Text

CN-2020-09-DRAFT Op Test
	ML20324A037
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	09/29/2020
From:	Greg Werner; Operations Branch IV
To:	; Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
References
	Download: ML20324A037 (431)
	v • d • e

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 1 of 13 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A1 (RO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 2 of 13 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine time to 200 F in the Spent Fuel Pool in accordance with 2.4FPC.

Revision Number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to use graphs in 2.4FPC to determine the time to 200°F in the Fuel Pool Cooling system.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined by using attachment 5, that Figure 4 in 2.4FPC that it would take 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for the Spent Fuel Pool to reach 200°F. Examinee read note 2 and recognized that he could not interpolate the initial Spent Fuel Pool temperature and used the 120°F line to determine time to 200°F.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 3 of 13 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 4 of 13 Revision Statements: New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: G2.1.25 (4.4)

2. Safety Function: Generic K/A Conduct of Operations

3. Task Number: 233024C0401 Respond to Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure

4. PSA Applicability:N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in procedure step in bold

References:

1. 2.4FPC FUEL POOL COOLING TROUBLE (REV 37)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 5 of 13 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 6 of 13 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: 2.4 FPC Attachment 5 ESTIMATED TIME-to-200°F for Critical step spent FUEL POOL NOTE 1 - The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months mark on the curves is utilized by Procedure 0. PROTECT-EQP during on-line periods when the time for SFP to reach 200°F upon loss of normal cooling is < 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . This is performed to develop protection of systems and equipment required to maintain the functions of spent fuel pool decay heat removal and inventory control.

NOTE 2 - If fuel pool temperature falls between curves, use next highest temperature curve.

Standard Examinee reviewed the notes. Examinee understands that if the temperature is between the temperature lines not to interpolate and that the higher temperature line is used.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 1. Time-to-200°F curves are maintained with cycle specific data.

Standard Examinee read step 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 7 of 13

3. Procedure Step: 2. Assumptions of Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 (reference NEDC 11-080, SFP Heatup to 200°F; Revision 3).

NOTE - These graphs are based on conservative estimates and are intended to give initial estimates.

Actual temperature trending will provide more accurate time estimates and can override these curves.

2.1 Figure 2 and Figure 3 are post RE-30 to determine Fuel Pool Heatup rate considering the expected discharge from the reactor for 30 days after refueling shutdown to 800 days.

2.2 Figure 4 and Figure 5 are post RE-30 for the period of 30 days after refueling shutdown to 800 days for spent fuel pool temperatures between 70°F and 190°F.

2.3 Figure 4 and Figure 5 assumes a full core off-load occurring 60 days after RE-30 shutdown to 800 days over a range of spent fuel pool temperatures between 70°F and 190°F. Even though they utilize decay heat of 60 days operation as a design assumption, they may be utilized any time after startup from refueling outage.

2.3.1 Data shows relative stability in heat input (from decay) from off-loaded core after 60 days full power operation.

NOTE - Although Attachment 2 actions will have FPC pumps running, these graphs remain conservative and are to be utilized.

2.4 No FPC pumps running.

2.5 Gates Closed/In.

2.6 All decay heat removal and inventory makeup methods have been lost.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 8 of 13 Standard Examinee determined that step 2.2. was the applicable step to know to use Figure 4 to determine time to 200°F and the rest of the conditions required were given in the Initial Conditions and Cues.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: NOTE - If FPC pump running, RHR-TR-131 CH 9 should be used to determine fuel pool temperature. If FPC flow is lost, a temporary temperature monitoring device may be needed for accurate indication (e.g., rope/thermocouple assembly lowered into fuel pool, floating thermometer, etc.) (e.g.,

contact Control Room, IAC, etc., if equipment/tools are required).1 Standard Examinee reviewed the note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 3. Obtain actual fuel pool temperature using Attachment 1 or 2.

Standard Examinee obtained actual fuel pool temperature from Initial Conditions and Cues.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 9 of 13

6. Procedure Step: NOTE - Frequency can be reduced to < 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months as Critical step required by Shift Manager.

4. Log fuel pool temperature, level (Pool Wall), and time-to-200°F every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months until cooling restored on Attachment 6 (Page Error! Bookmark not defined.).4 Standard Examinee filled out Attachment 6 and give to the evaluator. The examinee logs 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months as the time to 200°F Cue Notes This JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 10 of 13 ATTACHMENT 6 TIME-TO-200°F LOG DATE: ___________

Attachment 1 ANSWER KEY Do not give to Examinee FUEL FUEL POOL POOL TIME-TO-TIME TEMP °F LEVEL 200°F NOTES Current time 115 37.75 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A1 Page 11 of 13 Attachment 1 ANSWER KEY- Do not give to Examinee SFP Time to 200°F - Gates In; S/D 5 to 30 Days (Full Core Offload) 14 Cycle 31 12 70°F 10 80°F Time to 200°F (hours) 90°F 8 100°F 110°F 120°F 6 130°F 140°F 150°F 4

160°F 170°F 2 180°F 190°F 0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Days After Shutdown for Full Core Offload

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 A1 Page 12 of 13 ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and tell me when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant in mode 5 for refueling for cycle 31

2. FPC gates are installed and Fuel pool level is 37.75

3. Full core offload has been done

4. FPC pumps have tripped and cannot be restarted

5. Spent Fuel Pool temperature is 115°F as reported by I&C from as they installed local temperature thermocouple /rope assembly in the Fuel Pool INITIATING CUES:

The CRS has entered 2.4FPC and has directed you to inform him of the time to 200°F in the Spent Fuel Pool.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 A1 Page 13 of 13 ATTACHMENT 6 TIME-TO-200°F LOG DATE:

FUEL POOL FUEL POOL TIME-TO-TIME TEMP °F LEVEL 200°F NOTES

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A2 (RO)

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 2 of 11 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine Actions for a Control Rod Mispositioned < 2 Hours Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the trainees ability to identify a mispositioned control rod and direct actions to recover from the situation TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined that control rod 02-31 was mispositioned and actions required per section 8 of procedure 10.13. Examinee also determined that control rod 10-15 was not at the required position but not by definition a mispositioned rod but since he was in the approach to criticality the actions of step 2.9 of 10.13 applied.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 3 of 11 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 4 of 11 Revision Statement: Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.1.19 (3.8), 2.1.37 (4.6)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 345022O0103

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.1.1 STARTUP PROCEDURE

2. Procedure 10.13, Control Rod Sequence and Movement Control.

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. RPIS printout

2. Control Rod Sequence Movement Sheet Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

2. Control Rod Sequence Movement Sheet

3. RPIS printout

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 5 of 11 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: (10.13, Control Rod Sequence and Movement Control)

Critical Step 2.7 If a Control Room Operator or Concurrent Verifier relief occurs, the relieving Control Room Operator or Concurrent Verifier shall review current control rod positions on PMIS computer. If computer not available, current control rod status shall be obtained by observing the full core display and 4-rod display.

Standard Examinee compared control rod position from the RPIS printout to the Control Rod Sequence Movement Sheet and identified that 2 control rods were not at the required position.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 7 of 11

2. Procedure Step: 8.1 Verify control rod mispositioned as follows:

Critical Step 8.1.1 A control rod left (not corrected before completion of Concurrent Verification) in a position other than the intended position per Control Rod Sequence Package or Individual Rod Movement Sheet; Standard Examinee determined that control rod 02-31 was mispositioned by comparing control rod 02-31 position from the RPIS printout to the Control Rod Sequence Movement Sheet and identified control rod 02-31 is currently at position 04 and should be at 08. This rod has been deselected and other rods in the package after 02-31 are currently at position 08.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 8 of 11

3. Procedure Step: 8.2 Notify SM of mispositioned control rod.

Critical Step 8.3 If rod can be recovered to intended position in accordance with provisions of Step 5.1, recover rod to intended position.

8.4 If rod cannot be recovered to intended position using provisions of Step 5.1, contact Reactor Engineering for recovery instructions.

8.5 The Reactor and Fuels Engineering Supervisor, Operations Manager, and General Manager of Plant Operations shall be notified of mispositioned control rod and recovery actions taken.

8.6 A Condition Report shall be generated.

Standard Examinee determined that control rod 02-31 was mispositioned and informed the SM, generated a CR, and reviewed step 5.1 of 10.13 and determined that step 5.1.6 applied; 5.1.6 If a rod is not at its intended position and greater than one notch from its intended position or has been mispositioned for 2 or more hours, contact Reactor Engineer for movement instructions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 9 of 11

4. Procedure Step: N/A Critical Step Standard Examinee determined that control rod 10-15 was not mispositioned by comparing control rod 10-15 position from the RPIS printout to the Control Rod Sequence Movement Sheet and identified control rod 10-15 is currently at position 10 and should be at 08. Control Rod 10-15 is currently selected and has only been double notched and since less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months have passed can restore the control rod to 08 IAW step 2.9 of procedure 10.13.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 2.9 If a control rod double-notches during approach to criticality, following steps should be performed:8 Critical Step 2.9.1 If double-notch occurs due to fast rod or rod position control problem, contact System Engineer to correct problem.

2.9.2 Contact Reactor Engineer for guidance on rod position.

2.9.3 Write Condition Report to trend occurrence.

Standard Examinee determined that for control rod 10-15 the requirements were to contact system engineering to correct the problem, contact reactor engineering for guidance on how to restore the rod position, and generate a CR.

Cue Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 10 of 11 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY (Do NOT give to Examinee)

CONCLUSIONS:

02 inform the SM 02-31 is mispositioned, generate a CR, Contact RE for guidance on how to recover 02-31 rod position.

10-15 contact system engineering to correct the problem, generate a CR, Contact RE on how to recover 10-15 rod position.

CNS Audit Exam 2020-9 JPM A2 Page 11 of 11 ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Mode 2 pulling control rods on the APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.

2. The extra operator that is the current verifier on the control rod withdraws is sick and needs to be relieved.

3. The last movements on CRD was started 60 minutes ago and completed 15 minutes ago.

4. Control rod 10-15 double notched to position 10, due to rod speed fast and is still selected.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to relieve the concurrent verifier. All steps have been performed for the turnover except for step 2.7 of 10.13. You are to perform a review of rod positions IAW step 2.7 of 10.13 and inform the CRS of any actions required to be done before you take over the concurrent verifier duties.

CONCLUSIONS:

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 1 of 8 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A3(RO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 2 of 8 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine impact of pulling fuse Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to read electrical prints to identify plant impact for fuse removal.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined removing RWCU fuse 12A-F4 results in a trip of RWCU Pump A and annunciator 9-4-2/C-5.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 3 of 8 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 4 of 8 Revision Statement: Rev 0- new JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.2.15 (3.9/4.3)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 299012O0301

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step in bold

References:

1. GE Elementary Diagram 791E263, Reactor Water Cleanup System, Sheets 1 and 2 Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. none Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

2. GE Elementary Diagram 791E263, Reactor Water Cleanup System, Sheets 1 and 2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 5 of 8 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 6 of 8 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: N/A Critical Step Standard Determined removing RWCU fuse 12A-F4 results in:

Trip of RWCU Pump A

Annunciator 9-4-2/C-5 and recorded under CONCLUSIONS on Att. 2 IAW the Answer Key Cue Notes Annunciator 9-4-2/C-5 is listed as COOLING WATER TEMP HIGH on GE drawing 791E263 sh 2; however, actual engraving is RWCU PUMP A/B COOLING WATER HIGH TEMP.

This also causes a trip signal to RWCU Pump B. Listing RWCU B trip is not critical, since it is not operating.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 7 of 8 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY (Do NOT give to Examinee)

CONCLUSIONS:

Removing RWCU fuse 12A-F4 results in:

1) Trip of RWCU Pump A (also is trip signal to RWCU Pump B. RWCU B is not critical)

2) Annunciator 9-4-2/C-5 (RWCU PUMP A/B COOLING WATER HIGH TEMP)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A3 Page 8 of 8 ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Mode 1, 100% power

2. RWCU Pump A is operating INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to determine the impact of removing RWCU fuse 12A-F4 and record your conclusions below:

1. Record impact to RWCU system, including annunciator(s) that change state directly as a result of removing the subject fuse, if any.

CONCLUSIONS:

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 1 of 15 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A4 (RO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 2 of 15 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Perform ERP Effluent Release Rate Determination Using SJAE Pathway Revision Number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to determine release rate from Steam Jet Air Ejectors IAW Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined the release rate and completed Table 3-1 per the Answer Key IAW Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 3 of 15 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 4 of 15 Revision Statements: Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: G2.3.11 (3.8)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task Number: 200146P0501 Perform ERP Effluent Release Rate Determination Using SJAE Pathway

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination (Rev 27)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 5 of 15 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 6 of 15 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 5.7.16 Release Rate Determination)

Critical step 2.1 SELECT and PERFORM appropriate release rate determination attachment per Table 1.

Attachment 2 Steam Jet Air Ejectors (SJAEs) and Attachment 3 Standard Examinee referred to Attachments 2 and 3.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: (Attachment 2 Release Rate Using Steam Jet Air Ejector Monitors)

1. VERIFY MSIVs open.

Standard Examinee determined from MSIVs are open from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 7 of 15

3. Procedure Step: NOTE - Reactor shutdown is met by any of following Critical step conditions:

All rods fully inserted.

Reactor scram and power below 3%.

Cold shutdown boron weight injected per EOPs.

2. DETERMINE time since shutdown (EFFECTIVE AGE) in hours.

2.1 OBTAIN or VERIFY time of reactor shutdown from Radiological Control Manager (RCM), Operations, and/or Engineering.

2.2 RECORD EFFECTIVE AGE in hours in Table 3-1, Column 1.

2.2.1 IF not shutdown, THEN RECORD zero (0).

Standard Examinee determined that the plant was shut down five hours ago from initial conditions and recorded 5 in Table 3-1 column 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 8 of 15

2. Procedure Step: 3. OBTAIN highest SJAE monitor reading in mrem/hr Critical Step from any of following:

OFF-GAS RAD Monitors PNL 9-02 behind front panel in Control Room.

PMIS Display PMIS05.

PMIS Data Points.

o SJAE A: N082.

o SJAE B: N083.

3.1 RECORD SJAE MONITOR (mrem/hr) reading in Table 3-1, Column 2.

Standard Examinee determined Off Gas Rad Monitor Channel A reading was the highest available and recorded 2.9E3 in Table 3-1 Column 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 9 of 15

5. Procedure Step: NOTE - Conversion factor will change as fuel Critical step degrades. Chemistry is responsible for updating conversion factor after sampling.

3.2 OBTAIN current SJAE conversion factor (mrem/hr to µCi/sec/cfm) from one of following:

Posted location on PNL 9-02 near OFF GAS RAD Monitor behind front panel in Control Room.

PMIS Data Point SPDS0215.

Chemistry.

3.3 RECORD CONVERSION FACTOR value in Table 3-1, Column 3.

Standard Examinee read note and determined conversion factor for SJAE A was 0.047 from image provided with initial conditions and recorded 0.047 on table 3-1 column 3.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 10 of 15

4. Procedure Step: 4. OBTAIN combined SJAE flow rate (cfm) from one of Critical Step following:

OFF-GAS RAD Monitor in Control Room.

PMIS Display PMIS05.

PMIS Data Points:

SJAE A: N084 SJAE B: N085

5. RECORD COMBINED SJAE FLOW RATE (cfm) value in Table 3-1, Column 4.

Standard Examinee determined combined SJAE flow rate by adding values from PMIS data points N084 and N085 given in initial conditions:

31.8 CFM + 27.5 CFM = 58.7 CFM and recorded 58.7 CFM in Table 3-1 Column 4.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 11 of 15

6. Procedure Step: 6. CALCULATE Noble Gas Release Rate on Table 3-1 Critical Step as follows:

6.1 MULTIPLY Column 2 by Column 3 by Column 4.

(Column 2) x (Column 3) x (Column 4) =

(Column 5) 6.2 RECORD NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE

(µCi/sec) results in Table 3-1, Column 5.

Standard Examinee multiplied values recorded in Table 3-1 column 2, column3, and column 4:

(2.9E3 mR/hr) X (0.047 µCi/sec/mr/hr/CFM) X (58.7 CFM)

= 8000 µCi/sec and recorded 8000 in Table 3-1 Column 5.

Cue Notes JPM is complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A4 Page 12 of 15 ANSWER KEY (Do Not Give to the Examinees)

Table 3-1 (3) (4) (5)

(1) CONVERSION COMBINED NOBLE GAS EFFECTIVE (2) FACTOR SJAE RELEASE RATE AGE SJAE MONITOR (mrem/hr to FLOW RATE (µCi/sec)

(hours) (mrem/hr) µCi/sec/cfm) (cfm) (2) x (3) x (4) 5 2.9E3 0.047 58.7 8000

ATTACHMENT 2 (page 1 of 3)

DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3 following scram from 100% power five hours ago.

2. All MSIVs are open

3. CNS DOSE program is NOT available

4. ONLY the following data is available:

Panel 9-2 information (see attached image)

PMIS data point o N084 31.2 CFM o N085 27.5 CFM INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to determine the Noble Gas Release Rate from Steam Jet Air Ejectors IAW Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination, and complete Table 3-1 (Attached).

Other personnel will perform EPIP 5.7.17.1, Dose Assessment (Manual).

JPM ATTACHMENT 2 (page 2 of 3)

From Panel 9-2:

JPM ATTACHMENT 2 (page 3 of 3)

Table 3-1 (3) (4) (5)

(1) CONVERSION COMBINED NOBLE GAS EFFECTIVE (2) FACTOR SJAE RELEASE RATE AGE SJAE MONITOR (mrem/hr to FLOW RATE (µCi/sec)

(hours) (mrem/hr) µCi/sec/cfm) (cfm) (2) x (3) x (4)

Performed by: Date:

Signature

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A5 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 2 of 11 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine impact of fire in Reactor Building on reactor water level instrumentation Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to determine what reactor water level instrumentation will remain available during a fire in the Reactor Building IAW Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE-REACTOR, Reactor Building Post-Fire Operational Information.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined NBI-LI-91B Fuel Zone Level, NBI-LI-85B Wide Range Level, and RFC-LI-94B RX NR Level will remain available during a fire in the given location IAW Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE-REACTOR, Reactor Building Post-Fire Operational Information.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 3 of 11 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 4 of 11 Revision Statement:

Rev 0 New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.1.20 (4.6)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 200333G0503, Analyze Need and Direct Actions for Post-Fire Operations

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE-REACTOR, Reactor Building Post-Fire Operational Information (Rev 7)

2. Alarm Card FP-2/B-6, RX BLDG 931 SW PULL STATION 12 (Rev 7)

3. Procedure 5.1INCIDENT, Site Emergency Incident (Rev 41)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Computer Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE-REACTOR, Reactor Building Post-Fire Operational Information (Rev 7)

3. Alarm Card FP-2/B-6, RX BLDG 931 SW PULL STATION 12

4. Procedure 5.1INCIDENT, Site Emergency Incident

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 5 of 11 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step (Alarm Card FP-2/B-6, RX BLDG 931 SW PULL STATION 12) 1.1 Enter Procedure 5.1INCIDENT.

Standard Examinee referred to Procedure 5.1INCIDENT.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 7 of 11

2. Procedure Step (5.1INCIDENT, Site Emergency Incident)

Attachment 4, Control Room Supervisor

2. IF incident is a fire, THEN perform one of following:

WARNING - Use of 5.4FIRE-S/D or 5.4POST-FIRE procedures during MODE 4 or 5, or if Shutdown Cooling Suction isolation valves are not de-energized and closed, could result in an alignment which would drain the RPV.

NOTE - Analysis and strategies used for 5.4FIRE-S/D or 5.4POST-FIRE procedures are invalid if not in MODE 1 or 2, or in MODE 3 with RHR-MO-17 or RHR-MO-18 de-energized closed.

2.1 IF plant operating in MODE 1 or 2, or in MODE 3 with RHR-MO-17 or RHR-MO-18 de-energized closed, THEN determine fire location from Attachment 8 (Page18) and concurrently enter procedure specified in Attachment 8 for confirmed fire location, and take action specified for that fire location.

Standard Examinee determined fire exists during Mode 3 and referred to Attachment 8.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step Attachment 8, Fire Area Procedure Cross-Reference Reactor Building 931 South Central (RWCU HX Room) or Go to Procedure 5.4POST-Southwest Corner or RHR HX FIRE-REACTOR Room B Standard Examinee referred to Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE-REACTOR.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 8 of 11

4. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE-REACTOR, Reactor Building Post-Fire Operational Information) 4.5 Find most applicable fire location in CONFIRMED FIRE LOCATION column of Attachment 1 (Page7). Use only one fire location.

4.5.1 From SAFE SHUTDOWN ACTIONS FOR AREA column of Attachment 1 (Page 7), determine attachment required for fire location.

Attachment 1, Fire Area Actions Reactor Building 931 South Attachment RB-N Central (RWCU HX Room) or 12 (Page Southwest Corner or RHR HX 175)

Room B Standard Examinee located RX BLDG 931' SW on Att. 1 page 7, then referred to Attachment 12.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 9 of 11

5. Procedure Step Attachment 12, Safe Shutdown Actions for Analysis Area Critical step RB- N (Page 177)

AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTATION RPV LEVEL

NBI-LI-91B Fuel Zone Level (Panel 9-3)

NBI-LI-85B Wide Range Level (Panel 9-5)

RFC-LI-94B RX NR Level (Panel 9-5)

Standard Examinee located AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTATION on Att. 12, determined NBI-LI-91B Fuel Zone Level (Panel 9-3), NBI-LI-85B Wide Range Level (Panel 9-5), and RFC-LI-94B RX NR Level (Panel 9-5) were available and listed them on the answer sheet.

Cue Notes JPM is complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________ Total Time: ___________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A5 Page 10 of 11 Attachment 1 Answer Key DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The plant was at 30% power.

2. Annunciator FP-2/B-6, RX BLDG 931' SW PULL STATION 12, alarmed.

3. The Reactor Building NLO reported a fire in the RWCU HX room.

4. A manual scram was inserted five minutes ago, and plant shutdown is in progress IAW Procedure 2.1.5, Reactor Scram.

INITIATING CUE:

The Shift Manager directs you to determine ALL control room reactor water level instruments that will remain available per plant fire response procedures.

List available control room reactor water level instruments below:

NBI-LI-91B Fuel Zone Level (Panel 9-3)

NBI-LI-85B Wide Range Level (Panel 9-5)

RFC-LI-94B RX NR Level (Panel 9-5)

/

Signature Date

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

5. The plant was at 30% power.

6. Annunciator FP-2/B-6, RX BLDG 931' SW PULL STATION 12, alarmed.

7. The Reactor Building NLO reported a fire in the RWCU HX room.

8. A manual scram was inserted five minutes ago, and plant shutdown is in progress IAW Procedure 2.1.5, Reactor Scram.

INITIATING CUE:

The Shift Manager directs you to determine ALL control room reactor water level instruments that will remain available per plant fire response procedures.

List available control room reactor water level instruments below:

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 1 of 10 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-6 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 2 of 10 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Review procedure 2.0.4 for shift turnover.

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to perform the supervisor review or procedure 2.0.4 during shift turnover.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined that CS-MO-7B, HPCI TEST light, and SW pressure were not in the required positions for turnover and that CS-MO-7B requires entry into LCO 3.5.1 condition A and that one SW pump needs secured per 2.2.71.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 3 of 10 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 4 of 10 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.1.3 (3.9)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 341011O0303 Review Operating Logs For Trends And Out Of Specification Conditions

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.0.4 RELIEF PERSONNEL AND SHIFT TURNOVER (REV 65)

2. Procedure 2.0.11 ENTERING AND EXITING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION/TRM/ODAM LCO CONDITION(S) (REV 45)

3. Procedure 2.2.71 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (REV 129)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Computer Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

3. Attachment 3- 2.0.4 Attachment 2 (Completed ready for review)

Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

2. Attachment 3- 2.0.4 Attachment 2 (Completed ready for review)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 5 of 10 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 6 of 10 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 2.0.4, RELIEF PERSONNEL AND SHIFT TURNOVER)

Standard Examinee referred to body of Procedure 2.0.4, Section 6 and Attachment 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 6. SYSTEM STATUS CHECK 6.11 On-coming shift shall review System Status Checklist, Attachment 2 or 3, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of relieving watch, noting any discrepancies. At least one on-coming Control Room Operator and crew supervision shall sign the completed checklist.

Standard Examinee reviewed Attachment 2. Mode 1 stated in Initial Conditions and Cues Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 7 of 10

3. Procedure Step: N/A Critical step Standard Examinee identified the mis-positioned components; CS-MO-7B is CLOSED, required position is OPEN HPCI TEST light is ON Safety System Status board, required position is OFF SW-PI-2715 A/B is reading 70/72, required to be less than 70 psig.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: N/A Critical step Standard Examinee addressed CS-MO-7B closed by declaring CS B INOPERBLE and entered LCO 3.5.1 Condition A.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Examinee has HPCI TEST light extinguished. Initial Conditions and Cues state only 6.1SGT.301 surveillance in progress.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 8 of 10

6. Procedure Step: N/A Critical step Standard Examinee has checks procedure 2.2.71, which directs securing one SW pump.

Cue Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 Page 9 of 10 Answer Key CS-MO-7B is closed, Declare CS B INOPERBLE and entered LCO 3.5.1 Condition A.

Restore system to OPERABLE within 7 days. Need to re-open CS-MO-7B.

HPCI TEST light is lit ON the Safety System Status Board, no testing in progress. Press button to turn light OFF.

SW pressure is above 70 psig. Per direction of 2.2.71 need to secure one SW pump and verify SW pressure to RIVER ELEVATION VS. SW LOOP SW-PI-2715A(B) PRESSURE GRAPHS.

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 1, 100% power

2. River level is 895 feet.

3. Pre shift brief was completed

4. BOP has completed 2.0.4 review INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to determine review 2.0.4 that the BOP has turned in for review.

Identify any issues, and/if any configuration changes that are required to be made, or Technical Specifications that are not met.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 1 of 10 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A7 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 2 of 10 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine Post-Maintenance Testing Requirements Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to determine post -maintenance testing for HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE accumulator to be restored to an operable status.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined post-maintenance tests required for HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE accumulator per the answer key IAW Procedure 7.0.5, CNS Post-Maintenance Testing.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 3 of 10 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 4 of 10 Revision Statement:

Rev 0 New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.2.21 (4.1)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 200302W0203

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 7.0.5, CNS Post-Maintenance Testing (Rev 59)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Computer Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 5 of 10 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 6 of 10 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 7.0.5, CNS POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING)

2. USING MATRICES TO ASSIGN PMT Note prior to step 2.1:

NOTE - The list of "Maintenance Performed" activities and "Test Guides" are a guide and are not meant to be all inclusive nor meant to imply that all items listed are required.

The selection of testing required shall depend upon the scope of completed maintenance and the requirements of applicable codes, standards, Tech Specs, Tech Requirements Manual, or the Off-Site Dose Assessment Manual.

Standard Examinee reviewed note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 2.1 Identify the type of component listed on the Work Order.

Standard Examinee determined from the Initial conditions that the component is an accumulator.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 7 of 10

3. Procedure Step 2.2 Locate the general component from the Attachment 1 index.

Standard Examinee determined from 1st page of Att. 1 index that accumulators are on page 7.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 2.3 Identify from the "Maintenance Performed" column the type of corrective and/or preventive maintenance to be performed.

Standard Examinee located ACCUMULAOTOR REPLACEMENT on Att. 1 page 7 ACCUMULATORS (ACC).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step 2.4 Locate from the Test Guides header the Critical step corresponding test activity(s) for that maintenance activity.

Standard For Accumulator replacement on Att. 1 page 7 ACCUMULATORS (ACC) the Examinee noted Test Guides specified Leak Test (3), Pressure Drop Test (2), and needed to use Attachment 2 since the accumulator is an IST component.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 8 of 10

6. Procedure Step 2.5 If the maintenance performed affects an IST Program Critical step component, identify the corresponding test procedures for that component on Attachment 2.

Standard Located HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET on Att. 2 and determined the following tests and surveillance procedures were specified and recorded them as the required PMTs on JPM Att. 2

FSC, procedure 6.HV.101 (Full stroke exercise test to the closed position including stroke time measurement)

FST, procedure 6.HV.101 (Fail safe position test) and recorded them as the required PMTs on JPM Att. 2 Cue Notes JPM is complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________ Total Time: ___________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 9 of 10 Attachment 1 Answer Key DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The Reactor is 100% power.

2. Leak on HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE accumulator has been identified.

3. Maintenance to replace the accumulator on HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE is being planned.

INITIATING CUE:

The Shift Manager directs you to determine the post maintenance testing requirements to assign to HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE accumulator replacement IAW Procedure 7.0.5, Post Maintenance Testing.

Check ONLY the required tests below:

LLRT Leak test per applicable code requirements Pressure Drop Test Dynamic VOTES test Static VOTES test Fail safe position test Open position indication test Closed position indication test Timed full stroke open test Timed full stroke closed test

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A7 Page 10 of 10 ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The Reactor is 100% power.

2. Leak on HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE accumulator has been identified.

3. Maintenance to replace the accumulator on HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE is being planned.

INITIATING CUE:

The Shift Manager directs you to determine the post maintenance testing requirements to assign to HV-AOV-270AV CONTROL RM HVAC INLET VALVE accumulator replacement IAW Procedure 7.0.5, Post Maintenance Testing.

Check ONLY the required tests below:

LLRT Leak test per applicable code requirements Pressure Drop Test Dynamic VOTES test Static VOTES test Fail safe position test Open position indication test Closed position indication test Timed full stroke open test Timed full stroke closed test

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A8 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 2 of 11 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Verify Drywell Entry Conditions to perform work in the drywell on TIP Drives Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to determine requirements to perform a temporary lift on the Primary Containment Access clearance order during a refueling outage.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined the following requirements were required to perform a temp lift on the TIP drives during a refueling outage after the Primary Containment Access clearance order was hung. 1.) Radiation Protection Manager approval, 2.) Installation of area radiation monitors on TIP tubing to measure and record rad levels caused by driving the TIP, 3.) Radiological surveys, which bound TIP work being performed (including maximum length of time TIP is inserted in core), have been performed, evaluated, and found to be acceptable by Radiation Protection, with postings updated accordingly. 4.)

Stop work in the drywell during the surveys.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 3 of 11 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 4 of 11 Revision Statement:

Rev 0 New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.3.13 (3.8) 2.3.12 (3.7)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 345057P0103 Verify Drywell Entry Conditions

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.1.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ACCESS PREPARATION AND CLOSEOUT ACTIVITIES (REV 18)

2. 14.2.6 TIP DRIVING FORCE MEASUREMENTS AND CORE TOP/BOTTOM PROGRAMMING (REV 15)

SpecialConditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Computer Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 5 of 11 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.16, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ACCESS PREPARATION AND CLOSEOUT ACTIVITIES)

3. REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Steps in this procedure may be marked N/A and not performed with permission of Operations Manager or Operations Supervisor to suit existing plant conditions or configurations. Reason for non-performance shall be documented on Attachment 2.

Standard Examinee reviewed step.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 3.2 Unless otherwise designated, each step shall be initialed by an Operator.

Standard Examinee reviewed step.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 7 of 11

3. Procedure Step 3.3 Primary Containment Access Clearance Order:

3.3.1 Following components, as a minimum, shall be de-activated:

3.3.1.1 Nitrogen makeup to containment.

3.3.1.2 Standby Nitrogen Injection System.

3.3.1.3 TIP drive machines.

Standard Examinee reviewed step.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 8 of 11

4. Procedure Step 3.3.2 Requirements for Drywell access when Critical step lifting TIP drive machine portion of Clearance Order to allow TIP maintenance.

3.3.2.1 Radiation Protection Manager or designee approval.

3.3.2.2 Installation of area radiation monitors on TIP tubing to measure and record rad levels caused by driving the TIP.

3.3.2.3 Radiological surveys, which bound TIP work being performed (including maximum length of time TIP is inserted in core), have been performed, evaluated, and found to be acceptable by Radiation Protection, with postings updated accordingly.

Standard Examinee marks up key with the Radiation Protection Manager, Installation of area radiation monitors, Radiological surveys Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 9 of 11

5. Procedure Step NOTE - If Drywell is available for access and access Critical step to Drywell is desired during TIP maintenance, ensure it is initially evacuated and posted as "No Access While TIP Testing In-Progress". Once radiological surveys, which bound TIP work being performed (including maximum length of time TIP is inserted in core), have been performed and evaluated by Radiation Protection, and found to be acceptable, Drywell access may be restored and postings updated accordingly with Radiation Protection Manager or designee approval.

Note prior to step 3.6 in procedure 14.2.6 Standard Examinee marks up key with the drywell evacuated during survey.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step N/A Critical step Standard Answer Key and student sheet turned in match.

Cue Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________ Total Time: ___________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A8 Page 10 of 11 Attachment 1 Answer Key DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The Reactor is shutdown and in mode 5.

2. Primary Containment Access Clearance Order has been hung

3. I&C has brought a work order to perform 14.2.6 TIP DRIVING FORCE MEASUREMENTS AND CORE TOP/BOTTOM PROGRAMMING and need drywell access to perform the surveillance.

INITIATING CUE:

The Shift Manager directs you to determine what would be required to allow I&C to perform maintenance on the TIP drives Check the requirements for I&C to perform this work:

GMPO Approval Radiological Manager Approval Clearance order release on the Primary Containment Access C.O.

Temp lift on TIP Drives Radiological Surveys Temporary radiation monitoring on the TIP Drives Drywell evacuated during radiological surveys Stop work in the drywell while 14.2.6 is being performed

/

Signature Date

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The Reactor is shutdown and in mode 5.

2. Primary Containment Access Clearance order has been hung

3. I&C has brought a work order to perform 14.2.6 TIP DRIVING FORCE MEASUREMENTS AND CORE TOP/BOTTOM PROGRAMMING INITIATING CUE:

The Shift Manager directs you to determine what would be required to allow I&C to perform maintenance on the TIP drives Check all the requirements to do this work:

GMPO Approval Radiological Manager Approval Clearance order release on the TIP Drives Temp lift on TIP Drives Radiological Surveys Temporary radiation monitoring on the TIP Drives Drywell evacuated during radiological surveys Stop work in the drywell while 14.2.6 is being performed

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 1 of 14 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A9(SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 2 of 14 Lesson Number: SKL0343032 SAP Course Number: 72663 Lesson

Title:

Determine Protective Action Recommendations Table top 11 Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) YES NO (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to perform Protective Action Recommendations.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined IAW Procedure 5.7.20, Protective Action Recommendations, that within 15 minutes of starting this JPM, that Sectors A, B, C are affected and recommended SHELTER in place for ALL Sectors in the 0-2 mile range and Sectors A, B, C 2-5 mile range. ALL REMAINING sectors in the 2-5-mile range and ALL sectors in the 5-10 mile range are to go indoors and monitor EAS.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 3 of 14 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 4 of 14 Revision Statements: Updated JPM to new format.

JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: G 2.4.44 (4.4)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No: 200335G0503 Determine Protective Action Recommendations

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps in the Procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Procedure 5.7.1, EAL Classification (Rev 65)

2. Procedure 5.7.20, Protective Action Recommendations (Rev 31)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Computer Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.7.20, Protective Action Recommendations

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 5 of 14 Directions:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed.

You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1 (and Handout 2 if computer is not available).

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 6 of 14 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: 5.7.20 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Standard Examinee determined that 5.7.20 is the procedure needed to be used to give PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS.

Cue Notes Give examinee 5.7.20 or allow use of computer if JPM conducted in the classroom.

Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 1. ENTRY CONDITIONS [INFORMATION USE]

1.1 Projected Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) or Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) dose per EPIP 5.7.17 or 5.7.17.1 exceed 1 rem TEDE or 5 rem CDE at or beyond boundary of Owner Controlled Area (OCA).

1.2 GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) declared based on plant conditions.

Standard Examinee determined that step 1.2 was the entry condition, GE status was given in the initial conditions section.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 7 of 14

3. Procedure Step: 2. INSTRUCTIONS [REFERENCE USE]

2.1 USE Table 1 to select appropriate guidance:

TABLE 1 CONDITION GO TO If EOF not available and Shift Manager Attachment 1 is Emergency Director (ED)

If EOF activated with on-call ED, RAS, Attachment 2 and RCM Standard Examinee determined that with the table that the Shift Manager is the Emergency Director (ED) and goes to attachment 1 Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 8 of 14

4. Procedure Step: 1. Dose Assessor USE Table 1 to select appropriate section based on dose assessment method.

TABLE 1 DOSE ASSESSMENT METHOD GO TO EPIP 5.7.17, CNS-DOSE Section 2 EPIP 5.7.17.1, Hand Calculated Dose Section 3 Assessment Standard Examinee determined that with the table that CNS DOSE report is provided to the examinee that CNS-DOSE is available and goes to section 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 2. Dose Assessor OBTAIN CNS-DOSE Assessment Report and REVIEW PARs.

2.1 USE Attachments 3 and 4 to check CNS-DOSE PAR determination.

Standard Examinee transitioned to attachment 3 for performing the Protective Action Recommendation.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 9 of 14

6. Procedure Step: PAR-2 (PAR FLOWCHART) Is this the first PAR for the GE?

Standard Examinee answered YES, a General Emergency was declared in the Initial Condition section.

Cue Notes General Emergency has just been declared under EAL SG2.1, given in the Initial Conditions section.

Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: PAR-3 (PAR FLOWCHART) Has Containment boundary been determined to be lost (EPIP 5.7.1)?

Standard Examinee answered NO, containment status given in Initial Condition section.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: PAR-12 (PAR FLOWCHART) Do impediments to EVACUATION exist, OR Is this a controlled release of <1 hr duration?

Standard Examinee answered YES, Impediment status is given in Initial Condition section.

Cue Notes Initial Condition states that impediments to evacuation exists.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 10 of 14

9. Procedure Step: PAR-14 Are Dose assessment results available AND either Critical Step > 5 rem TEDE OR > 25 rem CDE Standard Examinee determined SHELTER PAR: (FLOWCHART PAR-15)

SHELTER in place 2-mile radius and 2 to 5 miles downwind.

All remaining sectors GO indoors and MONITOR EAS.

and recorded on JPM Att. 2 IAW the Answer Key.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: 2.2 USE Attachment 5 to check appropriate downwind sectors selected for PARs based on wind direction.

Standard Examinee transitioned to attachment 5 for the sectors associated affected by the Protective Action Recommendation.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: Attachment 5 Affected Sector Determination Critical Step Standard Examinee determined affected sectors Wind from 201º sectors affected A, B, C and recorded on JPM Att. 2 IAW the Answer Key.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 11 of 14 Attachment 1 ANSWER KEY Do NOT give to examinee Examinee data table should look similar to this one:

Protective Action Recommendations (PARS)

None [ ] Evacuate Sectors Go indoors and monitor EAS in

[X ] Shelter Sectors Sectors 0-2 Miles ALL 2-5 Miles A, B, C remaining 5-10 Miles ALL

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 12 of 14 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 2 This is a Time Critical JPM.

Immediately return Attachment 2 to the examiner when you have completed this task.

The completion time for this JPM will be documented when you hand the JPM back to the evaluator DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and tell the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. A General Emergency has just been declared under EAL SG2.1.

2. ERO is NOT Activated

3. ATWS in progress and reactor power is 7%.

4. RPV level is -187 corrected FZ and stable.

5. There is NOT a radioactive release in excess of ODAM limits at this time. (Dose assessment report below)

6. In Containment radiation monitors are both indicating 1.8E4 REM/HR.

7. Primary and Secondary containment are INTACT.

8. There ARE impediments to evacuation.

9. The wind is at 15 mph.

10. The wind is from 201°.

11. There is NO precipitation.

DOSE Projection Data Distance From Projected Integrated Dose (Rem) Projected Dose Rate (Rem/Hr)

Plant TEDE CDE (Thyroid) TEDE CDE (Thyroid)

Site Boundary 2.32E-01 3.56E00 5.81E-02 8.91E-01 2 Miles 2.27E-02 1.24E00 2.03E-02 3.11E-01 5 Miles 8.11E-02 3.48E-01 5.67E-03 8.70E-02 10 Miles 9.43E-03 1.45E-01 2.36E-03 3.62E-02

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 13 of 14

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM A9 Page 14 of 14 ATTACHMENT 2 (continued)

Page 2 of 2 INITIATING CUE:

TIME CRITICAL JPM You are directed as the Emergency Director to determine the appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the provided conditions. Complete the PAR table below, then immediately return this Attachment to the examiner when you have completed this task.

Protective Action Recommendations (PARS)

None [ ] Evacuate Sectors Go indoors and monitor EAS in

[ ] Shelter Sectors Sectors 0-2 Miles 2-5 Miles 5-10 Miles REMARKS for 5.7.6 Attachment 3:

Performed by: _________________________/

(Signature) Date Immediately return Attachment 2 to the examiner when you have completed this task.

The completion time for this JPM will be documented when you hand the JPM back to the evaluator.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 1 of 9 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure P-1 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 2 of 9 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Transfer PMIS UPS static switch from inverter to alternate source Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to transfer PMIS UPS static switch from inverter to alternate source IAW Procedure 2.2.63, PMIS Uninterruptible Power Supply System.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee transferred PMIS UPS static switch from inverter to alternate source IAW Procedure 2.2.63, PMIS Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Section 10.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform X Plant (RCA )

X Simulate Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 3 of 9 Comments (Required for Unsat):

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 4 of 9 Revision Statement:

Rev 0 - New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 262002 K4.01 (3.1/3.4)

2. Safety Function: 6, Electrical

3. Task No.: 262105P0101, Respond to PMIS Uninterruptible Power Supply Failure

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.63, PMIS Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Rev 17)

2. Procedure 2.4COMP, Computer Malfunction Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 1 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.63, PMIS Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Section 10 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 5 of 9 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 6 of 9 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 2.2.63, PMIS Uninterruptible Power Supply Critical Step System, Section 10 NOTE - Steps performed on MPF Mezzanine unless specified otherwise.

10. TRANSFERRING PMIS UPS STATIC SWITCH FROM INVERTER TO ALTERNATE SOURCE 10.1 ENSURE following breakers closed:

10.1.1 MDP-1(3) EE-DSC-UPS1, DSC FOR XFMR UPS1 - UPS BYPASS FEED TO PMIS.

Standard Examinee read note and closed breaker MDP-1(3)

EE-DSC-UPS1, DSC FOR XFMR UPS1 - UPS BYPASS FEED TO PMIS by placing breaker handle upward to ON.

Cue Breaker handle is up.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 10.1 ENSURE following breakers closed:

Critical Step 10.1.2 EE-DSC-UPS1 (FUSED DISCONNECT EAST OF UPS PANEL).

Standard Examinee closed EE-DSC-UPS1 (FUSED DISCONNECT) by placing breaker handle upward to ON.

Cue Breaker handle is up.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 7 of 9

3. Procedure Step: 10.1 ENSURE following breakers closed:

Critical Step 10.1.3 UPS STATIC SWITCH ALTN SOURCE AC INPUT BREAKER.

Standard Examinee closed UPS STATIC SWITCH ALTN SOURCE AC INPUT BREAKER by placing breaker handle upward to ON.

Cue Breaker handle is up.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 10.2 DEPRESS ALTERNATE SOURCE TO LOAD button.

Critical Step Standard Examinee depressed and released ALTERNATE SOURCE TO LOAD button at PMIS UPS panel.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 10.2 CHECK ALTERNATE SOURCE SUPPLYING LOAD light on.

Standard Examinee checked ALTERNATE SOURCE SUPPLYING LOAD light ON at PMIS UPS panel.

Cue Point to ALTERNATE SOURCE SUPPLYING LOAD and indicate it is ON.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-1 Page 8 of 9

6. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Examinee informed CRS that PMIS UPS alternate source from MDP-1 had been returned to service and PMIS UPS static switch had been transferred from inverter to alternate source.

Cue The CRS acknowledges the report.

Notes JPM is Complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

Rev 1

ATTACHMENT 1 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is at 100% power.

2. MDP-1 supply to PMIS UPS was removed from service for maintenance inspections and is ready to be returned to service. The following breakers are open:

a. MDP-1(3) EE-DSC-UPS1, DSC FOR XFMR UPS1 - UPS Bypass Feed to PMIS

b. EE-DSC-UPS1 Fused Disconnect

c. UPS STATIC SWITCH ALTN SOURCE AC INPUT BREAKER

3. Procedure 2.4COMP, Computer Malfunction, has been entered due to failure of PMIS UPS inverter and directs re-establishing power to PMIS UPS Panel.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to return MDP-1 supply to PMIS UPS to service and transfer PMIS UPS static switch from inverter to alternate source IAW Procedure 2.2.63, PMIS Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Section 10.

Inform the CRS when PMIS UPS static switch has been transferred from inverter to alternate source.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 1 of 15 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure P-2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 2 of 15 Lesson Number: SKL034-10-XX SAP Course Number: XXXX Lesson

Title:

Startup the RPS Motor Generator Set (RPS MG A)

Revision number: 08 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

FRAME:

PERFORMANCE Validation Time (min): 20 Actual Time (min):

TIME:

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to start a RPS MG Set.

TASK STANDARD: The examinee started RPS MG Set A and determined voltage could not be adjusted to within the required range IAW Procedure 2.2.22 Section 5, then secured RPS MG Set A IAW Procedure 2.2.22 Section 11.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform X Plant (RCA )

X Simulate Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 3 of 15 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 4 of 15 Revision Statements: Updated JPM to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: 212000 A2.01 (3.7/3.9)

2. Safety Function: 7, Instrumentation

3. Task No: 212003O0104

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - RPS

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Procedure 2.2.22, Vital Instrument Power System (Rev 81)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Key for access to Control Building RPS MG Set Room doors

2. Screwdriver Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 1 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.22, Vital Instrument Power System(entire procedure)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 5 of 15 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed.

You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 6 of 15 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.22, Vital Instrument Power System)

5. PLACING RPS MG SET IN SERVICE 5.1 Place RPS MG Set A in service by performing following:

5.1.1 At REACTOR PROTECT SYS MOT AND GEN SET

1A CONTROL CUBICLE (RPS MG Set Room A),

perform following:

5.1.1.1 Ensure AC OUTPUT GEN breaker OFF.

Standard Ensured the AC OUTPUT GEN breaker was OFF.

Cue Indicate that breaker handle is pointing towards OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 5.1.1.2 Ensure AC INPUT GEN breaker OFF.

Standard Ensured the AC INPUT GEN breaker was OFF.

Cue Indicate that breaker handle is pointing towards OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 7 of 15

3. Procedure Step 5.1.2 At MCC-L (Control Building 882'), ensure Breaker 3D, Critical Step RPS-MG-RPSA, REACTOR PROT SYS A MOTOR GEN SET, closed.

Standard Rotated breaker handle 3D on MCC-L in the upwards direction.

Cue (Initially) Indicate breaker handle down and pointing to OFF.

(When operated) Indicate breaker handle up and pointing to ON.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 5.1.3 At REACTOR PROTECT SYS MOT AND GEN SET #1A CONTROL CUBICLE, perform following:

5.1.3.1 IF VOLTAGE ADJ potentiometer setting was changed while RPS MG Set A was secured, THEN ensure VOLTAGE ADJ potentiometer is at approximately midpoint position.

Standard Determined voltage setting had been changed from initial conditions Cue If asked, indicate that the voltage setting was changed and the potentiometer is at the midpoint position.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 8 of 15

5. Procedure Step 5.1.3.2 Close AC INPUT MOT breaker.

Critical Step Standard Rotated AC INPUT MOT breaker handle clockwise until handle pointed to ON.

Cue Indicate breaker handle is pointed toward ON.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 5.1.3.3 Press MOTOR ON button for ~ 15 seconds to allow Critical Step MG Set to come up to speed and release when A-C VOLTS are > 110V.

Standard Depressed MOTOR ON pushbutton and released when A-C VOLTS were >110V.

Cue (After ~ 15 seconds) Indicate A-C VOLTS at ~111V.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 5.1.3.4 Check A-C VOLTS have stabilized between 114V and 126V.

Standard Checked A-C VOLTS have stabilized between 114V and 126V.

Cue Indicate A-C VOLTS are stable at ~111V.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 9 of 15

8. Procedure Step 5.1.3.5 IF A-C VOLTS not between 114V to 126V, THEN Critical Step perform following:

a. Loosen VOLTAGE ADJ potentiometer locking screw.

Standard Loosened VOLT ADJ potentiometer locking screw with the screwdriver.

Cue (When stated a screwdriver must be obtained, ask where a screwdriver could be obtained, then, when the examinee answers, tell the operator the screwdriver has been obtained).

The locking screw is no longer in contact with the dial.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step Alternate Path b. Make small increment adjustments to VOLTAGE ADJ Critical Step potentiometer until voltage is in this band.

Standard Rotated Potentiometer in the clockwise direction in small incremental adjustments. Determined volatage cannot be adjusted to within 114V to 126V.

Cue Indicate voltage is remaining at ~111V no matter how much or in which direction the dial is turned.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 10 of 15

10. Procedure Step c. Tighten VOLTAGE ADJ potentiometer locking screw.

Alternate Path Standard Used screwdriver and turned locking screw clockwise.

Cue The locking screw is tight against the dial.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step d. IF voltage cannot be adjusted to within this band, THEN Alternate Path remove RPS MG Set A from service per Section 11 and inform Electricians.

Standard Transitioned to Section 11 and notified electricians.

Cue As electrician, acknowledge report.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 11 of 15

12. Procedure Step 11. REMOVING RPS MG SET FROM SERVICE Alternate Path 11.1 Shut down RPS MG Set A by performing following:

11.1.1 Transfer RPSPP1A to alternate power supply per Section 7 for MODE 1, 2, or 3 and Section 8 for MODE 4 or 5, or remove RPSPP1A from service per Section 10.

Standard Determined step was N/A due to RPSPP1A was already on alternate power supply from initial condition Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step 11.1.2. At ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY 1A2 (RPS Alternate Path MG Set Room A), place breaker to OFF.

Standard Determined step was N/A by observing ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY 1A2 breaker already OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 12 of 15

14. Procedure Step 11.1.3. At ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY 1A1 (RPS Alternate Path MG Set Room A), place breaker to OFF.

Standard Determined step was N/A by observing ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY 1A1 breaker already OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

15. Procedure Step 11.1.4. At REACTOR PROTECT SYS MOT AND GEN SET Alternate Path #1A CONTROL CUBICLE (RPS MG Set Room A),

perform following:

11.1.4.1 Open AC OUTPUT GEN breaker.

Standard Determined step was N/A due to breaker was already open.

Cue Indicate breaker handle is pointed toward OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 13 of 15

16. Procedure Step 11.1.4. At REACTOR PROTECT SYS MOT AND GEN SET Alternate Path #1A CONTROL CUBICLE (RPS MG Set Room A),

Critical Step perform following:

11.1.4.2 Press and hold MOTOR OFF button; release after off light comes on.

Standard Pressed and held MOTOR OFF button; released after off light came on.

Cue After 3 seconds, indicate OFF light came on.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

17. Procedure Step 11.1.4.1 Open AC INPUT MOT breaker.

Alternate Path Critical Step Standard Rotated AC INPUT MOT breaker handle counter-clockwise until handle pointed to OFF.

Cue Indicate breaker handle is pointed toward OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P-2 Page 14 of 15

5. Procedure Step 11.1.5 IF removed from service for Procedure 6.1RPS.313, Alternate path THEN issue Clearance Order per Procedure 0.9 and tag as follows:

Standard Determined step was N/A and informed CRS that RPSMG set A has been removed from service.

Cue Notes JPM is Complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

ATTACHMENT 1 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The plant is operating at 71% of rated capacity.

2. RPS MG A set was shut down for maintenance.

3. RPS MG A voltage setting was adjusted during maintenance.

4. RPS MG set A maintenance has been completed.

5. RPS Power Panel 1A, RPSPP1A, is being supplied by CDP 1B.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to place RPS MG set A in service per Procedure 2.2.22, Vital Instrument Power System Section 5, in preparation for transferring RPSPP1A to RPS MG set A.

Notify the CRS when the task RPS MG set A is ready for transfer.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure P-3 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 2 of 11 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Locally start Diesel Driven Fire Pump D Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to start Diesel Driven Fire Pump D from local Panel FP-PNL-2 IAW Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee attempted to start Diesel Driven Fire Pump D in MANUAL 1 or MANUAL 2 mode, then started Diesel Driven Fire Pump D in the other MANUAL mode IAW Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System, Section 10.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform X Plant (RCA )

X Simulate Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 3 of 11 Comments (Required for Unsat):

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 4 of 11 Revision Statement:

Rev 0 - New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 286000 A2.08 (3.2/3.2)

2. Safety Function: 8, Plant Service Systems

3. Task No.: 286005O0104, Operate the Diesel Fire Pump Manually

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System (Rev 76)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 1 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System, Section 10 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 5 of 11 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System, Section 10

10. MANUAL START OF FP-P-D, FIRE PUMP D NOTE - After engine shutdown, it may take several hours for oil to drain down to oil pan before an accurate engine oil level can be taken.

10.1 Check engine oil level normal (SW side of engine).

Standard Examinee checked normal oil level by removing oil dipstick at engine and verifying level between normal range marks.

Cue Oil level is between the upper and lower marks of the normal range on the dipstick.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 10.2 Check engine cooling water reservoir full (east side of engine).

Standard Examinee checked coolant reservoir full by observing level at the top of the reservoir located above the control panel.

Cue Indicate water level is at the top of the reservoir.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 7 of 11

3. Procedure Step: 10.3 IF room exhaust fans not running (above small damper in Fire Pump D Room ceiling), THEN adjust Fire Pump D Room thermostat (west wall) to start fans.

Standard Examinee observed exhaust fans (above small damper in Fire Pump D Room ceiling) not running and started exhaust fans by lowering setting on thermostat on west wall until fans started.

Cue When Examinee checks exhaust fan status, indicate there is no motor/flow noise.

When Examinee lowers thermostat setting, indicate motor/flow noise can now be heard.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 10.4 Start FP-P-D using one of following methods:

NOTE - At Panel FA, DIESEL FIRE PUMP D indicating lamps are powered separately from pump starting control circuit. Loss of CBPP CKT #23 to Diesel Fire Pump D start control circuit would not be evident at Panel FA and would require manual start at local Panel FP-PNL-2.

10.4.1 At Panel FA, place DIESEL FIRE PUMP D switch to START.

Standard Examinee read note and determined step was N/A due to start attempt from Panel FA failed IAW initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 8 of 11

5. Procedure Step: 10.4.2 At FP-PNL-2, DIESEL FIRE PUMP CONTROL Critical Step PANEL, perform following:

NOTE - Alternate use of Batteries A and B.

MANUAL 1 uses Battery A to start diesel and MANUAL 2 uses Battery B to start diesel.

10.4.2.1 Place FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(SS) to MANUAL 1 or MANUAL 2.

Standard Examinee read note and placed FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(SS) to MANUAL 1 (or MANUAL 2).

Cue Indicate switch is aligned to the intended position.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step:

Critical Step NOTE - If engine cranking sluggish, low battery will have to be recharged with a high rate charger.

10.4.2.2 Press FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(START)(PB) button.

Engine should crank briskly and then start.

Standard Examinee read note and depressed and held FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(START)(PB) button, then determined engine failed to start and released button.

Cue Indicate engine rotation is very slow and sluggish.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 9 of 11

7. Procedure Step: (10.4.2.2) a. IF engine does not start due to sluggish Critical Step cranking, THEN place FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(SS) in other MANUAL position and press FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(START)(PB) button.

Standard Examinee read note and placed FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(SS) to other MANUAL position than first attempted in JPM step 5, MANUAL 2 (or MANUAL 1),

and depressed and held FP-SW-(FP-P-D)(START)(PB) button until engine started, then released button.

Cue When Examinee switches to MANUAL 2 (or 1), indicate switch is in the intended position.

When Examinee depresses start button, indicate sound of engine cranking briskly for approximately 2 seconds, then sound of engine running.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step:

NOTE - If Diesel Fire Pump D fails to AUTO START, assume a complete loss of engine controlling functions (i.e., engine trips and alarms). Engine parameters must be monitored locally in Step 10.6.

10.5 IF engine has not started using above methods, THEN perform following:

Standard Examinee read note and determined step 10.5 was N/A because the engine had started and proceeded to step 10.6.

Cue Indicate sound of engine cranking briskly for approximately 2 seconds, then sound of engine running.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM P3 Page 10 of 11

9. Procedure Step: 10.6 AFTER engine is warmed up, THEN check following:

10.6.1 Engine circulating water temperature between 165°F and 195°F.

10.6.2 Lube oil pressure between 30 and 85 psig.

10.6.3 Engine rpm between 1750 and 1850 (indication is at side of engine).

10.6.4 IF Diesel Pump operating outside limits of any of above parameters, THEN notify SM or CRS.

Standard Examinee obtained circulating water temperature, lube oil pressure, and engine rpm from gauges on engine and informed CRS or SM circulating water temperature was above the required band of 165°F and 195°F at 200°F.

Cue Cue the Examinee that time has elapsed and the engine is warmed up.

When the Examinee checks engine circulating water temperature, indicate it is 200°F.

When the Examinee checks engine lube oil pressure, indicate it is 50 psig.

When the Examinee checks engine rpm, indicate it is 1800 rpm.

Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

Rev 1

ATTACHMENT 1 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following, and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is at 100% power.

2. Procedure 5.1INCIDENT, Site Emergency Incident, has been entered due to a fire in the Administration Building.

3. Diesel Driven Fire Pump D failed to auto start and would not start using its control switch on Panel FA.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to start Diesel Driven Fire Pump D from local Panel FP-PNL-2 IAW Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System, Section 10.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 1 of 14 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 2 of 14 Lesson Number: SKL034-20-XX SAP Course Number: XXXX Lesson

Title:

Shift CRD Pumps (Alternate Path)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to shift CRD pumps IAW Procedure 2.2.8 and then respond to trip of both CRD pumps IAW Alarm Card 9-5-1/C-4, Rod Drift or Procedure 2.4CRD, CRD Trouble.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee started CRD Pump A and stopped CRD Pump B IAW Procedure 2.2.8, re-started CRD Pump B when CRD Pump A tripped, and inserted a manual scram within 5 minutes after CRD Pump B tripped IAW Alarm Card 9-5-2/A-6, CRD Pump A Breaker Trip.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 3 of 14 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 4 of 14 Revision Statements:

Rev 0 - New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 201001 A4.01 (3.1/3.1)

2. Safety Function: 1, Reactivity Control

3. Task No.: 201021C0401 - Respond to Loss of CRD Pump

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (Rev 109)

2. Alarm Card 9-5-2/A-6, CRD Pump A Breaker Trip (Rev 50)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Section 15 marked up as complete through step 15.2.8 for shifting to CRD Pump A, and step 15.3 marked N/A.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 5 of 14 Directions to Examiner:

Note: This is an ALTERNATE PATH JPM. 30 seconds after CRD Pump B is stopped during the pump shift, CRD Pump A will trip. When CRD Pump B is re-started, it will trip, requiring the examinee to insert a manual scram IAW Alarm Card 9-5-1/A-6.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give a sheet with the task conditions and cue and then answer any questions related to the task instructions

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 6 of 14 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System)

15. SHIFTING CRD PUMPS 15.4 At Panel 9-5, PERFORM following to place CRD-FIC-301, CRD FLOW CONTROL, in MAN:

15.4.1 ADJUST manual output knurled knob until DEVIATION needle centered (aligned with redline on settape).

Standard Examinee rotated CRD-FIC-301 manual output knurled knob clockwise or counter-clockwise as necessary until DEVIATION needle was aligned with redline on settape.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 15.4 At Panel 9-5, PERFORM following to place CRD-FIC-301, CRD FLOW CONTROL, in MAN:

15.4.2 PLACE selector to MAN.

Standard Examinee rotated CRD-FIC-301 selector switch clockwise to MAN.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 7 of 14

3. Procedure Step: 15.5 START standby CRD Pump.

Critical Step Standard Examinee started CRD Pump A by placing control switch CRD PUMP A clockwise to START, and observed red light on and green light off.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: CAUTION - CRDM damage could occur during scram if charging water pressure exceeds 1510 psig.

15.6 Locally CHECK for normal pump operation.

Standard Examinee directed local operator to perform step 15.6 Cue As local operator, report CRD Pump A is operating normally.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: 30 seconds after CRD Pump B is stopped in the next step, CRD Pump A will trip. When CRD Pump A trips, the examinee will transition from Procedure 2.2.8 to Alarm Card 9-5-2/A-6. Depending on examinee speed, the examinee may not reach JPM steps 6, 7, 8, 9, and/or 10 before CRD Pump A trips. N/A any of those steps the examinee does not perform due to CRD Pump A trip. Proceed to JPM step 11 when CRD Pump A trips.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 8 of 14

5. Procedure Step: 15.7 SHUT DOWN CRD pump being removed from service.

Critical Step Standard Examinee stopped CRD Pump B by placing control switch CRD PUMP B counter-clockwise to STOP, and observed green light ON and red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 15.8 Slowly ADJUST manual control on CRD-FC-301, CRD FLOW CONTROL, to 50 gpm.

Standard Examinee slowly adjusted CRD-FC-301 setpoint thumbwheel up or down as necessary to align 50 on settape with redline on settape.

Cue Notes Step is N/A if CRD Pump A trips before examinee performs this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 15.9 PERFORM following to balance CRD-FC-301:

15.9.1 ADJUST SETPOINT thumbwheel until DEVIATION needle centered (aligned with redline on settape).

Standard Examinee slowly adjusted CRD-FC-301 setpoint thumbwheel up or down as necessary until red deviation needle aligned with redline on settape.

Cue Notes Step is N/A if CRD Pump A trips before examinee performs this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 9 of 14

8. Procedure Step: 15.9 PERFORM following to balance CRD-FC-301:

15.9.2 PLACE selector to BAL.

Standard Examinee rotated CRD-FC-301 selector switch counter-clockwise to BAL.

Cue Notes Step is N/A if CRD Pump A trips before examinee performs this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step: 15.10 At Panel 9-5, ENSURE following:

Charging water pressure adjusted to 1425 to 1475 psig.

Standard Examinee checked CHG WTR PRESS CRD-PI-302 indicated between 1425 psig to 1475 psig.

Cue Notes Step is N/A if CRD Pump A trips before examinee performs this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: 15.10 At Panel 9-5, ENSURE following:

Drive water P adjusted to 260 to 270 psid.

Standard Examinee checked DR WTR DP CRD-DPI-303 indicated between 260 psid to 270 psid.

Cue Notes Step is N/A if CRD Pump A trips before examinee performs this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 10 of 14

11. Procedure Step: N/A Alternate Path Standard Examinee recognized and reports CRD Pump A trip and referred to Alarm Card 9-5-2/A-6, CRD PUMP A BREAKER TRIP.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step: (Alarm Card 9-5-2/A-6)

Alternate Path 1.1. Restore CRD as follows:

1.1.1 Place CRD-FC-301 in MAN.

Standard Examinee ensured CRD-FC-301 selector switch was pointing to MAN.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: 1.1.2 Adjust CRD-FC-301 to minimum.

Alternate Path Standard Examinee rotated CRD-FC-301 manual output knurled knob counter-clockwise until red needle on output meter was aligned with 0.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: CRD Pump B will trip two seconds after the control switch is placed in START in the next JPM step. Mark the time when CRD Pump B trips in the next JPM step. The examinee must insert a scram per JPM step 16 within 5 minutes after CRD Pump B trips to satisfy JPM critical step 16.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 11 of 14

14. Procedure Step: 1.1.3 WHEN in service FLOW CONTROL VLV AO 19A or Alternate Path 19B indicates closed, THEN start CRD Pump B.

Critical Step 1.1.3.1 IF pump fails to start, THEN go to Step 1.2 Standard Examinee observed FLOW CONTROL VLV A0 19A green light ON and red light OFF, then placed CRD PUMP B control switch to START, and observed breaker closed, indicated by red light ON and green light OFF, then observed breaker tripped, indicated by green light ON and red light OFF and annunciator 9-5-2/C-6, CRD PUMP B BREAKER TRIP alarmed when switch was released. Determined CRD Pump B failed to start and proceeded to step 1.2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Narrow range reactor pressure is indicated on recorder RFC-R-FRPR98 on panel 9-5, which will display 925 psig, the bottom of the narrow range band. The examinee should NOT use this recorder to determine actual reactor pressure but should use a wide range reactor pressure indication.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 12 of 14

15. Procedure Step: 1.2 IF both CRD pumps off:

Alternate Path 1.2.1 IF Reactor Pressure < 900 psi with more than one control rod withdrawn, THEN perform following:

1.2.1.1 Attempt immediate start of CRD Pump A.

a. IF CRD Pump A starts, THEN go to Step 1.1.4.

Standard Examinee determined reactor pressure was <900 psig by observing reactor pressure indication on RFC-R-LRPR97, RFC-PI-90A, RFC-PI-90B, and/or RFC-PI-90C, or other wide range reactor pressure indication, and placed control switch CRD PUMP A to START and recognized pump failed to start, indicated by green light ON and red light OFF, and proceeded to step 1.2.2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step: 1.2.1.2 IF neither CRD pump can be immediately Alternate Path restarted, THEN SCRAM and enter Procedure Critical Step 2.1.5.

Standard Within 5 minutes after CRD Pump B tripped, Examinee inserted scram by depressing RX SCRAM CH A and CH B buttons on panel 9-5 or by placing REACTOR MODE switch counter-clockwise to SHUT DOWN.

Cue Notes JPM is complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S1 Page 13 of 14 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None IC - 9; 4% power, or password protected IC at B. Initialize the Simulator in IC

<900 psig in Mode 2 C. Run schedule File 2020-9S1 D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None CRD Pump 1A

2. Malfunctions RD08A 1 30 trip CRD Pump 1B RD08B 11 2 trip

3. Remotes None 480V Bus 1F

4. Overrides an_p3820 Ground (CRD 1 32 OFF Pump 1A) 480V Bus 1G an_p3835 Ground (CRD 11 4 OFF Pump 1B)

5. Panel Setup a. BOL S/U book is available at panel 9-5 Schedule File Time Event Action Description 00:00 Insert malfunction RD08 after 30 on CRD Pump 1A trip event 1 00:00 Insert malfunction RD08B after 2 CRD Pump 1B trip on event 11 00:00 Insert override an_p3820 to off Annunciator 480V Bus 1F Ground (CRD after 32 on event 1 Pump 1A) 00:00 Insert override an_p3835 to off Annunciator 480V Bus 1G Ground after 4 on event 11 (CRD Pump 1B) 00:00 create event 1 zdicrdsws3b(1) == 1 CRD Pump 1B switch in STOP 00:00 create event 1 zdicrdsws3b(4) == 1 CRD Pump 1B switch in START

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following, and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Reactor is at 4% power.

2. CRD Pump B is in service.

3. CRD Pump A is in standby.

4. Procedure 2.2.8 Section 15 has been completed through step 15.2.8 for shifting CRD Pumps.

5. Building operator has completed pre-start checks for CRD Pump A and is standing by to perform post-start checks for CRD Pump A.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to shift CRD Pumps from B to A in operation IAW Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Section 15, beginning at step 15.4.

Inform the CRS when CRD pumps have been shifted.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 1 of 15 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 2 of 15 Lesson Number: SKL034-20-XX SAP Course Number: XXXX Lesson

Title:

Perform a Quick Restart of RFPT A/B (Alternate Path)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to perform a Quick Restart of RFPT B IAW Procedure 2.2.28.1 Attachment 2, and then respond to RFPT B thrust bearing failure IAW Alarm Card A-2/B-3, RFP Turbine B Thrust Brg Trip.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee started RFPT B and raised RFPT B speed above 2050 rpm IAW Procedure 2.2.28.1 Attachment 2, and then tripped RFPT B IAW Alarm Card A-2/B-3, RFP Turbine B Thrust Brg Trip.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 3 of 15 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 4 of 15 Revision Statements:

Rev 0 - New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 259001 A4.02 (3.9/3.7)

2. Safety Function: 2, Reactor Water Inventory Control

3. Task No.: 259058G0401 - Perform a Quick Restart of RFPT A/B

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.28.1, Feedwater System Operation (Rev 100)

2. Alarm Card A-2/B-3, RFP Turbine B Thrust Brg Trip (Rev 41)

3. Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations (Rev 104)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.28.1, Feedwater System Operation, Attachment 2, Reactor Feed System Operations Hard Card

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 5 of 15 Directions to Examiner:

Note: This is an ALTERNATE PATH JPM. RFPT B thrust bearing will fail, requiring the examinee trip RFPT B IAW Alarm Card A-2/B-3.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give a sheet with the task conditions and cue and then answer any questions related to the task instructions

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 6 of 15 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 2.2.28.1, Attachment 2, Reactor Feed System Operations Hard Card)

1. RFP QUICK RESTART NOTE - If RFPT-A(B) oil filter DP high, RFPT-A(B) trip may not reset.

1.1 RFPT has been tripped < 5 minutes Standard Examinee read note and determined RFPT tripped less than 1 minute ago from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 1.2 RFPT coasting down or rotating on turning gear.

Standard Examinee determined RFPT speed lowering on RFP TURB B TURBINE SPEED indicator RF-SI-2B.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 7 of 15

3. Procedure Step: 1.3 Press RFPT-A(B) TURBINE TRIP pushbutton (Panel A).

Standard Examinee pressed and released RFPT-B TURBINE TRIP pushbutton.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 1.4 Ensure all trips including high level trips reset.

Critical Step Standard At Panel 9-5, Examinee pressed and release at least two of the three HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP RESET LOGIC A, B, C pushbuttons.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 1.5 At a RFPT/RVLC HMI on MAIN CONTROL screen, ensure RFPT- A(B) control in MDVP with OUTPUT at 0.

Standard Examinee selected MAIN CONTOL screen and verified RFPT-B control indicated MDVP.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 8 of 15

6. Procedure Step: 1.6 Press and hold RFPT- A(B) TRIP RESET button until RFPT-B HP and LP STOP valves open.

Critical Step Standard Examinee pressed and held RFPT-B RESET button until RFPT-B HP and LP STOP valves opened, indicated by STOP VALVES HP POSITION red light ON and green light OFF and STOP VALVES LP POSITION red light ON and green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 1.6.1 IF RFPT does not reset, THEN press and hold RFPT-A(B) OVERSPEED TRIP BLOCK and RFPT-A(B)

OVERSPEED TRIP RESET.

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A because HP and LP stop valves opened.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 1.7 Ensure RF-FCV-11A(B), MINIMUM FLOW, open..

Standard Examinee checked RFP B MIN FLOW RF-FCV-11B opened indicated by red light ON.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 9 of 15

9. Procedure Step: 1.8 At a HMI, select FEEDPUMP A(B) screen for desired Critical Step RFP to be started.

Standard At a HMI, Examinee selected FEEDPUMP B.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: 1.9 Select QUICK RESTART start type.

Critical Step Standard At a HMI, Examinee selected QUICK RESTART box.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 1.10 Select HP START.

Critical Step Standard At a HMI, Examinee selected HP START.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 10 of 15

12. Procedure Step: 1.11 Press green START button and confirm start in pop-Critical Step up box.

Standard At a HMI, Examinee pressed green START button and confirmed pop-up box by pressing YES box.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: 1.12 AFTER RFP A(B) reaches MINIMUM GOVERNOR, THEN depress green CONTINUE button.

Critical Step Standard At a HMI, Examinee pressed green CONTINUE button when RFP B reached MINIMUM GOVERNOR.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step: 1.13 Ensure injection path is aligned to the reactor vessel, as dictated by plant conditions.

Standard Examinee reviewed injection path line up on RFPT-B benchboard mimic and determined injection path was aligned by observing RFP B STARTUP VALVE INLET RF-MO-34 and RFP B STARTUP VALVE OUTLET RF-MO-33 open indicated by red lights ON and green lights OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Annunciator A-2/B-3, RFP Turbine B Thrust Brg Trip will occur when RFPT B speed is raised above 2050 rpm in the next JPM step.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 11 of 15

15. Procedure Step: 1.14 Use UP arrow to raise RFP speed to raise RFP Critical Step discharge pressure.

Standard At a HMI, Examinee pressed UP arrow and raised RFP speed indicated on RFP TURB B TURBINE SPEED indicator RF-SI-2B and discharge pressure indicated on PUMP B PRESSURE DISCH PRESS RF-PI-2B.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step: N/A Alternate Path Standard Examinee recognized and reported annunciators A-2/B-3, RFP Turbine B Thrust Brg Trip and A-2/C-3, RFP Turbine B Thrust Brg Pre-Trip, and referred to alarm card.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 12 of 15 Examiner Note: The standard in the following JPM step falls under the requirements of Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations, step 10.4.3, which states: Upon recognition of a failure of a NON-ESF automatic action, the CRO shall manually perform those actions necessary to fulfill the function and report the completion of the manual action to the CRS as soon as possible.

17. Procedure Step: (Alarm Card A-2/B-3, RFP Turbine B Thrust Brg Trip)

Alternate Path 1. AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Critical step 1.1 Trips Reactor Feed Pump B Standard Examinee recognized RFPT B should have tripped and manually tripped RFPT B by depressing TURBINE TRIP pushbutton for RFPT B on panel A, and observed amber light on below trip pushbutton, STOP VALVES HP POSITION and LP POSITION green lights ON and red lights OFF, and annunciator A-2/A-1, RFP Turbine B Trip alarmed.

Cue Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 13 of 15 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC-18, 19, or 20; or password protected IC (See setup instructions for when to run schedule file)

C. Run schedule File 2020-9S2 D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None NBI-LT-94A

2. Malfunctions rr27a 100 (delete in 2 sec)

NBI-LT-94B rr27b 100 (delete in 2 sec)

NBI-LT-94C rr27c 100 (delete in 2 sec)

3. Remotes None A-2/B-3 RFPT B

4. Overrides p3167 12 ON Thrust Brg Trip A-2/C-3 RFPT B p3168 Thrust Brg Pre- 12 ON Trip

a. Reset to IC

b. Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN

c. Allow reactor water level to recover > 10 inches

d. Run schedule file

5. Panel Setup e. Allow RFPT B speed to lower below 2000 rpm

f. Ensure FW HMIs are selected to the Main Screen (not RFPT B)

g. Place simulator in freeze

h. During JPM, maintain reactor water level between -30 to +20 using HPCI/RCIC/CRD, as necessary

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S2 Page 14 of 15 Schedule File Time Event Action Description 00:00 insert override p3167 to ON on A-2/B-3 RFPT B Thrust Bearing Trip event 12 00:00 insert override p3168 to ON on A-2/C-3 RFPT B Thrust Bearing Pre-event 12 Trip 00:00 create event 2 zdirfswrftrb == 1 RFPT B trip reset PB depressed 00:00 create event 12 et_array(2) == 1 & trigger 2 true and RFPT B speed >

zaorfctsi2b > 0.2733 2050 rpm 00:00 insert malfunction rr27a to 100 NBI-LT-94A (NR Level) failure delete in 2 00:00 insert malfunction rr27b to 100 NBI-LT-94B (NR Level) failure delete in 2 00:00 insert malfunction rr27c to 100 NBI-LT-94C (NR Level) failure delete in 2

ATTACHMENT 2 Directions to Examinee:

Read the following, and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The reactor has scrammed.

2. Both RFPs have tripped on high level less than one minute ago.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform a quick restart on B RFP in accordance with Procedure 2.2.28.1 Attachment 2, Reactor Feed System Operations Hard Card.

Inform the CRS when B RFP is in service and maintaining level.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 1 of 9 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-3 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 2 of 9 Lesson Number: SKL034-21-61 SAP Course Number: 8902 Lesson

Title:

Defeat Group 1 Low Level Isolation during an ATWS (Restoration)

Revision number: 5 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to restore the Group 1 low level isolation IAW Procedure 5.8.20, EOP Plant Temporary Modifications.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee removed only the four MSIV Low RPV Water Level MSIV Isolation bypass jumpers in accordance with Procedure 5.8.20, EOP Plant Temporary Modifications, Section 4.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 3 of 9 Comments (Required for Unsat):

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 4 of 9 Revision Statement:

Rev 5 - Updated to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 239001 K4.01 (3.8/3.8)

2. Safety Function: 3, Reactor Pressure Control

3. Task No.: 200363G0501, Defeat Group 1 Low Level Isolation During an ATWS

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.8.20, EOP Plant Temporary Modifications (Rev 21)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Setup: See Attachment 1.

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.8.20, EOP Plant Temporary Modifications, Section 4 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 5 of 9 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 6 of 9 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 5.8.20, EOP Plant Temporary Modifications, Critical Step Section 4) 4.5 WHEN directed by CRS, THEN return Low Reactor Water Level Isolation interlock to normal by removing MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS jumpers, if installed; N/A if PTMs not installed.

4.5.1 Remove MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-15).

Standard In Panel 9-15 BAY-1, Examinee removed jumper between Terminals. DD-1 and DD-2.

Cue Notes Removal of a RPS jumper constitutes failure of this critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 4.5.2 Remove MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS Critical Step between Terminals BB-1 and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-15).

Standard In Panel 9-15 BAY-3, Examinee removed jumper between Terminals. BB-1 and BB-2.

Cue Notes Removal of a RPS jumper constitutes failure of this critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 7 of 9

3. Procedure Step: 4.5.3 Remove MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS Critical Step between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-17).

Standard In Panel 9-17 BAY-1, Examinee removed jumper between Terminals. DD-1 and DD-2.

Cue Notes Removal of a RPS jumper constitutes failure of this critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 4.5.4 Remove MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS Critical Step between Terminals BB-1 and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-17).

Standard In Panel 9-17 BAY-3, Examinee removed jumper between Terminals. BB-1 and BB-2.

Cue Notes Removal of a RPS jumper constitutes failure of this critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 4.6 Inform CRS Low Reactor Water Level Isolation interlock has been returned to normal.

Standard Examinee reported to CRS the Low Reactor Water Level Isolation interlock has been returned to normal.

Cue The CRS acknowledges the report.

Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S3 Page 8 of 9 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC any IC or password protected IC C. Load Schedule File N/A D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Events None 2.Malfunctions None

3. Remotes None

4. Overrides None

a. Reset to IC

b. Install four MSIV Low Level Bypass jumpers IAW 5.8.20.

5. Panel Setup

c. Install four RPS jumpers IAW 5.8.3.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, a SNAPSHOT can be taken after the panel setup is complete.

Rev 1

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following, and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is shutdown following an ATWS.

2. Recovery activities are in progress.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to restore Low Reactor Water Level Isolation interlock to normal per EOP 5.8.20, EOP Plant Temporary Modifications, Section 4.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 1 of 10 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-4 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 2 of 10 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

RPV Depressurization with Main Steam Line Drains Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to defeat interlocks and open MSL Drains for RPV depressurization IAW Procedure 5.8.2, RPV Depressurization Systems (Table 2).

TASK STANDARD: Examinee installed EOP PTMs 11 and 12 and opened valves MS-MO-74, MS-MO-77, and MS-MO-79 in accordance with Procedure 5.8.2, RPV Depressurization Systems (Table 2), Section 5.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 3 of 10 Comments (Required for Unsat):

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 4 of 10 Revision Statement:

Rev 5 - Updated to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 239001 A4.02 (3.2/3.2)

2. Safety Function: 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core

3. Task No.: 200188A0501, Conduct alternate emergency depressurization with main steam line drains

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.8.2, RPV Depressurization Systems (Table 2) (Rev 47) 2.

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Setup: See Attachment 1.

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.8.2, RPV Depressurization Systems (Table 2), Section 5 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 5 of 10 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 6 of 10 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 5.8.2, RPV Depressurization Systems (Table Critical Step 2), Section 5 NOTE - EOP PTMs are dependent upon plant conditions and are not required to be implemented in all situations.

5.1 To defeat all isolation interlocks for MS-MO-74, MN STM LINE DRAIN INBD ISOL VLV, and MS-MO-77, MN STM LINE DRAIN OUTBD ISOL VLV, perform following; N/A if not required by plant conditions:

5.1.1 For MS-MO-77, install EOP PTM # 11, jumper between Terminals AA-14 and AA-22 (BAY-3, PNL 9-17).

Standard In Panel 9-17 BAY-3, Examinee installed jumper between Terminals. AA-14 and AA-22.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 5.1.2 For MS-MO-74, install EOP PTM # 12, jumper Critical Step between Terminals EE-14 and EE- 22 (BAY-1, PNL 9-17).

Standard In Panel 9-17 BAY-1, Examinee installed jumper between Terminals. EE-14 and EE- 22 Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 7 of 10

3. Procedure Step: 5.2 Open MS-MO-74, INBD ISOL VLV (PNL 9-4).

Critical Step Standard Examinee opened MS-MO-74, INBD ISOL VLV by placing control switch clockwise to OPEN, and checked red light ON and green light OFF Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 5.3 Open MS-MO-77, OUTBD ISOL VLV (PNL 9-4).

Critical Step Standard Examinee opened MS-MO-77, OUTBD ISOL VLV by placing control switch clockwise to OPEN, and checked red light ON and green light OFF Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 8 of 10 Examiner Note: Valves that have fluted oval control switches are throttle MOVs in at least one direction. When fully closing MS-MO-79 in the next JPM step, the control switch is required to be held for ~5 seconds after fully closed indication is received.

Holding switch for 5 seconds is not a critical portion of a JPM step.

5. Procedure Step: 5.4 Open MS-MO-79, RO BYPASS VLV (PNL 9-4).

Critical Step Standard Examinee opened MS-MO-79, RO BYPASS VLV by placing control switch clockwise to OPEN and holding until red light ON and green light OFF Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 5.5 Inform CRS RPV Depressurization of RPV in-progress Standard Examinee reported to CRS RPV Depressurization of RPV was in-progress via MSL drains.

Cue The CRS acknowledges the report.

Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S4 Page 9 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None any IC with RPV at rated pressure (or password B. Initialize the Simulator in IC protected IC)

C. Load Schedule File N/A D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Events None 2.Malfunctions None

3. Remotes None

4. Overrides None

a. Reset to IC

b. Scram and take scram actions

5. Panel

c. Close all MSIVs Setup

d. Close all Main Steam Line Drain valves are closed Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, a SNAPSHOT can be taken after the panel setup is complete.

Rev 1

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following, and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The plant is shut down and the crew has entered EOPs.

2. An emergency depressurization is required.

3. All SRVs are inoperable.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to defeat Main Steam Line Drain isolation interlocks and perform RPV Depressurization using the Main Steam Line Drains IAW Procedure 5.8.2, RPV Depressurization Systems (Table 2), Section 5.

Inform the CRS when depressurization via Main Steam Line Drains is in progress.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 14 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-5 Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 14 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Respond to Fuel Element Failure - Align Sump Pumps IAW 5.2FUEL Revision number: 1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to align Reactor Building and Control Building sump pumps IAW Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee placed all sump pumps for sumps A, B, D, E, and L in OFF, started Sump Pump C-1 and/or C-2, and when Sump C level was less than 9.5 feet, placed Sump Pump C-1 and C-2 in OFF IAW Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure, Attachment 2.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 14 Comments (Required for Unsat):

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 14 Revision Statement:

Rev 0-New JPM Rev 1 - Editorial changes per NRC comments JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 295036 EA1.01 (3.2/3.3), EK3.04 (3.1/3.4); 290001 A4.10 (3.4/3.3),

K4.03 (2.8/2.9)

2. Safety Function: 5, Containment Integrity

3. Task No.: 200041C0401, Respond to Fuel Element Failure

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure (Rev 22)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Setup: See Attachment 1.

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure, Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 14 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 14 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2 Fuel, Fuel Failure)

Critical Step Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release

1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

1.1 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump A pumps.

1.1.1 SUMP PUMP A-1.

1.1.2 SUMP PUMP A-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switches for Sump Pumps A-1 and A-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked respective green lights ON, red lights OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 14

2. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.2 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump B pumps.

1.2.1 SUMP PUMP B-1.

1.2.2 SUMP PUMP B-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switches for Sump Pumps B-1 and B-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked respective green lights ON, red lights OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 14 Examiner Note: Examinee may pull the High-High Level alarm card S-1/A-3 Reactor Building C Sump Hi-Hi Level and place the C-1 and C-2 sump pumps to run to lower the sump level before continuing with this step. This will satisfy step 8 and 9 critical steps.

3. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.3 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump C pumps.

1.3.1 SUMP PUMP C-1.

1.3.2 SUMP PUMP C-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switches for Sump Pumps C-1 and C-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked respective green lights ON, red lights OFF.

Cue Notes This step is only critical if SUMP PUMPs C-1 and C-2 are not started in JPM step 8.

Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 14

4. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical step 1.4 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump D pumps.

1.4.1 SUMP PUMP D-1.

1.4.2 SUMP PUMP D-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switches for Sump Pump D-1 and D-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked respective green lights ON, red lights OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.5 Both Reactor Building Equipment Drain Sump E pumps.

1.5.1 SUMP PUMP E-1.

1.5.2 SUMP PUMP E-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switches for Sump Pumps E-1 and E-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked respective green lights ON, red lights OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 14

6. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee checked following sump levels on VBD-S:

RW-LI-828, FLOOR DRAIN AREA NW

RW-LI-829, FLOOR DRAIN AREA NE

RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW

RW-LI-831, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SE Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee determined operation of sump pumps for Sump A, B, and D not required due to Sump A, B, and D levels below Maximum Safe Operating limit of 9.5 feet, and determined operation of sump pumps for Sump E not required due to Sump E level below Maximum Safe Operating limit of 9.5 feet.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 14

8. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, Critical Step to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee determined RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW was above Maximum Safe Operating limit of 9.5 feet and placed control switch for SUMP PUMP C-1 and/or SUMP PUMP C-2 clockwise to RUN, checked red light On and green light Off for sump pump(s) started, and checked level on RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW was lowering.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, Critical Step to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee checked level on RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW was lowered below 9.5 feet, then placed control switch for Sump Pump(s) started in JPM step 8 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked respective green lights ON, red lights OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 14

10. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2 Fuel, Fuel Failure)

Critical Step Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release

2. Place both Control Building Sump L pumps to OFF (VBD-S).

2.1 SUMP PUMP L-1.

2.2 SUMP PUMP L-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump L-1 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2 Fuel, Fuel Failure)

Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release

3. IF Control Building Sump L level must be lowered, THEN perform following:

3.1 Operate Sump L pumps only, as necessary, to lower sump to desired level.

Standard Examinee determined operation of Sump L pumps not required by observing annunciator S-1/E-1, Control Bldg Sump L Hi-Hi Level not On.

Cue Inform the examinee This JPM is complete Examinee should not perform the steps on the front panel.

Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 14 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC319(performed with S2)

C. Load Schedule File 2020-4JPMS5 D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

create event 5 zdirwswc1(2) == 1 l zdirwswc2(2) == 1 (modifies overrides and PMIS to cause C Sump level to trend downward when either Sump Pump C1 or C2 is placed to RUN)

1. Events create event 15 when et_array(5) ==1 and zdirwswc1(2) ==

1 and zdirwswc2(2) == 1(modifies overrides and PMIS to cause C Sump level trend to slow when Sump Pump C1 or C2 taken to off) 2.Malfunctions None

3. Remotes None SW Quad/Sump

4. Overrides N397(PMIS) N/A N/A 10 N/A N/A 1C RW-LT-830 Sump C Level zaorwli830 N/A N/A 10 N/A N/A VBD-S Sump C level Hi-p4908 N/A N/A ON N/A N/A Hi annunciator

a. Load schedule file

5. Panel Setup

b. Acknowledge annunciators Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, a SNAPSHOT can be taken after the panel setup is complete.

Rev 1

ATTACHMENT 2 Directions to Examinee:

Read the following, and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3.

2. Chemistry results indicate reactor coolant activity is 4.2 µCi/gm, DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

3. Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure, has been entered.

4. There is a leak from RHR Pump B suction into the RHR B pump room.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to align all sump pumps IAW Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release, of Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 1 of 15 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S6

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 2 of 15 Lesson Number: SKL034-20-XX SAP Course Number: XXXX Lesson

Title:

Perform DG1 Standby Start from Control Room (Alternate Path)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to perform a standby start of DG1 from the control room IAW Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, and then respond to DG1 high vibration IAW Alarm Card C-1/F-3, Diesel Gen 1 Excessive Vibration.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee started and loaded DG1 to at least 900 kW IAW Procedure 2.2.20.1, Section 5, and then stopped DG1 B IAW Alarm Card C-1/F-3, Diesel Gen 1 Excessive Vibration.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 3 of 15 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 4 of 15 Revision Statements:

Rev 0 - New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 264000 K4.01 (3.5/3.7)

2. Safety Function: 6, Electrical

3. Task No.: 264022O0101 - Perform DG1(DG2) Standby Start from Control Room

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency Diesel Generator

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations (Rev 75)

2. Alarm Card 2.3_C-1 PANEL C - ANNUNCIATOR C-1 (Rev 33)

3. Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations (Rev 104)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, Section 5, marked up through step 5.22 complete or N/A, as appropriate.

3. Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, Attachment 2, DG1 Run Data Sheet (Control Room)

4. Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, Attachment 5, DG Start Notification Memo

5. Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, Attachment 6, DG1 No Load Data Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 5 of 15 Directions to Examiner:

Note: This is an ALTERNATE PATH JPM. High vibration will occur after DG1 is loaded, requiring the examinee to secure DG1 IAW Alarm Card C-1/F-3.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give a sheet with the task conditions and cue and then answer any questions related to the task instructions

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 6 of 15 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, Section 5)

Critical Step

5. DG1 STANDBY START FROM CONTROL ROOM 5.23 PLACE and HOLD DIESEL GEN 1 STOP/START (Panel C) switch to START until STOP light turns off.

Standard Examinee started DG1 by placing DIESEL GEN 1 STOP/START switch clockwise to START, observed red light ON, and held switch in START until green light extinguished, then released switch.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 5.24 Using DIESEL GEN 1 VOLTAGE REGULATOR, Critical Step ADJUST voltage to ~ 4200V.

Standard Examinee adjusted DG1 voltage by placing DIESEL GEN 1 VOLTAGE REGULATOR clockwise to raise until voltage indicated on DIESEL GENERATOR 1 VOLTS meter was between 4150V to 4250V.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 7 of 15

3. Procedure Step: 5.25 RECORD DATE and START TIME for DG1 on Attachment 5.

Standard Examinee recorded date and start time for DG 1 on Attachment 5.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 5.26 RECORD No Load GEN FIELD CURRENT on Attachment 6.

Standard Examinee recorded No Load GEN FIELD CURRENT on Attachment 6.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 8 of 15

5. Procedure Step: 5.27 IF DG1 will be loaded, THEN GO TO Step 5.29.

5.29 BEFORE loading DG1, CHECK following:

first 9 bullets are local verifications, Last 2 bullets are:

DG1 operated at rated voltage greater than or equal 5 minutes.

DG1 operated at rated frequency greater than or equal 5 minutes.

Standard Examinee proceeded to step 5.29 and directed local operator to perform first 9 bullets of step 5.29, then checked clock time and verified DG1 had been operating at rated voltage and frequency for greater than or equal 5 minutes.

Cue 7 minutes has elapsed since step 5.24 was performed.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 5.30 IF both of following:

NSST or SSST aligned to 4160V Bus A.

NSST and SSST become unavailable while DG running and EG1 closed.

THEN PERFORM following:

5.30.1 Operator ENSURE DG-SW-DG1(43DP), DG1 DROOP PARALLEL SWITCH, in ISOCH.

5.30.2 AFTER DROOP PARALLEL SWITCH in ISOCH, THEN ENSURE following:

5.30.2.1 DG1 frequency adjusted to ~ 60 Hz.

5.30.2.1 DG1 voltage adjusted to 4200 VAC.

Standard Examinee advised local operator of contingency requirement.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 9 of 15

7. Procedure Step: 5.31 IF both of following:

ESST aligned to 4160V Bus F.

ESST become unavailable while DG running and EG1 closed.

THEN PERFORM following:

5.31.1 Operator ENSURE DG-SW-DG1(43DP), DG1 DROOP PARALLEL SWITCH, in ISOCH.

5.31.2 AFTER DROOP PARALLEL SWITCH in ISOCH, THEN ENSURE following:

5.31.2.1 DG1 frequency adjusted to ~ 60 Hz.

5.31.2.1 DG1 voltage adjusted to 4200 VAC.

Standard Examinee determined steps were N/A due to 4160V Bus 1F supplied via 4160V Bus 1A, not ESST.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 5.32 PLACE SYNCH SWITCH EG1 OR 1FE to EG1.

Critical Step Standard Examinee inserted switch handle and placed SYNCH SWITCH EG1 OR 1FE to counter-clockwise to EG1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 10 of 15

9. Procedure Step:

Critical Step NOTE - DG1 speed and load changed using DIESEL GEN 1 GOVERNOR switch.

5.33 ADJUST DG1 speed to cause SYNCHROSCOPE to rotate slowly in clockwise (FAST) direction.

Standard Examinee read note and placed DIESEL GEN 1 GOVERNOR switch counter-clockwise to LOWER and/or clockwise to RAISE, as necessary, to achieve DIESEL GENERATOR 1 SYNCHROSCOPE moving slowly clockwise (FAST direction).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step:

Critical Step NOTE - DG1 voltage and kVARs changed using DIESEL GEN 1 VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch.

5.34 ADJUST DG1 voltage slightly higher than voltage of Bus 1F.

Standard Examinee read note and placed DIESEL GEN 1 VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch counter-clockwise to LOWER and/or clockwise to RAISE, as necessary, to achieve DIESEL GENERATOR 1 VOLTS slightly higher than voltage indicated on 4160V BUSES 1F VOLTS (i.e. > ~4080V).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 11 of 15

11. Procedure Step:

Critical Step NOTE - If ESST aligned to 4160V Bus F, Annunciator C-1/F-7 alarms when EG1 closes and clears after ~ 41 seconds. While alarm annunciated, load shedding function inoperable (TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 Fn 1.a).

5.35 WHEN SYNCHROSCOPE at 11 o'clock, THEN CLOSE DIESEL GEN 1 BKR EG1.

Standard Examinee read note and when DG1 SYNCHROSCOPE reached approximately 11 o'clock position, placed DIESEL GEN 1 BKR EG1 switch clockwise to close and held until red light ON and green light OFF, then released, and checked DG1 SYNCHROSCOPE stable at 12 oclock position.

Cue Notes If breaker fails to close on first attempt, examinee may repeat this step as SYNCHROSCOPE makes additional revolutions.

Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Annunciator C-1/F-3, Diesel Gen 1 Excessive Vibration will occur when DG1 load exceeds 900 kW in the next JPM step.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 12 of 15

12. Procedure Step:

Critical Step NOTE - Typical maximum DG1 load, 4000 kW or 694 amps. DG1 load may be raised to 4400 kW or 763 amps for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months out of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period in emergency conditions.

5.36 RAISE DG1 load to ~ 1000 kW.

Standard Examinee raised DG1 load by placing DIESEL GEN 1 GOVERNOR switch clockwise to RAISE until DIESEL GENERATOR 1 WATTS indicated greater than 900 kW and approximately 1000 kW .

Cue Notes It is acceptable for Examinee to stop raising DG1 load as soon as annunciator C-1/F-3, Diesel Gen 1 Excessive Vibration alarms.

Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: N/A Alternate Path Standard Recognized and reported annunciator C-1/F-3, Diesel Gen 1 Excessive Vibration, and referred to alarm card.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 13 of 15 Examiner Note: The standard in the following JPM step falls under the requirements of Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations, step 10.3.5, which states: Upon recognition of a failure of automatic action, the CRO shall manually perform those actions necessary to fulfill the safety function and report the completion of the manual action to the CRS as soon as possible.

14. Procedure Step: (Alarm Card C-1/F-3, Diesel Gen 1 Excessive Vibration)

Alternate Path 1. AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Critical step 1.1 DG1 trips (trip bypassed on an auto start).

Standard Recognized DG1 should have tripped and manually tripped DG1 rotating DIESEL GEN 1 START/STOP switch counter-clockwise to STOP and checked green light ON and red light OFF, and checked DIESEL GEN 1 BKR EG1 tripped, indicated by green light ON and red light OFF and annunciator C-1/A-3, Diesel Gen 1 Breaker Trip alarmed.

Cue Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S6 Page 14 of 15 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None Any IC with NSST in service and 4160V Bus 1F B. Initialize the Simulator in IC supplied via Bus 1A; or password protected IC C. Run schedule File 2020-9S6 D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None

2. Malfunctions None

3. Remotes None C-1/F-3 DG1

4. Overrides p3605 Vibration 6 ON Excessive

a. Reset to IC

b. Run schedule file

5. Panel Setup

c. Ensure switch handle is removed from DIESEL GEN 1 BKR EG1 on panel C.

Schedule File Time Event Action Description 00:00 create event 6 zaodgwiwm1 > DG1 WATT meter > 900 kW 0.1286 00:00 insert override p3605 to ON on C-1/F-3 DG1 Vibration Excessive event 6

ATTACHMENT 2 Directions to Examinee:

Read the following, and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The plant is in Mode 1.

2. 4160V Bus 1F is being supplied by the NSST via 4160V Bus 1A.

3. DG1 is required to be started and loaded for performance of a maintenance retest.

4. Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, Section 5 has been completed through step 5.22.

5. Recorders are NOT being used during this DG1 run.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to start and load DG1 to 3200 kW in accordance with Procedure 2.2.20.1, Diesel Generator Operations, Section 5, beginning at step 5.23.

Inform the CRS when DG1 has been loaded to 3200 kW.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 1 of 19 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S7

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 2 of 19 Lesson Number: SKL034-20-38 SAP Course Number: 72508 Lesson

Title:

Verify and Reset a Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation (Alternate Path)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 14 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to verify a PCIS Group 2 Isolation and determine the TIP Ball valve failed to close and effect isolation of the penetration.

TASK STANDARD: The examinee verified a PCIS Group 2 Isolation IAW Procedure 2.1.22, Recovering from a Group Isolation, recognized TIP A Ball Valve failed to close, retracted the TIP A detector, and then isolated the penetration by closing the TIP A ball valve, in accordance with Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 3 of 19 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 4 of 19 Revision Statement: Modified version of SKL034-21-66 created in new format (Rev 0)

JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 215001 A2.07 (3.4/3.7)

2. Safety Function: 7, Instrumentation

3. Task No.: 213002P0101 Verify and Reset a Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Primary Containment (Isolation)

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.1.22, Recovering from a Group Isolation (Rev 63)

2. Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System (Rev 38)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set Up IAW Attachment 1 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Setup

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.1.22, Recovering from a Group Isolation, Attachment 1 [Group Isolation Hard Card],

3. Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 5 of 19 Directions to Examiner:

Note: This is an ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The TIP A Ball valve will have failed to close, requiring the examinee to identify the failure, withdraw the TIP detector, and then close the ball valve.

Note: DO NOT give Procedure 4.1.4 to examinee until requested at JPM step 4.

Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give a sheet with the task conditions and cue and then answer any questions related to the task instructions

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2. (DO NOT give Handout 3, Procedure 4.1.4, to examinee until identified by the examinee at JPM step 4.)

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 6 of 19 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step N/A Standard Obtained Procedure 2.1.22, Attachment 1, GROUP ISOLATION HARD CARD Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 7 of 19

2. Procedure Attachment 1, Hard Card Step Standard Ensured following Group 2 valves closed (Green light ON Red light OFF):

Critical Step RHR-MO-920 ____ RHR-MO-921 ____ RW-AO-82 ____ RW-AO-83 ____

RHR-MO-274A __ RHR-MO-274B _ _ RW-AO-94 ____ RW-AO-95 ____

RHR-MO-25A ____ RHR-MO-25B ____ PC-MO-1306 ____ PC-MO-1305 ____

RHR-MO-18 ____ RHR-MO-17 _ _ PC-MO-1304 ____ PC-MO-1303 ____

RHR-SSV-60 ____ RHR-SSV-61 ____ PC-MO-1311 ____ PC-MO-1310 ____

RHR-SSV-95 ____ RHR-SSV-96 ____ PC-MO-1302 ____ PC-MO-1312 ____

RHR-MO-57 ____ RHR-MO-67 ____ PC-MO-1308 ____ PC-MO-1301 ____

RMV-AO-10 ____ RMV-AO-11 ____

RMV-AO-12 ____ RMV-AO-13 ____ TIP VALVES ____

Valves are de-energized (closed)

Cue Notes Refer to JPM Attachment 1 (Answer Key) showing Group 2 valves highlighted yellow on Hard Card.

Recognition of TIP VALVES not closed is the only critical portion of this step.

Valves are listed to enable Examiner to check off as Examinee marks off valves on the Hard Card.

This may be completed after closing TIP valves Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step N/A Standard Reported to CRS that TIP valve(s) not closed.

Cue CRS acknowledges the report. Respond to the failed automatic action using appropriate procedure, and then complete verifying the Group isolations.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 8 of 19

4. Procedure Step N/A Alternate Path Standard Examinee determined Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System, was required to correct TIP valve(s) out of position and obtained Procedure 4.1.4.

Cue When the examinee identifies procedure 4.1.4 is needed, provide examinee Handout 3, Procedure 4.1.4.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The remaining steps are from Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System, Section 6.

5. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION Alternate Path NOTES prior to Step 6.1 NOTE 1 - Section performed by a Licensed Operator.

Standard Examinee determined Section 6 was appropriate section, and reviewed Note 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 9 of 19

6. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION Alternate Path NOTES prior to Step 6.1 NOTE 2 - Red TIP VALVES light ON at Panel 9-3 containment ISOLATION VALVE POSITIONS display indicates one or more of TIP ball valves are in open position.

Standard Examinee reviewed note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION Alternate Path 6.1 lF containment ISOLATION VALVE POSITIONS (Panel 9-3) display red TIP VALVES light remains on, THEN at Panel 9-13, CHECK ball valve positions to determine which valve remain in open position.

Standard Checked TIP Machine A ball valve indicating open - red light ON at VALVE CONTROL MONITOR A on panel 9-13.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 10 of 19

8. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION Alternate Path 6.2 For affected TIP drives:

Critical Step 6.2.1 Manually retract TIP drives as follows:

6.2.1.1 PLACE MODE switch to MAN. A[ ]

Standard At TIP Drive Control Panel A, rotated MODE switch to MAN position.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step 6.2.1.2 PLACE MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch to OPEN.

Alternate Path A [ ]

Standard At TIP Drive Control Panel A, verified MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch in OPEN and verified ball valve was open.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step 6.2.1.3 VERIFY red BALL VALVE OPEN light on VALVE Alternate Path CONTROL MONITOR on. A [ ]

Standard Observed red BALL VALVE OPEN light on VALVE CONTROL MONITOR A.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 11 of 19

11. Procedure Step 6.2.1.4 PLACE MANUAL switch to REV. A [ ]

Alternate Path Critical Step Standard Rotated MANUAL switch to the REV. position and observed movement of TIP A detector indicated by DETECTOR POSITION on TIP Drive Control Panel A lowering.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step 6.2.1.5 CHECK IN-SHIELD light status. A [ ]

Alternate Path a. IF IN-SHIELD light remains off and there are indications of reactor coolant leak in drywell, THEN PROCEED to Step 6.3.

Standard Determined step was N/A by observing IN-SHIELD light On.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 12 of 19

13. Procedure Step 6.2.1.5 CHECK IN-SHIELD light status. A [ ]

Alternate Path b. IF IN-SHIELD light remains off, THEN HAVE IAC attempt to manually hand crank TIP to IN-SHIELD position per Procedure 14.TIP.301.

Standard Determined step was N/A by observing IN-SHIELD light On.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step 6.2.2 PLACE MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch to CLOSED; Alternate Path N/A for TIP ball valves not performed. A [ ]

Critical Step Standard Rotated MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch for TIP A ball valve at TIP Drive Control Panel A clockwise to CLOSE, and observed white VALVE light extinguished.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 13 of 19

15. Procedure Step 6.2.3 ENSURE green BALL VALVE CLOSED light on VALVE Alternate Path CONTROL MONITOR on.

Standard Observed green BALL VALVE CLOSED light was On and red BALL VALVE OPEN light was Off on VALVE CONTROL MONITOR A on panel 9-13, and initialed performed by at procedure step.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step 6.2.4 ENSURE MANUAL switch to OFF. A [ ]

Alternate Path Standard Rotated MANUAL switch clockwise to OFF on TIP Drive Control Panel A.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 14 of 19

17. Procedure Step 6.2.4 ENSURE MODE switch to OFF. A [ ]

Alternate Path Standard Rotated MODE switch counter-clockwise to OFF on TIP Drive Control Panel A.

Cue Tell examinee JPM is complete Notes JPM is complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 15 of 19 ANSWER KEY (Procedure 2.1.22, Attach 1, Front Panel Group Isolation Hard Card)

Page 15 of 2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 16 of 19 ANSWER KEY (Procedure 2.1.22, Attach 1, Back Panel Group Isolation/SGT Hard Card)

Page 16 of 2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 17 of 19 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC- 18, 19, or 20 or password protected IC C. Run schedule file see panel setup D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers 7, 17 see schedule file

2. Malfunctions RR20a A RR Loop leak N/A N/A 20 N/A N/A NM10a TIP stuck in core N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

3. Remotes None N/A N/A

4. Overrides

a. Place simulator in Run.

b. Place TIP Machine A ON

c. MODE switch in Auto.

d. Place toggle switch for the in-shield limit switches above the TIP machines to ON.

e. Place MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch to OPEN.

f. Drive TIP into the core area and insert malfunction NM10a and

5. Panel Setup verify the detector stops within the core region.

g. Put in malfunction RR20a and ensure Groups 2 and 6 are in.

h. Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

i. Place HPCI AOP in PTL.

j. Ensure PCIS Display for TIP Ball Valves indicates OPEN and that TIP Ball Valve A indicates OPEN.

k. run schedule file Schedule file

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S7 Page 18 of 19 Time Event Action Description 00:00:00 create event 7 zdinmdsws7aa(1) == TIP A mode switch in AUTO 0 & zdinmdsws7aa(2) == 0 00:00:00 create event 17 et_array(7) == 1 & Event 7 true and TIP A mode zdinmdsws7aa(1) == 1 switch in MAN 00:00:00 insert malfunction nm10a TIP A detector stuck in core 17 delete malfunction nm10a

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the Evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant scrammed on low reactor water level

2. Low water level resulted in PCIS Groups 2 and 6 isolations

3. There are indications of a reactor coolant leak in the drywell INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the actions associated with verifying the Groups 2 and 6 Isolation using Procedure 2.1.22 Attachment 1, Group Isolation Hard Card. Verify Group 2 first, and then Group 6.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 1 of 14 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S8

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 2 of 14 Lesson Number: SKL034-20-26 SAP Course Number: 72506 Lesson

Title:

Operate Service Water Backups for Critical Loop Cooling Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME Required Time Actual Time FRAME: (min): (min):

PERFORMANCE Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time TIME: (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle UNSA SAT one) T COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to align Service Water backup to REC.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee aligned SW backup to REC by isolating REC non-critical header, isolating SW to REC heat exchangers, opening REC heat exchanger temperature control SW valves, and placing SW TO REC DIV 2 CROSSTIE switch to open, raising supply pressure to both REC critical headers, IAW 5.2REC, Loss of REC, Attachment 6.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 3 of 14 Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 4 of 14 Revision Statements: Rev 0-Updated 2018 ILT JPM to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: 400000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0) K1.01 (3.2/3.3)

2. Safety Function: 8, Plant Service Systems

3. Task No: 208017C0101 - Operate Service Water Backups for Critical Loop Cooling

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Service Water

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Procedure 5.2REC, Loss of REC (Rev 19)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 1 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.2REC, Loss of REC, Attachment 6

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 5 of 14 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give a sheet with the task conditions and cue and then answer any questions related to the task instructions

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 6 of 14 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

Examiner Note: Valves that have fluted oval control switches are throttle MOVs in at least one direction. When fully closing or opening these valves in a throttle direction, the control switch is required to be held for ~5 seconds after fully closed/open indication, as applicable, is received.

Holding switch for 5 seconds is not a critical portion of a JPM step.

Examiner Note: Key #22 or #23 is required for JPM step 12. Retrieve key from key locker at RO desk before starting JPM and give to the examinee upon request to preempt examinee from going to front panel area during JPM.

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2REC LOSS OF REC)

Attachment 6 - SW Backup for Critical Subsystem Cooling NOTE - Cooling to the critical loops is required to be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to ensure postulated temperature limits are maintained.

Standard Examinee reviewed note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 7 of 14

2. Procedure Step: (Procedure 5.2REC, Loss of REC, Attachment 6)

Critical Step

1. INITIATE SW BACKUP FOR CRITICAL SUBSYSTEM COOLING 1.1 Close REC-MO-721, NON-CRITICAL HEADER RETURN Standard On VBD-M, Closed REC-MO-721, NON-CRITICAL HEADER RETURN, by placing switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: 1.2 Close REC-MO-722, NON-CRITICAL HEADER RETURN Critical Step Standard Closed REC-MO-722, NON-CRITICAL HEADER RETURN, by placing switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: NOTE - SW-MO-650 and SW-MO-651 throttle open upon a Group 6 isolation signal and will not fully close.

Standard Examinee reviewed note Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 8 of 14

4. Procedure Step: 1.3 Perform one of following:

1.3.1 Close following valves:

1.3.1.1 SW-MO-650, REC HX A SERVICE WATER OUTLET.

Standard Verified closed SW-MO-650, REC HX A SERVICE WATER OUTLET, by observing green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 1.3 Perform one of following:

Critical Step 1.3.1 Close following valves:

1.3.1.2 SW-MO-651, REC HX B SERVICE WATER OUTLET.

Standard Closed SW-MO-651, REC HX B SERVICE WATER OUTLET, by placing switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF and held control switch in CLOSE for ~5 seconds after red light extinguished.

Cue Notes Holding switch to CLOSE for ~5 seconds after green light extinguished is not a critical portion of this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 9 of 14

6. Procedure Step: 1.3 Perform one of following:

1.3.2 IF Group 6 isolation signal is initiated, THEN perform following:

Standard Examinee determined Group 6 isolation signal is NOT present and step 1.3.2 is N/A by observing white lights OFF above switches PCIS Group 6 Div 1 Isolation PC-SW-S61 PCIS Group 6 Div 2 Isolation PC-SW-S62 on VBD-K.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 1.4 Ensure SW-TCV-451A, REC HX A SW OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL, switch is in OPEN.

Critical Step Standard Placed SW-TCV-451A, REC HX A SW OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL clockwise to OPEN and observed red light ON, green light OFF Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 1.5 Ensure SW-TCV-451B, REC HX B SW OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL, switch is in OPEN.

Critical Step Standard Placed SW-TCV-451B, REC HX B SW OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL clockwise to OPEN and observed red light ON, green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 10 of 14

9. Procedure Step: 1.6 IF critical loops are split, THEN perform Steps 1.9 and 1.10.

Standard Determined critical loops are not split based on initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: 1.7 NOTE - Division I and Division II power available and placing Division II service water in service is for single failure criteria.

Standard Examinee reviewed note Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 1.7 IF critical loops are not split and Divisions I and II power is available, THEN go to Step 1.10.

Standard Determined critical loops not split and Divisions I and II power were available, indicated by Div 1 and Div 2 powered components have illuminated indicating lights ON, on nearby panels or from initial conditions, and proceeded to step 1.10.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 11 of 14

12. Procedure Step: 1.10 Place SW TO REC DIV 2 CROSSTIE switch to OPEN and ensure following:

Critical Step 1.10.1 REC-MO-714, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY, is closed.

1.10.2 REC-MO-698, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP RETURN, is closed.

1.10.3 SW-MO-887, SW SUPPLY TO SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP, is open.

1.10.4 SW-MO-889, SW RETURN FROM REC SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP, is open.

Standard Placed SW TO REC DIV 2 CROSSTIE switch to OPEN and verified:

REC-MO-714, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY closed, indicated by green light On, red light OFF,

REC-MO-698, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP RETURN closed, indicated by green light On, red light OFF,

SW-MO-887, SW SUPPLY TO SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP opened, indicated by red light On, green light OFF,

SW-MO-889, SW RETURN FROM REC SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP opened, indicated by red light On, green light OFF.

Cue Notes REC-MO-714 is already closed and is not a critical portion of this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 12 of 14

13. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Determined SW was being supplied to critical headers based on pressure indicated on REC-PI-472A, REC CRIT LOOP SUPPLY PRESS and REC-PI-472B, REC CRIT LOOP SUPPLY PRESS rising above 20 psig and Informed CRS SW Backup has been aligned to REC.

Cue CRS acknowledges the report Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 13 of 14 ATTACHMENT 1 A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC- 18, 19, or 20, or password protected IC C. Load Schedule File D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Events None REC Pump A

2. Malfunctions sw11a trip REC Pump B sw11b trip REC Pump C sw11c trip REC Pump D sw11d trip Group 6 rp15 isolation failure

3. Remotes None N/A N/A

4. Overrides None N/A N/A

a. Insert malfunctions listed above

b. Insert scram

5. Panel Setup c. Stop RR Pumps A and B

d. Stop CRD Pump B

e. Stabilize reactor water level above -30

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3

2. All REC pumps tripped and cannot be restarted

3. Step 4.3 of 5.2REC is complete

4. CSCS quad temperatures are rising

5. There are NO known leaks in the REC system

6. Division I and Division II power is available

7. REC critical loops are NOT split INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to initiate SW Backup for Critical Subsystem Cooling IAW Procedure 5.2REC, Loss of REC, Attachment 6.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 1 of 14 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S8

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 2 of 14 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Separation (Split) of REC Critical Loops (South loop available)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL DATE:

OPERATOR:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

FRAME:

PERFORMANCE Validation Time (min): XX Actual Time (min):

TIME:

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: (Circle one) Yes / No (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to separate (split) the REC Critical Loops TASK STANDARD: Examinee aligned SW backup to REC by closing REC-MO-695, REC-MO-694, REC-MO-721, REC-MO-722, and open SW-MO-651 and REC-MO-714, and ensure REC Pump A or B is operating per 5.2REC attachment 5. IAW 5.2REC, Loss of REC, Attachment 5.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 3 of 14 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 4 of 14 Revision Statements:

Rev 0 - Modified version of SKL034-21-24; changed from the North Critical Loop to the South Critical Loop available JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: 400000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0)

2. Safety Function: 8, Plant Service Systems

3. Task No: 208028P0101 - Separate (Split) REC Critical Loops

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Procedure 5.2REC, Loss of REC (Rev 19)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 1 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.2REC, Loss of REC, Attachment 5

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 5 of 14 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give a sheet with the task conditions and cue and then answer any questions related to the task instructions

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 6 of 14 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2REC LOSS OF REC)

Critical Step Attachment 5 - Splitting Critical Subsystems

1. Split REC Critical Subsystems as follows:

1.1 Close REC-MO-695, CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY CROSSTIE.

Standard Closed REC-MO-695, CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY CROSSTIE by placing control switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 1.2 Close REC-MO-694, CRITICAL LOOP RETURN Critical Step CROSSTIE.

Standard Closed REC-MO-694, CRITICAL LOOP RETURN CROSSTIE by placing control switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 7 of 14

3. Procedure Step 1.3 Close REC-MO-721, NON-CRITICAL HEADER Critical Step RETURN.

Standard Closed REC-MO-721, NON-CRITICAL HEADER RETURN by placing control switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 1.4 Close REC-MO-722, NON-CRITICAL HEADER Critical Step RETURN.

Standard Closed REC-MO-722, NON-CRITICAL HEADER RETURN.by placing control switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 8 of 14

5. Procedure Step 1.5 Ensure REC-19, REC HX B INLET FROM PUMPS A &

B (R-931-N east end, north side of REC HXs), open.

1.6 Ensure REC-21, RX HX A INLET (R-931-N east end, north side of REC HXs), open.

1.7 Remove seal and close REC-18, REC HX B INLET FROM PUMPS C & D (R-931-N east end, north side of REC HXs).

1.8 Remove seal and close REC-20, REC HX A INLET FROM PUMPS A & B (R-931-N east end, north side of REC HXs).

Standard Directed building operator to perform procedure 5.2REC Attachment 5 steps 1.5 through 1.8.

Cue Report steps 1.5 through 1.8 are complete (time compression is acceptable).

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 1.9 Determine which critical subsystem available and perform Step 1.10 if North Critical Subsystem available or perform Step 1.11 if South Critical Subsystem available.

Standard Determined South Critical Loop was available from initiating cue and proceeded to step 1.11.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 9 of 14

7. Procedure Step 1.11 IF South Critical Subsystem available, THEN Critical Step perform following:

1.11.1 Ensure SW-TCV-451B, REC HX B SW OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL, switch in OPEN.

Standard Placed SW-TCV-451B, REC HX B SW OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL, control switch clockwise to OPEN.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Valves that have fluted oval control switches are throttle MOVs in at least one direction. When fully closing or opening these valves in a throttle direction, the control switch is required to be held for ~5 seconds after fully closed/open indication, as applicable, is received.

Holding switch for 5 seconds is not a critical portion of a JPM step.

8. Procedure Step 1.11.2 Throttle SW-MO-651, REC HX B SERVICE Critical Step WATER OUTLET to obtain 400 to 1200 gpm flow on SW-FI-387B, HX B SERVICE WATER FLOW.

Standard Throttled SW-MO-651, REC HX B SERVICE WATER OUTLET open by placing and holding control switch clockwise to OPEN to raise flow until 400 to 1200 gpm flow was indicated on SW-FI-387B, HX B SERVICE WATER FLOW.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 10 of 14

9. Procedure Step 1.11.3 Ensure REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV, closed.

Standard Checked REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV closed by observing green light ON and red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step 1.11.4 Ensure REC-MO-714, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP Critical Step SUPPLY, open.

Standard Opened REC-MO-714, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY by placing control switch clockwise to open, and observed red light ON, green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 11 of 14

11. Procedure Step 1.11.5 IF REC surge tank available, THEN open REC-MO-721.

Standard Determined REC surge tank was not available from initial condition, and did not open REC-MO-721, NON-CRITICAL HEADER RETURN Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step NOTE - REC Pump A or B is used to supply South Critical Step Critical Subsystem through REC HX B due to configuration of critical subsystem return piping.

1.11.4 Ensure REC Pump A or B running.

Standard Started REC Pump A or REC Pump B by placing respective control switch clockwise to START, and observed red light ON, green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 12 of 14

13. Procedure Step 1.11.7 IF RMP-RM-351B, SW B EFFLUENT RAD MON, inoperable, THEN inform Chemistry to manually sample.

Standard Determined step was N/A from initial condition RMP-RM-351B, SW B EFFLUENT RAD MON was OPERABLE.

Cue Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-9 JPM S8 Page 13 of 14 ATTACHMENT 1 A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC- 18, 19, or 20, or password protected IC C. Load Schedule File D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Events None REC HX 1B

2. Malfunctions SW12b Tube Leak Group 6 isolation RP15 failure REC HX1B Inlet

3. Remotes SW02 Isol Vlv (REC-V- 8 18)

REC HX1A Inlet SW04 Isol Vlv (REC-V- 8 20)

4. Overrides None N/A N/A

a. Place the Simulator in RUN. Insert above listed malfunction.

b. Perform actions of EP 5.2REC Attachment 2 through step 1.3.5 (all REC pumps remain off).

5. Panel Setup c. Close REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV.

d. Activate Trigger 8.

e. FREEZE the simulator.

f. When JPM begins and simulator is taken to RUN, DELETE the malfunction.

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant was operating at 100% rated power when a leak occurred in the REC system.

2. Several alarms associated with the REC system have been received in the Control Room.

3. Emergency Procedure 5.2REC, Loss of REC, has been entered and actions have been taken up to splitting the REC Critical Loops.

4. ONLY the SOUTH Critical Loop is available.

5. REC surge tank is NOT available.

6. Service Water Radiation Monitor is OPERABLE.

INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you separate (split) the REC Critical Loops per 5.2REC Attachment 5.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 1 of 46 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-09 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the examinees ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Shift REC pumps from A in operation to B in operation

2. Raise power with Reactor Recirculation from 95% to 100%

3. Respond to Minor Earthquake causing gland steam exhauster B trip, Drywell Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzer failure

4. Respond to RFPT A governor valve failure high

5. Respond to Feedwater line B break inside containment

6. Respond to failure of control rods 22-23, 22-27, 26-23, 26-27, 30-31 to scram

7. Respond to intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch

8. Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically start Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 95% power near end of cycle.

Inoperable Equipment: Core Spray Pump A Turnover:

Plant operating at operating at 95% power near end of cycle.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Shift REC pumps

Raise power from 95% to 100% power Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes Page 1 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 2 of 46 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description N (BOP,CRS) Shift REC pumps from A in operation to B 1 N/A in operation (LCO 3.7.3)

TS (CRS) 2 N/A R (ATC,CRS) Raise power from 95% to 100%

hv02a (30) C (BOP,CRS) Minor earthquake, Gland Steam Exhauster B trip (start Gland Steam 3 zdiarswgseb TS (CRS) Exhauster A), Drywell Hydrogen/Oxygen (STOP) A (CREW) Analyzer failure C (BOP,CRS) RFPT A governor valve failure high (trip 4 fw24a @ 30 RFPT A)

A (CREW)

Feedwater line B break inside 5 fw18b @ 20 M (CREW) containment with check valve leakage (LOCA, LOFW)

Failure of control rods 22-23, 22-27, 26-23, 26-27, 30-31 to scram (attempt to insert rods using RMCS)

CT#1 Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before rd122223 exceeding the Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

rd122227 CT#2 6 rd122623 C (ATC,CRS) When Emergency Depressurization is required during a failure to scram rd122627 condition, stop and prevent all injection rd153031 into the RPV except for RCIC, Boron Injection, and CRD prior to opening an SRV for emergency depressurization.

(Failure to fully stop and prevent a subsystem IAW the hard card before an SRV is opened does not constitute failure of this CT if the subsystem is subsequently aligned such that it does not inject during depressurization.).

Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in 7 o/r zdinmswz1a7 C (ATC,CRS) switch (reinsert SRMs/IRMs)

Failure of RCIC to automatically start 8 rc01 C (BOP,CRS) (attempt to manually align RCIC)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Page 2 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 3 of 46 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. Failure of control rods 22-23, 22-27, 26-23, 26-27, 30-31 to scram Malfunctions after 1-2 3 2. Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch EOP entry

3. Failure of RCIC to automatically start

1. Minor earthquake Abnormal Events 2-4 2 2. RFPT A governor valve failure high Feedwater line B break inside containment with check valve leakage Major Transients 1-2 2 1. LOCA

2. LOFW EOP entries 1. EOP-6A requiring 2. EOP-7A 1-2 3 substantive action 3. EOP3A EOP contingencies 1. EOP-6B Contingency #2 - Emergency requiring 1 per set 1 Depressurization substantive action

1. (CT#1) Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before exceeding the Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

2. (CT #2) When Emergency Depressurization is required during a failure to scram condition, stop and Pre-identified prevent all injection into the RPV except for RCIC, 2 2 Critical Tasks Boron Injection, and CRD prior to opening an SRV for emergency depressurization. (Failure to fully stop and prevent a subsystem IAW the hard card before an SRV is opened does not constitute failure of this CT if the subsystem is subsequently aligned such that it does not inject during depressurization.).

Normal Events N/A 1 1. Shift REC pumps Reactivity 1. Raise power from 95% to 100%

N/A 1 Manipulations Page 3 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 4 of 46

1. Gland Steam Exhauster B trip

2. RFPT A governor valve failure high Instrument/ 3. Failure of control rods 22-23, 22-27, 26-23, 26-27, Component N/A 5 30-31 to scram Failures

4. Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch

5. Failure of RCIC to automatically start

1. Gland Steam Exhauster B trip

2. RFPT A governor valve failure high

3. Failure of control rods 22-23, 22-27, 26-23, 26-27, Total 30-31 to scram N/A 5 Malfunctions

4. Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch

5. Failure of RCIC to automatically start Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

RCIC, RPS, RHR, ADS

Operator fails to emergency depressurize following high pressure injection failure

Operator fails to maximize CRD Page 4 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 5 of 46 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 95% power near the end of the operating cycle.

After the crew takes the watch, the BOP will shift REC pumps from A in operation to B in operation IAW Procedure 2.2.65.1. The CRS will enter LCO 3.7.3 Condition B for this evolution due to manipulation of REC pump mode select switches.

After REC pumps have been shifted, the crew will raise power with Reactor Recirculation. When power reaches 100%, a minor earthquake will occur. This will cause the running gland steam exhauster to trip. The crew will take alarm card actions and start the standby gland steam exhauster. The earthquake also causes failure of the Division 1 drywell H2/O2 analyzer. The CRS will enter TLCO 3.3.3 Condition B for the inoperable H2/O2 analyzer.

After response to the earthquake is complete and the TRM requirements have been addressed for the H2/O2 analyzer, RFPT A governor valve will gradually fail open, resulting in RFPT A speed and reactor water level rising and a RFPT A control trouble alarm. The crew will enter Procedure 2.4RXLVL. RFPT B speed will lower automatically in response to rising reactor water level. The crew will diagnose RFPT A is not responding properly to its control signal and will trip RFPT A IAW the alarm card and enter Procedure 2.4MC-RF.

After the crew has stabilized plant conditions, Feedwater line B will rupture in the drywell. An automatic scram will occur on high drywell pressure. The crew will enter EOP-1A and EOP-3A on high drywell pressure. Five control rods will fail to insert on the scram, and the crew will transition from EOP-1A to EOP-6A and EOP-7A. Reactor power will be 0%.

Reactor water level will promptly fall to approximately -50 inches wide range, then it will slowly lower. The crew will re-enter Procedure 2.4MC-RF and secure Feedwater and Condensate. The crew will secure HPCI since it injects into the broken FW line. RCIC will fail to automatically start on low reactor water level, and when the crew attempts to start it manually, RCIC injection valve RCIC-MO-21 will fail closed. Elevated drywell pressure will require operation of Torus and drywell sprays.

The crew will begin inserting SRMs and IRMs following the scram, but an intermittent failure of the drive control switch will require a second attempt to fully insert SRMs/IRMs. The crew will attempt to insert the five control rods that failed to scram using RMCS, but will only be successful in inserting one of the five rods, requiring the crew to continue ATWS strategies. The crew will inhibit ADS to prevent uncontrolled depressurization and cold water injection (CT#1).

Page 5 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 6 of 46 Reactor water level will continue to slowly lower to -183 inches Corrected Fuel Zone, and emergency depressurization will be required IAW EOP-7A/6B. The crew will stop and prevent all available injection systems except boron and CRD (CT#2), then the crew will emergency depressurize using SRVs. When reactor pressure lowers to the Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure, 145 psig, the crew will restore reactor water level to +3 inches to +54 inches using RHR.

The exercise ends when emergency depressurization is complete and level is being restored to +3 inches to +54 inches.

Page 6 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 7 of 46 CRITICAL TASK BASIS Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before exceeding the Critical Task #1 Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

In order to effect a reduction in reactor power, actions in Contingency #5 may deliberately lower RPV water level to a level below the automatic initiation setpoint of ADS. Actuation of this system imposes a severe thermal transient on the RPV and complicates the efforts to maintain RPV water level within the ranges specified in Contingency #5. Further, rapid and uncontrolled injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated water from low pressure injection systems may occur as RPV pressure decreases to and below the shutoff heads of these pumps. Such an occurrence would quickly Safety Significance dilute in-core boron concentration and reduce reactor coolant temperature. When the reactor is not shutdown, or when the shutdown margin is small, sufficient positive reactivity might be added in this way to cause a reactor power excursion large enough to severely damage the core. Therefore, ADS initiation is purposely prevented as the first action of the level/power control procedure. When required, explicit direction to depressurize the RPV is provided in the PSTG, thereby negating any requirement to maintain the automatic initiation capability of ADS.

Cues ADS Timer actuated alarm 9-3-1/A-1.

Wide Range and Fuel Zone/CFZ RPV level indications approaching or exceeding Level 1 (-113).

ADS valve control switch red and amber indicating lights on panel 9-3 ON.

Measurable Manipulation of ADS A and ADS B Inhibit switches on panel Performance 9-3 vertical section.

Indicators Inhibit switches click into the vertical, inhibit position on panel 9-3 prior to breaking the tech spec required cooldown rate.

Performance Feedback Receipt of ADS actuated alarm 9-3-1/D-1.

Applicability ATWS with power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps per EOP-7A.

Page 7 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 8 of 46 Inhibiting ADS before injection from high volume, cold water systems occurs ensures a related power excursion will not be Justification for the experienced that could challenge to the fuel barrier. Inhibiting chosen performance ADS before the Tech Spec cooldown limit is exceeded limit ensures the RPV fission product barrier is not challenged by a significant thermal transient.

BWR Owners Group App. B, step RC/Q-6 Appendix The scenario must be designed to make the crew lower RPV level per EOP-7A step FS/L-6 or FS/L-7 (i.e. ATWS with Scenario Guide power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps, and Requirements Feedwater or HPCI maintaining level above -60 CFZ).

Page 8 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 9 of 46 When Emergency Depressurization is required during a failure to scram condition, stop and prevent all injection into the RPV except for RCIC, Boron Injection, and CRD prior to opening an SRV for emergency depressurization.

Critical Task #2 (Failure to fully stop and prevent a subsystem IAW the hard card before an SRV is opened does not constitute failure of this CT if the subsystem is subsequently aligned such that it does not inject during depressurization.)

Injection into the RPV is terminated and prevented while emergency RPV depressurization proceeds, in order to prevent uncontrolled injection of large amounts of cold water as RPV pressure decreases below the shutoff head of operating system pumps. Injection from boron injection systems and CRD is not terminated because operation of these systems may be needed to establish and maintain Safety Significance reactor shutdown. Further, the injection flowrates from these systems are small compared to those of the other systems used to control RPV water level. Injection from RCIC is not terminated because the injection flowrate from this system is small, continued operation of the turbine aids in depressurizing the RPV, and operation during RPV depressurization is not expected to result in significant injection flowrate variations.

Cues Emergency Depressurization is required by EOP-3A, EOP-5A, or EOP-7A during a failure to scram event with power above 3%. EOP-7A step FS/L-15 is required.

Crew overrides the following systems IAW 5.8 Attachment 4, as applicable:

Trip HPCI and place its Aux Oil Pump in PTL.

Trip both Reactor Feed Pumps and all Condensate Booster Pumps.

Measurable Secure both RHR systems by placing all RHR pumps in PTL, Performance or override RHR injection valves closed via installation of Indicators PTMs97-100.

Close Feedwater valves RF-MO-29 and RF-MO-30 or trip all condensate pumps.

Close valves CS-12A and CS-MO-12B, and place Core Spray pumps A and B in PTL.

Page 9 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 10 of 46 HPCI indicates tripped with HPCI Aux Oil Pump control switch in PTL on panel 9-3.

All RHR pump control switches are in PTL on panel 9-3, or PTMs97-100 indicate installed on instructor console with the respective RHR outboard closed on panel 9-3.

Performance Reactor Feed Pumps indicate tripped and CBPs indicate Feedback stopped on panel A.

All Condensate Pumps indicate stopped or valves RF-MO-29 and RF-MO-30 indicate fully closed on panel A.

Core spray valves CS-MO-12A and CS-MO-12B indicate closed and Core Spray pumps A and B control switches are in PTL on panel 9-3.

Applicability EOP-7A conditions when emergency depressurization is required by any EOP.

Since SRVs are opened to effect emergency Justification for the depressurization, stopping and preventing injection systems chosen performance before an SRV is opened or before injection actually occurs limit ensures no power excursion due to cold water injection and no boron dilution occurs.

BWR Owners Group App. B, step C5-5.1 Appendix The scenario requires Emergency Depressurization due to EOP-3A, EOP-5A, or insufficient high pressure injection availability to maintain level above -183 CFZ.

Scenario Guide The scenario must be designed to require Emergency Requirements Depressurization during failure to scram conditions before the reactor can be declared shut down and will remain shut down under all conditions.

Page 10 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 11 of 46 Related Operating Experience CR-CNS-2018-07852 Gland Steam Exhauster A trip During ascension of reactor pressure from 150 to 475 psig, Gland Steam Condenser Exhauster A began showing erratic indications. Low Discharge Pressure and High Condenser level alarms began cycling. Operators were dispatched to adjust the blast gate, but prior the adjustment, Gland Steam Exhauster A began tripping and restarting.

Received a report from an electrician in the field that amps on the exhauster were reading well above nameplate. Gland Exhausters were shifted, to B running and A secured, and Gland Steam indications stabilized. E-shop reported that B Gland Exhauster amps were 17 amps, below nameplate. Blast gate for A Gland Exhauster was moved after the shift of exhausters to match the position of the blast gate for B Exhauster.

Page 11 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 12 of 46 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC20 or password protected IC, 95% or 100% (EOC)

1. Ensure this schedule file is in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Name - 2020-9sc1.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-9sc1.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 13 of 46 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

Page 13 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 14 of 46 Page 14 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 15 of 46 Page 15 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 16 of 46 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure power is ~95%.

3. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

4. Ensure CRD Drive D/P at 265 psid.

5. Ensure CRD Cooling Water flow at 50 gpm.

6. Place CS Pump A in PTL.

7. Hang a caution tag on CS Pump A control switch.

8. Ensure CS A is OOS on safety system status panel on panel 9-5.

9. Place Protected Equipment placard on Panel 9-3 within Core Spray B area.

10. Ensure SSST Y voltage to RRMGs is set to TAP 2.

11. SSST X Voltage card should read TAP POS 3, MAX 4469 and MIN 4361.

12. Ensure IC20, Rod Sequence Notebook under the RO desk.

13. REC pump A selector switch in STANDBY.

14. REC pump B selector switch in NORMAL.

Page 16 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 17 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift REC pumps from A in operation to B in operation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to shift REC pumps from A in operation to B in operation per Procedure 2.2.65.1, Section 8.

CRS Directs BOP to place REC Pump A selector switch in NORMAL before placing REC Pump B selector switch in STANDBY during the evolution.

Booth Role Play: If asked, as Rx Bldg NLO report pre-start checks are complete for starting REC Pump B..

Operator (Procedure 2.2.65.1 [REC Operations)

8. SHIFTING REC PUMPS 8.1 Start desired idle pump.

8.2 Secure selected running pump.

8.3 Check system pressure > 65 psig on REC-PI-452, REC HEADER PRESSURE.

8.4 Check drywell flow remains in green band on REC-FI-453, SUPPLY HEADER FLOW.

BOP 8.5 IF REC pump NORMAL/STANDBY selector switches must be manipulated in step 8.6, THEN perform one of following:

8.5.1 IF both NORMAL/STANDBY selector switches in one division will be in NORMAL during swap, THEN inform SM associated REC Subsystem inoperable.

Informs CRS selector switches for both REC pumps A and B will be in NORMAL.

Places selector switch for REC Pump A in NORMAL.

Places selector switch for REC Pump B in STANDBY.

Enters LCO 3.7.3 Condition B for REC subsystem A inoperable while CRS selector switches for both REC pumps A and B are in NORMAL.

TS 3.7.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One REC subsystem B.1 Restore the REC subsystem to 30 days inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.

other than Condition A.

END OF EVENT Page 17 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 18 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift REC pumps from A in operation to B in operation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Notes Booth Proceed to next event after REC Pump A has been stopped and at the Operator direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 18 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 19 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2, 3 Event

Description:

Raise power from 95% to 100%, minor earthquake with Gland Steam Exhaust Fan B trip and Div 1 H2/O2 monitor failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs ATC to raise reactor power to 100% using RR flow per Procedure CRS 2.1.10 Booth Role Play: As Rx Building NLO, when requested to monitor RRMG lube oil temps and maintain 110-130°F, respond you will monitor RRMG lube Operator oil temps and maintain them in band.

Raises power using Recirculation flow IAW Procedure 2.1.10 [Station Power Changes]:

Selects S on RR flow controllers on panel 9-4.

6.4 Raise power by raising RR pump flow as follows:

6.4.1 IF thermal power 2413 (or 2375 if power limited to 2381 MWt),

THEN raise power by raising RR pump flow (by turning speed demand clockwise on one speed controller at a time and allowing conditions to stabilize before adjusting other controller).

6.4.1.1 Maintain rate of power change consistent with system capabilities as determined by Load Dispatcher and TG limits.

6.4.2 IF thermal power > 2413 (or > 2375 if power limited to 2381 MWt),

THEN perform following:

NOTE 1 - A change in scoop tube position indicates if change in RR pump flow will occur. RRMG A scoop tube position can be monitored ATC by PMIS Point N408 and P display on RRFC-SIC-16A, SPEED CONTROL. RRMG B scoop tube position can be monitored by PMIS Point N413 and P display on RRFC-SIC-16B, SPEED CONTROL.

NOTE 2 - Section 11 contains guidance for Operations Near Rated Thermal Power.

6.4.2.1 Raise RR pump flow with a speed demand signal rise of 0.2.

6.4.2.2 Closely monitors scoop tube position/RR pump flow response.

6.4.2.3 IF operating near rated thermal power, THEN verify compliance with both flow and thermal power per Section 11.

6.4.2.4 Repeat 6.4.2.1 through 6.4.2.3 until desired thermal power (target ~100% on PMIS display) achieved.

Closely monitors reactor power on APRMs and Main Turbine output on DEH HMI.

BOP Provides peer check of ATC actions.

Page 19 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 20 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2, 3 Event

Description:

Raise power from 95% to 100%, minor earthquake with Gland Steam Exhaust Fan B trip and Div 1 H2/O2 monitor failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When power reaches 97%, Trigger 3 will go true, resulting in:

Booth

Minor earthquake simulation Operator

Gland Steam Exhaust Fan B trip (20 sec delay)

Div 1 H2/O2 monitor failure alarms on panel P-1 (15 sec delay)

Responds to and reports alarm:

BOP

B-3/B-1, Seismic Event Per Alarm Card B-3/B-1, reports entry condition for 5.1QUAKE.

Enters and direct 5.1QUAKE [Earthquake] and assigns subsequent actions to CRS the BOP.

Provides update to the crew.

ROLE PLAY:

If asked, the 1 Yellow Seismic Event Level LED illuminated on MI-CPU-NCC1 is lit.

ROLE PLAY:

If contacted as the National Earthquake Information center, confirm a seismic event in the Cooper area. The magnitude was 0.02g or a minor Booth earthquake with an epicenter located in extreme Southwest Iowa.

Operator ROLE PLAY:

Call the control room as various NLOs and other personnel to report you think we had an earthquake (unless PA announcement was made).

ROLE PLAY:

As contacted by the control room, respond to the request to walk down your individual building or area of responsibility. After about 5 minutes, call the control room back with reports of no physical damage noted.

Performs 5.1QUAKE actions as directed and as time permits:

4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS Record current time and date.Time/Date:

Validate seismic alarm(s) by any or all of following:

BOP Physical sensation of earth movement.

Seismic instrumentation jarring/vibration by personnel or equipment (metal enclosure north of Intake).

Contact National Earthquake Information Center at (303) 273-8500.

Page 20 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 21 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2, 3 Event

Description:

Raise power from 95% to 100%, minor earthquake with Gland Steam Exhaust Fan B trip and Div 1 H2/O2 monitor failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior If only B-3/B-1, SEISMIC EVENT, is valid or cannot be shown false, continue normal operation.

IF both following alarms (B-3/B-1 and B-3/A-1) are valid or cannot be shown false, THEN enter Procedure 2.1.4. (Step is N/A)

Ensure SM refers to Procedure 5.7.1 EALs for entry into a Natural or Destructive Phenomena event.

BOP If earthquake impacted plant site, perform following:

Direct Radiation Protection to perform a dose survey of ISFSI.

Visually inspect Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) for signs of Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) damage.

IF any HSMs are damaged, THEN concurrently enter Procedure 5.1HSM.

Contact RP Department to conduct radiological surveys and assist with field walk downs, as necessary.

IF entry into Procedure 2.1.4 is required prior to starting shutdown, THEN conduct pre-shutdown inspections of following systems (N/A)

Perform 5.1QUAKE actions as directed and as time permits:

4.9 Walk down main Control Room panels to check for abnormal conditions/indications.

4.9.1 Specific items to check include following:

4.9.1.1 Reactor power.

4.9.1.2 RPV pressure.

4.9.1.3 RPV level, including cavity level if flooded up.

BOP/ATC 4.9.1.4 Core flow.

4.9.1.5 Primary and secondary containment isolation status.

4.9.1.6 Primary and secondary containment radiation levels.

4.9.1.7 Primary and secondary containment temperatures.

4.9.1.8 Vibration monitoring equipment.

4.9.1.9 Tank levels (ECST A, ECST B, CST A, CST B, etc.).

4.9.1.10 Balance of plant and support systems for actuations.

ROLE PLAY:

Booth If requested as building operator to check Gland Steam Condenser level (T-882-SJAE Room), wait five minutes, then report level is 3 inches above the Operator condenser bottom, stable.

Page 21 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 22 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2, 3 Event

Description:

Raise power from 95% to 100%, minor earthquake with Gland Steam Exhaust Fan B trip and Div 1 H2/O2 monitor failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Responds to annunciator:

B-3/D-4, GLND STEAM EXH B LOW DISCH PRESS Performs alarm card actions:

BOP 1.1 Check gland steam condenser level. (Sends building operator to check level.)

1.2 Start other exhaust fan. (Starts fan A.)

Checks Gland Seal Exhaust Vacuum recovers on AR-PI-89 on panel B.

ROLE PLAY:

If requested as building operator to investigate Div 1 H2/O2 monitor failure Booth (Cable Spreading Room), wait five minutes, then report the monitor appears to Operator have lost power. If asked to check breaker CCP-1A, Circuit Breaker 20, wait two minutes and report the breaker is tripped. If asked to reset the breaker, wait one minute and report the breaker will NOT reset.

Responds to annunciators:

P-1/C-1, H2/O2 System Trouble Div 1

P-1/C-2, H2/O2 Power Failure Div 1 Performs alarm card actions (actions are same for both alarms):

1.1 Dispatch an Operator to PC-CS-H2/O2 I (Cable Spreading Room) to BOP identify possible cause using local alarm lights on PC-CS-H2/O2 I.

1.2 Ensure Division II H2/O2 monitor is in operation per Procedure 2.2.60.1, if required.

1.3 Inform Chemistry to perform grab samples, if required.

Notifies CRS Div 1 H2/O2 monitor is de-energized CRS Determines entry into TLCO 3.3.3 Condition A is required for Function 12.

Page 22 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 23 of 46 TLCO 3.3.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. For Functions 1, 2, 3, 4, A.1 --------------NOTE-------------------

11, and 12 one Not applicable to Function 11 required channel Safety valve indication.

inoperable.

Restore channel to OPERABLE status. 30 days END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 23 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 24 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

RFPT A governor valve failure high/open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 4, fw24a RFPT A governor valve failure Operator Respond to the following annunciator:

A-1/E-6, RFP Turbine A Control Trouble Performs alarm card actions:

2.1 Stop any power changes in-progress.

2.2 Monitor reactor level, power, steam flow, and feed flow.

2.3 IF RFPT-1A control transferred to MDVP, THEN control turbine as follows: (Step is N/A)

BOP 2.4 Monitor RFPT-1A speed.

2.4.1 IF one of following conditions exist, THEN trip RFPT-1A and enter Procedure 2.4MC-RF:

RFPT-1A speed not following demand.

Determines RFPT A speed is not following demand based on rising level and RFPT A speed rising when it should be lowering.

Updates crew and trips RFPT A.

Informs crew entry into 2.4MC-RF is required.

CRS Enters Procedure 2.4MC-RF [Condensate and Feedwater Abnormal].

Assumes ownership of scram actions from procedure 2.4MC-RF, and updates crew.

Verifies RR pumps run back to stabilize reactor water level.

ATC Verifies reactor water level recovers to normal.

Checks and reports operation remains outside the Buffer Region of the Power-to-Flow Map.

Role Play:

Booth If asked as building operator to check RFP while it lowers speed, inform Operator the control room that everything looks normal.

Page 24 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 25 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

RFPT A governor valve failure high/open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Follows up by performing alarm card actions for A-1/A-4, RFP Turbine A Trip:

2.5 IF RFP Turbine 1A tripped, THEN verify following:

BOP 2.5.1 HP STOP VALVE closed.

2.5.2 LP STOP VALVE closed.

2.5.3 Nozzle block valve position (RF-POSI-651CV2A) ~ 0%.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 25 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 26 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 5, FW18B FW Line B rupture in PC.

Operator NOTE to Examiners: Reactor scram on high drywell pressure occurs within ~10 seconds from inserting TRIGGER 5.

Recognizes and responds to annunciator:

ATC

9-5-2/D-3 Drywell High Pressure Trip Reports reactor scram.

BOP Reports ECCS, DG, PCIS initiations on high drywell pressure.

Perform 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram] Attachment 1 Mitigating Task Scram Actions:

1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons.

1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

1.3 IF reactor power > 3%, THEN perform following: (step is N/A)

Reports power is below 3%.

Perform Attachment 2 Reactor Power Control of 2.1.5 as follows:

1 REACTOR POWER CONTROL 1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch is in SHUTDOWN.

1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

ATC 1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed (tripped) 1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

Recognizes and reports five control rods are not fully inserted.

1.5 Observe nuclear instrumentation and perform following:

1.5.1 Insert SRM detectors.

1.5.2 Insert IRM detectors.

1.5.3 Change APRM recorders to IRMs.

1.5.4 Range IRMs on scale.

1.5.5 Check reactor power is lowering.

Recognizes SRMs/IRMs stopped driving in and depresses DRIVE IN button ATC again.

Checks SRMs/IRMs fully insert.

Enters EOP-1A [RPV Control] and EOP-3A [Primary Containment Control] on CRS high drywell pressure.

Page 26 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 27 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Transitions from EOP-1A to EOP-6A [RPV Pressure/Power (Failure-to-Scram)] and EOP-7A [RPV Level (Failure-to-Scram)]

ATC Recognizes and reports Feedwater Line B break inside containment.

When FW line break is reported, enters Procedure 2.4MC-RF [Condensate CRS and Feedwater Abnormal] and directs ATC to isolate condensate/feedwater leak IAW 2.4MC-RF subsequent actions.

Isolates Feedwater leak per 2.4MC-RF [Condensate and Feedwater Abnormal], as directed by CRS:

4.2 IF system piping not intact, THEN perform following:

4.2.1.1 Concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

4.2.1.2 Ensure RFPs tripped.

4.2.1.3 Ensure RFP discharge valves closed.

ATC 4.2.1.4 At a RFPT/RVLC HMI, perform following:

a. Select RFPT-1A or RFPT-1B System.

b. Select STARTUP VALVE screen.

c. Press EMER CLOSE button.

d. Confirm pop-up screen.

4.2.1.5 Ensure condensate booster pumps tripped.

4.2.1.6 IF necessary to stop the leak, THEN trip condensate pumps.

CREW Recognize HPCI injecting through the broken FW line.

CRS Directs BOP to stop and prevent HPCI.

Page 27 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 28 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Trips HPCI as directed IAW Procedure 2.2.33.1 [High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operations] Att. 1, HPCI Operations Hard Card:

3. HPCI SHUTDOWN 3.1 ENSURE AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch in START.

3.2 DEPRESS and HOLD TURBINE TRIP pushbutton.

3.2.1 DEPRESS INITIATION SIGNAL RESET pushbutton.

BOP 3.2.1.1 IF amber INITIATION SIGNAL light off, THEN CLOSE HPCI-MO-14, STM TO TURB VLV. (Step is N/A) 3.2.1.2 IF amber INITIATION SIGNAL light lit, THEN after turbine stops, PLACE AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

3.3 RELEASE TURBINE TRIP button.

(EOP-6A steps FS/P-3,5)

Directs BOP to control pressure <1050 psig, maximizing bypass valves Directs RO to:

(EOP-6A step FS/Q-7)

runback Recirc flow to minimum (EOP-6A step FS/Q-17)

Reset ARI and insert control rods IAW 5.8.3 [Alternate Rod Insertion Methods].

CRS Page 28 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 29 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Aligns CRD to insert control rods IAW 5.8.3 [Alternate Rod Insertion Methods].

ATC Reports only control rod 30-31 could be inserted, and control rods 22-23, 22-27, 26-23, and 26-27 remain at position 48.

Page 29 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 30 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Per EOP-6A, directs BOP to:

Stabilize pressure <1050 psig using Table 12 systems as necessary EOP 6A Pressure (EOP-7A step FS/L-1)

Directs BOP to verify isolations and initiations for high drywell pressure.

CRS Checks and reports ECCS status to CRS.

BOP Checks DG1 and DG2 are operating, with Service Water.

Verifies group isolations as directed using 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group BOP Isolation] hard card.

Booth If requested to install EOP PTMs 61 and 62, wait 3 minutes, then insert Operator RF RD18 and report PTMs 61 and 62 have been installed.

Page 30 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 31 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Resets scram IAW 5.8.3 Att. 1:

ATC Page 31 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 32 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When SDV has drained for > 3 minutes, inserts scram IAW 5.8.3 Att. 1:

ATC ATC Reports no rod motion obtained by subsequent scrams.

Page 32 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 33 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When reactor water level falls below -42, recognizes and reports failure of RCIC to initiate.

Starts RCIC manually IAW Procedure 2.2.67.1 [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operations], Attachment 1, RCIC System Operation Hard Card.

1. EMERGENCY INJECTION WITH RCIC 1.1 OPEN RCIC-MO-132.

1.2 START GLAND SEAL VACUUM PUMP.

1.3 OPEN RCIC-MO-131.

1.4 OPEN RCIC-MO-21.

1.5 ADJUST RCIC-FIC-91, FLOW CONTROLLER, to maintain level.

1.5.1 IF less than 300 gpm and flow oscillations occurring, THEN PLACE RCIC-FIC-91 to MANUAL.

BOP 1.6 IF RCIC needed for RPV pressure control and injection required, THEN PERFORM following:

1.6.1 ENSURE RCIC auto initiation signal clear.

1.6.2 OPEN RCIC-MO-33, ECST TEST LINE SHUTOFF VLV.

1.6.3 THROTTLE OPEN RCIC-MO-30, TEST BYP TO ECST VLV, to allow RCIC turbine rpm rise.

1.6.4 ADJUST RCIC-FIC-91, FLOW CONTROLLER, to maintain desired RPV pressure.

1.6.5 IF RPV injection no longer required, THEN CLOSE RCIC-MO-21.

1.6.6 IF REC available, THEN at VBD-M, ENSURE REC-MO-711 or REC-MO-714 (associated with an in-service REC HX) open.

CRITICAL TASK #1:

Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before exceeding the Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

Directs BOP to inhibit ADS IAW EOP-7A:

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS Page 33 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 34 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Inhibit ADS when directed by CRS:

BOP At Panel 9-3 place ADS A and ADS B INHIBIT switches to INHIB.

Directs BOP to maintain level between -183 and +54 using outside shroud injection systems.

CRS CRS Directs RO to perform alternate coolant injection with CRD and SLC.

ROLE PLAY:

When directed to close CRD-63, wait 1 minute and report is it closed (not simulated).

When directed to place CRD Filter B in service, wait 2 minutes and report it is in service (not simulated).

When directed to place FCV B in service, insert REMOTE function RD12 to Booth OPEN (un-isolate FCV B) and insert REMOTE function RD04b at 100 (open FCV-B). Wait 3 minutes and report filter is in service.

Operator When directed to isolate CRD-13 and CRD-14, wait 2 minutes, insert REMOTE function RD13 at 0 and report they are closed.

When directed to open CRD-37, wait 1 minute and report it is open (not simulated).

When directed to throttle open CRD-170, wait 1 minute, insert REMOTE function RD14 at 100 and report it is open.

Maximizes CRD flow as directed IAW 5.8.4 [Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4)]:

Sends building operator to place standby filters and FCV in service IAW 5.8.4.

ATC 9.3 Start second CRD Pump (PANEL 9-5).

9.4 Close CRD-63, NBI CONTINUOUS BACKFILL SHUTOFF. (R-903-SE) 9.5 Place Standby CRD discharge filter in service (R-903-SE):

Page 34 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 35 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 9.5.2 FILTER B 9.5.2.1 Ensure CRD-21, CRD FILTER 1B OUTLET, is closed.

9.5.2.2 Ensure CRD-20, CRD FILTER 1B INLET, is open.

9.5.2.3 Vent Filter B with CRD-22, CRD FILTER B VENT.

9.5.2.4 Throttle open CRD-21 until pressure equalized, then fully open.

9.6 Place Standby CRD System FCV in service to operate in parallel with in service FCV as follows (R-903-SE):

9.6.2 FLOW CONTROL VALVE B 9.6.2.1 Ensure CRD-26, FLOW CONT. VLV. AO19B INLET, is open.

9.6.2.2 Place CRD-MA-245B, SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL MANUAL/AUTO STATION, to AUTO.

9.6.2.3 Throttle open CRD-27, FLOW CONT. VLV. AO19B OUTLET, until pressure equalized, then fully open.

9.7 Close CRD-13, CRD PUMP A MINIMUM FLOW (R-881-SE QUAD).

9.8 Close CRD-14, CRD PUMP B MINIMUM FLOW (R-881-SE QUAD).

9.9 Place CRD-FC-301, CRD FLOW CONTROL, to MAN and throttle open both FCVs (PANEL 9-5) until either both FCVs are full open or until it is anticipated that pump may trip due to low suction pressure or pump runout may occur.

Informs CRS CRD injection has been maximized.

Initiates SLC as directed IAW 5.8.4:

6.2 WHEN CRS directs, THEN commence Alternate RPV Injection as follows (PANEL 9-5):

6.2.1 Place following keylock switches to START:

6.2.1.1 SLC PUMP A.

ATC 6.2.1.2 SLC PUMP B.

6.2.2 Verify red indicating lights for each pump energize.

6.2.3 Verify SLC-14A, LOOP A SQUIB VALVE, has fired by observing that SQUIB VALVE READY Light 1106A has extinguished.

Page 35 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 36 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 6.2.4 Verify SLC-14B, LOOP B SQUIB VALVE, has fired by observing that SQUIB VALVE READY Light 1106B has extinguished.

6.2.5 Observe SLC pump discharge pressure rises above RPV pressure as indicated on SLC-PI-65, PUMP PRESS.

6.2.6 Inform CRS that Alternate RPV Injection with SLC from boron tank has commenced.

Directs BOP to defeat MSIV low level isolation IAW 5.8.20 [EOP Plant CRS Temporary Modifications]

Defeats MSIV low level interlocks as directed by installing jumpers (formerly EOP PTMs 57 through 60) IAW EOP 5.8.20 in Panels 9-15 and 9-17.

4.1 IF any MSIV closed, THEN place its respective control switch to CLOSE (PNL 9-3).

4.2 Ensure following valves closed (PNL 9-4):

4.2.1 RR-AO-740, OUTBD ISOL VLV.

4.2.2 RR-AO-741, IND ISOL VLV.

NOTE - MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS jumpers may be installed in any order.

4.3 To bypass Group 1 Low RPV Water Level Isolation interlock to maintain BOP any MSIVs open or to open MSIVs to re-establish main condenser as a heat sink, perform following; N/A if not required by plant conditions:

4.3.1 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-15).

4.3.2 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals BB-1 and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-15).

4.3.3 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-17).

4.3.4 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals BB-1 and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-17).

4.3.5 Reset Group 1 isolation by simultaneously turning GROUP ISOL RESET, CHANNEL A and CHANNEL B, switches (PANEL 9-5) to left RESET position and then releasing to NOR.

CRS Directs BOP to place DW Coolers in override IAW EOP-3A step DW/T-3:

Page 36 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 37 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to commence PC Sprays IAW EOP-3A step PC/P-4 and/or PC/P-5.

Directs Drywell pressure maintained between +2 psig and +10 psig.

CRS When DW Spray is required:

Checks operation in safe zone of DWSIL curve.

Directs BOP to secure RR Pumps and DW FCUs.

Page 37 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 38 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Places DW FCU to override as directed.

Places containment sprays in operation IAW 2.2.69.3 [RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray] Att. 1 Hard Card:

BEFORE torus pressure reaches 10 psig, spray Torus:

2.1 If required, with CRS permission, place CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD.

2.2 If required, place CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

2.3 If reactor pressure 300 psig and injection not desired, close RHR-MO-27A(B), OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

BOP 2.4 Ensure RHR PUMP(s) running.

2.5 If Torus spray required, THEN perform the following:

2.5.1 Ensure RHR-MO-39A(B) open.

2.5.2 THROTTLE RHR-MO-38A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

2.7 If PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ensure one of following open:

REC-MO-711

REC-MO-714 2.8 Place RHR SW System in service:

BOP 2.8.1 START SWBP(s).

2.8.2 ADJUST SW-MO-89A(B) to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

2.9 THROTTLE RHR-MO-66A(B) to maintain desired cooling rate.

When Torus pressure exceeds 10 PSIG Spray the Drywell:

Secures DW FCUs and ensures RR Pumps secured, as directed.

2.6 IF drywell spray required, THEN PERFORM following:

2.6.1 Open RHR-MO-31A(B).

2.6.2 THROTTLE RHR-MO-26A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

Report RPV level continuing to fall with RCIC, CRD, and SLC injection CREW maximized.

Page 38 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 39 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (EOP-7A step FS/L-13)

Determines level cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ and steam flow is below 800,000 lbm/hr, thus Emergency Depressurization is required.

Enters EOP-6B and EOP-7A leg J CRS Enters EOP-6B [Emergency Depressurization (Failure-to-Scram)]

CRITICAL TASK #1:

Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before exceeding the Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

(EOP-7A step FS/L-15)

Directs BOP to stop and prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC.

CRS Booth Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

Page 39 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 40 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Performs Stop and Prevent IAW EOP 5.8 [Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)] Att. 4 HARD CARD:

1. STOP INJECTION 1.1 Stop HPCI by performing one of following: (If HPCI not already secured) 1.1.1 IF HPCI is not running, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.1.2 IF HPCI is running, THEN perform one of following:

1.1.2.1 Place HPCI controller to MANUAL and lower on controller to maintain > 100 psig below low-end of RPV pressure band, and

a. Maintain turbine speed > 2050 rpm.

1.1.2.2 Trip HPCI turbine by performing following:

a. Ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP control switch in START.

b. Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

c. After turbine stops, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

d. Release TURBINE TRIP button.

BOP 1.2 Stop feedwater by performing following: (If not already performed.)

1.2.1 IF ENABLE INJECTION button is yellow, THEN on STARTUP VALVE screen, press ENABLE INJECTION button and press "YES" to confirm cancel.

1.2.2 At a RVLC/RFPT HMI, select STARTUP VALVE screen, press STOP AND PREVENT button, and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.

1.2.3 WHEN RF-MO-29 and RF-MO-30 are closed, THEN on STARTUP VALVE screen, press ENABLE INJECTION button and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.1.2.4 1.2.4 IF RF-MO-29 or RF-MO-30 are open and cannot be closed from Control Room, THEN perform following:

1.2.4.1 Trip both RFP's.

1.2.4.2 Trip all operating condensate booster pumps.

CAUTION - If Core Spray and RHR pumps are placed in PULL-TO-LOCK before system flow is reduced to minimum, draining of system may occur.

1.3 Place both core spray pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4 Stop RHR by ensuring one of following:

Page 40 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 41 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.4.1 Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4.2 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

1.4.3 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3.

2. PREVENT INJECTION 2.1 Prevent both RHR Subsystems by performing one of following in each loop:

2.1.1Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.1.2 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3; and 2.1.2.1 Bypass RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed. (If not already performed.)

BOP 2.1.3 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

2.2 Prevent feedwater by performing following:

2.2.1 Ensure RF-MO-29 is closed.

2.2.2 Ensure RF-MO-30 is closed.

2.2.3 Trip condensate and condensate booster pump(s), as required.

2.3 Prevent CS by performing following:

2.3.1 Ensure CS-MO-12A is closed.

2.3.2 Ensure CS Pump A control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK. (Step is N/A due to CS Pump A tagged out.)

2.3.3 Ensure CS-MO-12B is closed.

2.3.4 Ensure CS Pump B control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4 Prevent HPCI by performing following: (If HPCI not already secured)

Page 41 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 42 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.4.1 IF HPCI is not running, THEN ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch is in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4.2 IF HPCI is running, THEN trip HPCI turbine by performing following:

BOP 2.4.2.1 Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

2.4.2.2 WHEN turbine is at zero rpm, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4.2.3 Release TURBINE TRIP button.

Reports injection systems are stopped and prevented.

Direct NLO to install EOP PTMs 97 through 100 for RHR injection valve BOP control.

CRITICAL TASK #2:

When Emergency Depressurization is required during a failure to scram condition, stop and prevent all injection into the RPV except for RCIC, Boron Injection, and CRD prior to opening an SRV for emergency depressurization. (Failure to fully stop and prevent a subsystem IAW the hard card before an SRV is opened does not constitute failure of this CT if the subsystem is subsequently aligned such that it does not inject during depressurization.)

(EOP-6B step FS/P-13)

Directs BOP to mark PC water level.

Directs BOP to open 6 SRVs.

CRS Page 42 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 43 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Reports PC water level BOP Places control switches for 6 SRVs in OPEN.

Reports 6 SRVs are open.

(EOP-7A steps FS/L-17, FS/L-21)

Directs ATC/BOP to monitor RPV pressure and when RPV pressure goes below 145 psig (MSCP), slowly inject (starting with 3000-4000 gpm) using RHR to restore and control level between -183 (CFZ) and +54 (WR).

CRS Page 43 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 44 of 46 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in drywell, Failure of five control rods to scram, Intermittent failure of SRM/IRM drive-in switch, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Starts at least one RHR pump Monitor RPV pressure.

When RPV pressure falls below 145 psig, injects using RHR loop A(B)

ATC/BOP by throttling RHR-MO-27A(B) for the pump(s) in operation, as required to establish 3000-4000 gpm injection flow until level is restored above -

183 CFZ, then throttles RHR-MO-27A(B) as necessary to maintain level between -183 (CFZ) and +54 (WR).

NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when reactor pressure has lowered to <50 psig and level is being raised to +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

Page 44 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 45 of 46 IX. INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 95% power during power ascension following turbine valve testing near End of Cycle.

B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:

1. Day 1 of 7-day LCO per 3.5.1 A.1 for Core Spray A INOPERABLE.

C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. Core Spray Pump A tagged out for motor preventive maintenance.

2. CS B is protected.

D. Risk

1. PRA Risk is Green

2. Aggregate Risk is Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. BOP shift REC pumps from REC Pump B in operation to REC Pump A in operation IAW Procedure 2.2.65.1, Section 8.

2. Raise power to 100% IAW Procedure 2.1.10.

3. Continue full power operation.

4. Continue maintenance on Core Spray Pump A motor.

Page 45 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 46 of 46 Form Password is pepetf Activities Planned or in Progress: Core Spray Pump A motor preventive maintenance window Risk Green Rev: 0 Page 1 of 1 Creation Date: Current SM Review: Shift Manager Window Start: Yesterday Window Close: Tomorrow Sign(s)

Number Installed Removed Protected Sign Placement of Initials/ Initials/

Equipment Location Sign(s)* Date Date Magnetic sign on door:

Core Spray Loop B 1 NLO R105, R-903-SE Quad CS Pump B 4160 Bkr Magnetic Sign On: EE-CB- 1 NLO 4160G(CSP1B)

MCC-Y Barrier erected and Sign 1 NLO Posted: Around MCC-Y CS-Loop B controls panel 9-3 Magnetic sign placed on 1 WCO panel 9-3: within CS B area Page 46 of 46 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 1 of 40 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-09 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Perform Procedure 15.TG.304, Main Turbine DEH High Pressure Fluid System Functional Test

2. Respond to APRM A and C failing high

3. Respond to spurious RCIC initiation

4. Respond to small Recirc loop B leak in the drywell

5. Respond to Recirc loop B line rupture in the drywell

6. Respond to loss of offsite power

7. Respond to failure of DG2 output breaker to automatically close

8. Respond to HPCI auxiliary oil pump oil leak

9. Respond to injection valve RHR-MO-25A loss of power Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 100% power near end of cycle.

Inoperable Equipment: Core Spray Pump A.

Turnover:

Plant operating at operating at 100% power near end of cycle.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Perform Procedure 15.TG.304

Continue preventive maintenance on Core Spray Pump A Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes Page 1 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 2 of 40 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N/A N (BOP,CRS) Perform Procedure 15.TG.304 Spurious RCIC initiation CT#1 When a spurious RCIC initiation occurs C (BOP,CRS) that would cause power to rise above 2 rc05 A (CREW) 100% rated thermal power, crew lowers power to restore and maintain power TS (CRS) 100% rated thermal power by lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP640 exceeds 2419 MWt.

nm09c @ 94 C (ATC,CRS) 3 APRM A and C spike high then fail low nm09a @ 85 TS (CRS)

C (BOP,CRS) 4 rr20b @ 3 Small Recirc loop B leak in the drywell A (CREW)

Recirc loop B line rupture in the drywell, loss of offsite power CT#2 When high pressure injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and low pressure ECCS systems fail to automatically start due to failure of DG2 to automatically energize 4160V Bus 1G during loss of offsite AC power, crew manually closes DG2 output breaker to rr20b @ 21 energize LP ECCS systems prior to RPV water level falling below -183 CFZ (TAF) ed05 5 M (CREW) CT#3 ed06 When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) ed07 and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and it is apparent to the crew that insufficient high pressure injection systems will be available to restore level, crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening the first of 6 SRVs before RPV level lowers below -183 CFZ. (Momentary shrink below -183 CFZ due to automatic SRV operation in Low-Low Set mode does not constitute failure of this CT.)

Failure of DG2 output breaker to 6 dg03b C (BOP,CRS) automatically close (manually close breaker EG2)

Page 2 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 3 of 40 HPCI auxiliary oil pump oil leak (place HCIC 7 hp12 C (ATC,CRS) AOP in PTL)

Injection valve RHR-MO-25A loss of power 8 r/f rh17a C (ATC,BOP,CRS) (align RHR loop A pumps to containment spray or SPC)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Page 3 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 4 of 40 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. Failure of DG2 output breaker to automatically close Malfunctions after 2. HPCI auxiliary oil pump oil leak 1-2 3 EOP entry

3. RHR-MO-25A loss of power

1. Spurious RCIC initiation Abnormal Events 2-4 2 2. Small Recirc loop B leak in the drywell

1. Recirc loop B line rupture in the drywell Major Transients 1-2 2 2. Loss of offsite power EOP entries requiring 1. EOP-1A 1-2 2 2. EOP-3A substantive action EOP contingencies 1. EOP-2A Contingency #2 - Emergency requiring 1 per set 1 Depressurization substantive action

1. (CT#1) When a spurious RCIC initiation occurs that would cause power to rise above 100% rated thermal power, crew lowers power to restore and maintain power 100% rated thermal power by lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP640 exceeds 2419 MWt.

2. (CT#2) When high pressure injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and low pressure ECCS systems fail to automatically start due to failure of DG2 to automatically energize 4160V Bus 1G during loss of offsite AC power, crew manually closes DG2 Pre-identified output breaker to energize LP ECCS systems prior 2 3 Critical Tasks to RPV water level falling below -183 CFZ (TAF)

3. (CT#3) When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and it is apparent to the crew that insufficient high pressure injection systems will be available to restore level, crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening the first of 6 SRVs before RPV level lowers below -183 CFZ. (Momentary shrink below -183 CFZ due to automatic SRV operation in Low-Low Set mode does not constitute failure of this CT.)

Normal Events N/A 1 1. Perform Procedure 15.TG.304 Reactivity 1. none N/A 0 Manipulations Page 4 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 5 of 40

1. Spurious RCIC initiation

2. APRM C and A failure

3. Recirc loop B line leak in the drywell Instrument/

Component N/A 6 4. Failure of DG2 output breaker to automatically Failures close

5. HPCI auxiliary oil pump oil leak

6. RHR-MO-25A loss of power

1. Spurious RCIC initiation

2. APRM C and A failure

3. Recirc loop B line leak in the drywell Total 4. Failure of DG2 output breaker to automatically N/A 6 Malfunctions close

5. HPCI auxiliary oil pump oil leak

6. RHR-MO-25A loss of power Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

Primary Containment, RCIC, Emergency AC Power (DG2), HPCI, RHR, ADS

Operator fails to emergency depressurize following high pressure injection failure

Operator fails to manually initiate ECCS

Operator fails to maximize CRD Page 5 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 6 of 40 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power near the end of the operating cycle.

After the crew takes the watch, the BOP will perform Procedure 15.TG.304, Main Turbine DEH High Pressure Fluid System Functional Test.

After procedure 15.TG.304 is completed, RCIC will spuriously initiate. The crew will enter Procedure 2.4CSCS and secure RCIC. RCIC injection must be secured or reactor power must be lowered to prevent exceeding the licensed power limit (CT#1). The CRS will enter TS 3.5.3 Condition A due to RCIC initiation capability being prevented.

After TS for RCIC have been addressed, APRMs A and C will fail. APRM A will spike high then fail to 0%. APRM A will spike high then fail to ~82%. The crew will respond IAW alarm cards, bypassing APRM C and resetting the RPS A half scram . The CRS will enter TS 3.3.1.1 Condition A.

After TS for APRM A and C have been addressed, a small leak from Reactor Recirc loop B will develop. The crew will enter procedure 2.4PC and vent primary containment.

After primary containment venting has stabilized drywell pressure, Recirc loop B will rupture. Drywell pressure and temperature will rise, requiring a manual scram. EOPs 1A and 3A will be entered due to high drywell pressure. RPV water level will lower due to the leak. HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP) will develop an oil leak, and the HPCI AOP will be secured by the crew, preventing HPCI operation. CRD and SLC will not be able to keep up with the leak. RPV water level will continue to fall to TAF, -158.

Shortly after the scram, a loss of offsite power will occur. DG2 output breaker will fail to automatically close, and the crew will close it manually from Panel C (CT#2) to energize Div 2 low pressure ECCS systems. Elevated drywell pressure will require operation of Torus/Drywell Spray using systems not required to maintain adequate core cooling. CRD flow will be maximized and SLC will be initiated for level control, but they will not be able to stabilize reactor water level. When level reaches TAF, as indicated on SPDS using Corrected Fuel Zone (CFZ) at -158, and with Core Spray Pump B and LPCI Pumps C and D lined up for injection, the crew will enter EOP-2A and conduct emergency depressurization due to RPV water level below TAF and cannot be restored and maintained above -183 CFZ (CT#3).

When reactor press lowers below the low pressure permissive for LPCI injection valves, RHR-MO-25A will lose power. The crew will align RHR loop A to containment spray or suppression pool cooling, since RHR Pumps A and C will Page 6 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 7 of 40 be operating on minimum flow. The crew will use Core Spray Pump B and RHR Pumps B and D to restore reactor water level.

The exercise ends when emergency depressurization is complete and reactor water level is being raised to the normal band, +3 to +54 inches.

Page 7 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 8 of 40 CRITICAL TASK BASIS When a spurious RCIC initiation occurs that would cause power to rise above 100% rated thermal power, crew lowers power to restore and maintain power 100% rated Critical Task #1 thermal power by lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP640 exceeds 2419 MWt.

License Condition C.1 states 2419 MWt is the Maximum Power Level authorized. The licensed 100% power limit is a basis for assumptions in the plants safety analysis.

Sustained operation above 2419 MWt may place unit Safety Significance operation outside of the plant design basis. NUREG 1021 App. D, section D states a CT must be essential to safety, and lists actions to for which operation or correct performance prevents violation of a facility license condition as one example of a CT.

Cues Annunciators 9-4-1/A-1, RCIC Logic Initiated, RCIC turbine speed rising, RCIC-MO-21 opening, RCIC flow on RCIC-FI-91 rising, Reactor power rising indicated on IRM/APRM recorders NM-NR-46A-D, SPDS, PMIS.

Operator depresses RCIC Turbine Trip button and closes RCIC-MO-131 on panel 9-4, AND/OR Measurable Performance If reactor power rises above 100%, Operator Selects S on Indicators RR flow controllers RRFC-SIC-16A(B) on panel 9-4 and lowers RR pump flow (by turning speed demand counter-clockwise on one speed controller at a time) until power stabilizes below 100% on IRM/APRM recorders NM-NR-46A-D.

Reactor power stabilizes below 100% on IRM/APRM Performance recorders NM-NR-46A-D and on PMIS points NSSRP640, Feedback NSSRP641, NSSRP642, NSSRP643, and NSSRP645.

Applicability Any time a cold water injection from RCIC causes FW temperature to lower such that reactor power would exceed 100% with no operator intervention.

License Condition C.1 lists 2419 MWt as the Maximum Power Level for CNS. Procedure 2.1.10, Station Power Changes, sections 10 and 11 describes the methodology for adherence to this limit. A note at step 11.1 states Minor power fluctuations due to automatic control system response, Justification for the random processes such as bi-stable flow, and flow meter chosen performance measurement uncertainties are inherent to BWR operating limit characteristics. Small, short-term fluctuations in power that are not under the direct control of a Licensed Reactor Operator are not considered intentional. Step 11.1 states It is prohibited to intentionally operate greater than the applicable licensed power limit as determined in Section 10. If core Page 8 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 9 of 40 thermal power 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months average calculation exceeds applicable licensed power limit, action shall be taken to ensure subsequent hourly average remains less than or equal to applicable limit. Step 11.4 directs monitoring and maintaining PMIS Point NSSRP643 (running 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months average) and PMIS Point NSSRP645 (running 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months average) below 2419 MWt.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months point is the legal record for plant power level.

PMIS point NSSRP640 (15 minute average) was chosen because it is more limiting and provides the most rapid update to core thermal power available.

BWR Owners Group N/A Appendix Initial power level must be near 100% so injection from RCIC Scenario Guide would cause reactor power to rise above 100% with no Requirements operator intervention.

Page 9 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 10 of 40 When high pressure injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and low pressure ECCS systems fail to automatically start due to failure of DG2 to automatically energize 4160V Bus 1G during loss of offsite AC power, Critical Task #2 crew manually closes DG2 output breaker to energize LP ECCS systems prior to RPV water level falling below -

183 CFZ (TAF)

Failure to recognize the failure of DG2 output breaker to automatically close and energize the safety bus and failure to take manual action per Procedure 5.3EMPWR will result in Safety Significance unavailability of safety-related equipment necessary to provide adequate core cooling, otherwise resulting in core damage and a large offsite release.

Cues Indication and/or annunciation that all ac emergency buses are de-energized

Bus energized lamps extinguished

Circuit breaker position

Bus voltage

EDG status

Control room lighting dimmed Manipulation of controls as required to energize Div 2 AC Measurable emergency bus from panel C:

Performance Operator places DIESEL GEN 2 BKR EG2 to CLOSE on Indicators panel C Crew will observe light indication for equipment powered by Performance Division 2 AC illuminate on panel 9-3 and bus voltage ~4200V Feedback on panel C Applicability Loss of off-site power events when all sources of off-site power are lost and a diesel generator fails to energize its bus.

This is only applicable if manual action from the Control Room would be effective in energizing the bus.

Attempting to energize ECCS systems must be performed to determine their availability by the time -183 is reached in order to properly implement EOP-1A decision steps regarding Justification for the restoring and maintaining RPV level. The MSCWL (-183 chosen performance CFZ) is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered limit portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to preclude any clad temperature in the uncovered portion of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

BWR Owners Group App. B, Contingency#1 Appendix Page 10 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 11 of 40 LOCA severity should result in a near linear RPV level reduction that causes level to fall to TAF over approximately 15-20 minutes from the time the initial LOCA signal is Scenario Guide received. (The LOCA malfunction severity may be ramped Requirements initially, but it should reach its final severity within approximately the first 3 minutes.)

Page 11 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 12 of 40 When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and it is apparent to the crew that insufficient high pressure injection systems will be available to restore level, crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening the first of 6 SRVs Critical Task #3 before RPV level lowers below -183 CFZ. (Momentary shrink below -183 CFZ due to automatic SRV operation in Low-Low Set mode does not constitute failure of this CT.)

The MSCWL is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to preclude any clad temperature in the uncovered Safety Significance portion of the core from exceeding 1500°F. When water level decreases below MSCWL with injection, clad temperatures may exceed 1500°F.

Cues Corrected Fuel Zone indication (SPDS) falls to -158 and lowering trend continues, and, before -158 CFZ is reached, initial conditions, field reports, and control room indications convey that adequate high pressure injection cannot be restored before level falls below -183 CFZ.

Manipulation of any six SRV controls on panel 9-3:

SRV-71A SRV-71B Measurable SRV-71E Performance SRV-71G Indicators SRV-71H SRV-71C SRV-71D SRV-71F Crew will observe SRV light indication go from green to red, amber pressure switch lights illuminate, reactor pressure Performance lowering on SPDS and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and Feedback recorders, and SRV tailpipe temperatures rise on recorder MS-TR-166.

Applicability EOP-1A conditions with RPV pressure above the shutoff head of available low pressure injection systems or subsystems and any system injecting to the RPV (i.e. not in steam cooling).

Page 12 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 13 of 40 The MSCWL (-183 CFZ) is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to preclude any clad temperature in the uncovered portion of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

Emergency depressurization is allowed when level goes Justification for the below TAF (-158 CFZ) and should be performed, if in the chosen performance judgment of the CRS, level cannot be maintained above -183 limit CFZ. Since it is intended for the scenario supporting this CT to, early in the event, clearly indicate no high pressure injection systems can be made available to reverse the lowering level trend, the crew will have time to communicate and open 6 SRVs before -183 CFZ.

BWR Owners Group App. B, Contingency#1 Appendix LOCA severity should result in a near linear RPV level reduction that causes level to fall to TAF over approximately 15-20 minutes from the time the initial LOCA signal is received. It is very important to design the scenario such that the crew has information early during the LOCA event to determine high pressure injection systems cannot be recovered or optimized in order to stabilize level before -183 Scenario Guide CFZ is reached. The crew should know this within Requirements approximately 10 minutes from the start of the LOCA and by the time level lowers to -100 CFZ to allow time to align/realign low pressure systems for injection before level reaches -158 CFZ, so that the only remaining action when TAF is reached will be to conduct emergency depressurization.

Page 13 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 14 of 40 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC20 or password protected IC, 100% (EOC)

1. Ensure this schedule file is in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Name - 2020-9sc1.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-9sc1.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

Page 14 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 15 of 40 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

Page 15 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 16 of 40 Page 16 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 17 of 40 Page 17 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 18 of 40 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

3. Ensure CRD Drive D/P at 265 psid.

4. Ensure DEH Pump B is operating and DEH Pump A is in standby.

5. Ensure CRD Cooling Water flow at 50 gpm.

6. Place CS Pump A in PTL.

7. Hang a caution tag on CS Pump A control switch.

8. Ensure CS A is OOS on safety system status panel on panel 9-5.

9. Place Protected Equipment placard on Panel 9-3 within Core Spray B area.

10. Ensure SSST Y voltage to RRMGs is set to TAP 2.

11. SSST X Voltage card should read TAP POS 3, MAX 4469 and MIN 4361.

12. Ensure IC20, Rod Sequence Notebook under the RO desk.

Page 18 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 19 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Perform Procedure 15.TG.304 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to perform Procedure 15.TG.304 [Main Turbine DEH High CRS Pressure Fluid System Functional Test]

ROLE PLAY:

Booth If asked, as Turbine Bldg NLO report pre-start checks are complete for Operator starting DEH Pump A.

(Procedure 15.TG.304 [Main Turbine DEH High Pressure Fluid System Functional Test]

3. INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 At Panel B, PERFORM following:

3.1.1 ENSURE both DEH pumps in AUTO.

3.1.2 DEPRESS and HOLD STBY PUMP TEST button until one of following occurs:

Standby pump starts.

DEH fluid pressure less than or equal 1350 psig.

BOP 3.2 VERIFY idle DEH pump starts. AC 3.3 STOP previously running pump.

3.4 At Panel B, PERFORM following:

3.4.1 DEPRESS and HOLD STBY PUMP TEST button until one of following occurs:

Standby pump starts.

DEH fluid pressure less than or equal to 1350 psig.

3.5 VERIFY idle DEH pump starts. AC 3.6 STOP previously running pump.

Informs CRS Procedure 15.TG.304 was completed satisfactorily.

END OF EVENT Notes Page 19 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 20 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Perform Procedure 15.TG.304 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth Proceed to next event after 15.TG.304 has been completed and at the Operator direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 20 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 21 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Spurious RCIC initiation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 2, rc05, Spurious RCIC initiation Operator Reports annunciator 9-4-1/A-1, RCIC Logic Actuated Verifies by independent indication RCIC initiation is not valid (RPV water level above -42):

Absence of other low water level alarms/conditions (RPS, HPCI, PCIS)

BOP

Panel 9-3, 9-4, 9-5 Wide Range and Narrow Range level meters/recorders >-42 Reports entry condition to Procedure 2.4CSCS [Inadvertent CSCS Initiation]

Refers to alarm procedure.

CRITICAL TASK #1:

When a spurious RCIC initiation occurs that would cause power to rise above 100% rated thermal power, crew lowers power to restore and maintain power 100% rated thermal power by lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP640 exceeds 2419 MWt.

Enters 2.4CSCS Directs WCO/BOP to secure RCIC.

CRS Directs RO to reduce power IAW Procedure 2.1.10 [Station Power Changes]

as necessary to remain 100%.

Secures RCIC IAW 2.4CSCS, Attachment 4 (or alarm card 9-4-1/A-1):

1.1 Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button until throttle valve closed.

NOTE - Leaving RCIC-MO-131 open to maintain RCIC shutdown, with BOP an initiation signal present, will cause RCIC-MO-131 to cycle if a high water level trip occurs.

1.2 Leave RCIC-MO-131 open so turbine trip will not reset.

1.3 Ensure SM informed RCIC inoperable.

Page 21 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 22 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Spurious RCIC initiation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior As directed and if necessary, lowers power using Recirc flow IAW 2.1.10

[Station Power Changes]:

Selects S on RR flow controllers on panel 9-4 7.4 Lowers RR pump flow (by turning speed demand counter-clockwise on one speed controller at a time and allowing conditions to stabilize ATC before adjusting the other controller).

Closely monitors scoop tube position/RR pump flow response on panel 9-4 and APRM recorders on panel 9-5.

Repeats as necessary to maintain power <100%.

ROLE PLAY:

If sent as building operator to place starter for RCIC-MO-27 to OFF, wait 2 minutes, then report you are standing by the RCIC starter rack to place the Booth starter to OFF. When instructed by the BOP after he closes MO-27, trigger Operator event 12, then report you have placed RCIC-MO-27 starter to OFF.

If asked, report you do not observe a cause for the RCIC initiation.

Prevents RCIC min flow valve MO-27 from cycling per alarm card 9-4-1/B-2:

2.2.3 IF RCIC initiation not reset, THEN perform following:

2.2.3.1 Press and hold until instructed to release RCIC TURBINE TRIP button.

BOP 2.2.3.2 Ensure RCIC-MO-27 closed.

2.2.3.4 WHEN RCIC-MO-27 is closed, THEN have building operator open breaker for RCIC-MO-27 (125 VDC RCIC Starter Rack (RX 903 NE)).

2.2.3.5 Release RCIC TURBINE TRIP button.

CRS Determines entry into TS 3.5.3 Condition A is required for RCIC.

Page 22 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 23 of 40 LCO 3.5.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System A.1 Verify by administrative means 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE.

AND 14 days A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 23 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 24 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

APRM A and C failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 3, Booth nm09a, APRM A failure Operator nm09c, APRM C failure Responds to annunciators:

9-5-2/A-1, Rx Scram Channel A

9-5-2/B-1, Neutron Monitoring Trip

9-5-1/A-7, APRM Ch A Upscale Trip or INOP ATC

9-5-1/B-8, APRM Upscale

9-5-1/A-4, Rod Withdrawal Block Recognizes and reports annunciators 9-5-1/A-7 and 9-5-2/B-1 have reset.

Checks APRM recorders and determines APRMs A and C spiked high.

APRM A is currently reading ~82% and APRM C is currently downscale.

Checks back panel indications for APRM A and C are consistent with BOP panel 9- 5 indications.

CRS Directs ATC to bypass APRM C and reset RPS A half scram IAW alarm cards.

Performs alarm card 9-5-1/A-7 actions:

2.3 IF only one APRM inop, THEN perform following:

2.3.1 Bypass affected channel.

2.3.2 Reset half scram per Procedure 2.1.5.

ATC Performs Procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram] actions to reset RPS A half scram:

4.1 Place REACTOR SCRAM RESET switch to Group 1 and 4, Group 2 and 3, then back to NORM.

4.2 Ensure eight SCRAM GROUP lights (Panels 9-15 and 9-17) or SCRAM INDICATIONS GROUP A and GROUP B lights are on.

Page 24 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 25 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

APRM A and C failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Determines entry into TS 3.3.1.1 Condition A is required for APRMs A and C.

LCO 3.3.1.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

OR A.2 Place associated trip system in trip. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 25 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 26 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Small Reactor Recirc leak in drywell Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 4, rr20b (severity 3)

Coolant leakage inside PC, RR Loop B.

Operator CREW Recognize drywell pressure rising.

Enters Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control] and assigns subsequent actions to BOP.

CRS Directs BOP to vent containment IAW Procedure 2.2.60 [Primary Containment Ventilation and Nitrogen Inerting System] to maintain below 0.75 psig.

ATC Announces ownership of scram actions from Procedure 2.4PC.

If the crew manually scrams due to determining a reactor coolant leak in the Booth drywell exists, TRIGGERS 5 and 15 will go true, resulting in Recirc Loop B Operator rupture and loss of offsite power (Event 5). Proceed to next event if the crew manually scrams.

Performs Procedure 2.4PC actions, as directed:

Vent drywell through SGT System per Procedure 2.2.60 Att. 1 hard card to maintain drywell <0.75 psig.

1. SGT STARTUP 1.1 Ensure PC-AD-R-1B open and PC-AD-R-1A closed.

1.2 Start preferred SGT fan.

1.3 Open SGT-DPCV-546A(B) valve.

2. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENTING 2.1 Ensure SGT operating per Step 1.

NOTE - Steps 2.2 and 2.3 may be performed in any order or concurrently, depending on plant conditions.

2.2 Vent Torus by performing following:

2.2.1 Ensure PC-MO-1308 is closed.

2.2.2 Open PC-AO-245AV.

2.2.3 Open PC-MO-305MV.

2.2.4 WHEN Torus pressure ~ 0.25 psig, THEN close PC-MO-305MV. (Step is N/A)

BOP 2.3 Vent Drywell by performing following:

2.3.1 Open PC-AO-246AV.

2.3.2 While ensuring Torus pressure does not exceed Drywell pressure by > 0.1 psig, open PC-MO-306.

2.3.3 WHEN Drywell pressure ~ 0.25 psig, THEN close PC-MO-306.

(Step is N/A)

Page 26 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 27 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Small Reactor Recirc leak in drywell Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Monitors primary containment temperatures, pressure, humidity, and radiation levels in an attempt to determine source of leak.

BOP Checks operation of drywell fan coil units.

Checks REC lineup to DW.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 27 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 28 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 5, Booth

raises severity of rr20b Coolant leakage inside PC, RR Loop B

ed05, loss of SSST (15 second delay)

Operator

ed06, loss of ESST (15 second delay)

ed07, loss of NSST (15 second delay)

Recognizes and responds to annunciator:

ATC

9-5-2/D-3 Drywell High Pressure Trip Reports reactor scram.

Performs Mitigating task scram actions per 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram]: (ATT 1):

1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons 1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

Performs 2.1.5 (ATT 2) Rx Power Control:

1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch in SHUTDOWN.

1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed.

1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

ATC 1.5 Observe nuclear instrumentation:

1.5.1 Insert SRMs.

1.5.2 Insert IRMs.

1.5.3 Change APRM recorders to IRMs.

1.5.4 Range IRMs on scale.

1.5.5 Check reactor power is lowering.

Announces reactor scram and reactor status to Control Room including controlling systems for critical parameters.

CREW Recognizes loss of offsite power.

Enters EOP-1A [RPV Control] and EOP-3A [Primary Containment Control] on high drywell pressure.

CRS Enters Procedure 5.3 EMPWR [Emergency Power during Modes 1, 2, or 3]

due to loss of AC power.

Assigns BOP subsequent actions of 5.3EMPWR.

Page 28 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 29 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (EOP-1A)

Directs EOP-1A verifications:

CRS CRITICAL TASK #2:

When high pressure injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and low pressure ECCS systems fail to automatically start due to failure of DG2 to automatically energize 4160V Bus 1G during loss of offsite AC power, crew manually closes DG2 output breaker to energize LP ECCS systems prior to RPV water level falling below -183 CFZ (TAF)

Recognizes DG2 breaker failed to close.

BOP Closes DG2 breaker EG2 by placing control switch to CLOSE on panel C.

Verifies DG1 and DG 2 are supplying 4160V Buses 1F and 1G and SW BOP pumps are operating.

ROLE PLAY:

Booth If sent to investigate HPCI low oil pressure trip, wait 3 minutes, then report the Operator discharge line of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump is cracked and oil is pouring from the Aux Oil Pump pedestal onto the floor.

Checks and reports ECCS status:

All low pressure ECCS pumps operating on minimum flow (Except CS Pump A tagged out)

Recognizes HPCI not injecting:

BOP

Annunciator 9-3-2/B-1, HPCI Turbine Trip

Annunciator 9-3-2/C-1, HPCI Turbine Bearing Oil Low Pressure Sends building operator to investigate HPCI low oil pressure.

Places HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump switch to PTL on panel 9-3.

Page 29 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 30 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

Booth If directed as the NLO to reset SACs, wait 5 minutes, then insert TRIGGER Operator 25 to insert remote functions ia17 and ia18 to RESET. Then after 1 minute, report SAC A and B have been reset.

Performs 5.3EMPWR actions, as directed:

BOP

Checks REC not isolated on back panel VBD-M.

Sends operator to locally reset SACs IAW 5.3EMPWR Assigns BOP pressure control IAW EOP-1A step RC/P-5:

CRS Directs ATC to maximize CRD flow and inject SLC IAW EOP-1A step RC/L-3 CRS Page 30 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 31 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

When directed to maximize CRD per 5.8.4 wait 5 minutes and insert the Booth following remotes:

Operator RD12(CRD FCV B isolation valves) to open RD13(CRD Pump Min flow) to 0 Page 31 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 32 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Maximizes CRD flow as directed IAW 5.8.4 [Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4)]:

Sends building operator to place standby filters and FCV in service IAW 5.8.4.

Re-starts CRD Pump B IAW alarm card 9-5-2/C-6 (due to it having tripped during loss of power).

9.3 Start second CRD Pump (PANEL 9-5).

9.4 Close CRD-63, NBI CONTINUOUS BACKFILL SHUTOFF. (R-903-SE) 9.5 Place Standby CRD discharge filter in service (R-903-SE):

9.5.2 FILTER B 9.5.2.1 Ensure CRD-21, CRD FILTER 1B OUTLET, is closed.

9.5.2.2 Ensure CRD-20, CRD FILTER 1B INLET, is open.

9.5.2.3 Vent Filter B with CRD-22, CRD FILTER B VENT.

9.5.2.4 Throttle open CRD-21 until pressure equalized, then ATC fully open.

9.6 Place Standby CRD System FCV in service to operate in parallel with in service FCV as follows (R-903-SE):

9.6.2 FLOW CONTROL VALVE B 9.6.2.1 Ensure CRD-26, FLOW CONT. VLV. AO19B INLET, is open.

9.6.2.2 Place CRD-MA-245B, SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL MANUAL/AUTO STATION, to AUTO.

9.6.2.3 Throttle open CRD-27, FLOW CONT. VLV. AO19B OUTLET, until pressure equalized, then fully open.

9.7 Close CRD-13, CRD PUMP A MINIMUM FLOW (R-881-SE QUAD).

9.8 Close CRD-14, CRD PUMP B MINIMUM FLOW (R-881-SE QUAD).

9.9 Place CRD-FC-301, CRD FLOW CONTROL, to MAN and throttle open both FCVs (PANEL 9-5) until either both FCVs are full open or until it is anticipated that pump may trip due to low suction pressure or pump runout may occur.

Informs CRS CRD injection has been maximized.

Page 32 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 33 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Initiates SLC as directed IAW 5.8.4:

6.2 WHEN CRS directs, THEN commence Alternate RPV Injection as follows (PANEL 9-5):

6.2.1 Place following keylock switches to START:

6.2.1.1 SLC PUMP A.

6.2.1.2 SLC PUMP B.

6.2.2 Verify red indicating lights for each pump energize.

ATC 6.2.3 Verify SLC-14A, LOOP A SQUIB VALVE, has fired by observing that SQUIB VALVE READY Light 1106A has extinguished.

6.2.4 Verify SLC-14B, LOOP B SQUIB VALVE, has fired by observing that SQUIB VALVE READY Light 1106B has extinguished.

6.2.5 Observe SLC pump discharge pressure rises above RPV pressure as indicated on SLC-PI-65, PUMP PRESS.

6.2.6 Inform CRS that Alternate RPV Injection with SLC from boron tank has commenced.

Directs BOP to inhibit ADS CRS Inhibits ADS by placing ADS A and ADS B INHIBIT switches to INHIB BOP on Panel 9-3.

Page 33 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 34 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to commence PC Sprays IAW EOP-3A step PC/P-4 and/or PC/P-5.

Directs Drywell pressure maintained between +2 psig and +10 psig.

CRS When DW Spray is required:

Checks operation in safe zone of DWSIL curve.

Directs BOP to secure RR Pumps and DW FCUs.

ROLE PLAY:

Booth When asked to install EOP PTM 97-100, wait 7 minutes, then insert Remote Operator Functions RH46 ( OP PTM 97 & 98) at Install, and RH47 (EOP PTM 99 &

100) at Install. If already pre-staged to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 minutes then install the PTM.

Page 34 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 35 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Places containment sprays in operation IAW 2.2.69.3 [RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray] Att. 1 Hard Card:

BEFORE torus pressure reaches 10 psig, spray Torus:

2.1 If required, with CRS permission, place CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD.

2.2 If required, place CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

2.3 If reactor pressure 300 psig and injection not desired, close RHR-MO-27A(B), OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

2.4 Ensure RHR PUMP(s) running.

2.5 If Torus spray required, THEN perform the following:

2.5.1 Ensure RHR-MO-39A(B) open.

2.5.2 THROTTLE RHR-MO-38A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

BOP 2.7 If PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ensure one of following open:

REC-MO-711

REC-MO-714 2.8 Place RHR SW System in service:

2.8.1 START SWBP(s).

2.8.2 ADJUST SW-MO-89A(B) to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

2.9 THROTTLE RHR-MO-66A(B) to maintain desired cooling rate.

When Torus pressure exceeds 10 PSIG Spray the Drywell:

Secures DW FCUs and ensures RR Pumps secured, as directed.

2.6 IF drywell spray required, THEN PERFORM following:

2.6.1 Open RHR-MO-31A(B).

2.6.2 THROTTLE RHR-MO-26A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

Page 35 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 36 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs ATC/BOP to lineup at least 2 injection systems (RHR-MO-25A failure does not manifest until reactor pressure lowers below ~400 psig during emergency depressurization. Crew will believe all low pressure ECCS systems are available, except CS Pump A):

CRS Lines up injection systems, as directed:

Ensures at least one LPCI loop is aligned for injection with at least one pump running on panel 9-3.

BOP

If RHR loop was in containment spray mode, on panel 9-3:

o Ensures MO-26A(B) is closed o Ensures MO-39A(B) is closed o Ensures MO-27A(B) is open When level lowers to TAF, transitions to EOP-2A [Emergency Depressurization]

CRS CRS Requests mark PC water level >6ft for EOP-2A step RC/P-12 Page 36 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 37 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRITICAL TASK #3:

When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and it is apparent to the crew that insufficient high pressure injection systems will be available to restore level, crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening the first of 6 SRVs before RPV level lowers below -183 CFZ. (Momentary shrink below -183 CFZ due to automatic SRV operation in Low-Low Set mode does not constitute failure of this CT.)

Directs opening 6 SRV IAW EOP-2A step RC/P-12:

CRS When requested for ED, reports PC water level >6 ft.

BOP Places control switches for 6 SRVs in OPEN.

Monitors reactor pressure and when RPV pressure reaches 50 psig, reports emergency depressurization is complete.

Directs verifying CS B and RHR Loop A and B injection when pressure falls below injection valve pressure permissives (~400 psig).

IAW Operations Instruction #8 for ED, directs ATC maintain level:

Initially during ED -158 to 0 CFZ

Transitory ED -40 to +10 NR

Post ED/Anticipate ED +3 to 54 NR During ED, verifies low pressure ECCS injection valves open on panel 9-3 when pressure goes below the injection valve auto open permissive.

(approximately 400 psig).

ATC/BOP

LPCI A - INBD INJECTION VLV MO 25A Recognizes and reports RHR-MO-25A loss of power Page 37 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 38 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Loop B rupture in drywell, Loss of offsite power, Failure of DG2 output breaker to auto close, HPCI oil leak, RHR-MO-25A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

LPCI B - INBD INJECTION VLV MO 25B

Core Spray B - INBD INJECTION THROTTLE VALVE 12B Realigns RHR Loop A to containment spray or suppression pool cooling, or ATC/BOP stops RHR pumps A and C due to failure of RHR-MO-25A and operation on minimum flow.

When level rises above -158 inches CFZ, controls injection from LPCI A/B, ATC/BOP SLC, and CRD by throttling valves and/or cycling pumps to raise and maintain level +3 inches to +54 inches.

ROLE PLAY:

Booth If directed as the NLO to open N2 valve 74 (N2 solenoid bypass), wait 10 Operator minutes then irf PC21 OPEN. If already pre-staged to open N2-V-74 wait 3 minutes to open the valve.

BOP Verifies Group isolations IAW 2.1.22 hard card.

NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when reactor pressure has lowered to <50 psig and level is being controlled +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

Page 38 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 39 of 40 IX. INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 100% power during power ascension following turbine valve testing near End of Cycle.

B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:

1. Day 1 of 7-day LCO per 3.5.1 A.1 for Core Spray A INOPERABLE.

C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. Core Spray Pump A tagged out for motor preventive maintenance.

2. CS B is protected.

D. Risk

1. PRA Risk is Green

2. Aggregate Risk is Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. BOP operator to perform Procedure 15.TG.304 [Main Turbine DEH High Pressure Fluid System Functional Test].

2. Continue full power operation.

3. Continue maintenance on Core Spray Pump A motor.

Page 39 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 1 Page 40 of 40 Form Password is pepetf Activities Planned or in Progress: Core Spray Pump A motor preventive maintenance window Risk Green Rev: 0 Page 1 of 1 Creation Date: Current SM Review: Shift Manager Window Start: Yesterday Window Close: Tomorrow Sign(s)

Number Installed Removed Protected Sign Placement of Initials/ Initials/

Equipment Location Sign(s)* Date Date Magnetic sign on door:

Core Spray Loop B 1 NLO R105, R-903-SE Quad CS Pump B 4160 Bkr Magnetic Sign On: EE-CB- 1 NLO 4160G(CSP1B)

MCC-Y Barrier erected and Sign 1 NLO Posted: Around MCC-Y CS-Loop B controls panel 9-3 Magnetic sign placed on 1 WCO panel 9-3: within CS B area Page 40 of 40 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 1 of 40 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-09 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Withdraw control rods IAW the rod sequence to establish 17-20% bypass valve position

2. Respond to SRM D upscale

3. Place HPCI in standby

4. Respond to HPCI-MO-15 loss of power during stroke

5. Respond to CRD-FCV-19A failing closed

6. Respond to RPS B EPA breaker trip with SGT B fan trip

7. Respond to RCIC steam line break in the Reactor Building requiring scram

8. Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically isolate on high area temperature

9. Respond to failure RCIC isolation MOVs

10. Respond to 480V Bus 1A loss of power Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 5% power during startup, beginning of life Inoperable Equipment: none Turnover:

The plant is at 5% power at beginning of cycle.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Withdraw control rods IAW the rod sequence to establish 17-20% bypass valve position.

Place HPCI in standby IAW Procedure 2.2.33.

Continue startup IAW Procedure 2.1.1.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 2 of 40 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N/A R (ATC,CRS) Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods 2 nm02d @ 100 I (ATC,CRS) SRM D upscale 3 N/A N (BOP,CRS) Place HPCI in standby C (BOP,CRS) 4 r/f hp04 HPCI-MO-15 loss of power during stroke TS (CRS)

C (ATC,CRS) 5 rd04a @ 0 CRD-FCV-19A fails closed A (CREW)

C rp03c (ATC,BOP,CRS) 6 o/r zdisgtswefrf @ RPS B EPA breaker trip with SGT B fan trip off A (CREW)

TS (CRS)

RCIC steam line break in the Reactor Building CT#2 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through a break and M cannot be isolated, the crew scrams the reactor 7 rc06 @ 7 (ATC,BOP,CRS) prior to reaching Maximum Safe Operating Temperatures in two areas. (For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE is the first area to exceed MSO and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW is the second area to exceed MSO.)

Failure of RCIC to automatically isolate on high area 8 rc07 C (BOP,CRS) temperature Failure of RCIC steam supply isolation valves to fully close CT#2 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating r/f rc06a @ de-ener C temperatures are exceeded in two areas and 9 prior to exceeding Maximum Safe Operating r/f rc22a @ de-ener (ATC,BOP,CRS) temperature in a third area. (For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 W would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

Anticipating Emergency Depressurization and fully opening Bypass valves also satisfies this CT.

10 ed09a C (BOP,CRS) 480V Bus 1A loss of power (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 3 of 40 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. Failure of RCIC to automatically isolate on high area temperature Malfunctions after 2. Failure of RCIC steam supply isolation valves to fully 1-2 3 EOP entry close

3. 480V Bus 1A loss of power

1. CRD-FCV-19A fails closed Abnormal Events 2-4 2 2. RPS B EPA breaker trip with SGT B fan trip

1. RCIC steam line break in the Reactor Building requiring Major Transients 1-2 1 scram EOP entries 1. EOP-5A requiring 1-2 2 2. EOP-1A substantive action EOP contingencies requiring 1 per set 1 1. EOP-2A Contingency #2 - Emergency Depressurization substantive action

1. (CT#1) When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through a break and cannot be isolated, the crew scrams the reactor prior to reaching Maximum Safe Operating Temperatures in two areas.

(For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE is the first area to exceed MSO and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW is the second area to exceed MSO.)

2. (CT#2) When a primary system is discharging into the Pre-identified secondary containment through an unisolable break, the 2 2 Critical Tasks crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating temperatures are exceeded in two areas and prior to exceeding Maximum Safe Operating temperature in a third area. (For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first.

RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 W would be the third area to exceed MSO.) Anticipating Emergency Depressurization and fully opening Bypass valves also satisfies this CT.

Normal Events N/A 1 1. Place HPCI in standby Reactivity 1. Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods N/A 1 Manipulations

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 4 of 40

1. SRM D upscale

2. HPCI-MO-15 loss of power during stroke

3. CRD-FCV-19A fails closed Instrument/ 4. RPS B EPA breaker trip with SGT B fan trip Component N/A 7 5. Failure of RCIC to automatically isolate on high area Failures temperature

6. Failure of RCIC steam supply isolation valves to fully close

7. 480V Bus 1A loss of power

1. SRM D upscale

2. HPCI-MO-15 loss of power during stroke

3. CRD-FCV-19A fails closed

4. RPS B EPA breaker trip with SGT B fan trip Total Malfunctions N/A 7 5. Failure of RCIC to automatically isolate on high area temperature

6. Failure of RCIC steam supply isolation valves to fully close

7. 480V Bus 1A loss of power Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

HPCI, Primary Containment Isolation System, RCIC, RHRSW

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 5 of 40 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 5% power during startup, beginning of life.

After the crew takes the watch, the ATC will withdraw control rods IAW the startup rod sequence to establish Bypass valves 17% open.

During the power ascension, SRM D will fail upscale. The crew will respond IAW the alarm card and bypass SRM D.

After Bypass valves are at least 17% open, the crew will align HPCI to standby IAW procedure 2.2.33. When HPCI-MO-15 is being opened, it will lose power.

The CRS will enter TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A and TS 3.5.1 Condition C. The crew will isolate HPCI steam supply.

After TS for HPCI-MO-15 have been addressed, CRD-FCV-19A will fail closed.

The crew will enter procedure 2.4CRD and shift CRD flow control valves.

After CRD flow control valves have been shifted, RPS B EPA breaker 1B2 will trip, resulting in a half scram, half PCIS Group 1, 2, 3, 7 isolations, and a full PCIS Group 6 isolation. RWCU will isolate and the pump will trip. The crew will transfer RPS B to its alternate supply per alarm card C-1/F-2, reset the Div 2 half scram IAW 2.1.5, and enter 2.1.22 to begin recovery from group isolations.

SGT B exhaust fan will trip after it automatically starts. The CRS will enter TS 3.6.4.3 Condition A for SGT B. The crew will not be given time to complete all of the actions of 2.1.22, such as restoring Reactor Building HVAC realignments, due to the timing of the scenario.

When response to the loss of RPS B is complete, a small RCIC steam line break will occur in the Reactor Building. Secondary containment area temperatures will rise, requiring entry into EOP-5A. If RCIC area temperatures reach 195°F, MSO limit and isolation setpoint, before the crew attempts manual isolation of RCIC steam supply valves, the automatic isolation will fail to occur.

When the crew attempts manual isolation of the RCIC steam supply valves, both valves will fail to fully close due to mechanical binding in their gear boxes.

EOP-1A entry and reactor shutdown will be required before two areas exceed the MSO limit (CT#1).

Following the scram, 480V Bus 1A will lose power. The crew will respond IAW procedure 5.3AC480 and will be required to start TEC Pump C.

When the crew has stabilized the plant following the scram, the RCIC steam leak will get worse, causing area temperatures in more than one area of the Reactor Building to approach the MSO limit. When two areas have reached the MSO limit, emergency depressurization will be required IAW EOP-5A, and

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 6 of 40 the crew will enter EOP-2A to perform emergency depressurization (CT#2).

The crew may anticipate emergency depressurization and fully open Bypass valves, which also satisfies CT#2.

The exercise ends when the reactor has been depressurized and RPV water level is being restored to between +3 and +54 inches.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 7 of 40 CRITICAL TASK BASIS When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through a break and cannot be isolated, the crew scrams the reactor prior to reaching Maximum Safe Operating Critical Task #1 Temperatures in two areas. (For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE is the first area to exceed MSO and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW is the second area to exceed MSO.)

EOP-5A directs entering the RPV Control guideline and scramming the reactor when a maximum safe operating value is approached or exceeded. Failing to do so can result in an unnecessary offsite release and endanger plant personnel. Entering the RPV Control Safety Significance guideline shuts down the reactor and allows controlled RPV pressure reduction to lower the driving head of the leak to reduce the effect on secondary containment, in order to avoid or anticipate emergency RPV depressurization..

Cues Indication of rising or Maximum Operating values in an area of a system which is connected to the RCS, combined with abnormal system parameters (e.g. such as levels, pressures, and flow rates).

Field reports of visible/audible leaks into secondary containment.

Measurable Performance Operator depresses both manual scram pushbuttons, or places the Indicators Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN on panel 9-5.

RPS Group lights de-energized on panel 9-5.

Performance Feedback Control Rod full -in indication on panel 9-5.

Reactor power trend on nuclear instrumentation on panel 9-5.

Applicability EOP-5A conditions where a system (primary or non-primary) is discharging into the secondary containment and manual isolation capability from the control room is possible. This includes manipulation of valve control switches and valve power supply control switches, as applicable. If the leaking system is required for adequate core cooling (or meets the other criteria in EOP-05A), this task is not applicable.

EOP-5A directs that this action be taken when a maximum safe operating value is approached or exceeded and the source of a discharge cannot be isolated or determined. If temperatures, radiation levels, or area water levels in any one of the areas listed in the Secondary Containment Control guideline approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EPG actions can no longer be assured. A reactor scram is initiated through entry of the RPV Control guideline Justification for the to reduce the primary system discharge into secondary containment chosen performance limit and in anticipation of possible emergency RPV depressurization.

The scram is effected indirectly, through entry of the RPV Control guideline, rather than through an explicit direction in the Secondary Containment Control guideline, to ensure that RPV water level, RPV pressure, and reactor power are properly coordinated following the scram and to avoid potential conflicts with alternate rod insertion strategies in Step RC/Q if the RPV Control guideline is already in use. Failing to do so can significantly change the mitigation strategy as an unnecessary release will result and possibly endangering plant personnel.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 8 of 40 Before reaching two Maximum Safe values in two areas for the same parameter was chosen because that is the next EOP-5A significant action threshold, when Emergency Depressurization is required. Shutting down the reactor and entering the RPV Control guideline before reaching this level may avert the significant thermal transient on the RPV caused by Emergency Depressurization. If BWR Owners Group emergency depressurization is ultimately required, first shutting Appendix down the reactor reduces the amount of energy introduced into secondary containment, thus mitigating the effects on secondary containment temperature, radiation, and water levels, as well as offsite release rates. Emergency depressurization without reactor shutdown creates an unnecessary challenge to the secondary containment barrier.

App. B, steps SC/T-4, SC/R-2, SC/L-2 Scenario Guide Requirements

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 9 of 40 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating temperatures are exceeded in two areas and prior to exceeding Maximum Safe Operating temperature in a third area. (For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE and Critical Task #2 RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 W would be the third area to exceed MSO.) Anticipating Emergency Depressurization and fully opening Bypass valves also satisfies this CT.

Should secondary containment parameters exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area, the RPV must be depressurized to preclude further degradation. RPV depressurization places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are unisolated and discharging into the Safety Significance secondary containment.

The criteria of "two or more areas" specified identifies the rise in secondary containment parameters as a wide-spread problem which may pose a direct and immediate threat to secondary containment integrity, equipment located in the secondary containment, and continued safe operation of the plant.

Cues SPDS indication for secondary containment parameters indicate area radiation, area temperature, or area water level has exceeded its maximum safe operating value in two areas.

Manipulation of SRV controls on panel 9-3:

SRV-71A SRV-71B SRV-71E Measurable Performance SRV-71G Indicators SRV-71H SRV-71C SRV-71D SRV-71F Crew will observe SRV light indication go from green to red, amber pressure switch lights illuminate, reactor pressure lowering on Performance Feedback SPDS and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and recorders, and SRV tailpipe temperatures rise on recorder MS-TR-166.

Applicability EOP-5A conditions, RCS leaks into secondary containment with the RPV pressurized.

Emergency Depressurization is required due to effects of a break spreading into and potentially affecting safety equipment and operations in more than one area; however, emergency Justification for the depressurization is not allowed until the second area exceeds its chosen performance limit Max Safe limit. Before the Max Safe limit is exceeded in a third area gives reasonable time for the crew to perform emergency depressurization before the leak hampers equipment or operations in an even more widespread area.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 10 of 40 BWR Owners Group App. B, steps SC/T-4.2, SC/r-2.2, SC/L-2.2.

Appendix The scenario must be able to drive the selected parameter to its Max Safe value in three plant areas. If temperature is chosen, a failure to scram event, where RPV pressure is not allowed to be lowered, is well suited. Also, ensure the leak severity itself, or subsequent cold water injection, does not deplete RPV pressure Scenario Guide (driving head) so low that Max Safe in a third area cannot be Requirements reached. The crew should be driven to ED, versus just reducing pressure, to provide a consistent, measurable performance indicator. The CT listed in the scenario should list which instruments/areas will exceed their MSO limit first, second, and third.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 11 of 40 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC10 or password protected IC, 5% (BOC)

1. Ensure this schedule file is in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Name - 2020-9sc3.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-9sc3.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

Page 11 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 12 of 40 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 13 of 40 (Continued on next page.)

Page 13 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 14 of 40 Page 14 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 15 of 40 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

3. Power approximately 5%.

4. Mark up 31-SU-BOL rod package to sequence step 18, Rod 26-03 at Position 0 to provide for crew turnover.

5. Ensure GARDEL initializes properly.

6. Ensure RWM initialized.

7. Ensure HPCI-MO-15 and HPCI-MO-16 are closed.

8. Ensure HPCI is OOS on safety system status panel on panel 9-5.

9. Place Protected Equipment placard on Panel 9-3 within RCIC area.

10. Ensure RCIC flow controller is set to 400 gpm.

11. Ensure HPCI flow controller is set to 4250 gpm.

12. Ensure CRD flow controller is set properly(50 gpm and drive d/p at 265).

13. Ensure TEC Pump A is running and TEC pumps B and C are stopped.

14. Ensure IRM/APRM recorders in second speed.

15. Reset APRM back panel alarm lights.

16. Provide markup of procedure 2.1.1(Rev197) with step 4.24 marked complete through step 4.24.6 and section 5 complete up to 5.42 for crew turnover.

17. Provide copy of Procedure 2.1.10 for crew turnover.

18. Provide copy of Procedure 10.13 for crew turnover.

19. At Panel 9-4, set SSST Y Voltage Adjust to Tap 2.

20. At Panel C, set SSST X Voltage Adjust to Tap 3, min 4221, max 4333.

21. On STARTUP TRANSFORMER BACKUP VOLTAGE BUS, placard:

TAP POSITION: 3 MAX 4333 MIN 4221 Page 15 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 16 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1, 2 Event

Description:

Withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 17-20% Bypass Valve position, SRM D upscale Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth Event 2 goes true and nm02d, SRM D upscale, goes active when rod 26-51 is withdrawn past position 10.

Operator NOTE to Examiners: The beginning of shift brief and reactivity brief will have been conducted during turnover outside of the simulator.

SRM D upscale will occur when control rod 26-51 is withdrawn past position 10.

Example of Non-EOP Control Rod Movement Protocol per 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations, is attached for reference.

Directs ATC to withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 17-20%

Bypass Valve position IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL, Procedure 2.1.10 [Station CRS Power Changes] step 8.1, and Procedure 10.13 [Control Rod Sequence and Movement Control] section 4.

Withdraws control rods IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL using notch withdrawal:

(For control rods 26-03, 26-51, 02-27, and 50-27 to position 12)

Selects in-sequence control rod by depressing respective Rod Select push button on panel 9-5 Rod Select matrix.

Observes OUT PERMIT light ON on panel 9-5.

Withdraws control rod one notch at a time by placing rod movement control switch on panel 9-5 to OUT NOTCH, then releasing.

ATC

Observes ROD IN, ROD OUT, and ROD SETTLE lights illuminate in sequence and selected rod position indicates control rod withdrew one notch on panel 9-5.

Observes IRM recorder indication on panel 9-5 is consistent with control rod withdrawal.

Repeats notch withdrawal until control rod is at target position specified in sequence 31-SU-BOL, then initials step in 31-SU-BOL.

Repeats process for each successive control rod until bypass valve position on DEH HMI indicates 17-20%.

If directed, provides peer check for control rod selection, movement direction, BOP and step completion and initials as verifier in 31-SU-BOL.

Monitors bypass valve position on HMI, panel B.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 17 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1, 2 Event

Description:

Withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 17-20% Bypass Valve position, SRM D upscale Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Responds to annunciator:

9-5-1/F-7, SRM Upscale/Inop ATC Stops control rod withdrawal.

Checks SRM indications on panel 9-5 and determines SRM D has failed upscale and INOP.

Checks SRM D indication at back panel 9-12.

BOP Recognizes and reports SRM D upscale and INOP lights are on at SRM D.

CRS Directs ATC to bypass SRM D IAW the alarm card Bypasses SRM D by placing SRM bypass joystick to D on panel 9-5 IAW alarm card 9-5-1/F-7:

2.1 Check which SRM(s) is in alarm condition.

ATC 2.2 Determine if SRM is upscale or inop.

2.3 IF SRM high, THEN withdraw detector to lower reading.

2.4 IF SRM inop, THEN bypass it.

Determines Potential LCO tracking report is required for TS 3.3.1.2 and TLCO CRS 3.3.1.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 17 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 18 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3, 4 Event

Description:

Place HPCI in standby, HPCI-MO-15 loss of power upon stroke Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to place HPCI in standby IAW Procedure 2.2.33 [High Pressure CRS Coolant Injection System], Section 6, beginning at step 6.8.

Aligns HPCI IAW Procedure 2.2.33 6.8 WHEN reactor greater than or equal to 107 psig, THEN PERFORM following:

6.8.1 PERFORM following concurrently:

PLACE and HOLD HPCI-AO-70 and HPCI-AO-71, TURB EXH LINE DR POT TO GLD SEAL CNDSR VLVs, Control Switch S26A to ENABLE.

PLACE and HOLD HPCI-AO-70 and HPCI-AO-71, TURB EXH LINE DR POT TO GLD SEAL CNDSR VLVs, Control Switch S26 to OPEN.

6.8.2 VERIFY HPCI-AO-70 and HPCI-AO-71 indicate open.

BOP 6.8.3 RELEASE HPCI-AO-70 and HPCI-AO-71 Control Switch S26.

6.8.4 VERIFY HPCI-AO-70 and HPCI-AO-71 indicate closed.

6.8.5 RELEASE HPCI-AO-70 and HPCI-AO-71 Control Switch S26A.

6.8.6 ENSURE HPCI-AO-42 and HPCI-AO-43, STM LINE DRAIN TO CNDSR ISOL VLVs, open.

6.8.7 ENSURE MS-TP-17, RHR HX A STM SUPPLY DRIPLEG DRAIN TRAP, in service.

6.8.8 ENSURE HPCI-MO-15, STM SUPP INBD ISOL VLV, closed.

6.8.9 OPEN HPCI-MO-16, STM SUPP OUTBD ISOL VLV.

6.8.10 Slowly JOG OPEN HPCI-MO-15 warming steam supply line at less than or equal to 100 psig per minute.

ROLE PLAY:

If directed as building operator to attempt to close HPCI-MO-15 from the ASD panel, wait 3 minutes, then report the ASD isolation switch for HPCI-MO-15 Booth will NOT function.

Operator If directed as building operator to attempt to close HPCI-MO-15 from its LASP panel, wait 3 minutes, then report HPCI-MO-15 will not close from the LASP panel.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 19 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3, 4 Event

Description:

Place HPCI in standby, HPCI-MO-15 loss of power upon stroke Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Recognizes and reports annunciator:

9-3-2/F1, HPCI VALVE OVLD BOP Recognizes and reports HPCI-MO-15 loss of power.

Sends building operator to investigate loss of power to HPCI-MO-15.

CRS May direct operator to attempt to close HPCI-MO-15 from ASD panel.

CRS Directs BOP to close HPCI-MO-16.

BOP Closes HPCI-MO-16, as directed.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 20 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3, 4 Event

Description:

Place HPCI in standby, HPCI-MO-15 loss of power upon stroke Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Enters TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A for HCI-MO-15.

TS 3.6.1.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE-------- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for main steam line penetration flow path by use 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for main steam line Only applicable to of at least one closed and penetration flow paths de-activated automatic with two PCIVs valve, closed manual valve,

blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve One or more secured.

penetration flow paths AND with one PCIV inoperable except for MSIV leakage not Once per 31 days for isolation A.2 ----------NOTE--------- devices outside primary containment within limit.

1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be AND verified by use of administrative means. Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment

2. Isolation devices that are was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if locked, sealed, or not performed within the previous 92 otherwise secured may days, for isolation devices inside be verified by use of primary containment administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to Event 5 when directed by Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 20 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 21 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

CRD FCV 19A fails closed Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, trigger EVENT 5, Operator

Rd04a, CRD FCV 19A fail closed to 25%

Respond to and reports alarm:

9-5-2/E-6, CRD Charging Header High Pressure Recognizes and reports CRD charging water pressure ~1500 psig and CRD system flow has lowered to ~17 gpm with flow controller demanding 100%

open.

Diagnoses CRD FCV19A not responding to flow controller demand.

References alarm card 9-5-2/E-6 and updates crew:

1.1 Check drive water flow control valves for proper operation.

ATC 1.2 Adjust CRD-MO-20 to maintain following:

1.2.1 Drive water DP of ~ 265 psid.

1.2.2 Cooling water DP of ~ 20 psid.

(Reports inability to raise cooling water dp to 20 psid.)

1.3 Adjust charging water pressure manually with CRD-170, PUMP DISCHARGE MANUAL PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE, per Procedure 2.2.8. (step is N/A) 1.4 IF annunciator due to CRD flow degradation, THEN enter Procedure 2.4CRD.

Enters Procedure 2.4CRD [CRD Trouble].

CRS Directs ATC to perform actions for 2.4CRD Att. 5, Cooling Water Trouble.

ROLE PLAY:

When requested to shift to CRD FCV19B, wait 3 minutes, then open isolation Booth valves for FCV19B by IRF function rd12 to OPEN, close isolation valves for Operator FCV19A by IRF rd11 to CLOSE. Two minutes later, report CRD FCV19B is in service in AUTO.

Performs 2.4CRD Att. 5 (flowchart), as directed:

CWT-1 Stop any rod movement.

ATC CWT-2 Cooling water flow 45-50 gpm?

(Observes ~17 gpm on CRD-FI-306)

CWT-4 Take manual control with CRD-FC-301 Page 21 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 22 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

CRD FCV 19A fails closed Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (Places CRD-FC-301 in MAN)

CWT-5 Cooling water flow 45-50 gpm?

(Observes ~17 gpm on CRD-FI-306)

CWT-7 Shift FCVs per Procedure 2.2.8 Performs Procedure 2.2.8 [Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System]

Section 21.

Directs building operator to shift to CRD FCV B IAW 2.2.8 section 21.

Per step 21.3.8, ATC performs Procedure 2.2.8 Section 19.

Directs building operator to place CRD FCV B to AUTO IAW 2.2.8 Section 19.

ATC operates CRD-FC-301 per SOP 2.2.8 19.4.5 ADJUST CRD-FC-301 SETPOINT thumbwheel until DEVIATION needle centered.

19.4.6 PLACE to BAL.

19.4.7 ADJUST SETPOINT thumbwheel to system flow rate ~50 gpm.

CWT-8 ADJUSTS CRD-MO-20 as necessary to achieve ~20 psid CRD Cooling Water dP on CRD-DPI-304 on panel 9-5.

Notifies CRS CRD FCVs have been shifted from FVC 19A in operation to FCV 19B in operation.

CRS Exits 2.4CRD.

BOP If directed, provides peer check for ATC.

END OF EVENT Notes Page 22 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 23 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

CRD FCV 19A fails closed Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth Proceed to Event 6 when directed by Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 23 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 24 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RPS EPA breaker 1B1/1B2 trip, with SGT B exhaust fan trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by the Lead Examiner, trigger EVENT 6, Booth

rp03c, RPS EPA breaker 1B1/1B2 trip Operator

override zdisgtswefrf, SGT B fan switch in OFF Recognizes and reports:

RPS B half scram ATC

Half Groups 1,2,3,7 isolations

Full Group 6 isolation Responds to annunciators:

BOP

C-1/F-2, RPS Pwr Panel 1B Voltage Failure

C-1/G-2 RPS MG Set B Motor Disconnected Directs WCO/BOP to perform alarm card C-1/F-2 actions to restore RPS B CRS power and verify Group 6 isolation.

Performs alarm card C-1/F-2 to transfer RPS B to alternate supply:

2.1 IF a RPS power supply is available, THEN transfer RPS B to available source. (by placing RPS BUS B POWER TRANSFER switch to ALT FEED on panel 9-16).

2.2 Reset RPS Channel "B" half scram per Procedure 2.1.5.

BOP Procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram]:

4.1 Place REACTOR SCRAM RESET switch to Group 1 and 4, Group 2 and 3, then back to NORM.

4.2 Ensure eight SCRAM GROUP lights (Panels 9-15 and 9-17) or SCRAM INDICATIONS GROUP A and GROUP B lights are on.

ROLE PLAY:

If sent to verify RWCU Filter Demins are in hold, wait 4 minutes, then report RWCU F/Ds are in hold.

Booth If sent to investigate RPS B power loss, wait 3 minutes, then as building Operator operator report the MG motor running and EPA breakers 1B1 and 1B2 are tripped.

If sent to investigate SGT B exhaust fan failure, wait 5 minutes, then report you see nothing wrong with SGT B exhaust fan.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 25 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RPS EPA breaker 1B1/1B2 trip, with SGT B exhaust fan trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (Alarm card C-1/F-2 step 2.3) Verifies isolations IAW 2.1.22 hard card, including:

Crack open RWCU-MO-74, DEMIN SUCTION BYPASS VLV, on panel 9-4

Checks SGT for proper operation BOP Recognizes SGT B Exhaust Fan failure to start.

Attempts to start SGT B Exhaust Fan at VBD-K.

Reports SGT B fan failure to CRS.

(C-1/F-2 step 2.4) Sends operator to RPS B Room to check EPAs and RPS MG Set B to determine cause of failure.

Sends operator to investigate SGT B exhaust fan failure.

Reports entry condition for 2.4HVAC.

ROLE PLAY:

If sent to investigate AOG alarm, wait 3 minutes, then acknowledge annunciator Booth B-3/E-3 using remote function og04 and report alarms are due to AOG isolation.

Operator If sent to restore DW Vent Rad Monitor IAW 2.2.61, acknowledge the instruction.

(No further action for this is required. This will not be performed due to scenario timing.)

Directs WCO/BOP to reset isolations and restore Reactor Recirc MG CRS ventilation IAW 2.1.22.

Enters 2.4HVAC and assigns WCO/BOP subsequent actions.

Checks RR MG temperatures on recorders RRMG-TR-25 and 26 on panel 9-

21. Reports RR MG temperatures rising.

Resets Group 6 isolation and restores RB ventilation IAW 2.1.22:

9.8.1 Places following Reactor Building HVAC switches to OFF:

BOP 9.8.1.1 SF-R-1A-A, SUPPLY FAN.

9.8.1.2 SF-R-1A-B, SUPPLY FAN.

9.8.1.3 EF-R-1A, EXHAUST FAN.

9.8.1.4 EF-R-1B, EXHAUST FAN.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 26 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RPS EPA breaker 1B1/1B2 trip, with SGT B exhaust fan trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 9.8.1.5 BF-R-1A, EXH BSTR FAN.

9.8.1.6 BF-R-1B, EXH BSTR FAN.

9.8.2 Places following Reactor Building HVAC isolation valve switches to CLOSE:

9.8.2.1 HV-MO-272, HV-R-1A DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.2 HV-AO-257, HV-R-1A DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.3 HV-AO-259, EXH FANS DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.4 HV-AO-261, EXH FANS DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.5 HV-MO-258, EXH FANS DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.6 HV-MO-260, EXH FANS DISCH VLV 9.8.5 IF required (is required), turns Group ISOL RESET CHANNEL A and CHANNEL B switches (Panel 9-5) to right RESET position, and THEN release to NOR.

9.8.6 At VBD-R, ensures SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP, in MANUAL.

9.8.7 Adjusts SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP, Parameter V to 0%.

9.8.8 Ensures switch for operating SGT fan, EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN, in RUN (VBD-K).

9.8.9 Simultaneously presses PCIS GROUP 6 DIV 1 and DIV 2 ISOLATION RESET buttons (VBD-K).

9.8.10 Performs one of following:

9.8.10.1 Checks PCIS GROUP 6 DIV 1 ISOLATION and PCIS GROUP 6 DIV 2 ISOLATION lights turn on (VBD-K).

9.8.10.2 Checks Group 6, CHANNEL A and Group 6, CHANNEL B Isolation indicating lights on (Panel 9-5).

9.9 Checks following RRMG ventilation isolation valves open:

9.9.1 HV-AO-263, MG SET-1A INLET VLV.

9.9.2 HV-MO-262, MG SET-1A INLET VLV.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 27 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RPS EPA breaker 1B1/1B2 trip, with SGT B exhaust fan trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 9.9.3 HV-AO-267, MG SET-1A OUTLET VLV.

9.9.4 HV-MO-266, MG SET-1A OUTLET VLV.

9.9.5 HV-AO-265, MG SET-1B INLET VLV.

9.9.6 HV-MO-264, MG SET-1B INLET VLV.

9.9.7 HV-AO-269, MG SET-1B OUTLET VLV.

9.9.8 HV-MO-268, MG SET-1B OUTLET VLV.

9.10 Checks following RRMG exhaust fan starts:

9.10.1 EF-R-1C, EXH FAN (BOTTOM).

9.10.2 EF-R-1D, EXH FAN (TOP).

Checks RR MG temperatures lowering on RRMG-TR-25 and 26, panel 9-21.

Resets Group 1 isolation IAW 2.1.22:

4.6.2 Resets Group 1 Isolation by turning Group ISOL RESET, CHANNEL A and CHANNEL B, switches (Panel 9-5) to left RESET position and then releasing to NOR.

4.6.4 Checks Group 1, CHANNEL B Isolation lights turn on (Panel 9-BOP 5).

4.6.5 Ensures MS-MO-74 open.

NOTE - If all main steam lines in service and main steam line flow through each steam line is > 1.2x106 lbm/hr, Step 4.6.6 may be N/A'd.

4.6.6 Ensures MS-MO-77 open.

Resets Groups 2, 3, and 7 half isolations IAW 2.1.22.

Determines entry into TS 3.6.4.3 Condition A is required due to SGT B CRS Exhaust Fan failure.

TS 3.6.4.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT A.1 Restore the SGT subsystem to 7 days subsystem OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 28 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RPS EPA breaker 1B1/1B2 trip, with SGT B exhaust fan trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Examiner Note: The crew may not recognize isolation of the Drywell atmosphere sample line or AOG within the time frame of the scenario. If they do, the following TS may be asked as a follow-up question when the scenario is ended. It is not expected that the crew enter the following TS/ODAM within the time frame of the scenario.

Enters TS 3.4.5 Condition B due to due to isolation of the drywell atmosphere Outboard Supply and Return Sample Valves RMV-AO-11 and RMV-AO-13 CRS on panel 9-4.

Enters ODAM 3.2.4 Condition A for AOG isolated.

TS 3.4.5 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.1 Analyze grab samples of Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months B. Required drywell atmospheric drywell atmosphere.

monitoring system inoperable.

AND B.2 Restore required drywell atmospheric monitoring system 30 days to OPERABLE status.

ODAM 3.2.4 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Restore release of gaseous A. Gaseous releases 7 days discharged without discharge via charcoal either train of adsorbers.

charcoal adsorbers in service.

END OF EVENT Notes Page 28 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 29 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RPS EPA breaker 1B1/1B2 trip, with SGT B exhaust fan trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth Proceed to Event 7 when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 29 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 30 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, trigger EVENT 7, rc06 RCIC steam line break in reactor building.

Operator Recognizes Secondary Containment annunciator window on SPDS turns yellow, and recognize radiation and temperature rising in NE Quad, followed CREW by NW Quad using area temperature display on SPDS.

Directs building operator to investigate area temperature rise.

Enters 5.1RAD and assigns WCO/BOP subsequent actions.

CRS Assigns WCO/BOP critical parameter of Secondary Containment temperatures.

Monitors and reports Secondary Containment temperatures using PMIS or BOP panel 9-21.

Examiner Note: The CRS may not wait for EOP-5A entry condition to be met before directing isolation of the RCIC steam supply. The following operator actions are written from the standpoint that EOP-5A has been entered. If the crew attempts to isolate RCIC before the NE Quad reaches the RCIC isolation setpoint of 195°F, the failure of RCIC automatic isolation will not be observable.

Recognizes and reports alarm in NE Quad:

9-3-1/E-10 Area High Temp BOP Reports EOP-5A entry condition met when Torus NE Quad reaches Max Normal Operating (alarm)

Refers to alarm card.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 31 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-5A [Secondary Containment Control] on Secondary Containment temperature above Max Normal Operating value.

CRS Directs WCO/BOP to isolate RCIC steam supply.

ROLE PLAY:

Booth If sent as building operator to check breakers for RCIC-MO-15 and 16, wait 3 minutes, then report breakers are tripped.

Operator If sent to manually close RCIC-MO-16, wait 10 minutes and report the gearbox is bound and the handwheel will not turn. (This requires an RP.)

If NE Quad temperature reaches the RCIC isolation setpoint, recognizes and reports RCIC failure to automatically isolate.

Attempts to isolate RCIC steam supply by placing RCIC control switches INBD STM SUPP ISOL VLV MO 15 and OTBD STM SUPP ISOL VLV MO 16 to CLOSE on panel 9-4.

BOP Recognizes and reports loss of power to MO-15 and MO-16.

Sends building operator to check power supplies:

RCIC-MO-15 Breaker 10B on MCC Y

RCIC-MO-16 Breaker 10 125VDC Panel AA3 May direct building operator to enter steam tunnel to manually close RCIC-MO-16.

CRS May direct RO to perform a rapid power reduction by reducing RR Pump speed.

Page 31 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 32 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior If rapid power reduction is directed, using 2.1.10 [Station Power Changes]

hard card:

NOTE - Power reduction may be stopped at any point when determined to be no longer needed.

1. IF power change is going to be > 10% and OWC Injection System operating in Operator Flow Control Mode, THEN place OWC INJECTION SYS ENABLE switch to SHUTDOWN (Panel A).

CAUTION - When reducing core flow from high power, rod line could exceed 118.0%.

NOTE 1 - If conditions exist where RR flow reduction cannot be reduced ATC rapidly, rod insertion per Section 9 may be required.

NOTE 2 - Core flow reduction may result in entry into LCO 3.4.1 due to recirculation loop flow mis-match.

1.2 While monitoring rod line and feedwater flow, reduce core flow to 40x106 lbs/hr using Reactor Recirculation.

1.2.1 IF RRMG is being controlled locally, THEN operate per Procedure 2.4RR.

1.2.2 Before rod line exceeds 118.0%, go to Section 9.

1.3 WHEN core flow is ~ 40x106 lbs/hr, THEN go to Section 9 and perform remaining applicable steps of rapid power reduction.

CRITICAL TASK #1: When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through a break and cannot be isolated, the crew scrams the reactor prior to reaching Maximum Safe Operating Temperatures in two areas. (For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE is the first area to exceed MSO and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW is the second area to exceed MSO.)

Page 32 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 33 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (EOP-5A steps SC-4&5) Determines a primary system is discharging into secondary containment and areas cannot be maintained below the Max Safe Temperature value, 195°F.

CRS Enters EOP-1A [RPV Control] and directs ATC to insert a manual scram.

Performs Mitigating task scram actions per 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram]: (ATT 1):

1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons 1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

Performs 2.1.5 (ATT 2) Rx Power Control:

1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch in SHUTDOWN.

ATC 1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed.

1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

1.5 Observe nuclear instrumentation:

1.5.1 Insert SRMs.

1.5.2 Insert IRMs.

1.5.3 Change APRM recorders to IRMs.

Page 33 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 34 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.5.4 Range IRMs on scale.

1.5.5 Check reactor power is lowering.

Announces reactor scram and reactor status to Control Room including controlling systems for critical parameters.

(EOP-1A)

Directs BOP to perform EOP-1A verifications:

CRS Recognizes and reports annunciator:

BOP

C-3/F-1, 4160V Bus 1A Bkr SS1A Trip Reports entry condition to 5.3AC480.

Enters Procedure 5.3AC480 [480 VAC Bus Failure]

CRS

Enters Attachment 1 for loss of 480V Bus 1A

Directs BOP to perform 5.3AC480 Attachment 1 actions Page 34 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 35 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Performs Procedure 5.3AC480 Attachment 1 actions, as applicable:

1.2 Ensure TEC Pump C running. (Starts TEC Pump C on VBD-M)

BOP 1.6 Align SAC 1B and 1C to REC (Sends building operator to align REC to SAC 1B and 1C.)

1.7 To transfer MCC-E to alternate power supply: (Sends building operator to transfer MCC-E to MCC-G.)

Examiner Note: RCIC steam line break severity automatically increases 12 minutes after the scram, causing secondary containment area temperatures to begin rising more quickly.

CREW Recognize and report Secondary Containment temperatures rising.

Reports when ENE temperature rises to 195°F (Max Safe first area).

BOP Reports when NNW temperature rises to 195°F (Max Safe second area).

Page 35 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 36 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (EOP-5A steps SC-6 & 7):

Recognizes emergency depressurization is required when two areas exceed Max Safe Operating Temperature with a primary system (RCIC) discharging into secondary containment.

CRS Enters EOP-2A [Emergency Depressurization]

CRS Requests mark PC water level >6ft for EOP-2A step RC/P-12 CRITICAL TASK #1: When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating temperatures are exceeded in two areas and prior to exceeding Maximum Safe Operating temperature in a third area. (For this scenario, RCIC-TE-77C Torus 890 ENE and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 W would be the third area to exceed MSO.) Anticipating Emergency Depressurization and fully opening Bypass valves also satisfies this CT.

Page 36 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 37 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs opening 6 SRV IAW EOP-2A step RC/P-12:

CRS When requested for ED, reports PC water level >6 ft.

Places control switches for 6 SRVs in OPEN.

BOP Monitors reactor pressure and when RPV pressure reaches 50 psig, reports emergency depressurization is complete.

IAW Operations Instruction #8 for ED, directs ATC maintain level:

Initially during ED, -158 to 0 CFZ CRS

Transitory ED, -40 to +10 NR Post ED/Anticipate ED, +3 to 54 NR During ED, verifies Startup FCV responds to control reactor water level ATC above -158 inches CFZ (TAF)

NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when reactor pressure has lowered to <50 psig and level is being controlled +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

END OF SCENARIO Page 37 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 38 of 40 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

RCIC steam line break in secondary containment, failure of RCIC auto isolation, failure of RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 to fully close, 480V Bus 1A loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

Page 38 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 39 of 40 From Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations 9.6.3 EXAMPLE OF NON-EMERGENCY CONTROL ROD MOVEMENT STANDARD PROTOCOL 9.6.3.1 Control Rod 06-43 is to be withdrawn from Position 00 to Position 12 by notch rod withdrawal.

a. RO shall acknowledge intended target rod position prior to rod movement by circling Position 12 in the "TO" column on the Rod Movement Sheet.

b. RO points to the rod select Button 06-43 and says, "Selecting Control Rod 06-43".

c. Concurrent Verifier verifies the rod to be selected against the controlling document and says, "That's correct".

d. RO selects Control Rod 06-43, verifies it is the only rod selected, positions his hands on the Rod Movement Control Switch (such that the Concurrent Verifier is able to verify his intentions) and says:

"Control Rod 06-43 is the only rod selected, withdrawing Rod 06-43 from Position 00 to 12 using notch withdrawal".

e. Concurrent Verifier verifies the correct rod is selected, the intended movement is in accordance with the controlling document, correct controls are in use, and RO's hand position corresponds to the intended rod movement, then he gives concurrence to continue with the rod movement by saying: "I concur".

f. After hearing, "I concur" from Concurrent Verifier, RO may notch out the control rod.

g. Each subsequent notch of the rod must receive concurrence from the Concurrent Verifier. Each time Control Rod 06-43 is to be positioned, the RO should say, "Notching out", and wait for concurrence from the Concurrent Verifier.

h. After reaching Position 12, the RO says: "Control Rod 06-43 is at Position 12".

i. Concurrent Verifier says: "I agree".

j. RO and Concurrent Verifier annotate completion of the step on the applicable document(s).

Page 39 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-09 Scenario 3 Page 40 of 40 INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 5% power, near Beginning of Cycle.

2. Rod Sequence Information: 31-SU-BOL at step 17, rod 02-35 complete.

Next step is 18, rod 26-03 B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:

1. LCO 3.5.1 Condition C, HPCI inoperable C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. Plant startup in progress, transfer to RUN mode awaiting HPCI return to standby.

2. HPCI steam supply line is isolated following repair of a small packing leak on HPCI-MO-20. Work is complete. HPCI is ready to be returned to standby.

Procedure 2.2.33 Section 6, is complete through step 6.7.

D. Risk:

1. PRA Risk is Yellow

2. Aggregate Risk is Yellow E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. ATC withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 17-20% Bypass Valve position IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL and Procedures 2.1.1, 2.1.10, and 10.13.

2. After power has been raised, BOP place HPCI in standby IAW Procedure 2.2.33 [High Pressure Coolant Injection System], Section 6, beginning at step 6.8.

Page 40 of 40 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 1 of 43 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-09 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling, RHR-MO-34B loss of power/failure to open

2. Respond to CRD Pump A trip

3. Respond to Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure

4. Respond to control rods 30-23, 34-03, and 26-07 drifting in and failure of the scram air header to vent (ATWS)

5. Respond to failure of ARI to initiate

6. Respond to failure of both SLC pumps

7. Respond to CRD Pump B trip

8. Respond to RCIC speed control failure low in AUTO Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 100% power near middle of cycle.

Inoperable Equipment: None.

Turnover:

Plant operating at operating at 100% power near middle of cycle.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW Procedure 2.2.69.3.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes Page 1 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 2 of 43 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description C (BOP,CRS) Place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool r/f rh26a @ de-1 Cooling, RHR-MO-34B loss of power/failure ener TS (CRS) to open (secure RHR Pump B)

C (ATC,CRS) 2 rd08a CRD Pump A trip (start CRD Pump B)

A (CREW) o/r zdihvswefr1a C (BOP,CRS)

@ off Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure 3 A (CREW) o/r zdihvswefr1b (start SGT)

@ stndby TS (CRS)

Control rods 30-23, 34-03, and 26-07 drift in, manual scram required, failure of scram air header to vent CT#1 rd03j During failure to scram conditions when power is above 30% and the Main Turbine rd03i is on line and/or Bypass valves are rd03h available, prevent MSIV isolation by rp01a maintaining reactor water level above -104 inches or by installing MSIV low level 4 rp01b M (CREW) isolation bypass jumpers before wide rp01c range reactor water level lowers below -

rp01d 104 inches.

rd26 CT#2 rd27 Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before exceeding the Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

o/r zdirdsws53aa

@ normal Failure of ARI to initiate (manually trip Recirc 5 I (ATC,CRS) o/r zdirdsws53ba pumps)

@ normal sl01a Trip of both SLC pumps (place RPS test 6 C (ATC,CRS) switches to TRIP) sl01b Page 2 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 3 of 43 CRD Pump B trip CT#3 When control rods fail to scram due to scram pilot air header failing to vent, CRD 7 rd08b C (ATC,CRS) pumps are not available, SLC is not available, and energy is discharging into primary containment, crew directs manually venting the scram pilot air header before exceeding Boron Injection Initiation Temperature Limit (BIIT) and before exiting EOP-6A.

RCIC flow controller fails low in AUTO 8 rc04 @ 0 C (BOP,CRS) (control RCIC speed in MANUAL)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Page 3 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 4 of 43 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. Failure of ARI to initiate Malfunctions after 2. Trip of both SLC pumps 1-2 4 3. CRD Pump B trip EOP entry

4. RCIC flow controller fails low in AUTO

1. CRD Pump A trip Abnormal Events 2-4 2 2. Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure

1. Control rods 30-23, 34-03, and 26-07 drift in, manual Major Transients 1-2 1 scram required, failure of scram air header to vent EOP entries requiring 1. EOP-6A 1-2 2 2. EOP-7A substantive action EOP contingencies requiring 1 per set 1 1. EOP-7A Contingency #5 - Level/Power Control substantive action

1. (CT#1) During failure to scram conditions when power is above 30% and the Main Turbine is on line and/or Bypass valves are available, prevent MSIV isolation by maintaining reactor water level above -

104 inches or by installing MSIV low level isolation bypass jumpers before wide range reactor water level lowers below -104 inches.

2. (CT#2) Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection Pre-identified from high volume, low pressure systems and before 2 3 exceeding the Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during Critical Tasks a failure to Scram.

3. (CT#3) When control rods fail to scram due to scram pilot air header failing to vent, CRD pumps are not available, SLC is not available, and energy is discharging into primary containment, crew directs manually venting the scram pilot air header before exceeding Boron Injection Initiation Temperature Limit (BIIT) and before exiting EOP-6A.

Normal Events N/A 0 1. None Reactivity 1. None N/A 0 Manipulations Page 4 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 5 of 43

1. RHR-MO-34B loss of power/failure to open

2. CRD Pump A trip

3. Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure Instrument/

Component N/A 6 4. Failure of ARI to initiate Failures 5. Trip of both SLC pumps

6. CRD Pump B trip

7. RCIC flow controller fails low in AUTO

1. RHR-MO-34B loss of power/failure to open

2. CRD Pump A trip

3. Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure Total 4. Failure of ARI to initiate N/A 6 Malfunctions

5. Trip of both SLC pumps

6. CRD Pump B trip

7. RCIC flow controller fails low in AUTO Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

Primary Containment, RHR, RHRSW Page 5 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 6 of 43 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power near the middle of the operating cycle.

After the crew takes the watch, the BOP will begin placing RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW Procedure 2.2.69.3. When the operator attempts to open RHR-MO-34B, its breaker will immediately trip. RHR Pump B, operating on minimum flow, must be secured within 15 minutes. The CRS will enter TS 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

After TS for RHR-MO-34B have been addressed, CRD Pump A will trip. The crew will respond IAW the alarm card and place CRD Pump B in service.

After CRD Pump B has been placed into service, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 1A trips and Fan 1B will not start. Secondary Containment pressure will rise, requiring entry into EOP-5A and TS 3.6.4.1. The crew must enter 2.4HVAC to restore Reactor Building negative pressure with SGT.

After response to loss of RB ventilation is complete, three control rods will simultaneously drift in. The crew will respond IAW the alarm card and insert a manual scram. RPS will de-energize, but the scram air header will fail to vent.

Manual initiation of ARI will fail. The crew will enter EOP-1A and transition to EOP-6A and EOP-7A. The crew will trip Recirc pumps. Power will be approximately 50%. The crew will install MSIV low level isolation bypass jumpers (CT#1) and inhibit ADS (CT#2) and lower reactor water level IAW EOP-7A to control power. When reactor water level is lowered and RCIC automatically initiates, its speed controller will fail low in automatic, and the crew will raise RCIC speed in MANUAL.

CRD Pump B will trip, preventing manual control rod insertion. Both SLC pumps will trip after they have been started. The crew must direct the building operator to manually vent the scram air header IAW procedure 5.8.3 (CT#3). If the crew has not manually vented the scram air header, the main turbine will spuriously trip 25 minutes following the scram, resulting in SRVs opening.

After the scram air header has been vented and all control rods have fully inserted, the crew will transition to EOP-1A and stabilize plant conditions. The exercise ends when all control rods are inserted and reactor water level is being raised to the normal band, +3 to +54 inches.

Page 6 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 7 of 43 CRITICAL TASK BASIS During failure to scram conditions when power is above 30% and the Main Turbine is on line and/or Bypass valves are available, prevent MSIV isolation Critical Task #1 by maintaining reactor water level above -104 inches or by installing MSIV low level isolation bypass jumpers before wide range reactor water level lowers below -104 inches.

If the MSLs isolate with power >30%, SRV operation is required to control RPV pressure. If the reactor is still generating appreciable power, the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit could then be reached in a relatively short time. Exceeding HCTL would challenge primary containment Safety Significance integrity, especially during ATWS conditions, and would require emergency depressurization. Step C5-2 therefore defeats certain main steam line isolations to prevent closure of the MSIVs and permit continued use of the main condenser as a heat sink, even if RPV water level must be lowered below the low level isolation setpoint.

Cues APRMs indicate >30% power following a scram.

Turbine Generator is on line.

EOP-7A directs lowering reactor water level Operator installs jumpers IAW procedure 5.8.20:

Terminals DD-1 to DD-2, BAY-1, PNL 9-15

Terminals BB-1 to BB-2, BAY-3, PNL 9-15

Terminals DD-1 to DD-2, BAY-1, PNL 9-17

Terminals BB-1 to BB-2, BAY-3, PNL 9-17 OR Measurable Performance Crew maintains MSIVs open by maintaining RPV water level Indicators above -104 indicated on Wide Range instruments:

NBI-LR-1A

NBI-LR-1B

NBI-LI-85A

NBI-LI-85B

NBI-LI-85C

SPDS Visual observation jumpers are installed in Panels 9-15 and 9-17.

Performance Wide Range reactor water level >-104.

Feedback MSIVs indicate open on MSIV control switches and Isolation Valve Status mimic on Panel 9-3 Applicability Failure to scram conditions, power >30%.

Page 7 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 8 of 43 The actual setpoint for MSIV (Group 1) isolation on low Justification for the reactor water level is -104 (TS -113). The actual setpoint is chosen performance modelled in the simulator.

limit BWR Owners Group App. B, step C5-2 Appendix Power level following trip of both Recirc pumps should be Scenario Guide >30%. There should be not challenges to Feedwater or Requirements HPCI.

Page 8 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 9 of 43 Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before exceeding the Critical Task #2 Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

In order to effect a reduction in reactor power, actions in Contingency #5 may deliberately lower RPV water level to a level below the automatic initiation setpoint of ADS. Actuation of this system imposes a severe thermal transient on the RPV and complicates the efforts to maintain RPV water level within the ranges specified in Contingency #5. Further, rapid and uncontrolled injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated water from low pressure injection systems may occur as RPV pressure decreases to and below the shutoff heads of these pumps. Such an occurrence would quickly Safety Significance dilute in-core boron concentration and reduce reactor coolant temperature. When the reactor is not shutdown, or when the shutdown margin is small, sufficient positive reactivity might be added in this way to cause a reactor power excursion large enough to severely damage the core. Therefore, ADS initiation is purposely prevented as the first action of the level/power control procedure. When required, explicit direction to depressurize the RPV is provided in the PSTG, thereby negating any requirement to maintain the automatic initiation capability of ADS.

Cues ADS Timer actuated alarm 9-3-1/A-1.

Wide Range and Fuel Zone/CFZ RPV level indications approaching or exceeding Level 1 (-113).

ADS valve control switch red and amber indicating lights on panel 9-3 ON.

Measurable Manipulation of ADS A and ADS B Inhibit switches on panel Performance 9-3 vertical section.

Indicators Inhibit switches click into the vertical, inhibit position on panel 9-3 prior to breaking the tech spec required cooldown rate.

Performance Feedback ADS Timer actuated alarm 9-3-1/A-1.

Applicability ATWS with power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps per EOP-7A.

Inhibiting ADS before injection from high volume, cold water systems occurs ensures a related power excursion will not be Justification for the experienced that could challenge to the fuel barrier. Inhibiting chosen performance ADS before the Tech Spec cooldown limit is exceeded limit ensures the RPV fission product barrier is not challenged by a significant thermal transient.

BWR Owners Group App. B, step RC/Q-6 Appendix Page 9 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 10 of 43 The scenario must be designed to make the crew lower RPV level per EOP-7A step FS/L-6 or FS/L-7 (i.e. ATWS with Scenario Guide power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps, and Requirements Feedwater or HPCI maintaining level above -60 CFZ).

Page 10 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 11 of 43 When control rods fail to scram due to scram pilot air header failing to vent, CRD pumps are not available, SLC is not available, and energy is discharging into primary containment, crew directs manually venting the scram Critical Task #3 pilot air header before exceeding Boron Injection Initiation Temperature Limit (BIIT) and before exiting EOP-6A.

Failure to effect shutdown of the reactor when a RPS setting has been exceeded would unnecessarily extend the level of degradation of the safety of the plant. This could further degrade into damage to the principle fission product barriers if left unmitigated. Action to shut down the reactor is required when RPS and control rod drive systems fail.

The Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) is the greater of:

The highest suppression pool temperature at which initiation Safety Significance of boron injection will permit injection of the Hot Shutdown Boron Weight of boron before suppression pool temperature exceeds the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.

The suppression pool temperature at which a reactor scram is required by plant Technical Specifications.

The BIIT is a function of reactor power. If all control rods are inserted before suppression pool temperature reaches the BIIT, the HCTL will not be exceeded, so emergency RPV depressurization will be precluded.

Cues Manual scram is initiated and numerous control rods indicate beyond position 00 and reactor power not downscale on panel 9-5 indications.

RPS logics lights extinguished on Panel 9-5.

Absence of annunciator 9-5-2/F-5, Scram Valve Pilot Air Low Pressure.

Suppression Pool temperature rising on PMIS and panel indications.

Measurable Operator notifies (using phone/PA/etc) building operator to Performance manually vent the scram air header IAW Procedure 5.8.3.

Indicators Page 11 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 12 of 43 Booth operator, as building operator notifies control room operator that the scram air header has been manually vented IAW Procedure 5.8.3.

Receipt of annunciator 9-5-2/F-5, Scram Valve Pilot Air Low Pressure.

Performance Feedback Indication of all control rods fully inserted on Panel 9-5 and/or PMIS.

Indication of reactor power decaying to 0% on APRMs and/or SPDS.

Applicability ATWS with power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps per EOP-7A, no CRD pumps available, no SLC injection not available.

If all control rods are inserted before suppression pool temperature reaches the BIIT, the HCTL will not be exceeded, so emergency RPV depressurization will be precluded. BIIT is chosen for this scenario over HCTL because BIIT can be exceeded within the normal time frame of a scenario. Depending on conditions, HCTL may not be Justification for the exceeded within the normal timeframe of a scenario.

chosen performance limit If the failure to scram EOP were to be exited, other procedures would not provide the guidance for control rod insertion necessary to achieve reactor shutdown. Before exiting EOP-6A ensures guidance to effect reactor shutdown is not removed.

BWR Owners Group App. B, step RC/Q-7 Appendix Initial conditions, combined with the ATWS severity, should result in power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps per Scenario Guide EOP-7A. A condition must cause Suppression Pool Requirements temperature to rise if no crew action is taken. The scenario should be validated to exceed BIIT with no crew action.

Page 12 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 13 of 43 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC19 or password protected IC, 100% (MOC)

1. Ensure this schedule file is in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Name - 2020-9sc4.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-9sc4.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

Page 13 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 14 of 43 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

Page 14 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 15 of 43 (Continued on next page.)

Page 15 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 16 of 43 Page 16 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 17 of 43 Page 17 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 18 of 43 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

3. Ensure CRD Pump A is in service and CRD Pump B is in standby.

4. Ensure CRD Drive D/P at 265 psid.

5. Ensure CRD Cooling Water flow at 50 gpm.

6. Ensure RHR SWBP B is in service per procedure 2.2.70 in preparation for placing RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling.

7. Ensure SSST Y voltage to RRMGs is set to TAP 2.

8. SSST X Voltage card should read TAP POS 3, MAX 4469 and MIN 4361.

9. Provide markup to crew of procedures 2.2.69.3 and 2.2.70 for placing RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling

10. Ensure IC20, Rod Sequence Notebook under the RO desk.

Page 18 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 19 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling, RHR-MO-34B loss of power/failure to open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling per CRS Procedure 2.2.69.3, Section 7, beginning at step 7.22.

ROLE PLAY:

If asked, as Rx Bldg NLO report RHR Pump B pre-start checks are complete, SAT.

Booth If directed to check breaker for RHR-MO-34B, (breaker 9B on MCC-Y), wait 3 Operator minutes, then report the breaker is tripped.

If directed to check the position of RHR-MO-34B locally, wait 3 minutes, then report RHR-MO-34B is fully closed.

(Procedure 2.2.69.3 [RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray])

7. PLACING RHR SUBSYSTEM B SUPPRESSION COOLING MODE IN SERVICE 7.22 IF manual override required for 2/3 Core Valve Control Permissive, THEN PERFORM following: (Step is N/A) 7.23 IF manual containment cooling valve control required, THEN PLACE CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL. (Step is N/A) 7.24 OPEN RHR-MO-39B, SUPPR POOL COOLING/TORUS SPRAY VLV.

7.25 IF following exist:

RPV less than or equal to 300 psig.

BOP

Injection not desired.

THEN CLOSE RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

NOTE 1 - RHR-MO-16B, LOOP A MIN FLOW BYP VLV, remains open when RHR Subsystem B less than or equal to 2107 gpm.

NOTE 2 - Reactor Building high ambient temperature may cause Suppression Pool temperature to rise before lowering.

CAUTION - RHR pump damage may occur from minimum flow operation greater than 15 minutes.

7.26 START RHR Pump B or D.

7.27 THROTTLE OPEN RHR-MO-34B, SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE VLV, to obtain rated cooling flow or as directed by CRS.

Recognizes RHR-MO-34B loss of power as soon as switch was placed to open, informs CRS.

Page 19 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 20 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling, RHR-MO-34B loss of power/failure to open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Sends operator to check breaker for RHR-MO-34B, (breaker 9B on MCC-Y).

Advocates securing RHR Pump B due to operation on minimum flow limited to BOP

<15 minutes.

CRS Directs BOP to secure RHR Pump B per Procedure 2.2.69.3.

Secures RHR Pump B IAW Procedure 2.2.69.3, Section 9:

9.1 IF CM-38, PCV-266 BYPASS (R-958-SW), closed in Step 7.29, THEN OPEN CM-38. (Step is N/A) 9.2 IF RHR Pumps B and D running, THEN PERFORM following: (Step is N/A) 9.3 PERFORM following concurrently:

CLOSE RHR-MO-34B, SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE.

BOP (Step is N/A)

WHEN RHR Subsystem B flow zero, THEN STOP RHR Pump B or D.

(Stops RHR Pump B) 9.4 ENSURE RHR PUMP B switch in auto after stop (green flagged).

9.5 ENSURE RHR PUMP D switch in auto after stop (green flagged). (Step is N/A) 9.6 ENSURE RHR-MO-16B, LOOP B MIN FLOW BYP VLV, open.

CRS Directs BOP to secure RHRSWBP B IAW Procedure 2.2.70.

Secures RHR SWBP A IAW Procedure 2.2.70, RHR Service Water Booster Pump System, Section 8:

8.1 REMOVE SWBP A from service as follows:

8.1.1 ENSURE SWBP Subsystem at ~ 4000 gpm for about 15 minutes prior to securing SWBP A.

8.1.2 ADJUST SW-SW-MO89A, HX-A SW DISCH VLV 89A, to BOP

~ 2800 gpm.

8.1.3 PLACE SWBP A switch to STOP or PULL-TO-LOCK.

8.1.4 WHEN SWBP A breaker opens, THEN VERIFY SW-MO-89A, HX-A SW DISCH VLV (Panel 9-3),

closes.

8.1.5 ENSURE SWBP A switch in NORM AFTER STOP (green flagged).

Page 20 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 21 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling, RHR-MO-34B loss of power/failure to open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Determines entry into TS 3.6.2.3 Condition A is required for RHR B CRS Suppression Pool Cooling subsystem inoperable.

TS 3.6.2.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool 7 days pool cooling subsystem cooling subsystem to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event at the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 21 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 22 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CRD Pump A trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, trigger Event 2, rd08a CRD Pump A trip.

Operator Responds to the following annunciator:

9-5-2/A-6, CRD Pump A Breaker Trip Reports CRD Pump A trip.

Performs alarm card 9-5-2/A-6 actions:

1.1 Restore CRD as follows:

1.1.1 Place CRD-FC-301 in MAN.

ATC 1.1.2 Adjust CRD-FC-301 to minimum.

1.1.3 WHEN in service FLOW CONTROL VLV AO 19A or 19B indicates closed, THEN start CRD Pump B.

1.1.3.1 IF pump fails to start, THEN go to Step 1.2.

1.1.4 Adjust CRD-FC-301 to obtain flow of 50 gpm.

1.1.5 Balance CRD-FC-301.

1.1.6 Place CRD-FC-301 to BAL.

Reports CRD Pump B has been placed into service CRS Directs ATC to start CRD Pump B IAW alarm card.

ROLE PLAY:

Booth If sent to check CRD Pump A, wait 3 minutes, then report the motor is hotter to the touch than normal, but you see nothing else abnormal.

Operator If sent to check CRD Pump A breaker (EE-CB-480F(CRDP-A)), wait 3 minutes, then report the ground overcurrent relay is tripped for CRD Pump A breaker.

Reports the following annunciator came in and cleared:

C-2/G-3, 480V Bus 1F Ground BOP Sends building operator to investigate CRD Pump A.

Sends operator to check breaker for CRD Pump A, breaker EE-CB-480F(CRDP-A).

END OF EVENT Page 22 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 23 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CRD Pump A trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 23 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 24 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, trigger EVENT 3, (fails RB Exhaust Fans 1A and 1B using their control switches)

Operator Responds to annunciators:

R-2/E-4, Reactor Bldg Exhaust Fan Failure

R-2/C-4, Reactor Bldg HV-R-1A Fan Failure

R-2/D-4, Reactor Bldg Booster Fan Failure BOP Recognizes and reports Reactor Building exhaust and supply fans are not running.

Attempts to start Reactor Building exhaust fans.

Reports Reactor Building exhaust fans cannot be started.

Updates crew that high reactor building pressure is EOP-5A entry condition if D/P above 0.

Enters 2.4HVAC.

If Reactor Building pressure rises to 0 wc, enters EOP-5A. (not expected CRS due to scenario timing)

Directs WCO/BOP to perform 2.4HVAC subsequent actions.

Performs 2.4HVAC actions to start SGT:

3. IF Reactor Building supply and exhaust fans cannot be started, THEN perform following:

3.1 At VBD-K, start SGT System per Procedure 2.2.73 to maintain Reactor Building pressure negative.

Performs 2.2.73 section 6:

6.1 At VBD-R, place SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP, in AUTO 6.2 ADJUST SGT-DPIC-546 setpoint to less than or equal to -0.25" wg.

NOTE - Both SGT Subsystems may be placed in service for EOPs.

CAUTION - Secondary Containment pressure transient and TS LCO 3.6.4.1 entry may occur from starting SGT.

6.3 IF EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN, labeled PREFERRED, THEN at VBD-K, PERFORM following:

6.3.1 PLACE EF-R-1E in RUN.

Page 24 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 25 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 6.3.2 VERIFY following:

SGT-AO-249, SGT A INLET, opens.

SGT-AO-251, SGT A DISCHARGE, opens.

6.4 IF EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN, labeled PREFERRED, THEN at VBD-K, PERFORM following:

6.4.1 PLACE EF-R-1F in RUN.

6.4.2 VERIFY following:

SGT-AO-250, SGT B INLET, opens.

SGT-AO-252, SGT B DISCHARGE, opens.

6.5 At VBD-R, remove Reactor Building H&V System from service per Procedure 2.2.47.

6.6 IF HV-DPR-835, RX BLDG/ATMOS DP, less than or equal to -0.50" wg, THEN PERFORM following:

6.6.1 If both SGT fans running, THEN PLACE following to AUTO:

EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN.

EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN.

6.6.2 IF only EF-R-1E running, THEN PLACE EF-R-1E to AUTO.

6.6.3 IF only EF-R-1F running, THEN PLACE EF-R-1F to AUTO.

6.6.4 WHEN HV-DPR-835 between -0.35" wg and -0.50" wg, THEN PLACE following switch labeled PREFERRED to RUN:

EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN.

EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN.

6.7 VERIFY HV-DPR-835 maintained at less than or equal to -0.25" wg.

6.8 ADJUST SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP, as necessary, to obtain greater than or equal to 800 scfm on SGT-FI-545, SGT DISCHARGE HEADER FLOW.

6.9 VERIFY following annunciators clear:

K-1/A-2, SGT A HIGH MOISTURE.

K-2/A-2, SGT B HIGH MOISTURE.

Sends operator to investigate RB HVAC failure.

Booth Role Play: If sent to investigate RB Exhaust Fan failure, wait 5 minutes, then report you can find nothing unusual.

Operator Page 25 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 26 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Determines entry into TS 3.6.4.1 Condition A is required for period secondary CRS containment pressure above -0.25. (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1)

TS 3.6.4.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary containment to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable in MODE 1, OPERABLE status.

2, or 3.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 26 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 27 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4, 5 Event

Description:

Control rods 30-23, 34-03, and 26-07 drift in, manual scram required, failure of scram air header to vent, failure of ARI to initiate Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, trigger EVENT 4, Booth rd03j, rd03i, rd03h - Control rods 30-23, 34-03, and 26-07 drift in Operator Proceed to next event when ATC reports ATWS conditions.

Recognizes and reports alarm:

9-5-1/C-4, Rod Drift Reports 2.4CRD entry condition.

Performs alarm card actions:

ATC 2.1 Check full core display for rod drift light(s) to determine which rod(s) is drifting. (Determines and reports drift lights on for control rods 30-23, 34-03, and 26-07.)

2.2 IF more than one rod is drifting, THEN SCRAM and concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

Enters 2.4CRD [CRD Trouble].

CRS Directs ATC to insert manual scram.

Performs 2.1.5 Mitigating Task Scram Actions:

1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons.

1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

ATC 1.3 IF reactor power > 3%, THEN perform following:

1.3.1 Place REACTOR MODE switch to SHUTDOWN.

1.3.2 Initiate ARI.

Recognizes and reports ARI failure due to failure to ARM.

Perform Attachment 2 Reactor Power Control of 2.1.5 as follows:

1 REACTOR POWER CONTROL 1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch is in SHUTDOWN.

ATC 1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed 1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

Recognizes and reports not all rods fully inserted.

Page 27 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 28 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4, 5 Event

Description:

Control rods 30-23, 34-03, and 26-07 drift in, manual scram required, failure of scram air header to vent, failure of ARI to initiate Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Recognizes and reports scram pilot air header failed to vent due to absence of annunciators:

ATC 9-5-2/F-5, Scram Valve Pilot Air Low Pressure 9-5-1/G-4, North SDV Not Drained 9-5-1/G-5, South SDV Not Drained END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when ATC reports ATWS conditions.

Operator Page 28 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 29 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth SLC pumps will each trip 10 seconds after it is started.

Operator CRD Pump trips 30 seconds after the manual scram.

Enter EOP 1A [RPV Control] and transition to EOP 6A [RPV Pressure/Power Control (Failure-to-Scram)] and EOP 7A [RPV Level Control (Failure-to-Scram)]:

CRS (EOP-6A)

Directs BOP to:

Stabilize pressure <1050 psig using Table 12 systems as necessary CRS Page 29 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 30 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (EOP-6A)

Directs ATC to runback RR pumps to minimum speed, then trip RR pumps:

CRS Reports RR pumps have runback to minimum speed.

Trips RR pumps by placing switches DRIVE MOTOR BKR 1CN and DRIVE ATC MOTOR BKR 1DS to STOP.

Reports reactor power ~48%

Page 30 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 31 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (EOP-6A)

Directs ATC to Reset ARI and insert rods IAW EOP-6A step FS/Q-17.

CRS Page 31 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 32 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs ATC to inject SLC before BIIT curve is exceeded IAW EOP-6A:

CRS Page 32 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 33 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRITICAL TASK #1: During failure to scram conditions when power is above 30% and the Main Turbine is on line and/or Bypass valves are available, prevent MSIV isolation by maintaining reactor water level above -104 inches or by installing MSIV low level isolation bypass jumpers before wide range reactor water level lowers below -104 inches.

Directs BOP to defeat MSIV low water level isolation IAW Procedure 5.8.20 CRS

[EOP Plant Temporary Modifications]

Bypasses MSIV low water level isolation IAW Procedure 5.8.20:

4. BYPASSING LOW RPV WATER LEVEL MSIV ISOLATION 4.1 IF any MSIV closed, THEN place its respective control switch to CLOSE (PNL 9-3).

4.1.1 AO86C.

4.1.2 MS-AO-AO86D MS-AO-AO80A.

4.1.3 MS-AO-AO80B.

4.1.4 MS-AO-AO80C.

4.1.5 MS-AO-AO80D.

4.1.6 MS-AO-AO86A.

4.1.7 MS-AO-AO86B.

4.1.8 MS-AO-4.2 Ensure following valves closed (PNL 9-4):

4.2.1 RR-AO-740, OUTBD ISOL VLV.

4.2.2 RR-AO-741, IND ISOL VLV.

4.3 To bypass Group 1 Low RPV Water Level Isolation interlock to maintain any MSIVs open or to open MSIVs to re-establish main condenser as a heat sink, perform following; N/A if not required by plant conditions:

4.3.1 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-15).

4.3.2 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals BB-1 and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-15).

4.3.3 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-17).

4.3.4 Install MSIV LOW WATER LEVEL ISOL BYPASS between Terminals BB-1 and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-17).

Page 33 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 34 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRITICAL TASK #2: Inhibit ADS prior to uncontrolled injection from high volume, low pressure systems and before exceeding the Tech Spec cooldown rate limit during a failure to Scram.

Directs BOP to inhibit ADS IAW EOP-7A:

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS Inhibit ADS when directed by CRS:

BOP At Panel 9-3, places ADS A and ADS B INHIBIT switches to INHIB.

Directs BOP to stop and prevent injection to lower RPV level below -60 inches.

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS Performs Stop and Prevent IAW EOP 5.8 [Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)] Att. 4 HARD CARD:

1. STOP INJECTION 1.1 Stop HPCI by performing one of following:

1.1.1 IF HPCI is not running, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.1.2 IF HPCI is running, THEN perform one of following:

Page 34 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 35 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.1.2.1 Place HPCI controller to MANUAL and lower on controller to maintain > 100 psig below low-end of RPV pressure band, BOP and

a. Maintain turbine speed > 2050 rpm.

1.1.2.2 Trip HPCI turbine by performing following:

a. Ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP control switch in START.

b. Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

c. After turbine stops, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

d. Release TURBINE TRIP button.

1.2 Stop feedwater by performing following:

1.2.1 IF ENABLE INJECTION button is yellow, THEN on STARTUP VALVE screen, press ENABLE INJECTION button and press "YES" to confirm cancel.

1.2.2 At a RVLC/RFPT HMI, select STARTUP VALVE screen, press STOP AND PREVENT button, and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.

1.2.3 WHEN RF-MO-29 and RF-MO-30 are closed, THEN on STARTUP VALVE screen, press ENABLE INJECTION button and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.1.2.4 1.2.4 IF RF-MO-29 or RF-MO-30 are open and cannot be closed from Control Room, THEN perform following:

1.2.4.1 Trip both RFP's.

1.2.4.2 Trip all operating condensate booster pumps.

CAUTION - If Core Spray and RHR pumps are placed in PULL-TO-LOCK before system flow is reduced to minimum, draining of system may occur.

1.3 Place both core spray pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4 Stop RHR by ensuring one of following:

1.4.1 Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4.2 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed BOP per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

1.4.3 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3.

2. PREVENT INJECTION Page 35 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 36 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.1 Prevent both RHR Subsystems by performing one of following in each loop:

2.1.1 Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.1.2 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3; and 2.1.2.1 Bypass RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

2.1.3 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

2.2 Prevent feedwater by performing following:

2.2.1 Ensure RF-MO-29 is closed.

2.2.2 Ensure RF-MO-30 is closed.

2.2.3 Trip condensate and condensate booster pump(s), as required.

2.3 Prevent CS by performing following:

2.3.1 Ensure CS-MO-12A is closed.

2.3.2 Ensure CS Pump A control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.3.3 Ensure CS-MO-12B is closed.

BOP 2.3.4 Ensure CS Pump B control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4 Prevent HPCI by performing following:

2.4.1 IF HPCI is not running, THEN ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch is in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4.2 IF HPCI is running, THEN trip HPCI turbine by performing following:

2.4.2.1 Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

2.4.2.2 WHEN turbine is at zero rpm, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4.2.3 Release TURBINE TRIP button.

Reports injection systems are stopped and prevented.

Page 36 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 37 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

Booth When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 minutes then Operator put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP when PTMs installed.

Direct NLO to install EOP PTMs 97 through 100 for RHR injection valve BOP control.

Recognizes and reports RCIC-MO-131 failure to open when reactor water BOP level lowers below -42 Wide Range.

Opens RCIC-MO-131 using control switch on panel 9-4.

When RPV level lowers to less than -60 inches, maintains RPV level between

-60 inches and -183 inches using EOP 5.8.13 systems (Feedwater, HPCI and/or RCIC, CRD and SLC).

BOP When directed by the CRS inject SLC.

ATC

Place both keys in SLC PUMP A and SLC PUMP B keylock switches on Panel 9-5 and place switches to START.

Check both SLC pumps start.

Page 37 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 38 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

Check white SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3A (1106A) and SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B (1106B) lights turn off (Panel 9-5).

Check pressure on SLC-PI-65, PUMP PRESSURE (Panel 9-5), is greater than reactor pressure.

Check Annunciator 9-5-2/G-7, LOSS OF CONT TO SQUIB VLVS, alarms.

Ensure RWCU-MO-15, INBD ISOL VLV (Panel 9-4), is closed.

Ensure RWCU-MO-18, OUTBD ISOL VLV (Panel 9-4), is closed.

Ensure both RWCU pumps are off (Panel 9-4).

Ensure RWCU-MO-74, DEMIN SUCTION BYPASS VLV (Panel 9-4), is throttled open.

Provides CRS initial SLC tank level indicated on SLC-LI-66 TANK LEVEL on panel 9-5 (~80%).

Recognizes and reports SLC Pumps A and B tripped.

Performs 5.8.3 [Alternate Rod Insertion Methods] Attachment 1 flowchart:

Recognizes scram valves are NOT open by absence of scram valve ATC Places RPS TEST A1, A2, B1, and B2 TRIP LOGIC switches on panels 9-15 and 9-17 to TRIP, then returns switches to NORMAL Page 38 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 39 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

Booth When directed to manually vent the scram air header, wait 5 minutes, then Operator delete malfunction rd26 (Backup Scram Valve failure), and report the scram air header is being vented.

(Procedure 5.8.3, Attachment 1)

Sends building operator to manually vent the scram pilot air header IAW procedure 5.8.3, Section 8.

ATC (Procedure 5.8.3, Attachment 1)

ATC Recognizes and reports CRD Pump B tripped, so no CRD pump available to drive rods using RMCS.

Page 39 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 40 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Recognizes and reports all control rods have fully inserted due to scram air header venting and reactor power is lowering to 0%.

ATC Directs building operator to restore the scram air header IAW Procedure 5.8.3, Section 8.

When all rods have been inserted to at least position 02, exits EOP-6A and EOP-7A and re-enters EOP-1A, directs EOP-1A step RC/L-3 CRS Directs BOP to slowly raise RPV level to new band of +3 to +54.

Secures HPCI and RCIC.

BOP Slowly raises reactor water level by throttling Feedwater startup FCV using HMI.

NOTE to Examiners: The main turbine is expected to trip on reverse power due to the crew manually venting the scram air header. However, if the crew has not manually vented the scram air header, the main turbine will spuriously trip 30 minutes after the crew initially attempts to scram the reactor.

Recognizes and reports annunciator:

BOP

B-1/A-1, Turbine Trip Verifies turbine trip IAW 2.2.77 [Main Turbine], Att. 2 hard card:

Page 40 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 41 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.1 Simultaneously DEPRESS TURB TRIP 1 and TURB TRIP 2 buttons, and then check following; N/A if turbine automatically tripped:

1.2 VERIFY following valves closed (Panel B, DEH Main display):

Both stop valves.

All governor valves.

All reheat stop valves.

All interceptor valves.

1.3 ENSURE following breakers open (Panel C):

1.3.1 345KV BUS, PCB-3310.

1.3.2 345KV BUS, PCB-3312.

1.3.3 GEN EXCITER FIELD BKR.

If Suppression Pool Temperature exceeds 95°F, enters EOP-3A [Primary CRS Containment Control].

Directs BOP to place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling mode.

Places RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW Procedure 2.2.69.3 [RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray], Attachment 1 [RHR System Operations Hard Card]:

1. SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING 1.1 PLACE RHR SW System in service.

1.1.1 START SWBP(s).

1.1.2 ADJUST SW-MO-89A to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

1.2 If required, with CRS permission, PLACE CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL BOP OVERRD.

1.3 If required, PLACE CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

1.4 ENSURE RHR-MO-39A open.

1.5 IF reactor pressure less than or equal to 300 psig and injection not desired, THEN CLOSE RHR-MO-27A, OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

1.6 ENSURE RHR PUMP running.

CAUTION - RHR pump damage may occur from minimum flow operation greater than 15 minutes.

1.7 THROTTLE RHR-MO-34A to obtain desired cooling flow.

Page 41 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 4 Page 42 of 43 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Trip of both SLC pumps, CRD Pump B trip, RCIC failure to automatically start Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.8 THROTTLE RHR-MO-38A to split flow for torus sprays to maintain desired containment pressure, if required.

1.9 THROTTLE RHR-MO-66A to obtain desired cooling rate.

1.10 IF directed by EOP 3A, THEN OBTAIN maximum cooling.

1.11 IF PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ENSURE one of following open:

REC-MO-711.

REC-MO-714.

ATC Maintains level +3 to + 54 using feedwater, as directed.

NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when all rods have inserted and level is being controlled +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Page 42 of 43 Rev 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-9 Scenario 2 Page 43 of 43 IX. INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 100% power, steady state, near Middle of Cycle.

B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:

1. Day 1 of 7-day LCO per 3.5.1 A.1 for LPCI mode of RHR subsystem B INOPERABLE in preparation for placing RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling.

C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. none D. Risk :

1. PRA Risk is Green

2. Aggregate Risk is Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. BOP to place RHR Pump B in Suppression Pool Cooling per Procedure 2.2.69.3, RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray, Section 7, beginning at step 7.22.

(RHR SWBP B has already been placed in service to support Suppression Pool Cooling per Procedure 2.2.70.)

2. Continue full power operation.

Page 43 of 43 Rev 1

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