ML21183A075
| ML21183A075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/30/2021 |
| From: | NRC/OCIO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML21183A079 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA, NRC-2021-000058 | |
| Download: ML21183A075 (121) | |
Text
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Pickett, Douglas Friday, August 29, 2014 3:18 PM Mccoppin, Michael; Tammara, Seshagiri Beasley, Benjamin; Burritt, Arthur FW: NRC Planned Activities for the New Gas Pipe Line Near Indian Point NRC Inspection Plan - Indian Point Proposed Natural Gas Pipeline - r2.docx; Plan for NRC Actions Regarding AIM Project rl.docx; Communication Plan for AIM Project rl.docx Mike/Rao -
Here is the latest documentation from Region 1 regarding our planned review of the Indian Point 50.59 evaluation. As indicated in the attached file, NRC Inspection Plan....., the Region wants to complete the inspection and issue final documentation by mid-November. Thus, could you schedule your confirmatory review for completion by the end of October?
Art - Rao Tammara will be performing the confirmatory blast analysis and should be considered a member of the team.
Ben - The Work Request for NRO should be in your inbox. Could you revise the completion date to the end of October and send it to Mike Mccoppin in NRO?
Thanks - Doug From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: Friday, August 29, 2014 1:16 PM To: Trapp, James; Welling, Blake; Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Lew, David; Dean, Bill Cc: Tifft, Doug; McNamara, Nancy; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil; Beasley, Benjamin; Pickett, Douglas; Gray, Mel; Krohn, Paul; Dimitriadis, Anthony; Setzer, Thomas; Stewart, Scott
Subject:
NRC Planned Activities for the New Gas Pipe Line Near Indian Point The attached documents support NRC activities for the proposed new natural gas pipeline to be constructed near Indian Point. This new gas line is part of the Algonquin Incremental Market (AIM) project The email below provides an overview of the project timeline and the roles of other Federal partner's. The attached documents Include:
- a proposed inspection plan a plan for providing comments back to FERC a communication plan All documents are still considered draft, please provide any comments or concerns to Tom Setzer, Doug Pickett and me. We plan on finalizing all documents by 9/10.
From: Tifft, Doug Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2014 4:32 PM To: Burritt, Arthur
Subject:
FERC call summary Schedule The basic schedule for FERCs review and the pipeline construction is as follows. Note that all the dates are the *earliest* that things could happen. The schedule can slip but cannot move up.
Final EIS on December 19, 2014 After the final EIS is issued, the FERG Commission can issue an Order approving or denying the project. This Is very similar to how the NRC Commission operates and could be the next day or months later. Algonquin has requested final approval by January or March 2015 to meet their construction schedule, FERC will try to meet this request but is not obligated to, Constructlon for the overall project will begin in spring 2015.
Specifically, the portion of the pipeline that runs closest to Indian Point is the Stony Point to Yorktown segment. This is scheduled for construction from March 2015 to October 2015.
The segment of pipe running closest to Indian Point will be new piping, not replacement of existing pipeline. Therefore, when construction of this new pipeline is completed, it will not be in service until it is connected to the rest of the service loop. It is not expected to be tied in and placed in service until October 2016.
Inspections FERC performs inspections to ensure the pipeline is constructed in accordance with the provisions of the final EIS. These inspections occur at least every 28 days. For the NY segments, Algonquin has committed to have a 3rd party monitor the progress daily. These inspections do not ensure that the pipeline Is built safely, ie with the correct wall thickness, welded properly, etc. Pipeline safety is under the DOT. DOT is a cooperating agency, with FERC
-Doug
§}~~
Regional State Liaison Officer Office: 610-337-6918 Cell: !(b)(6) j 2
Communication Plan for the Proposed Spectra Energy 42-inch Natural Gas Pipeline at the Indian Point Site August 2014 Goal The primary goal of this plan is to guide staff communications and activities with internal and external stakeholders of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as they relate to the proposed Spectra Energy natural gas pipeline that will traverse the Indian Point owner controlled property Key Messages Key messages to be communicated to stakeholders are:
Spectra Energy has filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for a certificate to build a new 42-inch natural gas pipeline that will traverse the owner controlled property at Indian Point. The proposed pipeline is in addition to the existing 26-inch and 30~inch natural gas pipelines that traverse the owner controlled property at Indian Point. The proposed new pipeline will be located approximately one-half mile south of the Indian Point site and will merge with the existing pipelines just east of the Indian Point site.
Spectra Energy will augment the new pipeline in the vicinity of the Indian Point site to make It one of the most robust pipelines in the country. Piping in the vicinity of the Indian Point site will be buried deeper, will be constructed of thicker piping walls, will have additional corrosion and cathodic protection, and will have reinforced concrete blocks buried above the piping to provide extra physical protection.
FERC issued a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for public comment on August 6, 2014. NRC will review the draft EIS and provide comments. Comments are due by September 29, 2014.
Entergy has performed their site hazards analysis and concludes that coupled with the low probability of pipe failure, the new gas pipeline will not result in a more than minimal increase in consequences than that previously evaluated In the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Entergy has performed this analysis pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.59 and concluded that prior NRC review and approval is not required. Entergy voluntarily submitted their 50.59 evaluation on the docket for public availability on August 21, 2014.
The AEC/NRC previously performed confirmatory analyses to confirm the impact of a natural gas pipeline rupture at the Indian Point site during original licensing of Indian Point 3 in 1973, again as part of the Individual Plant Examination for External Events in 1995, and again in 2003 and 2008. While Entergy has concluded that prior NRC review and approval of the proposed 42-inch natural gas pipeline is not required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, the NRG intends to review the licensee's evaluation as part of the overall Reactor Oversight Program, Attachment
Background
The Algonquin Gas Transmission Company built the 26-inch diameter natural gas pipeline in 1952 and the 30-inch natural gas pipeline in 1965. The two pipelines are approximately 20 feet apart. The 26-inch pipeline operates at about 650 psig and the 30-inch pipeline operates at about 750 psig. Indian Point Unit 1 was licensed to operate in 1962 while Unit 2 was I icensed in 1973 and Unit 3 was licensed in 1975. The existing gas pipelines are closest to Indian Point Unit 3.
Spectra Energy approached Entergy during the summer of 2013 regarding a new 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that will operate at about 850 psig. On February 28, 2014, Spectra Energy submitted an application before FERG for a certificate to build the pipeline. The new 42-inch pipeline is proposed to be built further south of the existing pipelines but will still intersect with the owner controlled property.
In March 2014, FERC approached the NRC and asked we would volunteer to be a cooperating agency" in the preparation of the EIS. FERC wanted the"NRC to address the impact of the proposed pipeline on the Indian Point site. The NRC declined FERC's offer stating that we had nothing on the docket from Entergy to formulate a response. However, the NRC offered to provide comments once the draft EIS was released for public comment. FERC issued their draft EIS for public comment on August 6, 2014, and requested comments by September 29, 2014.
Entergy understands the significant stakeholder interest in the proposed pipeline. They also understand that the NRC has already received inquiries from local politicians and concerned citizens and that the NRC cannot provide meaningful responses without any information on the docket. Therefore, Entergy has decided to submit their site hazard analysis on the docket for public availability. The site hazard analysis was performed pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.59 and will not require prior NRC review and approval. Portions of the licensee's 50.59 evaluation are security-sensitive information (i.e., the hazard analysis) and will be withheld from public disclosure.
The AEC/NRC previously performed confirmatory analyses to confirm the impact of a natural gas pipeline rupture at the Indian Point site during original licensing of Indian Point 3 in 1973.
Additional confirmatory analyses were performed as part of the Individual Plant Examination for External Events in 1995, and again in 2003 and 2008. While Entergy has concluded that prior NRC review and approval of the proposed 42-inch natural gas pipeline is not required pursuant to 1 O CPR 50.59, the NRC retains the authority to review the licensee's evaluation as part of the overall Reactor Oversight Program.
Audience and Stakeholders 11 tcr K Office of the Commission Office of the Executive Director for Operations Office of New Reactors (NRO)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation(NRR)
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)
Region I Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA)
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
External Licensees Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Congressional members State and Tribal governments public interest groups/non-governmental organfzations Other government agencies media public Communication Timeline Date Summer 2013 February 28, 2014 August 6. 2014 August 21, 2014 September 29, 2014 TBD Activity Spectra Energy approaches Entergy about proposed pipeline Algonquin Gas Transmission files application with FERC FERG releases draft EIS for public comment Entergy submitted their 50.59 site hazards analysis on the docket Comments on FERC draft EIS are due Region 1 review of Entergy's 50.59 evaluation Communication Team Name Telephone Number Email Contacts in NRR Benjamin Beasley 301-415-2062 Benjamin.Beasely@nrc.gov Douglas Pickett 301-415-1364 Douglas.Plckett@nrc.gov Contacts in Regional Offices Arthur Burritt (Indian Point 610-337-5069 Arthur. Burritt@nrc.gov DRP Branch Chief)
Diane Screnci (RI OPA) 610-337-8165 Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov Neil Sheehan (RI OPA) 610-337-5331 Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov Contact In OPA Scott Burnell 301-415-8204 Scott. Burnell@nrc.gov Contact in OCA Gene Dacus 301-415-1697 Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov Contact in EDO Michael Dudek 301-415-6500 Michael.Dudek@nrc.gov Questions and Answers
- 1. What is the Algonquin Incremental Market Project (AIM)?
The AIM Project expands the pipeline capacity of Spectra Energy's existing Algonquin Gas Transmission system to allow regional natural gas supplies from the Appalachian basin through points Northeast including New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. The new pipeline includes 19.6 miles of 42-inch diameter pipeline that includes a new 1.2 mile horizontal directional drill crossing of the Hudson River near the Indian Point site. Most of the new 42-inch diameter pipeline will replace the existing pipeline. However, the existing pipelines crossi11g the Hudson River and that currently located at the Indian Point site will not be replaced.
- 2. What is the West Point Transmission Project?
The West Point Transmission Project is a proposed 1000 MW underwater power cable designed to bring power from northern and western New York State to the New York City area. The proposed route begins at the Leeds Substation in Athens, NY, and run approximately 80 miles below the Hudson Rtver bottom before making landfall in Corlandt, NY. The cable will tie into existing transmission facilities at the Buchanan North Substation near the Indian Point site.
- 3. Why must Entergy perform a site hazards analysis?
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 100.20(b) (Ref. 1) req1,1ires that the nature and proximity of hazards related to human activity (e.g., airports, dams, transportation routes, and military and chemical facilities) must be evaluated to establish site parameters for use in determining if a plant design can accommodate commonly occurring hazards, and if the risk of other hazards is very low.
(Ref. 2), the NRC requires that an application for a construction permit lnclude a description and safety assessment of the site on which the facility is to be located, with appropriate attention to features affecting facility design.
General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases," of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety be appropriately protected against dynamic effects resulting from equipment failures and from events and conditions that may occur outside the nuclear power plant. These latter events include the effects of explosion of materials that may be at nearby facilities or carried on nearby transportation routes.
Regulatory Guide 1.91, "Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur at Nearby Facilities and on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants," describes methods for applicants and licensees of nuclear power reactors that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff finds acceptable for evaluating postulated explosions at nearby facilities and transportation routes. It describes the calculation of minimum safe distance based on estimates of Trinitrotoluene (TNT)-equivalent mass of potentially explosive materials, the calculation of exposure rates based on potentially explosive cargo transportation frequencies, and the calculation of blast load effects.
- 4. What Federal agency approves the proposed natural gas pipeline?
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG) is the lead Federal agency. FERC i~ conducting a comprehensive review of environmental impacts that could result from the construction and operation of the proposed pipeline in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Accordingly, FERG is preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The draft EIS was released for public comment on August 6, 2014.
- 5. What role will the NRC have with the EIS?
FERC sought NRC assistance to address the impact of the proposed gas pipeline on the Indian Point site. The NRC declined FERC's offer to be a "cooperating agency" in developing the EIS because the NRC did not have anything on the docket to base comments upon. Furthermore, had the NRC agreed to be a cooperating agency and hearings were held on the EIS, the NRC would need to support the litigation. Instead, the NRC agreed to review the draft EIS once it became available for public comment.
- 6. What are the results of Entergy's site hazards analysis?
Entergy has performed their site hazards analysis and concludes that coupled with the low probability of pipe failure, the new gas pipeline will not result in a more than minimal increase in consequences than that previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Entergy has performed this analysis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 which will not require prior NRC review and approval. Entergy voluntarily submitted their 50.59 evaluation on the docket for public availability on August 21 2014.
- 7. Why did Entergy voluntarily release their 50.59 evaluation to the public and what will the NRC do with it?
While Entergy is not required to release their 50.59 evaluation to the public, they understand the significance of stakeholder interest. They also understand that the NRC has already received inquiries from local politicians and concerned stakeholders regarding the proposed pipeline and that the NRC cannot provide meaningful responses without information on the docket.
While the NRC is not required to review and approve Entergy's 50.59 evaluation, the Region 1 office is expected to review the evaluation under the Reactor Oversight Program.
BACKGROUND Plan for NRC Actions Regarding the Algonquin Incremental Market (AIM) Project August 2014 The Indian Point site is traversed by two natural gas pipelines owned and operated by Spectra Energy. The Algonquin Gas Transmission Company, a sulbsidiary of Spectra Energy, built the 26-inch diameter natural gas pipeline in 1952 and the 30-inch natural gas pipeline in 1965. The two pipelines are approximately 20 feet apart. The 26-inchi pipeline operates at about 650 psig and the 30-lhch pipeline operates at about 750 psig. Indian Point Unit 1 was Hcensed to operate in 1962 while Units 2 and 3 were licensed in 1973 and 1975, respectively. The existing gas pipelines are closest to Indian Point Unit 3.
The two pipelines are buried about 3 feet deep in a trench formed in excavated rock. Portions of the pipelines at the shoreline of the Hudson River exit the trench and are above ground. The nearest approach of the buried portion of the pipelines to Ulnit 3 safety related structures, systems and components (SSCs) is about 400 feet wheree1s the nearest approach of above ground piping to Unit 3 safety-related SSCs is about 800 foet.
The impact of a gas pipeline rupture on the safe operation of the Indian Pofnt Unit 3 site has been analyzed a number of times by both the licensee and the AEC/NRC. The impac1 of a gas pipeline rupture on Units 1 and 2 would be enveloped by the impact on Unit 3 and it is apparent that a site hazards analysis for Units 1 and 2 has not been performed. The following summarizes previous site hazards analyses for Unit 3:
The potential of a gas pipeline fire/explosion was addressed by the AEC in the 1973 Safety Evaluation Report during original plant licem;ing of Unit 3 and found not to Impair the safe operation of the facility.
The potential of damage due to a seismic or overprIessure event was addressed as part of the 1997 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). The NRC concurred with the licensee's conclusion that the probability of such events was sufficiently low.
A site hazards analysis was performed by the NRC staff in 2003 due to concerns of potential sabotage. The staff concluded that a fire would not impact SSCs and that the probability of a vapor cloud forming and detonating adjacent to SSCs was extremely low.
Due to questions from the public In 2008 regarding a potential sabotage event at the exposed portion of the gas pipelines, the licensee p*erformed a new site hazards analysis and concluded that SSCs would not be impacted. Confirmatory analyses by the NRC concurred with these findings, Spectra Energy approached Entergy during the summer of 2013 regarding a new 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that will operate at about 850 psig. On February 28, 2014, Spectra Energy submitted an application before FERC for ;a certificate to build the pipeline (Docket No. CP14-96-000). The new 42-inch pipeline is proposed to be built approximately one-half mile south of the existing pipelines but will still inte,rsect with the owner controlled property. The proposed pipeline will be located near the R1eserve Fuel Oil Tank for the Units 2 and 3 emergency diesel generators, the Buchanan Switchyard1 the Emergency Operations Facility, the Meteorological Tower, and the City Water Tank. Due to the potential impact to Attachment these important to safety components, Spectra Energy has agreed to enhance approximately 3,935 feet of piping in this vicinity. This enhanced portion of piping will be buried deeper, will be constructed of thicker piping walls, will have additional corrosion and cathodic protection, and will have reinforced concrete blocks buried above the piping to provide extra physical protection, PLANNED NRC ACTIONS Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG) Draft Envi1ronmental Impact Statement (EIS)
FERG is the lead Federal agency for approving the proposied natural gas pipeline and has held a number of public meetings concerning the AIM Project. FERC Issued their Draft Environmental Impact Statement (FERG/EIS-0254D) for public comment on August 6., 2014.
Comments on the draft EIS are due by September 29, 2014. NRR/DORL will take the lead on preparing comments on the draft EIS. Comments will be ci1rculated to Region I, NR,R/DLR and OGG for review and concurrence.
The draft EIS identifies interactions of the proposed natural! gas pipeline with the Indian Point Energy Center along with the results of consultations betwE~en FERC, Algonquin, Entergy, and the NRC. FERG identified a number of comments regardinig the close proximity of the 42-inch natural gas pipeline to the Indian Point site along with concerns regarding the proximity of the proposed West Point Partners 1000 MW underwater poweir cable line that will be routed near the gas pipeline.
The draft EIS has only minimal references to the Indian Po1int site and there is only one theme that will require NRG comment. Three times in the draft El S, FERC states that Entergy is required to perform a safety analysis of the proposed pipeline and provide that analysis to the NRG for review. FERG is recommending that Algonquin me with the Secretary its final conclusions regarding any potential safety-related conflicts with the Indian Point site based on the hazards analysls performed by Entergy. This same the1me is discussed in 1) the Executive Summary on page ES-8, 2) Environmental Analysis Sectio1n 4.12.3, "Impact on Public Safety/
on page 4-267, and 3) Conclusions and Recommendations1 Section 5.1.12, 11Reliability and Safety," on page 5-15. NRC comments should state that E.ntergy's site hazards analysis 1s complete and propose rewording to clarify Entergy's reportiing requirements and NRC involvement without referring to specific regulations
NRC Inspection Plan Indian Point Proposed New Natural Gas Pipeline
Background
The NRC received a letter from Entergy on August 21, 2014 concerning the proposed construction of a 42 inch diameter natural gas pipeline that will traverse the Indian Point owner controlled area. This letter briefly described the gas pipeline proposal as well as communicated Entergy's determination that this change introduces no increased risk to Indian Point and, therefore, does not require formal NRC approval prior to installation. To support this conclusion, Entergy enclosed an evaluation they performed in accordance with their 10 CFR 50.59 process in addition to a supporting blast analysis. The Entergy cover letter and the evaluation will be made publically available; however, the blast analysis is security sensitive information and will not be publicly released, The proposed pipeline will be located near the Reserve Fuel Oil Tank for the Units 2 and 3 emergency diesel generators, the Buchanan Switchyard, the Emergency Operations Facility, the Meteorological Tower, and the City Water Tank. Due to the potential impact to these important to safety components, Spectra Energy has agreed to enhance approximately 3,935 feet of piping in this vicinity. This enhanced portion of piping will be buried deeper, will be constructed of thicker piping walls, will have additional, corrosion and cathodic protection, and will have.reinforced concrete blocks buried above 1he piping to provide extra physical protection.
The construction and usage of natural gas pipelines is not within the regulatory purview of the NRC. However, this project does represent a change to the Indian Point site which will introduce potential hazards. Based upon the potential hazards introduced and stakeholder interest, it is important for the NRC to confirm that the consequence and frequency of the potential hazards introduced by the installation of a new 42 inch natural gas pipeline within the owner controlled area have been analyzed in accordance with the current licensing bases of the Indian Point Energy Center.
Proposed Inspection The NRC plans to perform a limited scope inspection sample of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for the construction of a new 42 inch natural gas pipeline within the owner controlled area using ROP baseline procedure IP 71111.18. The intent of this inspection is to verify that the consequences and frequency of any potential hazards associated with the proposed change (pipeline construction) have been appropriately analyzed with respect to Indian Point's current licensing bases in accordance with the associated inspection objective.
71111. 18-01 INSPECTION OBJECTIVE This inspection will verify that modifications have not affected the safety functions of important safety systems. To verlfy that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant SSCs have not been degraded through modifications. To verify that modifications performed during increased risk-significant configurations do not place the plant In an unsafe condition.
The inspection will focus on the licensing bases (1 O CFR 50.59) and failure modes parameters as discussed on page 5 of IP 71111.18.
Staffing Senior Inspector from EB2 will lead the effort (Regional 50.59 process subject matter expert)
NRC Inspection Plan Indian Point Proposed New Natural Gas Pipeline Security Inspector from PSB1 will support for security aspects and interface with NSIR and NRO hazards review Technical Expert from NRO/DSEA/RPAC will perform a confirmatory gas pipeline blast analysis The Indian Point Project Manager will coordinate the blast analysis support. Once an individual is assigned to perform confirmatory reviews of the blast analysis they will work directly with the team.
Other expertise that may be needed EB1 Inspectors for technical information on piping systems PSB1 Emergency Preparedness Inspectors to address impacts to the emergency response plan (e.g., facilities, access routes, etc.}
SRA for confirmation of risk assumptions and evaluations Resident Inspectors The lead inspector will be responsible for requesting any additional support needed through his Branch Chief for to ensure prompt coordination and timely reviews.
Timing The inspection is planned for the late September with anticipated completed prior to the end of the third quarter.
Documentation The modification fnspection sample should be documented as a formal feeder to DRP for inclusion into the third quarter integrated inspection report that should be signed out by mid-November.
If it becomes necessary to document security related information, the inspectors will re-evaluate and consider a stand-alone security report or alternatively including the inspection results along with a security baseline inspection scheduled for the week of October 20, 2014. The security baseline report would likely be issued by the end of November
Exhibit 1 Simplified Schematic - Algonquin Gas Transmission Pipelines Stony Pt to Southeast Compressor Stations Looped Segment Pre & Post AIM Project Proposal Stony Point Compressor
- Station, New York State
-~------
1 4
~1 Spanning Cortlandt I
I Existing 26-inch, 647 psig MAOP
\\
-29 miles Existing 30-inch, 750 psig MAOP 26-inch 647 psig MAOP replaced with 42-inch, 850 psig MAOP Southeast Compressor
- Station, New York State
= New installation of pressure reducing/letdown valves ( ~ ) and Interconnections
= Larger Loop gas flow after AIM
= Smaller Loop gas flow after AIM Accufacts Inc. 11 /2/14 - Not to Scale
Exhibit 2 - AIM Project Overview Map from DEIS Showing General Location of Replacement of26-inch with 42~Inch Pipeline Across Cortland, NY Legend
~ssor station (CISJ U-!.t*llan Proposad ~ttna
- Tak&-"" and Rehl'/ IT&RJ
- lwp
-Laltflli EliisqAlgonquin Nalural Gas Pipefnes D
Slalt Boundaly
[ J Colrlly !loundiry DUrr:HESS VE--RM:O N T NEW HAMPSHIRE l
Figure 2,1*1 AIM Project Project 0V8fView Map
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Importance:
NRO_FOIA Resource Monday, April 06, 2015 2:51 PM Mills, Vivian Crane, Samantha; Tammara, Seshagiri; NRO_FOJA Resource; Coates, Anissa SEARCH AND REVIEW REQUIRED: FOINPA-2015-00189-Letter Sent to Sandra Galef from Michele Evans, NRR dated 3/15/15, Reg. The Use of EPA ALOHA Computer Methodology 2015-0189-r.pdf; How To Respond To An Initial FOIA(3).pdf; Final FOIA Cover Sheet Templates.doc; ANAL FOIA Memo.doc; DSEA CLOSURE: ESTIMATES REQUIRED:
FOWPA-2015-00189-Letter Sent to Sandra Galef from Michele Evans, NRR dated 3/15/15, Reg. The Use of EPA ALOHA Computer Methodology The 1st attachment is publicly available in ADAMS as part of the High web package for FOIA-2015-0189 (Ml15138A018). The version of the "How To Respond" document, which is the 2nd attachment, is also publicly available as part of ML093230325.
Please proceed to the search ar,,.. "eview of all r£cords pertinent to this request.
ACTION:
- Letter Sent to Sondra Golef from Michele Evans,NRR dated 3/15/15, Reg: The Use of EPA ALOHA Computer Methodology Due Date: IT"uesday.
P.ril 15, 201, NTL 3.30pm For reporting purposes, the t ime expended on estimat es, search, and review should be charged to TAC ZFOOOO Attachments:
PDF of FOIA request How to Respond to an Init ial FOIA Request Final FOIA Cover Sheets Final Memo format E mail with DSEA P.revious estimates
- NJW jOI:A. Team Yess1e Correa - FOIA Coordinator - I E-mail: 'r...,.,,,""""""""l..l&>!..:=
Office: (301) 11s-&s22 I Anissa Coates - 8ackup FOIA Coordinator - I
,. _,gq_v J Office: (301) 415-5812 I
ADAMS Document as of 08/02/201310:2: 57 AM P ge 1 of 10 00:UMII 12001 l01HXII. Re'l1filOIIO,.,. 51111Cw.J RtpoltlnRKp01'RTOTile51l54
~
Reganlng FIA1lilllma
- Ttml Tall fflroe ~
2.3: SetAnlcftJr lne llilalclMJoCI st.llcn. Ul'I 1.* !>.ft I Of DtlaneyM Eulon GenmllJn co. u.c SIIYtl1'0!1lA'511d
!::5lrMeG PageOJIITt 157 PUOlctyA~
12l>>M18 I lli/12 12llllAM 12001 ca. lCHHm. Re'll&ion 0, 'Sellll'ile walllll1MI Re9(llt In Rl!&pOl'R To TIie 50.54 ll'RIRMIOn Req.leGReg;mtngRalll5nlm.tNl!iar-TM!IT.W.l Rnf ~2.3:SS!ic10rlne l!ri10MIOll SUilon, Ul'l 2." Pan 5 Of 5.
A1.1111U"~ Delaney E.Hlon ~
Co. u.c SIM!nliCll&A&&odaH5 53 PIIJllcty Avallable 12J.JM.219 I 161'12 1ZlXW4 120010ll.11HHXJ1, Revlli1on0. ~
~Regaldngf~lllil
-'Ii Slilllon. llnl t.'Pift2()(5.
DelnyM EJBIIII Gener3bl co. Ll.C SIMf1'0f1lA5&0d 79 PWICJy Av.&llllt t233WZI 11116112 t2l)O,t.M oocune11 12001oe.1~--001.~o. "SelRNC
~
~
Ra11&111ma
- 'Ii Slilbcn, IJnl I.' Part J (If AIJhl!Mim!- DelnyM EXelGn Generan co. LiC SIPtlenion & AaoclaK
~
CllU1I' 73 lmllt) ~mlad!
1233~1 lli/12 12:1lOAM Re9(llt In RKpOl'R To TIie 50.54 Tall FClllll!RfOll!WIIWOlll2.3:selimiCfQ'llie 1113ic111oo11 Oocune!t 1200108.l~--001, Re'll5lon0. 'Sel&n1c Rep!l'lln l!lf)OIR!TOTlleS0.54 ~
~
~
ftau"11maNsr-Ttm1Tal FGlll! ~2.3:
S8micltll'lne llnlll'llooll SQl!on, llnl 1: Pal 4 Of S.
~Qn!'
DelanefM 1JIJa Eulon Gener-. Co. LLC
~&Aili0dill8 CCUlt 124 A~Jty ~AYalal!e
~
Ys
FOIA/PA NO: --------
OFFICIAL RECORDS TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE IN ADAMS
FOIA/PA NO: --------
RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY
FOIA/PA NO:
RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN PART The following type of information are being withheld:
Ex. l:DRecords properly cla sified pursuant to Executive Order 13526
- x. 2:DRecords regarding personnel rules and/or human capital administration Ex. 3:Dinformation about the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons Information about the protection or security of reactors and nuclear materials Contractor propo *als not incorporated into a final contract with the NRC Other ----------------------
Ex. 4:OProprietary information provided by a submitter to the NRC Other ----------------------
- x. 5:ODraft documents or other pre-decisional deliberative documents (D.P. Privilege)
D Records prepared by counsel in anticipation oflitigation (A.W.P. Privilege)
Privileged communications between counsel and a client (A.C. Privilege)
Other __________________ _
Ex. 6:D Agency employee PIT, including SSN, contact information birthdate, etc.
Third party Pll, including names, phone numbers, or other personal infonnation
- x. 7(A):D opie of ongoing inve tigation case file, exhibit, note, RO I's, etc.
Records that reference or are related to a separate ongoing inve tigation(s)
Ex. 7(C): Special Agent or other law enforcement PII OPll of third parties referenced in records compiled for law enforcement purposes
. x. 7(D):OWitne e ' and Allegers' PJI in law enforcement record Confidential Infonnant or law enforcement information provided by other entity Ex. 7(E): Law Enforcement Technique/Procedure used for criminal investigations Technique or procedure used for security or prevention of criminal activity Ex. 7(F): D Information that could aid a terrori tor compromise ecurity Other/Comment : ------------------------------
FOIA/PA NO:
RECORDS BEING WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY The following type of information are being withheld:
Ex. l:DRecords properly cla sified pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (Est. pages_)
- x. 2:DRecords regarding personnel rules and/or human capital administration (Est. page Ex. 3:Dinformation about the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons (Est. pages_)
Information about the protection or security of reactors and nuclear materials (Est. pages_)
Contractor propo *als not incorporated into a final contract with the NRC (Est. pages_)
Other ---------------------
Ex. 4:OProprietary information provided by a submitter to the NRC (Est. pages_ )
Other ---------------------
- x. 5:ODraft documents (D.P. Privilege) (Est. page _ )
Correspondence deliberating a propo ed action (D.P. Privilege) (E *t. pages_ )
Records prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation (A.W.P. Privilege) (Est. pages_)
Privileged communication between coun el and a client (A.C. Privilege) (Est. page _)
Other ____________________ _
Ex. 6:0 Agency employee PU, including SSN, contact information, birthdates, etc. (Est. pages_ )
Third party Pll, including names, phone number, or other per onal infonnation ( st. pages_)
Ex. 7(A):OCopies of ongoing investigation case files, exhibit, note, RO J's, etc. (E t. pages_)
Records that reference or are related to a separate ongoing investigation(s) (Est. pages Ex. 7(C):OSpecial Agent or other law enforcement Pl1 (Est. pages_)
OPU of third parties referenced in record compiled for law enforcement purposes (E t. page_)
Ex. 7(0):OWitnesses' and Allegers' PII in law enforcement records (Est. pages Confidential Infonnant or law enforcement information provided by other entity (Est. pages Ex. 7(E): Law Enforcement Technique/Procedure used for criminal investigations (Est. pages Technique or procedure u ed for ecurity or prevention of criminal activity (Est. pages_)
Ex. 7(F): D Information that could aid a terrorist or compromise security (Est. pages_)
Other/Comments: -----------------------------
FOIA/PA NO: --------
RECORDS TO BE REFERRED TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE{S), AGENCY, OR COMPANY. IF COMPANY, PROVIDE POC AND ADDRESS
FOIA/PA NO: ---------
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL Description of Copyright Material and date of Copyright:
V-1\\ Rf:G(J(
e,'-
., ),_
f~~w o~l C/)
~
0
~
~"
~
~o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0CIOl ME;MORANDUM TO: FOIA/PA Specialist, __________
FOIA Privacy Information Branch FROM:
SUBJECT:
FOIA/PA-----------
No records subject to the request.
Records already publicly available. (Group
)
Records being released in their entirety. (Group
)
Records to have availability changed from non-public to1 public. (Group
)
Records being withheld in part. (Group
)*
Records being withheld in their entirety. (Group (Est. pages_))*
Records to be referred to other offices/agencies/companies. (Group (Est. pages_) )
Copyright material. (Group (Est. pages_) )
Ongoing investigation - ?A Certification attached. (Est. pages_ )
Attached is NRC Form 496, "Report of Staff Resources for Processing FOIA Requests."
Place released records in PDR.
Do not place released records in PDR.
This is a partial response to this request.
This is the final response to this request.
- Foreseeable harm statement attached for Exemptions 2 and 5.
A discretionary release of information was not mad1e in a record(s) subject to this request.
A discretionary release of information was made in a record(s) subject to this request.
Information was released which would have qualifie1d for withholding under:
Exemption 2 Exemption 5 OTHER COMMENTS:
Attachment(s): As stated
From:
Crane, Samantha Sent:
To:
Thu, 26 Mar 2015 13:12:16 -0400 NRO_FOIA Resource Cc:
Flanders, Scott;Kock, Andrea;Campbell, Andy;Mills, Vivian;McCoppin, Michael
Subject:
DSEA CLOSURE: ESTIMATES REQUIRED: FOIA/PA-2015-00189-Letter Sent to Sandra Galef from Michele Evans, NRR dated 3/15/15, Reg. The Use of EPA ALOHA Computer Methodology DSEA estimates 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of review and 80-100 pages. This closes the estimation for FOIA/PA-2015-00189 for DSEA Samantha Crane Technical Assistant Division of Site Safety & Environmental Analysis Office of New Reactors US Nuclear Regulatory Commlsslon Office: 30~ -415-6380 Samantha.Crane@nrc.gov From: NRO_FOIA Resource Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:01 PM To: Mills, Vivian; Saah, Lauren; Penny, Melissa; Greene, LaTosha; Hamilton, LaJuan; Scott, Tonya; Taru, Zarva Cc: NRO_TA; NRO_FOIA Resource; Akstulewicz, Frank; Caldwell, Robert; Campbell, Andy; Cheok, Michael; Delligatti, Mark; Donoghue, Joseph; Flanders, Scott; Hawkins, Kimberly; Jackson, Deborah; Kock, Andrea; Mayfield, Michael; Miller, Fred; Monninger, John; Tappert, John; Valentin, Andrea; Tammara, Seshagiri; Coates, Anissa
Subject:
ACTION: ESTIMATES REQUIRED: FOIA/PA-2015-00189-Letter Sent to Sandra Galef from Michele Evans, NRR dated 3/15/15, Reg. The Use of EPA ALOHA Computer Methodology Importance: High Off ices Assigned this Action NRO. NRR, and RI ACTION: fOIA/PA-2015-0018 - Letter Sent to Sandra Galef from Michele Evans,NRR dated 3/15/15, Reg: The Use of EPA ALOHA Computer Methodology Your Division's estimates are due to us (NRO_FOIA Resource) via e-mail by Thursda March 26 2015 NTL 3:30 m
- Search - time that will take you to locate all responsive records to the FOIA
- request,
- Review - includes the actual time each person who will be involved in the review of the records will spend determining if the records can be released in their entirety
or in part and the process of bracketing any information that will be proposed to be withheld.
(Formula for estimating review time: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to review 50 pages).
- Number of pages (or inches) - you expect will be released to the requester. This includes pages that may be released in part.
(Formula: 225 pages = 1 inch)
For reporting purposes, the time expended on estimates, search, and review should be charged t o TAC ZFOOOO Attachments:
- PDF of FOI A request
- How to Respond to an Initial FOIA Request
- N'RD :fOI.'A. Team Yessie Correa - FOIA Coordinator - I E-mail: Yessie.Correa@nrc.gov I Office: (301) 415-6522 I Anissa Coates - Backup FOIA Coordinator - I E-mail: Anissa.Coates@nrc.gov I Office: (301) 415-5812 I
Exhibit 3 - Algonquin Pipeline Hudson River Crossings, Existing and Proposed from AIM DEIS Figure 3.5.1-1 AIM Project Hudson River Northern Route Alternative
NRR WORK REQUEST Application Date August 21, 2014 Activity Type RA Plant Indian Point Units 2 and 3 TAC No(s)
MF4690 and MF4691 Spectra Proposed 42-inch natural gas pipeline Proposed Action:
Based upon the licensee's 50.59 evaluation contained in the letter dated August 21,
2014, perform a confirmatory blast analysis to support the Region 1 review of the licensee's evaluation.
Analysis needs to confirm licensee's findings that no increased risks will be created with the construction of the proposed Spectra 42-inch natural gas pipeline.
PM I Doug Pickett
!Phone I 415-1364
!Email I I Mai/stop I 08-G9a ASSISTANCE REQUESTED Technical Branch NRO/DSEA/RPAC Other TBs Providing Input/Concurrence Region 1 has the lead in the 50.59 evaluation Scope of Review/Product Requested Confirmatory analysis of pipe rupture blast Possible Precedents Indian PoinVCaJvert Cliffs Comment PM Signature
~
l' v
t'~~l_. q-
!Date I 8-27-2014
<..J Projects Request Tech Branch Agreed To Target Date
/t:> -3/- /'{- q~ ~e 2eqo1 Staff-Hour Estimate 80 Intermediate Milestone (e.g., RA/)
Milestone RAI Target Date Date 9-30-2014 Latest Possible Completion Date Schedule/Priority Considerations Support Region 1 review of 50.59 (e.g., transfer, uprate, outage evaluation Projects BC Signature -/3.J. ~
Tech Branch BC Signature _________ _
Date 'f-i - / ({
Date _______
TECHNICAL BRANCH RESPONSE TB Product Assigned Reviewer
!Phone I
!Email I Comments Any change in target date, priority or staff-hour estimate should be negotiated with the PM before revising. In addition, please inform the PM of any additional TBs required, that are not identified above, for the review.
ADAMS Accession No. ML101590507
'l'ext Summary lA_LOHA 5, 4. 1 i' SI TE DATA:
Locat.ion: KINGSTON, NEW YORK Building Air Exchang*es Per Hour: 0 50 ( enclosed office)
Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
CHEMICAL D,A'l'l\\.;
Chemical Name: ME'l'HANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm UEL: 165000 ppm Ambient. Boiling Point: - 258. 8° F Molecular Weight.: 16.04 g/mol TEEL-3; 25000 ppm Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature : greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration : 1,000,000 ppm or 100. 0%
ATMOSPHERIC DATA:
AL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind:
(b)(?)(F) from E at 3 meters Ground oug ness: open oounc:ry Cloud Cover: l(b)(?)(F)
Air Temperature: l~fu~}(7)(F)
Stability Cl1;1ss: *--
No Inversion Heig*....,_ _______ _
Relative Humidity: (li)(?)(r)
Source Heigh: O THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast. force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Rea LOC was never exceeded (8.0 psi= destruction of buildings) exceeded (3.5 psi= serious injury likely)
(1.0 psi = shatters glass)
THREAT AT POI.NT:
Overpressure Estimate at the point:
Downwind: 2363 feet Off Centerline: 0, feet Overpressure: 1_~_)rn_ 1_Fl __
\\AN
) ~
.P'
Overpressure at Point Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical.Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (enclosed office)
THREAT AT POlNT:
Model Run: Gaussian at the point:
L Overpressure Estimate Downwind: 2363 feet Overpressure: !_\\b_)(_7)_(F_) _ __.
Off Cent:erlino: 0 Overpressure: j(b)(7)(F)
At Point:
Downwind : 2363 feet Off Centerline: 0. feet ALOHA sA feet.
Overpressure (Blase For ce) Threat Zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind:..
l(l_i)_(7_HF_, ____ __,l from E at 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
ALOHA 5.4.l ~
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red
- LOC was never exceeded (8.0 psi ~ des tr1.1ction of buildings Orange: LOC was never exceeded (3.5 psi = serious injury l ikel y)
Yellow: 11111TJ(F1 I
(1.0 psi = shatters gl ass)
(b)(7)(F)
'r"ext Surru.nary SITE DATA:
Location: KINGSTON, NEW YORK Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0 50 (enclosed office)
Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA:
ALOHA 5. 4.1 f' Chemical Name: ~-ETHANE TEEL-1; 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm Molecular Weight: 16, 04 g/mol
'J'EE:L-3: 25000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm OEL: 165000 ppm Ambient. Bo:ling Point: - 258.8° r Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than l atm Amblent Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHjcR~C D::A* {MANU~L INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: _ (bl_{7)(F) _
J from E at 3 meters Groun oug ness: open country Cloud Cover:
Air Temperature: l(b)(7)(F)
Stability Class:
No Inversion Heig~u...,....c---------
Relative Humidity: \\b)(?)(F)
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Direct Source: (F)
(1.0 psi= shatters glass)
'rHREAT AT Off Centerline : 0. feet (hl(7)(F)
Overpressure at Point Time: J une 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (encl osed office)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run: Gaussian Overpressuj,.M.....,..8.lo..i..t.1.1iii,' eat the point:
Dow wind:
Overpressu overpressure: ~b_,,,_,,_F)--~
Off Centerline: 0 feet At Point:
Downwind: ~ltb-)(n_1_Fl __ _
Off Centerline: 0. feet ALOHA 5.4.1 1/4
Overpressure (Blast Force) Threat zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind: ~l(b_l(_f _)(f_*) ____ __,l from Eat 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
ALOHA 5,4.1 ~
Threat Modelea: Overpressure (blast farce) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion, congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8. 0 psi = destruction of buildjngs)
Orange: LOC was never exceeded (3. 5 psi = serious injury likely)
Yellow: l(h)(7)(r) 1---
(1. O psi = shatters glass)
(b)(f)(f)
Text Summary SITE DATA:
Location: KINGS'I'ON, NEW YORK Building Air Exchanges Per Hour : 0.50 (enclosed office)
Time: June 21, 2013 1200 h0urs EDT (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA:
ALOHA 5,4. 1 f-Chemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm Molecular weighc: 16. 04 g/mol TEEL-3: 25000 ppm LEL : 44000 ppm OEL : 165000 ppm Mibient Boiling Point: -258.8° F Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wi nd: !lb)(l)IF I from E at 3 meters Ground Roughness: o en countr Cloud Cover: !_(t_,)a_ HF_) __
Air Temperature: (b)(7)(F)
Stability Class:
No Inversion Hei~,,,---------'
Relative Hurni di ty: !M 17)(F)
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Direct Source: !0,)[7Xfl ReleaseDuration._:_.1-m*1_n_u~t-e _ __,
Release Rate:
b7F Total Amount R~e~l ~e*a-s-ed~:..,..(bJ_rn_lFl ____
~
Source Height: 0 Note: This chemical may
- as oi and/or resul~ in two phase flow Ose both dispersion modules to investigate its potential behavior.
THREA'f' ZONE:
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8.0 psi = destruction o bui1dings)
~ :.1oo.....n.w..il-~ever exceeded (3.5 psi; serious injury likely)
(1. 0 psi= shatters glass)
THREAT AT POINT:
Overpress.._.............,-~e at the point:
Downwind: 1t)(l~Fl Overpressu_r_e_:~1-b)t-7)-(Fl_.__
Off Centerline: 0. feet
Overpressure at Point ALOHA 5.4.1 Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 {enclosed office)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run: Gaussian ove.rpress~re Estimate Downwind: t oMTh.F>
l at the point:
Off Centerline: 0 Overpressure: ~llb_x_,~_~ __ ___.
Overpressure: ! ~1b_~_1(_F) __ ___.
AC Point:
Downwind:,_~_1n_ F1 __ _
Off Centerline: 0. feet feet
Overpressure (Blast Force) Threac Zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind:...
l'b_)(_l _)(F_) ____ _,I from E at 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
IILOHA 5.4 Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud ex-plosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Conges ion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8.0 psi= destruction of buildings) orange: r,oc was nfv
__ er_ exceeded (3. 5 psi = serious injury likely)
Yellow: l(b)(7)(F)
(1. 0 psi = shatters glass) lli)(/)(f-)
'l'ext Summar SITE DATA:
Location: KTNGS1rON, NEW YORK Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0 50 (enclosed office)
Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (~ser specified)
CHEMICAL DATA, ALOHA 5. 4.l 1/2 Chemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol
'rREL-3: 25000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm UEL: 165000 ppm
/\\mbienr. Boiling ~01nc: -258. 8° F Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature; greater than 1 ii m Ambi n Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100 oi ATMOSPHERIC DATA:
(MANUAL INPUT OF DA~A)
Wind: 3 meters/second from E a t 3 meters Ground Roughness : open cotmtrv Cloud Cover: 5 tenths Air Temperature: 25° C Stability Class: D (user override)
No Inversion He ' ghl Relative Humidity : SO%
SOURCE STRENGTH; Di r"'Ct Source:
(b)1711F1 Release Durat\\*c'iij::I:iffi!wi:Ee::::::;--~
Re 1 ease Rate; lb)r7 irFJ Tolal Amount R~e-,-e~a-s~e~d~:- b-7(*F*1..__ ___ _,
Source Height: 0 Noce: This chemical may as 01 and/or result ln two phnse flow,
use both dispersion modules t o investigate iLs potenclal behavior THREAT ZONE:
Th eat Mode~ed: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of CongesL1on: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red
- LOC was never ex.ceeded (8,0 psi= des t ru t.ion f buildings)
Orange: LDC was never exceeded (3.5 psi~ serious in'ury likely)
Yellow: l(b)(7)(F)
I --- (
1. 0 psi =- sha _cers glass)
THREAT AT POINT:
Overpressure Estimate at the point ;
Downwind: 2363 feel Off Cente.rlin O. feec Overpress re: l_lb_l(7)
_ 1_F* __
Overpressure at Poir.t Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specif'ed)
Chemical Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour : 0.50 (enclo~ed office)
THREAT AT POIN"" :
Model Run: Gaussian Overpressure Estimate at the poin~;
Downwind: 2363 feet Overpressure~ l~lb_~_)t_N __ _,
Overpressure: ~fb_~_}f_J __ __.
Off Centerline: 0. feet At Poi nt:
Downwi nd: 2363 fee t Of f Centerl ine: 0. f ee t ALOHA!__'_:_4; 1 t-
Overpressure (Blast Force) Threat Zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind:...
l1b_)(_7)_(F_) ____ __.I from E at 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
ALOHA 54 Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast to ce) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: igniced by spark or flame Level of CongesLlon: congest~d Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8. 0 psi = destruction of building,s)
Orange: LOC w s never exceeded (3. 5 psi = serious. injury likely)
Yellow: (h)(7)(F)
(1, 0 psi = shatters glass)
(ll)(/l(f-)
Texc. Summary
~-- ALOHA S. 4.1 i' SITE DATA:
Location*: KINGSTON I NEW YORK Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0. 50 (enclosed office)
Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA:
Chemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm UEL: 165000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -258,BQ F Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol
- rEEL-3: 7.5000 ppm Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000 1 000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC DATA i (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA),
Wind: l(b}(7)(F)
I from E at 3 meters Ground Roughness: o count Cloud Cover: l(b)(7)(F)
Air *remperature: (b)(7)(F)
Stability Class:
No Inversion Heig*
Relative Humidity: l(b)(7)(F)
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Direct Source: !(bH7l(F, Release Durati ----------'
Source Height: 0 Release Rate: ~1b_)1_n1~F, _______ _. ___
Total Amount Released:
lbl(71(FI Note: This chemical may'-'....,.a-s--o-i _ a.... nd/or result in two phase flow.
Use both dispersion modules to investigate its potential behavior.
THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or fl ame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded - - -
( 8. 0 psi "' destruction of bull dings)
Orange: LOC was nPver exceeded ---
(3.5 psi= serious injury likely)
Yellow: l(b)(7)(Fl j --- (1. 0 psi = shatters glass)
THREAT AT POINT:
Overpress ~ -
-.-.Wli\\l,te at the point:
Downwind:
(1))(7/(FJ Off Centerline: O. feet Overpressure: ibl(71(FJ
Overpressure at Point Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0. 50 {encl osed off i ce)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run: Gaussian Overpressure Estimat e at t he point:
Downwind: liimE I
0Verpressure: l~~_1a_K_Fi __ _
Off Centerl ine : 0 feet Overpressure: ~lrb_P_~_F1 __ ___,
At Point:
Downwi-nd:._l'b_1_,x_F_' __
Off Cen t er l i ne: 0 fee t ALOHA 5. 4. 1 f'
Overpressure (Blasl Force) Threat Zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
ALOHA 5.4.1 ~
- If+ I Chemical.Name: METHANE Wind: l(h)(?)(F)
I from E at 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) fron, vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded ---
(8.0 psi= destruc ion of bujldingsl orange: ('QC was n, ver exceeded --- (3.5 psi=- serious injury likely)
Yellow: _(b)(7)(F)
(1.0 psi = shatters glass)
(l.,)(7)(FJ
Text. Summary SITE DATA:
Location: KINGSTON, NEW YORK Bui lding Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0. 50 (enclosed office)
Time: June 21, 2013 l?.00 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA:
ALOHA 5, 4, 1
- Chemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm Molecular Weight: 16. 04 g/mol
'l'EEL-
- 25 000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm UBL: 165000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -258.8° F Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than at.m Ambient Sa uration Concentration: 1,000 1 000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHE:~_c DATA:
{MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: [!1(7)(F)
! from E at 3 meters Ground oughness: o en count Cloud Cover: l(b)(?)rF)
Air 'I'emperature : (b)(7)(F)
Stability Class:.
No Inversion Hei..-..----------
SOURCE STRENGTH :
Di recc Source: !1t,)f7~F1 Release Duratio~n-:_..1-m-,-i n-u~t -e--~
Release Rate:
b 7 F Total Amount R~e~ e~a~s~e':!l""'.":~b~ F~'----,
Relative Humidity:
Source Height: 0 (b)(l)(F)
Note: This chemical may as oi and/or resu lt in two phase flow.
Ose both dispersion modules to investigate its potential behavior.
THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled: overpressure (blas t [orce) from vapor cloud explosion
'I'ype of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Cong s~ion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was nev ;r: exceeded (8.0 psi= destruction of buildings)
Orange: LOC was never exceeded (3.5 psi= serious injury likely)
Yellow: !(b)(7)(F) j ---
(1.0- psi = shatters glass)
'l'HRSAT AT POINT:
Overpressw::e Estimate at the point:
Downwind : 2363 feet Off Centerline: O. feet Overpressure: !_1~_1o_H_F1 __
~
overpressure at Point ALOHA~ 5.4, l f' Time : June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT fuser specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (enclosed office)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run: Gaussian Overpressure Estimate at the point:
Downwind: 2363 feet Off Centerline: 0 feet Overpressure =l~~-~_(F) __ __
overpressure: ~11~_~7_K_F __ __.
At Point ;
Downwind : 2363 feet Off Centerline: O. feet
Overpressure (Blast Force) Threat Zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT {user specifi ed)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind: ~l(b_H_n_(F_1 ____ __,l from Eat 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
>.LOHA 5. 4, l ~
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8.0 psi= destruction of buildi ngs)
Orange: LOC was never exceeded (3.5 psi= serious injury likely)
Yellow; l(b)(7)(r) 1--- (1. 0 psi ::c shatters glass)
'l'ext Summary SITE DATA:
Location : KINGSTON, NEW YORK Building Air £xchanges Per Hour : 0.50 (enclosed office)
Tiine: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA:
ALOHA 5.4 Chemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol TEEL-3: 25 000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm UEL: 165000 ppm Ambient Boiling ~oint: -258.8° F Vapor Pressure at. 111Tlbient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100. 0%
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Di rect Source: !(bl17hF1 Release Duration~-:....,,.1-m~i-n-u~t-e __ _.
Source Height: 0 Release Race.
lb)(711F)
Total Amount R~e.;.;..;,e~a~s~e"""":~ tb~HT~t~Fl_. ____
~
Note: This chemical may as oi and/or result in two phase f:ow.
Use both dispersion modules to investigate its potential behavior THREAT ZONE:
'f'hreat Modeled: Overpressur:e (blast. force)
- from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion; congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8.0 psi= destruction of buildings)
Orange: LOC was never exceeded (3.5 psi= serious injury likely)
Yellow: l(b)(/)(F) 1 ---
(1. 0 psi = shatters glass)
THREAT AT POINT:
Overpressure Estirnace at che po1nt:
Downwind: 1580 fe t Of f Centerline: 0. feet overpressure! 1_,o_,m_1F_1 __
Overpressure at Point ALOHA 5.4.1 Time; June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name : METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (enclosed office)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run: Gaussian Overpressure Estimate at the point :
Downwind: 1580 feet Overpressure : !._(b_>i7_H_FJ __
Overpressure:._lib-ll7_H_n __ _.
At Paine.:
Downwind: 1580 feet Off Center l ine: 0 feet Off centerline: 0. fee~
Overpressure (Blast Force) Threat Zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind:._!(b_)(_?)_(F_) ____..,! from E at 3 meters
'I'HREAT ZONE:
ALOHA 5, 4. 1 1/2 Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) fcorn vapo cloud ex-plosion Type of Ignition : ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congeGted Model Run: Gaussian Red LO wa never exceeded (8.0 psi = destruction of bu'ldings)
Orange: LDC was never exceeded (3. 5 psi -= serious injury likely)
Yellow: l(h}(7)(F)
~ --
(1. O psi "' shatters glass)
Text Summary
~rftf-~~
A, ALOHA 5. 4. 1 1ti SITE DATA:
~
~
4.,_,;
W'\\ [~,...,.*'-'-""' *(b)(7)(F)
Cl)---e ~
Location: KINGSTON, NEW YORK Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (enclosed office)
Time : June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specif ' ed)
CHEMICAL DATA:
tb)(7)(F/
Chemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/m~o~l;:.... ________ ___,
TEEL-3: 25000 ppm (h)(7)(F)
LEL: 44000 ppm UEL: 165000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -258.8° F Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration : 1 1 000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHJR~C D:A
- IM/;Nilf L TNPO'T' OF DATA)
Wind : ITij(l)(F) from E a t 3 meters ibJ(7)(F)
Groun oug ess: :nen ca,mtrv Cloud Cover:
Air Tempera ture: l(b)(/)(F)
I Stability Class:
No Inversion Heign Relative Hurni di ty: (b)(l)(F)
SOURCE STRENGTH:
~;r:~;es~~~~~~o~~~-'~~{- m_i _n_u_t _e _ ___.
Source Height, 0 Release Rate:
,1;17)F\\
Total Arnoun t R"-e-!:'l '""'e._.a_s_e....,d,..:-.-b-17-\\ F_.....,..,_ _ __,
Note: This chemical may as and/or result in two phase low.
Use both dispersion modules investigate its potential behavior THREAT ZONE :
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was 11ever exceeded
( 8. 0 ps'i = destruction of buildings)
Orange: LOC was never exceed ed (3. 5 psi= serious injury likely)
Yellow: !{b)(l)(F) 1---
(1.0 psi= shatters glass)
THREAT AT POINT:
Overpressure Estimate at the point:
Downwind: _b_~7....._,h,.... __
Overpressure: (b)(7l(F)
(b)(7)(Fl Off Centerline: 0. feet
Overpressure at Point ALOHA 5 4. 1 t Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (enclosed office)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run: Gaussian Overpressure Estimate at the point:
Downwind: !it,1,r11F I
Overpressure:... l(b_~_~_F1 __......,
Off Centerline: 0. feec overpressure: !._1b_WJ
_ (_FJ __
At Point:
Downwind : !
... Ib_H_H_F1 __ __,
Off Centerline: 0, feet
Overpressure (Blast Force) Threat Zone Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: ME'l'HANE Wind:... 1(1_
1l(_n_o_) ____ _.I from E at 3 meters THREAT ZONE :
ALOHA 5,4,1 -t Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion
- rype of Ignition: igni t.ed by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8.0 psi ; destruct.ion of buildings)
Orange: ~~.II.Id,_..._
exceeded (3.5 psi = serious i njury l i kely)
Yellow: (rl(7)(FJ (l.O psi = shatters glass) lll)(7)(f-)
Text Summary SITE DATA:
Location: KINGSTON, NEW YORK Building Air Exchahges Per Hour: 0.
Time: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT CHBMlCAL DATA:
Chemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1: 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm UEL: 165000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -258.8° F Molecular Weight: 16.04 g mo TEEL-3: 25000 ppm Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm l\\mbient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC DATA:
MANUAL INPUT O~ DATA)
Wind: (b)(?)(F) from Eat 3 meters
~-----
count Cloud Cover: !(h)(7)(F)
Groun Air Temperature:
Stability Class:
No Inversion Hei,_ _______ _.
Relative Humidity: (b){?)(F-)
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Direct Source: !1ul17)tFl Source Height: 0 Release Duration: i minut e Re] ease Rate : ~b11711r)
Total Amount R~e~l~e~a~s~e~a~:~1i-b)_ln_j~------.
Note: This chemical may 11ash Eo1~ and/or result in two phase flow Use both dispersion modu es t o investigate its potential behavior.
THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast fori.:e) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: i gnited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LDC was never e*xceeded (8.0 psi "' destruc t ion of buildings)
Orange: LOC was never exceeded (3. 5 psi= serious i njury l i kely)
Yellow : l(b)(7)(F) 1 ---
(1.0 psi= shatters glass)
'l'HREA'l' AT,!?DINT:
Overpress~re Estimate at the point :
Downwi nd: 1580 feet Off Cente l i ne: 0. f eet Overpressure: l_(b-)(T_)(Fl __
Overpressure at Point Ti.me: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (enclosed office)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run: Gaussian Overpressure Estimate at the point:
Downwind: 1580 feet Overpressure: l~1b_kT_ F' __ __,
Overpressure: l_1b_~_'i_n __ _.
A.I: Point:
Downwind: 1580 feet Off Centerline: 0. feet Off Centerline: 0. feet
Overpressure (Blase Force) Threat zone Time; June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind:...
l(b_)(_!)_(F_) ____ _,I from E at 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
ALOHAOO 5.4.1 1/2 Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Gaussian Red LOC was never exceeded (8,0 psi: destruction of buildings)
Orange: LOC was never exceeded (3,5 psi= serious injury likely)
Yellow: l(h)(7)(F)
I (1.0 psi=- shatters glass)
(b)(T)(F)
Scca,ih 6cusiti;c 8fficiol !iilse 8fth Additional Modeling for proposed AIM Proiecl Pipeline Impact on IPEC 1)""'1L---ro
<\\. <:..45\\1'\\CA.-'V'Vl.pctv'
,I\\ £$Aee)the validlty~a!ves closure within 3 minutes of pipeline leak/burst con idered
_)~impact evaluation was raised, additional modeling with ALOHA is performed to e
variation of results with and without valves closure. Present modeling considered that the unbroken end of pipe is closed due to valves closure, and the natural gas is allowed_to exit until pipeline Is emptied. The impacts are determined based on maximum one minute release as conservative/bounding impact in determining minimum safe distance to 1 psi overpressure, and also potential heat flux due to jet fire at SSC/SOCA. This analysis is remodeled with same conditions b
- sin that the unbroken end of pipe *s assumed to be connected to Infinite source {with no valves closed) for an hour {limitation of ALOHA model. Since the maximum
_ ~calculated release rate of natural ga y ALOHA model is slightly varied, the calculated results A.
ul{°Y I are marginally changed. The distance to 1 psi overpressure changed from 2351ft to 2509ft,
~~
- which are lower than the distance to SSC of 2988ft. Similarly, the heat flux from jet fire
..... ~d at SOCA distance of 1580ft from enhanced pipeline changed from 4.05 kw/sq.m to 4.63 kw/s and are much lower than the potential threshold heat flux rate of!(b)(7J(F)
I hat would potentially damage the digital equipment. Therefore, it is concluded that the changes in impact results due to closer of valves within 3 minutes or extended period of time, would be minimal, and NRC conclusion of safe operation or safe shutdown of the nuclear units without radiological release, is still valid as NRC acceptance criteria and regulatory requirements are met, whether 3 minute criterion of valve closure Is applied or not. However, it should be noted that if valves are not closed for extended period time, potential adverse Impacts consisting of property damage. some injuries and possible fatalities may result in due to fire in the close proximity of the pipeline, which is outside the preview of NRC's regulatory frame work, consideration and jurisdiction from safe operation/shutdown of nearby I PEC nuclear plant perspective.
&Huritv ian&ili1t1e QU.oial I haa Qnlv
Indian Point: Nuclear Regulatory Commissfon says Algonquin Pipeline no risk to plant Page 1 of2 NRC says Algonquin Pipeline no risk to India, Elizabeth Ganga, eganga@lohud.com (Photo: Joo Larese, STAFF TJN) 8:56 a.m. EST No vember 19, 2014 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has concluded that a new 42-inch natural gas pipeline crossing the property of the Indian Point nuclear power plant (lstory/news/local/indian-point/2014/08/13/indian-polnt-reactor-shuts/14015231 /)in Buchanan will not add significant risks to the safety of the reactors.
The new section of the Algonquin Pipeline will come across the Hudson River Ustorv/opin ion/contributors/2014/09/14/view-blanch-spect ra-alg o ng um-pipeline-near-indian-poi nt/ 15648143/) from Rockland County and cross the Indian Point property about a quarter-mile south of the reactors. The new pipeline-is part of a multi-state project to Increase the amount of gas to New England.
The NRC said it reviewed the safety analysis of Indian Point's owner, Entergy, and also did its own analysis of the effect of an explosion on safety-related equipment around the reactors and less critical components such as switch yards.
"Our assessment is, and it concurs with what Entergy has found, we don't see that the margin of safety would be reduced," said Nell Sheehan, a spokesman for the NRC.
NRC1s conclusions were included in a quarterly inspection report for the nuclear plant.
A major opposition movement (lstorv/news/local/\\Nestchester/2014/09/15/hundreds-turn-alqonquin-pipeline-hearinq/156986590 has grown up around the pipeline proposal, and concerns about Indian Point are part of a long list of issues including worries about an increase in air pollution and construction impacts.
Several officials, including the Westchester Board of Legislators and U.S. Rep. Nita Lewey, have called for an independent risk assessment of the Intersection of the pipeline and the nuclear plant. But Sheehan said the report, dated Nov. 7, is NRC's final conclusion.
MC Kent drugged d
- oostooned Ustorv/news/crim Opponents and local officials were not convinced.
http://www.lobud.com/story/news/local/westchester/2014/ 11 /18/mc-says-aJgonquin-pipeline-risk-iudia... 11/19/2014
Indian Point: Nuclear Regulatory Commission says Algonquin Pipeline no risk to plant "It just defies logic," given the size of the potential Impact zone, said Westchester Legislator Peter Harckham, who has been reviewing the impact of the project.
Susan Rubin of Chappaqua, who has been campaigning against the project, said given how close the pipeline will be to the nuclear plant and the possibility of terrorism, it's not right to allow it to go forward.
"How is this all going to end?" she said. "1 know I'm not going to stop fighting."
The Algonquin Pipeline -
in that section actually two pipes -
already runs by Indian Point along a route further north. The new 42-inch pipe will expand the capacity.
Elsewhere, as part of the same project, several sections totaling more than 15 miles of 26-inch pipe will be replaced with 42-inch pipe in Westchester, Rockland and Putnam.
The plan (lstory/news/local/2014/09/12/algonguin-pipeline-project-sparks-safety-concerns/15535427 /) must be approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which is scheduled to release its Final Environmental Impact Statement in December.
Twitter: @eganga (https://twitter.com/egangal Read or Share this story: http://lohud.us/1uNXPQr lil°f2
(/story/news/er sentence-delayed/19276(
Nov. 19, 2014, l tlO p.1 NY
'.e.tt Sh
.::.Ql
(/story/news,hw
-on-
- m:
hu release-ethics-guidelines/1927
.BY.
.sru fh
.=S1 Ustory/newsM social/1927372 BE~EN _ Dr. Costa has extensive surgical training in for1 MEDICAL ASSOCIATES rearfoot and ankle procedures.
A Ptem1e1 Medical A.lllance Partner CLICK H FOR DET http:/ /www.lohud.com/story/news/local/westchester/2014/1 l/18/ruc-say.s-algonquin-pipeline-risk-india... 11 /19/2014
Text Summary SITE DATA:
Location : KINGSTON, NEW YORK Building Air Exchanges Per Hour; 0. 50 (enclosed of ice)
'I'ime: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Cl:IEMICAL DATA:
hemical Name: METHANE TEEL-1* 3000 ppm TEEL-2: 5000 ppm LEL: 44000 ppm UEL: 165000 ppm Ambient Boil ing Point: -258.8° F Molecular Weight:
'l'EEL-3 : 25000 ppm Vapor Pressure at A:nbient Temperatu e: greater than atm Ambient Saturation Concentrac* on: 1,000,000 ppm or 100. 0%
ATMOSPHE IC DATA
- MAl AL INPUT OF DATA)
ALOHA 5 4. 1 6. 04 g/mol Wind:
(b)(?)(F) from E at 3 meters Air Tempera cure: (b)t7)(F}
Ground oug messj; :pen coupt.T'(
Cloud Cover: l(b)(7)(F)
Stability Class:
No Inversion Hei Ji Relacive Hu..,udity~ !(b)(?)(F) j SOURCE STRENGTH:
Flammable gas is burning Pipe Diameter; 42 lnches Unbroken end of he pipe Pipe Roughness: smooth Pipe Press 850 ps~i_a ___......,
Max Flame Length: J 1bJ(7)(FJ I
Burn Durati on:
HA ! ~11U t eo he duration co 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Max Burn Rate:,_ib.._)17-'1(F_,l,....... _______
....,1...,
Tolal A.'l'.Olint Burne :
l~l(7l(rJ THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled: Thennal raaiation rom jet fire Red Mill yard
(~b)g)(r)
I I Orange: (Fl yards
(.
kW/ (sq m) = 2nd degree burns wj thin 60 sec)
Yellow.
yards ---
(2 0 kW/tsq m) = pain wichin 60 secl
'PHREAT AT POINT:
Thermal Radiation Estimates at the point:
Downwind : 1580 feel Of Cem:erline: 0. feet Max Thenna] Radiation: 4.63 kW/(sq m)
Thermal Radiation at Point Time : June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name : METHANE Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0,50 (encl osed office)
THREAT AT POINT:
Model Run,: No Model Given Thermal Radi ation Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 1580 feet Off Ccmte.rl ine: 0. fe e t Max 'l'hermal Radiation: 4. 63 kW/ (sq m)
(b)(l)(F)
At Point:
Downwind: 158 0 feet Off Centerline1 0 f:eet ALOHA
~herrnal Radiation Threat Zone AT 0 1 A (b)(7)(F)
'l'ime: June 21, 2013 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT (user specified)
Chemical Name: METHANE Wind:..
l(L_1l(_7l_(F_) _____ I from E at 3 meters THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled:
Red (b)(7)(F)
Orange:
Yellow:
Thermal radiation from jet fire
( l(b )(7l(F) p
(~.0 kw/( sg m) 2nd degree burns wichin 60 sec)
(2.0 kW/(sg rn) = pain within 60 sec)
'-----~
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Importance:
Mccoppin, Michael Wednesday, April 01, 2015 1:55 PM Pickett, Douglas; Tammara, Seshagiri Beasley, Benjamin; Miller, Chds; Kock, Andrea RE: ACTION: L TR-15-0156 - Request Expedited 10 CFR 2.206 Directors Decision for Proposed Indian Point 42 Inch Gas Transmission Une, letter Rv.docx High Attached is RPACs input to be used in responding to Mr Blanch s 1 O questions. Please let us know if you have and further questions.
Than Ks, mike From: Pickett, Douglas Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2015 2:14 PM To: Mccoppin, Michael; Tammara, Seshagiri Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Miller, Chris
Subject:
FW: ACTION: LTR-15-0156 - Request Expedited 10 CFR 2.206 Directors Decision for Propo.sed Indian Point 42 Inch Gas Transmission Line.
Mike/Rao-DORL has received the attached EDO ticket for Paul Blanch's ratest letter to the Commission. As indicated, the Commission wants to review our proposed response prior to issuance. I understand you've been preparing responses to the Issues identified in the Blanch letter. Please forward them to me when ready and I'll put the letter together. Our due date to the EDO's office is April 8.
Thanks for all your assistance on this.
Doug 1
he ALOHA user's manual (reference 1) addresses the ALOHA modelihg capability of sources and scenarios and the sample input template (on page38) to be used for data input. The ALOHA model calculates the release rate of gas based on pipeline size, length, and its operating characteristics, and resulting potential impacts d trans ort and e
- sion, hea nd fire due to flammable concentration limits., he Staff is not aware of the Paul Blanch quoted statement in bold '
cannot model gas release from a pipe that has brok n in the middle and is kin from both broken ends," and its referenc r the evaluation of a pipe rea 1n e m1 e, s a as modified the ALOHA input data to model different ALOHA runs to adjust and capture conservative gas release rates to determine the amount of gas released which is conservative, reasonable and representative for the gas released through a broken pipe in the middle. These release rates determined by ALOHA are also compared with average release rates calculated manually based on,equations available in reference literature and reports. The ALOHA model calculated maximum and average release rates are found to be higher than the ones calculated by hand, and therefore are considered conservative for the evaluation analysis.
2 The staff's sensitivity analysis performed considered the complete release of gas in the pipeline between closed valves in one case (where 9 minutes are estimated by the ALOHA model to empty the entire gas in the pipeline), and release of gas for an hour with unbroken end of pipe connected to an infinite source in another case. The resulted potential impacts are found to be marginally different from one another, Therefore, it is concluded that the effect of closure of valves within short period of time or open for long durations does not have any significant change in determined impacts, and also would not have any adverse impact on the safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
3&4 The licensee's hazard analysis and 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation report concluded that there will be no damage to safety related structures, systems and components (SSCs). However, the report did acknowledge that a potential rupture of proposed gas pipeline could potentially impact SSCs important to safety (SSCs ITS) that include the switchyard and city water tank. The licensee addressed this potential for damage by assessing that these SSCs ITS have redundant systems, and the potential impacts that could cause loss of offsite power and also station blackout which coutd occur are bounded by the impacts from low probability events such as extreme natural phenomena for core damage and potential release of radioactivity which have been analyzed and addressed in the updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARS).
f n its confirmatory analysis using conservative assumptions and rationale, the staff also concluded that no 1 psi overpressure is extended to any safety related SSCs inside the Security Owner Control Area (SOCA), However, nearby SSCs ITS would be affected because the calculated minimum safe distances exceeded the distance from the pipeline to SSCs ITS. The staff however, finds the impacts that may potentially damage SSCs ITS from the proposed new 42-inch gas pipeline that could cause loss of offsite power and station blackout which could occur are bounded by the impacts from low probability events of extreme natural phenomena (Including seismic activity, tornado winds, and hurricanes) for core damage and potential release of radioactivity, which have been analyzed and addressed in the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 UFSARS
5&6&7 In the evaluation of potentia,I hazards for impacts to be acceptable, the NRC analysis guidance and acceptance criteria given in (reference 2) require that the licensee address the hazards impact either by determining the impacts using a deterministic approach or by estimating that the probability of the event having an expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of 10 CFR 50.34(a) (1) is less than NRC s1aff's objective of being within an order of magnitude of 10*7 per year.
The licensee calculated the potentlai impacts to SSCs due to potential rupture of the proposed 42-lnch gas pipeline near IPEC, and concluded that no safety related SSCs within SOCA would be adversely impacted. The licensee acknowledged that some SSCs important to safety would be impacted. Based on redundant systems and consideration of being bounded by tile impacts from extreme low probability natural events evaluated for loss of offsite power and station blackout covered in Final Safety Analysis Reports the licensee concluded 1hat the margin of safety is not decreased.
Additionally, the licensee took an extra effort to address the safety significance of a postulated loss of the SSCs ITS from a postulated gas pipeline rupture. The licensee estimated frequency of postulated gas pipeline rupture that could damage SSCs ITS based on enhanced design and installation features to assess the effects of safety margin for protection of the public, and concluded to be sufficiently low (on an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year) and does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The staffs independent confirmatory analysis calculates minimum safe distances using a conservative deterministic approach (based on reference 2). The staff's calculated minimum safe distances, are less than the actual distance to nearest safety related SSC and therefore it is concluded that no 1 psi overpressure, no heat flux due to jet fire and no potential cloud fire would impact at any safety related SSC within the SOCA. However, SSCs ITS are affected but are not considered to be of concern as their potential impacts are bounded by the extreme low probability events that have damage potential and could cause loss of offslte power and station blackout that have been addressed in Indian Point Unit2 and 3 UFSARS. No design basis event is identified due to the rupture of proposed gas pipeline at IPEC. Therefore NRC staff finds the licensee's approach reasonable and conclusion acceptable.
Since the potential hazards are not screened out on the basis of determined probability of occurrence of pipeline rupture hazard, rigorous probability determination is not performed with actual data and statistics_ As the NRC acceptance criteria are satisfied based on the deterministic consequences impacting the SSCs, no probability estimates are either required or warranted.
Due to the licensee also estimating frequency of occurrence of pipeline rupture to demonstrate no reduction in margin of safety from safety significance perspective, the staff also estimated the frequency of potential pipeline rupture independently to evaluate the reasonabllity of the licensee's approach and assumptions. In estimating pipeline rupture frequency, the data from reference 3, (along with project specific assumptions from the licensee's submittal (reference 4) are made to take credit and account for underground pipeline and enhanced design and Installation features. It should be recognized that all ignitions from gas release do not necessarily generate explosions (producing pressure waves), therefore. the fraction gas releases that result in explosion ls assumed to be 5% based on literature (reference 5, reference 6). The gas releases due to pipeline pin holes or smaller size holes of 2 to 4 inch
diameter are more frequent than a complete rupture resulting in a catastrophic burst and release. The catastrophic rupture release frequency of 13% and release from other types of 87% are addressed in the reference (reference 6). Instead of the 13% catastrophic release frequency, a 1 % catastrophic release frequency with assumed credit for enhanced buried pipeline is considered based on expert engineering judgment. It is also the basis for lower potential for ignition underground and for less likely explosion.
8 The staff performed the review of the Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 Combined License (COL) application, which addresses the hazards impact of a natural gas pipeline near the proposed units. The staff evaluated the potential Impacts of that pipe line in the same manner as that of AIM project, and resulting impacts are lower due to smaller size pipeline and lower operating pressure. However, in that case the Turkey Point Units 6 & 7, the licensee determined the distance using RG 1.91 methodology as well as the ALOHA plume model based on an overly conservative assumption of confined explosion which resulted in a larger distance than the NRC analysis determined distance. The Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 licensee demonstrated that 1 psi overpressure criterion is met even with the overly conservative assumption. The reasonable realistic assumption considered would be an unconfined explosion having a lower yield factor for a potential explosion. The staff's independent confirmatory analysis ensures that the Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 COL application meets the required regulation, criterion and guidance provided, and would not raise a concern if the licensee demonstrates a larger margin of safety than required by NRC guidance of minimum safe distance (reference 2) and meets the adequate protection criterion.
9 It should be recognized that more recent updated accident data may change the previously determined unit accident rates (events/mile-year) slightly but not significantly enough to alter the conclusion. This can be observed from the reported values from reference (reference 6) where the pipeline rupture frequency that covers from 1970-2007 is about the same magnitude as that of the value reported in reference 3.
10 The basis for NRC staff's estimate of 7.5 x 10*7 per year probability of gas pipeline rupture is already explained. However, the staff is not aware of letter writer's referenced calcL1lations in order to review and respond.
REFERENCES
- 2. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 2.2.3, Evaluation of Potential Hazards,
Rev.3, March 2007.
- 4. Energy, "IQ CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation and Supporting Analyses Prepared in Response to the Algonquin Incremental Market Natural Gas Project Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units nos, 2 & 3, NL-14-106, August 21, 2014. ML14245A110.
5 FM Global "Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets, 7-42, May 2005.
- 6. Chiara Vianello, Giuseppe Mascho."Risk Analysis of Natural Gas Pipeline Case Study of a Generic Pipeline."
1 The ALOHA user's manual (US EPA, NOAA, "ALOHA User's Manual," February 2007) addresses the ALOHA modeling capability of sources and scenarios and sample input temj:>lettemplate (on page 38) to be used for data input. The ALOHA model calculates the release rate of gas based on pipeline [something missing here - size? And length?] and its operating characteristics, and resulting potential impacts of vapor cloud transport and explosion, heat flux, and fire due to flammable concentration limits.
[Comment-In item 1 the letter states that a deficiency of the ALOHA code is that it cannot model a pipe that has broken In the middle and leaking from both broken ends. Our response does not address this aspect. Is this a limitation of the code, or is there a reason that kind of break is not modeled, or that ALOHA was found to be acceptable for our analysis, considering the stated limitation?)
2 The staff's sensitivity analysis performed considered the complete release of gas in the pipeline between closed valves in one case [over what time period or instantaneously?], and release of gas for an hour with unbroken end of pipe connected to infinite source in other case. The resulted potential impacts are found to be marginally different from one another. Therefore, it is concluded that the effect of closure of valves within short time or open for long durations does not have any significant change in determined impacts, and also would not have any adverse impact on the safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
3&4 The af:)~icant-'.6 licensee's hazard analysis and 1 O CFR 50.59 safety evaluation report concluded that there will be no damage to safety related structures, systems and components (SSCs). However, the report did acknowledge that potential rupture of proposed gas pipeline could potentially impact SSCs important to safety (SSCs ITS) that include switch yard and city water tank. The applicant licensee addressed this potential by asserting that these SSCs ITS have redundant systems, and the potential impacts are bounded by low probability events such as extreme natural phenomena which have been analyzed in the updated Final Safety Analysis Repocts (UFSARS). In its confirmatory analysis using conservative assumptions and rationale, the staff also concluded that no 1 psi overpressure is extended to any safety related SSCs inside the Security Owner Control Area (SOCA) [check spelling out of SOCA]. However, nearby SSCs ITS would be affected because the calculated minimum safe distances exceeded the distance from the pipeline to SSCs ITS The staff however, finds the impacts.from the proposed new 42-inch gas pipeline are bounded by the impacts from low-probability events of extreme natural phenomena (including seismic activity, tornado winds, and hurricanes), which have been analyzed and addressed in respocti>..io the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 UFSARS. [consider whether to add discussion that states that damage to SSC ITS does not result in damage to the reactor core and release of radioactivity to the environment and how this is assured, or if this is too strong a statement, why potential damage to SSC ITS is not a concern]
5&6&7 In the evaluation of potential hazards for impacts to be acceptable, the NRC analysis guidance and acceptance criteria given in [?) require that the applicantlicensee address the hazards impact either by determining the impacts using a deterministic approach or by estimating that the probability of the event having an expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in
excess of 1 O CFR 50.34(a)(1) is less than NRG staff's objective of being within[?] an order of magnitude of 10 7 per year.
The applicantlicensee calculated the potential impacts to SSCs due to potential rupture of the proposed 42-inch gas pipeline near IPEC, and concluded that no safety related SSCs within SOCA would be adversely impacted. The ~licensee acknowledged that some SSCs important to safety would be impacted. Based on redundant systems and consideration of being bounded by extreme low probability natural events evaluated for loss of offsite power and station blackout covered in Final Safety Analysis Reports the awl4samlicensee concluded that the margin of safety is not decreased.
In addition, the applicantlicensee estimated frequency of postulated gas pipeline rupture that could damage SSCs ITS based on enhanced design and installation features to assess the effects of safety margin for protection of the public, and concluded that the frequency was tG-ee sufficiently low [sufficiently low for what? Screening out? Meet NRC acceptance criteria to not consider? Not be a design basis concern? Other?]. and does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The staff's independent confirmatory analysis based on the salswated-calculate minimum safe distances using a [conservative?) deterministic approach [based on NRC guidance? Industry practices?],. The staff's calculated minimum safe distances are '8weF less than the actual distance to nearest safety related SSC and therefore it is concluded that no 1 psi overpressure, no heat flux due to jet fire and no potential cloud fire would impact at-any safety related SSC within the SOCA. However, SSCs ITS are affected but are bounded by the extreme low probability events, and no design basis event is identified due to the rupture of proposed gas pipeline at IPEC. [as in comments above, consider adding a discussion on why it is acceptable that SSCs ITS are affected, and what it means that the impacts are bounded by extreme low-probability events}
Since the potential hazards are not screened out on the basis of determined probability of occurrence of pipeline rupture hazard, rigorous probability determination is not performed with actual data and statistics. As the NRC acceptance criteria are satisfied wittl-aetermined based upon analysis of the deterministic consequences impacting the SSCs, no probability estimates are either required or warranted. Due to the awlicant's licensee also estlmateeing frequency of occurrence of pipeline rupture to demonstrate no reduction in margin of safety, the staff also estimated the frequency of potential pipeline rupture independently to ensureevaluate the reasonability of the applicantlicensee's approach and assumptions. In estimating pipeline rupture frequency, the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data [add reference] along with project specific assumptions from the licensee's submittal {other reference?} are made to take credit and account for underground pipeline and enhanced design and installation features. It should be recognized that all ignitions (potential for def:lagralion, fir-EJs, and may be for e*plosion) from gas release tAey-do not necessarily generate explosions (producing pressure waves), therefore, it-the fraction of gas releases that result in explosion is assumed to be 5% based on literature (FM Global "Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets", 7-42, May 2005; Chiara Vianello, Giuseppe Maschio, "Risk Analysis of Natural Gas Pipeline Case Study of a Generic Pipeline")[make sure references are cited correctly]. The gas releases due to pipeline pin holes or smaller size wholes of 2 to 4 inch diameter are more fre ue t om late ru ture resultin in catas ro hie burst and r I s.
(b)(7)(F)
(b)(l)(F)
[This needs to be clarified. I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. Does this say t at at least one study shows that for a reported 13% of pipeline breaks that result in catastrophic failure and release, only 1 % of the gas releases result in explosion, if given credit for being buried underground? Something else? What about Mr. Blanch's claim that the references state that total pipe rupture occurs in 20% of accidents and his asking for the reference about the reduction in frequency of explosion if the pipeline break is underground? I think your are saying that the reference listed gives justification for that reduction of the ignition potential for breaks underground.]
8 (When? Based upon the comment, or was this during the staff's development of its independent evaluation?} The staff reviewed the Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 application, whore there is an address of which addresses the hazards impact of a natural gas pipeline near the proposed units. The staff evaluated the potential impacts of that pipe line in the same manner as that of AIM project, and resulting impacts are lower due to smaller size pipeline and lower operating pressure. However, in that case the Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 applicant determined the distance using RG 1.91 methodology as well as the ALOHA plume model based on an overly conservative assumption of confined explosion which resulted in a larger distance than the NRC analysis determined distance. The Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 applicant demonstrated that 1 psi overpressure criterion is met even with the overly conservative assumption. The reasonable realistic assumption considered would be unconfined explosion having lower yield factor for potential explosion. The staffs independent confirmatory analysis ensures that the applicant Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 COL application meets the required regulation, criterion and guidance provided, and would not raise a concern if the applicant demonstrates a larger margin of safety than required by NRC guidance [?] and meets more than the adequate protection criterion. [1 'm not sure what you mean by "meets more than the adequate criterion"? Is this referring to being well below the RG criteria? Something else?"
9 It should be recognized that mast-more recent updated accident data may change the previously determined unit accident rates (events/mile-year) slightly but not significantly enough to alter the conclusion. This can be observed from the reported values from reference [which reference?] where the data [which data? Gas line ruptures? Gas-line explosions?] covers from 1970-2007.
10 The basis for NRC staff's estimate of the probability of core damage and acceptability of use of the ALOHA code is explained in response to items 1-9. However, the staff is not aware of the letter writer's referenced calculations and /\\.LOFIJ\\. code probability of eoro damage in order to be able to review and respond.
[Also, consider adding a listing of references used in the responses]
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Samantha/Mike:
Tammara, Seshagiri Wednesday, March 11, 2015 1:13 PM Crane, Samantha; Mccoppin, Michael Flanders, Scott; Kock, Andrea; Campbell, Andy RE: ACTION: REQUEST FOR ESTIMATES: FOIA/PA-2015-00176 - All Written Communications, both Internal and External to the NRC. To, Cc, and from Mr. Rao Tammara Related to the Indian Point Reactors, from 1/1/2014 through March 9. 2015.
I am herewith furnishing the time estimates related to the requested FOIA. Based on the clarification of FOIA coordinator, the given estimates here reflect only my effort, and FOIA resource would coordinate with Region I and others for their additional time for review.
Search: documents, wrfte-ups, reports and e-mails (40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />)
Review: review and redact numbers in consistent manner with other pertinent reports/documents (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
No. of pages: about 100 pages Thanks.
Rao From: Crane, Samantha Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 2: 12 PM To: Tammara, Seshaglri; McCoppin, Michael Cc: Flanders, Scott; Kock, Andrea; Campbell, Andy
Subject:
ACTION: REQUEST FOR ESTIMATES: FOIA/PA-2015-00176
- All Written Communications, both Internal and External to the NRC, To, Cc, and from Mr. Rao Tammara Related to the Indian Point Reactors, from 1/1/2014 through March 9, 2015.
Importance: High Mike and Rao, We just received another FOIA related to the Indian Point Pipelines. They are now looking for all written communications,.both internal and external to the NRC, To, Cc, and from Rao Tammara related to the Indian Point Reactors. from 1/1/2014 through 3/9/15. At this point, they are just looking for ESTIMATES of search time, review time, and number of pages (see formula below). Although, I expect we'll get another email within a day or two telling us just to proceed. The estimates are due this Thursday, March 1 ih_ I cc-ed Scott, Andrea, and Andy. Is there anyone else in the division that should be included?
Samantha Samantha Crane Technical Assistant Division or Site Safety & Environmental Analysis Office of New Reactors US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 301-415-6380 Samantha.Crane@nrc.gov 1
From: NRO_FOIA Resource Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 2:06 PM To: Mills (CONTR), Vivian; Taru, Zarva; Saah, Lauren; Woods, Sylvia; Hamilton, LaJuan; Penny, Melissa; Greene, LaTosha; Scott, Tonya; Dickey, Karen Cc: NRO_SES Distribution; NRO_FO1A Resource; Coates, Anissa; Tammara, Seshagiri; NRO_TA
Subject:
ACTION: REQUEST FOR ESTIMATES: FOIA/PA-2015-00176 - All Written Communications, both Internal and External to the NRC, To, Cc, and from Mr. Rao Tammara Related to the Indian Point Reactors, from 1/1/2014 through March 9, 2015, Importance: High Of fices Assigned this Action NRO ACTION: FO!A/PA-2015-0176 - Alf Written Communications, both Internal and External to t he NRC, To, Cc, and from Mr. Rao Tammara Related to the Indian Point Reactors, from 1/1/2014 through Morch 9, 2015.
Your Division's Estimates are due to us (NRO_FOIA Resource) via e-mail by Thursday.. March
- 12. 2015. NTL 3:30pm Search - time that will take you to locate all responsive records to the fOIA request, Review - includes the actual time each person who will be involved in the review of the records will spend determining if the records can be released in their entirety or in part and the process of bracketing any informatfon that will be proposed to be withheld.
(Formula for estimating review time: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to review 50 pages).
Number of pages (or inches) - you expect will be released to the requester. This includes pages that may be released in part.
(Formula: 225 pages = 1 inch)
After reviewing the attached request thoroughly, please let me know if a scoping meeting is needed and I will set it up.
for reporting purposes, the time expended on estimates, search, and review should be charged to TAC ZFOOOO Attachments:
PDF of FOI.A request How to Respond to an Initial FOIA Request N'RO :fOl.'A 1eam Yessie Correa - FOIA Coordinator - I E-mail: Yessje,Correa@nrc,goy I Office: (301) 415-6522 I Anissa Coates - Backup FOIA Coordinator - I _, E-mail: Anissa.Coates@nrc.gov I Office: (301) 415-5812 I 2
Mccoppin, Michael From:
Crane, Samantha Sent:
To:
Monday, March 23, 2015 5:41 PM McCopprn, Michael; Tammara, Seshaglri
Subject:
RE: ACTION: SEARCH and REVIEW: FOIA/PA-2015-00176
- All Wrltten Communications, both Internal and External to the NRC, To, Cc, and from Mr. Rao Tammara Related to the Indian Point Reactors, from 1/1/2014 through March 9, 2015.
I just spoke ~ Yessie ands e will give us one of her days to help alleviate some of the time crunch on the rnultlple FO ~s. So we now I ve until 3/31 on this one. She also offered to help Rao get the documents together.
Samantha Technical Assistant Division of Site Safety & Environmental Analysis Office of New Reactors US Nuclear Regulato,y Commission Office: 301-415-6380 Samantha.era e nrc. ov From: Crane, Samantha Sent: Monday1 March 23, 2015 2:32 PM To: Mccoppin, Michael; Tammara, Seshagirl Cc: Mills (CONTR), Vivian
Subject:
FW; ACTION: SEARCH and REVIEW: FOIA/PA-2015-00176 - All Written Communications, both Internal and External to the NRC, To, Cc, and from Mr. Rao Tammara Related to the Indian Point Reactors, from 1/1/2014 through March 9, 2015, Importance: High Please go ahead ano start the review for the FOlA on all of your communications on the IP pipeline from 1/1/14-3/9/15. This is the one you did the estimates for last week. Please provide me your input by 3/30.
Vivian, please add it to the tracker
- Thanks,
,arnantha Crane Technical Assistant Division of Site Safety & Environrnental Analyst Office of New Reactors US NU cleat Regulatory Comniissi0n Office: 301-415-6380 Samantha.Crane nrc. ov From: NRO_FOIA ReSOl.lrCe Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 2:26 PM To: Mills, Vivian Cc: Crane, Samantha; Tammara, Seshagirl; Coates, Anissa; NRO_FOIA Resource
Subject:
FW: ACTION: SEARCH and REVIEW: FOIA/PA-2015-00176 - All Written Communications, both Internal and External to the NRC, To, Cc, and from Mr. Rao Tammara Related to the Indian Point Reactors, from 1/1/2014 through l
Analy~ '~ of hazard areas associated with high-pressure natural-gas pipelines - ResearchGate Page 1 of2
'i'OUO!J Do.lo Article An ysis of haz rd areas assoc,a ed with higl -press ire nRtural-gas pipelines
'-0 J ll J Al,n DepartITic*n* of Chen1ical E ume ring Kora:, Polylec~nl<: Unrversrty,luogw.1119-dong. Shihung stiL Kyu 199,,(ln, -1:,9,79 J Soulh Korea Journ.,I or Loss r vantton n, lhe Proc:efls l11,jus111es O,ped Facto, I J5) 05120ti.l 001,o u,s1 os50.4no,02)00001.4 ABSTRACT The rup*ur of ii hlgh,pre.~uri, 11al1Jlltl*ga r,ip.. 111111 r-.an read *.., OUICUITiflS *h~I c:;n frl)~
a srgn,ricanl lh1eal to oeopifs 1110 properW m lh - 11"1"1edl111ia l'icm,ty DJ the fallv1" IOCMII011, Th d01i,lna111 M211rll~ arp tl!Hmll t~dIa110I1 tr, m su~\\,;,n~J 111ft and coIJapee ul btlll<llllAs lrom e*plo~IClr I11s1de or on a rQn.ellv confir,ed ar~a enclosed by bu*ldlnQ~ J,.
stmpllfl"'1 eq,Ia11c,n lt6~ b~<!",1u~ol1*oc,d tluil relale 11,e d111meL r th operating p,es!ure arid 11\\e lengtn or p1pi,ll/'I to lh! ~r*e or lhe aNf<t'.'led sr, In lht van\\ ot full bcm, 1vr,1111.,
rl1e et;uat,ori ts tla~i,J on H,lc-a&e rate gil~ Jet and ~aI tlu~ Iron, r,re 10 e11Jmat@ lhe t,szard area t11zarll rea I~ airr-*tly prr,poroonal \\c the oper;itm~ r,r.- ~IIr,a,~
lu h~II ool'mt and to lhE p1pellne, ta,r,ejer,-;i,~ed tc, 1lvto-11'.JUT1hS po11;-er out lnv~-el ropol11oodl lo lhe oru 111, ll'l1tJt111aI d I "*1uw1l'lr P,JWl'r Tl,0 ij1roplilt d euuatlon.viii li au r;.ful loc,I fot safety mariageml'nt of r11g t1-pres~ur natut'9I-gas 17,pelInes 1 BOOl<MARI' 172 VIFWS CITATIONS 1,2)
CITED IN (30)
Source Article: Hazard Distance from Hydrogen Accidents Young-Do Jo I '
02/i012 1011), DOI 10 782/l\\lgas 2012. 1,; 1 1*
Article: High methane natural gas/air explosion characteristics in cor-,fined vessel.
Chenglong Tang, Shuang Zhang Zhanbo SI Zuonua Huang Kongmlng Zt>ang, Zeblng J1n J~u111~I t,f H<<latllou* Mnluil I; 06/201..:, 27SC.520-r.28, 001*10-1016/l.(hazmat.2014 06 047
- 4.33 Impact Factor Already a member? I Log In SIMILAR l'UBLICAflONS Expand f'rotfl~'> Saloty Man:aynment tleal umgerm~t\\
u-.e or Tlrn T mp,,rnturc lnleqrntors In rood s1&lr-tv rnan8!J81l'l1!11l l',on!tantlno< I KOU\\lQlllnfr!I~, M~ola 1go11lr Appllol(i(,n of'"" ll'IO\\llng window apprt111ch Ill lhl' vartflcallr.,11 ol llw performance or tnod sat tv m,rnagenn,11I ey I tn1t Claus I teggum Jw;ie I Gu~rrlll'CI Val1eio.s, 13 Njie, A O Ad11gt,oy Help us improve our network. Are you a researcher or scientific professional?
No R Mohsin, 2 A, Maltd M Z Yusof http://www.researchgate.net/publication/223714241 Analysis of hazard areas associated with high-p... 03/18/2015
_Aoaly,,is of hazard areas as ocialed wilh high-pte UTe natural-gas pipelines - ResearchGatc Source R llabll~y Engineering[?) Sysleoi Safety 1112014, 131 OOl:10 1016fi ri.s, 2014.06 008
- 2.05 Impact Factor I
'1111111
'-lhu.,11
- 11J11 yuMI/lirt.-~: I I ure:,t.:nl!-'l 1ouut, tii,\\11113 1,~
nu, r 11, rf It,. du
"' )/ r*,11,,, lt!lf ro
, ~I 1011"
,.,in, 111~ 11b11,1,
, ie-2enc~.. o,ee, *111 **
nPI i 1111 H Page2ofr
!'IN Y
[ II http://www.researchga_te.net/pubUcation/223 714241 Analysis of hazard areas associated with high-p... 03/ l 8/20 I~
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subjec.t:
Crane, Samantha Tuesday, March 24, 2015 10:15 AM Mccoppin, Michael; Tammara, Seshagiri Correa, Yessie; Flanders, Scott; Kock, Andrea; Campbell, Andy Pipeline Analysis FOIAs I spoke with Debra Dennis, one of the Agency FOIA Coordinators to help us get an understanding of what information that we've been requested to provide in the multiple Indian Point Pipeline FOIAs are actually FOIA-able. This is what she had to say:
Personal notes are not included Code runs, input decks, and output decks would be included; however we may be able to withhold them if they are not the basis for the final decision under exemption 5 or redact parts under exemption 7f Draft assumptions should be included but we may be able to withhold them under exemption 5 b/c they are deliberative The calculations and analyses would be included but may be redacted or withheld under 7f Samantha Crane Technical Assistant Division of Site Safety & Environmental Analysis Office o,f New Reactors US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 301-415-6380 Samantha.Crane@nrc.gov
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
- All, Krohn, Paul Monday, March 02, 2015 1:52 PM Dorman, Dan; Lew, Davld; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Burritt, Arthur; Mccoppin, Michael; Tammara, Seshagiri; Pickett, Douglas; Tifft, Doug; Beasley, Benjamin; Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Sheehan, Neil; Screnci, Diane; Klukan, Brett; McNamara, Nancy; Setzer, Thomas; Stewart, Scott; Dimitriadis, Anthony; Mccarver, Sammy Draft Options Paper for IPEC Gas Pipeline - to Support 3/2/15 RI Meeting IPEC Gas Pipeline Commune! ions Options Revl,docx Here's an options paper that provides a brief background of incoming correspondence and ongoing processes regarding the IPEC gas pipeleine. It presents a range of 4 options.
Tt,is should help focus our discussion at 2:00 pm. The proposed recommendation is some advance, proactive outreach on the gas pjpellne prior to the 4/28 AAM.
More detail in the attached, Paul
Communications Options IPEC Gas Pipeline Purpose Gain internal Region I alignment on path forward regarding IPEC gas pipeline and how/when the NRC responds to questions from 1/15/15 and 2/26/15 correspondence. Seek input from HQs staff who may also be on the line.
Incoming Correspondence and Other Ongoing NRC Processes 1/15/15-Assemblywoman Galef to NRC Chairman.
o Galef conferred with gas pipeline and nuclear experts about NRC's risk analysis and concluded that it was based on unrealistic assumptions.
o Based on expert's input, Galef called for an independent risk assessment.
o Galef requested that any NRC approvals be delayed until the independent risk assessment is complete.
2/26/15 - Galef/Gillibrand to NRC Chairman.
o Claims very important assumption in safety analysis (3 minutes to isolate) has not been validated.
o Press release from Galefs office also issued same day. Paul Blanch's 2.206 petition also referenced.
2.206 petition from Paul Blanch. Initial presentation before PRB done on 1/28/15. 3 items provided:
o 3 minutes to isolate is unreasonable. Should be more like 30 to 60 minutes.
o Controlling factor would be critical heat flux, not the pressure wave o
Requested independent review of safety analysis.
Recommendation Communicate what we can as now, staying clear of the 2.206 process to the extent possible.
Recommend using a mix of Options 1 and 2 (see next page) during March 2015 to proactively communicate the Agency's position on the gas pipeline prior to the 4/28 AAM.
While the pipeline subject is expected to come up at the 4/28 AAM, having had advance communications with local officials and docketed replies should help explain the NRC's position.
Options Option Pros Cons 1 Respond to 1/15 and 2/26 letters
- Response to 1 /15 letter has already been
- May complicate 2.206 responses. Will need early ahead of 2.206 petitions.
drafted. With slight modifications. could be careful coordination with NRR and OGC. (i.e.
used to answer 1 /1 5 and 2/26 letters petitioner and consultant may participate in any Give partial response that concurrently.
outreach efforts to Galef s office.
addresses some issues in 1/15 and 2/26 letters, but steers clear Message - NRC has done sensitivity studies of 2.206 questions.
regarding an infinite source of gas and increase in pressure wave and heat flux are Could also involve an OpEd minimal and still well below acceptance piece in the Editorial section of criteria.
the local IPEC newspaper.
- Gets initial response out. Begins to build Note - Mike McCoppin has communication plan leading up to Options 2 reached out to FERC contacts and 3.
for peer review. Would want
- Allows process 2.206 petition to continue.
FERC peer review complete before issuina oartial resoonse.
- 2. Government to Government
- Demonstrates forthcoming regulator actions to '*
May complicate 2.206 responses. Will need (GTG) meeting with targeted government peers in that meeting would occur careful coordination with NRR and OGC. (Le.,
Galef/Gillibrand office in March in advance of the AAM in late April.
petitioner and consultant may participate in any 2015.
- May allay some questions at April AAM outreach efforts to Galef s office) regarding gas pipeline.
In-person, telephone, or
- May prevent other incoming letters and webinar.
prevent further expenditure of NRC resources.
- May reduce FOIA requests and workload.
- 3. Wait until 2015 AAM cycle. GTG I* More time to complete peer review of NRC
- More difficult questions may arise during public on 4/27 with AAM on 4/28.
calculations.
Q&A at AAM. If Option 2 is done, the NRC could say that security sensitive issues have been discussed with elected officials in March.
- 4. Wait til 2,206 petition final
- Official NRC position will be issued by an
- Public questions likely to keep coming ill, decision is issued before Office level Director to close issue.
especially after the April AAM.
responding to two incoming
- Loss of working relationship with letters.
Galef/Gillibrand.
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
Mike:
Tammara, Seshagiri Monday, March 23, 2015 11:55 AM McCoppin, Michael FW: Follow up question to NRC response letter alohal.pdf; aloha2.pdf; aloha3.pdf As requested by Doug Tifft, I have prepared this response to clarify the IPEC AIM proposed pipeline* blast analysis. Please review, comment and correct as appropriate for -further transmittal.
The Staff is not aware of the quoted statement in bold "ALOHA cannot model gas release from a pipe that has broken in the middle and is leaking from both broken ends," and its reference.
The attached pages from ALOHA user's manual describe the ALOHA modeling capability of sources and scenarios and sample input templet ( on page38) to be used for data input. ALOHA model calculates the release rate of gas based on pipeline and its operating characteristics, and resulting potential impacts of vapor cloud transport and explosion, heat flux, and fire due to flammable concentration limits.
Based on ALOHA model methodology, and conservative inputs, the staff performed the confirmatory analysis.
Since explosion at the source is not determined by ALOHA model, the calculated release rate of gas from ALOHA model is used to determine the amount of gas available for potential explosion using TNT and RG 1.91 methodology in determining the minimum safe distance to 1psi overpressure. This is addressed in feeder document (ML14330A276) on pages 2 and 3. The other potential impacts including vapor cloud explosion, heat flux and cloud fire are determined by ALOHA model itself.
The suggested two sentences that possibly clarify are as follows:
ALOHA model calculates the release rate of gas based on pipeline and its operating characteristics, and resulting potential impacts of vapor cloud transport and explosion, heat flux, and fire due to flammable concentration limits. Since explosion at the source is not determined by ALOHA niodel, the calculated release rate of gas from ALOHA model is used to determine the amount of gas available for potential explosion using TNT and RG 1.91 methodology in determining the minimum safe distance to 1 psi overpressure.
- Thanks, Rao From: Tifft, Doug Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 1:52 PM To: Mccoppin, Michael; Tammara, Seshagiri
Subject:
FW: Follow up question to NRC response letter Mike/ Rao, See below in yellow from Assemblywoman Galef's office. They imply that we used ALOHA in lieu of RG 1.91. I thought that we used information from ALOHA, then plugged that in to the equations in RG 1.91. Assuming I'm correct, is there a one or two sentence way we can clear this up?
-Doug l
From: Dana Levenberg (majlto:!evenbergd@assembly.state.ny,u~]
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 1:14 PM To: Tifft, Doug
Subject:
Follow up question to NRC response fetter
Dear Doug,
Thank you for helping get a response to Assemblywoman Galefs letters to the NRC re AIM siting near IPEC. Based on this letter, It appears that there has been additional analysis conducted since she had originally corresponded, perhaps in response to many of the concerns that were raised, and she is very appreciative of that. We received a copy of a letter from Paul Blanch yesterday, which identifies specifically that the EPA says the ALOHA code should not be used for assessing a pipeline rupture of the nature that is being considered in your analysis. Here is a quote from his letter:
The analysis relies on the EPA ALOHA code lo predict lhe probability and consequences of fires, overpressure and radiant heat flux. The EPA document states the following: "ALOHA can11ot model gas release from a pipe that has broken in tlte middle and is leaking from bot!, broken ends. "(Bold emphasis added by EPA)
The Assemblywoman shared this most recent response from NRC with our two experts and Mr. Blanch suggests that the ALOHA model is not valid for a situation such as this. This recalculation was apparently used in direct conflict with NRC and EPA requirements, to justify the project. Had the NRC used its own approved progrnm, (Regll !atory Guide 1.19) the results would have been unacceptable:*
It seems that your follow up analysis is still reliant on the ALOHA model as opposed to your Regulatory Guide 1.19. Can you comment?
Again, thank you for your response.
Sincerely, Dana Levenberg Chief of Staff Office of Assemblywoman Sandy Galef 2 Church Street Ossining, NY 10562 levenbergd@assembly.state.ny.us (914) 941*1111 (p)
(914) 941-9132 (f) 2
Natural Gas Pipelines Near Indian Point Energy Center Natural gas pipelines have existed on the Indian Point owner-controlled property since before plant construction. The Algonquin Gas Transmission Company built a 26-inch diameter natural gas pipeline in 1952 and a 30-inch natural gas pipeline in 1965. The pipelines are located approximately 640 feet from the Unit 3 containment. The AEC/NRC performed confirmatory analysis to determine the impact of a rupture of the existing natural gas pipelines at the Indian Point facility in 1973 (prior to OL issuance for Unit 3) and again in 2003 and 2008.
?o...i.J, (;\\~'-'" f>ot.'K~~ '?..- 'LP' WM~.,( i:...
2,0\\0, In a planned upgrade of its natural gas distribution system, in February 2014, Spectra Energy submitted an application to the federal Energy Regulatory Commission to install 37.,6 miles of a new 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that would cross over a portion of the owner-controlled property at Indian Point. FERC granted the certificate on March 4, 2015.
NRC regulations required that Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., the licensee for Indian Point, perform a site hazards analysis to determine the impact of a r.upture of the proposed natural gas pipeline on the safe operation and shutdown of the nuclear power plants. By letter dated August 21, 2014, Entergy submitted their analysis on the docket, pursuant to 10 CFR 50,59, and concluded that a rupture of the 42-inch natural gas pipeline would not represent an increased risk to the site and that prior NRG review and approval was not required. This finding was made possible because the new pipeline will be located further from the site than the existing gas pipelines and the peak calculated overpressure pulse and heat flux will not result in unacceptable damage to safety-related components at the site.
NRC inspectors frorn the Region 1 office, combined with staff from the Office of New Reactors, inspected the licensee's analysis and concurred with the licensee's findings in inspection report 2014004 dated November 7, 2014 (ML14314A052). As part of the inspection, NRO staff performed an independent confirmatory analysis of a proposed gas pipeline rupture and, similar to the licensee, concluded that it would not adversely impact the safe operations of the Indian Point facility.
The proposed Algonquin Incremental Market Project pipeline has gathered significant local stakeholder and political interest. A 10 CFR 2.206 petition has been received from Mr. Paul Blanch. The petition and its supplements characterize Entergy's site hazards analysis as deficient and inadequate and requests an independent risk assessment of the proposed gas pipeline. Similar statements have been received from New York Assemblywoman Sandra Galef who represents the district that encompasses the site.
The NRC staff is continuing its review of the Blanch petition under the 2.206 process. The NRC staff has not identified any safety-related concerns at the Indian Point site.
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
From: Vietti-Cook, Annette Baggett, Steven Thursday, March 19, 2015 2:51 PM Vietti-Cook, Annette; Tully, Bridin Remsburg, Kristy; Lewis, Antoinette; Craver, Patti RE: COMMISSION E-READER ** Thursday, March 19, 2015 Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 2:50 PM To: Baggett, Steven; Tully, Bridin Cc: Remsburg, Kristy; Lewis, Antoinette; Craver, Patti
Subject:
RE: COMMISSION E-READER -- Thursday, March 191 2015 From: Baggett, Steven Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 2:45 PM To: Vietti-Cook, Annette; Tully, Bridin
Subject:
FW: COMMISSION E*READER -- Thursday, March 19, 2015 lhl(5)
From: "Tully, Bridin" <8m.hnJ ull,, nrc.!!Q_y>
ubject: OMMT IO E-READER~-Thur day, Mar 'h 19, 2015 Date: l March 2015 18:49 To: "Commission E-Reader Distribution" <Com,n1ssionE-Readerta 111l',-< >
2
1ammarat Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To!
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Importance:
(h)l5)
From: Pickett, Douglas Mccoppin, Michael Friday, March 20, 2015 3:43 PM Tammara, Seshagiri Kock. Andrea; Flanders, Scott FW: SECY request for guidance Re: response to incoming letter from Pa ti Blanch Tab A- 03-17-15 Blanch.pdf; RE: COMMISSION E-READER - Thursday, March 19, 2015 High Sent: Friday, March 20, 2015 3:13 PM To: Miller, Chris; McCoppin, Michael; Beasley, Benjamin
Subject:
FW: SECY request for guidance Re: response to Incoming letter from Paul Blanch Importance: High From: Tully, Bridin Sent: Friday, March 20, 2015 10:24 AM To: Mizuno, Beth Cc: Remsburg, Kristy; Lewis, Antoinette; Craver, Patti; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Tully, Brldln
Subject:
SECY request for guidance Re: response to incoming letter from Paul Blanch Importance: High l
2
[Type text)
SEMS'JIJ!i li6CI mn:u i;!ibi1 li& IIJfgRMpl,ll8rl CType text]
Safety Review and Confirmatory Analysis of Entergy's 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation For Algonquin Incremental Market (AIM) Project at Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC)
Introduction Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC (Algonquin) proposes an Installation of new 42-inch diameter pipeline near the southern boundary of IPEC for tne transport of natural gas as part of ~
AIM Project, to replace the existing 26-lncn plpelfne In vrclnlty of IPEC, which will remafn In place but idled. Entergy prepared a 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) related to the proposed AIM Project with an enclosure 'Hazards Analysis" (Reference 2).., ;,,_,, r. Th Io CFR 50.59. a few JVo)ual)on 1110., -\\*:a:J*, co*,gr,; ~ tti.
consequences of postulated fire and explosion following release of natural gas from the proposed new (southern route) AIM Project 42-inch pipeline south of IPEC and dei
,l!naU n4determh,eg exposure rates associated with failure of that proposed 42-inch natural gas pipeline. Based on the hazards an iyi;.e,malysis and also accounting for the pipeline design and Installation enhancements, Entergy has concluded that the proposed AIM Project poses no increased risks to IPEC and there is no significant reduction fn the margin of safety. Therefore, Entergy further-concluded that the change in the design basis external hazards analysis associated with the proposed AIM Project does not require prior NRC approval.
The NRC Staff has reviewed Entergy's 'HJlazards A, ly1;it;analys1 ' that supports the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation related to AIM Project, by performing indepe11dent confirmatory calculations to determine whether or not the licensee's conclusion is reasonable and acceptable, and also to ascertain that there is a~adequate reasonable assurance Qf.#1 safe operation of the plant or f~h safe shutdown of the plant.
Summary of Evaluation The staff has reviewed Entergy's "Hazard Analysis" supporting the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluatlon related to
!.b.JLAIM Project. Entergy ~id<!i:ed 11:ie e11aluaMi. Gfevaluati;d potential hazards to ;afe,. *re)a\\ed tructures
!Ult"TJS an() c;omt'OIIE\\fltsJ SSCs and also SSC5 ww2nan) to,atelk !SSC 1rs1 Wili>-.!W.Df..reasonable assumptions and rationale. '"&-Entergy's methodology is appropriate and acceptable. The staff has performed Independent confirmatory calculations with conservative assumptions and rationale using RG 1.91 methodology and also using the ALOHA model for vapor plume explosion. The staff also calculated the frequency of potential pipe line failure and determined that there Is no additional potential risk to the safe operatic of the IPEC units, Based on the review of !M:
~Ma-.y~ * ~~
~ provided as part of Entergy's 1 O CFR 50.59 Saf-ety Evaluation-mlaltH!4&-A.iM Flf~<!cl Rear~. and the staffs independent confirmatory calculation results using conservative assumptions and ratfonale. the staff concludes that t filno 1 p.,.* ___ _
b)(7)(F)
However, nearby SSC ITS would be affected.
be1.;ause the calculated minimum safe distances to the Impacts are exceeded~.
, he stat! finds that the Impacts Me S C IT;:, r,om !he ilropoi:,ed new 42 incr, OIP' are bounded by the impacts from low probability events of extreme natural phenomena h1C~seismic aellv1ty, tornado winds, and hurricanes) which have been assessed and already addressed In tt1e tmfom P91111 U111u no 3 UFSAR. Cloud flash fire may occur aloft and burn very rapidly 1n few seconds, without affecting any ~~r-elated SSCs or equipment, and ~
existing margin of safety ls not expected to be reduced due to potential rupture of the proposed AIM Project pipeline near IPEC. The staff also C£oR~l1c1i1f'S-~lhat the applicant's conclusions, that the potential rupture of p,
,~ proposed AIM 1iliU61illflii BE8WRl;JI/ REb,C,fEl!I IU1"8RMplclf811 I
Comment [mll\\1); C0ns1cler wilelhor t:__J identify that lhe staff,n quest1ro *s NRO/DSEA/RPAC 111111 Comment (m0.2): True tha1 looked only at I spfaty.MISted SSC* end SSC ITS' (di<ln't look at ncn-safaly SSC*)
I Comment [mlh3]: I lh;nk IP2 1111d IP3 ha.
SGparate UFSARs Although, !hey probably say the same lhlng abo<JI s,te hazards ___
[Type text}
&li91&1.tlCF
'iiEC' SPIV' RE' DIED IHEORDI0PON
[Type text)
Project pipeline near IPEC pose2 no threat to safe operatlon of the plant or safe shutdown of the plant.
, :1
~-
~
are reasonable and acceptable, and also comparable lo the staffs conclusions.
Technical Eval\\Jation Toe staffs lndependenl confirmatory analysis was performed based on rupture of the proposed new 42-inch natural gas plpeline consisting of about 3 miles between isolation valves, of which the enhanced section of pipeline length is identified to be-3935 It, located along the southern route near IPEC. rhe analysis assumed that rupture of the natural gas pipeline may result in an unconfined explosion or jet name al the source. delayed vapor cloud fire, or vapor cloud explosion. Missile generation may also accompany the rupture/explosion. For the assessment of an unconfined explosion, RG 1.91 (Reference 3) methodology was used to calculate the minimum safe distance. For the jet flame, cloud fire, and vapor cloud explosion, the ALOHA chemical release modellng computer cocle (R.eferei,ce ~ ) Is used to detemirne the hazard Impact distances which are compared with the actual distances a1 IPEC to structures, systems and components (SSCs) related to safety or SSCs Important to safety (SSC ITS), as listed In Reference 2, Table 1, ln order to assess the impact potential. ALOHA is run using the appropriate source term (amount of methane released) for the scenario considered, usin conservative meteorolo ical conditions Open country ground roughness conditions modeling assumptions were chosen_
EXPLOSION The ALOHA model for explosion scenario 1 conservatively assumed that the pipe rupture occurred at the far end of the pipe line above the surface, considering the length of pipeline to be 3 miles, _(,b-l...
17-V-E-l ____ __.
!!tJ)(7)(f-1 lat a maximum operating pressure of B50 pslg. The ALOHA calculaflon for lhis scenano resulted fn a maximum sustained methane release rate of 256,000 pounds/min, and estimated total release amount of 354,651 pounds averaged over 9 minutes. considering manual closure of the Isolation valves within 3 minutes. Conservatively assuming the maXimum release over one minute (256,000 pounds of methane), and determining the TNT equivalent amount with a yield factor of 0.05 {WTNT) with equation given below, the minimum safe distance (d) to 1 psi overpressure is calculated to be 2351 ft by using RG 1.91 methodology as follows:
WTNT= (Mf
- OHC
- V}/4500 where d=- 45 * (w) 113 WTNT" TNT equivalenl Mass, kg Ml
= Mass of vapor, kg DHC = Heat of combustion, kj/kg (50030)
Y
= Yield Factor (0.05) where d= minimum safe distance (ft) to 1 psi overpressure W" TNT equivalent mass in pounds This calcU1lated minimum safe distance of 2351 ft is smaller than the actual distance of 2363 ft to t,.,,,. SOCA (Security
~*
11r, Control Area) from the pipeline at the far end above surface or 2988 ft to 111 n I
- EIPl)-1el;leq SSC l(nearest sare:- -
l,m,- SSC Inside SOCA from ~11 is aboutITb l(7)
'* '-1!.'
1n SENS, 1102 - SECORI I I RELA?Ct, 1t*Fe~"1f:il8H C..mmcnt [mlh4): An~ SSC or "'l'tlly*related SSC*
[Type tel(tJ 6ill61;iiMi 6iiWRl1211 Aila' ;iii& oir&RMitlFl&II
[Type tel<t) the SOC&>.) and therefore 1 psi overpressure is not expected at any let. r _1,
SSC 1nslde.!!LSOCA from a potential rupture and explosion at the far end of pipeline above sun'ace. However, as U,e calculatei;I minimum safe distance of 2351 ft is larger than the actual distances to all SSC ITS, theY, may experience _greater than 1 psi overpressure Therefore, the SSC ITS would be Impacted, Nevertheless, thelr impacts are bounded by the severe/beyond design basis accidents considered as part of low probability events such as natural phenomena that Include seismic. hurricane and tornado events
... * ~
Loss of Offsite Power and Station Black Out (SBO) considerations with design of redundant systems, engineering safeguards and mitigation measures In the ~
UFSARi, The frequency ot exposure due to failure of these SSC ITS from potential rupture of AIM Project is also briefly presented later in this report to address whether the margin of safety Is reduced or compromised due to rupture of AIM Project.
Assuming 5% yield factor for unconfined methane exploslon '3 1 01yen In I '~ J.911. the methane amount determined from the maximum 256,000 pounds of methane reteased over one minute (determined tr~ ~
th.from h~ ALOHA run) 1s used as an Instantaneous methane release, to simulate the vapor cloud dispersion, transport and delayed explosion (conservatively assuming IJ.1 OJruLoongestlon {rorn ph,,cal tru~tw in the area) with the ALOHA model. The model determined minimum safe distance to 1 psi overpressure due to delayed vapor cloud explosion Is 3054 f~ and Is slightly higher (by 66 ft) than the actual distance of 2988 ft to SSC inside ~
SOCA. However, it should be noted that the determined minimum safe distance assumed I nltlon with con estlon In the area, and distances lo SSCs from the plpellne are based on the rough estimates (b)(7)(F)
Moreover, the SSCs are generally designed to withstand overpressure of 3 psi,!lbl(7)1Fl as methane is buoyant and quickly rises aloft. disperses rather rapldlY,!(b~lt~
Therefore, the K model was rerun with the same Input except with an assumption of no congestion In the area. The ALOHA model resulted In no vapor cloud explosion of 1 psi overpressure at any distance due to potential ignition. The potential pipe rupture underground at the enhanced section of the pipeline, would be expected to result In a stower methane release rate, and thereby nave potentially lower impacts than those determined as above.
JET FIRE I.,. ti ALOHA model was run conservatively assumlng that the rupture or pipe occurred at far end of the pipe line above the surface, considering the length of pipeline to be 3 mlles. j1h1f7)ifl j
!(h)(7l(fl
!at a maximum operating pressure of 850 psfg, Methane is assumed to be I * *,1111 released from the ruptured pipe as a flammable ~
gas, burning. The ALOHA model run resulted in a maximum
- urn b.llin.rale of !(tJ)l7)Wl I and Jn.estimated total amount burned of 354,651 pounds averaged over 9 minutes, considering manual closure of the isolation valves within 3 minutes. The ~A
..i l al* lal distances (Table 2) to ~ thermal radiation levels of !(b)(f)(F) js.o INV/m2, and 2.0 kW/m2
! ulateu Jh_~OHA ar; (h)(7)(F) l respectively.
fhe ALOHA model was also run conservatively assuming that the rupture of pipe occurred In the middle of the pipe located underground.al lr1e enhanced section Identified close to i!.!.:_SOCA, considering h,i;w..a.w;;u.i;;.i~ th gt lhs:,1, silos be,tw1 :a lt*AIQJIAO )(&1116$ £1.5 miles\\ on each side of th!.
,r ruplu roe.at un, (b)(7)(F)
!(b)(?)(F) 11 a maximum operating pressure of 850 psig.
I Methane Is assumed to be re..,h;; from ruptured pipe segmen as a !lli!!JJ.!lQ.flammable ~ufilll'lg as. The ALOHA model run resulted in a maximum twr bum rate of l(b)(7)(F)
(b)(7)(1) considering closure of the Isolation valves within 3 minutes. 1.J,ih'""e'"'ca
......,16... u*la... le_d.,..d..,ls"'"ta-nc_e_s _____
3211311102 SECURii t RCLAIED INFORMAi iON eomment[mlh5]: All or 0(11y some?
j f Comment [mlh6J1 A5wmlld high, med1<Jm or
.row oonge!J.\\ion?
(Type text]
SENSI I I0E SECURI I 1 RELAI EU l14Fbkif1AiiO14 (Type text]
(Table~) to the them,al radiation levels of!(b)i/)(F) 1 s.o kW/m2, 2.0 kW/m2 are!(b)(/)(f)
I respectively.
The dist,1nces determined to he thermal radiation level of (b)(?)(F) t ~
has <1 potential to darnage U &sslructures and equipment) due to potential pipe rupture a ar en or the pipeline or In middle of h pipeline areilb\\U)(f\\
I respectively. Both of these determined distances are smaller than the actual distances of 2363 fl and 1580 ft respectively, to \\!*> SOCA, and therefore, jet fire would not pose any adversµ.w..011,.1,w..__,
SSCs related to safety, However, ii may Impact s,ome of the SSC ITS as the radiation level of lb)(7)(F) ma, be f1/4C ;,,jeg {or;; me.:iSC fT
_ u Ide ot lhe SOCA. Nevertheless, II ~.lh£l._impacts o S!j I 1 ~ are bounded by the severe/beyond design basts accidents considered as part of seismic and tomado events covering Station Blaclc Out {SBO) and Loss of Offsite Power considerallons with design of redundant systems, engineering safeguards and mitigation measures already addressed In \\he Slli!l.!l. UFSAR CLOUD FlRE The ALOHA model was run conservatively assuming that the rupture of i e occurred at far end of the I e line above the surface, considering the length of pipeline to be 3 miles, (hJ(7)(F)
I l(b)(?)(F\\
jat a maximum operating pressure of 850 ps1;::1g-. ~ e:-Jl'T"l"l'fl'll"':m;:oo= e:rr.:r r.:-n-:o:res
= urr.e::::l':11':"n':;""'
a maximum sustained release rate of 256,000 pounds/min, and n estimated total release amount of 354,651 pounds averaged over 9 minutes, considering manual closure of the isolation valves within 3 minutes.
Conservatlvely assurnln~ the maximum releaseJ...11.t over one minute 256,000 pounds of methane (determined from lhe ALOHA run) is used as an instantaneous release over one minute, to simulate the vapor cloud dispersion, transport to determine ~ distance to reach.!.b,_methane lower explosive limit (LEL) of 44,000 ppm. The ALOHA model determined a distance of 1.8 miles to reach the LEL This estimated distance would bound the potential distance to LEL from rupture In lli_,middle of pipe In ~i_enhanced area buried underground, Even though M 01 m l11<1r1 plume travels to a long distance, Im it Is buoyant and quickly rises aloft, and, therefore, may burn rather rapidly in seconds much above the ground without sustaining, if enough oxygen is available. Therefore, the impact from cloud fire on SSCs and equipment is nol considered challenged.
DETERMINATION OF EXPOSURE RATE FOR FAILURE OF THE AIM PROJECT PIPELINE NEARIPEC Based on Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data ww h1r,sa u Loov, and also published Information from "Handbook of Chemical Hazards Analysis Procedures" (Reference 5). the accident rate of pipes greater than 20 Inches diameter is about 5 x 10'0/mlle-yr. Assuming 3 miles of AIM Project pipeline near IPEC, the accident rate Is determined to be 1.5x10"3/yr. Assuming 1 percent of accidents result in complete break or 100 percent release, a11'! assuming only 5 per~nt of the time that.\\Af_released gas gets o
m~. Ignited leading to potential explosion, the, Ina.!!? frequency (l'lr lhr-IM,
,..,,.IIM,
& lf2 is calculated to be about 7.5 x 10*1tyr_ If this release is due to underground pipe, the frequency of explosion will be further reduced by at least an order or magnitude. [In addition, the frequency of large radioactivity release from the reactor due to the frequency or the-above pipe rupture event would be at leasl few order!S of magnitude lower, and therefore would not be Identified as a design basis event. Therefore, It Js concluded that the r.,
,.,, pipe failure resulting in a methane release from proposed AIM Project near IPEC, would,1
~dHC nol r ~due~ any further the existing safety margins, and would not pose a threat to the safe operation of the plant or safe shutdown.
8EHOlil¥E OEOWRFFlf Rli!Wlili& OJFQAHCllQtl Comment [mlh7]: Clarify rn, ncl aul'e whal you're llylng to say hete Even though 11 moy travel far, ii n:ses quitldy &a thal any burning happl!n& far et)ovo the ground,,r enough oxygen,s a vallable at lhal alll\\ude'> Is there calculallon or the lofling (e g., cloud rea<fies 1000 fl on O 5 ec (e,a111ple made up))'>
I Comment [mlh8): 1 percent complete failure mte auumptIon bHod on vmat'> Also ttoe p,el/loue releren1>1s'>
Comment (mlh9)1 ll10re -m* to be a leap here Whal 15 lhe fmquane)I of e)lploslOO from a ptr,u rupture le d1t9 to QC n1clloaetlv1ty rolease? HoW does tho explos,on toad lo tor not lead lo) rad1oact1v1ty roleosu'>
(Type text]
SENSI I IVE = JtctjiAl'Fi5 Ail.al li/il lt!FARM AXION
[Type teKt]
Allhgugt) Entergy'? hazards anal~&! 1$ reasonable aod snows no reguctlo l()jl']e current,afety margin, l!n view of increasing the margin of safety from potential Impacts from the rupture of the proposed AIM Project pipeline near IPEC, th Staff suggests following recommendations. lt~houlrJ b noted that these are just Sl:l!l§@slecJ sU!lgestlons for RI stafi to consloer meeR1ff!endal10As but not requirements.
einse il:le pipeli!'IE' 16 ile1n9 plam:ieEI fer GenslF\\lstioFI Rear IPE"C, ~ onsideration may be given to Felocate e ro d lpellne about 200 ft farther away from ~
SOCA if possible. Thereby, the proposed pipeline would be placed farther away from the safe~related SSCs and SSC ITS~
add additional satety margin.
2, l'lDfOO&e-Consider 111creaslr11; the presently planned 100 fl wide clear buffer zone around !!l!Lburied pipeline, to 200 ft wide clear zone, so that buoyant methane would disperse aloft without being trapped/accumulated, thereby reducing the potential for explosion.
CONCLUSION Based on the review of!M_r4Jlazards llal\\l&l~{~l+I provided as part of Entergy's 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation related to ~
AIM Project near IPEC, and staff's independent confirmatory calculatlon results using conservative assumptions and rationale. the staff concludes that ~
no 1 psi overpressure is extended to 8'!Y--filrl..~satety-related SSC inside!t!g_SOCA:, b 7 F (b)(7)(F)
. However, nearby SSC ITS would be
, a e ca cu a e 1nimum sa e 1s ances o e 1mpa s are exceeded, but these impacts are bounded by the Impacts from low probability events of extreme natural phenomena that include seismic, tornado winds, hurricanes which have been assessed and already addressed in UFSAR. Cloud flash fire may occur aloft and burn very rapidly in few seconds, without affecting any safety related SSCs or equipment. and the existing margin of safety is not expected to be reduced due to potential rupture of the proposed AIM Project pipeline near IPEC. The staff also -.e,u;;l11das find that the applicant's conclusions that the potential rupture of e roposed AIM Project pipeline near IPEC pos _ no threat to safe operation of the plant or safe shutdown of the plan~ bases GA the Ha~ar js Ewahaiall are reasonable and acceptable. a Ad al&9 68lfli;tar.1ele te IRe sl:aWs ll.lSl8AS. The taff!, ryv1ewfinds thattt1, hau;u'ds analysts sypport1ng the Hcensce*- 10 CFR 50.59 alcty evaluaucr pproon !!:; nd h w at I _r 1; 101 mo,e lryen minimal m,rea;. to the Ukellhpod of ogcurrence or consar,;uences ot damage 10 8 saletx-relaled SSC 01 SSC l s when comparyd to lhe aurrenl
!lawd.s anal;sjs m the giant UFSAR§.
&iH&l;i:t>ti liiQWRll>f Ail USli' ll/FORUCIIPII Comment [mlhlOJ: Did the region asl< for such reoommendauons? I woula be careful about how to present lh*s Sw,ce lhe haurd*
.analysis 6how that the proposed localion 1s eccoplabl ond also 1s w1lhln lhe cooont aafety margin, the reg10n may dectde 10 not discuss with Iha l1C&11s08 I
Comment [mlhl1]1 Consider putting lhls storr l rinding sentence in lhe document It may be mo,e liko wt.al Iha region stall would be say11111 1n the~ documentation
(Type text)
SENS, I Ive - StctSl'lf I IU!!b\\'6i 1*1FORII 1/4DOI
[Type text)
REFERENCES
- 1.
Entergy, '10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation and Supporting Analyses Prepared lr1 Response to the Algonquin incremental Mar~t N_atura1 Gas Project Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units Nos. 2 &
3', NL-14-106,August21, 2014. ML142'15A1 10
- 2.
Entergy, "Hazards Analysfs", Enclosure to NL-14-106, August 21, 2014. ML t 42'.45A111 (Non-public)
- 3.
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory GUide 1,91, "Evaluations of Exploslons Postulated to Occur at nearby Facilities and on Transponation Routes Near NuclearPower*Plan!s', Revision 2, April 2013.
- 4.
US EPA, NOAA,"ALOHA User's Manual", February 2007 5,
FEMA. Us DOi, US EPA. 'Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures.
9Clf3"hl!! SE!e~"" I I\\E!LKll!15 IIU Ol<mlltl lOlt
(TypetextJ SENSI I IYE - SECUl(I I t PU!Lftt,ii f~IFQRH AllAtl
[Type text}
iiit!SIJD(S sec, !PITY REI ATE INFOBMATIAN
ases - Ratios of Specific Heat The Engineering ToolBox www.E:ng nee11ngToolBo>c.,on, Resources, Tools and Basic Information for Engineering and Design of Technical Applications! - adapls seamlessly lo phOfles, pods ard desktopsl
~ I Search ! -"tho most efficient way lo navigate Iha Engineering Too/Bo,c/"
Gases - Ratios of S ecific Heat Hea~ capacity of.. a g~~ In a ccm~tant pressure process
- t<? _heat ~apa~Jty In a constan!_~9l~m,e pr£C~ss Problem Report he page you are trying lo access is blocked because the web content category r
" ept2013;Blocked_ Domain *Web Ads/Analyti "i not allowed by agency (1('11 *.
Page I of 7 S)lonn ed Uni If you believe lhis web ite has been blocked in error, contact the Custom r upporl C cnll:r 111 I O I -l J 'I. I~ 11 11r
~. __,.:, _._ r,c-r~--- --*
- __ - - * !l:. - * * - * - --.--!-..--' 1-r ~--- ---,.,_rr n1...,... __ _ _ r ____,~..,.,
I
.r -
Internal Energy For an ideal gas the internal energy* u
- 1s a function of temperature and the change in internal energy can be expressed as du= cv dT (1) where du = change in internal energy dT = change m temperature Cv varies with temperature. but within a moderate temperature change the heal capacity - cv - can be regarded as constant.
- S.r.ecific Heat for Gases Enthalpy For an ideal gas the enthalpy - h - is function of temperature and the change in enthalpy can be expressed as Where dh = change in enthalpy cp can within a moderate temperature change be regarded as constanl
- More about Gases and S1 eci c Heal The enthalpy in a fluid is defined as:
h au + plp (3) where h = en,thalpy u = internal energy p = obsolt1te ressws http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/spccific-heat-ratio-d _ 60&. html 09/11 /20'!4
Oases - Ratios of Specific Heat Combining (3) and the Ideal Gas Law gives h = u +RT (4) where R = 1/Je mdlvidual,,aig__qo_nslafll The change in enthalpy can be expressed by differentiating (4):
dh = du t R dT (5)
Dividing (5) with dT gives:
(dh ldT) * (du ldn = R (6)
Modifying (6) With (1) and (2).
cp - cv,. R (7)
The difference cp
- Cv Is constant for an ideal gas.
The Ratio of Specific Heats The Ratio of Specific Heats can be expressed as*
where k = the ratio of specific heats Ratio of Specific Heats for some common gases:
Gas Acetylene Air, Standard Ammonia Argon Benzene N-butane
!so-butane Carbon Dioxide Carbon Dlsulphlde Carbon Monoxide Chlorine Ethane Ethyl alcohol Ethyl chloride Ethylene Helium N-heptane Hexane Hydrochloric acid Hydrogen Hydrogen chloride Hydrogen sulphide Methane Methyl alcohol Methyl butane Methyl chloride Ratio of Specific Heats 1.30 1.40 1,32 1.66 1.12 1.18 1.19 1.28 1.21 1.40 133 1.18 1.13 1.19 1.24 166 1.05 1.06 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.32 1.32 1,20 1.08 1.20 http://www.engineeringtool box,com/spe<:ific-heat-ratio-d _ 608.html Page 2 of7 09/1 1/2014
Gases -1,latios of Specific Heat Natural Gas (Methane) 1.32 Nitric oxide 1.40 Nitrogen 1.40 Nitrous oxide 1.31 N-octane 1.05 Oxygen 1.40 N-pentane 1.06 lso-pentane 1.06 Propane 1.12 R-11 1.14 R-12 1.14 R-22 1.18 R-114 1.09 R-123 1-10 R-134a 1.20 Steam (water) 1.33 Sulphur dioxide 1.26 Toulene 1.09 Since the ratio is dimensionless the value is the same in the SI and the imperial system of units.
Prohlcm Report The page you are trying to access is blocked because the web content category of "ScptZ013;81ocked_Oootains;Wcb Ads/Analytics" is not allowed by agency policy.
Page 3 of 7 Sponsored Li!ll If you believe: this website has been blocked in error, contact the Customer Support Center at (30 I) 41 5-1234 or 1,..., __... ! l _..,,...c:,r, r;::,. _ _ _ _.,...
_ _ _ _ *c...,_,,.,. ___ : __ _, f'T' - * **--... -' _,._rf' n 1-...... -
- - " - - - - *- 1,t,* --t--J ~ :,.. a.. **,,....... _... _,.
R~la~ed Topics uid Mech~ - The study of fluids - liquids and gases. Involves various properties of the fluid, such as velocity, pre'Ssure, density and temperature, as functions of space and time.
- Nozzles - Gas flow through nozzles
- sonic chokes
- Compression and Expansion of Gases - Isothermal and lsentroplc processes
- I eal Gas Law - In perfect or ideal gas the change in density is directly related to the change of temperature and pressure as expressed by the Ideal Gas Law ant - The Individual and Universal Gas Constant In fluid mechanics and thermodynamics
- ~ ~-~=-~~~
Const nts. Specific heat at constant volume, specific heat capacity al constant pressure and indlvldual gas constant - R - common gases as argon, air, ether, nitrogen and many more..
- S Formul s - Calculation formulas for velocity of sound - sonic velocity
- in gases, fluids or solids
, Units of Heat - BTU, Calorie and Joule - The most common units of heat are BTU - British Thermal Unit, Calorie and Joule ol rs clfic He t - Gase - Molar specific heats of some common gases at constant volume
~e.~rch_th£ ;ngl~_eerli:!9 To.?!B.~x I _ Search J -"the mos/ efficient way lo navigate the Engineen'ng Too/Box/"
En_g~neering ToolBox - S~e~chlJ.p Edit.ion ~_Qnl,in~ 3Q_ll)o_d_e1!ngl http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/speci fic-heat-ratio-d _ 608.html 09/l l/2014
Gases - Ratios of Specific Heat Page 4 of 7 En ineer
,
If you beli1
~
0.-p Support 0
!a
',,I.
0 your regio1
<{
0 Sept2013;
~ communic CJ) s' 0 -
/~ Reforto M
~,..~
6Jl)
~ I n frastructi I')
~o Agency Ai
- .- I-
- .I--~
- 2005, c,
httJ1;//W\\I fll2.html Access is E network se ystem po content.
Probl m au *c Websites l Ads/Anal Jll Pos ibl * ~ olut'ion If you hav1 Customer:
staff. (2) hLtp://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/specific-heat-ratio~<l_ 608.html 09/11 /2014
Ga~es - Ratios of Specific Heat Page 7 of 7 MJlilary & Aerospace Eleclropics
~
lliro-Sm,,;,lying EMineer 91 http:/ /www. engineeringtool box. com/specific-heat-ratio-d _ 608.html 09/11/2014
Tammara, Seshagiri From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Pickett, Douglas Tuesday, September 23, 2014 4;11 PM Miller, Chris Beasley, Benjamin; Burritt, Arthur; Rlkhoff, Jeffrey; Wrona, David; Folk, Kevin; Turk, Sherwini Green, Kimberly; Wlttick, Brian; Setzer, Thomas; Stewart, Scott; McKown, Louis; O'Sullivan, Kevin; Lubinski, John; Newman, Garrett; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug; BurnelL Scott; Roach (OGC), Kevin; McCoppin, Michael; Tammara, Seshagiri
Subject:
RE: FERC Draft EIS on Indian Point Natural Gas Pipeline Comments on FERC Draft EIS 9-23-2014,docx Attachments:
Chris -
As you know, FERC has requested comments on their draft EIS no later than Monday, September 29. I spoke with Maggie Suter of FERC and she offered the following insights of their process:
FERC has a two-part process in granting a certificate to Spectra Energy to construct the pipeline.
The first step is when the FERC Commission issues an Order approving the project.
The second step is a separate action by the FERC Commission approving a notice to proceed with construction. Spectra needs both actions before starting construction, Regarding timing:
FERC plans to issue their Final EIS in mid-December The FERC Commission will observe a 30-day "cooling off' period following issuance of the Final EIS. They are expected to approve the project in mid-January 2015, Issuance of the final notice to proceed with construction is expected shortly after that.
Spectra Energy wants to begin construction in March 2015.
By letter dated August 21, 2014 (ML14253A338), Entergy submitted their 50.59 evaluation to the NRC concluding that the new 42-inch natural gas pipeline would not introduce any additional risks to the site. NRC inspectors are onsite this week and NRO staff are performing a confirmatory blast analysis. Region 1 plans to issue their Inspection report in the mid-November time frame.
I have attached our proposed comments which are minimal. Most focus on Entergy's site hazards analysis and states that our inspection is ongoing, Considering that we should know our position on Entergy's 50.59 evaluation by late October, Maggie Suter of FERC recommends that we hold a telephone conference call to discuss our inspection results. This would assist FERC in preparation of the Final EIS.
Let me know if you have any questions You or your representative wlll need to negotiate the FERC web site to provide our comments.
Doug Douglas V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit James A FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-1364 Email: doug!as.pickett@nrc.gov
U.S. Federal t:nergy t<eguIatory commission Draft Environmental Impact Statement Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC Docket No. CP14-96-000 Comments Provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Comment 1: Page ES-3 includes the following paragraph:
The potential for geologic hazards, including seismic events, to significantly affect construction or operation of the proposed Project facilities is low. Although the Ramapo Fault has been linked to recent earthquake occurrence in the area, the design of the pipeline takes fnto consideration site-specific conditions, including earthquakes. The recorded magnitude of earthquakes in the Project area is relatively low and the ground vibration would not pose a problem for a modern welded-steel pipeline, The NRC recommends the paragraph be revised as follows:
The potential for geologic hazards, including seismic events, to significantly affect construction of operation of the proposed Project facilities is low. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has extensively studied the Ramapo Fault system and the level of seismicity in the region. The USGS's review of data for evidence of Quaternary fault activity (i.e., within the last 1.6 million years) encompassing the Eastern United States indicates that there is no clear association between the fault and small earthquakes that do occur in the region. Further, there is insufficient geologic evidenr;e to indicate the existence of a tectonic fault or Quaternary slip or deformation associated with the fault (Crone and Wheeler 2000; Wheeler 2006). The design of the pipeline takes into consideration site-specific considerations, including earthquakes. The recorded magnitude of earthquakes in the Project area is relatively low and the ground vibration would not pose a problem for a modern welded-steel pipeline.
Wheeler RL. 2006. "Quaternary tectonic faulting in the Eastern United States.
11 Engineering Geology 82:165-186.
Crone AJ, Wheeler RL. 2000. Data for Quaternary Faults, Liquefaction Features, and Possible Tectonic Features in the Central and Eastern United States, East of the Rocky Mountain Front.
Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey. Open-Fife Report 00-260. 2000. 332 p. Available at
<.hftp:llpubs. usqs. qovlof/2000/ofr-00-0260>
Comment 2: Page ES-8 Includes the following paragraph:
We received several scoping comments concerning the safety of the Project and its proximity to the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC), a nuclear facility on the east bank of the Hudson River in Westchester County, New York. Algonquin identified that because of the distance of the proposed Project from the IPEC generating facilities and the avoidance and mitigation measures that it would implement, the proposed route would not pose any new safety hazards to the IPEC facility. Based on our consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) is required to assess any new safety impacts on its IPEC facility and that analysis is provided to and reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Algonquin has coordinated with Entergy to provide information about its proposed pipeline and Entergy is currently performing a Hazards Analysis. To ensure that the AIM Project would not pres.ent new safety hazards to the IPEC facility, we are recommending that Algonquin file the final conclusions regarding any potential safety-related conflicts with the IPEC based on the Hazards Analysis performed by Entergy.
The NRC recommends the paragraph be revised as follows:
We received several scoping comments concerning the safety of the Project and its proximity to the rndian Point Energy Center (IPEC), a nuclear facility on the east bank of the Hudson River in Westchester County, New York. Algonquin identified that because of the distance of the proposed. Project from the IPEC generating facilities and the avoidance and mitigation measures that it would implement, the proposed route would not pose any new safety hazards to the IPEC facility, Entergy performed a site hazards analysis to assess any new safety impacts on the JPEG facility and concluded that, based on the proposed routing of the 42-inch pipeline and accounting for the substantial design and installation enhancements agreed to by Algonquin, the proposed pipeline poses no increased risks to I PEG (Entergy 2014). Entergy's site hazards analysis has been submMted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for inspection which is scheduled to be completed in late 2014. To ensure that the AIM Project will not present any new safety hazards to the JPEG facility, prior to construction in the vicinity of the IPEC facility, the final design should incorporate the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Letter from Entergy Nuclear Northeast to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated Auaust 21, 2014, letter NL-14-106.
Comment 3: Page 4-267 includes the following:
Given the distance from the IPEC generating facilities and the avoidance and mitigation measures described above, the proposed route should not pose any new safety hazards to the IPEC facility. Based on our consultation with NRC, Entergy is required to assess any new safety impacts on its facility and provide that analysis to the NRC. Algonquin has coordinated with Entergy to provide information about its proposed pipeline and Entergy is currently performing a Hazards Analysis. Therefore, to ensure that no new safety hazards would result from the AIM Project, we recommend that:
- Prjor to the end of the draft EIS comment perlod, Algonquin should file with the Secretary its final conclusions regarding any potential safety-related conflicts with the IPEC based on the Hazards Analysis performed by Entergy. If Entergy's Hazards Analysis is not yet complete, Algonquin should provide an update on its status and a schedule for anticipated completion. If, upon completion of the Hazards Analysis, additional mitigation measures are required to address safety-related issues or conflicts, prior to construction in the vicinity of the IPEC facility, Algonquin should file with the Secretary, for review and written approval by the Director of OEP, a site-specific construction and mitigation plan for the IPEC developed in consultation with Entergy.
The NRC recommends the paragraph be revised as follows:
Entergy performed a site hazards analysis to assess any new safety impacts on the IPEC facility and concluded that, based on the proposed routing of the 42-inch pipeline and accounting for the substantial design and installation enhancements agreed to by Algonquin, the proposed pipeline poses no increased risks to IPEC (Entergy 2014). Entergy's s;te hazards analysis has been submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for inspection which is scheduled to be completed in late 2014. Therefore, to ensure that no new safety hazards would result from the AIM Project:
Prior to construction in the vicinity of the IPEC facility. the final design* should incorporate the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Letter from Entergy Nuclear Northeast to U.S. Nuclear Ref:lulatorv Commission dated August 21, 2014, letterNL-14-106, Comment 4: Page 5-15 includes the following paragraph:
We received several scoping comments concerning the safety of the Project and its proximity to the IPEC, a nuclear facility on the east bank of the Hudson River in Westchester County, New York. Given the distance of the proposed Pr9ject from the IPEC generating facilities and the avoidance and mitigation measures that would be implemented by Algonquin, the proposed route should not pose any new safety hazards to the IPEC facility. Based on our consultation with NRC, Entergy is required to assess any new safety impacts on its IPEC facility and provide that analysis to the NRC, Algonquin has coordinated with Entergy to provide information about its proposed pipeline, and Entergy Is currently performing a Hazards Analysis. To ensure that no new safety hazards would result from the AIM Project, we are recommending that Algonquin file the final conclusions regarding any potential safety-related conflicts with the IPEC based on the Hazards Analysis performed by Entergy.
The NRC recommends the paragraph be revised as follows:
We received several scoping comments concerning the safety of the Project and its proximity to the IPEC, a nuclear facility on the east bank of the Hudson River in Westchester County.
New York, Given the distance of the proposed Project from the IPEC generating facilities and the avoidance and mitigation measures that would be implemented by Algonquin, the proposed route should not pose any new safety hazards to the IPEC facility. Entergy performed a site hazards analysis to assess any new safety impacts on the IPEC facility and concluded that, based on the proposed routing of the 42-inch pipeline and accounting for the substantial design and installation enhancements agreed to by Algonquin, the proposed pipeline poses no increased risks to IPEC (Entergy 2014). Entergy's site hazards analysis has been submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for inspection which is scheduled to be completed in fate 2014. To ensure that the AIM Project will not present any new safety hazards to the IPEC facility, prior to construction in the vicinity of the IPEC facility, the final design should incorporate the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Letter from Entergy Nuclear Northeast to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated August 21, 2014, letter NL-14-106.
Comment 5: Page 5-25 includes the following recommendation:
- 42.
Prior to the end of the draft EIS comment period, Algonquin shall fife with the Secretary the final conclusions regardihg any potential safety-related conflicts with the IPEC based on the HazardsAnalysis performed by Entergy. If Entergy's Hazards Analysis is not yet complete, Algonquin shall provide an update on its status and a schedule for anticipated completion. If, upon completion of the Hazards Analysis, additional mitigation measures are required to address safety-related issues or conflicts, prior to construction in the vicinity of the IPEC facility, Algonquin shall file with the Secretary, for review and written approval by the Director of OEP, a site-specific construction and mitigation plan for the IPEC devel1oped in consultation with Entergy.
(Section 4.12.3)
The NRC recommends the paragraph be revised as follows:
- 42.
To ensure that the AIM Project will not present any new safety hazards to the IPEC facility, prior to construction in the vicinity of the /PEG facility, the final design should incorporate the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Comment 6: Page 3~9 includes the following paragraph:
Because the subject of nuclear power remains controversial, any future proposals to construct new or expand existing facilities in the region would likely involve prolonged regulatory review and public opposition. Furthermore, there are environmental and regulatory challenges concerning safety and security, the disp9sal of toxic materials (spent fuel), and alterations to hydrological/biological systems (for cooling water) that would need to be addressed before any new plants could be constructed. Even if these challenges could be overcome, a new plant would not likely be operational for many years. For these reasons, new sources of nuclear power could not meet the schedule of the Project and are not currently a practicable alternative to the proposed Project.
The NRC recommends the paragraph be revised as follows:
Because the subject of nuclear power remains controversial, any future proposals to construct new or expand existing facilities in the region would likely involve prolonged regulatory review and public opposition. Furthermore, there is a regulatory process addressing safety and environmental issues (including reviews in the areas of nuclear safety and securffy, the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, and alterations to hydrological and biological systems) that would have to be completed before any new plants could be constructed and operated. Even ;f this regulatory review process were completed, a new plant would not likely be operational for many years. For these reasons, new sources of nuclear power could not meet the schedule of the Project and are not currently a practicable alternative to the proposed Project.