ML22089A016
| ML22089A016 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/15/2022 |
| From: | O'Driscoll J NRC/NMSS/DREFS/RRPB |
| To: | |
| O'Driscoll, James | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22089A012 | List: |
| References | |
| NRC-2009-0196, RIN 3150-AI66 | |
| Download: ML22089A016 (31) | |
Text
Parts 50/52 Lessons Learned Rulemaking CRGR Meeting on Physical Security-Related Backfit Tuesday, February 15, 2022 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM
Bottom Line Up Front Regulatory gap exists in the security requirements for the protection of Category II and III special nuclear material (SNM) for Part 50 power reactor operating license holders (§§ 70.22(k) and 73.67(d) and (f))
Current regulatory gap has led to ambiguity and the potential for inconsistent protection of SNM between different classes of licensees Addressing the gap in the Part 50/52 rulemaking would be backfitting for power reactor OL holders and justified based on adequate protection of common defense and security 2
Discussion Areas
- History on Category II and III Special Nuclear Material
- Risk Significance of Category II and III Special Nuclear Material
- Background on §§ 73.67(d) and (f)
- Gap Between Part 50 and Other Licensees
- Current and Proposed Changes to §§ 70.22(k), 73.67(d) and (f)
- Backfit and Adequate Protection 3
History of Category II and III SNM 10 CFR 73.67 provides physical protection for Category II and III quantities of SNM. The regulation was promulgated in 1979 in the interest of common defense and security. (44 FR 43280)
- Designed to protect against the theft of special nuclear material of a type and quantity that is not directly useable in the manufacture of a nuclear weapon but could be of substantial assistance in making such a weapon.
- Provides theft detection and deterrence capabilities.
- Demonstrated U.S. willingness to accept international physical security standards in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INFCIRC/225.
Common defense and security relates to impacts to national security.
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Risks Associated With SNM Three categories of SNM for an improvised nuclear device (IND) o Isotope o Quantity o Uranium-235 enrichment Risk = theft or diversion of the SNM for its use in an IND Requirements are graded commensurate with the IND risk Compliance with these requirements is presumed to provide adequate protection 5
Risk Associated With an Improvised Nuclear Device Category Material Form II IIIe I (SNM of moderate (SNM of significance) low significance)
Less than 2 kg but
- 1. Plutonium Unirradiated 2 kg or more 500 g or less.
more than 500 g
- 2. Uranium-235c Unirradiated:
Uranium enriched to 20 pct U235 Less than 5 kg but 5 kg or more 1 kg or less.
or more more than 1 kg Uranium enriched to 10 pct U235 10 kg or more Less than 10 kg.
but less than 20 pct Uranium enriched above natural, 10 kg or more.
but less than 10 pct U235 Less than 2 kg but
- 3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated 2 kg or more 500 g or less.
more than 500 g Examples: Category I: unirradiated Navy fuel; Category II: unirradiated HALEU fuel; Category III: unirradiated LWR fuel 6
SNM Physical Protection Requirements To provide adequate protection of the common defense and security, the regulations in 10 CFR 73.67 provide the following levels of protection.
Category II Quantities of Special Nuclear Material o Use the material only within a CAA* which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities (§ 73.67(d)(1))
o Store the material only within a CAA such as a vault-type room (§ 73.67(d)(2))
o Monitor with an intrusion alarm to detect unauthorized penetration or activities (§ 73.67(d)(3))
o Conduct screening prior to granting an individual unescorted access (§ 73.67(d)(4))
o Develop and maintain a controlled badging and lock system to identify and limit access to authorized individuals (§ 73.67(d)(5))
o Limit access to authorized or escorted individuals who require access to perform duties (§ 73.67(d)(6))
o Assure all visitors are under constant escort of an individual who has been authorized access (§ 73.67(d)(7))
o Establish a security organization to consist of at least one watchman per shift able to assess and respond to any unauthorized penetrations or activities (§ 73.67(d)(8))
o Provide a communication capability between the security organization and appropriate response force
(§ 73.67(d)(9))
o Search on a random basis vehicles and packages leaving the CAAs (§ 73.67(d)(10))
o Establish and maintain written response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of these materials (§ 73.67(d)(11))
- Controlled access area (CAA) means any temporarily or permanently established area which is clearly demarcated, access to which is controlled, and which affords isolation of the material or persons within it.
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SNM Physical Protection Requirements Category III Quantities of Special Nuclear Material o Store or use the material only within a CAA (§ 73.67(f)(1))
o Monitor with an intrusion alarm to detect unauthorized penetration or activities (§ 73.67(f)(2))
o Assure that a watchman or offsite response force will respond to all unauthorized penetrations or activities (§ 73.67(f)(3))
o Establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of this material (§ 73.67(f)(4))
Special Nuclear Material below Category III Quantities o Controlled pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802 Secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas Control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled or unrestricted area and that is not in storage 8
Physical Security Requirements
§ 73.67(f) § 73.67(d) § 73.55 General Performance Objective: General Performance Objective: General Performance Objective:
Establish and maintain a physical Establish and maintain a physical Establish and maintain a physical protection system that will protection system that will protection program, to include a minimize the possibilities for minimize the possibilities for security organization, which will unauthorized removal of special unauthorized removal of special have as its objective to provide nuclear material consistent with nuclear material consistent with high assurance that activities the potential consequences of the potential consequences of involving special nuclear material such actions and facilitate the such actions and facilitate the are not inimical to the common location and recovery of missing location and recovery of missing defense and security and do not special nuclear material. special nuclear material. constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
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Current Requirements
§ 70.22(k). Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to licensee control, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance as defined under § 70.4, other than a license for possession or use of this material in the operation of a nuclear power reactor licensed pursuant to part 50, must include a physical security plan that demonstrates how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), (f), and (g) of § 73.67 of this chapter, as appropriate. The licensee shall retain a copy of this physical security plan as a record for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material under each license, and if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion of the plan for 3 years after the effective date of the change.
§ 73.67(d) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except as allowed by paragraph (b)(2) of this section and except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50, shall:
§ 73.67(f) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses special nuclear material of low strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50, shall:
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Background on Proposed Changes to § 73.67(d) and (f)
Most Part 50 power reactor OL holders voluntarily implement § 73.67(d) or (f) security requirements NRC is aware of instances where certain Part 50 power reactor OL holders have stored non-fuel SNM within the OCA without protecting the SNM in accordance with § 73.67(f)
SRM-SECY-99-063, Staff Requirements SECY-99-063The Use by Industry of Voluntary Initiatives in the Regulatory Process 11
Gap Between Licensees in Protecting SNM
- Sections 70.22(k) and 73.67(d) and (f) contain an exception for Part 50 power reactor OL holders but not for Part 52 or Part 70 licensees.
- The proposed changes to § 70.22(k) and
§ 73.67(d) and (f) would align Part 50 and Part 52 licensees in the protection of Category II and III quantities of SNM by ensuring SNM is protected under § 73.67(d) or (f) until it is moved into the PA and protected in accordance with § 73.55.
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Current Protection of SNM Physical Protection Requirements for Category II and III Special Nuclear Material by Location and Licensee Controlled Access Owner Controlled Protected In Transit Area (CAA) Area (OCA) Area (PA)
Excepted from Excepted from Part 50 Licensees § 73.67(e) & (g) § 73.55 Requirements* Requirements*
Part 52 Licensees § 73.67(e) & (g) § 73.67(d) & (f) § 73.67(d) & (f) § 73.55 Part 70 Licensees § 73.67(e) & (g) § 73.67(d) & (f) N/A N/A
- Part 50 power reactor operating license holders were excepted from § 73.67(d) & (f) because the expectation was that once SNM was received onsite (i.e., shifted from in transit to fixed site requirements), licensees would safeguard the SNM in the protected area in accordance with the more stringent requirements of § 73.55.
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Future Considerations
- Due to the current gap in the regulations, these Part 50 licensees would not be required to protect this fuel when located outside the protected area [in contrast to Part 52 licensees].
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Proposed Changes to Requirements
§ 70.22(k). Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to licensee control, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance as defined under § 70.4, other than a license for possession or use of this material in the operation of a nuclear power reactor licensed pursuant to part 50 or 52 of this chapter, provided that the special nuclear material possessed or used by a part 50 or 52 nuclear power reactor licensee is located within a protected area, as defined in part 73 of this chapter, and protected in accordance with § 73.55 of this chapter, must include a physical security plan that demonstrates how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of paragraphs (d),
(e), (f), and (g) of § 73.67 of this chapter, as appropriate. The licensee shall retain a copy of this physical security plan as a record for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material under each license, and if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion of the plan for 3 years after the effective date of the change. (FRN, pgs 102-104, ML21159A067)
§ 73.67(d) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except as allowed by paragraph (b)(2) of this section and except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50 or 52 of this chapter, provided that the special nuclear material possessed, stored, or used by a part 50 or 52 nuclear power reactor licensee is located within a protected area and protected in accordance with § 73.55 of this part, must, shall:
§ 73.67(f) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses special nuclear material of low strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50 or 52 of this chapter, provided that the special nuclear material possessed, stored, or used by a part 50 or 52 nuclear power reactor licensee is located within a protected area and protected in accordance with § 73.55 of this part, must, shall:
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Proposed Action is Backfitting
- Changing the physical security requirements for Part 50 power reactor OL holders would constitute backfitting
- Staff must justify the proposed action; default form of justification is a backfit analysis
- One of the exceptions to the requirement to perform a backfit analysis is when the backfitting action is necessary to ensure a facility provides adequate protection to the public health and safety and is in accord with the common defense and security 16
Examples of an Adequate Protection Backfitting Post-Fukushima Mitigation Strategies Order These new requirements provide greater assurance that the challenges posed by beyond-design-basis external events to power reactors do not pose an undue risk to public health and safety.
Post-Fukushima Hardened Vents Order These new requirements provide greater assurance that the challenges posed by severe external events to power reactors do not pose an undue risk to public health and safety.
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Adequate Protection An adequate protection issue does not necessarily mean that the issue is an imminent hazard.
When proposed action is necessary for adequate protection, the Atomic Energy Act requires that the backfitting action be implemented Other backfitting justifications need not be considered 18
Path Forward 12/21/2021 - Steering Committee approved proceeding with the proposed rule language changes and the associated adequate protection backfits to ensure consistent compliance with regulations between different classes of licensees 1/18/2022 - DD Alignment Meeting 1/25/2022 - OD Alignment Meeting 2/15/2022 - CRGR Presentation Meeting 19
Questions?
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Background Slide 21
Parts 50/52 Lessons Learned Rulemaking CRGR Meeting Backfit Assessment Tuesday, February 15, 2022 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM
Backfit Assessment
- Enclosure 4 to SECY on the proposed rule SECY
- Discusses all proposed changes
- Total 60 rulemaking items in the scope
- Only one set of changes would constitute backfitting.
- The remaining 59 items would not constitute backfitting in any case, or would constitute backfitting only in certain circumstances; discussed in section II 23
Justifications
- Voluntary alternatives to existing requirements
- Voluntary relaxations of existing requirements
- Would not result in a modification of or an addition to:
- a structure, system, or component of a facility
- design of a facility
- procedures or organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility
- Would apply to future license applicants 24
Discussion Areas
- Design certification renewals (FRN III.H.1)
- Fitness for duty requirements (FRN III.F.2)
- Emergency preparedness exercises (FRN III G.2) 25
Removal of Duration of Design Certifications
- Design certification renewal (FRN III.H.1)
-DCs in effect would never expire.
- Does not affect DC finality
- Would not modify, rescind or impose new requirements on DC information 26
NEI Question on DC Renewal
- Wouldnt indefinite reporting be increased burden and backfit?
-No, because burden is offset
-Not a backfit because Part 52 already requires indefinite reporting 27
- Affects plants under construction at the time the rule goes final
-Staff does not expect this situation
-If necessary, staff will re-assess backfit before issuing the final rule.
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Emergency Preparedness Exercises
- Affects new operating license holders that have not conducted exercise at the time the rule goes final
- Affects new operating license holders on a different schedule that what the rule would require.
- Staff does not expect these situations
- If necessary, staff will re-assess backfit before issuing the final rule.
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Emergency Preparedness Exercises (contd)
- Affects new combined license holders that have not conducted exercise at the time the rule goes final
- Staff does not expect these situations
- If necessary, staff will re-assess backfit before issuing the final rule.
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Recap and Next Steps
- Complete concurrence on draft proposed rule
- Submit the proposed rule to the Commission
- Plan for additional public meetings(s) during the final rule phase.
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