ML20268C319

Comment (4487) E-mail Regarding Holtec-CISF Draft EIS

ML20268C319
Person / Time
Site:	HI-STORE
Issue date:	09/22/2020
From:	Public Commenter Public Commenter
To:	NRC/NMSS/DREFS
NRC/NMSS/DREFS
References
85FR16150
Download: ML20268C319 (17)

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From: Barbara Warren <WARRENBA@msn.com>

Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2020 5:32 PM To: Holtec-CISFEIS Resource

Subject:

[External_Sender] FW: Docket ID NRC -2018-0052 Attachments: Final NRC comments regarding HOLTEC CIS FEIS.pdf Resending due to incorrect Docket number, which has been corrected.

Thank you, Barbara Warren From: Barbara Warren Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2020 5:10 PM To: Holtec-CISFEIS@nrc.gov

Subject:

Docket ID NRC -2018-0082 Report number NUREG-2237 I attempted to file comments thru regulations.gov, however there are doing some sort of update and the Docket is not accessible.

I am submitting comments for this docket pertaining to Holtec CIS FEIS.

Please see attached.

Barbara Warren Citizens Environmental Coalition 845-754-7951 Note at the end of the day I had some difficulty with getting text to line up correctly on some pages, but it is readable.

I apologize.

Federal Register Notice: 85FR16150 Comment Number: 4487 Mail Envelope Properties (CH2PR19MB3880F03CB93FD0E1BB8A93A6DB3B0)

Subject:

[External_Sender] FW: Docket ID NRC -2018-0052 Sent Date: 9/22/2020 5:32:14 PM Received Date: 9/22/2020 5:32:23 PM From: Barbara Warren Created By: WARRENBA@msn.com Recipients:

Post Office: CH2PR19MB3880.namprd19.prod.outlook.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 707 9/22/2020 5:32:23 PM Final NRC comments regarding HOLTEC CIS FEIS.pdf 480931 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

Main Office: 422 Oakland Valley Rd. Cuddebackville, NY 12729 Phone 845-754-7951 E-mail: warrenba@msn.com US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Filed at http://www.regulations.gov Re: Docket ID NRC -2018-0052 ; NUREG-2237 Holtec CIS Facility Environmental Impact Statement

Dear NRC Staff,

Introduction In recent years, Citizens Environmental Coalition has been focused on nuclear policies at the federal and New York State levels, including addressing the Cleanup at the West Valley Demonstration Project in Western NY. We have attempted to highlight key regulatory issues that are essential for health and safety. We are very seriously concerned by the inadequate standards advanced for the Holtec CIS facility. If NRC and Holtec proceed as planned we fear there will be major radiological accidents, including transportation related impacts in NY. We strongly recommend thorough expert health and safety reviews by scientists, not political appointees.

Section I Deregulating high level radioactive waste Multiple proceedings have occurred under the Trump administration to deregulate radioactive waste. Deregulation results in weakening of standards and rules which provide essential protections- health, safety and environmental- from the extraordinary hazards posed by high level radioactive waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). Both of our nuclear agencies- DOE &

NRC- have recently been involved in deregulation. Deregulation is associated with weakening the input of scientists and health experts, limited standards and regulations, increasing many costs borne by the public and local government entities and reducing costs for private businesses.

The Federal Government launched this proceeding to deal with large quantities of spent nuclear fuel, after failing to develop the preferred long term solution, a site suitable for geological disposal. The absence of a long term repository also resulted in lawsuits by the nuclear industry, which has forced the government to make payments to nuclear owners for continued storage of spent nuclear fuel. According to the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), a government investigator and overseer, spent nuclear fuel is one of the most hazardous substances known. It should be obvious that one of the most hazardous substances known, which remains hazardous for thousands to millions of years, should be explicitly excluded from all deregulatory efforts.

If NRC and DOE continue to proceed with deregulation, major efforts should be undertaken to analyze the proposals in depth for the long term radiological impacts on health and the environment including complete understanding of intergenerational impacts for future A Clean Environment* Green Purchasing* Pollution Prevention* Healthy People* Green Jobs* Zero Waste A Healthy Economy* A Sustainable Future

generations, if institutional controls are unfunded or inadequate. The future economic and health burdens will fall on our children, and many future generation. Multiple different radionuclides and their products of decay create complex exposures that can add or multiple the effects of other radionuclides and hazardous substances.

A. In October of 2018 DOE Proposed the Re-Interpretation of High Level Radioactive Waste (HLW)

DOE said its interpretation under this proposal does not require the removal of key radionuclides to the maximum extent that is technically and economically practical before DOE can define waste as non-HLW.

There was no scientific, technical or economic justification for this decision. It was not consistent with trying to isolate long- lived radionuclides from humans. Merely changing the definition does not reduce the dangers or risks of the radionuclides present.

B. Approximately one year later in November of 2019 NRC proposed to deregulate Greater than Class C waste.

Three classes of radioactive wastes are allowed to be buried in surface disposal facilities-Class A, B & C which are all considered Low level radioactive waste. In contrast disposal of Greater than Class C radioactive waste requires a geological repository (which is not considered to be land disposal).

The proposal before the public was whether to allow Near Surface Disposal for Greater than Class C radioactive waste, weakening public and environmental protections. NRC findings of its own analyses demonstrated that near surface disposal will not isolate the waste over the long term and will expose the public to huge radiation doses exceeding 10,000 millirems as long as 10,000 years after final disposal.

C. Holtecs Consolidated Interim Storage proposal:

1) was not comprehensively evaluated in the current EIS due to NRCs reliance on the 2014 Generic EIS for the Continued Storage Rule, and

2) involves Near Surface Management for 100 or more years, depending on government funding and development of a final geological repository.

NRC reliance on the 2014 Generic EIS for the Continued Storage Rule is extraordinary given the enormous amount of SNF planned for this facility and the fact that NRCs rule required repackaging facilities- radiation shielded Dry Transfer Systems, which NRC has not implemented for this CIS facility.

The GEIS is applicable for the period of time after the license term of an away-from-reactor independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) (i.e., a CISF) (NRC, 2014).

Consistent with 10 CFR 51.23(c), this EIS serves as the site-specific review conducted for the construction and operation of the proposed CISF for the period of its proposed license term. In accordance with the regulation at 10 CFR 51.23(b), the impact determinations from the GEIS are deemed incorporated into this EIS for the timeframe beyond the period following the term of the CISF license. Thus, those impact determinations are not reanalyzed in this EIS. P. 1-5 Holtec EIS This highlighted section indicates that NRC already anticipates extended storage for the Holtec CIS.

We have developed the concept of near surface management as a consequence of the NRC Greater than Class C surface disposal plan. The Holtec proposal for enormous quantities of high level radioactive waste, especially spent nuclear fuel, is breathtaking in its magnitude. Under this proposal Holtec would receive 147,000 tons of SNF for NEAR SURFACE MANAGEMENT in consolidated storage from states across this nation for 100 + years. Some of this nuclear waste may already be 40 years old and showing signs of degradation. NRC has in effect approved Near Surface Management for SNF for potentially more than 140 years.

Adequate management was only briefly discussed in the NRC Greater than Class C radioactive waste proposal, but NRC did acknowledge that active management would be necessary prior to filling and final closure of a disposal site. Holtec will have to be successful in managing the hazards associated with enormous quantities of SNF in a brand new facility, never before constructed, whose design for its UMAX system already damaged 29 canisters at San Onofre. It is unknown how quickly corrosion could exacerbate this initial damage to the primary stainless steel containment and lead to containment failure.

We have developed the concept of near surface management as a consequence of the NRC Greater than Class C surface disposal plan. NRC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of ongoing management at a CIS facility, including handling of adverse events and outcomes. NRC has not analyzed containment failure and has no plans to require a repackaging facility to be constructed at the Holtec site, ignoring its own final rule. Beyond requiring a repackaging facility, NRC must develop detailed requirements for Near Surface Long Term Management.

We are recommending disapproval of this Holtec CIS facility.

However, if NRC moves forward to approve the Holtec CIS facility, every aspect of the facility and its operation must be considered of High Safety significance.

D. Transportation Deregulation To comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and out of an abundance of caution our nuclear agencies studied all of the difficulties and potential problems associated with a massive transportation campaign that will take decades to complete.

The agencies engaged numerous experts to deal with the training of emergency

responders, the stockpiling of emergency supplies and established a large number of new regulations to address the issues identified for long term transportation of very hazardous SNF.

The above paragraph is NOT TRUE. Neither of our nuclear agencies tackled the enormous task of addressing transportation of SNF across the country to the proposed CIS facilities in New Mexico & Texas, and the many potential hazards. Neither did NRC comply with established law in the National Environmental Policy Act that requires transportation to be studied in an environmental impact statement as an essential element of a new facility. The lack of detailed review of transportation has allowed a large area of concern to escape any public review. The absence of important information currently will facilitate the deregulation of many future transportation decisions, escaping even adequate state and local considerations.

We want to stress that the Federal Community Right to Know Act recognized important rights for the public regarding hazardous materials and also established the availability of information and what is required for emergency planning. In this proceeding too much information has been excluded from public review.

Here we highlight some of the numerous issues of concern.

1. Many elected leaders have discussed a National Infrastructure Plan for more than a decade. Despite the increasing need for infrastructure funding our leaders have failed to supply the funding. The American Society of Civil Engineers regularly issues a national report card. ASCEs latest Infrastructure Report Card gave the nations 16 infrastructure categories a cumulative grade of D+. The ASCE has identified this time as an ideal time to fund infrastructure projects given low interest rates. States are also suffering budget shortfalls related to the Covid pandemic. Such funding would also provide many job opportunities. https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/asce-engage-details/?id=508114

2. The D+ grade for infrastructure and the long term lack of funding means that infrastructure has continued to deteriorate, making trips with the extremely heavy loads of SNF a potentially very dangerous situation. DOE has been constructing a special rail car for rail transportation. However it is possible that DOE may also be using trucks and barges for some parts of the transportation, which require different evaluations. Barges pose additional serious hazards if SNF containers should fall into the water, because water enables uncontrolled nuclear fission to proceed.

3. Climate change and associated severe weather impacts have further degraded infrastructure in many areas of the country. Very comprehensive evaluations will be needed to evaluate potential severe weather impacts to transportation infrastructure, and make corrections to route infrastructure.

4. Overall federal transportation expenditures have increased threefold, primarily for highways, while aviation funds quadrupled. In contrast federal rail expenditures have declined in real dollar numbers by almost half. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) 2007 Study identified a need for $135 billion just to address the heaviest Class I freight rail roads, needed for SNF cask transport. As a result there are likely very large unmet needs for rail lines.

5. There will be extensive personnel training needs associated with years of SNF Transportation. Federal, State and local personnel will be necessary for inspection and maintenance, route planning and training for emergency response personnel. A variety of technical expertise will be needed. It is particularly important to recognize the degree of reliance on local volunteer crews for emergency response and the level of training they will need for responding to a radiological emergency.

6. A comprehensive system of accident and incident reporting as well as investigation is needed for all SNF and other radiological shipments, led by the National Transportation Safety Board. Radiological shipments must have an official regulatory system similar to other hazardous materials with monitoring, reporting and investigations of incidents and accidents, associated with adverse outcomes. It is not acceptable that only radioactive shipments escape the purview and expertise of the independent NTSB, which can also issue reports and make recommendations for improvements.

7. The National Transportation Safety Boards (NTSB) investigations have identified multiple rail accidents that point to inadequate track maintenance and inspections, as well as insufficient oversight and enforcement by federal inspectors. As a result, the NTSB has said there is a need for particular attention on maintenance, inspection, and repair for all routes handling hazardous materials. This would include SNF.

8. The NTSB has recommended the replacement of older tanker cars with newer models that have more features to protect against a catastrophic release of hazardous materials. SNF should also not be traveling on the same route with other hazardous materials, increasing the potential for catastrophe.

9. A major accident at Battele Labs in Ohio resulted in the widespread dispersal of SNF which was oxidized during transport from Connecticut. The oxidation of the fuel increased the volume of the fuel and caused the rupture of the fuel rods. The overheated canister exploded upon pool immersion spreading the oxidized fuel and radionuclides over the entire area of the pool. As a result of this incident, NRC required helium to be present in SNF canisters as a requirement for all SNF shipments. However, surprisingly NRC is now proposing to allow confirmation that helium is still present in canisters to be done upon arrival at a CIS facility.

There are no facilities planned at Holtec to deal with oxidized fuel. Even opening a cask could result in dispersal of fuel if rod ruptures have occurred during shipmant. It is essential that helium presence be confirmed at a nuclear reactor prior to shipping SNF.

Section II Radiological Chaos threatens our nations future health and well- being.

Our nation already has widespread contamination from nuclear weapons, nuclear power and radioactive waste. Widespread contamination across the nation awaits adequate cleanup, however, we have failed to impose adequate controls to prevent this problem from worsening. The result of this increasing problem is reduced funding for individual sites, less oversight, increased accidents and spreading radioactive contamination, which threatens to leave a massive problem for the next generation. All of this is happening while severe climate change impacts are often beyond our ability to control, and exceeding our ability to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination.

Examples include severe weather events and wildfires. Climate change is increasing the immediacy of dealing with radioactive contamination and the impacts on health and safety.

A. The nation has a massive backlog of nuclear waste sites that require extensive cleanups.

In 2019 the General Accounting Office reported that these cleanups represented growing environmental liabilities for the Department of Energy, which were 8 times actual spending on nuclear waste cleanups as of the end of FY 2018, $377 billion was needed compared to $46.8 billion appropriated. The funding gap was so severe, that DOE refused to accept the transfer of some sites from NNSA, the National Nuclear Securities Administration, usual practice for this defense part of DOE. It also can take a few years to actually quantify the cleanup needs for a site and assign a dollar cost for it, For new sites, this takes a few years. Thus even the $377 billion dollar need was an underestimate.

GAO-19-28 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Program-Wide Strategy and Better Reporting Needed to Address Growing Environmental Cleanup Liability Jan 29, 2019 https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696632.pdf B. Multiple accidents across our nuclear complex are regular occurrences which often require extensive corrective measures and increased funding.

WIPP in New Mexico, our only nuclear waste facility for transuranic defense waste, was put out of business by a severe error by Los Alamos National Lab in mixing organic kitty litter with a barrel of transuranic waste. This error cost more than $2 billion dollars and halted new TRU shipments for several years. It also exposed workers to airborne radionuclides.

In addition, Los Alamos contractors were unable to deliver work under a defense contract because of repeated problems associated with preventing criticality.

Hanford in Washington State suffered two severe accidents in two years. First there was a collapse of a tunnel, storing high level radioactive waste. Then there was a severe accident associated with an airborne release from the plutonium finishing plant with plutonium contamination over several square miles.

At West Valley in New York State, a former reprocessing site could release radioactive waste stored on steep unstable slopes to Lake Erie and the Great Lakes, contaminating a significant source of fresh drinking water. Heavy rainfall events from climate change could increase the likelihood of such radioactive releases.

In Simi Valley, California, the Santa Susana site has extensive contamination associated with 10 former nuclear reactors and a core meltdown from a sodium experimental reactor, as well as other industrial and research activities. None of the reactors had a containment structure. Long term inadequate cleanup and remediation left the site vulnerable to the airborne spread of radiation from fires in the area. In 2018 a major wildfire affected the site.

C. The Law of Entropy tells us that disorder always increases. It tells us that anything and everything will always move from order to disorder. In this section we discuss some of the evidence that radioactive materials and contamination are not currently restricted by sufficient regulation and physical control or containment.

The NRC in preparing the EIS has concluded that there will be primarily small impacts associated with the Holtec CIS proposal. We do not believe this conclusion is scientifically or technically possible if NRC undertook even a brief evaluation of the nationwide evidence present at existing radioactively contaminated sites. That evidence is not hidden, but widespread and illustrates what the law of entropy tells us. The evidence informs us that we as a nation have failed - allowing radioactive contamination to spread widely in the environment and to a large portion of the population.

NRC is reviewing two major CIS facilities for the nation under significantly reduced environmental and health protection- protection that would be expected of a geological repository. We believe the existing evidence supports a halt in permitting for CIS facilities until a comprehensive set of regulatory controls is developed in order for national agencies, and state agencies to have confidence in sufficient and redundant controls, coupled with frequent monitoring and review to ensure that the spread of radioactive contamination is prevented from occurring and adversely impacting the health of future generations. NRC had a responsibility to review the existing evidence of how we as a nation are handling high level radioactive material.

The law of entropy, or the second law of thermodynamics, along with the first law of thermodynamics comprise the most fundamental laws of physics. Entropy (the subject of the second law) and energy (the subject of the first law) and their relationship are fundamental to an understanding not just of physics, but of life A simple example is that of an adult cleaning house and starting by putting away all the toys, books, newspapers etc. that are lying about. The effort involves work and putting things away by categorizing them and storing in appropriate places. Energy is used to put the home in reasonable order. Radioactive materials require significant human energy and effort to maintain the ORDER that is absolutely necessary to prevent the dispersal of long-lived radionuclides into the environment and into humans. Human and organizational failings, inadequate budgets and other priorities always limit our collective ability to successfully maintain order, contain radioactivity and prevent public exposures.

Collectively our failures to tightly control and maintain orderly and rigidly controlled inventories of radionuclides will allow intergenerational injustices to impact the health of future generations with attendant consequences such as birth defects and cancer.

As a nation we have failed at achieving the required isolation and are paying the price at many nuclear facilities around the countryWIPP, Hanford and Savannah River are just a few of the hundreds of sites that collectively need thousands of years of work - just to temporarily contain and limit the dangerous DISORDER that the Law of Entropy guarantees. Inadequate budgets, too few personnel, inadequate regulation and oversight -

all allow disorder to increase.

We are all facing a new threat from the current proposals for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel - one of the most hazardous substances on Earth, according to the US Government Accountability Office. In evaluating the licensing of CIS facilities NRC should consider the collective radioactive mess we have created since the dawn of the nuclear age. Cataloging the extent of spread of radioactive contamination and identifying the risks at multiple facilities would be a means of developing a nationwide risk assessment for the federal government approach to understanding the impacts of Entropy on nuclear facilities and surrounding communities.

It would be more meaningful to evaluate the nations existing state of radioactive contamination including safeguards and notable failures rather than permitting an enormous CIS facility based on simple non-scientific judgements such as identifying impacts as small, medium or large. In fact we believe NRC has the evidence of widespread radiological contamination across the nation. That evidence evaluated along with the costs and potential health and environmental impacts, would enable the NRC to check the spread of radioactive contamination and develop the stringent controls needed for CIS facilities.

Given that we have seen inadequate effort to appropriately evaluate and regulate the highly dangerous potential of the Holtec Consolidated Interim Storage facility, we recommend that NRC disapprove the application.

D. The Consolidation of Spent Nuclear Fuel at Interim Storage Facilities could encourage proposals for Reprocessing. Reprocessing should be permanently barred by law for the nation because there exists no reasonable rationale for pursuing it.

Reprocessing is an industrial process with absolutely no benefits for the nation and the public. There is no shortage of uranium and supplies of plutonium are enormous enough for thousands of new nuclear weapons that are not needed. Disposal of nuclear waste is many times less expensive than reprocessing. Reprocessing increases the ease of access for terrorists to develop nuclear weapons, thus requiring government efforts to police the process and prevent access to nuclear materials by bad actors.

Costly investments in breeder or burner reactors are also required. Our government made huge investments in MOx fuel, a key step in reprocessing, but finally abandoned the project at Savannah River because of the high and escalating costs in the billions of dollars.

NRC should rule out Reprocessing as having no support, based on extensive existing evidence.

References:

von Hippel, Frank. Managing Spent Fuel in the US: The Illogic of Reprocessing.

Research Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. Jan 2007.

Alvarez, Robert. Radioactive Wastes & the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, Institute for Policy Studies in collaboration with Friends of the Earth, USA and the Government Accountability Project.

Makhijani, Arjun, PhD. The Mythology and Messy Reality of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing.

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. Apr 2010.

Section III Planning Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities for Spent Nuclear Fuel A. NRC failed to develop equivalent or similar protective standards to those provided by a geological repository for consolidated interim storage facilities, putting huge populations at risk.

High Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel currently require disposal in a geological repository because these very hazardous materials would have greater protection. NRC failed to incorporate the safeguards expected from a geological repository into the plans for Consolidated Interim Storage. Instead NRC merely adopted the standards already in place for existing reactor dry storage involving shorter time periods and much smaller quantities of SNF. The enormous amount of SNF at CIS facilities compared to dry storage at individual reactors did not cause NRC to require additional Safeguards, such as Hardened On-Site Storage or substantial barriers. Planned CIS facilities are open-air facilities visible for miles around and vulnerable to terrorism.

An act of terrorism could release millions of curies of radiation, causing death and destruction for miles around the facility.

In Europe containers of SNF in dry storage are stored in a concrete building, hidden and more protected from a terrorist attack. At Fukushima in Japan, SNF casks in dry storage were also stored in a building, preventing damage that might have occurred from the 2011 tsunami impact.

The Fukushima nuclear disaster despite the catastrophe, benefited from a bit of good luck for the fuel pools. A leak at one of the fuel pools leaked into another one, preventing the fuel from being uncovered and leading to a zirconium fire and a widespread radioactive release. Unlike operating nuclear reactors which have spent fuel pools, which can provide some backup for a damaged container. CIS facilities as proposed today have no backup plans for damaged containment.

NRC specifically rejected national activists recommendations for Hardened On-site Storage in the EIS. Hardened Onsite Storage Systems (HOSS) is a concept that aims to reduce the threat and vulnerability Dry cask storage systems. The primary components of HOSS include: (i) constructing reinforced concrete and steel structures around each waste container; (ii) protecting each of these structures with mounds of concrete, steel, and gravel; and (iii) spacing the structures over a larger area (Citizens Awareness Network, 2018a). The purpose of HOSS is to increase security and resistance to potential damage of DCSSs from natural disasters, accidents, and attacks.

NRCs response to this recommendation was extraordinary:

At this time, HOSS is a generalized concept, and detailed plans that would allow NRC staff to conduct a detailed safety, environmental, and cost/benefit analysis are not available. Furthermore, HOSS does not meet the purpose and need for the proposed action (provide away-from-reactor SNF storage capacity that would allow SNF to be transferred from existing reactor sites and stored for several decades before a permanent repository is available). Therefore, this alternative was eliminated from detailed consideration in this EIS. (P. 2-21 of EIS)

HOSS as proposed addressed key important safety measures that would increase security associated with terrorism attacks, accidents and natural disasters. NRC responds that HOSS was only a generalized concept without detailed plans that would allow NRC staff to conduct safety, environmental and cost/benefit analysis.

It should not be necessary for a good recommendation to be accompanied by detailed plans. NRC is a huge government agency capable of developing plans and conducting analysis if it sees possible benefits from HOSS. In addition narrowing the purpose and need for the action to be just storage capacity to enable transfer from storage at reactors until a repository is available defines the entire action as Storage only. The public takes public health and safety far more seriously and evaluating the safety benefits of HOSS was necessary before summarily dismissing the concept. Safety was even more important given the large amounts of SNF proposed to be stored at a CIS facility.

Instead of rigorous scientific and technical analysis NRC assumes there will be no accidents, no transportation damages and no failures of containment. Such decisions are primarily deregulatory -- missing the needed comprehensive scientific analysis. It is only because government has failed to conduct adequate due diligence and develop similar levels of safeguards as would be provided in a permanent repository that we are talking about clearly substandard consolidated interim storage.

B. In 2014 Rulemaking NRC finalized its Continued Storage Rule including provisions applicable to continued storage facilities.

NRC finalized its Waste Confidence Decision in 2014 and issued a Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). At the time it changed its terminology from Waste Confidence to Continued Storage of SNF. Then NRC adopted critically important provisions for repackaging of damaged and leaking casks, which NRC is failing to implement today.

In the final rule Continued Storage applies to the storage of SNF after the end of the licensed life for operations of a nuclear reactor and before final disposal in a permanent repository. Long-term storage of 100 years would apply to a new CIS facility and its Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).

Significantly NRC adopted a plan for Shielded Dry Transfer Systems. Earlier in 2010, the US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board had recommended the need for similar facilities, which it called Hot Cells to deal with damaged casks arriving at CIS facilities. These radiation- shielded facilities, including air filters, would enable remote handling of casks and canisters to transfer SNF to new containers while preventing radiation exposure of workers. The procedure enables repackaging and a dry transfer system or DTS is necessary for this operation.

All ISFSIs were required to have a DTS, both those at reactor sites and those operating away-from-reactors to enable receiving, transferring, storing, and repackaging of spent fuel. [See GEIS, Section 2.2.1.4]

This final rule is clearly applicable to the proposed Holtec CIS facility in New Mexico, which is an away-from-reactor ISFSI. However, NRC has not required that a DTS be incorporated in their CIS applications. Instead the plan is to merely return damaged casks to the original sender In the real world, a return-to-sender plan would, by necessity, be abandoned in the face of leaking radiation, since an ongoing radiation release would be injurious to the public and workers accompanying the shipment. Emergency crews would have to be dispatched just to attempt to control and limit the size of any release.

We fail to understand how NRC can ignore its own Continued Storage Rule which explicitly addressed the need for Radiation Shielded Dry Transfer Systems at ALL ISFSI sites including those at reactors. At reactor sites DTSs can be used to inspect the condition of canisters and whether there is evidence of corrosion or leaks. The continued

presence of helium in a canister is a critical evaluation that is required today prior to shipping and must be continued.

C. NRC failed to sanction Holtec International for two actions violating critical safety requirements and to require corrections. Both of these violations have potential for adverse impacts at the New Mexico CIS facility.

1. Holtec manufactured casks to be used for dry storage of SNF at the San Onofre nuclear reactor complex in California.

Unfortunately Holtec skipped an essential step: Inspection of the completed casks after manufacture to ensure that no loose parts remained. Actually Holtec also altered the cask design by changing a part without seeking approval from NRC first.

Workers at the San Onofre facility loaded the casks with SNF canisters without inspecting the cask first. As a result multiple casks now have loose parts. These loose parts could damage the canisters as a result of vibrations and shocks associated with the transportation of the casks to the Holtec CIS facility in New Mexico.

NRC failed to consider the potential for additional damage from loose parts upon transportation. If any damage is found upon arrival at the CIS, Holtec will merely ship the cask back to San Onofre. The Holtec CIS has no facility to deal with any damage by repackaging the SNF. Minor damage could allow a cask to be accepted at the CIS facility. However, degradation could be initiated via transportation and result in early containment failure- requiring emergency action at the CIS facility. As a result it will be critical to establish acceptance criteria for casks to be placed into the UMAX storage system, versus separating out canisters that require more detailed inspections and evaluations.

2. The dangerous potential load-drop incident at San Onofre involved the loading of a large SNF canister into the UMAX cask storage system. This is the same system proposed for dry storage at Holtecs CIS facility.

The incident was previously unanalyzed because it was never supposed to occur based on procedures Holtec proposed to NRC. As a consequence of this incident NRC issued multiple serious violations to the Utility (Southern California Edison) operating the San Onofre reactor. However, Holtec had major responsibility for what occurred and Holtec failures were never addressed.

At San Onofre, Holtec had a full service contract for nuclear waste management, including worker training. However, Holtec altered the UMAX cask, installing a shield ring which reduced the circumference of the opening to the cask, to only 1/4 inch clearance. Holtec also failed to train workers on the actual cask they would be using to install a stainless steel canister, instead training them on a cask with a larger opening with 1 inch clearance. Workers also had little visibility of the task they were doing.

Supervisors were stationed a good distance away so they were protected from radiation,

but they also could not visualize the situation. Workers did not know the canister had not been installed in the UMAX until they noted the high radiation levels. Workers were thus exposed to high levels of radiation. We dont understand why NRC failed to assign Holtec with significant responsibility for this event, especially given the fact that Holtec was proposing the same UMAX system for use at the CIS facility in New Mexico.

It turned out that 29 stainless steel canisters sustained damage as a result of gouging and scratching from the insertion of the canister into the UMAX system. This meant that insertion was a noisy procedureindicating the potential damage. NRC took no action to identify the extent of damageeven though such damage could accelerate stress corrosion cracking and lead to radiation leaks. This was also a costly mistake with millions of dollars in potential damages and a shortened lifespan for the canisters. Despite the obvious connection to Holtecs planned CIS facility using the UMAX system, NRC did not call for a full engineering review to identify appropriate corrective actions.

Instead the engineering problem, we identified in comments to NRCs regional office, may continue to cause damage to the UMAX system at Holtecs CIS facility.

D. Two official Advisory Bodiesthe US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and Sandia National Labs-- have identified extensive analysis and research that needs to be done related to CIS facilities and transportation. Such recommendations highlight how much technical work still needs to be done in order to provide scientifically adequate support for any kind of consolidated interim storage facility.

NRC has processed an application far too early in the absence of essential scientific support for all aspects of the enormous undertaking including redundant safety precautions.

Most of the research and recommendations address key issues relevant to CIS Facilities.

1. The 2019 US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board report, Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation: Technical Issues That Need to Be Addressed in Preparing for a Nationwide Effort to Transport Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, highlighted the need for a repackaging facility saying it is an important critical missing element for transport and disposal that will be a major undertaking that could take longer than 10 years. If no repackaging occurs, some of the largest SNF canisters storing the hottest fuel would not be cool enough to meet transportation requirements until approximately 2100.

The NWTRB also identified 30 technical issues to be resolved prior to transportation of SNF, which will require significant planning, integration, and interaction with other federal agencies, the nuclear industry, state and local agencies, and others.

2. Sandia National Labs has identified priority research gaps, which relate directly to important considerations for CIS facilities including long term containment,

transportation damages, and the need for repackaging facilities. We have focused on the highest priorities identified by Sandia NL, numbered 1-3. It is notable that NRC is planning for CIS when such major and significant research gaps exist. The years necessary to fill these priority gaps was not identified. Significant research gaps related to CIS facilities ability to contain radionuclides, withstand the stress of transportation, and repackage SNF from failed containers should have been addressed prior to proceeding with permitting.

Top Research Gap Priorities: Total 6 Research Gap Priorities 3 Priority #1 Research Gaps Priority #1 Welded Canister-Atmospheric Corrosion Priority #1 -This was a changed priority from #3, due to near term need to acquire data on Stress Corrosion Cracking of canisters.

Priority #1 Thermal or Temperature Profiles- They plan to use a dry cask simulator and test horizontal positions. Additional modeling work is also needed to better predict temperatures from decay heat transfer. This is important as NRC has been approving higher heat loads for canisters.

Priority #1 Stress Profiles They plan to fully analyze stress associated with transportation.

1 Priority #2 Research Gap related to water remaining after drying Drying Issues- Gas samples were pulled from small representative canisters as well as the High Burnup Demo Project cask. Water was found to remain after drying, providing a source of hydrogen for hydride formation, which causes embrittlement of fuel rods. The HBF Demo Cask was found to have 17,000 ppm of water or 100 ml.

within the helium backfill.

2 Priority #3 Gaps Fuel Transfer Options- Priority #3, previously Priority #4 This priority has been raised recognizing the need for data to support a surface facility design concept for opening a cask for inspection or repackaging at a consolidated interim storage facility.

These gaps are not described in detail. It is worth noting that the NRC had some sort of design concept when it proposed Dry Transfer Systems in 2014. It is not clear to us why this would need more research versus just arranging for adequate engineering and health and safety personnel provide more detail than the original plan.

External Monitoring- Priority #3 This item highlights the fact that we lack the ability to monitor canister degradation over time. EPRI, the Electric Power Research Institute, has taken the lead role in identifying non-destructive techniques for monitoring to use in the limited space between the canister and concrete cask. Inspection techniques include- visual, eddy current, ultrasonic, electromagnetic surface transducers and surface sampling. DOE has focused on non-destructive examinations and less proven technologiesacoustic emissions, laser induced breakdown spectroscopy, Raman spectroscopy, guided wave technology and emission source tomography.

In conclusion, we believe there is no adequate scientific support for such an extremely dangerous amount of Spent Nuclear Fuel to be sited in one location; and there is no support or analysis for a massive transportation campaign. In the absence of extensive scientific and public support, the project and the CIS facility should be rejected.

Respectfully, Barbara Warren, RN, MS Executive Director Citizens Environmental Coalition