L-21-068, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation

ML21242A125
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	08/29/2021
From:	Grabnar J Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-21-068
Download: ML21242A125 (37)

Text

energy Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

harbor Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 John J. Grabnar 724-682-5234 Site Vice President, Beaver Valley Nuclear August 29, 2021 L-21-068 10 CFR 50.90 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation" Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. hereby requests an amendment to the facility operating license for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and BVPS-2). The proposed amendment to Technical Specification 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation," would add notes to Technical Specification 3.3.5 required actions C.1 and 0.1, and revise Table 3.3.5-1, "Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation."

Notes would be added to Technical Specification 3.3.5 required actions C.1 and 0.1 to facilitate temporary bypassing of the loss of voltage functions while starting a reactor coolant pump. Voltage allowable values in Table 3.3.5-1 would be increased for relays that provide signals for emergency diesel generators to start and 4160 volt emergency buses to separate from the non-safety buses under loss of voltage conditions. New voltage allowable values would be added for new relays that have a reduced time delay and would be installed to provide signals for 4160 volt and 480 volt emergency buses to separate from the non-safety buses under degraded voltage conditions when a safety injection signal is present. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.'s evaluation of the proposed amendment is enclosed.

Approval of the proposed amendment is requested by August 31, 2022 . The amendment shall be implemented within 60 days following the planned completion of

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 L-21-068 Page 2 related modifications at BVPS-2 during the refueling outage in the fall of 2024, and at BVPS-1 during the refueling outage in the spring of 2027.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Phil H. Lashley, Manager - Fleet Licensing, at (330) 696-7208.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 29, 2021.

Sincerely, Gr.ibnar, John 19072 Site Vice President, Beaver Valley Gralms.r.Jolm 19072 ~:~  ;~;g~nf ::umc-nt 2~~

DocuS'r John J. Grabnar

Enclosure:

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment cc: NRC Region I Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRR Project Manager Director BRP/DEP Site BRP/DEP Representative

Enclosure L-21-068 Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment (34 pages follow)

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Page 1 of 21

Subject:

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation" TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 System Design and Operation 2.2 Current Technical Specification Requirements 2.3 Reason for the Proposed Change 2.4 Description of the Proposed Change

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Loss of Voltage Relay Settings 3.2 Degraded Voltage Time Delay with Safety Injection Signal

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria 4.2 Precedent 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis 4.4 Conclusions

6.0 REFERENCES

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Proposed Technical Specification Changes, Annotated Copy

2. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes, Annotated Copy

3. Vendor Loss of Voltage Relay Data Sheet Excerpts

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 2 of 21 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION This evaluation supports a request to amend renewed facility operating licenses DPR-66 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1) and NPF-73 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2).

The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation," by revising Table 3.3.5-1, Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation. Voltage allowable values would be increased for loss of voltage relays (LVRs) that provide signals for emergency diesel generators (DGs) to start (Function 1) and 4160 Volt (V) emergency buses to separate from the non-safety buses (Function 2) under loss of voltage conditions at BVPS-1 and BVPS-2. An increase in the nominal trip setpoint (NTS) for the LVRs that provide functions 1 and 2 is the reason that the associated allowable values require revision. The allowable values for the LVRs provide the operability criteria for the LVRs.

The increased LVR NTSs for functions 1 and 2 could increase the possibility that starting a reactor coolant pump would result in spurious actuation of the LVRs. Notes would be added to TS 3.3.5 required actions C.1 and D.1 to facilitate temporary bypassing of the loss of voltage functions while starting a reactor coolant pump.

New degraded voltage Function 5 (4160 V emergency bus bus separation) and Function 6 (480 V emergency bus bus separation) would be added to Table 3.3.5-1.

The new functions would be the same as existing functions 3 (4160 V emergency bus bus separation) and 4 (480 V emergency bus bus separation), but would apply when a safety injection signal is present and would have a reduced time delay. Implementation of the reduced time delay would resolve an issue identified in an NRC unresolved item.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 System Design and Operation As shown in BVPS-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Figure 8.1-1, Sheet 1 of 2, Electrical One Line Diagram, and BVPS-2 UFSAR Figure 8.3-1, Sheet 1 of 2, Main One Line Diagram, at each BVPS unit, two independent Class 1E emergency 4160 V buses (1AE and 1DF at BVPS-1, and 2AE and 2DF at BVPS-2) and switchgear are provided. Each emergency bus is supplied from a normal 4160 V station service switchgear bus (1A, 1D, 2A or 2D, respectively) which, in turn, is supplied from a selected preferred source unit station service transformer (main generator source) or system station service transformer (offsite source) with provisions for automatic transfer from the selected source to the remaining source should the selected source fail.

The normal 4160 V buses 1A, 1D, 2A, and 2D each supply power to the corresponding emergency bus through two series connected air circuit breakers (ACBs). Each series

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 3 of 21 connected ACB receives a trip signal under loss of voltage or degraded voltage conditions, thus separating the respective emergency bus, which can then be energized from its DG.

The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation. Loss of power instrumentation ensures a reliable source of emergency power by providing the following functions:

1) An automatic DG start on emergency bus undervoltage, and 2) Separation of the emergency buses on undervoltage or degraded voltage conditions.

BVPS-1 Loss of Voltage Protection BVPS-1 loss of voltage protection consists of two LVRs for each 4160 V emergency bus. One LVR actuates to open the normal supply breakers for the associated emergency bus (bus separation). The other LVR provides a start signal for the DG associated with the bus. Both LVRs have the same NTS and allowable value (with different time delays).

BVPS-2 Loss of Voltage Protection BVPS-2 loss of voltage protection consists of three LVRs for each 4160 V emergency bus. Two relays on each bus actuate to open the normal supply breakers for the associated emergency bus (with a two-out-of-two logic per bus) to provide the bus separation function. The other LVR provides a start signal for the associated DG. All three LVRs have the same NTS and allowable value (with different time delays).

Degraded Voltage Protection Degraded voltage protection for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 is provided by two DVRs (in a two-out-of-two logic per bus) on each 4160 V and associated 480 V emergency bus.

The DVRs on either the 4160 V or 480 V bus initiate a common time delay relay that actuates if the degraded voltage condition persists for the entire delay period. The supply breakers for the affected 4160 V emergency bus open and separate the bus from the degraded voltage supply if the time delay is exceeded. The two-out-of-two logic defends against a spurious DVR actuation causing bus separation.

Allowable Values Allowable Values are specified for each function in TS Table 3.3.5-1. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 Licensing Requirements Manuals.

The nominal trip setpoints are selected to ensure the setpoints measured by the surveillance procedures are not less than the minimum allowable values if the relays are performing as required.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 4 of 21 2.2 Current Technical Specification Requirements Technical Specification 3.3.5 is provided to ensure BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 DG start and bus separation instrumentation specified in Table 3.3.5-1 is operable.

Technical Specification Table 3.3.5-1 currently contains two loss of voltage functions and two degraded voltage functions as described above in Section 2.1. Function 1 (4160 V Emergency Bus DG start), and function 2 (4160 V Emergency Bus Bus Separation) specify allowable values and time delays after which LVRs provide a DG start signal and actuate to open the normal supply breakers for the affected 4160 V emergency bus. Function 3 (4160 V Emergency Bus Bus Separation) and function 4 (480 V Emergency Bus Bus Separation) specify allowable voltages and a time delay after which DVRs provide signals to open the normal supply breaker for the affected emergency bus to separate the bus from the degraded voltage supply.

2.3 Reason for the Proposed Change NRC Unresolved Item 05000334;05000412/2011007-03 (2011 Component Design Basis Inspection, Accession Number ML112130443) observed that the existing degraded voltage relay (DVR) time delay of 90+/-5 seconds did not appear to be consistent with the assumption in the UFSAR accident analysis for safety injection flow.

The inspection team found that TS Table 3.3.5-1, functions 3 and 4, listed the DVR time delay setpoint as 90+/-5 seconds. The team also noted that NRC letter dated June 2, 1977, sent to holders of operating licenses requiring the installation of DVRs to ensure safety-related loads had sufficient voltage to respond to an accident, stated in Position B.1.c that, "The allowable time delay, including margin, shall not exceed the maximum time delay that is assumed in the FSAR accident analysis." The NRC safety evaluation report dated March 3, 1982 for a TS amendment that incorporated the original DVR time delay, concluded that the proposed maximum time delay of 95 seconds "does not exceed this maximum time delay." However, the team found that BVPS-1 UFSAR Table 14.3.2-8 shows a time delay of less than or equal to 17 seconds for safety injection flow with offsite power, and less than or equal to 27 seconds with a loss-of-coolant accident coincident with a loss-of-offsite power [These values are now shown on BVPS-1 UFSAR, Revision 32, Table 14.3.2-1, page 2]. The team was concerned that if offsite source voltage was degraded below the level where it was capable of performing its accident mitigation function, but not so low as to actuate the fast acting LVRs and cause the DGs to load, the time delay assumptions in the accident analysis would not be satisfied. BVPS-2 design and accident analysis assumptions are similar to BVPS-1.

To resolve this concern, the degraded voltage protection scheme is being modified. An additional degraded voltage timing relay will be installed for each 4160 V emergency bus at each unit. The new relays will be installed in parallel with the existing degraded voltage time-delay relays but will have a reduced time delay setting that complies with the existing inputs to accident analyses. As with the existing relays, actuation of the

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 5 of 21 new relays cause the associated emergency bus to separate from the non-Class 1E power source so that the DGs can assume the load, except that the new relay output will be inhibited unless a safety injection signal exists. A license amendment is necessary to implement the improved design and achieve consistency between the TS and the time delays assumed in accident analyses.

The unresolved item was later closed in a February 5, 2013 NRC integrated inspection report for BVPS (Accession number ML13036A302) based on the licensee actions taken and planned as described in the inspection report.

2.4 Description of the Proposed Change Allowable values specified in Technical Specification Table 3.3.5-1 for voltages at which the DGs start (Function 1) and 4160 V emergency buses separate from the non-safety buses (Function 2) under loss of voltage conditions would be increased from " 2962 V" to " 3224 V" at BVPS-1 and to " 3328 V" at BVPS-2.

Increased voltage NTSs for functions 1 and 2 could increase the possibility that the voltage dip caused by starting a reactor coolant pump would cause an LVR actuation.

As a precaution to prevent spurious actuation, functions 1 and 2 should be temporarily bypassed. Therefore, it is proposed that notes be inserted in TS 3.3.5 required actions C.1 (One or more Functions with two channels per bus inoperable.) and D.1 (One or more Functions with one channel per bus inoperable.) to facilitate temporary bypassing of loss of voltage functions 1 and 2 while starting a reactor coolant pump. The notes would state that functions 1 and 2 may be bypassed for up to one hour while starting the "A" reactor coolant pump provided that the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus, and DG in the other train are operable. Intentional entry into Condition C or Condition D is already permissible per LCO 3.0.2 within the duration of the existing one-hour completion times stated for these required actions. Only the "A" reactor coolant pump (at both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2) is powered from a bus that also provides normal power to a Class 1E 4160 V bus.

Technical Specification Table 3.3.5-1 currently contains two degraded voltage functions. Function 3 (4160 V Emergency Bus Bus Separation) and Function 4 (480 V Emergency Bus Bus Separation) specify allowable voltages and a time delay after which the emergency bus separates from the normal supply bus. Functions 3 and 4 would be divided into functions 3 and 4 that apply when no safety injection signal is present and new functions 5 and 6 that would apply when a safety injection signal is present; the difference being that a shorter time delay is needed to support safety injection timing assumptions in the accident analyses. Functions 3 and 4 would be annotated to indicate that they apply when no safety injection signal is present. The new functions are needed to implement plant modifications at each unit that install an additional degraded voltage time delay relay in parallel with each existing 90-second nominal time delay relay. The new relay will start timing and execute the same output

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 6 of 21 function as the existing 90-second timer but will have a reduced nominal time delay of 4 seconds. The output of the new relay will be enabled only concurrently with a safety injection signal. The reduced time delay would achieve consistency between the TS and the time delays assumed in accident analyses.

Affected pages of the current TSs, annotated to show the proposed changes, are provided in Attachment 1. Two versions of TS page 3.3.5-3 are provided. The first page provides the changes related to the BVPS-2 plant modifications discussed above, and the second page includes the same changes related to the BVPS-2 plant modifications and includes changes related to the BVPS-1 plant modifications.

The changes shown on Technical Specification pages 3.3.5-1, 3.3.5-2 and the first page 3.3.5-3 would be implemented after the BVPS-2 plant modifications are installed.

The changes shown on the second Technical Specification page 3.3.5-3 would be implemented after the BVPS-1 plant modifications are installed.

Proposed changes to the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 Technical Specification Bases are provided for information only in Attachment 2.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Loss of Voltage Relay Settings The allowable value revision for functions 1 and 2 are based on updating operability criteria for the LVRs to support the NTS change. The LVR NTSs are being increased to ensure that running safety-related motors do not stall and trip on overcurrent during a sustained degraded voltage condition. Motors that trip on overcurrent are not available to automatically respond to an accident.

The proposed NTSs were selected to ensure automatic actuation prior to the voltages reaching the analytical limit as described in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 below. The nominal bus voltage, proposed NTSs, allowable values, analytical limits, channel statistical allowances (CSAs), and available margin are tabulated below. The CSA includes measuring and test equipment instrument uncertainties, calibration tolerances, and observed drift factors.

BVPS-1 BVPS-2 Nominal Bus Voltage 4160 V 4160 V Nominal Trip Setpoint 3266 V 3370 V Allowable Value 3224 V 3328 V Analytical Limit 3141 V 3253 V Channel Statistical Allowance +/-105 V +/-105 V Margin 19.8 V 11.5 V

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 7 of 21 3.1.1 Loss of Voltage Relay Analytical Limits To determine the minimum voltage analytical limits, load flow study cases were constructed that correspond to steady-state, maximum load conditions during normal operation. The load flow studies were used to determine the voltages at motors and motor control centers. These voltages were compared to the motor stall voltages and minimum allowable motor control center (MCC) voltages. Voltages at the safety-related 4160 V buses were iteratively adjusted to determine the minimum values that yield acceptable voltages at the downstream motors and motor control centers. Since motors supplied from MCCs are consolidated into lumped loads in the power distribution system analysis model used at BVPS, the minimum acceptable voltage at an MCC was determined by identifying the limiting motor downstream of the MCC, excluding non-safety-related equipment and equipment that is not normally running (for example, motor operated valves and dampers). The minimum acceptable voltage for each MCC ensures adequate voltage at the limiting motor. Therefore, the analytical limits for LVR voltage prevent normally running safety-related motors from stalling during degraded voltage conditions.

3.1.2 Loss of Voltage Relay Nominal Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values Setpoint uncertainty or channel statistical allowance (CSA) is calculated by a square root of the sum of squares of relevant uncertainty terms in accordance with the setpoint methodology defined in References 1 and 2. The existing CSA value (4.3%) was calculated with uncertainty terms reduced to 75% of their full span values to reflect the NTS, which is at 75% of span. The proposed CSA value (2.5%) was calculated with uncertainty terms at 100% of span. Calculation at 100% of span is more conservative because it yields a greater overall CSA value. The revised CSA inputs are otherwise the same as the existing inputs except that drift is changed from 3.79% to 1%. Accounting for uncertainty, available margins between the analytical limits and the NTSs were calculated to be 19.8 V at BVPS-1 and 11.5 V at BVPS-2.

Allowable values provide operability criteria for the LVRs. The proposed allowable values were calculated using the same method as for the existing values, by subtracting drift (42 V or 1%) from the NTSs that are being increased. NTSs are increased from 3120 V to 3266 V at BVPS-1 and from 3120 V to 3370 V at BVPS-2. Drift is also changed from 3.79% to 1% at both BVPS units. However, the 3.79% drift was extrapolated from 5% at full span to the NTS, which is at 75% of span. The proposed 1% drift is relative to 100% span. Since the proposed drift is less than currently reflected by the TS allowable value, the LVRs would have stricter criteria for demonstrating operability. The 1% drift value reflects the upper bound of a 95 percent confidence interval based on site-specific performance history gathered from calibrations and surveillances. The 5% drift value was based on vendor information.

Therefore, the proposed NTSs and allowable values are conservative.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 8 of 21 The planned settings and calibration tolerances for the LVRs are specified in Table 3.1.2-1. The LVRs do not have harmonic filters. Vendor data sheets showing the relay pickup and dropout voltages and performance tolerances are provided in Attachment 3.

3.1.3 Precautionary Actions When Starting Reactor Coolant Pumps It is proposed that a note be inserted in TS 3.3.5 required actions C.1 and D.1 associated with Condition C, One or more Functions with two channels per bus inoperable, and Condition D, One or more Functions with one channel per bus inoperable, respectively. Both notes would state that:

Functions 1 and 2 may be bypassed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> while starting the "A" RCP provided the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus, and DG in the other train are OPERABLE.

In the proposed note above, RCP is reactor coolant pump, and DG is diesel generator.

Starting the A reactor coolant pump at BVPS-1 or BVPS-2 can cause voltage dips at the 1AE or 2AE emergency 4160 V buses, respectively. Starting the B or C reactor coolant pump at either unit does not significantly affect the voltages at the emergency 4160 V buses.

Intentional entry into Conditions C or D would occur when bypassing loss of voltage functions 1 and 2 as a precaution to prevent spurious actuation of LVRs when starting the A reactor coolant pump. The proposed notes are not a technical change because they are informational in nature, do not change the intent of the existing TS, and reinforce existing LCO 3.0.2 requirements.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 9 of 21 Table 3.1.2-1, Loss of Voltage Relay Calibration Tolerances Unit 1 4160 V Emergency Bus, Bus Separation Relays Relay Information Settings Tolerances ID Type Model Dropout (V) Pickup (V) Dropout (V) Pickup (V) 27-VE100 47H 211N0171 93.3 100 +/-0.5 +/-2 27-VF100 47H 412N0175 93.3 100 +/-0.5 +/-2 Unit 1 4160 V Emergency Bus, DG Start Relays Relay Information Settings Tolerances ID Type Model Dropout (V) Pickup (V) Dropout (V) Pickup (V) 27-VE1100 47H 211N0171 93.3 96.2 +/-0.5 +/-1.92 27-VF1100 47H 412N0175 93.3 96.2 +/-0.5 +/-1.92 Unit 2 4160 V Emergency Bus, Bus Separation Relays Relay Information Settings Tolerances ID Type Model Dropout (V) Pickup (V) Dropout (V) Pickup (V) 27-VE200 47D 211N4171 96.3 102.1 +/-0.5 +/-2.04 27-VE1200 47D 211N4171 96.3 102.1 +/-0.5 +/-2.04 27-VF200 47D 211N4171 96.3 102.1 +/-0.5 +/-2.04 27-VF1200 47D 211N4171 96.3 102.1 +/-0.5 +/-2.04

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 10 of 21 Table 3.1.2-1, Loss of Voltage Relay Calibration Tolerances Unit 2 4160 V Emergency Bus, DG Start Relays Relay Information Settings Tolerances ID Type Model Dropout (V) Pickup (V) Dropout (V) Pickup (V) 27-VE2200 47D 211N6171 96.3 109 +/-0.5 +/-2.18 27-VF2200 47D 211N6171 96.3 109 +/-0.5 +/-2.18 Notes:

1. As-found tolerances (AFT) and as-left tolerances (ALT) are identical.

2. The potential transformer ratios are 4200/120. The dropout and pickup settings in the table can be converted to primary voltage values by multiplying by 35.

3. The pickup tolerances expressed in volts are based on the assumption that the pickup tolerances are +/-2% of the pickup voltage setting.

4. The dropout tolerances are to be maintained at +/-0.5 V to be consistent with the supporting uncertainty calculations.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 11 of 21 3.2 Degraded Voltage Time Delay with Safety Injection Signal The proposed amendment would divide existing Table 3.3.5-1 degraded voltage functions into two subsets: those that apply when no safety injection signal is present and those that apply when a safety injection signal is present. Existing functions 3 and 4 having a 90-second time delay would be duplicated by new functions 5 and 6, but with a reduced 4-second time delay applicable only with a concurrent safety injection signal.

Existing functions 3 and 4 would be unchanged, except that they would be identified as applicable when no safety injection signal is present. The revision to functions 3 and 4 is acceptable because the existing requirements stated for these functions are unchanged.

New functions 5 and 6 would be applicable when a degraded voltage condition is detected coincident with a safety injection signal. Function 5 and 6 allowable value voltages remain the same as functions 3 and 4 because a plant modification would install an additional degraded voltage time delay relay in parallel with the existing 90-second time delay relay. The existing time delay relay and associated DVRs remain unchanged. Both timing relays would be initiated by the same DVR signal. Only the time delay differs. The basis for the proposed time delay that would apply when a safety injection signal is present is discussed below.

3.2.1 Maximum Time Delay Analytical Limit The analytical maximum time delays during accident conditions were determined to be 4.4 seconds at BVPS-1 and 4.7 seconds at BVPS-2. The maximum time delays were selected to preclude overcurrent protective devices from tripping during degraded voltage conditions before the degraded voltage time delay is reached and to be within the 10-second assumption in accident analyses for the DGs to start and be capable of accepting loads following a safety injection signal.

To establish the analytical maximum time delays during accident conditions, an analysis for each unit was performed. Analysis results are contingent on replacing or changing the settings of some overcurrent relays at 4160 V buses 1AE, 1DF, 2AE, and 2DF. The analysis primarily applies to motors that start in response to a safety injection signal.

Under degraded voltage conditions, the motors are not guaranteed to have adequate starting voltage and are therefore assumed to stall. A stalled motor draws significantly more current than a running motor, which results in stalled motors tripping more quickly than running motors. Stall currents were calculated for the relevant motors. For motors powered directly from 4160 V buses and 480 V unit substations, the minimum trip time at the stall current for each motor was determined using time-current curves for the associated overcurrent protective devices. The minimum of all the trip times (excluding non-safety-related equipment) was used to establish a maximum DVR time delay limit

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 12 of 21 for accident conditions. The minimum trip time of 4160 V motors was determined to be more limiting than for 480 V motors.

For motors powered from 480 V MCCs, time-current curves for each breaker or overload heater were used to determine the minimum trip current that corresponds to six seconds. Six seconds exceeds the minimum trip times of the motors powered directly from the 4160 V buses and 480 V unit substations. For each motor, the trip current value that corresponds to a six-second trip time was then confirmed to be greater than the stall current for that motor. Therefore, the stall current is not great enough to result in a trip time that is less than six seconds. Therefore, proposed maximum time delay analytical limits at both BVPS units are conservative.

Temporary degraded voltage conditions are not expected to significantly affect overload heater function. Equipment that relies on battery chargers and inverters is backed-up by the station batteries. The temporary changes to performance of a battery charger or inverter due to degraded voltage conditions are not expected to prevent other safety-related equipment from performing its specified safety function.

3.2.2 Minimum Time Delay Analytical Limit The analytical minimum time delays during accident conditions were determined to be 2.5 seconds at BVPS-1 and 2.2 seconds at BVPS-2. The minimum time delays were selected to provide adequate time for bus voltages to recover and DVRs to reset following fast bus transfers and are longer than the voltage transients associated with block starting safety-injection equipment.

To establish the analytical minimum time delays during accident conditions, an analysis for each unit was performed using a model of the electrical distribution system. The model was used to simulate electrical transients caused by fast bus transfers and motor starts and to produce plots of voltage versus time for various study cases. The results of these simulations were reviewed to confirm that the minimum time delays would exceed the durations of voltage transients caused by block starting safety-injection equipment or by fast bus transfers, whichever is more limiting. Voltage transients associated with block-starting safety injection equipment subside within 2.5 seconds for BVPS-1 and 2.2 seconds for BVPS-2, thus defining the analytical minimum time delays.

3.2.3 Time Delay Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value The new degraded voltage time delay relay is an ABB solid state timing relay, Type 62T with a range of 0.01 to 9.99 seconds. Since the time delay relay setpoints should be as long as permissible to minimize the potential for inadvertent relay actuation and to preserve operating margin, an NTS of 4.00 seconds has been chosen.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 13 of 21 The CSA is calculated by a square root of the sum of squares of relevant uncertainty terms plus a positive bias. For the time delay relay, the bias reflects a time delay relay fixed delay of 0.005 seconds (one half of the least significant digit) plus up to 0.016 seconds for time delay relay output stage delay. The DVR introduces an additional 0.1 second delay to actuate the time delay relay. The resultant CSA value is +0.33 seconds to -0.21 seconds. With an NTS of 4.0 seconds, margin to the BVPS-1 upper analytical limit accounting for uncertainty is 4.4 - 4.0 - 0.33 or 0.07 seconds. Margin with respect to the lower analytical limit is 4.0 - 2.5 - 0.21 or 1.29 seconds. At BVPS-2 the respective margins are 0.37 seconds and 1.59 seconds. Margin exists between the proposed NTS, allowable values, and analytical limits tabulated below.

BVPS-1 BVPS-2 Maximum Analytical Limit 4.4 sec. 4.7 sec.

Margin to Maximum AL 0.07 sec. 0.37 sec.

Nominal Trip Setpoint 4.00 sec. 4.00 sec.

Margin to Minimum AL 1.29 sec. 1.59 sec.

Minimum Analytical Limit 2.5 sec. 2.2 sec.

Channel Statistical Allowance +0.33/-0.21 sec. +0.33/-0.21 sec.

Allowable Value 4.00+/-0.18 sec. 4.00+/-0.18 sec.

The proposed TS allowable values for the time delay reflect the amount of drift relative to the NTS that would be considered acceptable over a calibration interval without declaring the time delay relay inoperable. BVPS does not currently have calibration data for the ABB 62T, and ABB does not publish drift values for the ABB 62T series of relays. In the absence of vendor supplied drift values and plant operating data for the new time delay relays, a 1.8% drift value was applied. Based on the full range (9.99 seconds) of the time delay relay, drift would be +/-0.18 seconds over a 54-month calibration period. The proposed minimum allowable values reflect this value.

Instrument drift is monitored at Beaver Valley Power Station using the Measured Maintenance Data system, (MMD) which calculates device drift for each equipment calibration and surveillance based on as-left and as-found data. Excessive drift is addressed through the Corrective Action Program with condition reports. Drift values determined by MMD data provide the bases for the drift utilized in the uncertainty calculations for determining the CSA values and surveillance acceptance criteria.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. proposes to amend the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS) Technical Specifications. The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 14 of 21 and Bus Separation Instrumentation" and associated Table 3.3.5-1. Allowable values in Table 3.3.5-1 for voltages at which the emergency diesel generators (DGs) start (Function 1) and 4160 V emergency buses separate from the non-safety buses (Function 2) under loss of voltage conditions at BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 would be increased. This would allow the nominal trip setpoints for loss of voltage relays (LVRs) to be increased, introducing the possibility that starting a reactor coolant pump could result in spurious actuation of the LVRs. Notes would be added to Technical Specification 3.3.5 required actions C.1 and D.1 to facilitate temporary bypassing of the loss of voltage functions while starting a reactor coolant pump. The notes would state that loss of voltage protective functions may be bypassed for up to one hour while starting the "A" reactor coolant pump provided that the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus and diesel generator in the other train are operable.

Table 3.3.5-1, functions 3 and 4 associated with 4160 V bus separation under degraded voltage conditions would be divided into functions 3 and 4 that apply when no safety injection signal is present and new functions 5 and 6 that would apply when a safety injection signal is present. A shorter time delay would be applied in the new functions 5 and 6.

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50), Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, "Electric power systems," requires that an onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents. The proposed amendment involves settings applied to loss of voltage relays and degraded voltage time delay relays that help maintain vital functions required by GDC 17.

The requested amendment would permit an increase to LVR voltage settings and the addition of a new time delay that applies when a degraded voltage condition exists coincident with a safety injection signal. The increase of the LVR settings is in a conservative direction with respect to plant safety and prevents normally running safety-related motors from stalling and consequently tripping under degraded voltage conditions. The new time delay is less than the time required to start a DG and be ready to assume loads. It also is short enough to ensure that motors that start in response to a safety injection signal will not stall and trip when a degraded voltage condition exists.

These changes preserve the functions of equipment needed to assure that (1) specified

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 15 of 21 acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 36 (10 CFR 50.36),

"Technical Specifications," requires that each applicant for a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility shall include in his application proposed technical specifications in accordance with the requirements of that section.

Furthermore, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), Limiting conditions for operation, requires that limiting conditions for operation be established. The proposed amendment would revise existing allowable values and insert additional allowable values in Table 3.3.5-1 that are used to determine operability of loss of power diesel generator start and bus separation instrumentation as required by Technical Specification limiting condition for operation 3.3.5.

Branch Technical Position (BTP) 8-6, March 2007, "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages," provides guidance for use in NRC review of license applications.

BTP 8-6 Section B.1, Item b describes two second level time delays. This license amendment request proposes a second level undervoltage time delay, long enough to establish the existence of a sustained degraded voltage condition. If a safety injection signal occurs coincident with the degraded voltage, the Class 1E distribution system will be separated from the offsite power system when the time delay expires. The time delay is within the 10 seconds following a safety injection signal that is assumed in accident analyses for the DGs to start and be capable of accepting load.

BTP 8-6 Section B.1, Item d states that the technical specifications should include limiting conditions for operations, surveillance requirements, trip setpoints, and maximum and minimum allowable values for the first level of undervoltage protection (LOOP) relays and the second-level (degraded voltage) protection sensors and associated time delay devices. This license amendment request proposes to incorporate TS allowable values associated with an additional second level undervoltage time delay that applies when a safety injection signal exists. Allowable values for the first level undervoltage protection relays are being changed to ensure that running safety-related motors do not stall and trip on overcurrent during a sustained degraded voltage condition.

Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2011-12, Revision 1, "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages," dated December 29, 2011, further clarifies the NRC staff's technical position. The RIS provides the following guidance regarding the degraded voltage time delay:

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 16 of 21 c) The time delay selected shall be based on the following conditions:

(1) The allowable time delay, including margin, shall not exceed the maximum time delay that is assumed in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) accident analyses; Note: Time delay condition (1) indicates that the DVR circuits should be designed assuming coincident sustained degraded grid voltage and accident events. Upon the onset of the coincident accident and degraded grid event, the time delay for the DVR circuit should allow for separation of the 1E buses from the offsite circuit(s) and connection to the 1E onsite supplies in time to support safety system functions to mitigate the accident in accordance with the FSAR accident analyses.

(2) The time delay shall override the effect of expected short duration grid disturbances, preserving availability of the offsite power source(s); and (3) The allowable time duration of a degraded voltage condition at all distribution system levels shall not result in failure of safety-related systems or components The proposed TS amendment establishes an additional requirement that the DVR time delay does not exceed the time assumed in accident analyses for starting a DG. Upon the onset of the coincident accident and degraded grid event, the time delay for the DVR circuit would allow for separation of the 1E buses from the offsite circuit(s) and connection to the 1E onsite supplies in time to support safety system functions to mitigate the accident in accordance with the FSAR accident analyses. The minimum time delays were selected to provide adequate time for bus voltages to recover and DVRs to reset following fast bus transfers and are longer than the voltage transients associated with block-starting safety injection equipment. The maximum time delays were selected to preclude overcurrent protective devices from tripping during degraded voltage conditions before the degraded voltage time delay is reached.

4.2 Precedent A license amendment was granted for Fermi 2, on October 20, 2010 (Accession No. ML102770382). This amendment is similar to the BVPS request in that it added a new allowable time delay for coincident degraded voltage and accident conditions. The change was requested to implement a modification that installed an additional time delay relay for accident conditions in parallel with an existing longer duration timer for non-accident conditions. It differs from the BVPS request in that the changes at Fermi 2

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 17 of 21 were made to allowable voltage values for degraded voltage conditions, but no changes were made to the loss of voltage allowable values.

4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. is requesting an amendment to the facility operating license for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and BVPS-2). The proposed amendment to Technical Specification 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation, would add notes to Technical Specification 3.3.5 required actions C.1 and D.1, and revise Table 3.3.5-1, Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation.

Notes would be added to Technical Specification 3.3.5 required actions C.1 and D.1 to facilitate temporary bypassing of the loss of voltage functions while starting a reactor coolant pump. Voltage allowable values in Table 3.3.5-1 would be increased for relays that provide signals for emergency diesel generators (DGs) to start and 4160 volt (V) emergency buses to separate from the non-safety buses under loss of voltage conditions. New voltage allowable values would be added for new relays that have a reduced time delay and would be installed to provide signals for 4160 V and 480 V emergency buses to separate from the non-safety buses under degraded voltage conditions when a safety injection signal present. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. has evaluated whether a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, Issuance of amendment, as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

Spurious separation of the emergency buses from the non-safety buses is within the scope of a loss of offsite power event (BVPS-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report ,

or UFSAR, Section 14.1.11 and BVPS-2 UFSAR Section 15.2.6). The proposed amendment would increase allowable voltages for loss of voltage relay (LVR) settings so that nominal trip setpoints at which the DGs start and 4160 V emergency buses separate from the associated non-safety buses under loss of voltage conditions can be increased. The increased setpoints could make the possibility of unnecessary separation of an emergency bus more likely; however, since the proposed allowable voltages were selected to avoid unnecessary tripping of the LVRs due to expected transients and the allowable voltages are still significantly less than normal bus voltage, the change in probability is insignificant. Therefore, the increased LVR allowable voltage does not involve a significant increase in the probability of a previously evaluated accident.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 18 of 21 LVRs function to mitigate loss of offsite power. Loss of offsite power is assumed in a variety of previously evaluated accidents. When offsite power is lost, the increased LVR setpoints would cause bus separation to occur more readily than with the existing setpoints. Since the mitigating action of the LVRs would still occur, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents are not increased.

The proposed amendment would divide existing degraded voltage functions 3 and 4 into two sets of functions, one that applies when no safety injection signal is present, and a new set (functions 5 and 6) that applies when a safety injection signal is present.

Each set retains the requirements of existing functions 3 and 4, except that functions 5 and 6 would have a reduced time delay of 4 seconds. When a safety injection signal occurs, DGs receive a signal to start. Accident analyses allow 10 seconds for DGs to start and be ready to assume load. New functions 5 and 6 would require bus separation under coincident degraded voltage conditions to occur 4 seconds following the safety injection signal. Therefore bus separation would occur in sufficient time to be powered by the DGs when ready to be loaded. Additionally, the new time delay was selected to preclude overcurrent protective devices for safety-related equipment powered from the DGs from tripping during the 4-second time delay. Therefore the changes to the degraded voltage time delay functions are consistent with existing accident analysis timing and equipment availability assumptions, and do not increase the consequences of previously evaluated accidents.

Proposed functions 5 and 6 are accident mitigation functions that apply only when a safety injection signal exists (that is, an accident is in progress). As such they do not affect the probability of an accident.

The proposed amendment would insert notes in Technical Specification 3.3.5, Required Actions C.1 (One or more Functions with two channels per bus inoperable.) and D.1 (One or more Functions with one channel per bus inoperable.) stating that loss of voltage protective functions may be bypassed for up to one hour while starting the "A" reactor coolant pump provided that the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus and DG in the other train are operable. Intentional entry into Condition C or D would occur when bypassing loss of voltage functions as a precaution to prevent spurious actuation of LVRs when starting a reactor coolant pump. Since the proposed notes only serve to emphasize the more generalized requirements of existing technical specification LCO 3.0.2, they are informational in nature and do not change the intent of the existing technical specifications. Therefore, the proposed notes have no effect on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 19 of 21

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed amendment would increase allowable voltages for LVR settings so that nominal trip setpoints can be increased. Implementation of the increase requires no modifications to system design or functions except that LVR actuation would occur at a greater voltage when loss of voltage occurs. Loss of offsite power is a previously evaluated accident that assumes loss of voltage. Therefore, increased allowable voltages for LVRs does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Proposed Table 3.3.5-1 functions 5 and 6 would maintain the existing requirements of functions 3 and 4 but have reduced time delays that apply only when a safety injection signal exists. Existing functions 3 and 4 would remain unchanged. The reduced time delays would be implemented by installing a new 4-second time delay relay in parallel with each existing 90-second time delay relay. Since the new relays can only fail in the same way as the existing relays, introduction of new functions 5 and 6 does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment would insert notes in Technical Specification 3.3.5, Required Actions C.1 and D.1. Since the proposed notes only serve to emphasize existing technical specification requirements stated in another section, the proposed notes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Increased nominal trip setpoints for LVRs preclude normally running, safety-related motors from stalling and tripping during degraded voltage conditions. When offsite power is lost, the increased LVR setpoints cause bus separation to occur more readily than with the existing setpoints. Since the mitigating action of the LVRs would still be accomplished and normally running, safety-related motors would not stall and trip during degraded voltage conditions, safety-related equipment will be available to function as assumed in accident analyses. Therefore, the change in LVR setpoints and corresponding allowable values does not reduce a margin of safety.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 20 of 21 Proposed Table 3.3.5-1 functions 5 and 6 would maintain the existing requirements of functions 3 and 4 but would have reduced time delays that apply only when a safety injection signal exists. Existing functions 3 and 4 would remain unchanged. The new time delay is consistent with existing accident analysis timing assumptions that allow 10 seconds for starting a DG. Additionally, the time delay is selected to preclude overcurrent protective devices from tripping during degraded voltage conditions and rendering motors unable to restart automatically when power is restored. This enables affected equipment to function under coincident degraded voltage and accident conditions as currently assumed in accident analyses under coincident loss of voltage and accident conditions. Therefore, the new time delay does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendment would insert notes in Technical Specification 3.3.5, Required Actions C.1 and D.1. Since the proposed notes only serve to emphasize existing technical specification requirements stated in another section, the proposed notes have no effect on margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

4.4 Conclusions In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Evaluation of the Proposed Amendment Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Page 21 of 21 Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-11419, Revision 6, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems - Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1.

2. Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-11366, Revision 7, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems - Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2.

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5 "Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation" Attachment 1 Proposed Technical Specification Changes, Annotated Copy The following is a list of the affected pages.

3.3.5-1 3.3.5-2 3.3.5-3 3.3.5-3

LOP DG Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation 3.3.5 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5 The DG Start and Bus Separation instrumentation specified in Table 3.3.5-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS

- NOTE -

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the applicable Immediately with one or more required Condition(s) referenced in channels inoperable. Table 3.3.5-1 for the affected channel(s).

B. One or more Functions ------------------------------------------------

with one channel per bus - NOTE -

inoperable. The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels provided the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus, and DG in the other train are OPERABLE.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> B.1 Place channel in trip.

C. One or more Functions C.1 Restore one channel per 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with two channels per bus bus to OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

---

NOTE ----------------------------------------

Functions 1 and 2 may be bypassed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> while starting the A RCP provided the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus, and DG in the other train are OPERABLE.

Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.3.5 - 1 Amendments 282 / 166

LOP DG Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation 3.3.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One or more Functions D.1 Restore inoperable 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with one channel per bus channel to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

E. Required Action and E.1 Enter applicable Immediately associated Completion Condition(s) and Required Time not met. Action(s) for the associated DG made inoperable by LOP DG start or Bus Separation instrumentation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------

- NOTE -

Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.3 Verify ESF RESPONSE TIMES are within limit. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

---

NOTE ---------------------------------------

Functions 1 and 2 may be bypassed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> while starting the A RCP provided the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus, and DG in the other train are OPERABLE.

Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.3.5 - 2 Amendments 292 / 179

LOP DG Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation 3.3.5 Table 3.3.5-1 (page 1 of 1)

Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation REQUIRED UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CHANNELS ALLOWABLE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION PER BUS CONDITIONS VALUE VALUE Loss of Voltage

1. 4160 V Emergency 1 D, E 2962 V with a 2962 3328 V with a Bus DG start time delay of time delay of 0.33

< 0.9 seconds 0.03 seconds

2. 4160 V Emergency 1 (Unit 1) D,E (Unit 1) 2962 V with a 2962 3328 V with a Bus Bus Separation 2 (Unit 2) B,C,E (Unit 2) time delay of 1.0 time delay of 1.0 0.1 seconds 0.1 seconds Degraded Voltage (without safety injection signal)

3. 4160 V Emergency 2 B,C,E 3885.4 V with a 3873 V with a time Bus Bus Separation time delay of 90 delay of 90 5.0 5.0 seconds seconds

4. 480 V Emergency Bus 2 B,C,E 448.3 V with a 446.9 V with a time Bus Separation time delay of 90 delay of 90 5.0 5.0 seconds seconds Degraded Voltage (with safety injection signal)

5. 4160 V Emergency 2 B, C, E N/A 3873 V with a time Bus Bus Separation delay of 4.00 0.18 seconds

6. 480 V Emergency Bus 2 B, C, E N/A 446.9 V with a time Bus Separation delay of 4.00 0.18 seconds Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.3.5 - 3 Amendments 278 / 161

LOP DG Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation 3.3.5 Table 3.3.5-1 (page 1 of 1)

Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation REQUIRED UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CHANNELS ALLOWABLE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION PER BUS CONDITIONS VALUE VALUE Loss of Voltage

1. 4160 V Emergency 1 D, E 2962 3224 V with 3328 V with a time Bus DG start a time delay of delay of 0.33 0.03

< 0.9 seconds seconds

2. 4160 V Emergency 1 (Unit 1) D,E (Unit 1) 2962 3224 V with 3328 V with a time Bus Bus Separation 2 (Unit 2) B,C,E (Unit 2) a time delay of 1.0 delay of 1.0 0.1 0.1 seconds seconds Degraded Voltage (without safety injection signal)

3. 4160 V Emergency 2 B,C,E 3885.4 V with a 3873 V with a time Bus Bus Separation time delay of 90 delay of 90 5.0 5.0 seconds seconds

4. 480 V Emergency Bus 2 B,C,E 448.3 V with a 446.9 V with a time Bus Separation time delay of 90 delay of 90 5.0 5.0 seconds seconds Degraded Voltage (with safety injection signal)

5. 4160 V Emergency 2 B, C, E 3885.4 V with a 3873 V with a time Bus Bus Separation time delay of 4.00 delay of 4.00 0.18 0.18 seconds seconds

6. 480 V Emergency Bus 2 B, C, E 448.3 V with a 446.9 V with a time Bus Separation time delay of 4.00 delay of 4.00 0.18 0.18 seconds seconds Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.3.5 - 3 Amendments 278 / 161

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5 "Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation" Attachment 2 Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes, Annotated Copy The following is a list of the affected pages.

B 3.3.5-1 B 3.3.5-5

LOP DG Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation B 3.3.5 FOR INFORMATION ONLY B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation.

The LOP instrumentation ensures a reliable source of emergency power by providing the following Functions: 1) An automatic DG start on emergency bus undervoltage, and 2) Separation of the emergency buses on undervoltage and degraded voltage conditions.

Loss of Voltage Protection Unit 1 The Unit 1 loss of voltage protection consists of two relays for each of the 4160 V emergency buses. One relay actuates to open the normal supply breakers for the associated emergency buses (bus separation). The other loss of voltage relay provides a start signal for the DG associated with the bus. Both loss of voltage relays have the same nominal trip setpoint and Allowable Value (with different time delays). The minimum relay setting ensures that running safety-related motors do not stall and trip on overcurrent during sustained degraded voltage conditions.

Unit 2 The Unit 2 loss of voltage protection consists of three relays for each 4160 V emergency bus. Two relays on each bus actuate to open the normal supply breakers for the associated emergency buses (with a two-out-of-two logic per bus) to provide the bus separation function. The other loss of voltage relay provides a start signal for the associated DG.

All three loss of voltage relays have the same nominal trip setpoint and Allowable Value (with different time delays). The minimum relay setting ensures that running safety-related motors do not stall and trip on overcurrent during sustained degraded voltage conditions.

Degraded Voltage Protection In addition to the loss of voltage protection, degraded voltage protection for both Units is provided by two relays on each 4160 V emergency bus and two relays on each 480 V emergency bus. The two relays on each bus actuate upon a reduced voltage condition that exists for an extended time. The relays actuate (in a two-out-of-two logic per bus) to open the normal supply breakers and separate the affected emergency bus from the degraded voltage supply. The two-out-of-two logic helps prevent a spurious relay actuation from causing bus separation.

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 LOP instrumentation is described in UFSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 1).

Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.5 - 1 Revision 0

LOP DG Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation B 3.3.5 FOR INFORMATION ONLY BASES ACTIONS (continued) train are OPERABLE. This allowance is made where bypassing the channel does not cause an actuation and where the other electrical train remains OPERABLE to supply emergency power if required.

The specified Completion Time and time allowed for bypassing one channel are justified in Reference 4.

C.1 Condition C applies when more than one loss of voltage or more than one degraded voltage channel per bus are inoperable. The Condition is applicable to two inoperable channels on one bus or two inoperable channels on each bus.

Required Action C.1 requires restoring one channel per bus to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time should allow ample time to repair most failures and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring an LOP instrument actuation during this interval.

The Required Action is modified by a Note to allow Functions 1 and 2 to be bypassed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> while starting the A RCP provided the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus, and DG in the other train are OPERABLE. This allowance prevents the spurious actuation of the loss of voltage relays associated with functions 1 and 2.

D.1 Condition D applies when one loss of voltage channel per bus is inoperable and is applicable only to those LOP Functions on Table 3.3.5-1 with a single loss of voltage channel per bus. The Condition is applicable to a single inoperable channel on one bus or a single inoperable channel on each bus.

Required Action D.1 requires restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time should allow ample time to repair most failures and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring a LOP instrument actuation during this interval.

The Required Action is modified by a Note to allow Functions 1 and 2 to be bypassed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> while starting the A RCP provided the corresponding instrument channels, electrical bus, and DG in the other train are OPERABLE. This allowance prevents the spurious actuation of the loss of voltage relays associated with functions 1 and 2.

Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.5 - 5 Revision 10

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5 "Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start and Bus Separation Instrumentation" Attachment 3 Vendor Loss of Voltage Relay Data Sheet Excerpts Instruction Bulletin IB 7.4.1.7-2, Issue B, Applies to Series 211N Relays Instruction Bulletin IB 7.4.1.7-2, Issue D, Applies to Series 412N Relays (Four pages follow)

BBC 18 7.4.1.1-2 REFER TO ADDENDUM A lt*ue B BROWN BOVERI FO R CATALOG NUMBERS Instructions BEGINNING W ITH DIGIT "4" I-T-E Three Phase Voltag e Relays Three Phase Undervolt age and Phase Sequence Relays ITE-47 Inverse ITE-470 Definite Tirne

.ITE-47H 'High Speed ITE -47 BBC Brown Boveri, Inc.

1B 7.4.1.7-2 PAGE 6 SOLID-STATE VOLTAGE RELAYS (Continued from page 4)

Ret~~~-ing to the open-cond~~-t~~-~ituation with the Rating solid-state relay set .for 80% dropou~.-it* can detect * * " 160,.Vac continuous, 50/60 -Hz,'.. * *.

unbalances of only 10% negative-sequence compo-

. nent. i=or"a staring' current of6 pe*r u'riit; ttiis reiay can*.,, Burden. (*per phase at 120V, -3 phase).

Ph.a ~ A- 0.35 V_A, 1.0.,P.f protect that motor with an**open phase. . .' *- .

• Phase B - 0.60 VA. 1.0 pf

• • Inspection of Fig 4B shows -that it is possible to

• Phase C - 0.40 VA, *1:0 pf.

adjust the relay for more sensitivity to unbalance by Output Circuit adjusting the dropout voltage. For example with a Contact rating, each contact:

90% dropout setting,. the relay ca~ detect 5%

30A tripping duty negative-sequence.

SA continuous 1A break resistive RATINGS 0.3A break inductive Input Circuit Control Power Taps - see relay front panel See relay nameplate for rated control power.

Pickup: 90, 100. 110, 120 Vac Avai lable ratings include:

Dropout: 70, 80, 90, 98 percent of pickup, or 48/125 Vdc at 0.08 ampere 30, 40, 50, 60 percent of pickup 24/32 Vdc at 0.08 ampere Time Delay: see time-voltage characteristic 120Vac 50/60 Hz at 0.08 ampere (when AC con-curves trol power is used, source should be indepen-NOTE:Pickup, dropout, and time delay can be dent of phase voltages being applied to relay changed from fixed tap settings by means input circuits).

of internal adjustments - see Calibration section. Temperature Tolerances Nominal 25° ambient Pickup: +/- 5% of tap setting Additional :!:5% tolerance -1s*c to +ss*c Dropout: +/- 1Cl% of tap setting Must Operate -30°c to + 75°C Time Delay: +/- 10% of tap setting (dropout)

+/-25% of tap setting (pickup)

Tolerences listed are based on the printed dial markings on the front panel of the relay. By using the calibration procedures on pg. 10 the relay may be set precisely to the desire values of pickup, d ropout. and time delay, with excellent repeatabil ity.

jl 1111 ASEABAOWN BOVEAI INSTRUCTIONS 1B 7.4.1.7-2 Issue D Three-Phase Voltage Relay CIRCUIT 8 SHIELD ~

• THREE-PHASE UNOERVOLTAGE AND PHASE-SEQUENCE RELAYS TYPE 47 Inverse Delay TYPE 470 Oef.inite Delay TYPE 47H Instantaneous Catalog Series 412F/412N Drawout Test Case Catalog Series 212F/212N Standard case ASEA BROWN BOVERI-*

1B 7.4. l.7 2 Three-Phase Unden'o~tage Relays Page 8 SPECIFICATIONS Input Circuit Rati:og: 120v rnodels: I60vac, conhnuous. SU or 60 Hz.

208v models: novae, continuous, S*Oor 60 [ Iz.

Burde:ii'. 120'\I' ,nodel:s: less th.an VA, 1.0 PF al 120 volts.

208v models: ]ess th.au VA., 1.0 PF fll 208 v-olts.

Taps.: available models im;l11d~

Types47,.47D, 47H : Pickup 90, 100, l IO, 120 vac.

Pickup, I 55, ns, 190, 208 vac.

Dropo11t 70, 80, 90, 98% of pickup.

Types 47D, 47H: Pickup 90, 100, 1.10. ]20 vac.

Dropout 30, 40, 50, 60% of pid..1.tp.

Operating Tim.cc See Time-Vol,age duncteristic cur,;,es I.hat follow.

lnstan,ta11eou.e Units (f)'j)e 47H)c 3 cycles maximum, typical.

Reset Time (all types): less lhan ISO milliseconds.

Qui.put CiJcuit Each -contact @ 125 Vdc: @250 Vdc:

30 ar:npc11es )Oampe11es tri ppjng duty.

5 amperes 5 an peres oomhnuous.

1 ampere 0 ,) ampere break, resistive.

0.3 ampere 0.1 ampere break, inductive.

Series Target Coil: J arnpere or more of trip drc,u it current wm insure t.1rget oper.i.tioi:

Withstand: 30 amtpe.res, J second.

Cod resis,tance: negligible.

Ope1ati,1g Te:mperiuure Range: -JO 10 -+-70 deg, C, Control Power: Models available for 4 t / l!.25 v*dc @ Q.05 A max.

48/lJO, vdc @ 0.05 ]\ max.

24/ 32 vdc @ 0.08 A max.

220 vdo @ 0.05 A max.

250 vdc: @ 0.05 A max.

120- vac 50/60 HZ. @ 0 . 05 A max.

AUowabte vari:nion: 24 vdc nominal: 19-29 vdc 32 vdc 25*38 48 vdo 38-58 110 vd,o 88-125 125 220 vdc vdc . 100-uo l 7*6 -246 2'50 vdc 200-280 120 vac 95-135 v .a c Tok:rtmc.es: Operating Voltage: +/. 3% lypicll l These to,leranoes are b sed on the printed dial markings. By usi

+/. 5%max. the calibral ion procedur*es given !aler in this book, the relay ma:

~-el rnore precisely to 1he desired values ofoperotillg voltage Operal:ing Time: +/. 10% and ddoy wilh exc.eUent repeat.ability.

Repeatability: variation i.n opef/lling v,oltage for a +/~ l0% varia1ion in ooutrol voltage: -ti* 0.25%, 1ypical.

vairial ion in operating v,oltag.e over the temp~rat1.J1re tllillge

-20 to+ 55 deg C: +/- 2~o.. typicn!.

Dielectric Streuglit: 2000 vac, 50/60 Hz., all circuits to ground.

Seismic Capability: More Uuit 6g ZPA biaxia l brnadboud mullifrequency vibrntioo wililout damage w malfunction" (ANSI C37.98,- l 978)

UL Recognized: UL File No. m 03204