", Moecow Acldlmy of Sdtncn, 1881,

......... bV o.pt. offle/lnfrV,C<<'Piof Engln~~n, Fort Belvoir, VA, Report No. T*1480a-c, 83-111870.

44

TABLEA-1 TIME TO REACH CRincAL THICKNESS Spill tlze (llllans) 1o2

'1o' 10" 1oS 106 Tlme(houn) 0.038 0.176 0.81 3.6 17.0 Rdwlt1hlltlme 11.0 34.7 110 347 1100 F. SIMULTANEOUS SPREADING AND BURNING Altbouah a million pllon release of fUel oil may remain flammable on water for several

~

ig t1te event of ipition the fire would bum out in vel)' short time. Fire duration for fti!DJ!IabJe liquid spills with immediate ignition can be calculated utilizing the relationship:*

whele:

I vI ~'*

t=0.67 Gf2 t

= time for buming complete pool (sec)

V

= volume of spilled fuel (ft')

G = effective parity, &(1-l)ruetiPwater>, (ft/sec) t

= repeaion rate ofbuming fuel (ft/sec)

A typical repasion rate for psOJine and other petroleum products is 0.36 in./ sec wbereal a typical ratio of fuel density to water density is 0. 1*.

• Utiliziq theae values, we calc:nJated the time for fire duration of various sized spills shown in Table A-2 *

• ,.;f a* It Madill In Support of 1fie H.urd A r I **11 H *._.

.., Tldlnfcll Report bv Anhur D.

Utile, Inc., Cnbrldlt,......... to U.S. Collt Guri Office of RIIIJtdllnd Dwllapment, wr.~~~~* Jt=, oc, ~~~part No. coo....

• 74,....,.Y 1174.

1_.

45

0 0

[J 0

.[]

D D

TABLE:A..Z TYPICAL TIME TO COMPLEii'ELY BURN GASOLINE t*mulaneouaiPnld and I~)

Volume IPIIIed (plans)

Uf 1oS 1o' 6 x 1o' nme to bum out (MCOndl) 140 260 430 660 As can be seen from Table A-2, a mDUon gallon spDl, if immediately ipited, wD1 bum out in about 7 minutes. As a conaeJVative estimate, we ha\\t~ postulated that *a mDUon pllon spD1 may present a fire hazard of over 10 minutes duration. A five mDUon pllon spDI, if immediately ipited, wDJ bu,m for about 11 minutes. As a COD.SelVative estimate We have postula~ that a five mDiion pllon spill may present a fire hazard of over 20 minutes. The intake stnleture can withstand much more than 20 minutes of envelopment in a fire (see Appendix 7) but once qain, we have conseJVa*~y estimated that a fire of over 20 minutes duratlQD is a potential threat. As a result of these considerations, only five mDlion pllon spfDs within one mDe of the intake are considered hazudous. SpDls outside the onHDile distance may still be flammable (or burning, if already ignited) when they reach the intake, but in that case, the fire duration will be less than 20 minutes.

I -

I I

.~.

---

~---~---<<

A INTRODUCTION APPENDIX2 VAPOR DISPERSION Of the many chemicals transported on water, quite a few are cryogenic liquids which vaporize when heated to atmospheric temperatures. Other liquids are highly reactive with water and produce toxic gases. Therefore, if one is to assess their inherent hazard one must know to what extent these released gases are dispersed. The model used in the prediction of vapor concentrations at various locations and times is presented here.

The primary agent that will disperse a vapor cloud released into the atmosphere is the atmospheric turbulence. Molecular diffusion caused by concentration gradients represents a much smaller effect than turbulent mixing. Therefore, wind conditions and the air tem-perature gradient (in effect, the local meteorological conditions) have considerable influence on the dllution of the cloud. The uncertain and unpredictable character of the atmospheric condition, the differences in topography of a particular locale, and the differences in the physical properties of the vapor released make it difficult to give a general dispersion model applicable to all circumstances and loeations. However, some models have been proposed in the literature, all of which have their roots in the Fickian dift\\lsion equation based on tur-bulent diffusion coefficients. In alm~t all of the models the vapor released is u.,umed to have the same density as the local air (neutrally buoyant), and it is further assumed that during the dispersion process neither the wind direction, nor its velocity, nor other meteoro-logical conditions change. In most cases the effects of heat transfer from the surrounding air mtd ground are neglected.

The model presented here is the one most widely Uled in practice for concentration.

predictions.

B. DETAILS OF THE MODEL FOR LPG AND LNG RELATED DISPERSION The m<del presented is based on the Gaussian diffusion models ofPasquDI and others.<*>

The oriain of the x,y,z coordinates is on the ground directly beneath the source point (and, in the case of area sources, it is the center or the area on the ground). The x direction is defined as the direction or the wind and z is the vertical direction. (See Figures A-3 and A-4.)

47.

Arthur D lJttle Inc.

I I

0 0

0 0

0 D

P (x,y,z)

ORIGIN OR COORDINATES FIGURE A-3. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF A CONTINUOUS POINT SOURCE AREA SOURCE VIRTUAL POINT SOURCE

'-~-

---.......,.~~

FIGURE A-4. ICHEMAnC DIAGRAM OF A CONTINUOUS ARIA IOURCI 48

~:I

~--

1. Point Source For vapor released instantaneously, the following equation is used:

m

[<x-Ut )2

_I_]

C(x,y,z,t) =

312 Exp-2a2

+ ~ +

(2*)

ax 11y ax x

y where ax, ay, az = variances of the Gaussian concentration profiles in the respective directions.

The terms ay and az are a functions of downwind distance. For use in Eq. ( 1) we assume a;c = ay.

(1)

If the concentration is expressed in mole fraction (Cf) of the air vapor mixture, then:

c -

1 f- [I + PaiC My/M8 ]

where Pa = the density of air at standard conditions (1S°C, 1 atm).

2. Area Sources (2)

The proper procedure for obtainins the concentration at any point due to an area source is to add the contributions from each infmitesimal point source in the area toward the con-centration. This is illustrated by Eq. (3).

C8(x,y,z,t) = m/A /cp(x*J.,y-J,z

,t*I/U) di d9 (3)

J.,y over the source area A where C1

• concentration at (x,y,z) due to area.source; C.,

• concentration at the same point due to a point source at X,Y; and A

• area or source.

In aenenl, the evaluation or the above intearalls difficult. However, for estimatina the concentration at larp distances (lreater than two equivalent dlarneten or the source area) the foDowina simple analysis suffices for most enameerina purpo~e~.

49 Arthar D lJttle Inc

The area source Js replaced by a virtual point source of the same total strenath, but displaced upwind by a suitable distance. It is found that this "suitable distance" is a function of the concentration itself. However, a reasonable estimate of this upwind origin-shift dis-tance is about S diameters. Hence, for area source calculations we use:

x'

• x + Sd (4) md substitute this x' bi Eq. (1), instead ofx, to obtain the concentration at point x.

C. APPLICATION TO LPG AND LNG The ctispmion theory dilaaad here is the one Uled in calculatina distances of Oam*

mable ftPOI' traYe1 for both LPG and LNG pnerated vapors. The catchment distance is merely two times the maximum distance of flammable cloud traYeL The actual distances

• a ftmc:tion ofwlume spiOecl is shown in Table A-3.

TABLEA-3 IIAXJIIaJII DISTANCE OF FU...,..LE CLOUD TRAVEL CA* siKr*Ft Clll1:....

lpll au..dly (tDnll Pool......,.,

E 4 : illloia Time c-.t

........... EXIInt ofT,_ (mlllst E a; : iiiiDtt nn. c-.t 100 200 78 1.1 100 210 140 1.3 100.,

110 3.2 100 310 220 2.1 I,GOO 810 200 u

I,GOO 140.,

8.2 10,000 1,120 240 12 10,000 1,230 410 11 Bee** or.,. or coliltlwtioa or LNG ad LPG tlnken, lilY splllflllbly to,.._

tile Ul181111 of-.......... 'l'ypbllt.k..

Oil..... tlnbrlfl 10,000 toni.

Ia tile ewat of 10~

ab*u or LNG ad LPG tbe catchment cll!tace would be 24.... 22..... tiillfiCilwly.

50

D. MODEL FOR AMMONIA DISPERSION Unlike LPG and LNG generated vapor, ammonia vapor is lighter than air and will tend to rise. The model for ammonia dispersion used in this study is based on the results obtained in a recent U.S. Coast Guard sponsored project on ammonia spills on water.(2) When ammonia is spilled on water, approximately half of the quantity released dissolves to fonn ammonium hydroxide whereas the remaining half vaporizes and disperses downwind. The vapor dispersicn problem can be adequately treated as a combination of standard dispersion theory and buoyant plume theory. Full details of the prediction method and experimental verification of the theory are presented in Reference 2.

Based on the predictive methods in Reference 2, the extent of ammonia cloud travel prior to diluting the cloud below 100 ppm and 400 ppm are as shown below:

• Spill Oulntity (tons)

MAXIMUM CLOUD TRAVEL DISTANCES VARIOUS AMMONIA CONCENTRATIONS (AtmcllpMre F)

Downwind Dilbll1ce for 100 ppm (miles)

Downwind Distance for 400 ppm (miles) 100 5.6 3

600 11 6

3,000 24 11 7,000 36 14 Once again, in the event of a tanker related spill, the most likely spill quantity would be the entire tank content of 7,000 tons. The catchment distance is 28 mDes.

51 Arthlr D IJttle Inc.

REF~RENCES FOR APPENDIX 2 D

(1) "MeteorolOJ)' and Atomic EneJKY"; U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Teclmicallnfonnation, Slade, D.H., Editor, July 1968, Ch. 3, pp.65-116.

[J (2) "Prediction of Hazards of Spills of Anhydrous Ammonia on Water Report by Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts tQ U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Research and DeYelopment, Washmgton D.C. Report# CG-D-74-74. AD779400. January 1974.

NOMENCLATURE Formula or Symbol Description Value Units c

concentration of vapor

'q/m' LJ Cc molar vapor concentration fraction or%

0 d

equiYalent diameter of area 10urce m

h

.bei&ht of IOUI'ce above* the pound m

0 m

ma. of ftPOI' relealecl ka m

rate of releae of vapor kala 0

molecnlu welaht of air 28.9 ka/kmole My moJeadar weiaht of ftPOI' ka/kmole t

time I

u willd ftlodty m/*

I l w

.Wtli offtPOI' plume at any point m

X m

y aowwiDd cliltlnce.

m z

Wll1lcll cllltlace m

Pa dealltyoflirat ISOC, 1 atm 1.22 qJm*

CJx, "Y' crz vallacel of Geu-'en conceatration m

profile

,--~*

APPENDIX3 SHIPMENT OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES ON THE DELAWARE Small quantities of high explosives used to ship on the Delaware and Anchorqe 2 was used for unloading purposes. However, we have been unable to find any documentation of use of Anchorage 2 for explosives since 1969. We firmly believe that no explosives are now shipped or are likely to be shipped by Artificial Island in the near future. Brief descriptions of telephone conversations and actual correspondence with certain ~or companies are attached as ~its to substantiite the above facti. Some of the reported telephone ~~ns were initiated by Arthur D. Little personnel whereas others were initiated by PSEAG.

1. Name of Company:

• Telephone Number:

Date of

Contact:

Summary of Telcon:

2. Name of Company:

Telepbcme Number:

Date of

Contact:

SuauDIIy ofTelcon:

Telephone Conversations Pilots Association for the Bay cl River Delaware (21S) 92S-716S April IS, 1974

• Anchorage has not been used for explosives since late 1960's.

• Used to handle in pnenl caqo freiahters #C2 and C3; 6SOO Ton to 7300 Ton.

• Asosdation handles all vessels to and from foreian pOrts and some coastal caraos.

Frankford Anenal (21S) 831-6011 April IS, 1974

• Alllbipmentl by air or road.

• Do not expect to ever lhJp by water.

53

c u

u 0

0 0

0 LJ 0

D 0

D 0

[1

3. Name of Company:

Telephone Number:

Date of C<,.dct:

Summary of Telcon:

4. Name of Company:

Telephone Number:

Date of

Contact:

Summary of Telcon:

S. Name of Company:

Telephone Number:

Date of

Contact:

SUJDIIUII)' of Telc:on:

Atlas Corporation (302) 478-6200 Aprll16, 1974

• Explosives plant is in Reynolds, PA

• All shipments are by ran and truck

• Any water shipments are from Kings Bay, GA

• Absolutely no shipments of explosives in or out on Delaware River.

U.S. Coast Guanl District Headquarters, New York (212) 264-4916 September 9, 1974

• Does not know of any recent explosives movement by water on Delaware.

• A chanp of status plan to make Anchorap 2 a non-explosive anchorage is under me.

U.S. Coast Guard, COTP Office (215) 923-4320 September 9, 1974

• No explosives unloadlna Iince 1969

• C01? PhDadelphla hu requested 1 chanp in status of Anchorqe 2 to make it 1 nOJHxplOilft anchorqe.

i

LETJ"ERS OF SUPPORT Severalletten are attached 55 Arthar D l.Jt* Inc.

HERCULES INCORPORATED TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT

• WILMINGTON. OE~AWARE 19899 April 23, 1974 Mr. John T. Boettger Project Manager - Hope Creek t,

PROJECT MANAGER Efec'.rZc £n3ineer:n2 Oc;ar'mei1t J.T.~E_R Noted~

1 Public Service Electric and Gas Company i:i u

80 Park Place, Room 314 MP APB.2 51~74

~~~toat\\L C1 foflcr.*,

~----

Newark, New Jersey 07101

'~

Dear Mr. Boettger:

5 s

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION SHIPPrNG OF EXPLOSIVES We refer to your letter of April 18 which was just received by the undersigned today.

Prom 1966 through 1974 to date, Hercules Incorporated.has not used or made a shipment through the Explos~ve Anchorage off Artificial Island in the Delaware River.

i:n i96S we made two shipments as follows:

50~~se.

• 2) 24600 cases Dynamite and 75.cases Primacord to L!beria* on the Parrell Line vessel S/S AFRICAN MOON, November 30.

2,000 cases Dynamite ana*12s case* P~imacord

• to Liberia on the Parrell Line vessel AFRICAN GROVE, September 24.

Aa we informed Mr. Linn, there are very few places in the United States Where it is poaa1ble *to load export shipments of commercial 8X,plosives. We have just recently secured permission from the Navy to load some shipments of commercial &xploaives on vessels at their Barle, Rew Jersey, facility. As long as permission is granted by the Bavy to use their facility, we can see no reason or necessi~ to uae t:he Anchorage off Artificial Island. As you know, however, the Navy can withdraw permission at any time.

Jf Barle, Bew Jersey, and Artificial Is lane!, Delaware River, were both closed to us, the only other known facility on the Bast and Gulf coasts of the Unite4 States is Kipgs Bay, Georgia.

Ve~ trtll~*.

,_/:lv /.**

-v:-:~,P'~

a.

• out, Tnffic Manager IXport/Import Division

'zaffic Depart.ent

.- E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY

--.a..

u~

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19898 POLYMER INTCRMCDIATCS DC~ARTMCNT April 24. 1974 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION SHIPPING OP EXPLOSIVES Re:

Your Letter ot April 16, 1974 Mr. John T. Boettger ProJect Manager - Hope Creek Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place. Room 314 MP Hewark. New Jersey 07101

Dear Mr. Boettger:

PROJECT MANAGER EIIC'.f.c Enlineer~nl to;ar;me.1t J.T,~R Noted._,~~--..--

~01314-

t

;;l>

(i:ow,

~

Aa requested in the reterence letter, we have reviewed what information we do have pertaining to shipments ot explosives on the Delaware River over the past ten 'years

• As Mr. Linn round with Coast Guard recorda, our recorda beyond three years have alao been destroyed.

~o the best ot our recollection, Du Pont Company has ttot abippid any Class "A" or Class "B" exploai~es trom the Delaware River 1n the years 1969 through the present time. In the 7eara 1964 through 1968, approximately tour shipments per 7ear were made trom Artiticial Island. averaging approximately 150M lbs. each. Shipments were made in commercial motor and/or

~~eam ship vessels ot approximately 5000 gross tons and larger.

Ro other port on the Delaware River was used by Du Pont tor shipment ot Class "A" and Class "B" explosives.

Small amounts (under 5M lbs.) ot Class "C" explosives were shipped o~er the docks ot Philadelphia in the years 1964 thro~ 1967.

Aa tar as we can recollect, no shipment ot Claaa "C" explosives baa been made in the years 1968.through 1973 across the Philadelphia docks.*

We do not toresee any change in the pattern ot shipments troll the Delaware R1 ver in the next tew Y!tars.

Ve17. trul7 JOura,

~~~

-, ~rJ.r.

• J. Doubt ra1oal D1atr1but1on

.1

1 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMMANDANT, FOURTH NAVAL DI.STRICT PHILADELPHIA, PA. tet 12 IMSIMUI:be 8000 23 Apdl1974 Q1bj I U. S. Navy Shipping Of Ordnance em 1:he Dlk..m:e River

_ In reply to your letter of 16 l\\;:d.l 1974, you am advised '

tbe Navy docs not ship any type ecplosives to the ~

Base ar pbilaclelpua ansa in frci.;:1ters or &P...ight.Gr--t:ype ve-asels *.

RJrmel ship's armuniticn Wich Jnc11lde ~.

tnqe& res, gaD alll'IJI'dtion, stall m:ms and pyxotechnJ.ea for efeey at sea axe cm:riec1 on 1-iavy shi~ \\.:d.dl visit or are bane ported at tbe lldJ.adelPUa Naval Base. Ships enteriD;r the *Naval Shipyazd axe

'Z'8qQixed by zeguiatim to 1:1e free of armunitim *

.. Qmaalxlant, 4th Naval ~.

Naval Balis; Jlbl1adel.p1U,a, has no recoxd of 81r:f accident or incident iDVDl.ving u. s. Navy ships during the past ten years.

Jf wa can be of further assistance. *.. JIO'l; plew feal.fme

• tD ca11 CD tlil8 c I HIIIH!M1.

PJ?J:~

II. L. ltc!IILLAN District Ordnance Officer

~ourth Naval District 58

READING COMPANY AND.-.W L L~l

• *.J *. A.. D.JO.<<P'H 1.. C4~T1.1'. T"U!I,-C:U "IT USUP

5 I Z 0, as.* iRCSL-MARKETING DEPARTMENT READING TERMINAL PHILADELPHIA. PA. 18107 l*taY 23, 1974 Pile: 289.21-1-0 CHIEF STRUCTURAl ENG'R.

ELEC. ENG. pEPT.

nwa.c lifRM MAY3 01914 PROJECT MANAGER

• Ele~;c Enzinur;nl Ce~r;ment,

Mr. J. T. Boett~er, Project !*tanager Hope Creek Public Service J. T.

Ell'GER

" J Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Place, Room 314 ~*IP Hewark, ll. J. 07101

Dear i*~. Boettger:

Please re~er to your letter or April 19, wherein you inquired or us to fUrnish you with information concerninc ~ast, present, and tuture Explosive shipments from our railroad facilities 1n the ~1ilm1nr;ton, Del., area to Artificial Island in the Delat1are River: which inrorcation is required in connection _with your plans tor construction or the Hope Creek Generating Station on Artificial Island.

In order to respond to your specific inquiries, we also called upon the services or our Operating/Transportation and Sales Departments, uho fUrnished us the following information in part:

1. Concerning the number, size, and type or Explosive shipments handled in the last 10 years, our records

.

• indicate the following:

1962

~5 l:W.

1

-~

1963 1964 1965 611 10 6

197~

1971 1972 Hone Hone None 1966

'1967 1968 3

1 Hone 1974 *c 4 l*tonths)

Hone All ot these shipments r.toved through Pigeon Point, Del., to Artitic1a1 Island.

[]

D

[]

lJ D

0 0

0 D

At thi.s juncture we regret that tre are not able to furnish you with more detailed information relative to size of shipments a& well as type or Explosives as to develop these factors,.,ould entai l a substant1al time consuming process and, *further, as you will note.

we have not handled any movements ~ince 1969 or, tor that matter; are there any prospects or participating 1n future shipments, we do not understand why this type or detailed information concerning past ~ovements would be required in connection with your project.

2. In regard to our tariff naming rates on Explosives from the l*Tilmington, D~l., area to Artificial Island, we would advise that we have filed a proposal to cancel same which cancellation should be effective around July 1. 1974..

3.

We can respond to your question concerning our plans and capabilities to handle* future shipments or Explosives on the Delalfare River by stating that we are no longer interested in participating in these movements particularly when factors or high risk and excessive expenses are involved.

We wou~d point out that the decision to cancel our Explosives Tariff culminated from studied we recentlJ made on this tJPe o~ traffic movement.

In addition, we have retired much ot our tloating equipment (lighters, barges, etc.) and that which remains is in continual use. Therefore, we have no desire to tie-up this equipment 1n any possible tuture Explosives mQvements which we might be ottered, aa certainly this would be to the detriment ot our normal trattic handlinss.

We sincerely hope our responses to your *inquir1es will be ot benet1t to you and, if we may be ot further ass1st&nQ! *tO you 1n this matter, please do not hesitate to contac~ ua.

Verr truly yours,

~

c. w.

Pro due

GPDAJ, C01DJSBL or TBI DBPAITMIIT or DUIISE WASJID1GTOH, D. C.

20001

'fn7 1. C~r. Jr., Baq.

Comaar

• Hadlock act botta Suite 1050 1747 PeDUJ'lvaaia Ava.

• H. W.

WuhiDatOD, D. C.

20006 har Hr. CODDer:

24 Apr 1974

'lbia letter ccmfinaa the telephone diacusaion of AprU 18th betvHil 11r. b)'DOlda of your Office act Major Brlaa* of -.y Office cODcemiD&

the poaaible ahl,.at of 11UDltiODS on the D~e Uver

• near Sal**

Rw Janey.

The ~

rqular ehir--ata by ocUD vuael of 1IUilitiODS by the Depart-Milt of Defeue on the... t Cout of the thdtecl Statu lDvolva the porta at Sady Book, B* Jeraey ad Suzmy Point, Borth CarollDa. !bare :la no Wonaticm to indicate that the DepartMDt of Dafaue 1a ahippiq auDltiGDa Oil the Delaware Uver.

I trwlt that the above infonaation will be of aaalatarice to you.

S~carely, Hartin 1.. BoffMD

u D

0 u

0 0

D

[~

0 0

[j 0

[J

[j

[ l G

A. RESISTING MECHANISMS APPENDIX4 SHIP GROUNDING When a ship~ aground, several energy-absorbing mechanisms can develop, depending upon the character of the sea bottom and of the ship's hull construction. These mechanisms include structural defonnation of the hull (especially if the *bottom is hard or rocky); frictional resistance between the bull and tJte bottom material; displacem~t of the bottom material (particularly for heavy and strong-hulled ships moving in soft bottom material); or rigid-body motions of the ship, such as trim change-..1 (the bow rises) or vertical translation (the entire ship moves up).

In the vicinity of Artificial Island, the bottom material is characterized as consistina "larply of silt-size materiaJs,*"(1 ) with a few areas of fme sand. For these types of pneraDy soft materials, the probability of ship bottom deformation as a IIUUor eneqy absorption mechanism would be low. The energy involved in changes in the ship's trim is small compared to that involved in \\'el'tical translation, so trim changes can also be Janored. The determination of frictional *coefficients and effective contact areas is difficult, 10 this mechanism will also be neglected, providina some additional CODielVatism to the analyas.

Therefore, the principal eneqy~b10rbiq mec:hanJsms during a arounctin& for the purposes of this analysis, are asswned to be lateral displacement of the bottom material and vertical rile of the ship. Each of these medlanisms wm be considered..,....~, litho-both would be expected to occur to some depee.

B. SHIP CHARACTERISTICS From an exiinination of the dimensions of a wide nriety of shipa, approxiate relationships can be derived that relate the ship displacement, dimeftliona, mel aenenJ shape facton.

For bulk carrien and aeneral caqo lhips, for example, reaonable nlatioblldpa are:

62

D =

1.25 II' 8/H =3.3 and IJH =

20 where D

• cliaplacement (tons)

H

• draft (ft)

B

• beam (ft)

L

• lenath (ft)

Tranalt velodtlea of lhlps Jn the Delaware River channela are estimated to nnae from I 0 knott for the IIDIIler ve*ll to 5 knott for the larptt ve.la.

Prom the* aaumptioM, the draft, beam, and kinetic eneqy of tranaltina ahlps can be estimated u a function of diaplacement, u tabulated below.

-.ft'lld Tl'lftllt Drift 111m ICinldo.....,

ftDN)

Vllalllty Cknob)

Cft)

Cft)

Cft) 2,000 10 12 38 240 20x 1ot 1,000 I

18 12 320 40x 1ot 10,000 8

20 88 400 84x 1o' 20,000 7

21 83 100 87 X 1ot 40,000 8

32 101 840 143x 1o' iii,OOo I

40 132 800 200x 1o' Ships smaller than 2000 tons are not considered, Iince their clrafta are pnerally smaller than the water depths of Interest.

C. RIVER*BATHYMETRY 1be rate at which the kinetic eneqy of the ship ilabiOibed by either bottom material displacement or by wrtical rile will depend upon the bathymetr)', or the topGII'aphy of the bottom, and expecially of the slope of the bottom. Typical bottom profiles from the lite of the propolld water intake structure to the channel a1ona snera1 rays, obtained from Reference~ 2 and 3, are plotted on Fiaun A*S. (Note that th* CUMI are ~efe~enced 63 Artt.ar D IJtdclnc.

DEPTH t

BELOW MLW (FEET) 0 - *

• 10

• 20

• 30

~

1 DREDGED T0 -18.4' 2

I c.:!

0

• • • ~*

~"i.~.

HORIZONTAL RANGE (1000 FEET) 3 4

6 8

7 toO 4fiJ I

~;:-~...._.._ -.!'--"

• • .... ~~

~--**- '

\\

,~*~*********

.(67%0

\\

\\

\\

• -*-*---~

10316' 7- *---:-.....-'\\., ____ ~o::~:----,,

ANGLES MEASURED FROM UPSTREAM DIRECTION RANGE

-o

}' /

'*...: ~-- ~

,..... ~

'* -........ II.

'-~,

' ': ~-,

11211°

\\

":1. ~'*,.

\\-**,__

CHANNEL AT...0' 8

~~------------------------------------------------------------------------~

FIGURE A.a.

to tbe.an low water lnel, wblcb Ia 2.6 feet below mean sealevel.) The eomewhat erratic llopea are not an unusual characteristic or lhoallna areas:.

An lfti'IP COWnt slope may be calculated IS 40-16.4 I::: 600()

• liS

• 0.0042 ft/ft Uae of an a~

value of the bottom slope in aroundina analyses is generally co.-native, becauae the actual slope near the channel is considerably greater than the nenp slope, and most ray cUrections have bottom mounds which could be particularly eff'ective in teliltina on-c:omina ships.

D. GROUNDING BY VERTICAL TRANSLATION Under thiiiiiUJDption, the kinetic eneqy or the on<Omina ship is assumed to be con.ted entirely to raJsma the ship IS a IilLi body (i.e., conversion of the kinetic eneqy to potential enerav). It is IIIUIDed that the ship, upon initial impact with the bottom, hiS reduced Its forward power to zero, I.e., the enalnea lme been stopped, 10 the total forward thrust II due to the Jdnetic eneqy available at the initial impact.

For thia c:ae, the calculation II limply: Khletic Eneqy

• Potential EneJBY.

1 -mr*mah 2

whete:

h

• wrtica1 rile *ld 1

• bottcr.n alope d

• tranlit lenath in poundlna 11l1.11 d

• v'/2p,loldlna to the foUowtna..Wta:

DIIIIIUIJ-11 d/L ceo.*

2,000 1010 4A 1,000 110 2.7 10,000 1.7 20,000 120 1.0 40,000 0.10 G.33

u 0

D D

0 0

0

.o D

D D

0 D

E. GROUNDING BY DISPLACEMENT OF BOTTOM MATERIAL Under this usumption, the kinetic enei'IY of the on-comJng ahip is dUslpated by lateral displacement of the bottom m~terial. Fiaure A-6 illustrates the eneqy balance.

SHiP FIGURE A~ ENERGY Mi.ANcE: GROUNDING BY DI.LACEMENT aonoM MATIRIAL

• 1bo eneray balance for this cue can be established lS follows:

Let e = work requiled per unit volume of bottom material

• p.x where:

p = weiaht density of bottom material x = averaae distance of lateral displacement of bottom material or

= 8/4 for d2:d 1

= 8/8 for bow portion of ship d = grounding transit length s = bottom slope 8 = beam of ship 8 = bow angle of ship d 1 = length of bow portion of ship

= 8/2 cot8/2 V = total volume of bottom material dispJ:!ced or the energy, which reduces to; e._V = S:8' ~~2

• 1.5 d1d +id~]

A typical value for 8 is 40 degrees. Thus, d1 = 1.37 B. Letting the slopes =.0042, as calculated previously, and the density p =I 00 lb/f~, leads to:

..,. **~** "' e.V =.0525 82 [d2 - 2.1 8d + 1.25 82]..

,-\\

(.

67

f u I u L

D D

[

L1

[J r-* u D

o*

0 0

D 0

~

'lbil oxpre 11lon can be equated to the kinetic eaeqy to obtain the poUDdiq tralllit JeDath. 1be values obtlinecl in this manner are tabulated below:

D':'

111nt dCft) diL 2,000

&41 2.3 6,000 -

1.8 10,000 698 1.&

20,000 819 1,2 40,000 808 0.16 80,000 803 0.7&

F. CONCLUSIONS From these simplified and conservative analyses or aroundina coUisi0111, it can be concluded that the typicalgroundin& transit lenath is a few hunclrecl to a thoUIIIld feet, or the same order or magnitude as the length or transitina ships. This conclusion Js consistent with the obtenation that grounding lenaths are typically equal to or lea then a ship leqth.

~.

Noting that the' average distance from the Delaware River channels (Baker Raqe, Uston Range) to the proposed location or the water intake structure is about 6000 feet, it should be generally true that ships with drafts greater than a few feet more than the intake structure depth will ground before reaching the intake structure and therefore win not present a potential hazard to this structure by ~

68

REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX 4 (I) l.olw ~Spill~

Study. Ptlrt 1: GeMI'tll Dtlmfor tile Del4wtln River, U.S. Corps ofBnaineen (no date).

(2) Nautlcll Oaat, Delaware IUYer, Smyrna Rim' to WIJmiDaton. CAGS 294 22nd Edition, Notember 17. 1973 (3) Hope Cleek GeneratiDa Station, Site Topopaphy. Prepared by TAA Assoc. Inc. South.

Plainfield, NJ (no date).

69 Artmr D lJttle Inc.

APPENDIX&

ENERGY AVAILABLE FOR RAMMING COi.U$10NS A. INTRODUCTION The kinetic energy available in a rammina collision of the service water intake structure by a ship will depend on the velocity and size (displacement) of the ship at the time of collision. The sizes of the ships which will present ramming hazards will depend at any given time on the tidal conditions, while the rammina velocities will, at most, be equal to the normal transiting velocities associated with ships of a given size.

• ~ -* * *.

B. TIDAL DATA The tides in the Delaware River are semi-diurnal with little difference between the rises and falls. At Artificial Island, the tide height time-history is approximately sinusoidal with the duration of rise only slightly less than the duration of fall.(l) The tidal cycle is approximately 12-1/2 hours, so there are about 700 tides per year.

n~ statistical data in terms of standard levels are given below with their referenced sources. Allle\\'els are referenced to mean sea level as zero. {The Corps of Engineers datum for the Delaware is 2.9 feet below MSL.)

Maximum credible high high waterb)

Flood protectio~ leve1(3 >

High high water (November 1950)(2,3)

Mean high water (average height of all high wate~)(2,3)

Mean tide Mean sea level Mean low water (average height of all low water)b,3 )

Low low water (January 1939)(3)

+ 33.0 ft

+ 25.4 ft 8.5 ft 3.2 ft 0.3 ft 0 ft 2.6 ft 5.9 ft L~west projected low waterC2,3 >

8.0 ft Desian low low water<2*3 >

- I 0.6 ft The normal daily tidal ranp at Artificial {sh!~4 ~ 3.2 + 2.6.~-~.8 ft, whlle*the maximum tidal ranp, of"i-ecorded floor and low water conditions, is 8.5 + 5.9 = 14.4 feet.

The minimum depth in the channel ranges near Artificial Island is* 42.6 ft re: MSL, and the bottom elevation "f the propose~ water intake structure is-19.0 fed.

70

C. MAXIMUM SHIP SIZES AND IMPACT ENERGY LEVELS

~....

At mean~ level conditions, the water depth at the intake structure is 19 feet. The laqest ship which could reach the intake structure without grounding is, according to the displacement-draft relationship given in Appendix 4, equal to 1.25 (19)3 = 8600 tons. With an assumed transit velocity of eight knots, the total kinetic energy at impact would be equal toSS x 106 ft-lb. Similar calculations carried out for each of the tidal conditions given previously lead to the following tabulation:

Mlxlmum Ship Assumed Mlximum Ki~

DispiiiCiment Velocity Energv 1ldll Condition

-........... ~

(tons)

(knots)

(ft-lb)

Maximum Credible HHW 126,000 4

200x 106 Flood ProtKtlon Level 110,0()0 4

~H6x 106 HHW 28,000 6

93x 106 MHW 13,600 7

66x 1o' 67 X 106 MT

~~*

9,000 8

MSL 8,600 8

65 X 106

• t.W 6,600 9

44 X 106 LLW 2,800 10 28x 106 Lowest Projected LW 1,700 10 17 X 106 Design LLW 740 12 11 X 106 Note that for more than 99 percent of the time, the tidal level will be within, 5ay', four feet of MSL, with the corresporiaini kinetic energy in the 40 x 1 06 to 80 x 1 0' ft-lb range.

The extreme values, leading to kinetic energy in the 200 x 1 0' ft-lb range, correspond to postulated hurricane conditions occurring once in I 000 yean.

71

. J

.D 0

D D

D D.

[]

APPENDIX I

.BLOCKING OF WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE A. PROBLEM STATEMENT Safe*operation of the power plant requires that the service water pumps deliver the

\\.

required flow rate set by the specified operating mode. B!ockqe of the. water intake structure by a sunken vessel restricts the normal access of wate1 to the pump inlet; that is, it in*

creases the difference between the level of the water in the river ~d the level of water in the sump provided for the pumps by this structure. Accordingly, the head available to the pumps is decreased by an amount that depends on the degree of blockage presented by a sunken vessel. A real hazard exists if the blockqe is sufficient to reduce the head available to the service water pumps to a point below the net positive suction head (NPSH) require-ments. of the pumps. If the NPSH requirements of the pumps are not met, they will cavitate with a resulting immediate and sharp decrease in water rate, accompanied by pulsations in flow and possible destructive damage to the pump because of bearing f~ure or cavitation

~

erosion following sometime thereafter. Therefore, a re~nable criterion for safe operation is set by the maximum tolerable blockage limit, which is that blockage of the intake structure that just reduces the head available to the pumps to their ~SH requirement when the river is at its minimum credible low low water mark.

, *~

One criterion for safe opel'@tion under blockage conditions is plant shutdown in ~e.

LOCA mode. This criterion sets the minim.um tolerable safe flow rate for the plant and sets the maximum tolerable blockage. Shutdown of the plant in th~ LOCA operational mode specifies that two of the ef&ht pumps deliver 1 S,OOO GPM each for a toW of 30,000 GPM.

Another criterion can be set for continuous safe operation of the plant. To meet this requirement requires that each of eight service-water pumps dellv.er~their normal design flow

~

rate of 10,875 GPM for a total of 87,000 GPM under blockage conditions. The latter criterion sets a maximum tolerable blockage that is less than that for safe shutdown.

J'.

72

• • ~

B. SYSTEM UNDER CONSIDERATION Intake Stnlcture with Vessel Blockaae I*

126'

. *I T

• . *~

130' WATERINTAKESTRUCTURE l

PLAN PUMP WITH DRIVE

~.;.w£![..

\\ \\

\\ \\

EL 70'.()

ELEVATION SIDE ELEVATION C. MODEL SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS We consider the system appearina below as a simplified model of that illustrated in Section B. This simplified model is construCted to serve the purposes of fluid flow analysis which is fundamentai to the solution of the problem as stated in Section A.

8'-4" 125'

• I

._~[lj,~z~1/.~{:~zZV(2zZ'/t.~z~1 ::;.:=:.._ SUNKEN VESSEL SCREENS a TRASH RACKS 73 b\\

WATER LEVEL IN SUMP

...,..1~- ABOVE PUMP INLET U:VEL OF PUMP INLET ABOVE I; BASE OF SUMP 1'*3" SIDE ELEVATION 6,..1

D

[J 0

D lJ D

0 0

D D

D 4

\\

The croa-hatcMcl area 'ihown in elevation is an area aaumed to be completely impervious to Oow as a result of blockqe.

D. ANALYSIS

• .. ' Let the ftow into the pump sump provided by Uie water intake stru~ttire* be designated by Ql. Let ~~ ~um ftow rate for s&re operati~n of the 'piant be Q2, determined by the n

sire operation criterion. Let the river level above the el~va_ti_on of~ ~e floor of the pump sump be 8' 4", corresponding to the minimum credibk low low wate~ ~~!el. The level of the plane of the inlet bell of the pumps above the ftoor of the pump-sump* is 1' 3.... Let the water level in the sump in the vicinity of the pumps be design8ted by H. tet the drop in

~

water level from that of the river to that immediat~ly above the pumps be designated by h.

Let the required net positive suction head requirement for the pumPs be designated by NPSH.

Now for safe operation:*

Ql = Q2

~..

H. + (1 atmo.) = NPSH H + 33.9 = NPSH (ft - H20) ~,\\

(1)

By def1:'1jtion:

';:..';t'. ~-

h + H = 8.33-1.25 = 7.1 (ft) or a* = 1.1 -h

r.

(2).. *:.>*

~~~..

Combining equations 1 and 2, and ~teria established in Section A, we get h < 41.0 - NPSH (ft)

Ql = Q2 = 30,000 GPM (~e plant shutdown)

Ql.,= Q2. = 87,000 GPM (Sde plant ope~tion) ' *

.. ~*/-, -~

An accurate evaluation of the relationship between the ftow rate ofwater by the

~....

blockage a 1 into the sump provided by the water intake structure depe!'~s on the differen\\Sle.-

between the water level in the ~rand that in the sump in the region ofih~. pump inlet is not purely analytical means. However, useful estimates can be derived o~ the following

~

bases which are beUeved to be reasonable:

J~

~

~

1)

Under nonnal plant ope~!ion, the ftow res_trictions produced by the screens and trash racks resul~ in a nealilibte Josi in head.

2)

Under normal plant operation, the head loa, h, at the pump inlet is cau.d 1aqely by the corumement presented by the cellular bays in which the pumps are mounted in couples. This loss is estabUshed by specification of the ~um Vllue ofH, equal to 4.75 ft. Therefore, h

• 7.10

• 4.75

• 2.35 ft under normal operatina conditions.

3)

Because no finn data on the NPSH requirements of the senice water pumps are available at this time, iiSUme NPSH = 33.9 + Hmin "min = 2.75 ft or NPSH = 36.7 ft and 11max ~ 41.0 - 36.7 = 4.30 ft

4)

In general, with *blocka&e of the intake structure, the relationship between the flow rate to the pumps and the total held loa, h, can be expn1n d by equations which model the system as two flow restrictions in series. One restriction ilat the face where:

of the inlet structure caused by a sunken vessel; the other il the normal restriction whose ~r element is ~escribed in item 2) above. 1be ~latioDihip between the water flow rate and the head loss due to each of these restrictions can be expressed in the fonn of an orifice or weir equation,

• follows:

Q = Ql. Q2 Q

• Ct Att~2~ah~t (3)

Q = c2 ~2 8h2 (4)

(5) c1

• flow coeflicient.-oc~atect with now IIOUDd block ** ~

c1

• o.5 A 1 c free flow area around blockiP at intlke structule.

c2

• effective area of equivalent orifice that produc:a tpedlied ha4 loll at pumps under normal operation.

h 1

• had loll due to blocble.

h2

• bead loll due to normal~

becau. of confinement of pumps within bayL 75

r; L

f L~

L L

L

5)

Inherent to the crt,.eriOai for safe shutdown, it is usumed that only two pumps within two cliflferent bays aR opentifta. If aU pumps were opentinl and the blockap of the inlet structwe wa the maximum tolerable b..t on two-pump o~~'!* iUs certain that they aU would cavitate. Under these conditions they milht still provide the minimum flow rate for shutdown in the LOCA mole, but operation with pump cavitation is taken to be intolerable. Moreover, the Yllue of c2 is..umed to be unch*npd under conclitionl of only two of eilbt pumps opera tina.

On the basis of items l) and 2) :,bove, under llOI'IIIII operation, h a* 0, h2

• 2.35 ft.

Also Q

• 87,000 FPM

• 193.9 ft' /tee. Therefore, fiom equation 4, C2

• 15.76 ft2

• This vaJur, of C2 is appropriate to eiaht-pump nonnal operation.

Follow~....-*~be methods and IIIUIDptions outlined above, the minimum tolenble free-flow area for safe continuous plant operation is calculated

• follows:

h1 * ~~max -h2

• 4.30 - 2.35

• 1.95 ft A

Q 193.9

• 34 6 ft2 I

c1 i$1 O.S ~64.6 d.9S)

As the total unblocked CI'OII sectional area aailable for flow at the minimum credible flow low water lnel is 125 x 8.33

• I 041 ft2, the maximum tolerable block* factor for afe continuous plant opention is 1041-34.6

• 0961 1041 The value of c2 appropriate to two-pump operation in the LOCA mode is calculltecl on the bllil: h 1 aa 0, h2

• 2.35 ft,

• and Q

• 30.000 GPM

• 66.9 ftl/rec. The result is

~. 5.43 ft2.

The minimum tolerable free-flow area for ~e shutdown in the LOCA operational niocle il calculated

• follows:

.,_ 1oc81,_,loll, "2* II* 1111d to b1...... to tllltlt nonn11 opntJon. In LOCA....._..till loc8l flows.. taw-..._of till..._In..,... flow t'ltlfram 10,171to11,GDOGPM. Thll, bfltlltf would r...et In *...., Vllul of "2-Ha***** tNI...._ wlllbl offltt to.....,_

~if till feet tlllt only two of tWit pun~~~~.. opee....._,..._ ttlltlon II ttwt._two..,....,_. on hlld._

..atyanotl.

16

~. 2.35ft bt

• 1.95 ft At

• O.S JA.. 4(fj5)

• 11.9 ft' AJIIl... -**-** tolenble block.. fiCtDr il 1041*11.9

---

* 0.989 1041 17

1."

.l APPENDIX7 EFFECT OF FIRE ON INTAKE STRUCTURE 1'bfl ilaitioa of flimmebJe liquid cia. to tbe iDtake ltnlctwe may IXpole tbe rein-for"'*' CODCiele ltNcba to an iDieDII fire.ror alhort period or time. ID lUCia a lltllatlon, die~

tbattb;nild-OrC.s CODCntc ~will,_..~........ -**"~

bla *** die..... ill8ow by clebril, may be ccalldencl.

Tbe blab.... or file Jle riltmce of NiDf'orced coacrete CODibUCtion.... been.....,.

lilbed bJ ;;-.._..of fire tests and by tbe raulta ad experience o~ ~

~

'!be IIIII bate been COIIO'Si'J1eCI primarily witb the performance of the NiDf'orced concrete

• a I

Jold.beariDa matedll durllw tbe fire; from lUCia telb, it.... been cleteJmined that tbe con-aete...... il c:llmcterizecl primarily by tbe stnm.Jth or tbe steel reinf'orcement, wbich deere I! I with iDcre '*W temperataale. The temperature attaiDecl by the steel durina ftre

..,_.,. il determiDed by tbe tbenDII conductiYity of tbe coverina concrete and the

..,...t of tbil CCMr. For IIOI'IIIIIwelabt coaaete, a fire expoaue or one bour wiD nile tbe lleel tempaatule to ippi'OXimately 8SC1F with a CJI1eoiDdl ccwer, or to appiOXimately SOIJIP Wfib a iWO-inch OlJfCJ.<*) At tbele tempentwes, tbe ltleawtb ortbe steel will be equal to appi\\)Ximdely 805111&1 9Ca, rapecthely, of the bllic ltlqtb meaaued at 7C1F.

1'llae laUitl were obbdned 6oaa ltlndanl ftre tells iD whicb the tat llpedmenlue

• ~

to a file coatlollecl by altlndlld tiJne.temperatu cane, iD ICCOidlnc:e with NFPA No. 251 or AS11I EIJ9. 'l'ldlltlndanl c:urN hll a npid..,__,to 155C1F, c1urbw die illlitlll30......... of tbe felt, 8lld a llower rate, t? 17fXfF, at tbe one hour rollowecl by a.._ Jacreare to 230CJ'F at ellbt boun.

SiiiCI die..,._ of..,... coaaele......._Ia complilnce wltb ltlndanl coda ot

• Am*rk* Coec:lete lllltltule,(J,J) IDd ICCOidbw to tbe..,._ tpedflcationl ofwatef.

war lbliCbaMI... :at'lrhrll by the Corplofhllneera,<*,t) is._.. on~

riCton otlllety, ddl m piiiNie of._ ill Jtaenatb does DOt COIIItitute albUctUI'II,...,. hlllrd.

It *.,... tlllldle ltntetural..,._ of the -*e...., iatlke ltiUcttare PNPINd for

• llopea.k Gelwra*lna Slatloa, lire tbat oldie.......,. Sllclll StatiOII,II corapolld of

_...._... *-'u* CODCiefll M lbaetaM, 11101t ofwlllda

• two or dane feet tldck, with 71

' t the ndaf'orcement CCMr...,.oy equal to two or three JncbeL For IUCb ltnlctural con-flauratioDI, therefore, the On.-stance would be expectecl to be IUbltlntially in excea or aae bour. Thus, for tbe types and potential quantities or spiUecl and ianitecl material or interest in this study, the effect or the J)9lhllatecl fbel would not be expected to produce aay sipiftcant cbaale in the structural intearity or the intake structure.

Another potential result or fire exposwe upon reinforced concrete il spdlna, in which portioaa or the concrete cover brut off' beCinte of thermal Pldients, ~

l'lltrlint condi-tions, or hilb Ieveii of free moisture within the concnte. For waterways structures, @le Cree moisture in the concrete would be expected to be relatively hilb. 10 vaporization or this water upon heatina could spall the IUI'lace coaciite layer, particularly iC the concrete porolity and permeability ue low and the time of exposure to the fire II relatively lona.<')

1be an-effects or such spaDtna, however, would not create a bazud to the structural ifttepity or the serrice water intlke structuJe itlelf, nor could the spaOt"' be extenlive enouah to block the intake. However, the concrete IW11Ce probably would have to be patched.

79

l REFERE~ES FOR APPENDIX 7 (I) Gibbons, A. T., "Some Alpectl of Structural File EnclUI'Iftce of Conaete," pn.nted at Secoad AmlUil File Protection Seminar, YontluJ.Ottawa Clapter of SFPE, Yay 5,1969.

(2) "ltuildiDa Code Requbementa for ~Oicecl Concrete," Amedcln Conaete Institute ACI318-63,1963.

(3) "Spec:iftcation for Stnactunl Concrete for Juildt.,.," Americlll Concrete Institute ACI301-66, 1967.

(4) "PimniaJ mel Dellp of Naviption Lock WIIJIIDCI Appurtenmces," Corps of Eoameen EM* III 0.2-26-2, 30 June 1960.

(5) "Structunl Dellp of Spillways mel Outlet Worb," Corps of Enaineen EM-1110.2*

2400, 2 Ncmmber 1964.

(6) Lie, T. T., File Ill BlllldbiJ;s, Applied Science Publilben Ltd., London, 1972.

10

APPENDIX I ANALYSIS OF "WATERBORNE COMMERCE" DATA FOR DELAWARE RIVER IN 1972 In thJs appendix we explahl the method used to detennine how much of each of traffic type actually paaed Artificial Island. Table A-4,1 which is based on the criteria for ach of the cateaories of traffic, ccmn the 13 commodities which can be considered hazard-ous ad for which volumes of over 300,000 tons were moving in the Delaware River in 1972.

A. FOREIGN IMPORTS (Alii* one-half of eastbound canal traffic)

F~

imports can mive

( 1) direct from the aea, or (2) tluouah the Olesapeake and Delawart. ':anal.

It can be..umed that all the traffic comina from the sea passes Artificial Island, the exception beiDa the cnade that is dilchaqed into Uahters, which allows tanken to proceed up mer with a partial CillO* The CillO tr&Yelma in the tankers is included in this cateaory, but tJJe c:81J0 in the baqes is apparendy clusifle'.t u intemal traffic. Traffic movina

• throuah the canal, termed "Foreip Eastbound," either can be for Delawire River port diJ.

c1wJe or can be throuah traffic JOina to the sea. For this reason, we take foreip imPort traft1c p8llina Artificilllsland to be the total less one-half of the outbound foreip canal trafiJc

• reported in the W11tnbome St111UtiC8.

8. FOREIGN EXPORTS (All._one-half of westbound canal traffic)

Foreip exports canleaw:

(I) direct to tbe-. or (2) tbiOUih tbe ClftiL It can be _...., that all of tbe traffic proceecllna diJectly to the..,_ Artificial llllad bel ** nftaerlel, ct.nicll pllntl, etc., 11e Jmel'llly situated north of that lite. The

.... n**~"'*.,.,.. to canal tramc

• to foreian imports-fontp westbound cuao.

• aeported in tile W4111r'borM S14116tlcl, either could be orillnatina in tbe Delaw~n Riftr ana

• could be tbiOUih tramc com*na from -ani. For tbll 1e11011, we haft t11cen foreJp II

~

0

~ ":

... "' "'.,... ~.......

OOft..; 0

~

N.A 0..; N... :::

0

~..; 0

..; 0..

~.: ;i

• -.p~u

"' :i ~

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

....... l.

I

'.... 0 0 0 0

• ~~

ogoo

~-....

I I. I I

I I..

I

. I I

I I

I I "'

0 0

I I 0 I ' 0 0

0 I 0 I,..... "'.

~ ~ ~

I I

I I

I I

I "'.....

~=~~

I 0 I

0 0

0 0 I 0 I

0 0

0 0 0....

~ ~

0

~ ~.......... "' "' *... "'...

no~..oo..;..:

I I..

0 0 0 0 0

0 f:i =..: ::i 1

0 0

t"Pl...

I I

I I

I I

0

~ ~

I

~......

no 1_,

I I Q 0 I

0 0

0 ennP~

I

~

I I

I

~

I I

I I

I I

I "'....

o 1 o 0 I

I 0

ci 0 0 0

~q 0

I I

I I

I I

I

~ ~

I I

I I

I I

I l....

I lo 0 0 0 0 0

~er I

I I

I I

I o*~"'..... l

~

I I

**o MlLOftO

.;.;go..;..;

I 0 I

0 q~*............

~ :

• I I

I

• I

~

I I

I I

I I

I........

~

000 0 0

I 0

0 0 0

~...

~ I I

I I

I I

0 I

I I

0 I

~

I I

I I

I I

I O'O

~

_,~ ' * *.

• I I

I I

I

~

I * * * *

• I

-=

ol 0

0 I 0

[J I *

• I I

I I *...

I

~

• *

• I

.1aJllll 0

• 0 O'O nun......

I

~

I

• . ~

.o... * ~ : ~~~

~

I

~

• 0 *

=

I 0

0. 0

o;

8fiU:)

s..

t j

I I=

IIIII i gl I I i j I

~ s I

l;a!l 11 i HjnJJ 1 11!1 11 1 II i li t j Ill

• IIIIIs lhiiJ L J 111 J L I 111 Lll iilllll l

~ ~ ~

.li.JI I Ill 82

export caqo passina Artificial Island to be all of that reported in the Waterborne Statistics less one-half of the westbound foreip canal traffic.

C. FOREIGN THROUGH TRAFFIC (All upboqnd and downbound)

This can be taken to mean traffic from and to the sea passing through the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal {Uld also traffic to and from the sea destined for areas classified as non-Delaware River inland waterways. It appears that the Schuylkill River is included in this

' latter cateaory. All upbound and downbound foreip through traffic has been included.

D. DOMESTIC COASTWISE RECEIPTS (All less one-half of eastbound canal traffic)

These caqos can arrive (I) direct from the sea, or (2) throuah the canal.

Some domestic receipts are probably dropped off south of the catchment area, that is, lOUth of Artificilllsland, but probably only a small amount. And only a small amount would pass the Artificial Island area if arriving through the Chesapeake and Delawlfe Canal.

We hate ISIUIDed that coastwise receipts passing the Artificial Island area consist of all tnffic 11 reported under that heading less one half of eastbound canal traffic. This latter deduction foUows the same reaonina u. for foreip imports and exports - that traffic tbJouab the canal labeled coastwise could be destined either for the Bela~ River system or for CCMStwile destinations necessitating passqe throuah the Delaware River to proceed to E. DOMESTIC COASTWISE SHIPMENT (All lela one-half of westbound domestic

......... tmfic)

This traffic Clll leave (I) clbect to tea, or (2) tluouab the Che11,elke 111d Delaware Canal.

Malt of the trafftC motina directly to.. would.,.. Artificial Island, but pnctically 110111 of that p

W t1uou11t tbe canal would. We have u.d the same technique for calculat*

1111 Mmrltic cowtwile....._.... p nfna Artifldllltlancla in.the tluee previous c-.

1'lllt II, we took

• of the traffic lilted under this catetorY and aubtncted one-half of a JIIJidllwl dam ntlc COilltwile Clllll tnmc..

83 Arthar D lJttle Inc.

F. DOMESTIC COASTWISE UPBOUND THROUGH TRAFFIC (All) 1bis traffic can be (1) traffic from the sea passing westbound throuah 'the canal; (2) traffic from the sea destined for inland waterways arljoinina the D:elaware River other than the Schuylkill River if this is so classifir d; or (3) traffic eastbound throuah the canal proceeding north alona the Delaware River.

Only the latter category would not pass Artificial Island and because it is not possible to identify dtrouah traffic from canal statistics, all of this category has been taken to be paaiq the Artificial Island area.

G. DOMESTIC COASTWISE DOWNWARD THROUGH "('RAFFIC (All)

This traffic can be (1) from the canal proceeding to sea by way of the Delaware River; (2) from points north of the canal outside the Delaware River system and proceeding to sea; (3) as for (2) but proceeding throuah the canal.

The only portion not passing Artificial Island would be the latter and usina similar reiiODina to that given for upbound traffic of this nature, all caraos reported as domestic COIStwise downward through are taken as passing Artificial Island.

H. INTERNAL INBOUND UPBOUND (None) 1bis is traffic comin& from another inland waterway, proc:eedina to a destination in the Delaware RiYer system, and proceedJna upstrelm. This can be llrivfnl (1) fia tbe Cbeapake and Delaware Canal, or (2). Yia other waterways.

Tbere are no waterways below Artificialllland; thus no traffic of this cateaory would PMI tbrouah tbe catchment area.

I. INTERNAL INBOUND DOWNBOUND (10W.)

1'ldl il traffic comiDI CJOm lllOther intemal waterway for destinations on the Delaware Rher.,._,PRJ ceed'* in a downstream clir.dion. The tnfllc can be III'MIIa (1) hal~~

IIICI OJ e llpeaU Clnal, or (2) hal otber waterways.

Some traffic could be expected to be Passin& Artificial Island but probably this is only a 'VerY smaD amount; most will be destined for areas north of Artificial Island. As a liberal Mtim*te, 1-. of that movement listed in this category is taken to pass Artificial Island.

J. iNTERNAL OUTBOUND UPBOUND (All crude petroleum and 10% of other hazardous c:.gosl This carao oriainates in the Delaware River system and is proceeding to another inland waterway movma in an upstream direction. It can be proceeding _

(1) to the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal; or (2) to another inland waterway which would be north of the canal.

~

cateaoJY probably includes the barge traffic from the lower Delaware Bay area that is unloaded from ttnkers to pennit those vessels to procee4 up river in lighter condition, but it is unlikely to inclooe refined products, for these commodities will be originating. from refineries which are located above Artificial Island. We have taken all crude in this category but only 10% (a liberal estimate) of other hazardous commodities.

K. INTERNAL OUTBOUND DOWN BOUND (10%)

1bis is traffic originating in the Delaware River syStem destined for another inland waterway and mcmng in a doWilStream direction. None of this traffic would be passing Artificial Island.

L INTERNAL UPBOUND (All crude petroleum and 10% of other haza~ous cargos) 1bis is traffic originating in the Delaware River system, proceeding in an upstream direction to a destination within the system. This would include crude in barges discharged fiom tanten in the lower Delawue Bay area, but only a very small proportion of other traffic becan~e there does not seem to be much industrial activity below Artificial Island or any Jllljor port fadJities. We have, therefore, taken all of the ~de listed in this category but only I 01J, of other hazanfous commodities. Apin this latter estimate should be con-liderecl to be rather Hberal.

M. INTERNAL DOWNBOUND (1mt,)

1'hil il traffic oriainatinl within the Delawue River system, proceedina downstream to a dalilllfioa within tbe system. There is probably not much moving past Artificial Island 85

and what theJe is would mostly be products distributed to small population centers at the seaward end of the Delaware River. A very liberal estimate would be I 0% of traffic in this category.

...~

N. INTERNAL UPBOUND AND DOWNBOUND THROUGH (None)

This is traffic moving from one inland waterway to another passing throuP. the Delaware River system, moving in both upstream and downstream directions. None of this would pass Artificial Island.

0.

Table A-4 shows for each of the 13 hazardous commodities, by *category of traffic, the cargo in millions of short tons estimated to be passing Artificial Island disch~d or loaded in the Delaware River area or passing through that area. Foreign, domestic, and internal traffic have been separately identified. We have also separated out up~und and downbound traffic. The justification for amounts of traffic estimated in each category were given pre-viously in this appendix. We shall now discuss some points of detail.

Ctude petroleum accounts for slightly over 62% of'all estimated hazardous traffic pass-ing Artificial Island. Direct foreign imports, that is, imports remaiiling within the tanker, account for almo:Jt 35 million tons. Six hundred thousand tons of these appear to be dis-clwged on an inland waterway outside of the Delaware Ri~er system. ~cause westboun~

and eastbound crude petroleum movements through the Chesapeake and Delaware Caiial total something less than 3,000 tons, it appears that these are movina to other areas, some possibly to the Schuylkill River. Three hundred and eighty-two thousand tons o~ cru~e petroleum foreign imports are reported for the Schuylkill River. "Dome*stic coastwise throuah upbound" crude petroleum, reported at 333,915 tons in the table "Trenton, New Jersey to the Sea." pqe 68, Waterbome Commerce, is also reported under Schuylkill_. River, pap 76, Waterborne Commerce, under "coastwise receipts." This conrmns that Schuylkill Rmr is considered to be a separate inland waterway; the fact that the SchUYlkill River does not account for all of the "foreian throuah upbound" crude petroleum traffic, however,.

indicates that other areas off the Delaware River system are also classified as inland water*

ways. For mfemll traffic, 800,000 tons are U.:rted under "internal outbound upbound" and this also appears for the SchuyDdll River under "domestic internal receipts, reinforcina our 86

~.

{.

'J

4,.. *. -

'o; aqument that other inland waterways exist adj~t to the Delaware River system besides the O.eapelke ~

Delaware~

• The internal traffic of that commodity was unloaded from tanten in the lower DeJa~ Bay area and barged up past A..-ti..t'!cial Island, some of it

• ~

aoina to refineries that are within the Delaware River system and the 800,000 *tons to the Schuylkill R.iftr area. Th!' should be consid~red to, be barge tra!fic because it is the only

~wn

.. mOftiDent intemally ~f crude and there is no crude_ oil production in that area.

About 100,000 tons are indicated as ~ing internal downbqund traffic; it is not known from or to where this traffic iS moving, but because of its small size it does not warrant any further imestiption.

Most of the psoline traffic is domestic coastwise, although in the section reporting Wfrenton, New Jersey to the ~,

there is a substantial movement of gasoline classified as "internal;" most of this would not be passing Artificial Island, but would be distributed within the Delaware River system above Artificial Island. Owing to the apparent absence of

~r port facilities and 1aqe consumption centers to the 5outh of Artificial Island, the pre-mus comment can be considered as applying to all petroleum products. Apart from crude petrole~. the only other "internal,. commodity in the hazardous category that moved in any sipificant quantity past Artificial Island in 1972 was residual fuel oil, in total an esti-mated 800,000 tons. _

As explained previously in the appendix, one-half of canal traffic in some cases has been deducted from estimates in order to account for traffic that would be diverted and not pass-ina Artificial Island, but exiting or entering the system via the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. In the case of ~asphalt, tar, and pitches" this deduction for domestic westbound

.- canal traffic of 300,000 tons is larger than domestic eoastwise shipments. The reason for this is that in the canal statistics i~ is not possible to separate out traffic w~ch is destined for or Orisinates in the Delaw~ River system from traffic that is pissing through that system. If one adds to the domestic coastwise shipments, theref9~,* domestic coastwiSe' throuah downbound traffic and then subtra~ts the estimate of on~~f-of the westbound Clllll ti~c, the result willaiYe us the domestic coastwise downbound traffic paitis ',.

Artificial Island.

/

87

..:.~

ArtOOr D lJttle Inc.

[]

[j

..-~

~ ~L

-.:_ :~-

--~, --~:.:~;}.~~. -~.

It can be seen that there is a noticeable imbilance betWeen upbOun~ total traffic of 73 * * -~* :

~

mDuon tons and down bound traffic of almost i 0 million toni. Most of this is aceounted for '

~ -

1-/.

~

hy the crude petfulewn imports. The upbound traffic in residUal fuel on is alsO qnrncan~y

• peater than downbouitd traffic.

• The calciilations of traffic passing Artificial Island have \\)eon entirely deduced* from the" Corps of Engtneen Waterborne Commerce oi the United States. 1 97~ and it is quite polldble *

• that further investiptions will pro~d~ PlOre infoimadoq,o~ tra~c f!ows ~d cl~fy so~e of*

'~, ;...

.~..:_

YJ I

~

the movement. for which a percentage estimate lias had to be utilized.* TJ>>$.is*particul8rly so. **

~

I{

t in the case of internal traffic. The supposition ot: the barge b-am~, the identification of

• .. ~.

~.

~

inland waterways systems apart from the Canal which ~

adjacent to the Delaware River cystem, and the ~bility thJlt some cargo is discharged. in th~ Canal that-is not conjjdered. *.

to be Canal traffic (the tone miles edunated for the Chesapeike ~d

• Dela~~ Canal di~ded.

by the total tonnage indicate~ th~t -~ traftJc reported for that' inland ~aterway passed alona its entire length) are cases in question.

"Eastbound foreign" and "westbound foreigri" traffic throush L~-~* Chesapeake and Del&ware Canal were, for any of the commodities treated, less thUi 100,000 tons and so have not been deducted from "foreign impom" and "foreign exports," respeCtively. Sum-

.::.~......

larly~' "eastbound domestic coartwise'~ traffic was less than 100,000 tons and no deductlo~..

are made from "domestic co~

receipts." "Foreign through do'!Jlbound~' traffic was less ~

50,000 tons and so does not\\v~t consideration..

0

"[l 0

• D 0

L.~

• [

APPENDIX I SPILLSTAnmcs FOR U.S. WATERS

. 1170-1172 The data in this appendix were furnished to A. D. Uttle, Inc., by the U.S. Coast G~

Headquarten in Washinaton, D.C. The information concerns spills of hazardous materials from ftllels in U.S. waten for the period 1970-1972, in terms of the material spilled, its soun:e, cause, volume and location. The selection of spills from the ovenll Coast Guard file wu bast.d on cause: collision, poundin& or founderin&

• 89

Q

-, D c~

- ~

t:*

L -~]

!&.!!!~

SOURCE

~-

Tank barge C:.-rude I

Tank ship TOTAL Tank barge Tank ship 8

Tank barge Tank barge DISTILLA'!E FUEL Tank baTge Tank barge Tank barge Tank barge

~

Tank ba~ge

~

'j TOTAL

~ ;;.

I l ~

[~ -* c.:.1 r--t I.

[l TABLE A-&

TANK VEIIEL ACCIDENTS 1170

~

VOL,.

• Collision 42 gal.

Collision 12,600 gal, 2

12,642 gal.

Collision

• 1,500 gal.

Collision 16,800 gal.

Collision

. 1,000 gal,

Collis:lon 42,000 gal, Collision 27,500 gal.

Collision 84,000.gal,

• Collision 107,000 gal, Collision Uaknown Collision 4,000 gal.

9 283,000 gal, Cl STATE KY MS LA CT I

I OB KY MO FL CA

~*./

CA TN *

(.

WATER Boadat~ad Clwmel Bay Dock Roadstead Roadstead Dock Port/harbor Channel Bay Roadstead c-r-"

I

t c

t:"

~

if

\\0 -

Tank barge Residual Tank barge Fuel Tank barge Tank barge Tank barge Tank barge TOTAL ANY GAS OR VAPOR Tank barge Tank ship UNIQf(Mf Tank ship

_::J D

...;)

TABLE A-1 (Cont.)

Collision 2,100 gal.

Collision 134,000 gal.

Collision Unknown Collision 71,000 gal.

Collision Unknown Collision Unknown 6

207,100 gal...

Collision 750 gal.

Collision Unknown Colli".i01'.

Unknown r-"1

~

L~--... SJ r~.. ~A NJ NJ MS TX LA LA TX PL DB

• ~

Port/harbor Bay Channel Offshore (1 ai.)

Chamnel Coastal Channel Bay Channel

• --------*------~** -.-4*

~

r---

t,.

t lld'IIIAL ft.MIIAILI (GAJGLIII)

I I.

,....__,\\

,.'0\\.I'O!M't<'tf r~~.. t-to*

.........,.~ r-TAK.IM TANK ~MIJOIIITI 1171 IQUICI CADI I i

~

ColltliOD 5,000.. 1.

,.. ~.

ColUaioo

, 11,600.. 1.

ColUaioa

~00 pl.

ColUaioo 30....

,...... I I

r.ro.Miq 100.. 1.

Gro.ltq Growdlq -*-

Colltaloa 10,500.. 1.

I

,......... I GnMICitaa 21,010....

ColUat*

75.000 pl.

tukalatp GrowN~ lila 5,000.....

'-'aldp GI'OWMIIq u.lta**

,.. bar..

Colli a loa 50 pl.

,_. Nl'..

CoUtaioa 10,000....

T*ll baqa ColUaton 16,000 pl.

TOI'AL I

15 155,310....

---

~~-~~~-~~*------~

.~.... }*:*

~~~ !...........,.

~**). *{,...... ~

.."-""".-1>~.4 I i I nm

..... ~

IL Uwr IL Uwr lL Uwr liver aa...t

.t I CT Uver IY liver

• Aa liver

. AI diY Port Teralul' IIY

.;aawr

I I

\\

J II

....... J i J J

I J J I..

I

.. I J..

~

I l

=

~, =

=

t.

I

. fi

~ ~ '

t I! " ~

! I!

5 :5 :5 :s

~ t I!

j

~

i i 1 I......

I I J I I I I I

I I

I I ! 2 t 1

I I a

~

I I ::

0

"' I i

i ***JJrrJ I I

I I !

r r J 1 3 J ' ~ 1 ] :1 i 1 i

~.!

• liio

~ t 0

8 0

8

~ 8 8 ;

8 0

u *

~

I t t ~ ~ ~ ~ t ! ! ! ! t t -

t ~ !

J J t t t t J J J J J J J

.: t J

J ! J J J J J ! J J J J J J J J A

~

" ~

I

-I I I

t.

93 Anlur D lJt*lnc.

, ~tlr~'r t *,;-;;t...., ;,.,.

.~)H.-'~

....... ;"~

[

,.. \\~'\\~~~*~ *

,.,.. ~.r

.~~

TMLIM.._.

LICB JUa-T.- lllalp en-a..

Oqhr*

II a.-1 IODir T.-Hqe CnuMial 500 pl.

II

~~-~

1'0fAL 3t2,4U pl.

l T.-laaqe CoUlaloa 2,000....

ft PM& /llano~

~

~

.,...taip ColU.Ioa 240,000....

n t

.an T.-Mqe Colllaioa 1,000 pl.

LA Port

{

'IObL,

24l,OOO pl.

l l I

,.. 8htp Cnundlaa 20,000 pl.

01 Te-..1 (Dock) t T.. Mqe Cr0UD411q 1S pl.

Ill ltlWI' GUDIB T........

Cro.dlq 60,000....

Ill Ill WI' DIIHL TaakHqe Colllalon 10 pl.

n.

Dock Taakbaqe Croun.Uaa UMnown

n.

TaaltHqe C.pala 75 pl.

CA Port

'IO'W.

6 80,100 pl.

I Taakbaqe Colllaloa 50 pl.

NO Dock "'

t TaakHqe ColUaloa 75 pl.

n.

Port CUDI E T.UNqe Gl'OUDdiDa Unlulown Itt WI' il 0

~

E:"

Talt barp C:.,ll:lalon 4,074 pl.

1ft UWI' I

R--

J

~

~

f;

~~

~

~

---*---~-.... --*-~~~

.......,....-....,.. _ _. *.__....,-'!'"~*---- *~-~"'~"--..-...-:.......,....,._,.,~~~~~

~

0 t:" --

iD if r

\\0 Vl

~

,....,......,~,

-..J II&TDIAL DAVY FUlL OILS CUDII LUI OIL WAST! OIL B!l -LIQUID SOLUILI/klSCIILI DWATD SOURCE Tak barp Tak abip Ta~ barp Tank abip TO'I'Al Tank abip Tank barae Tank abtp Tank bup TO'I'Al Tank barae Tank barae n

TABLE A.. Cc.t.t CAUSE VOL.

STATE ColliatOD 42 pl.

lY Colllaton 850,000 pl.

CA ColliaiOD 168,000 pl.

TX Colltaton 8,400 pl.

TX 8

1,030,641 pl.

Groundina 5 pl.

IU Collision Unknown MY Colliaion Unknown MY Ground ina 10,000 aal.

MY 3

10,000 pl.

Colliaioo Unknown AR Colliaton Unknown TN

>I' t*.

VATD Rlwr lay C2aalmel Po.:t a.annel River

Port/harbor Beach River River I I I

I I

~ ',

I l 1

! I l "

---

~~

- -~~

~ ::.

.J n

~

... -.),

..... _~~

r-1 L~~!

L r-_

L

~.:w.li

~ ---*

'*>--""....l,... :...

• :.;;.$~

~'i-)i~o,i

-*~~~; !

f"'"'"'

~**

-~*-'f:

t

.....,.z TAILIA*7 TANK YUilL ACCIDIN11 1172 WArn KATIIllAL I

SOUICI CAllS I VOLw STATI IODY t

ahip ColliaiOD 20 pl. I NJ I

!Dock"

.,... abip ColliaiOD 45 aal.

NJ IQauaoel Tank barp ColliaiOD 100 pl.

I w

I liver Tak barp Ground iDa UDknown I

LA t

Chalulal

'-* barp Collf.aiOD UDkDOWD I

LA I

Chalulal Tak barp ColliaiOD I 17,500 aal.

I IA I

River Tak abip Collie ion 50 pl.

I IL I

Cbuaoel

\\C)

GIADI I I

0\\

Tak bara*

i Colli a ion 25,000 pl.

I ICY I

River IVJIIAILI Tak barp Colliaioo 100 pl.

I wv I

River Tak barp ColUaiOD 10 pl.

I AJ.

I River Tak barp Collf.aiOD 147,000 pl.

I AJ.

I CbanDal Tak barp ColliaiOD 40,000 pl.

I MO I

River Tak.barp ColliaiOD 350,000 pl.

I 011 I

River Tak barp ColliaiOD 90,000 pl.

I MO I

River Tak barp Colliaioo 4,000 pl.

I MO I

Rive~

T.ak barp CnlliaiOD 100 pl.

I MO I

River T.ak barp CoUtaioa 126 pl.

I LA I

liver

i

! t ! l

=

9 !

~ = =

" 1 "

I I I I

§ 8 § "

. i i

N N

0

.-4" 0\\

1ft "

r r r 8

==......

CIO

'0.,

• 5 I g g..

~...

N 2 2 "

8 0

0 0

~-

& ! t r.

~

I

,IJ

,IJ

,IJ A

J J J i

~ ~':

i 97 Arthar D IJtt~ Inc.

\\0 00 IIA1'DUL GIADI C FUMHABI.I l1 SOURCI Tat baqe Taak barae T*k barae Tat barae Tat baqe Tat barae TalL barae Taak ehip Tak bara*

Taak barae Taak barae Tak barae Tank bara*

• -T*k barae "Tat barae Taak barae TarAt I

r-m-,

\\

• • - i TABU A*7 CC..)

CAUSI VOL.

Collidon 10 pl.

Collldon 4 pl *.

ColUalon Unknown Groundlq 10,000 aal.

Collbicm 168,000 aal.

-~Uidon 2 aal.

ColUeioD 42 aal.

ColU.iOD 1,000 pl.

ColUeion 2s aal.

Colliaioa 1 pl.

Ground iDa s,ooo aal.

Collbloo s aal.

SiDidq/FoundeJ 2,000 pl.

Collie ion 420 pl.

ColUaioo 21 aal.

Grouncllq 168 aal.

16

~86,698 pl.

.t~W..,_

... ~

STAT I ltY KY IL NY Gulf Cout CA LA CT LA LA FL LA tA LA LA LA

~'ob.f

- '~'"""'"-\\

'--~~..;

WA1"11 BODY Uver Uver Uwr auauael Off uore llwr Cbamael Dock Riwr Bay River liver River Qwmel River CbaiUlel

'1*

i"W.#J;.t

-l

i

.. c t:

a ID lf

~

MA1'UIAL GlADE D LIGIII' FLASH-ronrr ao 1.50 SOURCE Tault barae Tault barge Tault barge Tank barge Tank barge Tault barge Tank barge TaDk8hip Tank barge Tank ebip TaDit ebip Tank barge Tank ebip Tank barge Tank barge Tank ebip TOTAL TABLE*A*7 (Cont.)

CAUSE VOL. **- **-...

Collision SO gal.

Collision Unbown Collision s.2oo gal.

Collision 75.000 gal.

Collision 24.000 gal.

Collision Unknown Grounding 300 gal, Grounding Unknown Grounding

. 12,000 gal.

Grounding 42,000 gal.

Grounding 100 gal.

Collision 500 gal *

• Grounding Unknown Grounding Unknown Collision 4.200 gal.

Grounding Unknown 16 163.350 gal *

... STATE ICY LA NY IL -

LA LA NY DE CT NJ NY MN NY NY OB NY VATBJl IJ(I)Y llivar Jliver tiver River River River Riwr Off ebore Port/harbor Quumel Riwr River River River River Port/harbor

, ~..

r---1 l

r c~ r MArDIAL SOUltCE Tank barae GRADED Tank ship DAVY FLASBPOIN'f Taak barae 80 150 Tank llarae.

Taalt barae TOI'AI Tank barae 8

'Iaalt barae Tank barae GRADE E Tank barae DIESEL OIL I Tak barae Tank ship Tank barae Tal' AI.

• Tak baqe Tank ship GRADE E Tak barae Tanltabip

\\,,____, L r--'1 TABLE A*7 (Cant.)

CAUSE VOL.

Ground ina 4,200 aat.

Grounctina 135,000 sal*

Collision 9 pl.

Ground ina 150 pl.

Collisi~

~0 pl.

5 139,419 pl.

Colliaion 200 pl.

Collie ion 500 aal.

Ground ina 320,000 pl.

Colliaioo 20 aal.

Colliaion 200,000 aal.

Colliaion 1Jnbow Groundina UnbeND 7

520,720 pl.

Groundina 840 pl.

Collisioo 100,000 pl.

Collision 6,000 pl.

Collision 4,200 pl.

11 I

STATE ICY IIY ltY FL OR

• w MA 1M HA OH NY Fl.

w ME OH NJ

• :..:.;-~

.~

WATD IOD'f Unr Uver Uver Uver Uwr linr Cbalmel Unr Dock liver River Bay River

-K.......

• ~.:.<o..,J Port/harbor River Qwmel

TABLE A*7 (Cont.)

I VATER f,

• ~

I MATDIAL SOURCE CADS I VOL.

STATE BODY Tank barae Ground in&

SOO gal.

MA Cbaaael Tank ship Groundiaa Uakuown

.. FL Channel Tank barae Groulldia&

168 aal.

TX Channel

\\~

Taak barae Grounding 1,000 gal.

CT River

~-

~

HEAVY lUlL OILS Taakabip Grounding 100,000 gal..

ME Bay t~*

Tank barae Collision Uakaowa NJ River Tank barge Siaki~/Founde 3,000 gal.

NC Bay

~..

Taak barge Colllaioa S gal.

NJ Dock,.

~....

0 -

TOTAl 215, 71~ gill.

12

~-.

t,

\\.

Taak barge S1akiag/Foundel 25 gal.

.. IL Chaaae~

GRADi E Taak barge Grounding 25 gal.

FL Bay L1JB OIL

~..

TOTAL 2

SO gal.

.. ~.

WASTE.OIL

,.... \\.

Taalt barge Siak1Da/Fouade1 10 gal.

PA River

~

I

~...

<J,.

• .. ~ :_

~

1JRID1MT OIL T~ barge Grouad:lng Uabovn CT r

River,

BS-LIQUID Taak barge Collisioa

• 81,522 gal.

LA River \\

~-*.

LIQIDR TIWf VATU

-~.... ;.

I

~

c i

iD

• lf

II

! I 5

s 15

~..

. 1 11!1

• o I

I

. § 8 8 g

i CD

\\0

\\0 f,

c Ill

'--J

~

ID f i l

.., g

.e J

IIQ '

en g

N 9 !

e 0

en

r. ~

D I

~

,Q

,Q en J J i

~a e

1l

li

• ~ ~

~~

102 Artmr D IJttle Inc.

~ ;..

,, -2,6:

) H

~~:

• ~\\

{:~*

.~ *.J.

l' c

~.

J

--;; 1..4

• I

l J

-....