ML21330A012
| ML21330A012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07103099 |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2021 |
| From: | Isoflex Radioactive |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| Nishka Devaser, NMSS/DFM | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML21330A003 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML21330A012 (142) | |
Text
ISORAD-TC1 Type B Package Docket Number 71-3099 RAI SAR Updates Certain Information Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390 Security Related & Proprietary Information USNRC RAI Purposes Only
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-1 Safety Analysis Report Section 1 ISO-RAD Canada, Inc Ottawa, ON Canada Model: ISORAD-TC1 Type B(U)-96 Transport Package October 09, 2021 Revision 1 Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-2 Section 1 Contents Section 1 Contents ................................................................................................................................ 1-2 Section 1 GENERAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................... 1-3 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1-3 1.2 Transport Package Description .............................................................................................. 1-3 1.2.1 Packaging ........................................................................................................................ 1-4 1.2.1.1 Outer Drum Assembly ............................................................................................. 1-4 1.2.1.2 Bulk and PIC Inner Container (BPIC) - Square ...................................................... 1-6 1.2.1.4 Multi Port Inner Container (MPIC) - Square........................................................... 1-9 1.2.1.5 Multi Port Inner Container (MPIC) - Round ......................................................... 1-10 1.2.1.6 BPIC 2835A .......................................................................................................... 1-11 1.2.2 Contents ........................................................................................................................ 1-12 1.2.3. Special Requirements for Plutonium ............................................................................ 1-14
1.3 Appendix
............................................................................................................................. 1-14 1.3.1 References ..................................................................................................................... 1-14 1.3.2 Drawings of the ISORAD-TC1 transport package ....................................................... 1-16 1.3.2.1 R180831-100 ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum Assembly - Empty ............................. 1-16 1.3.2.2 R180831-101 ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum with BPIC - Square Assembly .......... 1-18 1.3.2.3 R180831-200 ISORAD-TC1 BPIC - Square Assembly ....................................... 1-19 1.3.2.4 R180831-201 ISORAD-TC1 BPIC - Square Assembly (No Lid & Plug) ........... 1-20 1.3.2.5 R180831-101-4 ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum with BPIC - Round Assembly ....... 1-22 1.3.2.6 R180831-400 ISORAD-TC1 BPIC - Round Assembly ....................................... 1-23 1.3.2.7 R180831-401 ISORAD-TC1 BPIC - Round Assembly (No Lid & Plug) ............ 1-24 1.3.2.8 R180831-102 ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum with MPIC - Square Assembly ......... 1-26 1.3.2.9 R180831-300 ISORAD-TC1 MPIC - Square Assembly ...................................... 1-27 1.3.2.10 R180831-301 ISORAD-TC1 MPIC - Square Assembly (No Lid & Caps) ......... 1-28 1.3.2.11 R180831-102-6 ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum with MPIC - Round Assembly ...... 1-30 1.3.2.12 R180831-600 ISORAD-TC1 MPIC - Round Assembly ...................................... 1-31 1.3.2.13 R180831-601 ISORAD-TC1 MPIC - Round Assembly (No Lid & Caps) .......... 1-32 1.3.2.14 R180831-101-5 ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum with BPIC 2835A ........................... 1-34 1.3.2.15 R180831-500 ISORAD-TC1 BPIC 2835A ........................................................... 1-35 1.3.2.16 R180831-501 ISORAD-TC1 BPIC 2835A (No Lid & Plug) ............................... 1-36 1.3.2.17 R180831-XXX Sketch ISORAD-TC1 Prepared for Transport............................. 1-38 List of Figures Figure 1.2a - Isometric View of ISORAD-TC1 Packages .................................................................. 1-4 Figure 2 - Outer Drum External Parts .................................................................................................. 1-4 Figure 3 - Outer Drum Internal Parts ................................................................................................... 1-5 Figure 4 - BPIC Inner Container External Parts .................................................................................. 1-6 Figure 5 - BPIC Inner Container Internal Parts ................................................................................... 1-6 Figure 6 - MPIC Inner Container External Parts ................................................................................. 1-8 Figure 7 - MPIC Inner Container Internal Parts .................................................................................. 1-9 List of Tables Table 1.2a: Isotopes Permitted in the Model ISORAD-TC1 BPIC ..................................................... 1-13 Table 1.2b: Isotopes Permitted in the Model ISORAD-TC1 MPIC .................................................... 1-14 Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-3 Section 1 GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1 Introduction ISO-RAD Canada Inc (ISO-RAD) respectfully requests this Safety Analysis Report (SAR) application be reviewed under the RD-364/NUREG-1886 The Joint Canada-United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transportation Packages (NUREG-1886). The SAR has been prepared according to the RD-364/NUREG-1886 document.
The ISORAD-TC1 Transport Container (ISORAD-TC1) is designed as a transport package (package) and storage container for Type B quantities of special form radioactive materials primarily, but not limited to, Iridium-192 (Ir-192), Selenium-75 (Se-75), Ytterbium-169 (Yb-169), Cesium-137 (Cs-137),
and other radioactive isotopes listed in Tables 1.2a and 1.2b. The package conforms to the General Package Requirements, Type A Package Requirements, and Type B(U) Package Requirements criteria for packaging in accordance with IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SSR-6), IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (TS-R-1), 10 CFR 71, and 49 CFR 173 which were in effect at the time of sign-off of this report. The package was designed and tested to verify compliance with the Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport (HACT) requirements and tests.
The ISORAD-TC1 package has been designed to withstand the Type A Package (NCT) and Type B Package (HACT) specifications and testing requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Europe Committee for Inland Transport, International Air Transport Association (IATA), and other regulatory bodies governing transport packages. The regulations and guides used in the design development of the ISORAD-TC1 are IAEA SSR-6:2018, IAEA TSR-1, SOR/2015-145 CNSC Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations (PTNS Regulations), RD-364/NUREG-1886 The Joint Canada-United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transportation Packages (NUREG-1886), the 2019 European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations.
1.2 Transport Package Description
[IAEA SSR-6 220 & 809, IAEA TS-R-1 220 & 807, and 10 CFR 71.33]
The ISORAD-TC1 package, shown in Figure 1.2a, is constructed in accordance with descriptive drawings R180831-100, R180831-200, R180831-300, R180831-400, R180831-500, and R180831-600 in Section 1.3. Its general dimensions are approximately 589 mm (23.1875 inches) high, 403.24 mm (15.88 inches) diameter, and has a maximum weight of 136.08 kg (300 pounds) while configured to transport the BULK and PIC - Square Inner Container assembly (BPIC).
The Outer Drum of the ISORAD-TC1 package is designed to operate as a Type B(U) outer container with multiple inner package configurations, that provide inner shielding and security of approved special form capsules of radioactive material.
Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-7 1.2.1.2.2 BPIC Top Plate The top plate encloses the top portion of the Outer Casing. The BPIC Top Plate is constructed of austenitic stainless steel that is approximately 170 mm (6.693in) wide, 170 mm (6.693in) deep and 24.35mm (0.959in) thick. The Top Plate contains eight threaded and tapped M8 x 1.25 holes to secure the BPIC Lid, four threaded and tapped M6 x 1 holes to secure the BPIC Plug Assembly, and one hole approximately 61.75 mm (2.431in) diameter to allow the insertion and removal of the BPIC Plug Assembly.
1.2.1.2.3 BPIC Lid The BPIC Lid encloses the top portion of the BPIC Assembly. The BPIC Lid is constructed of austenitic stainless steel that is approximately 170 mm (6.693in) wide, 170 mm (6.693in) deep and mm ( in) thick. The BPIC Lid contains eight recessed holes to accommodate eight M8 x 1.25 bolts to secure the BPIC Lid to the BPIC Assembly and one hole threaded and tapped M8 x 1.25 for the removable eyebolt.
1.2.1.2.4 BPIC Shield The BPIC Shield is either depleted uranium (DU) or tungsten and has a minimum shield thickness of approximately 62.0 mm (2.44in) in every direction. The shield is approximately mm +/- mm
( in +/- in) high and mm +/- mm ( in +/- in) diameter. The DU version has a titanium inner cylinder or tungsten shield has an inner titanium or stainless steel cylinder that has an interior dimension of approximately mm +/- mm ( in +/- in) diameter and mm +/-
mm in +/- in) tall. The DU shield rests on a brass bottom support, a brass cylinder that slips over the DU shield and has a brass top shield support which provides a eutectic barrier which prevents stainless steel and DU interaction. The brass creates stability and a eutectic barrier with prevents stainless steel and DU interaction. The tungsten version eliminates most brass pieces.
1.2.1.3 Bulk and PIC Inner Container (BPIC) - Round The BPIC Inner Container is approximately 278 mm (10.945in) high, 170 mm (6.693in) diameter. It has a maximum weight of 87.54 kg (193.0 pounds). It has an Outer Casing, Top Plate and Bottom Plate made of austenitic stainless steel which encases a brass clad depleted uranium (DU) shield or tungsten shield. The DU version has a titanium inner cylinder or tungsten shield has an inner titanium or stainless steel cylinder that has an interior dimension of approximately mm ( in) diameter and mm ( in) tall. The DU shield rests on a brass bottom support, a brass cylinder that slips over the DU shield and has a brass top shield support which provides a eutectic barrier which prevents stainless steel and DU interaction. The round version eliminates the brass corner spacers. The brass creates stability and a eutectic barrier with prevents stainless steel and DU interaction. The tungsten version eliminates most brass pieces.
Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-10 1.2.1.4.4 MPIC Shield Assembly The MPIC Shield Assembly creates the source cavities/channels for the source assemblies to be stored or transported. The MPIC Shield Assembly comprises two major parts the MPIC Base Insert and the MPIC Inner Insert and are constructed of either depleted uranium or tungsten. The tube configurations are either one circle of ten tubes or a circle within a circle of five tubes each. The MPIC Shield Assembly is approximately mm in) in diameter and mm ( in) tall. The approximate weight is 50.8 kg (111.99 pounds).
1.2.1.5 Multi Port Inner Container (MPIC) - Round The MPIC is approximately 278 mm (10.945in) high and 170 mm (6.693in) diameter. It has a maximum weight of 69.66 kg (153.57 pounds). The Outer Casing, Top Plate, and Bottom Plate are constructed of austenitic stainless steel. It has a two part inner cylindrical shield of depleted uranium (DU) clad in brass, or tungsten, which creates ten shielded cavities for Radioactive Material (RAM) in special form capsules installed in source holders. The cavities are lined with titanium tubes for the DU version and titanium or stainless steel for the tungsten version. Each source holder is secured with an individual locking mechanism and further secured with a threaded source cap. The DU shield rests on a brass base, brass sleeve, and is topped with a brass plate. This creates a eutectic barrier between the DU and stainless steel. The tungsten shield version eliminates some of the brass pieces.
1.2.1.5.1 MPIC Lid The MPIC Lid encloses the top portion of the MPIC Assembly. The MPIC Lid is constructed of austenitic stainless steel that is approximately 170 mm (6.693in) in diameter and mm ( in) thick. The MPIC Lid contains one recessed hole to accommodate the padlock and the M16 x 1.25 Hex Nut to secure the MPIC Lid to the MPIC Assembly and one through hole to slip over the Lock Screw Post.
1.2.1.5.2 MPIC Top Plate The MPIC Top Plate encloses the top portion of the Outer Casing. The MPIC Top Plate is constructed of austenitic stainless steel that is approximately 163.5 mm (6.437in) in diameter and 51.6 mm (2.031) thick. The Top Plate contains ten threaded and tapped M14 x 1.5 holes to mount and secure the Locking Mechanisms the MPIC Top Plate, one threaded and tapped M12 x 1.25 holes to secure the MPIC Lock Screw Post, which is used to secure the MPIC Lid into place.
1.2.1.5.3 MPIC Source Locking Mechanism The MPIC Source Locking Mechanism (SLM) is used to secure the sources in each of the ten source tube channels within the MPIC. The MPIC SLM is Lock Housing is constructed of austenitic stainless steel or titanium with the remaining parts being constructed of austenitic stainless steel. The MPIC SLM is approximately 26.5 mm (1.043 in) long and 24.78 mm (0.976 in) high.
Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-11 1.2.1.5.4 MPIC Shield Assembly The MPIC Shield Assembly creates the source cavities/channels for the source assemblies to be stored or transported. The MPIC Shield Assembly comprises two major parts the MPIC Base Insert and the MPIC Inner Insert and are constructed of either depleted uranium or tungsten. The tube configurations are either one circle of ten tubes or a circle within a circle of five tubes each. The MPIC Shield Assembly is approximately mm ( in) in diameter and mm ( in) tall. The approximate weight is 50.8 kg (111.99 pounds).
1.2.1.6 BPIC 2835A The BPIC 2835A Inner Container is approximately 248 mm (9.764in) high and 170 mm (6.693in) diameter. It has a maximum weight of 80 kg (176.37 pounds). It has an Outer Casing, Top Plate, Bottom Plate, and Source Cavity made of austenitic stainless steel which uses brass shims where necessary to protect the depleted uranium (DU) shield. The BPIC 2835A is the inner container from the Croft and Associates 2835A transport package. ISO-RAD has tested the package in its ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum and has met the requirements. The BPIC 2835A has an inner austenitic stainless steel cylinder that has an interior dimension of approximately mm ( in) diameter and mm ( in) tall. The DU shield rests on brass shims as necessary. The design limits available oxygen preventing stainless steel and DU eutectic interaction. The O-ring seals are removed as the BPIC 2835A Inner Container will not be authorized for normal form radioactive material. The removal of the O-rings will enable the container to be open to the air as the other BPICs.
1.2.1.6.1 BPIC 2835A Plug Assembly The BPIC Plug Assembly encloses the top cavity in a DU plug shield. The BPIC Plug Assembly includes a DU Plug Shield that is encased in austenitic stainless steel and is inserted into the upper portion of the interior cavity of the lined DU shield. Brass shims are inserted as necessary in between the DU Plug Shield and the Plug Lid. The BPIC Plug Assembly is secured in place by the BPIC 2835A Lid with six stainless steel M8 x 1.25 bolts.
1.2.1.6.2 BPIC 2835A Top Plate The top plate encloses the top portion of the Outer Casing. The BPIC 2835A Top Plate is constructed of austenitic stainless steel that is approximately 170 mm (6.693in) in diameter and mm ( in) thick. The Top Plate contains six threaded and tapped M8 x 1.25 holes to secure the BPIC Lid and one hole approximately mm ( in) to allow the insertion and removal of the BPIC 2835A Plug Assembly.
1.2.1.6.3 BPIC 2835A Lid The BPIC 2835A Lid encloses the top portion of the BPIC Assembly. The BPIC Lid is constructed of austenitic stainless steel that is approximately 170 mm (6.693in) in diameter and mm ( in) thick. The BPIC Lid contains six recessed holes to accommodate six M8 x 1.25 bolts to secure the Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-12 BPIC Lid to the BPIC Assembly, one threaded and tapped hole for the former test point, and one hole threaded and tapped M8 x 1.25 for the removable eyebolt.
1.2.1.6.4 BPIC 2835A Shield The BPIC Shield is depleted uranium (DU) and has a minimum shield thickness of approximately 63.0 mm (2.48in) in every direction. The shield is approximately mm +/- mm ( in +/- in) high and mm +/- mm ( in +/- in) diameter. The DU has an inner stainless steel cylinder that has an interior dimension of approximately mm +/- mm ( in +/- in) diameter and 1
mm +/- mm ( in +/- in) tall. The DU shield rests on a brass shim and an austenitic stainless steel brass shield support, a brass shield shim that slips over the DU shield, and has a brass top shim which provides a eutectic barrier which prevents stainless steel and DU interaction. The brass creates an eutectic barrier which prevents stainless steel and DU interaction.
1.2.2 Contents
[IAEA-SSR6 Section IV & 809(a), IAES TS-R-1 Section IV & 807(a), and 10 CFR 71.33(b)]
Typically, the source capsules are inserted into a capsule insert/holder (300 series stainless steel, 400 series stainless steel, titanium, or tungsten), then placed into the transport packages inner isotope cavity, and secured in-place by the bolted down Shield Plug Assembly which is covered by the bolted down Lid Assembly. During shipments, an optional tungsten insert may be used to provide additional shielding.
The ISORAD-TC1 package is designed as a general purpose transport package to transport special form capsules containing the isotopes listed in Tables 1.2a and 1.2b. The package is designed for radioactive material that emits alpha, beta or gamma radiation. The specified contents do not include materials that emit a significant number of neutrons. The contents are solid or liquid form in approved special form capsules.
The contents may also include inorganic non-radioactive materials associated with the radioactive materials, such as contents holders or fixtures and packing materials. No organic/hydrogenous materials are allowed in the inner cavity.
Fissile materials and irradiated fissile materials containing fission products are not permitted for transport in the ISORAD-TC1. No Pyrophoric radioactive materials are permitted in the ISORAD-TC1 package. The ISORAD-TC1 transports less than 3,000 A1, the package is designated as Category II as defined in NUREG-6407 (Page 5 Table 4) [1.9].
The maximum activity of the radioactive contents is limited principally by the radiation heat load and has excess shielding. The contents heat limit is 60.88 Watts for radioactive materials in special form.
Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-13 Table 1.2a: Isotopes Permitted in the Model ISORAD-TC1 BPIC Authorized Total Authorized Total Isotope Curies Isotope Curies Forms Watts Forms Watts Actinium-225 Special1 67.75 2.35 Selenium-75 Special1 10017 53.6 Actinium-227 Special1 25 0.0118 Sodium-24 Special1 5.4 0.029 Actinium-228 Special1 17 0.136 Strontium-89 Special1 329.4 1.14 Barium-131 Special1 5076 15.54 Strontium-90 Special1 50 0.163 Barium-133 Special1 125 0.669 Thorium-227 Special1 272.7 9.79 Cadmium-109 Special1 2700 14.45 Thorium-228 Special1 150.66 4.84 Carbon-14 Special1 1080 0.32 Tungsten-187 Special1 604.8 2.75 Cobalt-57 Special1 300 1.61 Tungsten-188 Special1 17.36 0.0104 Cobalt-60 Special1 0.5 0.0077 Yttrium-90 Special1 46.71 0.0259 1
Cesium-131 Special1 26900 4.44 Ytterbium-169 Special1 10017 25.143 Cesium-137 Special1 3888 3.927 Ytterbium-175 Special1 26900 26.9 Type A Copper-67 Special1 18657 30.04 Other Isotopes Special1 30 Quantity Curium-248 Special1 5 0.18 Indium-111 Special1 11475 29.84 Iridium-192 Special1 10125 60.88 Iridium-194 Special1 55.35 0.296 Iron-55 Special1 2700 0.45 Lutetium-177 Special1 10017 53.6 Phosphorous-32 Special1 150.66 0.81 Phosphorous-33 Special1 10017 53.6 1 Special Form is defined in IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, 10 CFR 71, and 49 CFR 173.
Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-14 Table 1.2b: Isotopes Permitted in the Model ISORAD-TC1 MPIC Authorized Curies Total Total Isotope Sources Forms Each Curies Watts Special1 Iridium-192 10 150 1500 9.16 Solid Special1 Selenium-75 10 150 1500 8.025 Solid Special1 Ytterbium-169 10 150 1500 3.765 Solid 1 Special Form is defined in IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, 10 CFR 71, and 49 CFR 173.
1.2.3. Special Requirements for Plutonium The ISORAD-TC1 package is not designed for plutonium.
1.2.4 Operational Features The primary containment system for the ISORAD-TC1 package is the radioactive source capsule(s) meeting special form criteria referred to in Section 4.1 of this Safety Analysis Report.
The source capsule(s) are certified as special form radioactive material under IAEA SSR-6 (2018),
IAEA TS-R-1, CNCS SOR (2015), USNRC 10 CFR Part 71, or USDOT 49 CFR Part 173.
1.3 Appendix
1.3.1 References
[1.1] IAEA SSR-6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Revision 1, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2018.
[1.2] IAEA TS-R-1, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2005 Edition, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2005.
[1.3] IAEA TS-R-1, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1996 (Revised),
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2000.
[1.4] Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations (CNSC PTNS SOR/2015-145),
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, 2015.
[1.5] Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Office of the Federal Register, Washington D.C.
[1.6] Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Office of the Federal Register, Washington D.C.
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Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-15
[1.7] ADR European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road. United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2018.
[1.8] CNSC RD-364/ USNRC NUREG-1886 Joint Canada - United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transport Packages, USNRC and CNSC, Washington &
Ottawa, 2009.
[1.9] NUREG/CR-6407, INEL-95/0551, Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components According to Importance to Safety, February 1996
[1.10] Regulatory Guide 7.6, Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels, Revision 1, March 1978.
[1.11] Regulatory Guide 7.8, Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, March 1989.
Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 1-38 1.3.2.17 R180831-XXX Sketch ISORAD-TC1 Prepared for Transport Revision 1 09 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-1 Safety Analysis Report Section 2 ISO-RAD Canada, Inc Ottawa, ON Canada Model: ISORAD-TC1 Type B(U)-96 Transport Package October 21, 2020 Revision 1 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-2 Table of Contents Section 2 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION ...................................................................................... 2-5 2.1 Description of Structural Design ................................................................................................ 2-5 2.1.1 Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 2-5 2.1.1.1 Outer Drum ................................................................................................................... 2-5 2.1.1.2 Cork Assembly.............................................................................................................. 2-6 2.1.1.3 Inner Container ............................................................................................................. 2-6 2.1.1.4 Containment System ..................................................................................................... 2-8 2.1.2 Design Criteria ..................................................................................................................... 2-9 2.1.2.1 Regulations and Codes .................................................................................................. 2-9 2.1.2.2 Allowable Stress ......................................................................................................... 2-10 2.1.2.3 Buckling ...................................................................................................................... 2-10 2.1.2.4 Fatigue......................................................................................................................... 2-10 2.1.2.5 Brittle Fracture ............................................................................................................ 2-10 2.1.3. Weights and Centers of Gravity ........................................................................................ 2-10 2.1.4 Identification of Codes and Standards for Package Design ............................................... 2-11 2.1.4.1 Package Design ........................................................................................................... 2-11 2.1.4.2 Fabrication & Assembly ............................................................................................. 2-11 2.1.4.3 Maintenance & Use..................................................................................................... 2-12 2.2 Materials ................................................................................................................................... 2-12 2.2.1 Material Properties and Specifications .............................................................................. 2-12 2.2.1.1 Structural Materials ..................................................................................................... 2-15 2.2.1.2 Shielding Material ....................................................................................................... 2-15 2.2.1.3 Cork Assembly............................................................................................................ 2-15 2.2.2 Chemical, Galvanic or Other Reactions............................................................................. 2-15 2.2.3 Effects of Radiation on Materials ...................................................................................... 2-15 2.3 Fabrication and Examination .................................................................................................... 2-16 2.3.1 Fabrication ......................................................................................................................... 2-16 2.3.2 Examination ....................................................................................................................... 2-16 2.3.2.1 Fabrication Tests and Examinations ........................................................................... 2-17 2.3.2.2 Acceptance Tests ........................................................................................................ 2-17 2.4 General Standards for All Packages ..................................................................................... 2-18 2.4.1 Minimum Package Size ................................................................................................ 2-18 2.4.2 Tamper-Indicating Feature............................................................................................ 2-18 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-3 2.4.3 Positive Closure ............................................................................................................ 2-18 2.5 Lifting and Tie-down Standards for All Packages ............................................................... 2-18 2.5.1 Lifting Devices.............................................................................................................. 2-18 2.5.2 Tie-Down Devices ............................................................................................................. 2-19 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) ................................................................................... 2-20 2.6.1 Heat .................................................................................................................................... 2-20 2.6.1.1 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures ............................................................. 2-24 2.6.1.2 Differential Thermal Expansion ............................................................................ 2-26 2.6.1.3 Stress Calculations ................................................................................................. 2-27 2.6.1.4 Comparison with Allowable Stresses .................................................................... 2-29 2.6.2 Cold ............................................................................................................................... 2-29 2.6.3 Reduced External Pressure ........................................................................................... 2-29 2.6.4 Increased External Pressure .......................................................................................... 2-34 2.6.5 Vibration ....................................................................................................................... 2-38 2.6.6 Water Spray .................................................................................................................. 2-38 2.6.7 Free Drop ...................................................................................................................... 2-38 2.6.8 Corner Drop .................................................................................................................. 2-39 2.6.9 Compression ................................................................................................................. 2-39 2.6.10 Penetration................................................................................................................. 2-40 2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport .................................................................. 2-41 2.7.1 Free Drop I .................................................................................................................... 2-42 2.7.1.1 Oblique Drop ......................................................................................................... 2-42 2.7.1.2 Top Down Drop ..................................................................................................... 2-43 2.7.1.5 Summary of Results............................................................................................... 2-44 2.7.2 Crush ............................................................................................................................. 2-45 2.7.3 Puncture ........................................................................................................................ 2-45 2.7.3.1 Top Puncture Drop ................................................................................................ 2-45 2.7.3.2 Side Puncture Drop ................................................................................................ 2-45 2.7.3.3 Bottom Puncture Drop ........................................................................................... 2-46 2.7.4 Thermal ......................................................................................................................... 2-46 2.7.4.1 Summary of Maximum Pressures.......................................................................... 2-47 2.7.4.2 Differential Thermal Expansion ............................................................................ 2-47 2.7.4.3 Stress Calculations ................................................................................................. 2-48 2.7.4.4 Comparison with Allowable Stresses .................................................................... 2-48 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-4 2.7.5 Immersion - Fissile Material ......................................................................................... 2-48 2.7.6 Immersion - All Packages ............................................................................................. 2-48 2.7.7 Deep Water Immersion Test ......................................................................................... 2-50 2.7.8 Summary of Damage .................................................................................................... 2-50 2.8 Accident Conditions for Air Transport of Plutonium .......................................................... 2-51 2.9 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport ................................. 2-51 2.10 Special Form ..................................................................................................................... 2-51 2.11 Fuel Rods .......................................................................................................................... 2-51 2.12 Appendix .......................................................................................................................... 2-52 2.12.1 QTP-001 Test Plan, Revision 1. ............................................................................ 2-52 2.12.2 QTP-001 Test Report Revision 0 .......................................................................... 2-54 2.12.3 SERCO Test Report............................................................................................... 2-55 2.12.4 Special Form Certificates for use with Model ISORAD-TC1 .............................. 2-56 2.12.5 References ............................................................................................................. 2-57 List of Tables Table 2.2.1.A: Mechanical Properties of Principal Transport Package Materials .............................. 2-12 Table 2.2.1.B: Materials of Construction............................................................................................ 2-13 Table 2.6.A: Summary of NCT Initial Conditions ............................................................................. 2-20 Table 2.6.1.A: Radionuclide Decay Energy ....................................................................................... 2-20 Table 2.6.1.B: ISORAD-TC1 Authorized Contents BPIC Inner Container ....................................... 2-21 Table 2.6.1.C: Summary Temperatures Normal Conditions of Transport ......................................... 2-24 Table 2.6.1.D: NCT Maximum Temperature and Pressure in the Special Form Capsule .................. 2-24 Table 2.6.1.E: HACT Maximum Temperature and Pressure in the Special Form Capsule ............... 2-25 Table 2.6.1.F: Summary of Thermal Expansion of BPIC Inner Container ........................................ 2-27 Table 2.7.A: Summary of HACT Initial Conditions........................................................................... 2-42 Table 2.7.4.1.b: Summary Table of Maximum Pressures................................................................... 2-47 Table 2.7.8.a: Summary of Damages During Performance of QTP-001 ............................................ 2-50 List of Figures Figure 2.1.3: Centers of Gravity......................................................................................................... 2-10 Figure 2.6.7.a: NCT Drop Test Orientation 1 and NCT Drop Test Orientation 2 ............................. 2-39 Figure 2.6.10.a: NCT Penetration Test Orientation 1 and NCT Drop Test Orientation 2 ................. 2-41 Figure 2.6.10.b: NCT Penetration Test Orientation 3 and Impact Area ............................................ 2-41 Figure 2.7.1.a: HACT Free Drop 1 Test Orientation 1 ...................................................................... 2-43 Figure 2.7.1.b: HACT Free Drop 1 Test Orientation 2 ...................................................................... 2-44 Figure 2.7.3.a: HACT Puncture Test Orientation 1, 2 & 3 ................................................................ 2-46 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-5 Section 2 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION The Structural Evaluation section identifies and describes the principal structural engineering design of the ISORAD-TC1 packaging, components, and systems important to safety and compliance with the performance requirements of IAEA SR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, and 10 CFR Part 71. The design was influenced in part by the organizations American Welding Society (AWS) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME).
2.1 Description of Structural Design
[IAEA TS-R-1 220 & 806-808, IAEA SSR-6 220 & 808-810, and 10 CFR 71.33(a)]
2.1.1 Discussion The principal structural components of the ISORAD-TC1 package are the Outer Drum Assembly, the five (5) configurations of Inner Containers forming part of the security containment system, and the special form radioactive material (primary containment vessel). The radioactive contents are carried within the Inner Containers in special form capsules of various sizes and potential configurations. The special form capsules are placed inside capsule inserts within the inner container isotope cavity (see Section 1.2.1).
The Outer Drum is designed to absorb impacts, provide protection during handling/transportation operations, and provide thermal insulation for the inner container during NCT and HACT conditions.
The inner cork packing is designed to absorb the impact loads preventing damage to the inner container under NCT and HACT conditions. The inner container configurations are designed to provide the shielding and security for the special form capsules. The containment system consists of the inner container (provides shielding and secures the special form capsules within the inner container), capsule insert {spacer/holder} (centers the special form capsules, distributes the dose, and may provide additional shielding within the inner container isotope cavity), and special form capsules (are the primary containment vessel for the radioactive isotope). A description of the structural design of each of these components is provided in the following sections.
2.1.1.1 Outer Drum The Outer Drum comprises of a keg, Attachment Ring Assembly, Lid Assembly, Cork Assembly, and Cork Lid assembly as shown in drawing R180831-100 (Section 1.3.2). The keg is a commercially available standard 1/2 barrel 15.5 gallon keg and is constructed from two rolled and formed austenitic stainless steel halves welded in the center to form a cylinder. A base and top with rims are welded to the rolled cylinder to form the keg body. The keg is modified with Attachment Ring Supports and Attachment Ring Assembly, which are permanently welded into place to form the attachment point for the Lid Assembly. The Cork Assembly is assembled into the modified keg. An optional stainless steel Cavity Sleeve can be placed within the Cork Assembly cavity to protect the cork during normal handling operations.
The Outer Drum closure is facilitated by eight M14 x 2 threaded bolt holes for securing the Lid Assembly to the Attachment Ring and two Lock Studs which are permanently welded into position.
The Lid Assembly is a circular plate with ten holes machined for the eight closure bolts and two holes for the Lock Studs. The Lid Assembly is attached to the body with eight M14 x 2 austenitic stainless Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-6 steel hex head bolts with lock and flat washers, two padlocks for security, and tamper-evident seal (lead wire seal, special zip tie, or other tamper-evident device) between the two Lock Studs. The Outer Drum has two handle holes that can be used to lift the package.
2.1.1.2 Cork Assembly The Cork Assembly fits inside the Outer Drum cavity and surrounds the Inner Container. It is designed to reduce impact loads on the Inner Container and provides thermal insulation. The cork surrounds the side walls and the lid of the Inner Container. The cork varies in width from mm ( inches) to .0 mm inches) on the side walls due to the variation in configuration of the Inner Container and is a minimum of mm ( inches) thick above the lid. The cork may be coated in a fire-retardant paint.
The cork components are shown in detail in drawing R180831-110 and R180831-111 (Section 1.3.2).
2.1.1.3 Inner Container The ISORAD-TC1 consists of five configurations of Inner Containers.
Configuration 1: The Bulk & PIC Inner Container (BPIC) - Square inner container forms part of the containment system and consists of a body, a removable Shield Plug Assembly bolted together with four M6 x 1 closure screws, and a removable lid assembly bolted together with eight M8 x 1.25 closure screws as shown in drawing R180831-200 (Section 1.3.2).
The body assembly is formed from a stainless steel square casing filled with depleted uranium or tungsten shield which is surrounded by brass. The depleted uranium or tungsten forms the shielding for the walls and base of the inner cavity. The shielding cavity is filled with a titanium cavity sleeve that is press fit into the Top Plate and LocTite, JB Weld, or brazed together. The austenitic stainless steel casing consists of three austenitic stainless steel pieces, the Outer Casing, Top Plate, and Bottom Plate.
Each piece is machined from solid or tubular austenitic stainless steel. The Top Plate and Bottom Plate are welded to the Outer Casing with a circumferential full penetration groove weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.6/D1.6M or equivalent international standard.
The Shield Plug Assembly is formed from the titanium Plug Housing and Plug Housing Lid filled with the depleted uranium or tungsten Plug Shield and the brass Plug Housing Spacer. The Plug Housing and Plug Housing Lid are welded together with a circumferential fillet weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.9/D1.9M or equivalent international standard.
Configuration 2: The Bulk & PIC Inner Container (BPIC) - Round inner container forms part of the containment system and consists of a body, a removable Shield Plug Assembly bolted together with four M6 x 1 closure screws, and a removable lid assembly bolted together with eight M8 x 1.25 closure screws as shown in drawing R180831-400 (Section 1.3.2).
The body assembly is formed from a stainless steel round casing filled with depleted uranium or tungsten shield which is surrounded by brass. The depleted uranium forms the shielding for the walls and base of the inner cavity. The shielding cavity is filled with a titanium cavity sleeve that is press fit into the Top Plate and LocTite, JB Weld, or brazed together. The stainless steel casing consists of three austenitic stainless steel pieces, the Outer Casing, Top Plate, and Bottom Plate. Each piece is Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-7 machined from solid austenitic stainless steel. The Top Plate and Bottom Plate are welded to the Outer Casing with a circumferential full penetration groove weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.6/D1.6M or equivalent international standard.
The Shield Plug Assembly is formed from the titanium Plug Housing and Plug Housing Lid filled with the depleted uranium or tungsten Plug Shield and the brass Plug Housing Spacer. The Plug Housing and Plug Housing Lid is welded together with a circumferential full penetration fillet weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.9/D1.9M or equivalent international standard.
Configuration 3: The Multi Port Inner Container (MPIC) - Square inner container forms part of the containment system and consists of a body and a removable lid assembly with one closure M16 hex nut and padlock as shown in drawing R180831-300 (Section 1.3.2).
The body assembly is formed from a stainless steel square casing filled with a two part depleted uranium shield which is surrounded by brass. The depleted uranium or tungsten forms the shielding for the ten inner cavities and can be configured as five and five holes in two rows or ten holes in one row.
Each shielding cavity is filled with a titanium source tube that is press fit into the Top Plate and source lock and brazed together. The stainless steel casing consists of three austenitic stainless steel pieces, the Outer Casing, Top Plate, and Bottom Plate. Each piece is machined from solid austenitic stainless steel.
The Top Plate and Bottom Plate are welded to the Outer Casing with a circumferential full penetration groove weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.6/D.6M or equivalent international standard.
Configuration 4: The Multi Port Inner Container (MPIC) - Round inner container forms part of the containment system and consists of a body and a removable lid assembly with one closure M16 hex nut and padlock as shown in drawing R180831-600 (Section 1.3.2).
The body assembly is formed from a stainless steel round casing filled with a two part depleted uranium or tungsten shield which is surrounded by brass. The depleted uranium forms the shielding for the ten inner cavities and can be configured as five and five holes in two rows or ten holes in one row.
Each shielding cavity is filled with a titanium source tube that is press fit into the Top Plate and Source Lock Assembly and brazed. The stainless steel casing consists of three austenitic stainless steel pieces, the Outer Casing, Top Plate, and Bottom Plate. Each piece is machined from solid austenitic stainless steel. The Top Plate and Bottom Plate are welded to the Outer Casing with a circumferential full penetration groove weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.6/D.6M or equivalent international standard.
Configuration 5: The Bulk & PIC Inner Container (BPIC) 2835A is a round inner container that forms part of the containment system and consists of a body, a removable Shield Plug Assembly, and a removable lid assembly bolted together with six M8 x 1.25 closure screws as shown in drawing R180831-500 (Section 1.3.2).
The body assembly is formed from a stainless steel round casing filled with depleted uranium tungsten shield which is surrounded by brass. The depleted uranium or tungsten forms the shielding for the walls and base of the inner cavity. The shielding cavity is filled with a stainless steel cavity sleeve that is welded to the Top Plate. The stainless steel casing consists of three austenitic stainless steel pieces, the Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-8 Outer Casing, Top Plate, and Bottom Plate. Each piece is machined from solid austenitic stainless steel.
The Top Plate and Bottom Plate are welded to the Outer Casing with a circumferential full penetration groove weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.6/D1.6M or equivalent international standard.
The Shield Plug Assembly is formed from the stainless steel Plug Housing and Plug Housing Lid filled with the depleted uranium Plug Shield and the brass shims. The Plug Housing and Plug Housing Lid is welded together with a circumferential full penetration fillet weld which is both visually and liquid penetrant tested according to AWS D1.6/D.6M or equivalent international standard.
2.1.1.4 Containment System The ISORAD-TC1 is designed to transport solid or liquid radioactive materials only in special form capsules. The package will not transport normal form or non-special form radioactive material or gasses. The package may transport liquids providing the liquid is encapsulated in an approved special form capsule. The containment system for the BPIC Series consists of three major components inner container (provides shielding and secures the special form capsules within the inner container),
capsule insert {spacer/holder} (centers the special form capsules, distributes the dose, and may provide additional shielding within the inner container isotope cavity), and special form capsules (provides the primary containment of the radioactive isotope and is considered the containment vessel for the package). The containment system for the MPIC Series consists of the three major components inner container (provides shielding and secures the special form capsules incorporated into a source holder assembly (i.e. radiography source or similar source holder assembly) within the inner container),
source locking mechanism (locks the source holder assembly into the inner container), and special form capsules (provides the primary containment of the radioactive isotope and is considered the containment vessel for the package).
The inner container as described above in 2.1.1.3 and is the outer most layer of the containment system.
The inner container provides the physical security, shielding and the isotope cavity.
The capsule inserts are designed to accommodate the various special form capsules that will be transported in the three configurations of BPIC. The capsule inserts can be constructed of 300 series stainless steel, 400 series stainless steel, titanium, or tungsten. The hole configurations are variable in number and diameter to maximize the isotope contents flexibility. The sizes of special forms vary from country to country and are not standardized. The maximum weight of isotope contents and capsule insert holder is 1.37 kg (3 pounds).
The special form capsules must possess a valid special form certificate issued under conformance to IAEA TS-R-1 or IAEA SSR-6 standard requirements. In addition, a valid and current leak test analysis is required before transport of the special form in the ISORAD-TC1. Meeting special form criteria provides the primary containment of the radioactive isotope being transported.
Any one of the three inserts specified in Section 1.3.2 shall be used to provide further shielding and confinement for the special form capsule contents.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-9 2.1.2 Design Criteria The ISORAD-TC1 package has been designed to withstand the Type A Package (NCT) and Type B Package (HACT) specifications and testing requirements of the IAEA, CNSC, USNRC, USDOT, UN, IATA, and other regulatory bodies governing transport packages. The ISORAD-TC1 package is not a containment vessel, nor transports greater than 3000A1 quantities of radioactive isotopes, and therefore the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC)Section II Part D or Section III (BPVC) was not used as an integral part of the design process, but was referenced during the design process. The containment vessel are the special form capsules. The following regulations and codes were used to design, develop, test and prepare the ISORAD-TC1 Type B application.
2.1.2.1 Regulations and Codes 2.1.2.1.1 Regulatory References A. IAEA SSR-6:2018 [2.1]
B. IAEA TS-R-1:2005 (Revised) [2.2]
B. IAEA TS-R-1:1996 (Revised) [2.3]
C. CNSC PTNS SOR/2015-145 [2.4]
D. USNRC 10 CFR Part 71 [2.5]
E. USDOT 49 CFR Part 173 [2.6]
E. UN ADR:2019 F. IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations 2.1.2.1.2 Regulatory Guides A. CNSC RD-364 / USNRC NURERG 1886 [2.7]
D. USNRC NUREG 6407 [2.10]
E. USNRC Regulatory Guide 7.6 [2.11]
F. USNRC Regulatory Guide 7.8 [2.12]
G. USNRC Regulatory Guide 7.11 [2.13]
2.1.2.1.3 Welding Codes and Guides A. AWS A2.4 Standard Symbols for Welding, Brazing, and Nondestructive Examination
[2.14]
B. AWS A3.0 Standard Terms and Definitions [2.15]
C. AWS D1.6/D1.6M Structural Welding Code: Stainless Steel [2.16]
D. AWS D1.9/D1.6M Structural Welding Code: Titanium [2.17]
2.1.2.1.4 Design Codes and Standards A. 27th Edition Machinerys Handbook [2.18]
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-10 2.1.2.2 Allowable Stress The ISORAD-TC1 is not subject to this section because it is not a pressure vessel. See Sections 2.6.1.1
- 2.6.1.4 for calculations.
2.1.2.3 Buckling The ISORAD-TC1 is not subject to this section because it is not a pressure vessel.
2.1.2.4 Fatigue The hypothetical maximum number of cycles that the ISORAD-TC1 will undergo is approximately 52 cycles/year for 20 years = 1040 cycles. The number of cycles was multiplied by 10 to give 10400 cycles, to give a safety margin. In reality, the average ISORAD-TC1 will undergo 18 cycles/year for 20 years = 360 because of logistical limitations. Providing the same safety margin of 10 as in the hypothetical maximum, the ISORAD-TC1 maximum safety margin cycles is 3,600.
2.1.2.5 Brittle Fracture All the structural components (Outer Drum and Inner Container outer casing components) of the package are fabricated from 300 series stainless steel which is an austenitic stainless steel that is ductile at low temperatures. According to Regulatory Guide 7.11 [2.13], austenitic stainless steel is not susceptible to brittle facture at temperatures encountered in transport. The most destructive hypothetical accident condition 9 meter Free Drop test was conducted on Prototype #1 at -40°C to determine if brittle fracture has any effect on the package, with compliance demonstrated if the containment vessel (special form capsule) is undamaged and leak tight on completion of testing.
2.1.3. Weights and Centers of Gravity The ISORAD-TC1 package maximum weight is approximately 136.1 kg (300 pounds). The heaviest Inner Container (BPIC - Square) weighs approximately 102.1 kg (225.0 pounds), including about 67.8 kg (149.5 pounds) +/- 2.0 kg(4.41 pounds) of DU shielding. The center of gravity of the ISORAD-TC1 transport package is approximately 285 mm (11.22 inches) above the bottom of the drum (See Figure 2.1.3).
Figure 1.1.3: Centers of Gravity Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-11 2.1.4 Identification of Codes and Standards for Package Design The package has been designed to transport special form material in quantities of less than 1000 TBq or 3000A1, and is classified as a Category II package, as defined in NUREG-6407 [2.10 Page 5 Table 4].
The standards to which the package has been designed, fabricated, tested and maintained have been selected based on the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 7.6 [2.11] and NUREG/CR-3854 [2.9].
The design criteria used to assess the containment boundary have been taken from Regulatory Guide 7.6 [2.11] and the load combinations have been taken from Regulatory Guide 7.8 [2.12] as discussed in section 2.1.2.1. The Inner Container contains austenitic stainless steel welds and inspection according to the AWS D1.6/D1.6M welding code. The Plug Assembly contains titanium welds and inspection according to AWS D1.9.D1.9M welding code.
Section 2.1.1 identifies the major components of the ISORAD-TC1 package and identifies if they provide containment or fulfill the other safety functions such as gamma shielding or support. The drawings in section 1.3 identify whether the items are Important to Safety (ITS), the identification was carried out using the guidance of NUREG/CR-6407 [2.10]. The Assembly drawings from SAR section 1.3 contain the QA Category classification for the various components, the codes or standards used to purchase materials, fabricate the package, inspect and examine the package.
The depleted uranium and the cork insulation and impact limiters are specialist materials for which an ASTM standard does not exist. The depleted uranium is fabricated and tested in accordance with standard industry practices. Chemical composition checks through Material Test Reports (MTRs) like other metal materials used in the package. In addition, Lot numbers are permanently engraved on the shields to track and trace the shields. Each shield is surveyed to ensure regulatory dose level compliance in each completed Inner Container.
The cork is fabricated in accordance with the vendors standard practices and quality inspected to the requirements of drawing R180831-110 or R180831-111.
2.1.4.1 Package Design See Section 2.1.2 relating to design criteria of the package. The regulations, regulatory guides, and codes listed were all referenced and incorporated during the design, development, testing, and safety analysis review of the ISORAD-TC1 package. However, the design was based on the General Package, Type A, and Type B(U) container requirements of IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, CNSC SOR/2015-14, UN ADR, 49 CFR 173, and 10 CFR 71 regulations in effect at the time of the package design.
2.1.4.2 Fabrication & Assembly All component fabrication (including assembly) is controlled under the ISO-RAD Canada Inc. Quality Assurance Program (QAP) previously submitted to the CNSC. All welding under this plan adheres to American Welding Society (AWS), American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), or equivalent international standards appropriate to the materials and designs fabricated. All safety critical hardware meets ASME-B18 standards. All external fabrication and especially items deemed critical to safety are QA inspected by qualified ISO-RAD Canada personnel. The process includes verification to Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-12 manufacturing/fabrication instructions, assembly instructions, and drawings and all records are retained on file for the life of the transport package.
2.1.4.3 Maintenance & Use Maintenance and use of this transport container are described in Sections 7 and 8 of the SAR.
2.2 Materials [SSR-6 614, TS-R-1 613, and 10 CFR 71 .43(d)]
2.2.1 Material Properties and Specifications Table 2.2.1.A lists the relevant mechanical properties (at ambient temperature) of the principal materials used in the ISORAD-TC1 transport package. The sources referred to in the last column are listed after the table.
Table 2.2.1.A: Mechanical Properties of Principal Transport Package Materials 300 Series Brass Titanium Uranium Tungsten Cork Stainless Steel C360/C260/ Grade 2 (Depleted) #4 (Weathered)/ C230 #2 (Painted White)#1 Modulus of 190 GPa 100 GPa 116 GPa 205 GPa 400 GPa 0.02 GPa Elasticity (27 Mpsi) (15 Mpsi) (16.8 Mpsi) (30 Mpsi) (58 Mpsi) (0.0029 Mpsi)
Poissons 0.29 0.33 0.361 0.21 0.28 0.0 Ratio Density 8000 kg/m3 8500 kg/m3 4621 kg/m3 19,000 kg/m3 19,270 kg/m3 154.23 kg/m3 (0.29 lb/in3 (0.32 lb/in3) (0.163 lb/in3) (0.69 lb/in3) (0.70 lb/in3) (0.00544 lb/in3)
(Ultimate) 517 MPa 478 MPa 344 MPa 365 MPa 980 MPa 0.85 MPa Tensile (75 kpsi) (69 kpsi) (49.9 kpsi) (53 kpsi) (142 kpsi) (0.12 kpsi)
Strength Yield 207 MPa 240 MPa 275 MPa 172 MPa 750 MPa N/A Strength (30 kpsi) (35 kpsi) (39.9 kpsi) (25 kpsi) (109 kpsi)
Coefficient 17.3 µm/m°C 20.2 µm/m°C 8.90 µm/m°C 13.3 µm/m°C 4.5 µm/m°C 40 µm/m°C of Thermal (9.9 µin/in°F) (11.2 µin/in°F) (4.94 µin/in°F) (7.4 µin/in°F) (2.5 µin/in°F) (22.2 µin/in°F)
Expansion Thermal 16 W/m-°K 100 W/m-°K 11.4 W/m-°K 27.5 W/m-°K 163.3 W/m-°K 0.04 W/m-°K Conductivity (9.2 Btu/h-ft-°F) (63 Btu/h-ft-°F) (6.6 Btu/h-ft-°F) (16 Btu/h-ft-°F) (1130 Btu/h-ft-°F) (0.023 Btu/h-ft-°F)
Emissivity 0.85/0.992 0.22 0.31 0.15 0.23 (1500°C) 0.95 Specific 500 j/kg °K 390 j/kg °K 522.3 J/kg °K 120 j/kg °K 0.13 j/kg °K 2000 j/kg °K Heat (0.12 Btu/lb-F°) (0.09 Btu/lb-F°) (0.125 Btu/lb-F°) (0.03 Btu/lb-F°) (0.03 Btu/lb-F°) (0.48 Btu/lb-F°)
Melting 1,427 887/954/1000 1,668 1,130 3,410 400 Point °C Resource references:
- 1. American Society for Metals. Metals Handbook, Volume 1, Tenth Edition. Ohio: Materials Park, 1990.
- 2. Lowenstein, Paul. Industrial Uses of Depleted Uranium. American Society for Metals. Metals Handbook, Volume 3, Ninth Edition.
- 3. American Society for Metals. Metals Handbook, Volume 2, Tenth Edition. Ohio: Materials Park, 1990.
- 4. http://rhenium.com/assets/tungsten_properties.pdf Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-13 Table 2.2.1.B: Materials of Construction Outer Drum Material ASTM or Other Specification Form Keg AISI 304 A240/A240M Plate/Sheet Lid Assembly AISI 304 A240/A240M & A276 Plate/Sheet & Bar Attachment Ring AISI 304 A240/A240M Plate/Sheet Attachment Ring Support AISI 304 A240/A240M Plate/Sheet M14 x 2 x 35 Hex Bolt AISI 316 Minimum A4 70 M14 Lock Washer AISI 316 Minimum A4 70 M14 Washer AISI 316 Minimum A4 70 Cork Assembly Cork ISO 7322 Sheet Cavity Sleeve AISI 304 A240/A240M, A276, A312/A312M Plate/Sheet, Bar, or Tube/Pipe Cork Lid Assembly Lid Cork Cork ISO 7322 Sheet Mounting Plate AISI 304 or Aluminum 6061 A240/A240M & A276 or B209/B221 Plate/Sheet or Bar or Plate/Sheet or Bar BPIC - Square & Round Material ASTM or Other Specification Form Shield Depleted Uranium/Tungsten SAE AMS 7730 /B777 Casting or Ingots / Sintered Outer Casing AISI 304 A240/A240M or A312/A312M Plate/Sheet or Round or Square Pipe Top Plate AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Bottom Plate AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Lid AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar M8 x 1.25 Skt Head Screw AISI 316 Minimum A4 70 M6 x 1 Socket Head Screw AISI 316 Minimum A4 70 Top Support Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Bottom Support Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Spacers (Square Only) Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Sleeve (Round Only) Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M or B135/B135M Bar or Plate & Bar or Tube Shield Cavity Grade 2 Titanium (min) B348/B348M or B338/B338M or B861 Bar or Tube/Pipe Shield Plug Assembly Material ASTM or Other Specification Form Shield Plug Depleted Uranium/Tungsten SAE AMS 7730 / B777 Casting or Ingots / Sintered Plug Housing Grade 2 Titanium (min) B348/B348M or B338/B338M or B861 Bar or Tube/Pipe Plug Lid Grade 2 Titanium (min) B348/B348M or B265 Bar or Plate/Sheet Plug Spacer Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-14 Table 2.2.1.B Materials of Construction (Continued)
MPIC - Square & Round Material ASTM or Other Specification Form Shield Base Depleted Uranium/Tungsten SAE AMS 7730 / B777 Casting or Ingots / Sintered Shield Top Depleted Uranium/Tungsten SAE AMS 7730 / B777 Casting or Ingots / Sintered Outer Casing AISI 304 A240/A240M or A312/A312M Plate/Sheet or Round or Square Pipe Top Plate AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Bottom Plate AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Lid AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Lid Support AISI 304 A240/A240M or A312/A312M Plate/Sheet or Round or Square Pipe Source Lock Assembly AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Source Caps AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar M16 Low Profile Hex Nut AISI 316 Top Support Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Bottom Support Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Spacers (Square Only) Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Shield Sleeve Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M or B135/B135M Bar or Plate & Bar or Tube Tubes Grade 2 Titanium (min) B348/B348M or B338/B338M or B861 Bar or Tube/Pipe BPIC 2835A Material ASTM or Other Specification Form Shield Depleted Uranium SAE AMS 7730 Casting or Ingots Outer Casing AISI 304 A240/A240M or A312/A312M Plate/Sheet or Round or Square Pipe Top Plate AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Bottom Plate AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar Shield Cavity AISI 304 A276 or A312/A312M Bar or Round or Square Pipe Lid AISI 304 A240/A240M or A276 Plate/Sheet or Bar M8 x 1.25 Skt Head Screw AISI 316 Minimum A4 70 All Shims Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Shield Sleeve Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M or B135/B135M Bar or Plate & Bar or Tube Shield Plug Assembly Material ASTM or Other Specification Form Shield Plug Depleted Uranium SAE AMS 7730 Casting or Ingots Plug Housing AISI 304 A276 or A312/A312M Bar or Round or Square Pipe Plug Lid AISI 304 A276 or A240/A240M Bar or Plate/Sheet Plug Shims Brass C360/C260/C230 B16/B16M or B36/B36M Bar or Plate & Bar Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-15 2.2.1.1 Structural Materials The Inner Container structural materials are fabricated from austenitic stainless steel and titanium. The structural members in the main body (Top Plate, Outer Casing, and Bottom Plate) are fabricated from AISI 304/304L stainless steel in either plate, bar, tube, or pipe form and from Grade 2 titanium in either plate, bar, tube, or pipe for the inner cavity. The closure bolts are minimum AISI 316 SAE Grade A4 (70,000 psi) [2.18, page 1508]. All the insulating and shock absorbing material is fabricated from resin bonded cork.
The structural evaluation of the Outer Drum and Inner Container was assessed under NCT using a temperature range of -40°C to 250°C. In order to carry out the stress analysis a Poisson ratio of 0.3 and a density of 8030 kg/m3 were used for the austenitic stainless steel 304/304L components. A Poisson ratio of 0.3.
2.2.1.2 Shielding Material The shielding is formed from 99% pure depleted uranium with a maximum of 0.45% U-235 by weight.
The mechanical properties of the depleted uranium used in the structural evaluation are presented in Table 2.2.1.A.
2.2.1.3 Cork Assembly The Cork Assembly is manufactured from resin bonded cork in sheet or rolls. The cork may be formed from one piece or from several pieces glued with a contact adhesive. ISO-RAD is using data researched and by information gathered and tested by Croft and Associates and reported in Serco Report SERCO/TAS/002762/01 (See Appendix 2.12.3). In addition, ISO-RAD tested the cork under NCT and HACT conditions and completely protected the Inner Container as the inner container received no damage during testing.
2.2.2 Chemical, Galvanic or Other Reactions
[IAEA SSR-6 614 & 644, IAEA TS-R-1 613 & 642, and 10 CFR 71.43(d)]
The package has been evaluated to determine all the material interactions of chemically or galvanic dissimilar materials. The materials used in the construction of the ISORAD-TC1 package are depleted uranium, tungsten, 300 series stainless steel, cork, brass, aluminum, and titanium. To prevent the possible formation of a eutectic alloy from steel and depleted uranium during the HCAT thermal scenario, defined by 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4), the brass and/or titanium is used as a separator for all steel-uranium interfaces. With this construction, there will be no significant chemical or galvanic reaction between package components during NCT or HACT.
There is no potential for chemical, galvanic or other reactions between the components of the package which are stainless steel and cork in dry conditions, and stainless steel with brass and titanium as eutectic barriers and encapsulated depleted uranium which is sealed and therefore dry. Eutectic formation shall not affect the package performance as the operating temperatures are lower than the eutectic formation temperature.
2.2.3 Effects of Radiation on Materials Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-16
[IAEA SSR-6 614, IAEA TS-R-1 613, and 10 CFR 71.43(d)]
The contents of the package emit one or all of alpha, beta, gamma. Some of the alpha, beta, and gamma sources may emit small amounts of neutron radiation. The use of depleted uranium, tungsten, stainless steel, cork, brass, aluminum, and titanium in Type B(U) transport packaging is well documented and are standard materials of construction. The materials have been in use for decades without degradation of package performance over time. The ISORAD-TC1 will have no material degradation due to irradiation from the package contents. Austenitic stainless steel, brass, depleted uranium, titanium, aluminum, and cork were chosen for the construction of the package because they are durable materials that can withstand the damaging effects from the radiation.
2.3 Fabrication and Examination [IAEA SSR-6 228, 306-309, 640, 809(b), IAEA TS-R-1 232, 306-309, 638, & 807(b), and 10 CFR 71.33(a)(5)]
2.3.1 Fabrication Package components are procured, manufactured and inspected for use under ISO-RAD Canada Incs QA Program submitted to the CNSC. All new fabrication of packaging will be evaluated and documented for compliance to the specifications contained in the drawings provided in Section 1.3 prior to initial use as part of an ISORAD-TC1 transport package. All work performed in the fabrication of the ISORAD-TC1 package is required to be carried out under ISO-RAD Canadas QAP.
The other safety items are fabricated in accordance with the manufacturing instructions created and implemented under the ISO-RAD Canada QAP. All components are machined, cut, shaped, or other process to approved drawings and assemblies are assembled with approved drawings and assembly/
manufacturing instructions. These components are the Outer Drum, Outer Lid Assembly, Attachment Ring Assembly, Inner Container, and Plug Assembly. All welding procedures and personnel shall be qualified in accordance with AWS D1.6/D1.6M and AWS D1.9/D1.9M or equivalent international standard. Welding consumables their supply, certification, control during storage and use, shall comply with the appropriate requirements of AWS D1.6/D1.6M and AWS D1.9/D1.9M or equivalent international standard. The Outer Drum shall be fabricated in accordance with drawing R180831-100.
All welding procedures and personnel shall be qualified in accordance with AWS D1.6/D1.6M and AWS D1.9/D1.9M, or equivalent international standard.
It shall be fabricated using standard industry practices. The cork shall be tested to demonstrate it meets the required specification in drawing R180831-110 and R180831-111.
Any consumables used during manufacture such as bolts, screws, hex nuts, and padlocks shall be procured from commercial suppliers that are approved to a level commensurate with the safety functions of the consumable purchased.
2.3.2 Examination All examinations shall be carried out under the scope of ISO-RAD Canadas QAP. Examinations shall be carried out on materials, components, and finished assemblies throughout the manufacturing process. These tests will assure that the manufactured article meets the critical characteristics to allow Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-17 the safe transport of radioactive material. All tests shall be carried out to approved procedures, with calibrated equipment. Section 8 describes the acceptance testing and routine maintenance requirements for the Inner Containers and other package components used in the ISORAD-TC1 package. The records of the tests will be maintained with the manufacturing records for the life of each package.
The examinations required during manufacture are described below:
Material Tests All metal materials used to fabricate parts of the Outer Drum, Inner Containers, and Inserts shall have Material Test Reports (MTR) with heat numbers, ASTM standard met, and other critical information about the metal being purchased.
Any consumables used during manufacture such as bolts, screws, and hex nuts shall be marked with grade markings by the manufacturer. The minimum grade is A4 (70). Optional exterior padlocks, as a minimum, have a stainless steel shackle and preferable be constructed entirely of stainless steel.
2.3.2.1 Fabrication Tests and Examinations All welds are subjected to non-destructive visual (VT) and liquid penetrant (PT) examination in accordance with AWS D1.6/D1.6M and AWS D1.9/D1.9M or equivalent international standard. The applicable acceptance criteria for the visual examinations are given in drawings R180831-100, R180831-201, R180831-301, R180831-401, R180831-501, and R180831-601. The acceptance standards for the liquid penetrant examination of the welds is in accordance with AWS D1.6/D1.6M and D1.9/D1.9M or equivalent international standard.
All components and assemblies are required to be visually inspected and the dimensions measured using calibrated equipment (calipers, check pins, etc.) to assure compliance with the dimensions shown on the general arrangement drawings. The weight of the finished Inner Container and fully assembled package are required to be measured to ensure the weight requirements are met.
2.3.2.2 Acceptance Tests The completed Inner Containers are open to the atmosphere and do not required pressure testing as the packages is not sealed with O-Rings or other seals. The Outer Drum is also open to the atmosphere and will not require pressure testing.
On completion of manufacture the Inner Container will be surveyed in the Outer Drum forming the completed ISORAD-TC package ensuring proper shielding of radioactive contents and external dose rates.
After completion of all acceptance tests and verification of the manufacturing processes, a Certificate of Conformance for each ISO-RAD-TC1 will be issued for each serial numbered package.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-18 2.4 General Standards for All Packages [IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, and 10 CFR 71.43]
2.4.1 Minimum Package Size [IAEA SSR-6 636, IAEA TS-R-1 634, and 10 CFR 71.43(a)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package exceeds the minimum size requirements since it is 403.24 mm (15.876 inch) in diameter and 589 mm (23.1875 inches) high.
2.4.2 Tamper-Indicating Feature [IAEA SSR-6 637, IAEA TS-R-1 635, and 10 CFR 71.43(b)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package outer lid is secured with eight M14 x 2 stainless steel bolts and two lock studs with optional padlocks. A tamper evident lead wire seal, unique zip tie, or other tamper evident seal or device is used to demonstrate if the package has been tampered with. The tamper seal is placed through the holes and in between the Lock Studs. This seal wire is not readily breakable, therefore if it is broken during transport, it serves as evidence of possible unauthorized access to the contents.
2.4.3 Positive Closure [IAEA SSR-6 641, IAEA TS-R-1 639, and 10 CFR 71.43(c)]
The ISORAD-TC1 does not contain valves or pressure release mechanisms. The radioactive material is sealed inside special form capsules and placed inside the ISORAD-TC1 Inner Container, then Inner Container shielded plug and lid are secured as described in paragraph 2.1.1.4. These features maintain positive closure of the transport package and security of the radioactive material during transport.
2.5 Lifting and Tie-down Standards for All Packages 2.5.1 Lifting Devices
[IAEA SSR-6 503(a) & 608, IAEA TS-R-1 502(b), 606, 607, & 608, and 10 CFR 71.45(a)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package is designed to be lifted using straps or chains through the handles cut through the wall of the drum near the top. The ISORAD-TC1 package is approximately 403.24 mm (15.876 inch) in diameter and 589 mm (23.1875 inches) high with the handle openings through the keg wall are approximately 38.1 mm (1.5 inches) high x 120.65 mm (4.75 inches) wide with at least 38.1 mm (1.5 inches) of stainless steel separating the top of the handle opening to the top of the keg. The maximum stress on the handle openings is:
The following force vectors can be determined by using the given load combination, which consists of three separate forces (where Vector 1 is the force that is horizontal along the direction of the vehicle (hv), Vector 2 is the vertical force (vf), and Vector 3 is the horizontal transverse force (ht)).
Vector 1= 10(300 pounds) = 3000hv + 0vf + 0ht Vector 2 = 2(300 pounds) = 0hv + 600vf + 0ht Vector 3 = 5(300 pounds) = 0hv + 0vf + 1500ht The formula to determine the force magnitude is:
= ( 2 ) + ( 2 ) + ( 2 )
= 30002 + 6002 + 15002 R =9000000 + 360000 + 2250000 = 3407.35 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-19 The assumption is the rounded load of 3407.4 will act fully in each direction in the interest of conservatism and simplicity. The calculations assume the full load will act in each of the vector directions. The angular contribution in the x, y, and z directions will not be considered.
The worst case is assumed with the greatest pulling force being in the y plane or horizontal direction. If 3668 pounds were acting on the x, y, and z planes, then the worst case for the handles of the drum would be the force pulling along the horizontal or y plane.
The area used in the following calculation is an estimated number for extreme conservatism. Each handle opening through the keg wall is approximately 38.1 mm (1.5 inches) high x 120.65 mm (4.75 inches) wide of 7.125 in2 with at least 38.1 mm (1.5 inches) stainless steel separating the top of the handle opening to the top of the keg. ISO-RAD has assumed to be extremely conservative the area used by both handles is approximately 0.50 in2, which gives the following:
3407.4 3407.4
=
= 7.125
478.3
= .5
= 6814.8 600 600
=
= 7.125
84.21
= .5
= 1200 Therefore, the actual stress generated in each handle is 478.3 psi. The stress generated using the conservative number in handle is 6814.8 psi. With an additional safety factor of 3 applied, the maximum stress in the lifting handle is 20,444.4 psi. This is substantially below the 39,000 psi yield strength of the stainless steel. Therefore, the lifting handle can support more than three times the weight 1 of the transport package as required by IAEA SSR-6 636, IAEA TS-R-1 634, and 10 CFR 71.45(a).
The package handles will not fail and if the handle openings failed it would not impede the ability of the package to meet the other safety requirements.
2.5.2 Tie-Down Devices
[IAEA SSR-6 607& 638, IAEA TS-R-1 606 & 636, and 10 CFR 71.45(b)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package has no specifically designed tie-down devices. The normal method of securing the package during transport is expected to be using dunnage, cargo nets or an equivalent system that envelope the package without being attached to it: such a system cannot stress the structure of the package. The package may be secured in either the horizontal or vertical position.
The stresses and safety factors demonstrated in Section 2.5.1 demonstrate the forces applied to the package will not exceed the yield strength with a safety factor of three.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-20 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT)
[IAEA SSR-6 648, 659(a), & 719-724, IAEA TS-R-1 646, 657(a), & 719-724, and 10 CFR 71.43(f)
& 71.71]
Table 2.6.A: Summary of NCT Initial Conditions Load NCT Initial Conditions (According to Regulatory Guide 7.8)
ID Ambient Internal Fabrication NCT Insolation Decay heat Temperature Pressure Stress 38°C -40°C Max Zero Max Zero Max Zero 1 Hot 38°C Ambient X X X X Cold -40°C 2 X X X X Ambient Reduced External 3 X X X X X Pressure 25 kPa Increased External 4 X X X X X Pressure 140 kPa 5 X X X X X Vibration 6 X X X X X 7 X X X X X Free Drop (Side) 8 X X X X X 9 X X X X X Free Drop (Top) 10 X X X X X 2.6.1 Heat [IAEA SSR-6 615, 617, 618, 639, 653, 664, & 666, IAEA TS-R-1 615, 617, 618, 637, 651, 662, & 664, 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1), and USNRC Regulatory Guide 7.8]
According to IAEA and 10 CFR, the package must be evaluated in an ambient temperature of 38oC, in still air and insolation. Under these conditions the maximum temperature and pressure generated have been calculated and discussed in Section 2.6.1.1. These temperatures and pressures have then been used to determine the differential thermal expansion in Section 2.6.1.2 and therefore the stresses present in the containment system. The calculated stresses are then used to determine if the containment system meets the structural design criteria.
The largest heat source for the ISORAD-TC1 transport package with the BPIC Series installed is 10,125 Curies (375 TBq) of Iridium-192, generating approximately 6.013 milliwatts per Curie or a total of 60.88 watts (see Table 2.6.1.A). The thermal test was conducted assuming 65 Watts (10,810 curies) of Ir-192 which is approximately 6.75 percent higher than the operational limit 60.88 watts (10,125 curies). The thermal evaluation for the heat test is described in Section 3.
Table 2.6.1.A: Radionuclide Decay Energy Radionuclide Package Activity Ci (TBq) MeV/Decay Watts/Package Iridium-192 10,125 (375 TBq) 1.46 60.88 Se-75 10,000 0.86 51 Yb-169 10,000 0.91 54 Cs-137 500 1.18 4 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-21 Table 2.6.1.B: ISORAD-TC1 Authorized Contents BPIC Inner Container 3000 x A1 Highway Special Special Authorized Gamma Energies Half Life Watt Total No Quantities Route Isotope Form Form Forms (keV) (days) Per Ci Watts Exceed Control Type A1 (Ci) Type B (Ci)
These Limits 1000 TBq Alpha Actinium-225 Special 10 21.6 67.75 0.0346 2.35 64000 27000 5.93 MeV Beta 21.277 Actinium-227 Special 24.3 25 0.000472 0.0118 72900 27000 44.77 Years Beta 6.13 Actinium-228 Special 16.2 17 0.008 0.136 48600 27000 2.12 MeV Hours Beta Barium-131 Special 11.5 54 5076 0.00306 15.54 162000 27000 353.8 Barium-133 Special 80-356 3848.7 81 125 0.00535 0.669 243000 27000 Cadmium-109 Special 88 462.6 810 2700 0.00535 14.45 2430000 27000 1
Beta 5700 Carbon-14 Special 1080 1080 0.000293 0.32 3240000 27000 156 Years Cobalt-57 Special 122 271 270 300 0.00535 1.61 810000 27000 5.27 Cobalt-60 Special 1.3 MeV 10.8 0.5 0.0154 0.0077 32400 27000 Years X-Ray Cesium-131 Special 9.7 810 26900 0.000165 4.44 2430000 27000 29.5-33.5 Cesium-137 Special 662 10,983 54 3888 0.00101 3.927 162000 27000 Copper-67 Special 184.6 2.58 270 18657 0.00161 30.04 810000 27000 Alpha 340,000 Curium-248 Special 0.54 5 0.0359 0.18 1620 27000 5.08 MeV Years Indium-111 Special 245.4 2.8 81 11475 0.0026 29.84 243000 27000 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-22 Table 2.6.1.B: ISORAD-TC1 Authorized Contents BPIC Inner Container (Continued) 3000 x A1 Highway Special Special Authorized Gamma Energies Half Life Watt Total No Quantities Route Isotope Form Form Forms (keV) (days) Per Ci Watts Exceed Control Type A1 (Ci) Type B (Ci)
These Limits 1000 TBq Iridium-192 Special 206-612 73.8 27 1015 0.006013 60.88 81000 27000 Iridium-194 Special 147 0.803 8.1 55.35 0.00535 0.296 24300 27000 X-Ray Iron-55 Special 985.5 1080 2700 0.000165 0.45 3240000 27000 5.9-6.5 Lutetium-177 Special 113-208 6.73 810 10017 0.00535 53.6 2430000 27000 Beta Phosphorous-32 Special 14.3 13.5 150.66 0.00535 0.81 40500 27000 1710.4 Beta Phosphorous-33 Special 25.4 1080 10017 0.00535 53.6 3240000 27000 250 1
Selenium-75 Special 66-401 119.8 81 10017 0.00535 53.6 243000 27000 Beta Sodium-24 Special 0.625 5.4 5.4 0.00535 0.029 16200 27000 472 Beta Strontium-89 Special 50.5 16.2 329.4 0.00346 1.14 48600 27000 1.46 MeV Beta 28.8 Strontium-90 Special 8.1 50 0.00346 0.163 24300 27000 546 Years Alpha Thorium-227 Special 18.7 270 272.7 0.0359 9.79 810000 27000 6.7-7 MeV Alpha Thorium-228 Special 698.25 13.5 150.66 0.0321 4.84 40500 27000 84.4 Gamma Tungsten-187 Special Beta 0.998 54 604.8 0.00454 2.75 162000 27000 Tungsten-188 Special 155 69.78 10.8 17.36 0.000598 0.0104 32400 27000 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-23 Table 2.6.1.B: ISORAD-TC1 Authorized Contents BPIC Inner Container (Continued) 3000 x A1 Highway Special Special Authorized Gamma Energies Half Life Watt Total No Quantities Route Isotope Form Form Forms (keV) (days) Per Ci Watts Exceed Control Type A1 (Ci) Type B (Ci)
These Limits 1000 TBq 1
Beta Yttrium-90 Special 2.67 8.1 46.71 0.000554 0.0259 24300 27000 2.28 MeV Ytterbium-169 Special 8-308 32 108 10017 0.00251 25.143 324000 27000 Beta Ytterbium-175 Special 4.185 810 26900 0.001 26.9 2430000 27000 470 Alpha Other Isotopes Special Beta Any Type A Type A Any 30 Various 27000 Gamma Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-24 2.6.1.1 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures
[IAEA SSR-6 616 & 663, IAEA TS-R-1 615 & 661, 10 CFR]
Table 2.6.1.C: Summary Temperatures Normal Conditions of Transport Temperature Condition ISORAD-TC1 External Surface Min-Max Average Insolation (65 Watts) 51.26-104.21 (124.27 - 219.58) 78.76 (173.77)
(38 in full sun)
Decay Heating (65 Watts) 40.48 - 48.82 (104.86 - 119.88) 44.63 (112.35)
(38 in shade)
The calculated maximum temperatures in the Inner Container and Outer Drum with maximum heat load of 65W under NCT are shown in Section 3, Table 3-1.B through Table 3.1D. The maximum temperature for the Inner Container containment system is 244.46oC with insolation. Some of the stress calculations were carried out assuming a temperature of 250°C. The temperatures are divergent by 5.54oC, which would not cause the results of the test to be any different from those presented here and would represent a worst case.
Table 2.6.1.D: NCT Maximum Temperature and Pressure in the Special Form Capsule Special Form Capsule Precalculated NCT Conversion for Formula Starting Temp (T1) 20°C (68°F) 293.15°K Max Temp (T2) 250.0°C (472.03°F) 523.15°K 1
Starting Pressure (P ) 100 kPa (14.504 psi) 1.0 bar abs = 750.061683 Torr Max Pressure (P2) 178.452 kPa (25.883 psi) 1.785 bar abs = 1338.5 Torr Special Form Capsule NCT Thermal Simulation Conversion for Formula Starting Temp (T1) 20°C (68°F) 293.15°K Max Temp (T2) 244.46°C (472.03°F) 517.61°K Starting Pressure (P1) 100 kPa (14.504 psi) 1.0 bar abs = 750.061683 Torr 2
Max Pressure (P ) 176.57 kPa (25.61 psi) 1.765 bar abs = 1323.2 Torr 2 = 1 x 2 ÷ 1 P2 = (750.061683 Torr x 517.61°K) / 293.15°K P2 = (388,239.42774) / 293.15 P2 = 1324.37124 Torr = 1.7656831 bar abs = 176.56831 kPa = 25.6090682 psi The thermal simulation value has been used in the structural evaluation. A calculation of the actual maximum pressure expected under NCT is provided in (Section 2.6.3 & 2.6.4). The precalculated maximum pressure is 1.785 bar abs (178.452 kPa) or 25.883 psi and with the simulation analysis the maximum pressure is 1.765 bar abs (176.57 kPa) or 25.61 psi under NCT.
As all components are open to the ambient atmosphere, no pressure will build up in any part of the Inner Container or Outer Drum under NTC that would adversely affect package performance or integrity. The maximum pressure build-up under Normal Conditions of transport within the special form capsule is 176.5 kPa (25.61 psi) as demonstrated above. As demonstrated in Section 3.5.3.2 for the HACT thermal assessment, the Inner Container and the special form capsule can withstand this pressure differential with no adverse effect on the containment.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-25 Table 2.6.1.E: HACT Maximum Temperature and Pressure in the Special Form Capsule Special Form Capsule Precalculated HACT Conversion for Formula 1
Starting Temp (T ) 20°C (68°F) 293.15°K Max Temp (T2) 800.0°C (1472.03°F) 1073°K 1
Starting Pressure (P ) 102.5 kPa (14.87 psi) 1.02 bar abs = 768.813227 Torr Max Pressure (P2) 375.367 kPa (54.45 psi) 3.754 bar abs = 2815.4841Torr Special Form Capsule HACT Thermal Simulation Conversion for Formula Starting Temp (T1) 20°C (68°F) 293.15°K Max Temp (T2) 244.46°C (472.03°F) 517.61°K 1
Starting Pressure (P ) 102.5 kPa (14.87 psi) 1.02 bar abs = 768.813227 Torr Max Pressure (P2) 181.075 kPa (26.263 psi) 1.8 bar abs = 1365.11227 Torr Precalculated Pressure 1 2 2 =
1 Where: P1: Atmospheric Pressure at the time of sealing (102.5 kPa) (A conservative assumption)
P2: Pressure resulting from the Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature T1: Temperature at the time of sealing (20°C or 293°K) (a conservative assumption)
T2: Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature (800°C or 1,073°K)
P2 = P1(T2)/T1 P2 = 102.5(1073)/293 P2 = 109982.5/293 P2 = 375.36689 kPa or 54.4423646 psi rounded to 54.45 psi for Precalculated HACT Calculated Pressure HACT Thermal Simulation 2
1 2
= 1 Where: P1: Atmospheric Pressure at the time of sealing (102.5 kPa) (A conservative assumption)
P2: Pressure resulting from the Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature T1: Temperature at the time of sealing (20°C or 293°K) (a conservative assumption)
T2: Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature (244.46°C or 517.61°K)
P2 = P1(T2)/T1 P2 = 102.5(517.61)/293 P2 = 53055.05/293 P2 = 181.07517 kPa or 26.262733 psi rounded to 26.263 psi for Thermal Analysis HACT The regulations stipulate that upper pressure experienced by the containment vessel (special form capsule) cannot exceed 700 kPa gauge pressure. The precalculation of the worst case maximum pressure expected under HACT assuming the Special Form Capsule reached 800°C is 3.754 bar abs (375.367 kPa) or 54.45 psi. The maximum pressure is over 46% lower than the limit. The simulation Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-26 thermal analysis showed a maximum pressure of 1.82 bar abs (181.075 kPa) or 26.263 psi under HACT. The thermal simulation maximum pressure is over 74% lower than the limit.
2.6.1.2 Differential Thermal Expansion The finite element analysis model investigated the deformations caused within the containment system as a result of the differing expansion rates of the depleted uranium shielding and the stainless steel outer casing. The results of the analysis included the effect of differential thermal expansion in both the radial and longitudinal directions.
The ISORAD-TC1 Outer Drum is designed to have a mm clearance between the cork and the Cavity Sleeve, mm clearance between the Cavity Sleeve and the Inner Container, and another 6 mm clearance between the cork and the Outer Drum lid. As the cork is free standing within the Outer Drum this allows movement of the top cork of up to mm and hence expansion of the Inner Container of mm. There was no significant expansion of the Inner Container therefore it will not impact the structural integrity of the package.
The model has assumed no gap is present between the depleted uranium, brass, and the stainless steel and determined the stresses within the containment vessel boundary caused as a result of the differing thermal expansion rates. The results of the stress calculations are discussed in section 2.6.1.3.
Any thermal expansion encountered during NCT transport will be insignificant with respect to the manufacturing tolerances of the package.
For example:
Expansion of the Outer Casing circumference of the BPIC - Round Inner Container is approximated by:
Expansion Outer diameter derivative formula [2.18, page 405]
E = DT Where: D = Diameter of the Outer Casing = 6.693 in
= Coefficient of Thermal expansion 9.9in/in T = Cold temperature differential (from -40 to 100 = 140)
T = Hot temperature differential (from 100°F to 472.028°F = 372.028)
E = (6.693in)(9.9 in/in)(140)
E = (3.14159)(6.693)(0.0000099)(140)
E = (21.02666187)(0.001386)= 0.02915 (cold)
E = (6.693in)(9.9 in/in)(372.028)
E = (3.14159)(6.693)(0.0000099)(372.028)
E = (21.02666187)(0.0036830772)= 0.0775 (hot)
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-27 Table 2.6.1.F: Summary of Thermal Expansion of BPIC Inner Container BPIC - Round Material Cold Temp Hot Temp Coefficient Cold Dia Hot Dia
°C (F°) °C (F°) µmm (µin) mm (in) mm (in) 300 Stainless 60 (140) 188.91 (372.03) 17.3 (9.9) 0.75 (0.0292) 1.97 (0.078)
Steel 400 Stainless 60 (140) 188.91 (372.03) 10.8 (5.7) 0.074(0.0029) 0.196(0.0077)
Steel Brass 60 (140) 188.91 (372.03) 20.2 (11.2) 0.80 (0.0313) 2.11(0.0831)
Titanium 60 (140) 188.91 (372.03) 8.6 (4.95) 0.14 (0.0055) 0.37(0.0145)
Depleted 60 (140) 188.91 (372.03) 13.9 (7.4) 0.52 (0.0205) 1.38(0.0545)
Uranium The full analysis is contained in section 3.5.4. Further, the Inner Container Lid and closure bolts /
hardware will expand at approximately the same rate which will maintain the security of the package. All other package components have similar tolerances. Any expansion in this temperature range will be well within these tolerances.
2.6.1.3 Stress Calculations As shown in Section 2.6.1.2, thermal differentials will have no adverse effect of the interfaces between the package components. Mechanical loads at the maximum package weight (300 lbs.) are well distributed across the package bottom and are small compared to the yield strength of the stainless steel (39,000 psi - See Table 2.2). Assuming the mechanical stress from the Inner Container is localized around the sides of the square casing portion of the Inner Container gives:
Inner Container (outside dimensions) = 6.693 inches Length x 6.693 inches Width Area of Inner Container bottom = 44.7951 in2 Mass of Inner Shield = 68.1 kg (150 pounds) rounded up for conservatism Stress on Inner Container bottom = 150 pounds/44.7951 in2 = 3.349 psi Stress Area of Bolt [2.18, page 1502]
Where: A = Stressed Area dn = Nominal bolt diameter n = 1/p = 1/p = number of threads per inch or cm p = pitch in inch or cm (length per thread)
A= /4 (dn-0.9743/n)2 A = (3.14159)/4(6-(0.9743/1.25)2 A = (0.7853975)(6-0.77944)2 A = (0.7853975)(27.2542467136) = 21.405422 mm2 A = 0.03317846 in2 Stresses developed within the Inner Container cavity will be negligible as the cavity is not sealed.
Assuming the Inner Container was a perfect seal and no escaping gasses then the force on the Inner Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-28 Container cavity with just the Plug Assembly bolted in and the Outer Container Lid is not on the package is estimated by:
F = (D2/4)P Where: D = Max Diameter of the Plug Assembly lid = 4.0 in P = Pressure induced by the thermal gradient = 54.45 psi (from Table 6.6.1.F Worst Case)
Worst Case 800°C Inner Container Actual Case 244.46°C Inner Container F = (4.0 in)2/4)54.45 psi F = (4.0 in)2/4) 26.263 psi F = ((3.14159)(16)/4)(54.45) F = ((3.14159)(16)/4)(26.263)
F = (12.567)(54.45) = 684.7315 (lbf) F = (12.567)(26.263) = 330.04712 (lbf)
Where: Fi = Force in each bolt A = Stress area of the bolt = 0.03317846 in2 Worst Case 800°C Inner Container Actual Case 244.46°C Inner Container S = Force/Area = Fi/A S = Force/Area = Fi/A S = 171.06828/0.03317846 S = 82.51178/0.03317846 S = 5,156.0135 psi on each bolt S = 2,486.915 psi on each bolt The cover is held by four (4) M6 x 1 stainless steel bolts. This imparts a force of 171.06828 lbf in each bolt in the worst case scenario and imparts a force of 82.512 lbf in each bolt as a result of the thermal analysis. However, if all the stress is assumed to be taken by only one bolt, then the stress in that bolt equals:
Where: Fo = Force in each bolt A = Stress area of the bolt Worst Case 800°C Inner Container Actual Case 244.46°C Inner Container S = Force/Area = Fo/A S = Force/Area = Fo/A S = 684.7315/0.03317846 S = 330.0471/0.03317846 S = 20,637.869 psi (all stress one bolt) S = 9,947.65 psi (all stress one bolt)
The above calculations represent the worst case scenario of the Inner Container Plug Assembly becoming sealed and the Inner Container reaching 800°C. The results are still below the tensile strength value for the M6 x 1 Stainless Steel Grade A4 bolt (70,000 psi nominal). Once again even though the Inner Container is not gasketed and will not hold pressure, if it did, a single bolt would afford a safety margin of 70,000/20,637.869 = 3.39 times safety margin. With all four bolts installed 70,000/5156.0135 = 13.58 times safety margin. All other Inner Containers would have similar or lower stresses. The actual conditions based on thermal simulation result in a much higher safety margin. The M6 x 1 Stainless Steel Grade A4 bolt (70,000 psi nominal) has a high tensile strength.
The results based on the thermal simulation, assuming the Inner Container is gasketed and will hold pressure, a single bolt would afford a safety margin of 70,000/9,947.65 = 7.037 times safety margin.
With all four bolts installed 70,000/2,486.92 = 28.15 times safety margin.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-29 2.6.1.4 Comparison with Allowable Stresses All stresses calculated in Section 2.6.1 are well below strengths for the materials of construction.
Further, the ISORAD-TC1 package was fully tested and passed under NCT. It is therefore concluded that the ISORAD-TC1 package will satisfy the performance requirements specified by the regulations.
2.6.2 Cold [IAEA SSR-6 616, 639, & 666, IAEA TS-R-1 615, 637, & 664, 10 CFR 71.71(c)(2)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package does not contain carbon steel components that are susceptible to brittle fracture at low temperature. The transport package, however, successfully met Type B(U)-96 Transport Tests requirements at temperatures below -40°C (-40°F), the minimum specified in the regulations. Thus, it is concluded that the ISORAD-TC1 package will withstand the normal transport cold condition.
2.6.3 Reduced External Pressure
[IAEA SSR-6 645 & 621, IAEA TS-R-1 643 & 619, 10 CFR 71.71(c)(3), and 49 CFR 173.412(f)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package does not include gaskets between the Inner Container Top Plate and the Inner Container Lid and therefore is open to the atmosphere. The package must be able to withstand the reduced external pressure of IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, 10 CFR 71 and 49 CFR 173. The ISORAD-TC1 package is designed to only transport special form capsules.
The following analysis demonstrates that under NCT reduced pressure condition, the package will meet or exceed the applicable performance requirements specified in the regulations:
- 1. there will be no loss or dispersal of contents;
- 2. there will be no structural changes that reduce the effectiveness of components required for shielding, heat transfer, or containment;
- 3. any loss of shielding integrity would not result in more than a 20% increase in the radiation level at any external surface of the package; and
- 4. there will be no changes that would affect the ability of the package to withstand the hypothetical accident conditions tests.
The regulations listed above specify four reduced pressure conditions:
"The containment system shall retain its radioactive contents under a reduction of ambient pressure to 60 kPa (8.7 psia)."
- 2. IAEA TS-R-1 (1996) Revised Paragraph 619 state: "Packages containing radioactive material transported by air shall have a containment system able to withstand without leakage a reduction in ambient pressure to 5 kPa.
- 3. IAEA SSR-6 (2018) Paragraph 621 and TS-R-1 (2005) Paragraph 619 state: Packages containing radioactive material to be transported by air shall be capable of withstanding, without leakage, an internal pressure which produces a pressure differential of not less than maximum normal operating pressure plus 95 kPa."
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-30
- 4. 10 CFR 71.71 (c)(3) requires the package to withstand a reduced pressure of 25 kPa.
The analysis will be conducted using the most conservative conditions and have assumed the following:
- 1. The external pressure is only 5 kPa.
- 2. The package is at HACT temperature of 800°C For this analysis, we have considered the package in four elements: Inner Container, Inner Container Contents Cavity, and Containment (Special Form Capsule).
Inner Container The Inner Container (BPIC) is open to the atmosphere so no pressure differential exists within the outer package areas. The stainless steel casing containing the depleted uranium or tungsten shield is sealed by means of the welding the Top Plate and Bottom Plate to the Outer Casing. The space between the shield and the housing is filled brass and a small amount of air.
Inner Container Contents Cavity The Inner Container Contents Cavity (the location where the Special Form capsules are located),
although enclosed, is not sealed; no gaskets or O-rings or other sealing devices are used to seal the Contents Cavity. Therefore, the Contents Cavity is open to the atmosphere and no pressure differential within the Contents Cavity.
A further assumption is that the air behaves as an ideal gas, the pressure within this special form capsule would be calculated from:
1 2 2 =
1 Where: P1: Atmospheric Pressure at the time of sealing (102.5 kPa)
P2: Pressure resulting from the Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature T1: Temperature at the time of sealing (20°C or 293°K) (a conservative assumption)
T2: Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature (800°C or 1,073°K)
P2 = P1(T2)/T1 P2 = 102.5(1073)/293 P2 = 109982.5/293 P2 = 375.366894198 kPa or 54.4423652 psi The formula result is a maximum pressure from HACT temperature of 800°C is 375.67 kPa or 54.45 psi.
The increase in pressure within the Inner Container between the Inside wall and the Shield, which is welded closed (sealed) would increase stress. The increase in pressure within the Contents Cavity in between the Contents Cavity and the Shield would also result in increased stress. The assumption is Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-33 stress in the Inner Container casing is less than 6% of the yield strength of the austenitic stainless steel at the test temperature.
Containment (Special Form Capsule)
The special form capsule is constructed of austenitic stainless steel, titanium, or vanadium. The calculations will use the austenitic stainless steel because it has a lower yield strength than titanium or vanadium.
A further assumption is that the air behaves as an ideal gas, the pressure within this special form capsule would be calculated from:
1 2 2 =
1 Where: P1: Atmospheric Pressure at the time of sealing (102.5 kPa)
P2: Pressure resulting from the Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature T1: Temperature at the time of sealing (20°C or 293°K) (a conservative assumption)
T2: Maximum Hypothetical Accident Temperature (800°C or 1,073°K)
P2 = P1(T2)/T1 P2 = 102.5(1073)/293 P2 = 109982.5/293 P2 = 375.366894198 kPa or 54.4423652 psi The formula result is a maximum pressure from HACT temperature of 800°C is 375.37 kPa or 54.45 psi.
The ISORAD-TC1 is designed and intended to be used with a wide range of Special Form Capsules.
Perhaps the most vulnerable special form capsule would be a long length thin walled special form capsule fabricated from stainless steel. The assumed worst case Special Form Capsule would and have an outside diameter of 13.75 mm and a wall thickness of 0.25 mm. (Titanium and Vanadium have higher yield strengths than austenitic stainless steel, and therefore a capsule with similar dimensions would be less vulnerable.) The tensile stress induced in a thin-walled pressure vessel from an internal pressure can be described by Barlow's formula (Machinery's Handbook, 27th Edition, page 327):
=
2 Where: P: Pressure Differential 375.67 kPa (54.45 psi) di: Inside Diameter 13.25 mm (0.52165354 in) t: Wall Thickness 0.25 mm (0.00984252 in)
= Pdi / 2t
= 375.67(13.25) / 2(0.25)
= 4,977.6275 / 0.5 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-34
= 9,955.255 kPa or 9.955 MPa or 1443.88766 psi (Contents Cavity and the Special Form)
The same hypothetical worst case Special Form capsule (13.75 mm outside diameter and 0.25 mm wall thickness), the pressure differential stress is calculated to be 9.955 MPa (1443.888 psi). At a temperature of 870°C (1600°F) the yield strength of type austenitic stainless steel is 69 MPa (10,000 psi).
The longitudinal stress for Special Form Capsule is calculated from:
2
=
( + 2)2 2 Where: l: Longitudinal Stress Pl: Longitudinal Pressure: (375.67 kPa or 54.45 psi) d: Inside diameter of the Cylinder (13.25 mm or 0.52165354 in) t: Thickness of the Cylinder (0.25 mm or 0.00984252 in) l = P(d2) / (d + 2t)2 - d2 l = 375.67(13.25)2 / (13.25 + 2(0.25))2 - (13.25)2 l = 375.67(175.5625) / (13.25 + 0.5)2 - (175.5625) l = 65,953.564375 / (13.75)2 - 175.5625 l = 65,953.564375 / 189.0625 - 175.5625 l = 65,953.564375 / 13.4495 l = 4,885.630162228231 kPa or 4.886 MPa or 708.600746 psi For the same hypothetical worst case Special Form capsule (13.75 mm outside diameter and 0.25 mm wall thickness), the longitudinal stress is calculated to be 4.886 MPa (708.60 psi). At a temperature of 870°C (1600°F) the yield strength of type austenitic stainless steel is 69 MPa (10,000 psi).
Therefore, under the conditions of the reduced pressure at the HACT thermal temperature, The maximum differential pressure stress generated in the worst cast Special Form Capsule is less than 15% of the yield strength of the austenitic stainless steel at the test temperature. The maximum longitudinal pressure stress in the Special Form Capsule is less than 7% of the yield strength of the austenitic stainless steel at the test temperature. The reduced external pressure evaluation demonstrates that the package satisfies the applicable performance requirements specified in the regulations.
2.6.4 Increased External Pressure [IAEA SSR-6 616, IAEA TS-R-1 615, and 10 CFR 71.71(c)(4)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package does not include gaskets between the Inner Container body and the Inner Container Lid and therefore is open to the atmosphere. The package must be able to withstand the increased external pressure of IAEA and 49 CFR do not provide a kPa (psi) value and 10 CFR of 140 kPa (20 psi).
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-35 The Inner Container and the Contents Cavity will withstand this pressure without loss of structural integrity. The ISORAD-TC1 transport package components are open to the atmosphere and contain no items which could create a differential pressure relative to atmospheric conditions. As demonstrated in Section 2.6.1, the package containment can withstand a pressure differential 54.45 psi, therefore the increased external pressure requirement of 20 psi in 10 CFR 71 will not adversely affect the package containment.
The following analysis demonstrates that under NCT reduced pressure condition, the package will meet or exceed the applicable performance requirements specified in the regulations:
- 1. there will be no loss or dispersal of contents;
- 2. there will be no structural changes that reduce the effectiveness of components required for shielding, heat transfer, or containment;
- 3. any loss of shielding integrity would not result in more than a 20% increase in the radiation level at any external surface of the package; and
- 4. there will be no changes that would affect the ability of the package to withstand the hypothetical accident conditions tests.
The regulations listed above specify two increased pressure conditions:
1 1. IAEA SSR-6 Paragraph 616 and IAEA TS-R-1 Paragraph 615 state: "The design of the package shall take into account ambient temperatures and pressures that are likely to be encountered in routine conditions of transport."
- 2. 10 CFR 71.71 (c)(4) states, increased external pressure. An external pressure of 140 kPa (20 lbf/in2) absolute.
The analysis will be conducted using the most conservative conditions and have assumed the following:
- 1. The external pressure is 140 kPa.
- 2. The internal pressure in the sealed areas is 0 kPa For this analysis, we have considered the package in four elements: Inner Container, Inner Container Contents Cavity, and Containment (Special Form Capsule).
Inner Container The Inner Container (BPIC) is open to the atmosphere so no pressure differential exists within the outer package areas. The stainless steel casing containing the depleted uranium or tungsten shield is sealed by means of the welding the Top Plate and Bottom Plate to the Outer Casing. The space between the shield and the housing is filled brass and a small amount of air. The assumption is the internal air sealed within the container is at 0 kPa.
The assumption is the Inner Container behaves as a cylindrical tube. The collapsing pressure of a tube can be described (Machinery's Handbook, 27 Edition, pages 292 - 298) by:
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-37 8
3
= 3.46 x 10 x Where: P: Collapsing Pressure of Capsule d: Outside Diameter 1.3880787 inch T: Wall Thickness = 0.06003937 inch P = 3.46 x 108 x (T/d)3 P = 346000000 x (0.06003937/1.3880787)3 P = 346000000 x (0.0432535777690415)3 P = 346000000 x 0.00008092191 P = 27998.980862768 kPa or 28.0 MPa or 4060.90884 psi The calculation demonstrates the collapsing pressure of the austenitic stainless steel Contents Cavity is 28.0 MPa (4060.91 psi). The NCT increased pressure condition (140 kPa) represents less than 1%
of the collapsing pressure.
Containment (Special Form Capsule)
The special form capsule is constructed of austenitic stainless steel, titanium, or vanadium. The calculations will use the austenitic stainless steel because it has a lower yield strength than titanium or vanadium.
Using the same worst case Special Form Capsule from the reduced external pressure, the following calculation was made:
3
= 3.46 x 108 x Where: P: Collapsing Pressure of Capsule d: Outside Diameter 13.75 mm (0.54133858 inch)
T: Wall Thickness = 0.25 mm (0.00984252 inch)
P = 3.46 x 108 x (T/d)3 P = 346000000 x (0.009843/0.54133858)3 P = 346000000 x (0.018180271)3 P = 346000000 x 0.00000600898414 P = 2,079.10851244 kPa or 2.079 MPa or 301.549195 psi The calculation demonstrates the collapsing pressure of the austenitic stainless steel Special Form Capsule is 2.079 MPa (301.55 psi). The NCT increased pressure condition (140 kPa) represents less than 7% of the collapsing pressure.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-38 The increased external pressure evaluation demonstrates that the package satisfies the applicable performance requirements specified in the regulations.
2.6.5 Vibration [IAEA SSR-6 613, IAEA TS-R-1 612, and 10 CFR 71.71(c)(5)]
The ISORAD-TC1 package incorporates the use of bolts, lock washers, and optional padlocks to secure the Outer Drum Lid Assembly. The cork material is a vibration absorber and should perform better than other similar transport containers. It is therefore concluded that the ISORAD-TC1 will withstand vibration normally incident to transport.
2.6.6 Water Spray [IAEA SSR-6 719, 720, & 721, IAEA TS-R-1 719, 720, & 721, and 10 CFR 71.71(c)(6)]
The ISORAD-TC1 packages are constructed of water-resistant materials throughout. Therefore, the water spray test would not reduce the shielding effectiveness or structural integrity of the package.
The test was not conducted.
2.6.7 Free Drop [IAEA SSR-6 722(a), IAEA TS-R-1 722(a), and 10 CFR 71.71(c)(7)]
ISORAD-TC1 Prototype #1 was subjected to two 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drops in accordance with Test Plan QTP-001 (Section 2.12.1). The orientation of the first 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drop (see Figure 2.6.7.a) was selected because of its potential to cause significant deformation of the Outer Drum and with the intent of breaking the lid bolts with high stress loads potentially causing the Inner Container to be ejected from the Outer Drum. Prototype #1 was dropped at about a 45 angle onto top side edge of the Outer Drum. The orientation of the second 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drop (see Figure 2.6.7.b) was selected because of its potential to cause significant deformation of the Outer Drum and with the intent of breaking the lid bolts with high stress loads potentially causing the Inner Container to be ejected from the Outer Drum. Prototype #1 was dropped at about straight down onto top side of the Outer Drum.
ISORAD-TC1 Prototype #2 was subjected to two 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drops in accordance with Test Plan QTP-001 (Section 2.12.1). The orientation of the first 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drop (see Figure 2.6.7.a) was selected because of its potential to cause significant deformation of the Outer Drum and with the intent of breaking the lid bolts with high stress loads potentially causing the Inner Container to be ejected from the Outer Drum. Prototype #2 was dropped at about a 45 angle onto top side edge of the Outer Drum. The orientation of the second 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drop (see Figure 2.6.7.b) was selected because of its potential to cause significant deformation of the Outer Drum and with the intent of breaking the lid bolts with high stress loads potentially causing the Inner 1 Container to be ejected from the Outer Drum. Prototype #2 was dropped at about straight down onto top side of the Outer Drum.
Photographs of the drop orientation are provided in Test Plan QTP-001Test Report (QTP-001)
(Section 2.12.2).
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-39 1 Figure 2.6.7.a: NCT Drop Test Orientation 1 Figure 2.6.7.b: NCT Drop Test Orientation 2 There was minimal damage to the Outer Drum of Prototype #1 from the two 1.2 meter Free Drops.
Specifically, the top rim of the Outer Drum had a small indentation from the impact point of Orientation 1. No damage was indicated from the Orientation 2 impact. The damage to Prototype #2 was also minimal from the two 1.2 meter Free Drops. The damage from the Orientation 1 Free Drop was like Prototype #1. The Orientation 2 Free Drop resulted in no damage to the Outer Drum.
When Prototype #1 was disassembled to load the radioactive material into the package, no interior damage was noted to any internal structures. When Prototype #2 was disassembled to load the radioactive material into the package, the only damage noted was minimal damage to the first spacer for the Inner Container 2835A configuration. The first spacer is butt up against the Inner Container lid. The lid has a raised point that impaled the first spacer causing a 3mm diameter break in the first spacer. The damage would not impede the safety of the package nor render the package to not be fit for transport.
2.6.8 Corner Drop [IAEA SSR-6 722(b), IAEA TS-R-1 722(b), and 10 CFR 71.71(c)(8)]
This test is not applicable, as the transport package does not transport fissile material, nor is the exterior of the transport package made from either fiberboard or wood.
2.6.9 Compression [IAEA SSR-6 723, IAEA TS-R-1 723, and 10 CFR 71.71(c)(9)]
The QTP-001Test Plan (Section 2.12.2) documents that the ISORAD-TC1 package maintained its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the NCT compression test. As a worst case, Prototype #3 was used and was prepared as Prototype #1 and Prototype #2 with the exceptions of no Cork Assembly, no Outer Drum Lid, or any other internal support. Prototype #3 was subjected to an Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-40 evenly distributed compressive load of 1097.5 kg (2419.57 pounds) based on Prototype #1s maximum weight for a period of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />, which exceeds five times the maximum transport package weight of 136.1 kg (300 pounds). This weight is also greater than 13 kPa (2 lb/in2) multiplied by the vertically projected surface area of the transport package. Following the test, no damage to the specimen was observed.
2.6.10 Penetration [IAEA SSR-6 724, IAEA TS-R-1 724, and 10 CFR 71.71(c)(10)]
Prototype #1 was subjected to three penetration tests, in accordance with Test Plan QTP-001 Revision 1 (Section 4). Prototype #1 was impacted by a penetration bar in Orientation 1 on the bottom center of the Outer Drum with the intention of puncturing the Outer Drum. The inspection following the test indicated that the bar hit as intended on the package and dented the Outer Drum to a depth of mm ( inches). Prototype #1 was impacted by a penetration bar in Orientation 2 on the side center of the Outer Drum with the intention of puncturing the Outer Drum. The inspection following the test indicated that the bar hit as intended on the specimen, and slightly dented the Outer Drum to a depth of mm ( inches). Prototype #1 was impacted by a penetration bar in Orientation 3 on the top off-center of the Outer Drum Lid in between the lid splines with the intention of puncturing the Outer Drum. The inspection following the test indicated that the bar hit as intended on the package and did not dent the Outer Drum Lid. As described in QTP-001 Test Report (Section 4.5.5), the result was no loss of structural integrity or reduction of shielding efficiency as a result of the three impacts.
Prototype #2 was subjected to three penetration tests, in accordance with Test Plan QTP-001 (Section 4). Prototype #2 was impacted by a penetration bar in Orientation 1 on the bottom center of the Outer Drum with the intention of puncturing the Outer Drum. The inspection following the test indicated that the bar hit as intended on the package and dented the Outer Drum to a depth of mm ( inches). Prototype #2 was impacted by a penetration bar in Orientation 2 on the side center of the Outer Drum with the intention of puncturing the Outer Drum. The inspection following the test indicated that the bar hit as intended on the specimen, and slightly dented the Outer Drum to a depth of mm ( inches). Prototype #2 was impacted by a penetration bar in Orientation 3 on the top off-center of the Outer Drum Lid in between the lid splines with the intention of puncturing the Outer Drum. The inspection following the test indicated that the bar hit as intended on the package and did not dent the Outer Drum Lid. As described in QTP-001 Test Report (Section 4.5.5), the result was no loss of structural integrity or reduction of shielding efficiency as a result of the three impacts.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-41 Figure 3.6.10.a: NCT Penetration Test Orientation 1 and NCT Drop Test Orientation 2 Figure 4.6.10.b: NCT Penetration Test Orientation 3 and Impact Area 2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport [IAEA SSR-6 726, IAEA TS-R-1 726, and 10 CFR 71.73]
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-42 The same two prototypes were used to conduct the HACT tests as for the NCT tests. Each prototype consisted of a different Inner Container (Prototype #1 BPIC-Square and Prototype #2 BPIC-2835A).
However, the same tests were performed on each of the specimens. The QTP-001 Test Plan was followed during the execution of the HACT tests.
Table 2.7.A: Summary of HACT Initial Conditions Load HACT Initial Conditions (According to Regulatory Guide 7.8)
ID Ambient Internal Fabrication HACT Insolation Decay heat Temperature Pressure Stress 38°C -40°C Max Zero Max Zero Max Zero 1 9 m Free Drop X X X X X 2 (Oblique) X X X X X 3 9 m Free Drop X X X X X 4 (Top) X X X X X 5 Free Drop X X X X X 6 Puncture (Top) X X X X X 7 Free Drop X X X X X 8 Puncture (Bottom) X X X X X 9 Free Drop X X X X X 10 Puncture (Side) X X X X X 2.7.1 Free Drop I [IAEA SSR-6 727(a), IAEA TS-R-1 727(a), and 10 CFR 71.73(c)(1)
The design of the ISORAD-TC1 allows only one path for the radioactive contents to come out of the package. The drop orientations are designed to dislodge the inner container from the inside of the Outer Drum. The Inner containers are constructed of a stainless steel outer casing that is welded closed top and bottom with a bolted Shield Plug and an Inner Container Lid that is also bolted down.
The two bolted components secure the special form radioactive contents within the Inner Container.
The Inner Container would have to be ejected from the Outer Drum and both bolted enclosures would need to fail for the special form content to become unshielded. In addition, the Outer Drum is permanently enclosed on the bottom and sides with a removeable bolted down Lid Assembly. The Outer Drum is primarily for protection of the Inner Container and to provide thermal and shock protection during normal transport. Justification for all prototype drop orientations are included in Test Plan QTP-001 (Section 4).
The drop orientations apply the maximum force on the package in an attempt to break the Outer Drum Lid Assembly and possibly dislodging the Inner Container from within the Outer Drum. If the Inner Container becomes dislodged, it is subject to direct damage from further impacts and the puncture pin damage. A dislodged Inner Container alone would not significantly increase radiation levels and certainly not to 1000 mR/hr at one meter. As stated before, both the bolted down Inner Container Lid and the bolted down shield plug would have to fail for the special form capsules to become unshielded.
2.7.1.1 Oblique Drop Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-43 Prototype #1 was dropped top down and at an oblique approximately 45° angle (as shown in Figure 2.7.1.2a). The first 9 meter Free Drop of Prototype #1 was conducted with the test specimens at or below -40°C (-40°F). Prototype #1 was selected because it weighed the most and would impart the most damage and was most likely to suffer brittle fracture from extreme cold. Orientation 1 was selected based on an assessment because the greatest force would be applied to one area and would potentially impart the most damage to the specimen. The orientation would impart the maximum force onto the top rim and welding points of the Attachment Ring Assembly. This is referenced as the 9 meter Free Drop Orientation 1 in the test plan and report.
The intent of the test was to apply the maximum moment to the Outer Drum Lid, Attachment Ring, enclosure bolts, and weld attachment points. In addition, to determine if (1) impact could cause buckling and/or brittle failure of the stainless steel Outer Drum structure and components, and (2) detachment of the Outer Drum Lid from the Attachment Ring Assembly due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the Attachment Ring and brittle failure of the stainless steel components, which are welded to the Outer Drum. Sketches of the drop orientations are provided in Section 4 of the QTP-001 Test Plan and Photographs of the drop orientations are in the QTP-001 Test Report (Section 5.1).
Figure 5.7.1.a: HACT Free Drop 1 Test Orientation 1 2.7.1.2 Top Down Drop Vertical Top Down: The intent of the test was to apply the maximum tensile load to the Outer Drum Lid Assembly and Inner Container Lid bolts. The justification for the test is to determine if (1) the Outer Drum Lid Assembly could separate from the Outer Drum, (2) the impact could cause buckling and/or brittle failure of the stainless steel Outer Drum structure, and (3) detachment of the Inner Container from the Outer Drum could occur due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the Outer Drum Attachment Ring Assembly or the Attachment Ring Supports. (Test Specimen XXXX).
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-44 Figure 6.7.1.b: HACT Free Drop 1 Test Orientation 2 2.7.1.5 Summary of Results
[IAEA SSR-6 726, IAEA TS-R-1 726, and 10 CFR 71.73(a) and (b)]
Two prototypes were subjected to the 9 meter (30 foot) free drop in accordance with QTP-001 Test Plan Revision 1 (Section 4). All tests were conducted at ambient temperature except the Orientation 1 for Prototype 1 at or below -40°C (-40°F). Two different orientations were used, as described in Section 4. Photographs of the drop orientations are provided in QTP-001 Test Report Section 5.1.4.
The test results are summarized in the following sections.
2.7.1.5.1 Oblique Drop Results Test Specimen Prototype #1 impacted as intended. The impact deflected the top rim of the Outer Drum one side by approximately mm ( in). One of the padlocks detached from the Lock Stud and the Lid Assembly was slightly bowed out. No damage was noted on any of the eight M14 x 2 bolts. The rest of the Outer Drum remained intact.
Test Specimen Prototype #2 impacted as intended. The impact deflected the top rim of the Outer Drum one side by approximately mm ( in). The Lid Assembly was slightly bowed out.
No damage was noted on any of the eight M14 x 2 bolts and the padlocks remained intact. The rest of the Outer Drum remained intact.
2.7.1.5.2 End Drop Results Prototype #1 impacted as intended. The impact deflected the top rim of the Outer Drum on the entire rim by approximately mm ( in). The Lid Assembly was bowed outward by approximately mm ( in). No damage was noted on any of the eight M14 x 2 bolts. The rest of the Outer Drum remained intact.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-45 Test Specimen Prototype #2 impacted as intended. The impact deflected the top rim of the Outer Drum on the entire rim by approximately mm ( in). The Lid Assembly was bowed outward by approximately mm ( in). No damage was noted on any of the eight M14 x 2 bolts. The rest of the Outer Drum remained intact.
2.7.2 Crush [IAEA SSR-6 727(c), IAEA TS-R-1 727(c), and 10 CFR 71.73(c)(2)]
Not applicable. This package is not used for the Type B transport of normal form radioactive material.
2.7.3 Puncture [IAEA SSR-6 727(b), IAEA 727(b), and 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3)]
The puncture bar is a 152.4 mm (6.0 inch) diameter x 218.44 mm (8.6 inch) long, mild steel solid bar attached to a 1219.2 mm ( 48.0 inch) x 1219.2 mm (48.0 inch) x 50.8 mm (2.0 inch) thick mild steel plate (Drop Test Target). The bar is attached to the base with a 1/4 inch circumferential fillet weld. The puncture is rigidly attached to the Drop Test Target by four 7/16-14 x 1 long stainless steel bolts (See QTP-001 Test Report Appendix 7.2).
Justification for all prototype puncture orientations are included in Test Plan QTP-001 (Section 4).
Following the 9 meter (30 foot) free drop, the prototypes were subjected to the puncture test, in accordance with Test Plan QTP-001 (Section 4).
2.7.3.1 Top Puncture Drop Prototype #1: As noted above, in the 9 meter (30 foot) Free Drop of Prototype #1, the top rim of the Outer Drum was damaged, and the Lid Assembly was slight bowed outward. The damage from the Orientation 1 (Top Side Down) Puncture Drop was minimal causing no indentation on the Lid Assembly. The impact to the Lid Assembly pushed the bowed portion of the Lid Assembly back in to almost normal. No other damage was noted from the Puncture Drop.
Prototype #2: As noted above, in the 9 meter (30 foot) Free Drop of Prototype #1, the top rim of the Outer Drum was damaged, and the Lid Assembly was slight bowed outward. The damage from the Orientation 1 (Top Side Down) Puncture Drop was minimal causing no indentation on the Lid Assembly. The impact to the Lid Assembly pushed the bowed portion of the Lid Assembly back in to almost normal. No other damage was noted from the Puncture Drop.
2.7.3.2 Side Puncture Drop Prototype # 1: The damage from the Orientation 2 (Side) Puncture Drop was minimal causing a slight indentation approximately mm ( in) diameter and mm ( inch) deep at the area of impact. No other damage was noted from the Puncture Drop.
Prototype # 2: The damage from the Orientation 2 (Side) Puncture Drop was minimal causing a slight indentation approximately mm ( in) diameter and mm ( inch) deep at the area of impact. No other damage was noted from the Puncture Drop.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-46 2.7.3.3 Bottom Puncture Drop Prototype # 1: The damage from the Orientation 3 (Bottom) Puncture Drop was minor causing an indentation approximately mm ( in) diameter and mm ( inch) deep at the area of impact. No other damage was noted from the Puncture Drop.
Prototype # 2: The damage from the Orientation 3 (Bottom) Puncture Drop was minor causing an indentation approximately mm ( in) diameter and mm ( inch) deep at the area of impact. No other damage was noted from the Puncture Drop.
Figure 7.7.3.a: HACT Puncture Test Orientation 1, 2 & 3 2.7.4 Thermal The regulations require that the package can withstand a 30 minute fire with an average flame temperature of 800°C. A hypothetical accident thermal test was not performed on the ISORAD-TC1. The requirement was demonstrated by conducting a simulated thermal analysis using a model of the ISORAD-TC1. The detailed results of the simulation evaluation are presented in Sections 3.3 through 3.5 and Appendices 3.6.
The analysis assumed the Outer Drum was slightly deformed, and the Cork Assembly essentially undamaged, as described in Section 2.7.1. The thermal analysis demonstrates no loss of structural integrity of the package, no loss of shielding effectiveness from the heat, and not escape of radioactive contents under HACT thermal conditions. Based on the Hawk Systems Thermal Simulation Analysis and the ISO-RAD analysis, ISO-RAD concludes the ISORAD-TC1 will maintain its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the HACT thermal conditions.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-50 2
=
( + 2)2 2 l: Longitudinal Stress Pl: Longitudinal Pressure: (365 kPa or 53 psi) d: Inside diameter of the Cylinder = 13.25 mm (0.5216535448 in) t: Thickness of the Cylinder = 0.25 mm (0.00984252 in) l = (p x d2) / ((d + 2(t))2 - d2 l = (365 x 0. 52165354482) / (0.5216535448 + 2(0.00984252))2 - 0.52165354482 l = (365 x 0.2721224) / (0.5216535448 + 0.01968504)2 - 0.2721224 l = (99.324476) / (0.5413385848)2 - 0.2721224 l = 99.324476 / 0.2930474633932667910 - 0.2721224 l = 99.324476 / 0.02092506339326679104 = 4,746.675034302 kPa or 688.447009 psi From this relationship, the minimum collapsing pressure of the source capsule is 301.55 psi, which exceeds the required external pressure increases of 21.7 psig (Normal Water Immersion) and 290 psig (Enhanced Water Immersion) for the respective regulatory references.
Resource references:
- 1. Young, Warren C. Roarks Formulas for Stress & Strain, Sixth Edition. McGraw-Hill: New York, 1989, p. 634.
- 2. Hibbeler, R.C. Mechanics of Materials. 2nd Edition, 1991.
2.7.7 Deep Water Immersion Test (for Type B Packages Containing More than 105A2)
[IAEA SSR-6 659, 660, & 730, IAEA TS-R-1 657, 658, & 730, and 10 CFR 71.61]
Not applicable. This package does not transport normal form radioactive material in quantities exceeding 105A2. The worst case Special Form Capsule would pass the 290 psig requirement with 301.55 psig.
2.7.8 Summary of Damage [IAEA SSR-6 701, 702, 716, & 726, IAEA TS-R-1 701, 702, 716, &
726, and 10 CFR 71.73 (a) & (b)]
Table 2.7.8.a summarizes the results of the Normal Conditions of Transport and Hypothetical Accident testing performed on the ISORAD-TC1, in the sequence that the tests were completed.
Table 2.7.8.a: Summary of Damages During Performance of QTP-001 Specimen Test Performed Test Results Prototype #3 Compression test Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #1 1 meter (40 inch) penetration bar Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #2 1 meter (40 inch) penetration bar Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #1 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #2 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-51 Prototype #1 9 meter (30 foot) drop Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #2 9 meter (30 foot) drop Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #1 1 meter (40 inch) Puncture bar Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #2 1 meter (40 inch) Puncture bar Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #1 Post Drop Inspection Pass See QTP-001 Test Report Prototype #2 Post Drop Inspection Pass See QTP-001 Test Report The tests were performed using three test prototypes. In the course of testing, one prototype (Prototype # 3) was used for the NCT compression test, and the two prototypes (Prototype # 1 and Prototype #2) were conservatively subjected to all the NCT Tests, two each 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests, and three each puncture tests without loss of structural integrity or shielding effectiveness.
Based on these results, it is concluded that the ISORAD-TC1 transport package maintains structural integrity and shielding effectiveness during Normal Conditions and Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport.
2.8 Accident Conditions for Air Transport of Plutonium [IAEA SSR-6 683, IAEA TS-R-1 680, and 10 CFR 71.55]
Not applicable. The ISORAD-TC1 package is not used for transportation of plutonium.
2.9 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport [IAEA SSR-6 683, IAEA TS-R-1 680, and 10 CFR 71.55]
Not Applicable. The ISORAD-TC1 package is not used for transportation of Type B quantities of fissile material.
2.10 Special Form [IAEA SSR-6 602-604, IAEA TS-R-1 602-604, and 10 CFR 71.75]
The ISORAD-TC1 transport package is designed for use with only special form source capsules with a maximum of 13.75 mm (0.5413 in) outside diameter and 0.25 mm (0.009843) minimum wall thickness. The materials of construction are austenitic stainless steel, 400 series stainless steel, titanium, or vanadium. The source capsule must be qualified as Special Form radioactive material.
Representative Certificates for each special form, or an equivalent with justification, are included in Appendix 2.12.4.
2.11 Fuel Rods Not applicable. The ISORAD-TC1 package is not designed or used for transportation of fuel rods.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-52 2.12 Appendix 2.12.1 QTP-001 Test Plan, Revision 1.
Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-53 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-54 2.12.2 QTP-001 Test Report Revision 0 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-55 2.12.3 SERCO Test Report Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-56 2.12.4 Special Form Certificates for use with Model ISORAD-TC1 Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-57 2.12.5 References
[2.1] IAEA SSR-6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Revision 1, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2018.
[2.2] IAEA TS-R-1, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2005 Edition, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2005.
[2.3] IAEA TS-R-1, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1996 (Revised),
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2000.
[2.4] Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations (CNSC PTNS SOR/2015-145),
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, 2015.
[2.5] Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Office of the Federal Register, Washington D.C.
[2.6] Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Office of the Federal Register, Washington D.C.
[2.7] Joint Canada - United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transport Packages (CNSC RD-364 / USNRC NURERG 1886), USNRC and CNSC, Washington & Ottawa, 2009.
[2.8] NUREG CR/3019, UCRL-53044 Recommended Welding Criteria for Use in the Fabrication of Shipping Containers for Radioactive Materials, March 1984.
[2.9] NUREG/CR-3854, Fabrication Criteria for Shipping Containers, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C., April 1984.
[2.10] NUREG/CR-6407, INEL-95/0551, Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components According to Importance to Safety, February 1996.
[2.11] Regulatory Guide 7.6, Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels, Revision 1, March 1978.
[2.12] Regulatory Guide 7.8, Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, March 1989.
[2.13] Regulatory Guide 7.11, Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inch (0.1 m), U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, June 1991.
[2.14] AWS A2.4 Standard Symbols for Welding, Brazing, and Nondestructive Examination Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 2-58
[2.15] AWS A3.0 Standard Terms and Definitions
[2.16] AWS D1.6/D1.6M Structural Welding Code: Stainless Steel
[2.17] AWS D1.9/D1.6M Structural Welding Code: Titanium
[2.18] Oberg, E., Jones, F., Horton, H., and Ryffel, H., 27th Edition Machinerys Handbook, A Reference Book for the Mechanical Engineer, Designer, Manufacturing Engineer, Draftsman, Toolmaker, and Machinist, 2004 Industrial Press Inc. New York
[2.19] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Part D, Materials, 2001 Edition with Addenda through July 1, 2003.
[2.20] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, Code Cases: Nuclear Components, Case N-284-1, Metal Containment Shell Buckling Design Methods, Class MC, 2001 Edition with Addenda through July 1, 2003
[2.21] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB, Class 1 Components, 2001 Edition with Addenda through July 1, 2003.
[2.22] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF, Supports, 2001 Edition with Addenda through July 1, 2003.
[2.23] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 3, Containment Systems for Storage and Transport Packagings of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Radioactive Material and Waste, 1977 Edition.
[2.24] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 3, Containment Systems for Storage and Transport Packagings of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Radioactive Material and Waste, 2001 Edition with Addenda through July 1, 2003.
[2.25] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section V, Non Destructive Examination, 2001 Edition, with Addenda through July 1, 2001.
[2.26] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Ferrous Material Specification, 2007 Edition with Addenda through July 1, 2009.
[2.27] American National Standards Institute, for Radioactive Material, Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment, ANSI N14.5-1997.
[2.28] Vibration, Measurement and Analysis, JD Smith, Butterworth-Heinemann Revision 1 21 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-1 Safety Analysis Report Section 3 ISO-RAD Canada, Inc Ottawa, ON Canada Model: ISORAD-TC1 Type B(U)-96 Transport Package October 22, 2021 Revision 1 Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-2 Table of Contents Section 3 - THERMAL EVALUATION .............................................................................................. 3-3 3.1 Description of Thermal Design ................................................................................................... 3-3 3.1.1 Design Features .................................................................................................................... 3-3 3.1.2 Decay Heat of Contents ....................................................................................................... 3-4 3.1.3 Summary Tables of Temperatures ....................................................................................... 3-4 3.1.4 Summary Tables of Maximum Pressures ............................................................................ 3-6 3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications.................................................................... 3-7 3.2.1 Material Properties ............................................................................................................... 3-7 3.2.2 Component Specifications ................................................................................................... 3-8 3.3 General Considerations ............................................................................................................... 3-9 3.3.1 Evaluation by Analysis ........................................................................................................ 3-9 3.3.2 Evaluation by Test ............................................................................................................... 3-9 3.4 Thermal Evaluation Under Normal Conditions of Transport ................................................... 3-10 3.4.1 Heat and Cold .................................................................................................................... 3-10 3.4.2 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses ................................................... 3-12 3.4.3 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure .............................................................................. 3-12 3.5 Thermal Evaluation Under Hypothetical Accident Conditions ................................................ 3-12 3.5.1 Initial Conditions ............................................................................................................... 3-12 3.5.2 Fire Test Conditions ........................................................................................................... 3-12 3.5.3 Maximum Temperatures and Pressure............................................................................... 3-12 3.5.4 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses ................................................... 3-16 3.5.5 Fuel/Cladding Temperatures for Spent Nuclear Fuel ........................................................ 3-28 3.5.6 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport .............................. 3-28 3.6 Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 3-29 3.6.1 References .......................................................................................................................... 3-29 3.6.2 Hawk Ridge Systems Technical Report SVC-01129 December 2019 .............................. 3-31 List of Tables Table 3.1.A: Selected Summary Table of Inner Container Contents.................................................... 3-4 Table 3.1.B: Summary Table of BPIC Maximum Temperatures of Major Components ...................... 3-4 Table 3.1.C: Summary Table of BPIC Maximum Temperatures of Major Components ...................... 3-5 Table 3.1.D: Summary Table of BPIC Special Form Capsule and DU Shield Temperatures ............. 3-5 Table 3.1.E: Summary Table of Maximum Internal Pressures ............................................................. 3-6 Table 3.2.A: Thermal Properties of Principal Transport Package Materials ..................................... 3-7 Table 3.2.B: Thermal Properties of Special Form Capsules (Containment Vessel) ............................ 3-7 Table 3.4.A: Variable Surface Temperatures by Adjusting the Decay Heat Load ............................. 3-11 Table 3.5.A: NCT Thermal Expansion Diameter ............................................................................... 3-26 Table 3.5.B: HACT Thermal Expansion Diameter ............................................................................. 3-26 Table 3.5.C: NCT Thermal Expansion Length.................................................................................... 3-27 Table 3.5.C: HACT Thermal Expansion Length ................................................................................. 3-27 Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-3 Section 3 - THERMAL EVALUATION
[IAEA SSR-6 644, 653-657, 662-664, 728, & 736, IAEA TS-R-1 642, 651-655, 660-662, 728 &
736, and 10 CFR 71.33(b)(5), 71.33(b)(7), 71.43(d), 71.43(g), 71.55(f)(1)(iv), 71.71(c)(1),
71.71(c)(2), & 71.73(c)(4)]
3.1 Description of Thermal Design This section identifies the key thermal design features for the ISORAD-TC1 package. The maximum temperatures at both NCT and HAC conditions have been calculated for these features by a Finite Element Analysis (FEA) and a thermal model of the package. The FEA and the thermal model of the package were validated against thermal analysis of other similar transport containers.
The test procedure and results of the simulation tests and the FEA are presented and discussed within this section.
The ISORAD-TC1 package is a passive thermal device having no mechanical cooling system or relief valves to aid in cooling the package. All cooling of the transport package is through free convection and radiation. The maximum actual heat source is 375 TBq (10,125 Ci) of Iridium-192 (Ir-192) generating 60.88 Watts of decay heat, the thermal analysis was conducted with a heat source of 400.37 TBq (10,810 Ci) of Iridium-192 (Ir-192) generating 65.0 Watts of decay heat. The corresponding decay heat generation rate is approximately 60.88 Watts (actual) versus 65.0 Watts (simulated), which is approximately 6.75% lower heat load providing an additional safety margin for the NCT requirements (See Section 2.6.1, Heat). The design of the ISORAD-TC1 package is that of a non-fissile Type B(U) package and will not be tested under IAEA SSR-6 736, IAEA TS-R-1 736, or 10 CFR 71.55(f)(1)(iv).
The maximum operational temperatures determined for the maximum contents heating have been listed and shown to be lower than the maximum design temperatures of the package.
3.1.1 Design Features The ISORAD-TC1 package is as described in Section 1 and was tested to 65 Watts and will have an operation limit of 60.88 Watts or 375 TBq (10,125 curies) of Ir-192. The Outer Drum and the Cork Assembly provide the Inner Container and the special form capsules with protection from impact and fire. Under HACT fire conditions the Outer Drum skin is designed to heat up very quickly with the Cork Assembly providing insulation to the Inner Container and special form capsules, as a result of its low thermal conductivity and ablation properties. Since heating of the Cork Assembly during the HACT fire may cause gas evolution within the Outer Drum cavity, the Outer Drum is not sealed with gaskets and is open to the atmosphere and pressure build up should not occur. Features uniquely relevant to thermal performance are detailed below.
3.1.1.1 Outer Drum The protective Outer Drum increases distance from the Inner Container surface to the package surface. The Outer Drum also includes cork as insulation and shock absorbing material. The Outer Drum design elevates the main body of the drum off the ground and limits the ground contact to Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-4 only the outside bottom rim. The top Attachment Ring configuration incorporates an air gap of approximately mm ( inch) to aid in heat dissipation.
3.1.1.2 Inner Container The Inner Container uses depleted uranium surrounded by brass or tungsten shielding fully enclosed in a welded austenitic stainless steel square or round structure. The construction with the brass filling the air voids prevents oxidation by severely limiting oxygen from reaching the depleted uranium shield. The tungsten shield versions will not have brass as the threat of possible depleted uranium oxidation will not exist.
The Inner Container provides the shielding and security closure for the special form capsules (containment vessel(s)). The special form capsules provide the primary containment for the radioactive contents.
3.1.2 Decay Heat of Contents [IAEA SSR-6 653, IAEA TS-R-1 651, and 10 CFR 71.33(b)(7)]
The maximum content activity for the ISORAD-TC1 package is 10,125 Ci of Ir-192. The corresponding decay heat generation rate for the content activity is approximately 60.88 Watts (See Table 2.6.1.A). All other contents generate significantly less heat (See Table 2.6.1.A) for complete list of contents.
Table 3.1.A: Selected Summary Table of Inner Container Contents BPIC BPIC 2835A MPIC Isotope mW/Ci Ci TBq W Ci TBq W Ci TBq W Ir-192 6.013 10125 375 60.88 10125 375 60.88 1512 56 9.092 Se-75 5.35 10017 371 53.6 10017 371 53.6 1512 56 8.09 Yb-169 2.51 10017 371 25.15 10017 371 25.15 1512 56 8.09 Lu-177 5.35 10017 371 53.6 10017 371 53.6 N/A N/A N/A See Table 2.6.1.A for other isotopes 3.1.3 Summary Tables of Temperatures The maximum temperatures reached under NCT and HACT conditions have been determined using an FEA thermal model detailed in the Hawk Ridge Technical Report SVC-01129 appended in Section 3.5.2. Table 3.1.B summarizes the results of this report and presents the maximum temperatures reached in the Inner Container cavity and the Iridium Capsule with internal heat loads of 65 Watts under NCT and HACT thermal conditions.
Table 3.1.B: Summary Table of BPIC Maximum Temperatures of Major Components Temperature Condition Outer Inner 1 Iridium/ Insulation 65 Watts Heat Load Drum Container Special Form (Cork)
NCT Decay Heating (38 in shade) 48.82°C 237.51°C 237.9°C 231.16°C NCT Isolation (38 in full sun) 104.1°C 245.55°C 245.97°C 235.53°C HACT Maximum During Fire Test 801.3°C 244.07°C 244.56°C 809.94°C HACT Maximum 30 minutes 210.7°C 247.04°C 247.5°C 364.76°C Post-Fire Test Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-5 1
Note that the special form capsules will not reach 800°C, but theoretically could reach a maximum temperature of 800°C during the HACT thermal test when transporting the maximum activity of 10,125 Ci of Ir-192 if the Inner Container is ejected from the Outer Drum during an accident.
All components, except for the Special Form Capsules, are open to the atmosphere. As such, no pressure will build up in these parts of the package under HACT conditions. As noted in Section 2.7.4, any associated pressure build-ups will be insufficient to detrimentally effect the package containment of the Special Form Capsules.
The maximum temperatures within the Inner Container and special forms are generated at 65 Watts; therefore, the temperatures reached at critical locations with this heat load were calculated in the Hawk Ridge Test Report under NCT and are summarized here in Table 3.1.B and 3.1.C. The maximum temperatures calculated are all within the acceptable temperature limits for the package components.
Table 3.1.C: Summary Table of BPIC Maximum Temperatures of Major Components Temperature NCT Decay NCT Isolation HACT Maximum HACT Maximum Condition Heating (38 in During Fire 30 minutes 65 Watts Heat Load (38 in shade) full sun) Test Post-Fire Test Outer Drum 48.82°C 104.10°C 801.30°C 210.70°C Insulation (Cork) 231.16°C 235.53°C 809.94°C 364.76°C Cork Lid Plate 231.65°C 239.63°C 238.29°C 243.40°C DU Shield 236.51°C 244.45°C 243.07°C 246.10°C Inner Container Shell 231.71°C 239.63°C 238.33°C 242.05°C 1
Iridium/Special Form 237.90°C 245.97°C 244.56°C 247.50°C DU Plug Shield 235.54°C 243.56°C 242.18°C 245.26°C Brass Supports 231.72°C 239.67°C 238.34°C 241.80°C Brass Plug 229.89°C 237.97°C 236.50°C 240.10°C Titanium Plug 237.51°C 245.55°C 244.07°C 247.04°C The temperature of the Inner Container contents under NCT and HACT conditions with contents emitting 65 Watts has been determined from the data in the Hawk Ridge Technical Report as from 1.39°C to 1.42°C above that of the Depleted Uranium shield (See Table 3.1.D): this is based on the worst case assumption that all the heat from the contents, which is emitted as radiation, is absorbed within the special form capsules. The maximum resulting temperatures of the special form capsules calculated are presented in Table 3.1.D: these temperatures are within the acceptable temperature limits for the all the components of the Inner Container.
Table 3.1.D: Summary Table of BPIC Special Form Capsule and DU Shield Temperatures Temperature NCT Decay NCT Isolation HACT Maximum HACT Maximum Condition Heating (38 in During Fire 30 minutes 65 Watts Heat Load (38 in shade) full sun) Test Post-Fire Test 1
Iridium/Special Form 237.90°C 245.97°C 244.56°C 247.50°C DU Shield 236.51°C 244.45°C 243.07°C 246.10°C Difference 1.39°C 1.52°C 1.49°C 1.4°C DU Shield 236.51°C 244.45°C 243.07°C 246.10°C Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-6 Inner Container Shell 231.71°C 239.63°C 238.33°C 242.05°C Difference 4.8°C 4.82°C 4.74°C 4.05°C 1
Iridium/Special Form 237.90°C 245.97°C 244.56°C 247.50°C Inner Container Shell 231.71°C 239.63°C 238.33°C 242.05°C Difference 6.19°C 6.34°C 6.23°C 5.45°C 3.1.4 Summary Tables of Maximum Pressures All package components are open to the atmosphere. As such, no pressure will build up in these components under either NCT or HACT conditions. Normal operating conditions will generate negligible pressure differential within the package. The package can withstand elevated atmospheric pressure because all components except the Special Form Capsules are open to the atmosphere.
Any pressure generated within the Special Form Capsule is significantly below that which would be generated during the HACT thermal test, which is shown in Sections 2.6.3 to result in no loss of structural integrity or containment.
Table 3.1.E: Summary Table of Maximum Internal Pressures Package Fire Conditions Internal Configuration 800 (1,472) Pressure Internal Pressure Limit Developed ISORAD-TC1 BPIC 800 (1,472) 800 (1,472)
Inner Container - Weld Seal 0.3754 MPa (54.45 psi) 4.675 MPa (677.97 psi)
Contents Cavity N/A N/A Open to Air Special Form Capsule 0.3754 MPa (54.45 psi) 4.886 MPa (708.60 psi)
ISORAD-TC1 BPIC 2835A 800 (1,472) 800 (1,472)
Inner Container - Weld Seal 0.3754 MPa (54.45 psi) 4.675 MPa (677.97 psi)
Contents Cavity N/A N/A Open to Air Special Form Capsule 0.3754 MPa (54.45 psi) 4.886 MPa (708.60 psi)
ISORAD-TC1 MPIC 800 (1,472) 800 (1,472)
Inner Container - Weld Seal 0.3754 MPa (54.45 psi) 4.675 MPa (677.97 psi)
Contents Cavity N/A N/A Open to Air Special Form Capsule 0.3754 MPa (54.45 psi) 4.886 MPa (708.60 psi) 1 - Pressure assuming transport of the greatest decay heat generating source term of 10,125 Ci Ir-192.
Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-7 3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications 3.2.1 Material Properties Table 3.2.A lists the relevant thermal properties of the important materials in the transport package.
The sources referred to in the last column are listed below the table.
Table 3.2.A: Thermal Properties of Principal Transport Package Materials Material Density Melting/ Thermal Thermal Emissivity Modulus Source kg/m3 Combustion Expansion Conductivity 1
Of (lb/in3) Temperature µm/m°C W/m-°K Elasticity
(µin/in°F) (Btu/h-ft-°F) GPa (Mpsi)
Depleted 19,000 1,130 13.3 27.5 0.15 205 #2, #1, Uranium (0.69) (2,066) (7.4) (16) (30) 6-11 Tungsten 19,270 3,370 4.5 163.3 0.23 400 #1, (0.70) (6,098) (2.5) (1130) (1500°C) (58) 6-51 Brass C360 8500 887°C(1628.6°F) 20.2 100 0.22 100 Brass C260 (0.32) 954°C (1749.2°F) (11.2) (63) (15)
Brass C230 1000°C(1832°F)
Titanium 4621 1,690°C 8.90 11.4 0.31 116 GPa #4, Grade 2 (0.163) (3,074°F) (4.94) (6.6) (16.8) 6-50 Stainless 8000 1,427 17.3 16 0.852 190 #1, Steel - 304 (0.29) (2,600) (9.9) (9.2) 0.9923 (27) 6-11 Cork 154.23 400 40 0.044 0.95 0.02 (0.00544) (752) (22.2) (0.023) (0.0029)
Table 3.2.B: Thermal Properties of Special Form Capsules (Containment Vessel)
Material Density Melting/ Thermal Thermal Emissivity Modulus Source kg/m3 Combustion Expansion1 Conductivity Of (lb/in3) Temperature µm/m°C W/m-°K Elasticity
(µin/in°F) (Btu/h-ft-°F) GPa (Mpsi)
Titanium 4621 1,690°C 8.90 11.4 0.31 116 #4, Grade 2 (0.163) (3,074°F) (4.94) (6.6) (16.8) 6-50 Stainless 8000 1,427 17.3 16 0.36 190 #1, Steel 300 (0.29) (2,600) (9.9) (9.2) (27) 6-11 Series Stainless 7800 1,427 10.3 305 0.36 215 #5, Steel 400 (0.28) (2,600) (5.7) (17) (31) 20 Series Stainless 0.28 1,420°C 11in/in 17.9 0.36 190 #5, Steel (2,588°F) (6.1) (12.4) (27) 10 4PH Vanadium 5953.5 1735°C 7.92 30.7 0.42 160 #7 (0.221) 3155°F (4.4) (17.7) (23.2)
MP35N 0.30 1,315°C 14in/in 11.2 0.23 215 #6, (2,399°F) (6.4) (31) 13 1Note: The thermal expansions of the materials in this table are temperature dependent 2
Note: Weathered Stainless Steel has a higher emissivity of 0.85.
3 Note: Painted Stainless Steel has a higher emissivity Flat White 0.992 and Flat Black 0.92.
4 Note: Cork Thermal Conductivity varies significantly as it absorbs heat (See Table 6) Hawk Ridge Report 5
Note: 400 Series Stainless Steel Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-8 The Cork Assembly will experience temperatures exceeding 800°C during a HACT fire. The best data available on cork under these conditions and under the same use in transport packages is from Croft and Associates Ltd. (Croft). No measurements of cork properties at HACT high temperatures are available. However, the HACT thermal test has been performed on the Safkeg-LS 3979A package as detailed in Crofts report CTR 2009/21, this package uses approximately the same cork specification as the ISORAD-TC1 package design. The ISO-RAD simulation conducted by Hawk Ridge Systems uses the Safkeg-LS and Safkeg-HS thermal report data. The Safkeg data was used to validate the ISO-RAD model and, to demonstrate the acceptability of the thermal properties assumed for the cork. Croft found that, in order to obtain agreement with the measured temperatures, the thermal conductivity of the cork needed to be increased by 50%. Croft validated the thermal properties against an actual furnace test and are effective properties that include any effects of charring and shrinkage of the cork.
The NCT thermal test performed on the ISORAD-TC1 package has been simulated using the Croft cork thermal characteristics applied to the model. As cork is a natural material, a degree of variation in conductivity may well be possible because granular size and shape irregularities exist.
3.2.2 Component Specifications All components are specified and described on the descriptive drawings included in Appendix 1.3.
The components that are important to thermal performance are the Outer Drum, the Cork Assembly, the Inner Container, and special form capsules (containment vessel). The outer shell of Outer Drum and the outer shell of the Inner Container vessel are manufactured from austenitic stainless steel with the special form capsules having a range of materials as described in Table 3.2B and all having been tested to at least 800°C during special form testing.
The allowable service temperatures for all the components cover the maximum and minimum temperatures anticipated during NCT and HACT conditions of transport apart from cork which may combust at temperatures ranging from 400°C to 450°C. The minimum allowable service temperature for all components is less than or equal to -40°C. The maximum service temperature for each component is determined from the temperatures calculated from the thermal model.
The upper NCT temperature reached by the austenitic stainless steel in the Outer Drum is 104.21°C for continuous operations and 801.32°C for short term under HACT conditions. The upper temperature reached by the austenitic stainless steel in the Inner Container 239.63°C for continuous operations and 243.4°C for short term operations under HACT conditions.
The allowable temperature limit for steel when relied upon for structural support is 427°C as specified in USNRC Regulatory Guide 7.6 [3.8 Page 7.6-3]. During the HACT test the temperature of the Outer Drum shell skin exceeds this temperature for a short period of time. During a fire the austenitic stainless steel is providing fire shielding to the cork from the direct exposure of the flames, its main function is not providing structural support therefore the maximum allowable temperature it can reach is 1427°C, which is the melting point of austenitic stainless steel.
The depleted uranium shielding reaches a maximum temperature of 243.07°C during HACT conditions and 246.1°C 30 minutes after the fire conditions. The depleted uranium does not provide Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-9 any structural function therefore it is limited by its melting point of 1130°C. Tungsten shielding would reach a similar temperature, but has a melting point of 3370°C.
The cork is essentially unaffected by temperatures up to 300°C and hardens during temperatures from 320°C until it reaches combustion temperature. The Cork Assembly average temperature during NCT insolation operations is 137.0°C with maximum temperature NCT where small portions of the cork may reach 235.53°C along a thin layer of the cork adjacent to the Inner Container. Under HAC conditions the Cork Assembly reaches a maximum temperature of 809.94°C. Cork chars and self-extinguishes under high temperatures and leaves a low-density carbonaceous layer which provides insulation equivalent to still CO2. The cork is very effective in protecting the Inner Container and the radioactive contents in a HACT event.
The upper temperature reached by the Iridium/special form capsule(s) is 245.97°C for continuous operation (NCT Insolation conditions), and 244.56°C for short term operation (HACT conditions) and 247.50°C 30 minutes after. These temperatures are within the allowable range of the special form materials listed in Table 3.2B.
3.3 General Considerations 3.3.1 Evaluation by Analysis Evaluations by analysis are described in the section they apply to in this Safety Analysis Report or when applicable in the documents contained in Appendix 2.12 and Appendix 3.6.2. The analysis was conducted by Hawk Ridge Systems using Solidworks Thermal Simulation software. The assumptions used were conservative and the wattage used was 65 Watts, which is 6.75% higher than the planned ISORAD-TC1 package wattage limit of 60.88 Watts.
The NCT thermal conditions for the 38°C in the shade test was conservatively conducted in a steady state analysis. For the 38°C with solar insulation test, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> transient test with twelve hours cycles was used alternating solar insolation and no solar insolation.
The HACT thermal conditions used a transient test analysis for the 30 minutes in an 800°C fire and for a period of time following the removal of the 800°C fire.
The ISORAD-TC1 model used was a simplified version of the actual model. The simplified model removed bolts, other hardware, chamfers, and most spacing from in between parts. The heat source used was 65 Watts in a single austenitic stainless steel special form capsule containing Iridium metal. The decay heat generated was deposited completely as heat within Iridium contents (65 W).
ISO-RAD contends this is a conservative assumption, as in actual use, not all of the decay power would be completely deposited as heat in the source capsule; much of the gamma decay power would be distributed beyond the capsule to be deposited in the uranium or tungsten shield.
3.3.2 Evaluation by Test Evaluations by direct testing are documented in the Test Plans contained in Appendix 2.12 or are described in the section they apply to in this Safety Analysis Report.
Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-10 3.4 Thermal Evaluation Under Normal Conditions of Transport The ISORAD-TC1 package has been evaluated for compliance with IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1and 10 CFR 71 by thermally modeling the package. The thermal model has been validated by comparison against other thermal evaluations on similar Type B transport containers.
3.4.1 Heat and Cold 3.4.1.1 Insolation and Decay Heat Thermal Model The analytical model is described in detail by the Hawk Ridge Test Report SVC-01129 (Section 3.6.2). The thermal evaluation in the report is modeled on the ISORAD-TC1 containing the largest thermal heat source of 65 Watts (10,810 Ci of Ir-192) and is therefore representative of the worst case temperature condition. The maximum surface temperature caused by the effects of solar input and content decay is 104.21°C (219.58°F) approximately located at the center external surface of the Outer Drum Lid. Please note the simplified thermal model presented the Outer Drum Lid Assembly as completely flat and the actual Lid Assembly contains ridges and may slightly lower the external temperature reading. This temperature is well below the maximum service temperature for the materials used in the ISORAD-TC1 transport package components important to safety. This temperature constitutes the most onerous NCT thermal condition. Based on the package materials of construction for components important to safety, this temperature will not be sufficient to adversely affect the containment or shielding integrity as it is well below the maximum service temperature for the materials. As such, the package complies with the requirements of this section.
3.4.1.2 Still Air (shaded) Decay Heating
[IAEA SSR-6 654 & 656, IAEA TS-R-1 652 & 654, and 10 CFR 71.43(g)]
The Hawk Ridge report (see Section 3.6.2) determines the maximum surface temperature of the ISORAD-TC1 package in the shade (i.e., no insolation effects), assuming an ambient temperature of 38°C (100°F), per IAEA SSR-6 654 & 656, IAEA TS-R-1 652 & 654, and 10 CFR 71.43(g).
The thermal evaluation in the Hawk Ridge report is modeled on the ISORAD-TC1 containing the largest thermal heat source of 65 Watts (10,810 Ci of Ir-192) and is therefore representative of the worst case temperature condition. The highest temperature on the ISORAD-TC1 package under these conditions is 48.82°C (119.88), located on the side of the Outer Drum slightly below the center of the drum. The highest temperature on the ISORAD-TC1 in a readily accessible location on the package is 48.82 (119.88). Based on the analysis in the report, it is demonstrated that the surface temperature for any readily accessible surface of the ISORAD-TC1 package in still air at 38 in the shade will not exceed 50. The thermal analysis is also 65 Watts versus 60.88 Watts in actual contents. The actual contents would lower the external temperature to 48.138°C (118.65°F) as presented in Table 3.4.A. below.
Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-11 aT = 38.026 + (0.1016(W)) mT = 38.026 + (0.1661(W))
Table 3.4.A: Variable Surface Temperatures by Adjusting the Decay Heat Load Decay Heat Load (W) Average Surface T Max Surface T 0.0 38°C 38°C 10.0 (MPIC) 39.04°C (102.27°F) 39.69°C (103.44°F) 30.0 (BPIC) 41.074°C (105.94) 43.009°C (109.42) 45.0 (BPIC) 42.60°C (108.68) 45.501°C (113.90) 60.88 (BPIC) 44.21°C (111.58) 48.138°C (118.65°F) 65.0 (BPIC) 44.63°C (112.34) 48.823°C (119.88) 72.1 (BPIC) 45.35°C (113.63) 50.002°C (122.00) 3.4.1.3 Cold Effected Materials The ISORAD-TC1 does not contain carbon steel components. The components of the ISORAD-TC1 package are not affected by the low Normal Transport temperature (-40). Although austenitic series stainless steel is not known to be susceptible to brittle fracture at -40°C, during testing, shock induced stresses could cause the stainless steel to fail in brittle fracture. As such, to demonstrate that brittle fracture will not occur, the first 9 meter (30 foot) Free Drop will be conducted with the package at or below -40°C at the time of drop. Damage during Normal and Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport are described in Section 2.7 of the SAR.
All materials exhibit some contraction due to lower temperatures. However, in this limited temperature range, the ISORAD-TC1 package was not adversely affected as the Prototype #1 passed the Normal and Hypothetical Accident drop, and puncture testing and maintained its structural integrity and shielding.
3.4.1.4 ISORAD-TC1 Series Type B(U) Source Capsule Thermal Analysis This analysis demonstrates that the pressure inside the hypothetical ISORAD-TC1 special form capsule, when subjected to the HACT thermal test, does not exceed the pressure which corresponds to the minimum yield strength at the thermal test temperature.
The source capsules to be used in the ISORAD-TC1 are all special form capsules tested and approved. The thermal test from the HACT requires heating the package externally to a temperature of 800°C for a period of 30 minutes. From the Hawk Ridge Technical Report (see 3.6.2), the special form capsules will reach a maximum temperature of 247.50°C (477.5°F) 30 minutes post fire test when loaded to the maximum decay heat load 65 Watts (10,810 Ci) of Ir-192 during the thermal test.
Hawk Ridge Technical Report SVC-01129 demonstrated that the special form capsule will withstand the stresses induced by the thermal test when loaded to the maximum source term and will retain their integrity under the Thermal test conditions. Therefore, it is concluded that the container and contents meet the requirements of this section.
Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-12 3.4.2 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses The temperature and pressure variations described in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 will not adversely affect the transport package during normal transport since the melting temperatures of all safety critical components are well above these temperatures and the package will experience no pressures sufficient to cause package failure. It is therefore concluded that the ISORAD-TC1 package will maintain its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport thermal stress conditions.
3.4.3 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure All package components except for the special form capsules are open to the atmosphere. As such, pressure will not build up in these parts of packages during NCT conditions. This condition is not time dependent once steady state is achieved. However, the following assumes the Inner Container and Contents Cavity were gasketed for conservatism. If the Content Cavity is sealed under the lowest temperatures (-40°C) and then allowed to heat up to the highest temperature (245.97°C from Section 3.1.3.) a small pressure differential will be created.
The result is a pressure differential of 18.26 psi. All other package components, except for the special form capsules, will exhibit a pressure differential of 0 psi as they are open to the atmosphere with no means for creating a pressure differential. Hawk Ridge Technical Report SVC-01129 (see 3.6.2) demonstrated the source will maintain its containment integrity under HACT Thermal test conditions which created a pressure differential of 68.49 psi (See Section 3.5.2.3). The increased pressure differential of 18.26 psi will have no adverse impact on the source containment under NCT operating pressure conditions. No other contributing gas sources are present.
3.5 Thermal Evaluation Under Hypothetical Accident Conditions 3.5.1 Initial Conditions The ISORAD-TC1 package is assumed to start at the NCT solar insolation temperature values with an external value of 104.21°C (219.58°F) on the Outer Drum and an internal value of 245.97°C (474.75°F) in the Special Form Capsule. The Inner Container is not expected to reach the thermal test temperature of 800°C (1,472°F). As demonstrated in the Hawk Ridge Technical Report SVC-01129 (see 3.6.2), the maximum temperature for the special form capsule during the HACT thermal test condition when loaded to the maximum heat load is 244.56°C (472.21°F).
3.5.2 Fire Test Conditions Not applicable. Actual NCT and HACT Fire Tests were not conducted. The tests were conducted via computer simulation.
3.5.3 Maximum Temperatures and Pressure See Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4.
Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-13 3.5.3.1 Temperatures The cork in the ISORAD-TC1 package will be partially destroyed when subjected to the HACT thermal test conditions. The other package materials, however, are suitable for use at 800 (1,472) (see Table 3.2.A). The depleted uranium, which is susceptible to oxidation, is surrounded by brass and enclosed within austenitic stainless steel and would not be exposed to oxygen. The transport package will undergo no loss of structural integrity or shielding. The pressures generated have been demonstrated in Section 3.5.3.2 to be less than the yield strength of the material and will not adversely affect the package integrity.
Based on the minimal damage caused by the mechanical destructive testing, no breach of the weldment occurred, therefore no air path to the shield was created which could cause uranium oxidation and resultant loss of effective shielding around the sources.
It is concluded that the ISORAD-TC1 package therefore meets the requirements of the fire test based on an analysis of its construction and the condition of the test units after the preceding destructive testing.
3.5.3.2 Pressure All package components except for the special form capsules are open to the atmosphere. As such, pressure will not build up in other package components during the Hypothetical Accident conditions.
If the Special Form Capsule is sealed under the lowest temperatures (-40°C) and then allowed to heat up until the HACT thermal test temperature of 247.5°C (477.5°C) a small pressure differential will be created.
Using the Ideal Gas Law and equating for two standard scenarios the result is:
P1/T1 = P2/T2 Substituted: P2 = (P1/T1) x T2 Where: P1 = Ambient pressure at sealing = 14.87 psi T1 = -40°C = 233°K P2 = Pressure at temperature (245.97)
T2 = 247.5 = 520.65°K P2 = (P1/T1) x T2 1 P2 = (14.87/233) x 520.65 P2 = 0.063819742 x 520.65 P2 = 33.22774893 Which is a pressure differential of 18.35774893 or 18.36 psi. No other contributing gas sources are present. See Section 2.7.4.3.
If the Special Form Capsule hypothetically reaches 800°C, the maximum internal pressure can be found by assuming that the internal temperature will reach 800°C (1,470°F) under the HACT Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-15 A = 5.0488929 /
A= in2 F = (A)(Pressure)
F=( (54.61401)
F = 68.93507 lbf
= F/A 1 = 68.49/
= 54.61401 psi
= F/A
= 53.61815666/
= 42.4791405 psi The cover is held by four (4) M6 x 1 stainless steel bolts. This imparts a force of 68.94 lbf in each bolt. However, if all the stress is assumed to be taken by only one bolt, then the stress in that bolt equals:
Stress Area of Bolt [2.18, page 1502]
Where: A = Stressed Area dn = Nominal bolt diameter n = 1/p = 1/p = number of threads per inch or cm p = pitch in inch or cm (length per thread)
A= /4 (dn-0.9743/n)2 A = (3.14159)/4(6-(0.9743/1.25)2 A = (0.7853975)(6-0.77944)2 A = (0.7853975)(5.2056)2 A = (0.7853975)(27.2542467136) = 21.40541723324466 mm2 A = 0.03317846 in2 Where: Fi = Force in each bolt A = Stress area of the bolt S = Force/Area = Fi/A S = 68.93507/0.03317846 S = 2,077.705535 psi if all stress applied to one bolt Where: Fi = Force in each bolt 1 A = Stress area of the bolt = 0.03317846 in2 nBolt = Number of bolts for the part S = Force/Area = Fi/(A(nBolt))
S = 68.93507047/0.03317846(4)
S = 68.93507047/0.13271384 Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-16 S = 519.4263839 psi on each bolt Therefore, the force on all 4 bolts is (stress from pressure differential) x A (inside closure area)
(54.61401 psi) (1.2622232 in2) = 68.93507047 lbf. The stress area of the M6 x 1 bolt is 0.03318 in2 Stress Area of Bolt Formula result. Multiplying this result by 4 (number of Plug Assembly bolts) gives a total stress area of the bolts as 0.1327136 in2. Therefore, the maximum stress on each bolt is 68.93507047 lbf/0.13271384 in2 = 519.4263839 psi. The maximum stress if all the force is applied 1 to one bolt is 68.93507047 lbf / 0.03317846 in2 = 2077.70555 psi. At a temperature of 870 (1,600), the yield strength of type 316 stainless steel is 10,000 psi (
Reference:
Department of Defense Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook, Metals and Ceramics Information Center, Battelle, 1991 Edition). Thus, the maximum stress in the 4 bolts is calculated 519.43 / 10000 = 0.051943 or 5.2% of the yield strength at 870. If all the stress was placed in one bolt, it is calculated 2077.70555 / 10000 = 0.207770555 or 20.78% of the yield strength at 870.
This analysis demonstrates that the maximum internal gas pressure at 800 (1,472) would be 54 psi. Under these conditions, the maximum stress in the source cavity and on the cover bolts would be less than the yield strength of the material.
3.5.4 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses The temperature and pressure variations described in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 will not adversely affect the transport package during normal transport since the melting temperatures of all safety critical components are well above these temperatures and the package will experience no pressures sufficient to cause package failure. The thermal stresses introduced under the hypothetical accident condition criteria were evaluated in Section 3.5.3 and again demonstrated to be insufficient to cause package failure. It is therefore concluded that the ISORAD-TC1 package will maintain its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the hypothetical accident condition transport thermal stress conditions.
There will be no thermal stress as a result of differential thermal expansion of the materials of the Inner Container. The construction of the Inner Container positions the uranium shield by surrounding by Brass Spacers resting on austenitic stainless steel parts. Brass has a larger linear coefficient of thermal expansion (11.2 µin/in°F) than Uranium (7.4 µin/in°F). Therefore, as the temperature increases from 20°C to 800°C, the clearance between these parts will increase.
Similarly, austenitic stainless steel has a larger linear coefficient of thermal expansion (9.9
µin/in°F) is slightly less than Brass (11.2 µin/in°F). Therefore, as the temperature increases from 20°C to 800°C, the clearance between these parts will decrease, but sufficient tolerance exists to not create stress. Consequently, there will be no thermal stress as a result of differential thermal expansion of the materials of the Inner Container.
The construction of the Inner Container Shield Plug Assembly positions the uranium shield by surrounding with Titanium with a Brass Plug Spacer on top of the Depleted Uranium Plug Shield is a Titanium Plug Lid. Brass has a larger linear coefficient of thermal expansion (11.2 µin/in°F) than Uranium (7.4 µin/in°F). Therefore, as the temperature increases from 20°C to 800°C, the clearance between these parts will increase. The Titanium has a smaller linear coefficient of thermal expansion (4.94 µin/in°F) than Brass (11.2 µin/in°F) or Uranium (7.4 µin/in°F). Therefore, as the temperature increases from 20°C to 800°C, the clearance between these parts will decrease, but Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-28 At a temperature of 800°C, the surface of the uranium shield would be expected to oxidize.
However, the air-filled space between the depleted uranium shield and the housing has a volume of approximately cm3 ( liter). For analysis, we assume this volume is filled with air at atmospheric pressure. This is a conservative assumption, as during the seal welding process, the temperature of the austenitic stainless steel, and therefore the contained air, would be elevated, thereby reducing the initial pressure. However, for conservativism, no account is taken of this reduced pressure. Assuming air occupies 22.4 L/mol at atmospheric pressure, and further assuming that oxygen represents only 20% of the volume of air, this volume would contain 1.19 x 1021 molecules of O2 or 2.38 x 1021 atoms of oxygen.
The metal uranium forms several oxides:
- Triuranium octoxide (U3O8, the most stable uranium oxide, yellowcake typically contains 70 to 90 percent Triuranium octoxide)
- Uranyl peroxide (UO4)
ISO-RAD conservatively assumed that UO2 would be the only oxide formed in the Inner Container, UO2 is the most "uranium-rich" oxide. ISO-RAD will also conservatively assume, all oxygen atoms are consumed in the formation of uranium oxides, then the 2.38 x 1021 atoms of oxygen would consume 1.19 x 1021 atoms of uranium, which would represent approximately 0.469 grams.
Assuming the 0.469 grams of uranium were removed uniformly over only the outside surface of the depleted uranium shield (1052 cm2), then the reduction of shield thickness would be less than 0.5
µm. For Iridium-192, this would represent an increase in the exposure rates of less than 0.010%, far below the HACT requirement of less than 10 mSv/hr (1000 mR/hr) permitted by the regulations.
Outer Drum The Outer Drum is enclosed, but is not sealed. Therefore, there will be no pressure build up in this part of the container during the HACT thermal test.
3.5.5 Fuel/Cladding Temperatures for Spent Nuclear Fuel Not applicable. This package is not used for transport of spent nuclear fuel.
3.5.6 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Not applicable. This package is not used for transport of Type B quantities of fissile material.
Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-29 3.6 Appendix 3.6.1 References
[3.1] IAEA SSR-6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Revision 1, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2018.
[3.2] IAEA TS-R-1, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2005 Edition, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2005.
[3.3] IAEA TS-R-1, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1996 (Revised),
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2000.
[3.4] Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations (CNSC PTNS SOR/2015-145),
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, 2015.
[3.5] Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Office of the Federal Register, Washington D.C.
[3.6] Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Office of the Federal Register, Washington D.C.
[3.7] Joint Canada - United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transport Packages (CNSC RD-364 / USNRC NURERG 1886), USNRC and CNSC, Washington & Ottawa, 2009.
[3.8] Regulatory Guide 7.6, Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels, Revision 1, March 1978.
[3.9] Regulatory Guide 7.8, Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, March 1989.
[3.10] Holman, J. P., Heat Transfer, 10th Edition, McGraw-Hill, New York 2010.
[3.11] Summary of the Physical Properties and Composition of Resin Bonded Cork, CTR 2001/11, Issue D, 2002.
[3.12] The Emissivity of Various Materials Commonly Encountered in Industry, Land pyrometers Technical Note 101.
[3.13] Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2005 Edition, IAEA Safety Guide No. TS-G-1.1 (Rev. 1), 2008.
Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-30 3.6.1.1 References Table 3.2.B
- 1. Eugene A. Avallone and Theodore Baumeister III, Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, Tenth Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996. Pages 6-7, 6-11, 6-50, 6-51,
- 2. Lowenstein, Paul. Industrial Uses of Depleted Uranium. American Society for Metals. Metals Handbook, Volume 3, Ninth Edition.
- 3. Smith, L. P., The Language of Rubber: An Introduction to the Specification and Testing of Elastomers, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1993.
- 4. Marks Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, Tenth Edition, E.A. Avallone, T.
Baumeister. Page 6-50
- 5. Stainless Steel: Tables of Technical Properties, Materials and Applications Series, Volume 5.
Euro Inox: The European Stainless Steel Development Association. Luxembourg 2007.
- 6. SPS Technologies Data Sheet. Page 6
- 7. Vanadium http://www-ferp.ucsd.edu/LIB/PROPS/PANOS/v.html
- 8. ASM Specialty Handbook Stainless Steels, Ed. J.R. Davis, 1994. Page 10 Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 3-31 3.6.2 Hawk Ridge Systems Technical Report SVC-01129 December 2019 Revision 1 22 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 4-1 Safety Analysis Report Section 4 ISO-RAD Canada, Inc Ottawa, ON Canada Model: ISORAD-TC1 Type B(U)-96 Transport Package October 07, 2020 Revision 1 Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 4-2 Table of Contents Section 4 - CONTAINMENT ...........................................................................................................4-3 4.1.1 Special Requirements for Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel ......................................................4-3 4.2 Containment Under Normal Conditions of Transport .......................................................4-3 4.3 Containment Under Hypothetical Accident Condition .......................................................4-4 4.4 Leakage Rate Tests for Type B Packages .............................................................................4-5 4.5 Appendix ..................................................................................................................................4-5 Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 4-3 Section 4 - CONTAINMENT
[IAEA SSR-6 648, 658, 660, & 661, IAEA TS-R-1 646, 656, 658, & 659, 10 CFR 71.43(f), and 10 CFR 71.51]
4.1 Description of the Containment System The ISORAD-TC1 package containment system is the Special Form Capsule(s) that contains the radioactive contents. This source capsule shall be qualified as Special Form radioactive material under IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, 49 CFR 173, or other equivalent regulatory body.
The containment for the radioactive contents is a seal welded 300 Series stainless steel, 400 Series stainless steel, titanium, or vanadium certificated as a Special Form Capsule. The Special Form Capsule may have diameters ranging up to 13.75 mm (0.541 in) and have wall thicknesses as small as 0.25 mm (0.009843 in). The welded radioactive source capsule, certified as special form radioactive material, must possess a valid special form certificate of Competent Authority issued under conformance to IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1 or 49 CFR Part 173 standard requirements.
In addition, a valid and current leak test analysis is required before transport of the special form in the ISORAD-TC1. Meeting special form criteria provides the primary containment of the radioactive isotope being transported.
There are no penetrations of the containment. There are no drain or fill ports, valves, seals, test ports, pressure relief devices, lids, cover plates or other closure devices. The source capsules are seal welded using a weld process that has been demonstrated to be acceptable for certification of the radioactive source capsule as Special Form radioactive material under an IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority.
There is no mechanical closure as the containment is seal welded.
4.1.1 Special Requirements for Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel Not applicable. This package is not used for the transport of spent nuclear fuel.
4.2 Containment Under Normal Conditions of Transport 1 [IAEA SSR-6 659(a), IAEA TS-R-1 657(a), 10 CFR 71.51(a)(1), 10 CFR 71.71, 10 CFR 71.75, and 49 CFR 173.469]
The seal welded and certified Special Form Capsules used in conjunction with the ISORAD-TC1 package have satisfied the requirements for the special form radioactive material as prescribed in IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, 10 CFR 71.75, and 49 CFR 173.469. There will be no release of radioactive material under the NCT.
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 4-4 Pressurization of the source capsules and contents cavity under the conditions of the HACT thermal test resulted in stresses below the yield strength of the Inner Container Contents Lid bolts as provided in Section 2.6.1.3.
The NCT criteria listed in IAEA SSR-6 719-724, IAEA TS-S-1 719-724, and 10 CFR 71.71 will result in no loss of transport package containment as prescribed in IAEA SSR-6 659(a), IAEA TS-R-1 1 657(a), and 10 CFR 71.51(a)(1). This conclusion is based on calculations and data provided in Sections 2 and 3 of the SAR. The certified Special Form Capsules have demonstrated the leak-tightness specified in this section (<1 µPa m3 s-1 as prescribed by ISO 9918 and IAEA TS-R-1). This testing provides sufficient demonstration that the containment criteria of 10CFR71.51 for normal conditions of transport have been satisfied. This demonstrates that there will be no release of radioactive material content under the NCT.
There will be no generation of combustible gases within the special form capsule and the package will not transport fissile material.
4.3 Containment Under Hypothetical Accident Condition 1
[IAEA SSR-6 659(b), IAEA TS-R-1 657(b), and 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2)]
The HACT requirements outlined in IAEA SSR-6 726-729, IAEA TS-R-1 726-729, and 10 CFR 71.73 will result in no loss of transport package containment. This conclusion is based on information presented in Section 2.7 and Section 3.4.
The pressurization of the Special Form Capsules and package under HACT accident conditions was determined to have no detrimental effect on the capsules ability to maintain containment. In addition, the Inner Container cover bolts provide an additional measure of security in ensuring pressurization of the package under the accident conditions. The containment (Special Form Capsule) will withstand the pressure variations of transport. Sections 2.7 and 3.5 of the SAR demonstrate the transport package 1 meets the containment requirements of IAEA SSR-6 659(b), IAEA TS-R-1 657(b), and 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2).
The Special Form Capsules used as containment in this package must be certified as special form radioactive material as delineated in IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1, and 10 CFR 71.
The performance of the most vulnerable special form source capsule under the HACT thermal condition is described in Section 2.6.4 and 2.7.6. Under the conditions of the HACT, the maximum differential pressure stress generated in the worst cast Special Form Capsule is less than 15% of the yield strength of the austenitic stainless steel at the test temperature. The maximum longitudinal pressure stress in the Special Form Capsule is less than 8% of the yield strength of the austenitic stainless steel at the test temperature.
No thermal stress will result from differential thermal expansion of the materials of the Special Form Capsule as the capsule is fabricated from a single material. In each special form capsule design, there is sufficient clearance between the contents and the capsule to preclude any thermal stress as a result of differential thermal expansion of the radioactive contents against the material of the Special Form Capsule.
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 4-5 4.4 Leakage Rate Tests for Type B Packages
[IAEA SSR-6 658, IAEA TS-R-1 656, 10 CFR 71.51, and ISO9978:1992(E)]
The primary containment for the radioactive material contents in the ISORAD-TC1 packages are the radioactive Special Form Capsules. Only certified Special Form Capsules are authorized for Type B transport in the ISORAD-TC1. The certification must be under IAEA SSR-6, TS-R-1, 10 CFR Part 71, or 49 CFR Part 173. The Special Form Capsule must be certified leakage free after manufacture, and again once every six months thereafter prior to transport, the source capsules are leak tested in accordance with ISO9978:1992(E) (or more recent editions) to ensure that containment of the source does not allow release of more than 0.005 Ci of radioactive material. These fabrication and periodic tests ensure that contamination release from the package does not exceed the regulatory limits.
The ISORAD-TC1 package does not have leakage test requirements as it does not contain seals and is open to the atmosphere.
Reference ISO9978:1992(E) - Radiation Protection - Sealed Radioactive Sources -
Leakage Test Methods.
4.5 Appendix No Additional Documents.
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-1 Safety Analysis Report Section 7 ISO-RAD Canada, Inc Ottawa, ON Canada Model: ISORAD-TC1 Type B(U)-96 Transport Package October 7, 2021 Revision 0 Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-2 Table of Contents Section 7 PACKAGE OPERATIONS .................................................................................................. 7-3 7.1 Package Loading .................................................................................................................... 7-3 7.1.1 Preparation for Loading .................................................................................................. 7-3 7.1.1.1 Authorized Package Contents .................................................................................. 7-3 7.1.1.2 ISORAD-TC1 Loading Instructions ........................................................................ 7-3 7.1.2 Loading of Contents ........................................................................................................ 7-4 7.1.2.1 For the Bulk & PIC Inner Container (BPIC) ........................................................... 7-4 7.1.2.2 For the Multi Port Inner Container (MPIC)............................................................. 7-4 7.1.2.3 For the Bulk & PIC Inner Container 2835A (BPIC 2835A) ................................... 7-5 7.1.2.4 Loading the Inner Container into the Outer Drum .................................................. 7-5 7.1.3 Preparation for Transport ................................................................................................ 7-5 7.2 Package Unloading................................................................................................................. 7-6 7.2.1 Receipt of Package from Carrier..................................................................................... 7-6 7.2.2 Removal of Contents....................................................................................................... 7-7 7.2.2.1 General for All Configurations ................................................................................ 7-7 7.2.2.2 For the BPIC and BPIC 2835A ............................................................................... 7-7 7.2.2.2 For the MPIC ........................................................................................................... 7-8 7.3 Preparation of an Empty Package for Transport .................................................................... 7-8 7.4 Other Operations .................................................................................................................... 7-9 7.5 Appendix ................................................................................................................................ 7-9 Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-3 Section 7 PACKAGE OPERATIONS
[IAEA SSR-6 IAEA 809(d), TS-R-1 807(d), 10 CFR 71.31(c), 10 CFR 71.35(c), 10 CFR 71.43(g),
10 CFR 71.47(b-d), 10 CFR 71.87, and 10 CFR 71.89.
Operation of the ISORAD-TC1 transport packages must be in accordance with the operating instructions supplied with the transport package, per the above referenced regulations.
7.1 Package Loading 7.1.1 Preparation for Loading 7.1.1.1 Authorized Package Contents The ISORAD-TC1 transport packages are designed for use with only special form source capsules as approved under IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-R-1 or U.S. Department of Transportation special form certification. The approved isotopes and maximum package activity limits are shown in Section 2 Table 2.6.1.A and Table 2.6.1.B. Details of encapsulation as well as chemical and physical form of the radioactive material will comply with specifications approved under the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Certificate of Compliance, U.S. Department of Transportation revalidation Certificate of Competent Authority, and the valid Special Form Certificates issued under IAEA SSR-6, IAEA TS-S-R-1, U.S. Department of Transportation, or other Competent Authority special form certifications.
7.1.1.2 ISORAD-TC1 Loading Instructions Ensure that written instructions exist for preparing the ISORAD-TC1 for loading. These written instructions must include the following steps at a minimum:
Step 1. Verify that the contents are special form and appear on the Certificate of Competent Authority issued by the regulating authority, and that the Activity contained is less than or equal to the authorized activity.
Step 2. Ensure that the package complies with the conditions of approval in the Certificate of Competent Authority. Verify that the package meets the design identified in the package approval. The package must have a nameplate that has the Type B certificate number permanently on the plate.
1 Step 3. Visually inspect bolts and screws for cracks, and replace any unsuitable bolts and screws with those supplied by the manufacturer.
Step 4. Verify that the package is in unimpaired physical condition. Surface dents and small holes are allowable in the outer housing, the drum, providing that the inner container is secured in the center of the drum. Surface dents that do not impair the proper transport and operation of the inner container are also allowed.
Step 5. Verify that the package is properly labeled.
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-4 Step 6. There are no special controls or precautions for handling the package.
7.1.2 Loading of Contents Ensure that written instructions exist for loading the ISORAD-TC1. These written instructions must include the following steps at a minimum:
7.1.2.1 For the Bulk & PIC Inner Container (BPIC)
Step 1. Load the special form capsules into the center cavity working from a properly shielded area, shielded vault, or hotcell.
1 Step 2. Insert Shield Plug Assembly into container over the center cavity, and secure into place.
Using an allen wrench, securely tighten four M6 x 1.0 stainless steel screws.
Step 3. Place the Lid over the secured Shield Plug Assembly from Step 2. When properly aligned, it should be flat and flush with the top of the BPIC.
1 Step 4. Secure the container lid in place. Using an allen wrench, securely tighten eight M8 x 1.25 screws and install the M8 x 1.25 eyebolt (assists in lifting) in the center hole.
Step 5. The BPIC is ready to be lifted and installed into the Outer Drum cavity.
Step 6. Using a manual or mechanical lifting device, place the BPIC in the cavity in the outer package.
Step 7. Remove the eyebolt.
7.1.2.2 For the Multi Port Inner Container (MPIC)
Step 1. The MPIC can load up to 10 sealed sources assemblies, one each, into the tubes working from a properly shielded area, shielded vault, or hotcell.
Step 2. Secure each source assembly using the locking mechanism.
Step 3. Install a Source Cap fitting over each source channel end.
Step 4. Install the MPIC Lid over the Locking Stud and either Step 4A. Thread the special M16 eyebolt tight to the stud to enable lifting of the MPIC; Step 4B. Thread the M16 Hex Nut tight securing the Lid to the MPIC body and use the special lifting attachment installed through the padlock hole in the Locking Stud.
1 Step 5. Using a manual or mechanical lifting device, place the MPIC in the cavity in the outer package.
Step 6. Remove the eyebolt or lifting attachment.
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-5 7.1.2.3 For the Bulk & PIC Inner Container 2835A (BPIC 2835A)
Step 1. Load the special form capsules into the center cavity working from a properly shielded area, shielded vault, or hotcell.
Step 2. Insert Shield Plug Assembly into container over the center cavity.
Step 3. Place the BPIC 2835A Lid over the Shield Plug Assembly. When properly aligned, it should be flat and flush with the top of the BPIC 2835A.
Step 4. Secure the container lid in place. Using an allen wrench, securely tighten eight M8 x 1.25 1
screws and install the M8 x 1.25 eyebolt (assists in lifting) in the center hole Step 5. The BPIC 2835A is ready to be lifted and installed into the Outer Drum cavity.
1 Step 6. Using a manual or mechanical lifting device, place the BPIC 2835A in the cavity in the outer package.
Step 7. Remove the eyebolt.
CAUTION: Failure to remove the eyebolt may cause damage to the Cork Lid Assembly.
Step 8. Install BPIC 2835A cork space(s) on top of the BPIC 2835A in the Outer Drum cavity.
7.1.2.4 Loading the Inner Container into the Outer Drum Step 1. Ensure the lifting eyebolt or lifting attachment is removed.
Step 2. Place the Cork Lid Assembly into the upper cavity of the Outer Drum.
Step 3. No additional equipment may be transported in the space between the Cork Lid Assembly and the Outer Drum Lid.
Step 4. Install the Outer Drum Lid. Secure the Outer Drum Lid to the drum by securely tightening the 1 eight M14 x 2 stainless steel bolts, M14 split lock washers, and M14 flat washers. Visually inspect the split lock washer is flat (fully compressed).
Step 5. Install two padlocks through the two Lock Studs.
Step 6. Apply tamper-evident seal.
7.1.3 Preparation for Transport Ensure that written instructions exist for preparing the ISORAD-TC1 for transport. These written Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-6 instructions must include the following steps at a minimum:
Step 1. The level of removable radioactive contamination must be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The contamination may be determined by measuring the activity on wipes taken from representative areas using an absorbent material and moderate pressure. Packages may be shipped on a nonexclusive use basis only if outer surface contamination levels are less than the values given below. It is it is the shipper's responsibility to ensure that the following conditions are met. IAEA SSR-6 508, TS-R-1 508, and 49 CFR 173.443 require that the non-fixed (removable) contamination on the external surfaces of the outer package being shipped on a nonexclusive use basis not to exceed 10-4
µCi/cm2 (0.0001 µCi/cm2) averaged over a 300 cm2 (46.5 in2) area of any part of the surface assuming a wipe efficiency of 0.10 (or the actual wipe efficiency may be used).
Step 2. Measure the maximum surface radiation level of the outer package, the drum. This Radiation level must be as low as reasonably achievable, and not exceed 2 mSv/hr (200 mR/hr). Measure the maximum radiation level at one meter (39.4 in) from the surface. This radiation level must not exceed 0.1 mSv/hr (10 mR/hr).
Step 3. Ensure that the padlocks and tamper-evident seal is properly applied.
Step 4. There are no pressure relief valves utilized on the ISORAD-TC1.
Step 5. The Outer Drum handles are the only structural parts of the package designed to meet lift and tie down requirements.
Step 6. The outer package will be properly marked, labeled and described on a shipping paper in accordance with IAEA SSR-6 531-536, 538-539, and 542; IAEA TS-R-1 535-540, 542-543, and 546; and 49 CFR 172.310 and 49 CFR 172.403.
Step 7. The ISORAD-TC1 is designed to meet nonexclusive use requirements when loaded with the maximum radioactive. Written instructions to the carrier are required for packages that require exclusive use shipment.
Step 8. There are no special instructions needed to safely open the ISORAD-TC1 package.
7.2 Package Unloading 7.2.1 Receipt of Package from Carrier The consignee must establish written procedures for receiving and safely opening the ISORAD-TC1package in accordance with applicable regulations. These procedures must include, at a minimum, these requirements.
Step 1. Schedule to either receive the package when the carrier offers it for delivery, or to take possession of the package expeditiously at the carrier's terminal.
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-7 Step 2. Monitor the external surface radiation level as soon as practical after receipt. The package must be monitored (surveyed) within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after the package is received during normal working hours, or not later than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after start of business the next working day if it is received after working hours.
NOTE: The ISORAD-TC1 package is only authorized to transport special form radioactive material, so it is only required to monitor the external surfaces of the package for removable contamination if there is evidence of degradation of package integrity, such as package that is crushed or otherwise damaged.
Step 3. Check the external package for excessive dents or damage if they might reasonably be expected to impair the inner package, including the presence of the tamper seal and lid bolt indicating that the package is, and has been, securely closed.
Step 4. Make any required notifications if the above requirements have not been met prior to proceeding to unload the package.
Step 5. The MPIC may be unloaded one source at a time into an industrial radiography device or source changer using an exchange tube. For the BPIC containers and other circumstances, a shielded vault or hotcell may be the only way to provide adequate shielding during the unloading process.
7.2.2 Removal of Contents CAUTION: The BPIC inner containers may be hot to the touch, thick thermally insulated gloves are recommended for use in handling the BPIC containers.
7.2.2.1 General for All Configurations Step 1. Remove the tamper-evident seal and padlocks from the Outer Drum Lid.
1 Step 2. Loosen and remove the eight M14 x 2 bolts from the Outer Drum Lid.
Step 3. Lift the Cork Lid Assembly from the Outer Drum to expose the BPIC or MPIC by using the finger holes in the top of the lid.
Step 4. Use the appropriate eyebolt(s) or lifting attachment to assist in lifting the BPIC or MPIC from the Outer Drum.
Step 5. Remove the BPIC or MPIC to a suitable location for transferring its radioactive contents.
7.2.2.2 For the BPIC and BPIC 2835A Follow the remaining steps to remove the contents:
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-8 Step 1. Loosen and remove the (BPIC) eight M8 x 1.25 screws or (BPIC 2835A) six M8 x 1.25 screws from the Lid of the inner container.
1 Step 2. Remove the BPIC Lid, exposing the secured down Shielded Plug Assembly.
Step 3. Remove the four M6 x 1.0 screws from the Shielded Plug Assembly.
Step 4. Lift the Shielded Plug Assembly, use appropriate measures, the plug weighs approximately 4.5 kg (9.9 pounds).
Step 5. Transfer special forms and store in shielded vault or hotcell.
7.2.2.2 For the MPIC Follow these remaining steps to remove the contents:
Step 1. Remove padlock from the Locking Stud.
Step 2. Loosen and remove the M16 Nut the MPIC Lid.
Step 3. Remove the MPIC Lid, exposing the Source Caps and Locking Mechanism.
Step 4. Loosen the Source Caps and transfer source assemblies.
7.3 Preparation of an Empty Package for Transport Step 1. Verify the ISORAD-TC1 package does not contain radioactive sources by surveying the package for higher radiation levels. This test should be performed by trained and authorized personnel who are monitored and possess a calibrated and properly operating survey instrument.
Step 2. The empty packaging may contain Depleted Uranium and may be shipped as either a labeled radioactive material package or as an excepted package, article manufactured from depleted Uranium as required by applicable U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. For the Tungsten shield versions use the appropriate empty packaging marking.
Step 3. Perform a contamination survey of the internal surfaces of the package (inner container cavity and underside of the lid). If the non-fixed surface contamination exceeds local requirements for empty package shipment, decontaminate as necessary.
Step 4. Assemble the package in the same manner as a loaded package, (with the exception that there will not be any radioactive material loaded in the package. Secure the BPIC or MPIC in the Outer Drum, install the Cork Lid Assembly, install the Outer Drum Lid, and tighten the eight M14 x 2 bolts.
Step 5. Install the padlocks and apply tamper-evident seal.
Revision 1 07 October 2021
Model: ISORAD-TC1 SAR 2020-1 Rev 1 Project: QTP-001 Page 7-9 Step 6. Perform a radiation survey to confirm that the package is empty and meets the requirements for shipment of empty packages.
Step 7. Apply the appropriate marking and labeling for the empty package.
7.4 Other Operations Not Applicable; there are no special operational controls needed.
7.5 Appendix None.
Revision 1 07 October 2021