ML20357B112

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Action Process Email to Daniel Shea from Mike King Into ADAMS (FW Letter to Chairman NRC on Vogtle 3 & 4 Human Factors Engineering and Pressurizer
ML20357B112
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/22/2020
From: Mark King
NRC/NRR/VPOB
To:
- No Known Affiliation
Garry Armstrong
References
Download: ML20357B112 (3)


Text

1 Greene, Delores

Subject:

ACTION: Process Email to Daniel Shea from Mike King into ADAMS (FW: Letter to Chairman, NRC, on Vogtle 3&4 Human Factors Engineering and Pressurizer Importance:

High

From:King,Mike Sent:Tuesday,December22,20202:51PM To:djs7500@aol.com<djs7500@aol.com>

Subject:

RE:LettertoChairman,NRC,onVogtle3&4HumanFactorsEngineeringandPressurizer

DearMr.Shea:

IamtheDirectoroftheVogtleProjectOfficewithintheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissions(NRC)Officeof NuclearReactorRegulation.Iappreciateyourconcernsandshareyourgoalofasafenuclearindustry.Iam respondingtoyourNovember25,2020,emailtoChairmanSvinicki,thatincludedanattachedletterdated October3,2017,regardingyourconcernsrelatedtotheVogtleElectricGeneratingPlant(VEGP),Units3and 4.

Webelievethatyourconcernsfallintotwobroadcategories:(1)anapparentdisconnectbetweenoperator trainingdesignandHumanFactorsEngineering(HFE)andtheassociatedimplicationsforrealtimetask overload;and(2)theAP1000pressurizervolumeandimplicationsforthesafetyofthecurrentoperatingfleet givenlessonsfromtheThreeMileIsland,Unit2(TMI2)accident.

RegardingHFEtrainingandhumanperformance,thestaffhasreviewedyourconcernsandbelievethatthe issuesyouraisedhavebeenaddressed.TheNRCusesNUREG0711,HumanFactorsEngineeringProgram ReviewModel,Revision2(AgencywideDocumentsAccessandManagementSystem(ADAMS)AccessionNo.

ML040770540)toreviewHumanFactorsprograms.NRCstaffdevelopedNUREG0711,Revision2,in coordinationwithBrookhavenNationalLaboratory.ThestaffconsideredRevision2whenapprovingthe AP1000DesignCertification(DC)andtheVEGP,Units3and4,CombinedLicense(COL)application(see Section13.2,Training,Section18.6,StaffingandQualifications,andSection18.10,TrainingProgram Development,oftheVEGPCOLfinalsafetyevaluationreport(SER)(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12271A048) andChapter18oftheAP1000DesignCertificationDocumentfinalSER(ADAMSAccessionNo.

ML112061231)).

NUREG0711says,inpart,thatthelicenseeorapplicantmustuseaTaskAnalysis(TA).TAisaverybroadterm includingseveraldifferentacceptablemethods.Thejobtaskanalysis(JTA)developedbytheInstituteof NuclearPowerOperations(INPO)isjustoneTAmethodthathasalonghistorywithinthenuclear industry.TheTAisoneof12elementsofacomprehensivehumanfactorsprogram,allofwhichwerefoundto beacceptableduringtheAP1000DCandVEGP,Units3and4,COLreview.Portionsoftheprogramare confirmedasneededbyinspections,tests,analyses,andacceptancecriteria(ITAAC)andNRCinspections.

HumanFactorsprogramswhichareconsistentwithNUREG0711includenumerouscontrolstoensurethat bothengineeringinsightsaswellastheperspectivesofoperatorsareincludedinthedesignprocess.These insightsarethenconsideredwhendevelopingtrainingprogramsbytheCOLholder.Forinstance,accident

2 analysesandprobabilisticriskassessment(PRA)insightsareusedtoidentifyimportanthumanactionsas partofahumanfactorsprogram(seeSection18.6ofNUREG0711).Figure7.1,Theroleofhumanreliability analysisintheHFEprogram,ofNUREG0711,Revision2,illustrateshowimportanthumanactionsareusedto informthedesignoftheplant,plantprocedures,andoperatortrainingprogram.Inaddition,performance basedtesting(illustratedinFigure7.1astheHumanFactorsVerificationandValidationbox)provides confidencethatelementsofthetrainingprogramandthedesignworktosupportsafeandreliableoperation.

ThestaffinspectedSouthernNuclearCompanysHumanFactorsVerificationandValidationprogram,which includedanassessmentofoperatorworkload,anddeterminedthatthelicenseefollowedtheappropriate proceduresandproducedadequateresults(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML16336A244).

TheNRCapprovedaKnowledgeandAbilities(K/A)catalog(NUREG2103,KnowledgeandAbilitiesCatalogfor NuclearPowerPlantOperators:PressurizedWaterReactors,WestinghouseAP1000(ADAMSAccessionNo.

ML11307A367))thatwasdevelopedusinginsightsfromsubjectmatterexperts(e.g.,systemengineersand operators)whoidentifiedtheK/Anecessarytooperatetheplant.Licensedoperatorsmusthaveknowledgeof plantsystemsandplantresponses.TheNRCapprovesthewrittenexamination,administerstheoperating testsfortheinitiallicensingofoperators,andconductsroutineoversightofproficiencytrainingand examinationsforlicensedoperatorstoprovideconfidencethattheoperatorsdoinfacthavetheK/Aneeded tosafelyoperatetheplant(ADAMSAccessionNos.ML15212A744andML20127H986).Sincetrainingisa criticalcomponenttosafety,theNRCrequiresthatalllicensedoperatortrainingprogramsbederivedfroma systemsapproachtotrainingasdefinedinTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations(10CFR)55.4.

Finally,thestaffappreciatestheopportunitytorespondtoyourconcernsregardingwhytheWestinghouse AP1000pressurizeris40percentlargerthancomparablysizedexistingnuclearunitsandifthiswasnecessary inlightoftheTMI2accident.TheWestinghouseAP1000pressurizersizewasdesignedasexplainedinthe documentsyoureferenced.Thisincreasedvolumeprovidesplantoperatingflexibilityandminimizes challengestothesafetyreliefvalves.TheAP1000DesignControlDocumentdescribestheuseofthe pressurizeraswellastheabilityoftheplanttohandleloadrejectsandtoperformloadfollowing.Thedesign featureschosenfortheAP1000includedalargerpressurizertoallowformeetingtheAP1000Chapter15 safetyanalysisaswellasoperationalconsiderations,suchasloadfollowing.

TheAP1000designandsafetyrelatedsystemsaresignificantlydifferentthancurrentlyoperatingfleetsafety relatedsystems.Asaresult,theAP1000Chapter15safetyanalysisisalsosignificantlydifferentthanthe currentlyoperatingfleet.ThesedesignshaveallbeenapprovedbytheNRC.Thecurrentnuclearfleethave pressurizersthathavebeendesigned,analyzed,andapprovedbytheNRCtomeettheirUpdatedFinalSafety AnalysisReport(UFSAR)Chapter15safetyanalyses.Therefore,theNRCdoesnothaveasafetyconcernabout thesizeofthepressurizersofthecurrentfleetwithrespecttoeithertheiraccidentanalysesortheirabilityto performtheirfunction.Thestaffhasdeterminedthatbasedontheirdesigns,boththecurrentfleetandthe newAP1000pressurizerdesignandassociatedaccidentanalysesareacceptableandsafe.

WithregardtotherelationshipthatyoudrewbetweentheAP1000designandtheaccidentatTMI2in1979, amongthemanyactionsNRChastakentoaddresstheaccident,10CFR50.34wasaddedtotheCodeof FederalRegulations.10CFR50.34(f)(2)(iii)requiresCOLapplicantstodemonstratethattheyappliedstateof thearthumanfactorsprinciplestothemaincontrolroomdesignofreactors.NRCstaffusesChapter18of NUREG0800StandardReviewPlantoevaluateanapplicantshumanfactorsprogram.Chapter18includesa referencetoNUREG0711whichcontainsthe12elementsofsuchaprogramandincludesacceptancecriteria whichoutlineanacceptablehumanfactorsprogram.

OnbehalfoftheNRC,Ithankyouforyourconcerns,andhopethatwehaveaddressedthem.

3

Sincerely,

MikeKing Director,VogtleProjectOffice OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation USNuclearRegulatoryCommission 3014156637 OneWhiteFlintNorth(O13H19)