ML20249C422
| ML20249C422 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1998 |
| From: | PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083C703 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9806290295 | |
| Download: ML20249C422 (300) | |
Text
Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 JLS CONVERSION TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CTS 3/4.6-CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ITS 3.6 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO RAIS AND LICENSEE INITIATED ADDITIONAL CHANGES l
l
- gg62;g2di?%2gs P
c-__-_____-_.
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER 3.6.0-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.0-2 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.1-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.1-2 DC, CP, WC YES 3.6.1-3 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.1-4 CA NA 3.6.1-5 DC,CP YES 3.6.1-6 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.1-7 CA NA 3.6.1-8 DC YES 3.6.1-9 CA NA 3.6.1-10 DC,CP YES 3.6.2-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.2-2 CP NA 3.6.2-3 DC,CP YES 3.6.2-4 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.2-5 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.2-6 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.2-7 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.2-8 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.2-9 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.2-10 CP, WC, CA NA 3.6.2-11 WC NA 3.6.2-12 DC YES 3.6.2-13 CP NA 3.6.2-14 DC YES I 3.6.3-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES I 3.6.3-2 CP NA 3.6.3-3 CP NA 3.6.3-4 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-5 DC YES 3.6.3-6 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-7 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-8 DC, CP, WC, CA YES l l 3.6.3-9 DC YES {
l 3.6.3-10 DC, WC, CA YES i 3.6.3-11 DC, CP, WC, CA YES i 3.6.3-12 DC YES 3.6.3-13 WC, CA NA 1
Enclosure 2 PG&E Lettsr DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER 3.6.3-14 CP NA 3.6.3-15 DC, WC, CA YES ,
3.6.3-16 DC YES l 3.6.3-17 DC, CP, WC, CA YES l 3.6.3-18 DC YES 3.6.3-19 CP NA !
3.6.3-20 CP NA {
3.6.3-21 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-22 WC, CA NA
{
j 3.6.3-23 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-24 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-25 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-26 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-27 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-28 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-29 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-30 CP NA 3.6.3-31 WC NA 3.6.3-32 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-33 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-34 DC,CP,CA YES 3.6.3-35 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-36 CP NA 3.6.3-37 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-38 DC YES 3.6.3-39 DC YES 3.6.3-40 DC,CA YES 3.6.3-41 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-42 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.3-43 DC,CP YES 3.6.3-44 DC YES 3.6.3-45 CA, WC NA 3.6.3-46 CA NA 3.6.3-47 CP NA l 3.6.3-48 DC YES l 3.6.3-49 DC,CA YES l 3.6.3-50 CA NA 3.6.3-51 WC NA 3.6.3-52 DC, CP, WC, CA YES i- 3.6.3-53 CP NA
. 3.6.3-54 WC, CA NA 3.6.3-55 DC YES 3.6.3-56 DC,CP YES 2
i
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ l
- Enclosura 2
- l. PG&E Lett::r DCL 98-087 l
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER
! 3.6.3-57 WC NA 3.6.3-58 CP NA 3.6.5-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.5-2 CP NA 3.6.5-3 DC,CP YES l
3.6.5-4. DC,WC YES
! 3.6.6-1 CP NA 3.6.6 DC YES 3.6.6-3 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.6-4 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.6-5 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.6-6 CA NA 3.6.6-7 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.6-8 DC YES 3.6.6-9 WC, CA NA 3.6.6-10 WC, CA NA 3.6.6-11 DC, WC YES 3.6.6-12 DC YES 3.6.6-13 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.6-14 WC NA 3.6.6-15 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.6-16 CA NA 3.6.6-17 DC YES 3.6.6-18 CA NA 3.6.6-19 DC YES 3.6.6-20 DC YES 3.6.6-21 CA NA 3.6.6-22 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.6-23 WC, CA NA 3.6.6-24 DC,CP YES 3.6.7-1 DC YES 3.6.7-2 DC,WC YES 3.6.7-3 CA NA 3.6.7-4 DC YES 3.6.7-5 DC, CP, WC YES 3.6.7-6 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.7-7 WC NA !
3.6.7-8 WC NA 3.6.7-9 DC YES l
3.6.7-10 CA NA 3.6.7-11 WC NA 3.6.7-12 CP NA 3.6.7-13 DC YES 3
l
Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER 3.6.7-14 DC, CP, WC YES l 3.6.7-15 DC YES l 3.6.7-16 CP NA l l 3.6.7-17 CP NA l
3.6.8-1 DC, WC, CA YES 3.6.8-2 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.6.8-3 WC NA 3.6.8-4 DC, CP, WC YES 3.6.8-5 DC YES 3.6.8-6 WC, CA NA 3.6.8-7 DC YES 3/4/6.4.1-1 DC,CP YES DC ALL-001 (3.6 changes only) DC see DCL-98-003 DC ALL-002 (3.6 changes only) DC see DCL-98-003 DC 3.6-ED DC YES CA 3.6-ED CA NA CA 3.6-001 CA NA CA 3.6-002 CA NA CA 3.6-004 CA NA CP 3.6-002 CP NA CP 3.6-004 CP NA CP 3.6-005 CP NA CP 3.6-006 CP NA CP 3.6-007 CP NA CP 3.6-008 CP NA CP 3.6-009 CP NA CP 3.6-010 CP NA CP 3.6-011 CP NA CP 3.6-012 CP NA CP 3.6-013 CP NA CP 3.6-014 CP NA CP 3.6-015 CP NA CP 3.6-016 CP NA CP 3.6-017 CP NA TR 3.6-002 DC,CP YES WC 3.6-ED WC NA WC 3.6-001 WC NA WC 3.6-002' WC NA WC 3.6-003 WC NA WC 3.6-004 WC NA WC 3.6-005 WC NA WC 3.6-006 WC NA WC 3.6-010 WC, CA NA 4
. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __a
Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 3.6 General ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.0-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST:
CTS 3/4.6.x in converting CTS 3/4.6 to the iTS, numerous reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording changes were made. In addition certain wording preferences and/or English language conventions were adopted, which resulted in the ITS being more readily readable and therefore understandable by the plant operators and users. These changes did not result in any technical changes, but are considered to be Administrative changes. No discussion orjustification was provided for these Administrative changes.
Comment: Provide the appropriate discussion and justification for these Administrative changes.
FLOG RESPONSE: As discussed in the transmittalletter and the " Methodology For Mark-Up of Current TS" in the back of Enclosure 2, the CTS has been marked up to reflect the substance of NUREG-1431, Revision 1. In general, only technical changes have been identified. However, some non-technical changes have also been included when the changes cannot easily be determined to be non-technical by a reviewer, or if an explanation is required to demonstrate that the change is non-technical. DOC 1-07-A was created and added to the top of the page for each CTS Section 3.6 Specification. DOC 1-07-A states: "All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development, certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified."
ATTACHED PAGES:
Enci 2 3/46-1,3/46-5,3/46-7,3/46-8,3/46-10,3/46-11,3/46-12,3/46-13,3/46-15, 3/46-17,3/46-18 Enci 3A 2 Encl 3B 1 1
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS -
$ 3. G.o -l 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT di-O'l-A CONTAINMENT "5CF" LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT !*TECR!" shall be maint:in-d OPERABl.E. 01-01-LG APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
ACTION:
t A
Withest CONTAINMENT !'TECRI" lin~op~erabld, restore CONTAINMENT !'TECR!TY t6 o3.o3(i3)
DPERABLE within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be ih"at' lea ^st HOT STAWBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and -
irrCOLD' SHUTDOWN within the following'30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. C3 ' I-I SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT !'TECR!" shall be demonstrated MRjaLE{
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations *# not 0106-LS19 ca able of being closed by 0PERABLE containment automatic isolation va ves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, en deactivated automatic valves 1-o u secured in valve secur.their positions, ed except pricheciq,yalgpit[
for valves that are open under flow;throughJthe admi'nistrative 01-04-Ls1 ermitted by Specification 3.6.3. IsolationTdevices11r!
controras~)
l11gQ@at tor ([geasimayJeylfie(WlaMMytaf1pgmeang
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the 01-0 9 requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
- txcept valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located 01-06-LS19 inside the containment :nd :re 10:hed. :::!Od. Or other.!t: 00 ured in th0 0100 d
- '
- :4 ti cn. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be perfonned more often than once per 92 days.
01-06-LS19
~~ 1 RExcept?when1165dd'bfTmanssT3/ilvesithitTiite"Ib& lied 55#iTed K6Eothersite securediand blindtflangesG1f? locked ?sealednomotherwise secured manual valves.: blind:flangesNandideactivated!autanatic;; valves!aretclosed to:satisf ACTIDN7(e.gid'3;6:3)itWpositionimust i be;yettfied@ut;mayfbelyerjfied;)y-^f~3an
~
admnistra.t_ive means;.
- - - ~
m ,_,
C. BH pu(wmong coma,nment waa$e m Menf , eurpt oz-on- A for conaa.nmen + air Ic;x Hshn3, in cecordence. wim .ne.
Conic nmen+ Le Auf t. 2:st. Tesu;ne, Ergrc m .
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS fMA!NMENT AIR LOCKS o 3.v.o _f of.c7_;
_ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION s M ed 0 c'cpt 7 cFth 3.6.1.3 Eachithi!t%6 containment 1- !cck it bein; i cd for no m:1 transit air locki shall entry and "it be OPERA
- 03424 thrcup9 the-c^*!ai ment, ther :t lc;;t onc ci- lock dccr ch:!' be c!c:cd z
~ 03-13-A APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
~
ACTION
- W**Y ***
w au _03-09-LS7 _
- a. + on.2_7 -
Withorit%1nter;1ocMmechanjsm" door one 6EiiKir# containment air lockslitW6nd inoperableY cb
~ntalMenfalhl6d
~0343-LS3 1.
~"~""~~~~~~~
om ss M: int:1 :t ic::t VeFiff the OPERABLE air lock door --
closed to"0PERABLE lock door closed, i(nd status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock the O -o3.o g 2.
Oper: tier may ther continue unti' performance of the next os-Ls4
} the OPERABLE air lock door is ver"1cd least once per 31 days. M 'at to03-Os-LS5 bc locked c
}
3.
COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. -ad A
9 prr/1 icn: cf Spcci'ic: tion 2.0.' :rc not :pplic:b! '
b.
With ee oniE6 03-12-A other0thancaT.~f adM containment air locks inoperable fohlr6dsodi _03-07-M leakagejrate dnt t1 ate *Actionito ?eVriluate?overall phrJLC026f15eEbpt~ai~thpie$ containment - air bit'6f"ad~ih6perable lock24 door within door.~obantinterlocktmechanisa0 closed ho0FF6Fwithiq ^'in'at e ' ihouC~ restleast HOT 6FE^the ST inoperable"' air lockeint:in to OPERABLE berifi sta COLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefc!!Mn;30$6 hours.ANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and fCJEntrifand
_ components; texit]Qermistib]egperformlepairQnithelaffected!:aitlocE 103-09.Ls7 ~
&GSepafat[conditiMentrf3MMfoQicQMoch - 03424 CEnterTappHeable7tonditionFandiReq01 red Containment"-when. airlock? leak Actionrof^tCO'^3;6lR ~
pogtainmentdeakageMat.ef ^~' ~ age results'" ~~ ~~~"1niexceeding'fthefove_ra,ll
~~~~~~'~'
o3 13.A
~ ~~^~' ~
- M TEntry "and'exitWs;permissableifof "both: ai rlocks;;a re gnoperablef^ ~^" ~ ^~ ^7~ day ~s ?under7 Administrative' C
~'"~~^~~~~~^~~~ 03_o3.Ls3 ^
$**[ Administrate.1ve;meansjAirlock7doorsMn?high3adIationJfea[maKp0lve .
_0346-LS5 _
~W JEntrylindlix1FofsontiiMEhtWsTp~simiidabisTUddsi9thd~E6ntro1Fof~a dedicated;1ndf y1dualf-~~~~~~~"" ~~ ~ "~~~~"~~^~ ^~~~~ ~~~~~ ~
+ lo3-os-Lss Qans a.I, a.2,ana a3 are no+ appbewt 4*Lom der m .M .same. o3.5.27 0,e lecx are inopercole Onct. Achm h. is enkitd.
93,og g59 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 TAB 13.4A 3/4 6-S Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996
i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS cho-l CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS o f. m.4 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION' m24 I 3.6.1.3 EichlttiiiG^isi6 containment air lock 5 shall be OPERABLE? with both decr {
cle:-' ::t:^t 5 r~th: :1r '^ t i: bein; d :d for n: ' tr:nbit entry :nd exit 03-134 j thr^";'. th centai .cnt. ther :t le::t On^ 21- 'cch dcor ch:l' b^ clcred. 1 03 01-LG APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
03-09-LS7 I ACTION e* whoN *** l t
.p OM.2 I 03-03-LS3 i
- n. v ;s.n ,
n w th,y,s, na ,a
- a. Wi th o. . n. .,.e. ir c.,.,_n. ,., 1,.,..,,,,..,riapre,_conta.i n.m.._en.t con a,o _t_a,inm_ent._. i- 03-08-LS6 l.ocks.,.eni.Inoperab.le_
i
. m _,
s door . _m t e.r__ ... _. _._._ I l'
- 1. " int:1r. :t le::t ifdhiff the OPERABLE air lock door closed om
- liitthWWh6Gh and sithbr restore the inoperable air lock door to"0PERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock the OPERABLE air ~
lock door closed, gl ,
- - ' - - ' ~ ^.........^. .'.+'^
"^+d
- 2. ... 03-05.LS4
^...'+."......",',+.',..^...+.4^^.
._.4_s___
1 .v.,..
.4.
, _ . o. . . . .o._+~.+
....,.7, ...
.,.......a+u...-+.
_ __4 s
=4 A
the OPERABLE air lock door is "er4'1-d te be locked clos' 'at least'once per 31 days. M -
- 3. Otherwise. be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.-end
! .e v u - - .- m.4.W-4 -..,y - , e --, 4. ,4 , .+ 4 - .
, ne .__ --+ .--, 4,.u,-
WFD . .y y, w ww .yyy .yz ye .m W. D ..yy - ..W.W .D q
.,., ...,._ containment air lock,s. inoperable fot
- b. Wi th @e s,....,,
ee _2,c_ esso _ns 03-07-M Dl8186%han4E.~. flytt4WQWM}W[WueralFqontajfuient^
leakagepateipetMB3 19except as the result of an inoperable air i lock' closed door en 1 door T isittilailigesp,~ meclignisal ma hta # g~eirt rest 6F6'the inoperab1p"&.ff at least one air lock
! ir lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hoUFs~6F~be"Tn at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the '^1 5:4n;3036 hours0.0351 days <br />0.843 hours <br />0.00502 weeks <br />0.00116 months <br />.
mm
. EM..EntFFian. die _ft.,!_!i.a?pi._ra._iss..i_ble_i_tu,fil._iffo.
~ .
rm._7 hip. s._i^r_s?M.n i_ttis.uie_f_fected_fa.Th_l_oc._k 03-og.LS7
[
- 'e$ep_6_Fiti.a~h._ond.._iti.b.~.
.ama_ areb _bt._hf4_s_"f4swe.gf4p_rie_sc.hT.m.iM,a _i 6ck9 m24
- .m m
, f'l$3*^EEntirlippl idbleTCondi tibnfiapeqdrid~ktiMi?Bfat04i671? n3-134 l Containment 4whentairlock ~ '
'Tlcontattiment{14akageMatej'f~leakap~etresults%fnleemadingithefoviFill ~ " ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ^ '~ ~ ^ ^ ~~^
l 1
****REntry!and m.% 4Xi. t. i.isipermissableifo_FWdd_yiTunde_F%._4 m ._ . min._is._tpat.-~iiWContr61 . . . _ --_ s.t_i f. ' 03-03-LS3 I botMaM- ockslare nopetab}e; L*fyJAffl6ckidoorQhlhighjlidMt1Missillaji)MhhldRidRhiiedjbj M6-LS5 Act_ninis_tr_ativelaeans.t m . _m -x
- E2EhtFyTihdiikitNficants]Hjiirit]((jii@iipibjfMdifrMCMh#sHf3 ON86 ded_i.ca...t.ed
- - -~~a si_ndiHduah m. 2-7 9 - khons' a.1, 0.9, ona 03 are & GW* W W " '" h "'- 5g.at. A ef Iecx are. onoperocle. onM. Achen b. t3 en M A- 0 3 o s .i. %
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 i TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 i March 1. 1996 ! i l i
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS g34g.t INTERNAL PRESSURE' ci-o7-A l l' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION - i 3.6.1.4 Containment internal pressure shall be maintained between -1.0 and +1.2 psig. l l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4 l ACTION: ! With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal
)ressure to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 l lours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l I
4 1 l l I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS' 4.6.1.4 The containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 12 hours. l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-7 Amendment Nos. 11 and 9 TAB 13.4A January 7. 1987
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ###'O AIR TEMPERATURE O' ~ O~1d LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I 3.6.1.5 Containment average air temperature shall not exceed I?O'F. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. ACTION: With the containment average air temperature greater than 120'F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5 The containment avera Of the te p0rature at the f01ge.~c air4ng temperature chall 100: tion: =d 50 be shall crithmet10:at1least thedetermined aver:ge 0541-LG once per 24 hours. E10m0-t =d Loc:tir a- TE 85 or TE 85. :pprox4mately 100 't elevation bet';;ccr cr=0 .21' rd 00ntai m=t -::1'. th- TE 87 Or TE SS. ppr0x4 mat 0ly 100 ft 010v: tion b0t'c!00r st0r g0ncr: tors, s- TE SO Or TE 90. Oppr0x m:tely 140 ft 010 Vat 40n r.0:r Oguip :ent h:tch Or :tsir: 4 at 270*. rc p00tively. =d d- TE 91 Or TE 92. :ppr0xim:t01; ISi ft Olevat10n On top of st0r generator
~1:0110 bar-icr r.::y 'rr Stc r g=0r: tors.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-8 TAB 13.4A
c D4.o -l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS o-om A
. CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM 07-01 A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ~
1' l 3.6.1.7 One purge supply lirie and/or one purge exhaust line of the Containment pyj*y g 1- Purge System may be open or the vacuum / pressure relief line may be open -The v = u"-!;r= c r^ r^14^f l1 r = y bc Op-^ provided the vacuum / pressure relief ONEM l isolation valves are blocked to prevent opening beyond 50' (90' is fully open). ! Opera, tion m,._.......m........ with u...+ any two 4, of,these three lines open is permitted. ,,.m..._im.- Op^r:t1=_., tith th0 pur;^
,m_
. m, .s.a. i
,+4_
m ,3 m. m.
.,.m.. ~. m_. 4. +.u. +. um .mm. .. 4.m< 4. ,. m. 3. + 4.
... ... _1t. ,200 . . . .h0ur;
. dur4 ;
l v:.v= Opr up t^ 50' th:1' b^ '4-it^d to in the Or O';u: = led:r We6F-- APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 1102 A l l ACTION wh N 03-13-A l Pit.'. : -t:1rrt pr;0 r^^1y rd!r rh:=t inl:tir =1 0 ^;r r the vre"-!;r^=ure relief inl:tir ":lez Opr up t 50' fr -^re the 200 07-044 u; h^" : dur4 ; : =1 r dr y = r er th^ C rtei r rt Pur;0 Syst^ Opr r d th0 OM 3 'T "ru"-!;- =re rCli^f itz ^p .. Or elith th0 "r"L 'pr0=re r^!4^f . 07-05.A 4 i nlati r Cl"= 0^ "* WithitN07Containmentiphrgeisdpply?ar aldumstMiiilvesiaF%r sE b^y^^^^"d
~ ~ ~ '
ire 11efswa ~ Eanthisanespenet. ifs.- tid 11-12 A y g.g 3 Vilv'sGTbF'is5 Tat #~thb"pb^ fithrifiT sib ~itMi) wit in 1 hour: otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the"next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. 07-02-LSe {paMj!DndidFIsore *giiiiiietratfMT15a,iFjettiisttEfiiiiiiidfjaari"itientifininf~
%3 ,g jg 9
.a issefg@st WithtakhoursMselsteithelsfTected' " teniflesif o m S1 leastiinefelseedraadWactfiisted '. @saisenciased;mendebielseEo~f bli 3 flange M .. 1the; penettetten! flew ' 4s#solatadiance~
I4
~
- pera ? Wert cutstee taedi ' ottoj fras lifL 1perfogued arttMeshe 19hdessi itselation Mnside ~~
containmentWand: C1088d perform <$erustllanceM 144arathenes11@1entises]jpurgel i tolc!NWMthMsJegdgd$ctlanJilDNiencejpeg jdtysj -ov.e- At SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.7.1 The position of the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation e< w valves and the vacuum / pressure. relief. m .isol ,ation =m. va ,l've _s shall=n bendete. =rmined _ closed ( 0743-A , )
~n _ x ,
a ,,e _as on _ce per. . ays,
, , w_. _._ _ ._... _ _ . _. ,,.._,. n __. _.. _ __. _ _.1. __ _._.._.. _. q g,s,3 5
=*F'M m M a na& =._.m., m*
A r1 r9 rkm ._ .1. ., +. 4. m..m.. +. 4 . .m +k.+
.... m . ._. +km e mmm . i. m,
.sm. .a r m, _w...r+ 4,m1
_...............+4.m.m.. 07.oa.g t.c
..... . . . m... . . m.m.
_ . ,... . ,....4.,....,+.4._... .., __ s . . 4 _ ,
.s,..m....... .. m
,m.._,_m--....
+wm....m...... . . . . . . . .. 4.m..
m, mm- u.
..m...
m .s.m,_ . . . . . . . , . qu,p ., g
. =1rdr y=r th:l' b,e dete-4 rd :t '^=t == per d:y:.
4.6.1.7.3 The 12iinibt@ vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves shall be verified "ED to be blocked to' prevent opening beyond 50* at least == per 'S -^^the DC-ALL -COI CCC h REVUG)dG IMYEb/AL WW
*amuIMlat1.6sEdefylde57~1 hi. _Wa_dli._
- tim._~s_pesi_~ jN_s'~ _ ~ _ffM_ ' '_~_lbf 01-04-LS1 dminist.
.a. ~.~.r.a.t.iv..e_7me.enst beorN . . . . . . -. - . -. . . . . - . . -. .u.e . . .+.. a . m ._ .-6 +..<. & -.....#.* .-....~..~...#".......y. -J 1102-A
*_?* EErsteFa~pp~11Eabli"ConditiMFMd1teqGiriiDetidEsibf2ttii3*Contithnient*HC0 o3 33.A hhe gle.;stagei msu]ts h eaceedkgithedo mra R gentainmentg eakage; rate r DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-10 1 TAB 13.4A
o%o-1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ci A 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS o3.o4 4 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .. 8 01-LG l 3.6.2.1 Two Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE "ith ::b Spr y Syst r c:^ ble of : kin; suction 'r = the ""ST and tran fer- M; spray function t: : " Syst= tab:ng sucticr #rr the centsi m:nt cump. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4. M . 08-11-L52 ACTION: $ 03.46 4 With one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the incperable Spr:y Syst= to OPEP/SLE statu vitb4" the next 'g 08-02-A hourt or and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 M hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . . . 4.6.2.1 Each Containment Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- b. os_og_to By?the7 flow!testTpointrisdifferce.tial at : verifying that on retircul:
- ressure tionthan bf greater #1^r:.
or each pump 15 develops equal t6^205"prid the: required" developed nead when tested pursuant to Spe:1'1 : tion d .95theMnservi.cesTestpogram: ec.cn kskuwd6 mrcevet X-ML-00I
- c. At least once p^r(IS s ths by:
- 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its a rrect position on an actual or simulated actuation .cignal, and
- 2) Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal
- d. At least once per 10 years by perfc-- M ; :n ci cr moke '10: test 08-06-LG throu;h cach spray header :nd verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.
M T f~ ^.^~" Additionally #' completion" time"ofa0~daystfrom discovery ^of failure to ^ '~~ ~ ' 08-11-LN meetyth..e. conditi.o. .n..s. tof;3. 6 23!an..d. 3 6.2. :3. 93,g,g 4 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-11 Unit 1 - Amendment No. M3114 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. M1112 July 25. 1995
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS g ,q,o ; SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM oi. a7 -A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION , 3.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE wie :
- a. A spray additive tank with a contained volume of between 2025 :nd 09-01-A 1000 ;:llen: 46;P J ind191:9% of between 30 and 32% by weight NaOH sol uti on , and'~~~~ '~ ~~ ~
- b. 50 ::r:y additi;T Oductor: c ch capable of Oddin; N 0H :Clut10n 'rr og-02-LG the caric:1 2dditi c t:9 t0 : Contsi"mont Spr:y Syst e pump ' hc!
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4. ACTION. With the 53 ray Additive System ino)erable, restore the system to OPERABLE status 09-03-A within 72 1ours or be in at least 10T STANDBY within the next 6 hours: restore the
^ddit M Syrt = to CPEP/?LE ct:tu; ,,ithin th; ncxt !C h;;r Or be in COLD
-5^ SOU ff)0WN within the following 00' hours. ( ag op.G,7, f 78 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . . 4.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual. )ower-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otlerwise secured in position. is in its correct position;
- b. At least once per 6 months by:
- 1) Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
- 2) Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.
ecc.h gswEb06 jtmerA/At DC-4u,-031
- c. At least once 4cr 20 month; by verifying that each automatic valve in og 04-A the flow path thatNsi:.notilo'ckidFsealbd20r.Otherwise secured in position ? actuates'to'its"dorrect'~'positi6ri onTar[ actuator ~~ 09-05-TR1 simulated C et:1 ment Spray ::te: tion test signal; and
- d. At least once per 5 years by verifying both spray additive and RWST full flow fre the t0 t =l= 0000 throughTeach ~ ~ ' ^ s61ution? flow p"athlin
~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ " ' ~ ~
09 07-M the Spray Additive System. g ,g G367-f DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-12 TAB 13.4A
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ci-o7-4 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.3 The Containment Cooling System shall be OPERABLE with either:
- a. - At least four containment fan cooler units (CFCUs). or
- b. At least three CFCus, each of the three supplied from a different vital bus.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4. M 06-11-LK2 E I $3.4.4 8/
- a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied. but at least two CFCus OPERABLE and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE. restore the Containment Cooling System to OPERABLE status within 7 days, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied an'd one Containment Spray System inoperable, but at least two CFCOs OPERABLE. restore the inoperable Containment Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore the Containment Cooling System to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hon "
09 M m,_pgggg;;__ c3. 4. s ,13. w SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS [ # GJ. (,. 6 - 2. 4.6.2.3 Each containment fan cooler unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by:
- 1) Starting each containment fan cooler unit and verifying that each containment fan cooler unit operates for at least 15 minutes.
M 08-11-W2 QRAdditfoMUyNK;6MsilitihhlttiiFbfE10?dipsyg#fgoveryMf2fiDUM]t# p,g,,,;;y
!=etatheiconditionsERA#12ipmCgg214 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-13 Amendment Nos. 89 and 88 l March 2. 1994 l TAB 13.4A
' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS cE' 0-I 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Cl'O LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.* !
. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
ACTION **** w**t - a W m With one or more of-@e penetFatEflolii!;isthsisithline isolation valveM 11-12 A inoperable, maintain at least 66E'isblation~VaTVe^~0PERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and: ,
- . P.= tere the' drepr210 =1=W te OPEP.^EE d:t= Mth4- d h= r:. Or 11-16 4 )
- b. 11-12-A at least one deactivated automatic ^ Val (ve~ secured in the isolationIsolate each a position, or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration g6lPiitti within 4 hours by use of 11-12 4 i at least one closed manual valve oFblind'Ylange 56i:heckHiii%eNith ~~~ 01.o3-A
- or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
G"?$EfiiiiilHihtehiiii"Miiildl3tuisiP3ifet~TVi1FE!DE$uiEleMiistdiinTlio~litidii 11 11-A V.alve.s.;Utslys,m_Mainfeelheternso_' ontvalvesMIVeH6' ms.c. g .io
. __. u-4
. = = : w e -- x_ _ a ,u_ m_ - ___g,, IC
.Qig 1 Valves @ h'y h _
MXHQ* Lrtd Or :C1d 01rd =1r= BiiiitMitfihlfidW7p~aith.]s may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. 1101-ts13 (ne. w--)"WithioneioF5aorelenetratidiiifi,diiTpathi'iirith;tikiTcontiliiment!1 solation
- 11-04-A bysusesof atsleastioneiciosediandialgactivatadiantenatictualvesclosed' ~
manualdvalveit e blind m angehorihet M atEleast N JSTAlWBY4withinj ~theIhext!67 ~
~ ~ ^ ^ ' hours g;g[ COL 0iSE@D8h!!Lth_ini thelfo%dgA0Jgst
(~new)J1thioniF6Miu5FETheNithilt135EflusTiiiithiT6f%tliRtRiiiRdiliiifigured~itttE6519 11-05-LS14
~ onet containmenttisolationWelvesand Welcaedtsys :en$with tone :containept
; isolation!valvedna Withini72ihouestby:perableMsolateitheiaffected, use?offatMeastione tclosed :and reactivated penetration # flow path ~~
ieutomaticNalve7cTosed manualival ve s orzblind rflangegor:besin tattleastN; STANDBY;~within:theinext: 60 hours
' ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ~
and. fin. iCOLD.~iSH..U.-.- TD..OWN
- wit..hin;th_e;fo.
. -- llowing;301h.ours; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
' E.2.1 E:2 rrt i=rt inl:tir ele 2:1' be d==tr:td OPEP.^EE prior t0 11-06-TR3 retur dn; the =?= to rrvir :fter = intern re;:1 Or replr=rt =rk 1:
perf0md = the =!= r it :ZO 1:td stat 0r. rrtr 1 r ; = = c1rcuit by
;0rf0 = = 0 Of : Cycidn; trt, rd =rd' int 1r of inhtir ti=. 11-09-A DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-15 Amendment Nos. 73 and 72 TAB 13.4A August 10. 1992 L
o3.e.c -l { CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS c1-o7. A 1241-A 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL I HYDROGEN ANALYZERS / MONITORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6'.4.1. Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers / monitors shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. and 2 @ ] . 12-02-M 3 ACTION: [C0] D I M f @ tidi g g Tg 13.os-t.s23
- a. With one hydrogen analyzer / monitor ino wrab1'e restore the inoperable analyzer / monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 da s or be 124RS15 i
" :t 10::t "T ST.t"Y ';;1 thin the n:rt 5 50; : s0bmittai 4
141 Rep'ortMnIR~coNiendiNith?10!CFRIS0!*sithin!the?following 14; days outlinino:the:preplannedialternate;arthodiof rannitoring athe:caustfbfithe i 2noperabilitylanditherilanstandtscheduleprirestorftgithejidrogenf^ ~~
' MLskzer/segitorityiDR iRABLEsstatu_s .
l
- b. With both hydrogen analyzer /.nonitors inoperable. restore at least one analyzer / monitor to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least 12 M M
HOT STANDB.Y within the next 6 hours @l@,{NITi31MD@L3thiMthe geMif M . , I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _ { 124Rs16 4.6.4.1 'Each hydrogen analyzer / monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once g 92 d:y: }Bisianths by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION ::in; : : Or :nd 12-06-LG liieis!EPerf6hiiTCHANNEETCHECCit9eastEMM[3}i. ^^W~eHWhidrogen v 12-07-M annyzerjeanitons ipone,9ya]. y ,,, j DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-17 Amendment Nos. 73 and 72 August 10, 1992 TAB 13.4A I W
)
l }, p CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
# 3'*U ~I bi A ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS -
t LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l l' 3.6.4.2 Two independent Hydrogen Recombiner Systems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTION: WithoneHydrogenRecombinerSysteminoperable$.restoretheinoperablesystemto 13-05-LS23 OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
^
[hisi)3Ht#ftisi!
^~~ ^1":7~^'3%idombefiU5ifgiEfibisNiiihifi?id thihililiiiUEIsiW6hdiip'"e^]r -
13.oi.ts17 12thourst ftensby administrativelseansathetithe2ydnpgentoontfor '. andirestorelone fonction1Westatainedg;lbe;1(atid%_g_a!!Mitijelgeg16iM]
$4_ttlsindtjl!$n%defsjjg xrecombineretoiSPutABLE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1
4.6.4.2 Each Hydrogen Recombiner System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. EERJEJ4 W@ TC-ALL-dol ({1332.Lgig i i
- a. n At-least llejFfeigling once each ref=lin; a Recombiner Systemdnter=1MagdB functionai teu..b{:tt..th- -%4mWmverifyin;. duri ;
13 03-LG idR P :..n th t- per:tur 4=rn:= t: ;r=ter th e er ^~r' t 700*r within 90
+-..4_. -4=tr.-~.-- <-."^^_4 o r= .
, ..a7 .00'F. 4+u.= r=+w = __.--
. 0h4^; ..4<, the ^~:^r
_-+- . =ttin;
.a ___.+ .
1 I
.;T ~ ""' ~ ~ ' '" '"'r~ " ' ' ~ '" - ' "' t G. . '.".'2.
....x_ L. .W G.. s.. v_G. .... JL
- b. At least once each r^f= r; . rf: by:
4 per-fc-4 n; C"^."El C^ LISP.^7".* Of :1 ' r= ^-'1 =r 13-04-LG 4 =tre-^*t:ti er =d :^^ trol 01 r=1 tt.
- 2) Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiner 13 03-LG enclosure (1.^. 100x w1-in; cr :tr=tur:1 ===tio=.
deprit: Of for 1;n =teri:15 etc.), and
- 3) Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by !
performing a resistance to ground test f011^w n; the 2 = 0 i n.03_to j required furt10ml tet. The r^ 1:t = = to ground for ry h^:ter phnt 0h:l' be greter th:r Or 0;=1 to 10.000 0" ;. i 1
]
i I t- . I DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-18 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 102
. TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 101 i July 25. 1995 i
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 3/4.6 (Continued)
' CHANGE !
NUMBER R& liq DESCRIPTION ! 01 06 LS19 The CTS requires all penetrations not capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automabe isolation valve (and required to be closed for accident conditions) be verified closed on a 31 day frequency, except for valves, blind flanges, and deschvated automatic valves which are located inside containment and locked closed, sealed, or otherwise secured in a closed position. These excepted penetrations were to be verified closed during each cold shutdown but not more often than once per 92 days. Consistent with Traveler TSTF-45, Rev.1 only containment isolabon valves that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured are required to be verified closed at the once per COLD SHUTDOWN frequency. Penetrabons (inside or outside containment) which are isolated by manual valves and blind flanges that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured are not required to be venfied closed, since they are venfied to be in the correct position prior to locking /secunng. CTS Surveillance 4.6.1.1 is incorporated into ITS SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 and into the redundant requirements of ITS 3.6.3, Required Action A.2. C.2, and [D.2]. As discussed above, the ITS surveillance were modified consistent with TSTF-45. The redundant Required Achons were also modified in a subsequent Traveler (WOG-91). The TSTF 45 modificabons to the ITS surveillance and the WOG-91 modificabons to Required Achons, while similar, differed in that the Required Achons still require some venficabon of posebon of valves that are locked closed, sealed or otherwise secured, although this venficabon may be performed via administrative means. The 01- O'7 A '*9" " G34.0-1
'02-01 A Consistent with NUREG 1431, the Containment Leakage LCO is now included in ITS 3.6.1, Containment LCO.
0 3,6.I-5~ 02 02 A fhe wording
- to ' the Reactor nt Systs temperature 200*F"* by equivalent iremen
- prior to the t unit startu lowing testin performed i rda
{ with the ' inment L Rate Testi Program." fact tthe Appl ~ of the new tainment LC is MODE 1-4 and the R 3.0.4 ires surveilla to be perfo before e ring MODE of 'lity, ensu that the requi leakage ra testing ' and that as-left test nce crite ' are before en into MODE 4. is changeis sistent with URE 431. This, irement is now ~ ciudad in ITS $.5.16, the in Leak Rate) t ProfgramgetApphcacte. -to Dcop. See, Converpon Compariscn Tnc>lt (Ereto:urg 32). 02-03 A This change is not applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 02-04 A This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison 1 Table (Enclosure 38). 02-05 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). l l DCPP Dem .y-,a of Changes to Current TS 2 ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - . - . _ . - - - - - - - - . - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - ---------------.__----------_a
Y i n 2 A t o l 1 f W n - o A L 2 O. 1 1 L e g a A C s s s s 6 3 .
.S 3 G.
s s s P e Y e Y e. Y e Y e Y e Y e Y NC oT o N 9 K n E i E t o R n C 2 F 1 L 6 Y O T 3
.S. -
I L I W s e s e s e s e s e s e s e oT o B Y Y Y Y Y Y Y NC N A C I L P P E A H CK S. NA AE f, M MP j 3 S O 7,~ T C s s . s s s s s s , s T e e e e e e e e 3 e N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y @ Y E . R R N 2. )37 U C O Y . $. t. c
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, J Lo Os yb ed I a l tb s t at W d v o e t n nt o rd hd t C r d i h"m.
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; et 3 t o oCr S C O r.
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s vnre L e a e e *pidte t n6 n u H S i R a 1 si l l e v ea e ou g r vf ea e3 C coo nbt mR l - C ie gr e r a t. E O Gsl l e oh nhm ds dn tcee k n r mS - C D L' . f( Eio st i g aoit os se l se e e anef roe eT e Rhi s e hs ir I E N i wie o e g u l qi n Lm P
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=. C t i l e t wa t dt n mir n o "g pett sn ivni s 1 . =L E " /- wfntia l l daw c eu iont iC inmrn ee t sepor i r
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f sl d qR t no t n1 de t egmt t T. p s raC a eN isa l r A- ; . _ . t u qhO eef e o cdd o6 oml a mm Sw. s SE R m o rs C wevwt a Eo Ti '- . i t s e3, co yl e' n a* t I t 3 L. :". :^ n n eiT oi sk i Snk c J C nve heS hetsulon n t ic l _. Coe6 niC es ho eh T y ql o TSefC o Pe r o p n G^ ,. ,
,f p3 AwA Adu TL OsC TI cal T i o
s r - e v R n _ E o B 1 C 3 4 5 6 2 3 M 0 9 1 2 1 - 0- 0- 0 1 0- 0- 0- 0- 0 P U 0 VA 1S 1S 1 2 2 2 - P N 1 1 1 iA CD 1M 0 0A 0A 0L 0A 0L - 0A 0A 0A O
Insert for 3.6.0-1 Enclosure 3A - page 2 DOC 1-07-A All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified. Enclosure 3B - page 1 DOC 1-07-A All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical SpecificaNons, NUREG-1431. App!icability: DC - Yes CP - Yes WC - Yes UE - Yes
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett::r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.0-2 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3/4.6.x ITS 3.6.x and Associated Bases Changes to the CTS and ITS markups are indicated by highlighting or striking out text. Modifications and additions are mainly highlighted and in some cases indicated by handwritten text. Deletions are indicated by striking the text out. During the course of the review of Section 3.6 numerous changes, modifications and additions have been found particularly in the ITS Bases which are not highlighted. In addition, a number of deletions were made in the ITS in which the text completely disappeared (it was not struck out). These deletions were found only because the ITS was being checked against another document (TSTF, STS or other FLOG ITS), and they usually occurred at the end of a paragraph, or subsection. Comment: Review the CTS and ITS markups to verify that the text accurately reflects the CTS and STS and that aH changes, modifications, additions and deletions are properly indicated. Update the submittal to reflect results of this review. FLOG RESPONSE: The submitted CTS, ITS, and ITS Bases markups for Section 3.6 have been compared to the CTS, STS, and STS Bases, respectively. Some differences that were identified were in accordance with the markup methodologies (e.g., deletion of brackets and reviewer's notes). Most of the differences were editorial in nature and would not have affected the review. Examples of editorial changes are:
- 1) Capitalizing a letter with only a " redline" but not striking out the lower case letter that it replaced.
- 2) Changing a verb from singular to plural by adding an "s" without " redlining" the "s."
- 3) Deleting instead of striking-out the A, B, C,.. etc. following a specification title (e.g.,
SR3.6.6A.7).
- 4) Changing a bracketed reference (in the reference section) with only a " redline" for the new reference but failing to include the strike-out of the old reference.
- 5) in some instances the brackets were retained (and struck-out) but the unchanged text within the brackets was not redlined.
- 6) Not redlining a title of a bracketed section. The methodology calls for the section title to be redlined when an entire section was bracketed.
- 7) Additional text not contained in the STS Bases was added to the ITS Bases by the lead FLOG member during the development of the submittal. Once it was determined to not be applicable, the text was then struck-out and remains in the ITS Bases mark-up.
Differences of the above editorial nature will not be provided as attachments to this response. The pages requiring changes that are more than editorial and are not consistent with the markup methodology are attached. l 2 1
Enclosuro 2 PG&E Lottar DCL 98-087 ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5A 3.6-19 EnclSB B3.6-3, B3.6-6, B3.6-16, B3.6-25, B3.6-37, B3.6-39 I l i ! I. i l .' 3 l. t
i Containment Spray and Cooling Systems '^trc:pheric. PS
-+Rd N:1 )
3.6.6A ACTIONS (Continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. D.1 Restore one feqUiFid 72 hours TwoDETsi]difid containment ^0F0;; tra u s sprayatriin containment 00bTih;; spfay train to OPERABLE status. 3
- 14 inoperable andione PequtFed?CFCUttrajii E.
lei:suchtthatii
. numiofitwoiCFCus'~~ D.2 Restore one CFCU train to 72 hours Q3.6.o-2.
r_e_ma. in.,_0_PE.RABLE
~
. ~~~ OPERABLE status such that four CFCUs or three CFCUs. g *.
each supplied by a different vital bus, are OPERABLE. E. Required Action and associated Completion E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Time of Condition C or 0 not met. .A.N. D . E.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours F. Two containment spray F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately trains inoperable. 3.6-14
^= c^-tin: tion of three or -^rc tr:in:
4neper2!c. One containment!sprai; train inoperableianditwolCFCU trainssinoperable?such ~ thationeloraldssCFCus punain;0PERABLEI^~ ~ E l OneToR1ess7CFCus - l f l DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 3.6-19
Containment P.t-^:;hed d B 3.6.1 BASES thc;0 'ndividual " it: Only result in the. containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the overall acceptance criteria of
" ~ ^ ^ ~
?;;rdi- J 1104 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.4. " Containment Penetrations."
ACTIONS .A_l In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to 0PERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2. 3, and 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal. B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status. the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 (g,
/ y) 0% 4 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining e containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements as3pecifiedlin1the .
Containment ' kage1 Rate 1 Testing Program"whichlis; consistent 6with Reg l If163ifl995.Jandathehequirements{of10CFR750'.'AppendixJ20ptionB; l
~(Ref 7"1EW-^df#i^# by"$P:9:d ^-- ;t1 = . Failure to meet ~ air ~ lock a 4
- er^0 v:1ve with re:1'1 r t =:1 leakage limits specified in the Containment
.eakage:RatejTest9togra$LCO 2.5.2 rd LCO 3.5.3 does not invalidate'the" acceptability ~~of'thise 095rall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overall Type A. B. and C leakage causes that to exceed M g' ,
limits. As left leakage prior to the first startuD af"er Derformina a/ ; required 10 CP 50. ?;;=dir J. Containment Leakage Ra;e Tesuno Proaram3 l leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L for combined Type B and C leakage followihg?afoutagey?sfiutdown'thatHnciluded!TypeiBlandfCftestingTonly. and Ys'0.75 (~for'~overalT~Typp"A~1eakade'following anToutagefornshutdown;that included!TypeTtestiid. At all other ti~mes'betwesirequirsd~ leakage" rate" tsstsTth acEeptancs" criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limi s 1.0 L,. At s 1.0 L, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the g assumptions of the safet analysis. SR Frequencies are as required by
?; pedi- J. :: -^di'1 d {y :ppr0ved ^ =ptir: OCFR50FApG40ptioniB. ffr:
These periodic testing requirements verify tha the' containment ge ra .e_ does not exceed the leakw nte assumM in thgety analysis ns6F
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OCPP Mark-uo of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-3
Containment Air Locks P.tmc:pheric. Sbatme pheric. H e Cenden cr, 2nd N an B 3.6.2 RASF9 Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE. the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE. the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPEPABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock 15 not being used for normal entry into or exit from containment. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these ! events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these ! MODES. Therefore, the containment air locks are not required in MODE 5 to ' prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for the containment air locks during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.Hl.
" Containment Penetrations."
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoperable. then it may be easily accessed for most repairs. It is preferred that the air lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering through the other OPERABLE air lock. However, if this is not practicable, or if repairs on either door must be performed from the barrel side of the door then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, which means there is a short time during which the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the OPERABLE door). The ability to oDen the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact. is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. After each entry and exit the OPERABLE door must be imediately closed. If ALARA conditions permit, entry and exit should be via an OPERABLE air lock. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO. separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable air lock. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and a subsequent inoperable air lock is governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. ,g In the event the
- . . , . . . , . . . air
. lock-leakage
,:p =tY:d:t:fresults infdRtre??e exceedingMthonrallthe M:it*1dFt..t Mr
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l containment Conditions and~1eakage rater'ofNote'3~directrentry"into~ Requirei Actions the'~ahp LCO 16.1. " Containment 1f the overa LiCMLem) 1-2 ggy a A.1. A.2. and A.3 l With one air lock door in one or more containment air locks inoperable. the OPERABLE door must be verified closed (Required Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock. This ensures that a leak tight containment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within ; hour. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTION of LC0 3.6.1. which requires containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. In addition, the affected air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hour Completion Time. The 24 hour Completion (Continued) l DCPP Mark-vo of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-6
Eubat =p".cric. Ice C6nd3?.dr355Ii B3.6.3 APPLICABILITY Therefore. the containment isolation valves are not required to be OPERABLE (continued) in MODE 5. The requirements for containment isolation valves during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.4. " Containment Penetrations." ACTIONS EeACTIONS re modified by a N e allowing penetra on flow paths atTare' normallysi' lated by;1oded or ealediclosedivalve' or valves do not' receive; containment:;isolati : signa C c.icept'~f^ $9 4 ^ch"Cet' --^nt' Po?" 3 5er+ 0"d 12 4 .ch "yd q c 'Pur^c ~ L intermdtently hndeFadminiMr.i;^ pen ^tr:ti^^ ']d cit"" . to be lnisolated D gN'3-N consist of stationing a cea1cated operator at the valve controls, who is inative cont continuous communication with the control room. In this way. the penetration can +m nm, be +wm rapidly isolated 4,- when _a +need
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isolation is indicated.
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y y i ,. . - ncp^r:b'^ ';&c. :: 'b;cd by SP. 3.5 3.1.ThiFNote!also;11mits'operatidri~of 03'6'o -a the normall flow; paths)y!1solated: Containment"Supplyfand ExhaustivalvesM2; penetration ~~'
~ ;and:the Wacuum/ Pressuret Relieff valvestW penetrationtflow ath EORelhan12JL3JpenegationJog, paths _opegWonettime!~~~ ~p~Q A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO.
separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken if necessary. if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment isolation valve. In the event the air !cck containment" isolation 1alve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment ~1e'aEage" rate ^ acceptance criteria. Note 4 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and' Required ~ Actions of LC0 3.6.1. A 1 and A 2 (Continued) DCDD Mark-uo of NUREG-la31. Rev 1 Bases B 3 6-16
Containment Isolation Valves (Atme pheric. Subn m0:pheric. !:0 Condon:Or. =d Du:1) B3.6.3 BASES SR 3.6 3.8 cent w e t iS N 93.G.o-2. Automaticcontainmentisolationvalvescloseona[haseIAMPhase1BToWCV) signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material Trom~' containment"folloWing a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic cont:i ment i 01: tion valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation signal. This surveillance is not recuired for valves that are locked. sealed, or oQerwise secured in the recuirec position under administrative controls. The (@ month Frecuency is basec on the need to perform this Surveillance under the 24 concitions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an m.m.m unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown t%t these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at theG) month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. N %~ ~# SR 3.6.39N6tlUsed 4r cubstm= pheric cont:i m =tc. the check V:lv5 th:t serv 0 cont:1nm=t incl: tion funct1 = :re ';;0ight er sp-4n; 10:ded to provide p0:itive 10:urc 4-the dirxtion Of #1 e. "i; =: urn th:t ther chxk V:lv5 "4' r =:i - c!=0d ":Or the 4=ide =nt:1==t st-^:phere return: to Cub:tm=pheric conditic= foll e n; : "A. SR 2.5.2.9 ver4'in the 0^0r ti= Of the check 4 valv = th:t Orc =t t rt:ble dur4n; unit Oper:ti = . TECc0;ueryof r 18 m=th it bred On =th frtors = the 4".r:0=1bi'ity Of ther V:lvr. the frt th:t the =1t me:t be chut dece' to perf0- the t=tc. =d the suc cZ ful r= Ult Of the t = t: On r 18 m=t" bri: dur4"; prt =1t Operati= SR 3.6.3.10 Revia:cr*: M0te: Thi: SR n Orly requir^d f0r th0= =1t: ';'ith rc 111=t
=:1 pur;0 valv5 :110;;0d t0 bc Oper dur4"; [MDDE 1. 2. 2. Or C = d h:v4ng b!0cking devi 5 On the V:lv= th:t Orc not pcm==tly 4":talled.
Verifying that each f43312 inch containment ppge (pressureNatuum?reHef valve is blocked to restrict opening to r [S0]! 50'~1s required to ensure '
~
~
that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in ses of References 1 and 2. If a LOCA occurs, the ppge containment the analy/vacuumTreliefsvalves must close to maintain containment leakage pressure , withirithe valu6s'ahsumed in the accident analysis. At other timx "hcr ! purg0 valvt r0 r^ quired to b0 apable Of cl=ing 'O g. dur4n; mov0-'0-t of l r==tly d'r:diat^d fuel n ~".blin). prezurintion co^^0r": 3r04 t pr0Mht, thus thc pur;0 v:lv5 ':r be fu"y Oper. The month Frequency is I y removed e4y appropriatebecausetheblockini)[devicesarenottypica dur4n;
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V (Continued)
'1 1
DCPP Mark-uo of NUREG 1431. Rev 1 Bases B 3.6-25
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems (^.tmospher1: :nd Du:1' B 3.6.6A BASES (Continued) pressurizer compartment, and instrument tu- clr' ektoFcoolantiumps and outside the secondary. shield in the lower areas'of containment: BACKGROUND During normal operation. 21' four fan unit: thr~ee?CECUs are operating. The : (continued) fans are normally operated at high speed with"EGW CCW supplied to the cooling I coils. The Cont irment C0014ng Systr. Operating 4" conjunction "ith the l Contsi==t V=til: tion and "- Conditicrdn; syst=:. S CFCOsiare designed l to limit the ambient containment air temperature during normal' unit operation to less than the limit specified in LCO 3.6.5 " Containment Air Temperature." This temperature limitation ensures that the containment temperature does not exceed the initial temperature conditions assumed for the DBAs. Inpostaccidentoperationfollowinganactuationsignal,theContaim=t C00.4ng Syst e fan: CFCus are designed to start automatically in slow speed if not already running' 'If running in high (normal) speed, the fans l automatically shift to slow speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed ' during accident conditions to prevent motor overload from the higher mass atmosphere. The temperature of the ESW CCW is an important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan units.'
~
APPLICABLE The Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System i SAFETY limits the temperature and pressure that could be experienced following a ANALYSES DBA. The limiting DBAs considered are the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the main steam line break (MSLB). The LOCA and MSLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or j consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to containment ' ESF systems, assuming the 1c= Of one W6rsticasEsinglsifaildre. &tfihmbt enaa n ' + =i4
- Fam ' t f# A i=# 4.ka > #6 41 LA' + a einem a##nna McTU'dae + kWl D 15 " i G ' i M d R h iuh 5in n a M iiiM % i c : K % T = u'rrf .
;gsw w .m ;f L 3i; J 1 4 E F;Ci.n4 n giindm;s;L E5n3i555SC50i?N 555~ bhiE7r 555rciJMef5ETEL F55thEiMUseNt5e worstisinglsi:failur;edsithsifailureiof one 55h$ftrain%whichWesultsiinfonly one:CSPiand;two:CFCOs7availableh;FordSLB: case Athelworsttsingle ? failure 11s ~
thelf a i lurej ofMMSIVitolc]oselwi thitwo; CSP 3ndithreej CFCusloperating T~~ The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case scenario, the highest peak containment pressure is 46-12 42 25 psig (experienced during an 0c ^, MSLB;at?30%Epower) compareditolanlallowable 47dsi The analysis shows that the pe'ak" containment ~ temperature ~i M 40-86^326 C (g. experienced durin q J.o.o -2. at?70% power)tand$1@cosperedito7thesenvironm6ntahqualifications'g of:01 ant an MS equi snentT^^Both~resiilts~ meet"ths' intent bf ^the~desigri" basis 7(Er the S xg
.0- LU 2.0 '. " Cont:1 m rt r= :ure." r d LCO Z i l !c : cct:iled e
< di=uzien ' /The analyses ano evaluouuns anume a unit spec 1 Tic 70wer level of MG 102%5foEthen.0CA withioneMontainment~sprayLtrain anditwoMFCUs rea w e operating [ 2Thenimitingicase(MSLBlanalyseslandAvaluations~ ^ ~
SM ta-oA o 3 4 -I1 (Continued) l DCPP Mark-vo of NUREG-1431. Rev 1 Bases B 3.6-37
- n v ~ - --
- ~~ ~ B1.0 BASES (Continued)
LC0 During a DBA LOCA, a minimum of m: :=t:frrt r:Pn; tr:1- Wo7CFCusiand one containment ~ spray train are required to maintain the containment ~ peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Refs. 4). Additionally, one containment spray train is also required to remove i ine from the containment atmosphere and maint centrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. To ensure tha hese requirements are met. two C340 2 containment spra CFCU trains bonstiting of?four?CFCOs oryCFCus?eactnsupplied:bila?dif ithree trains and two _..1=nt reli ferent vite.llhusunust~~be 4-OPERABLE'.~_ Thsrefore~.'i_n"_th.e^ event'of ni~adct. dent 7ilt' lea "one tra"in =$ assumin 'the" worst ~ case s le" actin ~fiYTDrs~'occun~.'~~Each" Containment Spray System ~ rain typically incl es a spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, pi ing instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of t.a ing suction from
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--~rvc w =n=x Each Cet:1 =t Cr:P ; Sy:tr CFGitypinP" incluoes drittr:. cooling coils, dampers, fans. instruments".~andcontrSistoensureanOPERABLEflow path.
APPLICABILITY ' In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment' pressure and temperature requiring the o mration of the containment spray trains and senta4 ament 20P n; tr:in: Ecus. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the Containment Spray System E d 20 Cem . _ . . : n; ty:- r,-- not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 ano o.
%emwe sWu-oJ4-
' ACTIONS A,l '
With one containment spray train inoperable.-the inoperable containment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray and cooling trains are 46-adequate to perform the iodine removal and containment cooling functions. The 72 hour
. Completion Time takes into account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by the Containment Spray System, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
(Continued) L
-DCDD. Mad-vo of NUREG-1431 : Dev 1 Bases B 3.6-39
Enclosuro 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 i 3.6.1 Containment ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.1-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) DOC 1-01 LG CTS 1.7 (1.8 for Diablo Canyon) CTS 3/4.6.1.1 ITS B3.6.1. Bases - BACKGROUND CTS 1.7 (8.8 in Diablo Canyon) defines CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. A markup of CTS 1.7/1.8 is provided in the CTS markup of CTS 1.0, but not in the markup of CTS 3.6. DOC 1-04A (CTS 1.0) states that the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted from the CTS /ITS. DOC 1-01 LG in CTS 3.6 states that the definition requirements have been relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.6.1. Both of these justifications are incorrect. DOC 1-04A (CTS 1.0) is incorrect in that the definition is not deleted but relocated to various Bases in ITS 3.6, which is a Less Restrictive (LG) change. In addition, the individual statements within the definition (CTS 1.7a/1.8a, 1.7.c/1.8c,1.7.d/e/1.8d, and 1.7f) are used as the basis for various iTS SRs and Bases statements in ITS 3.6.1,3.6.2 and 3.6.3 which are Administrative and Less Restrictive I (LG) changes. DOC 1-01 LG does not relocate the definition from the CTS to the ITS Bases, but changes CTS 3/4.6.1.1 from rnaintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY to the containment shall be OPERABLE. This is an Administrative change. (See Comment Numbers 3.6.1-2, 3.6.1-3, 3.6.1-4, 3.6.2-1, 3.6.2-2, 3.6.3-1 and 3.6.3-2). Comment: Revise the CTS markup of CTS 1.7/1.8 and CTS 3/4.6.1.1 to reflect the above discussion. Provide additional discussions and justifications for relocating the details of the definition to ITS B3.6.1. Bases-BACKGROUND and to ITS 3.6.2 and 3.6.3. See Comment Numbers 3.6.1-2, 3.6.1-3, 3.6.1-4, 3.6.2-1, 3.6.2-2, 3.6.3-1 and 3.6.3-2. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) has been changed to DOC 1-04 LG (CTS 1.0) and revised to read:
"The definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted on the basis that it does not appear in NUREG-1431. It has been replaced with the new requirement of Improved TS 3.6.1 for containment to be OPERABLE. The details of this definition describe what constitutes an OPERABLE containment. Thus, they would be incorporated into the Bases for improved TS LCO 3.6.1 and are reflected in various Surveillance Requirements for ITS 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3. This change is proposed to conform to NUREG-1431, and it is -
categorized as LG because information of a descriptive nature would be moved to the Bases of the improved TS. For the individual statements within the definition (CTS 1.7a/1.8a,1.7c/1.8c,1.7d/e/1.8d, l and 1.7f), that are used as the basis for various ITS SRs that would be retained in ITS 3.6.1, l 4
i Enclosura 2 PG&E Lcttar DCL 98-087 3.6.2, and 3.6.3, these changes are categorized as Administrative. The sealing requirements (CTS 1.7e/d/1.8e) have been incorporated into the Bases of 3.6.1 (Background). Further discussion of this change is also given in change description 1-01 of CTS Section 3.6." DOC 1-01 LG (CTS 3.6) has been changed to DOC 1-01 A and revised to read:
" Consistent with NUREG-1431, improved TS 3.6.1 would retain requirements currently specified in CTS 3/4.6.1.1, " CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY." [] Meeting containment leakage
. requirements would be made a direct condition of containment OPERABILITY through SR 3.6.1.1. In addition, the term CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY has not been retained as a defined term in the ITS. The requirements for containment OPERABILITY, including the requirements previously found in the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definition, would be placed in the Bases for TS 3.6.1. (See the discussion of the deletion of the defined term CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY in change des::ription 1-04 of CTS Section 1.0.) []. These changes are classified as Administrative (A)."
ATTACHED PAGES: 1.0 Enci 2 1-2 1.0 Enci 3A 1 1.0 Encl 3B 1 3.6 Encl 2 3/4 6-1 3.6 Enci 3A 1 3.6 Enci 3B 1 i ! 5 [. __ ._________________-____________O
1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.01 DEFINITIONS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.7 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:
- a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the
~
channel as close to the sensor as practicable to' verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/sa trip functions, or 0101-A
- b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated or'actua~1 signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including required ' alarm and/sr-trip functions;;or 01-01-A
- c. Digital channels - the injection of a simulated orfactual. signal into the channel as close to the sensor input to the process racks as practical to verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/sr-trip 01-01-A functions.
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DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 1.0 This Enclosure contains a brief description / justification for each marked-up change to existing current plant Technical Specifications (CTS). The changes are keyed to those identified in Enclosure 2 (mark-up of the CTS). The referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHC) are contained in Enclosure 4. All proposed technical changes to the CTS are discussed below; however, some administrative changes (i.e., format. presentation, and editorial changes made to conform to the improved Technical Specifications (ITS)) may not be discussed. For Enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A, and 6B, text in brackets *[]" indicates the information is specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) Plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location. CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION 01-01 A These definitions would be reworded to be consistent with NUREG-1431. The proposed rewording included in this category does not involve any changes of a technical nature. 01-02 A Not applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). See Conversion Companson Table (Enclosure 38). - 01-03 M The definition of CHANNEL CALIBRATION is reworded to be consistent with NUREG-1431. The revised wording provides additional detail concerning calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTDs) or thermocouple. ,,, f 01-04 .N LG The definition oI ONTAINMENT TREGITY would no lo er be used) and the spec' tions in ITS ion 3.6 and the Admini ative Controls j Section wou be revised acco ingly. The CTS defini' n for CONTAIN ENTINTEGRITY uld be deleted to be nsistent with NUREG- 31. This definiti is effectively incorpor ed into the NUREr 1431 Bases for new Containment Li ng Condition for
, Oper on (LCO)(ITS 3. 1) and the Administra ' e Controls Section for Lthe ntainment Leak e Testing Program [
.Tn5cet 01-05 A The current definition for CONTROLLED LEAKAGE would be in accordance wdh NUREG-1431. This definition will no longer be required for the ITS because LCO 3.5.5 ensures that reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection flow remains within limits. Therefore, this change is not technical and has been categonzed as administrative.
01-06 LS1 Not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B) 01-07 A The location of the thyroid dose conversion factors used for the calculation of DOSE EQUIVALENT l 131 have been added in accordance wdh NUREG-1431. DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 1
insert for 3.6.1-1 1.0 Enci 3A ' 1-04-LG - The definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted on the basis that it does not appear in NUREG-1431. It has been replaced with the new requirement of improved TS 3.6.1 for containment to be OPERABLE. The details of this definition describe what constitutes an OPERABLE containment. Thus, they would be incorporated into the Bases for improved TS LCO 3.6.1 and are reflected in various Surveillance Requirements for ITS 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3. This change is proposed to
. conform to NUREG-1431, and it is categorized as LG because information of a descriptive nature would be moved to the Bases of the improved TS.
For the individual statements within the definition (CTS 1.7a/1.8a, 1.7c/1.8c,1.7d/e/1.8d, and 1.7f) that are used as the basis for various ITS SRs that would be retained in ITS 3.6.1,' 3.6.2, and 3.6.3, these changes are categorized as Administrative. The sealing requirements (CTS 1.7e/d/1.8e) have been incorporated into the Bases of 3.6.1 (Background). Further discussion of this change is also given in change description 1-01 of CTS Section 3.6. l
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3/4.6 CONTA3NMENT SYSTEMS ~ 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT OI- Cff-A CONTAINMENT !"7ECR m LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1. CONTAINMENT I'TECRITV shall be -':1nt:ined OPERABLE. 01-01-LG APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. j i ACTION- i Y.- Without CONTAINMENT I"7EC9?TY f ~'7abli. restore CONTAINMENT I'TECRITY t6 0101g g DPERABLE within 1 hour or be in lei 5t HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and -
'iH~ COLD ^ SHUTDOWN within the following'30 hours. OS.6. l-I l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT !"7ECRITV shall be demonstrated @l@BEj
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations *# not 01-06-LS19 capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation j valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are 1-0 9 I closed by valves, blind flanges. OF deactivated automatic valves ]
,] Ithe gj.o4.tg3 secured valve 3 secured _in their positions, except orgjchedQva})Qi@hMla(dminis for valves that are open GHder a Pitive coritr6Tas^ permitted by_ cjfication 3.6.3. IsolatforiMevicesMrj hWMML ._ -
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- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the 01-05-A requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located 01-06-LS19 inside the containment and :re 10:E0d. 00:1^d. Or Oth =:100 00=r^d in the cl0:0d petition These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.
01-06-LS19 ($@'E2eptishinichidd iby!aanuali^ii19esithat?iPe?16iidd?Mid16d EoRotheNise secured ?andiblind nflangesNfMaoeked ledWorgotherwiseVsecuredmanual valves Mb11nd sflan'g'e' shand. deactivated..automaticlitalvesiareiclosedito esati sf '
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DIABLO' CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996
1 DESCRIPTION OF CHAN2ES TO TS SECTION 384.8 This Enclosure contains a brief description /jussfication for each marked-up change to existing current plant Technical Specifications (CTS). The changes are keyed to those identified in Endoeure 2 (mark-up of the CTS). The referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHC) are contained in Enclosure 4. All proposed technical changes to the CTS are discussed below; however, some administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes made to conform to the improved Technical Specifications (ITS)) may not be discussed. For Enclosures 3A, 3B,4, 6A, and 68, text in brackets "[ T indicates the i,-Jui,,,e A,,. is specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) Plants. Empty brackets indente that other JLS plants may have plant specsfic information in that location. CHANGE
- NUMBER HRliQ DESCRIPTION 01-01 -4:0- A C='
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gg'gg S 3. dr. l- 1 01-02 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, this roc,urement to verify the penetratio_n flow path is isolated is now addressed by improved Technical (god)
' Si-c.;' tion (ITS) 3.6.3, Containmentisolation Valves, Condition Arge and(9} and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.g.g.4 01-03 A The ACTION atstements are revised to incorporate the NUREG-1431 l allemative isolabon method of a " check volve with the flow through the valve secured." This isolabon method is prowded in NUREG-1431 and is considered an acceptable vanabon of a de-achvated automatic valve.
01-04 LS1 A Note is added to valve and blind flange SRs consistent with NUREG-1431. The Note allows venfication of valves, flanges, and isolation devees located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of admmistrahve means. This change is less restnchve in that the CTS SR 4.6.1.1 has an excephon to valves, blind flanges, and desebvated automsbc valves whch are located inside containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed posibon These valves shall be venfied closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN. However, under CTS, if an area outside of containment becomes a high radiation area, we would still be required to enter the area to venfy the closed positions. The ITS would allow venficebon of all areas that are high radiation areas or become high radiation areas to be venfied by administrative means once they have been vonfied to be in the proper possbon This is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is restncted for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probabihty of misalignment of these devices, once they have been initially venfied in the proper position, is small. 01-05 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, this requrement is addressed by SR 1 3.62.1 in ITS 3.6.2, Containment Air Locks Required Acbons. ! i i DCPP Desenption of Changes to Current TS 1
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Insert for 3.6.1-1 3.6 Enci 3A - page 1 01-01-A Consistent with NUREG-1431, improved TS 3.6.1 would retain i requirements currently specified in CTS 3/4.6.1.1, " CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY."[] Meeting containment leakage requirements would be i made a direct condition of containment OPERABILITY through SR l 3.6.1.1. In addition, the term CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY has not been retained as a defined term in the ITS, The requirements for containment OPERABILITY, including the requirements previously found in the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definition, would be placed in the Bases for TS 3.6.1. (See the discussion of the deletion of the defined term CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY in change description 1-04 of CTS Section l 1.0.).[] These changes would be classified as Administrative (A). 3.6 Enci 3B - page 1 01-01-A improved TS 3.6.1 would retain requirements currently specified in CTS i 3/4.6.1.1, "CONTA!NMENT INTEGRITY."[] The proposed change would I no longer address containment leakage in a separate specification. l l l
-_______ ___ __. _ _ J
r Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett r DCL 98-087 l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.1-2 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC l REQUEST: l DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) DOC 1-01 LG CTS 1.7.b (1.8.b for Diablo Canyon) l CTS 3/4.6.1.1 l ITS B3.6.1. Bases - BACKGROUND CTS 1.7 (1.8 in Diablo Canyon) defines CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. A markup of CTS 1.7/1.8 is provided in the CTS markup of CTS 1.0. DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) states that the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted from the CTS /ITS. DOC 1-01 LG in CTS 3.6 states that the definition requirements have been relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.6.1. Both of these justifications are incorrect. CTS 1.7.b/1.8.b states that "All equipment hatches are closed and sealed." ITS B3.6.1 Bases - BACKGROUND states the following: "To maintain this leak tight barrier: c. All equipment hatches are closed; and.. " The requirement for sealing the equipment hatches has been deleted. No justification is provided for this Less Restrictive change. Comment: Provide a discussion and justification for this Less Restrictive change. FLOG RESPONSE: Consistent with the current requirements of CTS 1.7.b (1.8.b for Diablo Canyon), the words "and sealed" have been added to the ITS B3.6.1 Bases - Background , statement "c. All equipment hatches are closed . . ." j Further, DOC 1-04 (CTS 1.0) has been revised to include the relocation of CTS 1.7.b (1.8.b for Diablo Canyon) to the Bases of ITS 3.6.1 as a Less Restrictive (LG) change. See response to Q 3.6.1-1.
)
DOC 1-04 LG (CTS 1.0) now reads:
"The definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGPITY is deleted on the basis that it does not appear in NUREG-1431. It has been replaced with the new requirement of Improved TS l 3.6.1 for containment to be OPERABLE. The details of this definition describe what constitutes an OPERABLE containment. Thus, they would be incorporated into the Bases for improved TS LCO 3.6.1 and are reflected in various Surveillance Requirements for ITS 3.6.1,3.6.2, and 3.6.3. This change is proposed to conform to NUREG-1431, and it is categorized as Less Restrictive (LG) because information of a descriptive nature would be moved to the Bases of the improved TS.
For the individual statements within the definition (CTS 1.7a/1.8a,1.7c/1.8c,1.7d/e/1.8d, and 1.7f) that are used as the basis for various ITS SRs that would be retained in ITS 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3, these changes are categorized as Administrative. The sealing I requirements (CTS 1.7e/d/1.8e) have been incorporated into the Bases of 3.6.1 I (Background). Further discussion of this change is also given in change description 1-01 of CTS Section 3.6." 6
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.6-1 l 7 l l I
l I l Containment (^.tme:pheric) B 3.6.1 { \ l B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ! l B 3.6.1 Containment (^.tmospheric) ! J BASES BACKGROUND The containment consists of the concrete reactor building. its steel liner, and the penetrations through this structure. The structure is designed to contain I radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core following a ! g op cookntDesigr. Basi: Accident 93At. Additionally, this structure provides shielding ! NM from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere ; following accident conditions. l The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cylindrical wall, a j flat foundation mat with?a? reactor > cavity; pit projection, and a cha'lew ! bemisphericil dome roofEThe ~inside~ surface"of~the^ containment is lined with a ! carbon ~ steel" liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating ' and accident conditions. em- - mm + , 4 -+ , m.us ,,merm,,+ms + mms - !
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si..~;';. J. 7. ;~;<. J.;i_;;L ,,+ J4X. s ; L.;T,,J";;;T 7;;r7;;;'r ;C;; J"" l y . - . . . . The exteHoEsheTUand concrete re:cter buildir. strUctUrsiarabnd:thEreactor - VesselMerahe4 wall;and is required'for"5tFudturarint~egrity of
^
the^ containment"6 rider ishieldhalp"The conditions ~.~ steel liner and its penetrations ) establish the leakage miting boundary of the containment. ThelstbelElirjef addi tiond11y~ provides3upportand ranchofagetfo$safet9?reMed ; pipingMnd" l elettricalf racewayDHaintaining the" containment ~0PERABLE~ limits thelehkage of 4 fission ~ product ^ radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50. Appendix JH0ption B (Ref.1), as modified by approved exemptions. The isolation devices for the
~
penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:
- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
- 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions. except as 1 provided in LCO 3.6.3. " Containment Isolation Valves" I
- b. Each air lock is OPERABLE. except as rovided in LC0 3.6.2.
" Containment Air Locks"; and seCed., 03 6 I- 1 l
- c. All equipment hatches are close nd 1
- d. The p c:curi:cd sealing mechanism associated with a penetration l 4-1e:g.,TweldsRbe11.0.wsHor10irings..). is OPERABLE. c=pt at provided
. m _
l I APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the containment must l SAFETY withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without ANALYSIS exceeding the design leakage rate. The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high pressures and temperatures are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a ~~ steam line break a^d a red (Continued DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-1
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.1-3 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) DOC 1-01 LG CTS 1.7.d/e (1.8.e for Diablo Canyon) CTS 3/4.6.1.1 ITS SR 3.6.1.1 and Associated Bases CTS 1.7 (1.8 in Diablo Canyon) defines CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. A markup of CTS 1.7/1.8 is provided in the CTS markup of CTS 1.0. DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) states that the definitions of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted from the CTS /ITS. DOC 1-01 LG in CTS 3.6 states that the definition requirements have been relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.6.1. Both of these justifications are incorrect. CTS 1.7.d (1.7.e in Callaway and 1.8.e in Diablo Canyon) specifies that the leakage rates are in accordance with CTS 3.6.1.x. This requirement has not been relocated to the Bases, but is the basis for ITS SR 3.6.1.1. No justification is provided for this Administrative change. See Comment Number 3.6.2-2. Comment: Provide a discussion and justification for this Administrative change. See Comment Number 3.6.2-2. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-37 A (CTS 1.0) has been added to read:
" CTS 1.7.d (1.7.e for Callaway and Wolf Creek and 1.8.e for Diablo Canyon) specifies that containment leakage rates are within the limits of CTS [SR 4.6.1.1c]. Improved TS 3.6.1 contains requirements currently specified in CTS [SR 4.6.1.1c ). This requirement is the basis for ITS SR 3.6.1.1. Because meeting containment leakage requirements would be made a cirect condition of containment OPERABILITY through SR 3.6.1.1, this change would be classified as Administrative (A)."
Also, see the FLOG response to Comment 3.6.1-1 regarding the relocation of the
- CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definition requirements.
ATTACHED PAGES: 1.0 Enct 2 1-2 1.0 Enci 3A 5 1.0 Enci 3B 4 1 l 8
1.0 USE AND APPLICAT10N 1.01 DEF1NITIONS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL-TEST 1.7 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:
- a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated or'~ actual signal into the channel. as close to the sensor as practicable to' verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/es trip functions, or 01-01 A
- b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated or 5ctdal signal into
~
the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including required ^ alarm and/or-trip functions, Lor 01-01 A
- c. Digital channels - the injection of a simulated ofactual signal into the channel as close to the sensor input to th practical to verify OPERABILITY including requ,e process racks asired 01alarm 01-A and functions.
The Channel Funct'ional' TestTsai~b(T>ei foriedibi meins~of"any7seriss"of - . sequential . Tove..rla..ppin.
- - . .~
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- l. DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 ^-^r"- Et t '2 ! '2 ?' :rd !2 l
TAB 4.4A E "::t ': : :': ' ) u ! I l _ _ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ _ _
i DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 1.0 i' CHANGE - NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION l 01-26 A New Sections 1.2.1.3, and 1.4 would be incorporated into the ITS to be t consistent with NUREG-1431, Section 1.2 provides specific examples of the use of the logical connectors ANR and Qli and the numbering sequence associated with their use in the ITS. Section 1.3 deals with the proper use and interpretation of Completion Times, and specific examples are given that will aid the user in understanding Completion E Times. Section 1.4 deals with the proper use and interpretation of surveillance Frequencies. Specific examples are given that will aid the user in understanding surveillance Frequencies as they will appear in the ITS. The proposed changes are administrative in nature and by themselves are not technical changes, incorporating Travelers WOG-74, Rev.1, and WDG-90, Rev.1. i 01 27' M Not applicableto DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3Bk l 01-28 - LG Not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3BL 01-29 LS3 Not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3Bk 01-30. A Consistent with TSTF-39. Rev.1, the definitions of COT, { CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (CFT)], and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST (TADOT) are expanded to include the details of acceptable performance methodology. Performance of these tests in a
' senes of sequenbal, overlapping, or total channel steps provides the
. necessary assurance of appropriate operation of the entire channel.
- l. This change also makes the COT, [CFT], and TADOT definitions
' consistent with me CTS and the NUREG-1431 definition of CHANNEL CALIBRATION which already contains similar wording.
!. 01-31 A Definitions of specific plant systems which are defined by the plant !' design are deleted consistent with NUREG 1431. The definitions contained in ITS 1.0 are intended for definitans that are necessary for ! the understardng of the specifications and can be generically defined ' for most plants. Definitions of systems that are not used in the specifications, or are specific to a particular plant (or only a few plants) are no longer defined in this section Where necessary, such items are defined in the Bases for the applicable specifications. 1-32 A The definitions of CHANNEL CAllBRA' TION, COT, [CFT]. and TADOT are reworded to be consistent with Industry Traveler TSTF-64 to clarify the phrase
- entire channel;" thus reducing the potential for inconsistent interpretation of the phrase as experienced by a number of plants.
'1-33 A This change reuses the CTS definition of CORE ALTERATIONS to delete "or manipulation" and
- conservative" in accordance with NUREG-1431. The words as used in the definition were redundant and deleting the words does not alter the meaning of the definition.
-l-35 A (see inse<+ p,e q 3 5.3 0- c35,3.,
1- % A /sr.e hse a f - o 3 6.2- 0 o s.s.2- # I 'b~1 A (see. Instro for 4 S.6.I-$ q ;its.t.3 DCPP Desenption of Changes to Current TS 5
- P - ly n . Y oST _ A n oC tono S T W iy it di ec t C A na iw ve L L f ea oS in A m,R t _ dll ,a o C sC sA4 s n e eS6 o e o, s s Yi n YF1 N Y e e N Y Y K 6 1 E E ' t on S R dt e T C ec C F ve n L oS i Y t T O mR o n sA 0 I L W o eS o 's , s s I B N e o e e 1 - YU N Y N Y Y S A T CI T L =
. e in d
l E P P E eA g5 - ht f g yS T A HCK om ne lnC R n0 a- o R ' NA h1 ob isS U AE C0 r E C MP e e t i n degPS r oo O eb s,m pt E C ,n nC s si f a he s s L o ou s E B A N NN Yd ee hct Y e Y e Y e Y e - _ S. T c. n N E. O O eA q S Y g5 - I R N n0 A A a-P C h1 c0 M O er O L B ee sb C ,m N A I o ou o s e 'se s e s D N Nn N e O I Y Y Y Y S _ R elae , - E - st Tt E V N ist is e r h eoc n t e Oen Ct Rd O i h alet or r al e r a ,sd On Em Gh . t f i ei C r o w Tab o ,un gsn h Nse ns C *a Awn t Otpcosa e ic Oove i f n oob E Kloe mle Denp ah h d I Tcei r r ba n a G N Af m Emuc o r Ac apyc r Tc amt s a e we Ae t se R b eh e rt n ol tu
) )
A d e npe d r r si r B o T "y inp I l e L u o nofo e ee sn edmle - t f i H N t e Ded t o on a v l t ld . b f ea n 2 C O I le Erdr e ni ee ]i
.l se o,c r
e e yr t se Ae4t Cd6n dm s.o r N T d L el Lt l h r TaPlanh sa r - a Sr c. 3 Oao r w so as Ft e ynitef t O PI is LoFe To 3 Cdget o n laing EwTm t r TI R Rwtn Rl ec h C *e Q O u s n pes NNeS m [ A C D Tao l Tne t Th .eooqeio l rTis et e C SE F Nec Pnt e rt hsdle I F D A Ose Qa h de Ot Cde osi deda vr t icd f t Ar Hal ea h t e CPes gce se o I C . R folut hf oo r pe ela cin CTevw fe f W E f o f Cn n r r ce pp Oas i t v P ore n oo snme spo s f oDrTi e eS + oo e n pta ohe se n c ut c S n oheil s c -n ni f nA f rNe +r e - o yn L it tTa aei et c e ei sy e oTr t a eOv e s A i n n o e t ee indn st r mdsl t c* gI i nTa t s n C f i e fi.t ed d mdl sea b f edmn e aa lsp o o er ed nb f nu gle e a dnmn aAv r a I N H d de e t wo ev r dnri ao np snp inn e d]iT dn hRe cEs e e elevo locx o epf r t s aa f i eF hr a s iTn e c C h h e hxe coehf ef e hT[ Cioh t hLo s s TdmAem _ l E T Tept Dd wwc tac [ T - ( R - E B M 7 8 9 0 2 3 U 2- 2 2 3 3-1 3- 3- 3- % % G S - 1 1 - N 0M 0L 1 0L 1 0A 1 0A 0A 1 1 0A s oA ic
I Insert for Q3.6.1-3 1.0 Enci 3A - page 5 l 01-37-A CTS 1.7.d (1.7.e for Callaway and wolf Creek and 1.8.e for Diablo Canyon) specifies that containment leakage rates are within the limits of CTS [SR 4.6.1.1c]. Improved TS 3.6.1 contains requirements currently specified in CTS [SR 4.6.1.1c.] This requirement is the basis for ITS SR 3.6.1.1. Because meeting containment leakage requirements would be made a direct condition of containment OPERABILITY through SR 3.6.1.1, this change would be classified as Administrative (A). 1.0 Enci 3B - page 4 01-37-A CTS 1.7.d (1.7.e for Callaway and wolf Creek and 1.8.e for Diablo Canyon) specifies that containment leakage rates are within the limits of CTS [SR 4.6.1.1c]. Improved TS 3.6.1 contains requirements currently specified in [SR 4.6.1.1c.] This requirement is the basis for ITS SR 3.6.1.1. Applicability: DC Yes CP .Yes WC Yes CA Yes 1
- - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _a
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lctt:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.1-5 APPLICABILITY: DC,CP REQUEST: DOC 2-02 A CTS 3.0.3 CTS 3.6.1.1 ACTIONS CTS 3.6.1.2 ACTIONS ITS 3.6.1 ACTIONS CTS 3.6.1.2 ACTIONS restrict reactor coolant heat up beyond 200 F if the containment leakage rates are outside established limits. The CTS markup of CTS 3.6.1.2 changes this requirement to restore leakage rates " Prior to the first unit startup following testing performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program." This change is characterized as an Administrative change since it is a restatement of CTS 4.0.4/ITS 3.0.4. This change is only partially correct. As currently written and as proposed in the CTS markup, no remedial actions are provided if the reactor coolant temperature is >200 F (MODE 4) and the containment leakage rates are outside established limits. In this case, CTS 3.0.3 or CTS 3.6.1.1 ACTIONS are to be entered since they are equivalent. Because ITS 3.6.1 ACTIONS are the same as both CTS 3.6.1.1 ACTIONS and CTS 3.0.3, the replacement of these CTS ACTION requirements by the ACTIONS of ITS 3.6.1 is an Administrative change which has not been addressed. Comment: Revise the submittal to address this change in presentation of CTS ACTION requirements and provide a discussion and justification for this Administrative char.ge. FLOG RESPONSE: For DCPP, License Amendment (LA) 120/118 (dated 2/3/98) eliminates this RAI. LA 120/118 relocated ten TS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36. Thus, CTS 3/4.6.1.2 and 3/4.6.1.6 no longer exist and DOCS 2-02-A,2-06-A,6-02-A,6-03-TR2, and 6-04-M are no longer applicable to DCor. CTS 3/4.6.1.2 was relocated to CTS SR 4.6.1.1.c (new) and ECG 45.1 and CTS 3/4.6.1I was relocated to ECG 45.2. For CPSES, DOC 2-02-A has been expanded to address the replacement of the CTS ACTION requirements by the ACTIONS of ITS 3.6.1. ATTACHED PAGES: Sec 1.0, Enct 2 1-2 Sec 3.6, Enci 2 3/46-1,3/46-2,3/46-3,3/46-9 Sec 3.6, Enci 3A 2, 5 Sec 3.6, Enci 3B 1, 4 l l 9 l l J
l 1.0 USE AND APPLICAT10N 1.01 DEFINITIONS CHANNEL FUNCT!0NAL TEST . i 1.7 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:
- a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to' verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/en trip functions, or 0 % 1-A 1
- b. - Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated or~ actual signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including required ' alarm and/en-trip functions.'or .
01-01-A
- c. Digital channels - the injection of a simulated o Factual signal into the channel as close to the sensor input to...the process ~ racks as practical to verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/er--trip 01-01-A functions. .
i The Channel? Functional Test ~mafbe~peiformed!byTmeans~of'any" series ~of . sequentialfoyerlapping,;oritotal ichannellsteps so;that;the entire channel;is tested. 3 30-A P.nMT A T Lut"k.fT T hfTE.[.*D. . T TV 1 O 01-045LG
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l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 TAB 4.4A 1-2 ^:Or crt *:00 " ! '2 S' " ?2' E " 0:t':0 '.,:': _ - _ -__ _-__ . _ - - - a
3/4:6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - 3/R 6 1 CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT 4EKAI-TE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT I PEC" shall be = int:ined O g g;E. 01-01-Lo APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. E lQN: tA Withew4 CONTAINMENT PTEC".!TY ]MieFablh. restore CONTAINMENT 4WGR4T4 t6 o1.osda OPERABLE within 1 hour or be in af Teast HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and -
'ih" COLD' SHUTDOWN within the fo110 wing'30 hours. 03.6. l-I SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 01-02-A 4.6.1.1' CONTAINMENT 4EE.R4T4 shall be demonstrated QBjRA8]g 't
- a. ' At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations *# not 01-06-LS19 capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are 1-0 M closed by valves, blind fla s. en deactivated automatic valves secured in their. positions. 01-04-LS1 vaTiiiisidhFed except for va19hs 'that[velgj{illg(fleiCthroughjthe -srb open und cification 3.6.3. 146)stigh7 devices?ir contF6TlasTpermitted M M 5 5 N 8153 M F1 by Sg3NM@EMO. .NMBLasar!sg~i
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in cegliance with the 01-05-A requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.-
4 xcept valves. blind flanges, and deactivated autamatic valves'which are located 0106-LS19 inside the cont 31nment :nd Or: 100ted, :::! d. Or Oth:r; 10 : Cur d in th: 10:0d petition.. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need^not be performed more often than once per 92 days. 01-06-LS19 - E" M'Except?isherR1 ; inniiUiiii1Visithit"nNdlackedSiiiiTid RWbthEMiie securedlandfblind l !1odeed edNoesotherwisetsecured asnual
. italves2blindtflang"es$ ideacti ;astomatictvalvestarvtelosedtto tsati sf ~
ACTIONMeY $31613httajpostt;1&musQajyerpfimalbut!1stbelverjifiedIby~~^f amini.stra!1vemeans g 3_ s , _ , oz.ot. A C. By performong+ conic,nment. Iracge (Mt 4:hnf , exapt for coma.nmen . cie locac H:hn3 , un ceconunce. wim .ng., Conn nevn+ Le w Se. &cse.,T~en; _ pegram , L DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110
- 1. -TAB 13.4A. Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996 L _
sp O *34. I-5 [0NTAINMENT SYSTEMS
- J-CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE .
QM , ) LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPE ION f 3.6.1.2 Containment lea age rates shall be limited in acco dance with the Containme Leakage Rate Testing Pr ram. APPLICABILITY: MODE 1. 2. 3 and 4. ACTION: With the measur d overall integrated containment 1 kage rate exceeding 1.0 a. within I hour initiate ction to be in HOT STANDBY within e next 6 hours and in C D e SHllTDOWN wit n the following 30 hours. Restore he overall integrated 1 kage rate to les than or equal to 0.75 La. and the ombined leakage rate for all '02p- - }~ penetratio subject to Type B and C tests to ess than or 0^u:1 to 0.6 ..La. prior to more: .n" the Re::ter CO^1:nt S"'+ + -^ " * "-^ ^^"^ "
- r thel rstcunit b02M- 3 QW llMM!tes@lgpffo[nedlipla dl_/.,' _.1_MthAhe:
Con @ __ J gatage~ pM ..Inoltagem. v i (. DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996 L____---_-_____ _ - - . - )
- 03. 4. / -5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS N RVEILLANCERE0VIREMfMf5 / w i
4.6.1.2 The con inment leakage rates shall be d strated at the test schedule and shall be determined conformance with the criteria s ified in the Containment Leakage Rate ng Progr I l l l I 1 l l l l I i l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A (next page 3/4 6-5) Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1, 1996 u____----_---_--__ _ _ _ _ _ _.
! CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS gjjj.g. CONTAINMENT CTURAL INTEGRITY i* l l LIMITING CONDITION OPERATION
- _9-3.6.1.6 The structural 1 egrity of the containmen shall be maintained at a {0W-A' ' )
! level consistent with the a ceptance criteria in cification 4.6.1.6. I APPLICABILITY: MDDES 1. 2, 3. nd 4. ACTION: A ! With the' structural integrity of the o .ainment not conforming to the above wu 3 requirements, restore the structural egrity to within the limits within 343 v hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY it ' the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the follpwing 30 hours. i' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.6.1 Containment rfaces The structural in grity of the exposed accessible interior a exterior surfaces of the co ainment, including the liner M plate. shall be dete ined during shutdown by a visua inspection of these ( 06-DF-A T ! surfaces. This in ection shall be performed in accor nce with the Containment v Leakage Rate Test' g Program to verify no apparent chan s in appearance or other abnormal degrad ion. d
.5.1.5.2 S. =^t r Any 2n^ . 1 dO;r:dation O' the =nt: 1.- t str=ture y
- hall b0 rep ^\:=ted t d0txted d#n; the 20ve required 4=p00t10^^dl tp^rt purar+ t0 in : S?^L ud: : de=ript1= cf th: =ndit1= cf th := ret ^. F0 4 =p00t1 =
y .Sp=1f1=ti= "'1 r0p^rt 5.9.2m vwith" Ibb :o ch:11 pr^ =d"1r# 0. th^ t 2 r=C5 = trrh4ng = d th^ =rr=tiv^ rti b t:k = i 1 l l l l t i l I i DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-9 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Am5ndment No. 109 March 1, 1996 L_____________- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ __O
DESCRIPTION CF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Continued) CHANGE NUMBER HRtiQ DESCRIP110N 01 06 LS19 The CTS requires all penetrations not capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automabc isolatcm valve (and required to be closed for accident conditions) be verified closed on a 31 day frequency, except for valves, blind flanges, and deac2Wated automatic valves which I are located inside containment and locked closed, sealed, or otherwise secured in a closed posson. These excepted penetrations were to be verified closed during each cold shutdown but not more often than once per 92 days. Consistent with Traveler TSTF 45, Rev.1 only containment isolabon valves that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured are required to be venfied closed at the once per COLD SHUTDOWN frequency Penetrations (insde or outside containment) which are isolated by manual valves and blind flanges that are locked, sealed or othenuse secured are not requred to be verified closed, since they are venfied to be in the correct positan prior to loclung/secunng. CTS Survedlance 4.6.1.1 is iris,r-m f into ITS SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 and into the redundant requirements of ITS 3.6.3, Required l Achon A.2, C.2, and [D.2). As discussed above, the ITS surveillance j were modified consistent with TSTF 45. The redundant Required Achons were also modNied in a subsequent Traveler (WOG-91). The . TSTF-45 modificotrans to the ITS survegences and the WOG-91 ! modifications to l'. aquired Achons, while samler, differed in that the Required Achons stui require some verificebon of posebon of valves that are locked closed, sealed or othenmee secured, although diis venficabon may be performed via admrustrabve means. The 01- 0~l A '*** ** # ogg,o.g 02-01 A Consstent with NUREG-1431, the Contamment Leakage LCO is now included in ITS 3.6.1, Contamment LCO. 0 3. 6. I-5~ ' 02-02 A 6e wonhng
- to ' the Reassor nt Systony' (temperature 200*F* by equivalent rep-iremen -
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- prior to the t unit performed i --d.
with the ment Rate T Program.' fact tthe Applica of the new inment L is MODE 1-4 and the R 3.0.4 surveil to be p-i;e zj before e ring MODE of ,ensu that the requir testing ' and that as-left test ==f^ - ,ce leakage crite are before into MODE 4. is change is c/ne;stentwith URE 431. This irementis now uded in ITS f.5.16 the in Leak Rate) t Program Alcd Apobcacit to DCpp. Ses converpon CompQrt.to'n TKbit (Ertlowet 33). 02-03 A This change is not applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). See Conversion Comparison Table (Endosure 38). 02-04 A This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02-05 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 2 , I
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Continued) CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION 03-12 A The statement that Specification 3.0.4 does not apply is no longer needed as revised ACTIONS consistent with NUREG-1431 permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time. 03-13 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, a Note is added to the ACTIONS to enter
$14.2 7 applicable Conditions and Required ACTIONS of the " Containment" LCO when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage 03-l'J A 23rd rate. This is current operating practice per TS requirement CTS 3.6.1.1.
03-s5' A There , this change is considered an administrative change in format. Jrure 05-01 LG The method for calculating containment average temperature and the locations where measurements are taken are moved to the Bases. This level of detailin the TS is not consistent with NUREG-1431. The improved STS Bases is licensee controlled under the Bases Control Program in the Administrative Controle section of the improved STS. 06-01 Not Used. 772.5ed 06-02 o3.6.?r-1
. A {The structurali 'tegrity require nts of contain nt are conta ed in' ITS 3.6.1. inspection req raments as with stru raf integnty of exposed a sibleinterioran exteriorcon inment surfaces, contained in pendix J, Optio B and in R latory Guide ( ) 1.163. The r uirementtoperf rmvisualins ctions is i1 ITS S Requi . .ent (SR) 3.6.1. which refers the con nment Leakage te Testing Progr m as control byITS
- 5. 6.
06-03 TR2 onsistentwith N EG-1431, the re rting require tis being deleted.10 C 0.72 and 10 CFR .73 establish reporting requirements. 06-04 M The ACT is moved to ITS 3.6. . Condition A an B. The IT require are more severe in at only 1 hour owed ou e time (AOT)is ed while the CT rovides a 24 ho r AOT. T shorter actis ble because a ntainment wh' ay not able to ac : ndary as designed co id have a signifie ntadvers impacton (asthe asequences of an a nt. . 07-01 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, the LCO and SRs for containment ventilatiorWpurge valves are now included in ITS 3.6.3 for Containment isolation Valves. 07-02 LS9 Consistent with NUREG-1431, the Required Action for a containment ventilationipurge valve with a leakage rate which exceeds the acceptance enteria is revised to allow continued operation if the penetraton flow path is isolated within 24 hours. This action is in lieu of requiring a shutdown if the valve leakage rate is not restored to an acceptable value within 24 hours. This is considered acceptable because with the associated penetrations isolated per the proposed ACTION requirement, no accident is credible as a result of the leaking valve. fXb ogimdc Jo W/). Sec. Contr.S# dnYonM fc+ck. (E>ctkd. 33.). 934.1-5 DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 5
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1 Enclosura 2 i PG&E Lctt::r DCL 98-087 I i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.1-6 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: l DOC 2-05 LG DOC 2-06 A JFD 3.6-1 CTS 4.6.1.1.c (Wolf Creek) l CTS 4.6.1.1.d (Callaway) CTS 3/4.6.1.2 (Diablo Canyon and Comanche Peak) ) STS SR 3.6.1.1 ITS SR 3.6.1.1 and Associated Bases i CTS 4.6.1.1.c/d and 3/4.6.1.2 require leak rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program which is based on the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B. STS SR 3.6.1.1 requires the visual examination and q leakage rate testing be performed iin accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J as modified by approved exemptions. ITS SR 3.6.1.1 modifies STS SR 3.6.1.1 to conform 4 to CTS 4.6.1.1.c/d and 3/4.6.1.2 as modified in the CTS markup. The STS is based on Appendix J, Option A while the CTS and ITS are based on Appendix J, Option B. , Changes to the STS with regards to Option A versus Option B are covered by a letter from Mr. Christopher 1. Grimes to Mr. David J. Modeen, NEl, dated 11/2/95 and TSTF-
- 52. While the ITS SR 3.6.1.1 differences from STS SR 3.6.1.1 are in conformance with the letter and TSTF 52 as modified by staff comments, the changes to the ITS Bases as well as ITS 3.6.2 and ITS 3.6.3 and their associated Bases are not in conformance. See Comment Number 3.6.3-28 for additional concerns with regards to CTS 4.6.1.2.c and 4.6.1.2.d at Comanche Peak. Also see Comment Numbers 3.6.0-2,3.6.2-5,3.6.3-27, 3.6.3.28 and 3.6.3-37.
Comment: Licensees should revise their submittals to conform to the 11/2/95 letter and t TSTF-52 as modified by the staff. See Comment Numbers 3.6.0-2,3.6.2-5,3.6.3-27, 3.6.3.28, and 3.6.3-37. FLOG RESPONSE: The 11/2/95 letter from C. Grimes (NRC) to D. Modeen (NEI), "TSTF-52 proposed Revision 1" (which includes the changes proposed by the staff) was reviewed for incorporation into the ITS. Based on this review, the ITS Bases have been revised to incorporate proposed Revision 1 of TSTF-52. Revision 1 addresses the NRC comments on Revision 0 of this TSTF but has not been approved by the Tech Spec Task Force. The FLOG will continue to evaluate any NRC/ industry approved revisions to TSTF-52 and will incorporate ) applicable changes into the ITS submittal as appropriate. ATTACHED PAGES: Sec.1.0, Enci 2 ; t Sec.1.0, Enci 3A Page 2 1 Sec.1.0, Enci 3B Page 2 i Sec.1.0, EncI SA Traveler Status Page,1.1-3 10 J
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lctt:r DCL 98-087
' Sec.1.0, Enci 6A Page 3
' Sec.1.0, Enct 6B Page 2 Sec. 3.0, Enci 5A Traveler Status Page Sec. 3.0, Enc! 5B B 3.0-10 Sec. 3.6, Enci 5A Traveler Status Page,3.6-7 Sec 3.6, Enci 5B . B 3.6-1, B 3.6-2, and B 3.6-3 Sec. 5.0, Enci 5A Traveler Status Page,5.0-30 l
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DESCRIPTION OF CHAN2ES TO TS SECTION 1.0 I' CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION 01-08 A The CTS definitions for ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESPONSE TIME and REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) RESPONSE TIME would be modified to be consistent with NUREG-1431. In addition, the term " measured" would be replaced by "venfied" to be consistent with the requirements of ITS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10 to venfy response time is within limits. The addrtion of the statement that response time may be venfied by means of any series of sequentia!, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is venfied, is administrative in nature. Tnis is cesistent with the methodology presentiy desenbed in the CTS Bases for demonstrating total channel response time. 01-09 A The CTS definition for FREQUENCY NOT ATION (and Table 1.1, FREQUENCY . NOTATION) would be deleted to be consistent with NUREG-1431. The acronyms defined in Table 1.1, FREQUENCY NOTATION, are no longer used in NUREG-1431. Surveillance frequencies are specified in NUREG-1431; thereby, obviating the definition. This is a nontechnical change made to conform to NUREG-1431. 01-10 N The defini n for maximu allowable primary ntainment leak e rat (L.) wou be added in th ITS to be consiste with NUREG-1 1. Thi additio has been date ined to be an ad istrative chang on the basi at this defiaiti has simply been [ pied) from the TS Ad inistrative Contr is 6.8.4.j] to the def stions. ft& used O l* 6 01-11 A The CTS definitions for IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, t! UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, and PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE have been merged into one definition for LEAKAGE and reworded to be consistent with NUREG-1431. This is a nontechnical change since it will not alter the manner in which LEAKAGE is accounted for and treated from present practice. The definition of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE has been expanded to include "except RCP seal water [ injection or leakoff,)" to be consistent with NUREG-1431. 01-12 A The CTS definition for MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC, would be deleted to be consistent with NUREG-1431. This definition would be deleted on the basis that it is defined in 10 CFR 20.1003 and 40 CFR 190. 01-13 A The CTS definition of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) [OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION PROCEDURE (ODCP), ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING PROCEDURE (ERMP), and RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROLS PROGRAM (RMCP)) would be [ merged where duplications occur and would be) incorporated into the Administrative Controls Section 5.5.1 of the ITS. [These) changes [are] nontechnical because the definitions of the ODCM [ODCP, ERMP, AND RMCP) will be [ combined and) moved to another section of the ITS. , l 1 1 I DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 2 i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - . _ . - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ .._.______a
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- C ticn E T: toc Ts T _ R E B 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 1 M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 U 1 A- 1 1 1 1 1 1 G 1 1 N 0A - 0A 0A 0A 0A 0A 0L 0A 0A
indu2try Travalers Applic ble 12 Section 1.0 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-19, Rev.1 Not incorporated NA Not NRC approved as of traveler cut-off date. l TSTF-39, Rev.1 Incorporated 1.1-9 TSTF-64 incorporated 1.1-1 TSTF-88 incorporated 1.1-8 TSTF 111, Rev.1 Incorporated 1.1-5 WOG-67 Rev.1 Incorporated 1.1-6 WOG-74, Rev.1 incorporated 1.1-3 WOG-90. Rev.1 incorporated 1.1-11 T5TF-52 IfforGDrAkd I- l-l 5 Incorpan kd kcf+ W I per G941-lo 43.6.I-la I DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431, Rev.1
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) CORE OPERATING LIMITS The COLR.is the unit specific document that provides REPORT (COLR) cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific parameter limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.5. Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications. ! DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 l (microcuries/ gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131. 1-132. 1-133. 1-134, and 1-135 actually present. The thyrold dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in 7 Table!III of TID-14844. AEC.T1962. " Calculation of Distance Factors,for Poweriand Test: Reactor.. Sites." or those i listed in Table E-7 of NRC: Regulatory Guide!1109. Rev;il. October. ~1977. '.cFICP". ! Pirt l'.r #,:;c'192 m v,u m +ms -c~ 30 + E Su??
+ a n_ e c=r.t~
m + , ,tc,' ~+u ,,, m B E. L,.. 7 :7t!. ;! /,;;
. _ %,. . :. ~i. .,4..' C"5. 0_ T. . L. 4.!. i.,I. L..', . ,, ' ~ "' '
E-AVERAGE E shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the DISINTEGRATION ENERGY concentration of each radionuclides in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives > . + % 10 2 minutes. B-PS making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant. ENGINEERED SAFETY The ESF RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval FEATURE (ESF) RESPONSE from when the monitored' parameter exceeds its ESF TIME actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be = :: Uredv' erified by means of any series of sequential. overlapping,~or total 1 1-5 steps so that the entire respons- Time is =::ured verifjed. rThe maximu allowable primar containment leaka e rate. J L,. shall e E 0.1DL,:3 % primary containme air r day'at the cal lated peak contain ent pressure h S )
~
weight ( P,) . v
- 03. 6. t - 6 (Continued)
DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. I 1.1-3
l 1 JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 NUREG-1431 Section 1.0 CHANGE
~
NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 1,1-11 Again, the example does not change the intent of the specifications but only makes clear the (continued) application of SR 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to surveillance with Frequencies tied to plant conditions. This change will eliminate confusion and misapplication of the iTS and will ensure consistent application of SR 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to these types of surveillance Frequencies. This change is consistent with Industry Traveler WOG-90. ' l.I-a3 Insed. 03.6. I-(o l
\
< 4 i I l I l l I-l l. DCPP Description of Changes to improved TS 3 l..____________ __ ._ _
s e e e Y Y Y K g E n . E i g R nn iai C t d F n ro 0
~
Y L O iaw 1 T s mS s N I L W e oT e O I I B Y NIS Y T A C CK S E I L A T S P E 0 P P C 1 f 3 A E o 4 H t r 1
- C a p
G N E A t o R M s n U O e o s e N C Y N Y M O - R F f S ON o E L O t r C BY a p N IANA t E R D- C s o. n,S E e s oT e
+
f i Y NC Y D R d e n t O e sh e nn F d et t ay r oe it g E n f df L a oio v ic o c ei n p f t x e ison nn t B er ot Sn . A e pi ae os T cr enesa f lc n v Scn T o , r aspr oai I ei c. N a matep e ns r o tad r d O Tr n so ioie t t n o. S 1 ea ) I R 3 4 Ooi lete Dr f t e sna t igw inn 5 haoc
- 4. sn t t c.
e aS 1 f A - N Apeni r 3 P GO T t esh o ap d hC 1 (i ea o S cR e cp l M E IT dln bhi cr p s n O R at at lap Tiy lped UI P h a mu C Tw aqan f C N R
, pot a o
N ] e Tc et f e .e xey O MC S F c no cr e o ht Eh t ef r c n I S OE Ca a ,c [f nGt oAc ed ewecn euq R R D T, omngn dKe eAf armn a F r i a f E ls Oifopr e V E pu sE al o sef l i r N C Carea s baL or t s t f dvd ePr a . sDne l O N f od e p d ui r e C E R n e y.v oran yleiEs eL ee a sic f E ioh gt ol,sn gL o ad gf r eye
+
t F inel asaa nO s nri p F I D id f eud oee oieh t ncc h R nde alas h ch e c dl e cTa cn c istoob t s entch unr sNya i n h i eqetnhOlnah eh i l
- 4. n I Ttomst eTCOb T1 o R
E B 0 M 9- 1 1 1 31 U 1 1 1 - N 1 1 1 I. I lj ll
industry Travalers Applic ble t3 Section 3.0 TRAVELER # , STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-06, Rev 1 incorporated 3.0-01 i TSTF-08, Rev 2 incorporated N/A TSTF-12, Rev 1 incorporated 3.0-02 l l TSTF-52 incorporated N/A /##F"d NU At*' / i we 0.3.6J-4 4 3.p4 i TSTF-71 Not incorporated N/A Will be addressed in I SFDP. TSTF-103 Not incorporated N/A Performed 3.0.4 Matrix. TSTF-104 incorporated 3.0-03 TSTF-122 Not incorporated N/A Not NRC approved as of the Traveler cutoff date. TSTF-136 incorporated 3.0-02 TSTF-165 incorporated N/A
- LCO 3.0.5 Bases change 1 only. I 1
TSTF-166 incorporated 3.0-04 l l , i l l l i f DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev.1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - - __ _ ___ _ o
f t SR Applicability B3.0 BASES SR 3.0.1 Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is l (Continued) required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillance are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment mcy be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been ' satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a 10DE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed. SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillance and any Required Action with a Completion Time that' requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per . " interval. SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g.. transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities). 1 The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillance for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. An cx::ple of ec SR 3.0.2 2ca not ;pply is tQCO .t:in;t?Q]itGdftih;;1"T -' :? M/:"hn:
' 4 t' .1 ;;.n., ;f "" ::::-dm "t" 10 CP 50. ^.rce-di' 1 : modi'ded by sp; evcd pr;t?Oct " Uhe recuin:nt: of c;ubtient t20 p Occden 0 Ov03 g g ] ] r-ct
.f...._.
4" and of th=:0!ve; crtend : t00: "terve spen n ed k reev+ I (Continued) j l l DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.0-10 a
Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.6 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-17, Rev.1 incorporated 3.6-2 NRC approved. TSTF-30, Rev.# 2. Incorporated 3.6-4 Not applicable to Wotf pe. 3 6-oo2 - Creek and Callaway. TSTF-45, Rev.1 incorporated 3.6-5 NRC approved. TSTF 46, Rev.1 incorporated 3.6 7 NRC approved. TSTF-51 Notincorporated N/A Not NRC approved as of traveler cut-off date. ay'j.g incorporated 3.6-1 rn:orpokkd draft TSTF-52 gev,f p ,c o s.c,,f_ c TSTF 145 Not incorporated. N/A NRC approved as of traveler cut-off date. WOO 91- M 249 incorporated 3.6-11,3.6-12 0 3.6. 3 -// l l , l I l l l 1 l \ l l DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431, Rev.1 L J
Containment Air Locks (^.tmospheric. Sub:tme ph^r10. !:0 Cond =:cr. 2nd Du:1) PS 3.6.2 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock f leakage test.
3.6-1
- 2. Results shall be evaluated against 3 acceptance critoria M Ann 11 cable"tn
#0 !
SR3.6.1.1finf.ccordancer""10CFR f.ppend'sJ . modifi^d spproved Q S. (.. l - 6 ithithe.: Cont nmentile age"2 pt est)fkyProgram] [b" iOXS[^[On:/.
~
Perform required air lock leakage rate testing - NOTE in accordance with 10 CFo 50, f.pp =di" J. :: So ?.0.2 i: ^0t modi' icd by :pproved ex^ ptient. pplic ble i The :: cept:n 0 criteri: for :1- lock testing j e In acc With. .,ordance
- n. c.r. o. e.n. . 4 a- Overall zi- lock 100k:;0,+r:t0 i;
?.ppedi." J. :: )
- r n. +m. ,,+. a.
6 . n. c ,. , mu. .m. ., .. .s p,,.
~,a. 4. < 4. a. x.,,,, i P' P" b- For 0:ch decr. lak:;0 r:t^ it r [.014) ==^ti o"n: th..,.e <
Zig).the Containment ~ wh^^ t0:ted Containment :t ' [ 3tegestjgiffoghaiidi
%egage Leakage; Rate Test RiJO9 P ram 3.6-1 _.
1 i l i SR 3.6.2.2 NOTE l Only required to be performed up= =try or i crit throu;h the 00nt:1^m =t 21- lock - 3.6-2 Verify only one door in the air lock can be IS' d y; 24 opened at a time, mont}!$ DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 3.6-7 I J
t B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 Containment Ptme:ph^ rid ! BASES i i BACKGROUND The containment consists of the concrete reactor building, its steel liner, and the penetrations through this structure. The structure is designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core followin a l g 4 cooldDO ign S :er Accident fBBAt. Additionally, this structure provides shie ding ) N*M from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere 1 following accident conditions. The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat with~adreactoricavity pit? projection, and a 0h:110: hem 15phericil dome roof.~The"inside~ surface of~the~ containment is lined with a carbon steeT" liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions. I For 00nt:1*m^nt: "ith un;rcuted tendent. the cyl"dcr ":P it prc tre: 0d v 4t" )
- p0 t...,.
s.~. ten:10nin;
- m. tytt^- ".+ m!;0
- o. . r. m.-+. m. .- ~ .
t w';0rti
, c:1 :nd h0ri:Ont:1 dir00tt0nt. :nd the
+s-mm m,m - m
. g g , -+ + ~ ,- u.... m , .j, . + m.
The ExteFf6Eih61Tia concrete re:Otcr building 5thict0HEiround?thi~fistt6r vesselMerane wallia ishield?WalD is requirsd^for~5tFodtural"intsgrity"of 1 the~ containment ~0Hder dodditT6ns^. The steel liner and its penetrations establish the leakage _ { I addition &1biprovides?suppiting boundary.of the containment.orthand fa The?htselilined electricalfracewayMHaintaining"thelontainment~0PERABLE'^11mits the leakage of fission ~ product' radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requireinents comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix JF0ptisi B (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions. The isolation devices ~for"the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:
- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions ;
are either:
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
- 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges. or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves"
- b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as rovided in LCO 3.6.2,
" Containment Air Locks": and st4Lled., 03 6 I- 1
- c. All equipment hatches are close nd
- d. The prc::ur1:Od sealing mechanism associated with a penetration !
$ 9; y ds kbeHowsg o @ d ngs) is OPERABLE. except :: prc'lided in
- .... a.
l APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the containment must SAFETY withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without l ANALYSIS exceeding the design leakage rate. The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high I pressures and temperatures are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a ; steam line break :nd a r0d
^
l (Continued DCPP Mark-ve of NUREG-1431. Rev 1 Bases B 3.6-1 t L _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _J
Containment Mtect;heric4 B 3.6.1 BASES cjection accident '"Et4 (Ref. 2). In addition, release of significant fissior, product radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA w REA or~a fuelihandling accident. In the DBA analyses, it is assumed that the containment ~is0PERABLE~such that. for the DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity. release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3). This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting from accidents. is defined in 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. 0ption'B (Ref.1). as L,: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (P,) resulting from the limiting DBA LOCA. The allowable leakage rate represented by L, forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing. L, is assumed to be 0110% of containmentjairyeight per day in the safety analysis at P,'- ~47 psig "(Ref 3T.' Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY. The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the "9C Policy St:tcaent-10CFR5.0l36(c)(2)(ti) . LCO Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to s 1.0 L, except prior to the first startup after performing a required 10 CFR 50. l'??cndi" J. Containment;testage Rate Test;ing. Program leakage test. At this over:Ptime. Typethebbined'T% A le m indTR&^c muc.^te ' O.5 L. 2nd the P.:tg R$tgit;g,ge leakaijimitsEmus muct be ' O.75 L*kbepaef ~ ~ 'fdplicable"Cstir=t '
" q3.(, . l- fe Lcigc Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatch. that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. g,g ,,, p Individual leakage rates s ified for the containment _ air inck P (LC0 3.6.2) andecontai 1 purge supply:arWexhaust hydre;ca pu" @ and containment: pressure /vacuus relief valves with'~ ~resi'l(lent seais (LCO 3.6.3) ,,,e / re not cpec:fic:lly part df'th: :cceptance criteri cf 10 CP 50.
g iteout N Append:' J Therefore, icMgt r:tec cxceedin; Lt , cphe, a Q3.6./-G (Continued) 0700 Mark-uc O # T l?EG-!Ol Rev 1 Bases B 3 6-2
BASES I i th=0 Mdivid=1 "-it: =ly result in the containment being inoperable
' when the leakage results in exceeding the overall acceptance criteria of 4
?;;=dt- 2 LOA. ' ~-^-~
l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.4. " Containment Penetrations." ACTIONS A.1' In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to
,0PERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. This time period ;
also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment ' OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal. B.1 and B.2 l If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required , Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed " i Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.1 ,g #6 84 Maintaining e containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leaka rate test requirements as$specifiediin:the ! Containment 7 iTesting Program 1hich*tsicansistent with Reg 7 Guide' IC163 M 995.fand; i requirements tof ' 10~CFR"507 App'endi M 0p'tionj~B (Ref'.~^1T:~H M' Sty Wehd '=^ ;t1=:. Failure to meet ^ air 1ock mi
=r("0 civ0 with r=1'i=t :=1 leakage ea agaTRateTest*ProgramACO 2.5.2 =dlimits LCOspecified 2.5.2 doesinnottheinvalidate Containment
~the'~
l- acceptabilitTof~thi^se~oferall leakage detenninations unless their contribution to~ overall Type A. B. and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. As left leakage prior to the first startuo after oerfonnino aMg l required 10 CP 50 ?;;=d1.. J. Containment Leakage Rate Testma Froaram3 , leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L for combineo l l following}anVoutageibE?shutdowFthat?ticluded;Ippe%ype 8 and 7 C leakagend C tageforkshutdown;that sincluded!TypFNte s^0^75 Q~for"6vefalTTipe~A'Teakags^followhqp ,/ equi' red ~ leak' age ~ tssts7thi adepta$tjg. At all other timss~he;weennce criteria is based on an s 1.0 L,. At s 1.0 L the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the sa,fet analysis. %y* fr;=di- 2. = Odi'10d {_y :ppr=0d =^ ;tir:SR Frequencies are as required by These periodic testing requirements verify tha the~.-containment rap #9.J0ption?B.bee-
~
ra;W_*
- - does not prepad the leakana rate Assumod in t ty analysjs L 3 6 7 b g @
fd.Q.g ~ l##: %:W : Chhib'=A % ~ Q3 6.I-6 M S R. 3.r..l.E fnould havt. Wee n sheda 5+v uc t:.- oc sin c t., q u .o.2
-- ne applicwe e pe.pp, DCDD Mark uo of NUREG-1431. Rev 1 Bases B 3.6-3 l-l L _ - _ - - - _ - - - - - - _ - - - - _ _ - - - - i
Insert for Q 3.6.1-6 1.0, Enci 6A page 3 1.1-13 Traveler TSTF-52, draft Revision 1, deletes the definition of L.. Since L, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J and ITS Section 5.5-15, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, it is redundant to include L. as a definition. As described in NUMARC 93-03, " Writer's Guide for the Restructured Technical Specifications," Specification 1.1 is a list of l r defined terms and corresponding definitions used throughout the TS. La is not used throughout the TS and is defined in Section 5.5-16. 1.0, Enci 6B page 2 1.1-13 Traveler TSTF-52, draft Revision 1, deletes the definition of L,. Since L, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J and ITS Section 5.5-15, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, it is redundant to include L. as a definition. Applicability l DC Yes CP Yes WC Yes CA Yes l l 3.0, Enci 5B B 3.0-10 Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the SR include a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." An example of an exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations is the Note in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test interval. l I i ( 3.6, Enci 5B B3.6-3 Reviewer's Note: Regulatory Guide 1.163 and NEl 94-01 include acceptance criteria for as-left and as-found Type A leakage rates and combined Type B and C leakage rates, which may be reflected in the Bases. L
l Industry Travelers Applicable to CTS Section 6.0/ITS 5.0 l TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-9, Rev.1 incorporated B-PS NRC Approved TSTF-37, Rev.1 incorporated 5.6-2 DCPP only TSTF-52 Incorporated 5.5-4 N f# # 43-6 TSTF-65 Notincorporated NA Not NRC approved as of traveler cut-off date TSTF-106 Rev.1 Not incorporated NA Retain CTS TSTF-118 incorporated 5.5-8 TSTF-119 Not incorporated NA Retain CTS TSTF-120 Not incorporated NA Retain CTS TSTF-121 incorporated 5.2-2 TSTF-152 Incorporated 5.6-4 TSTF-167 incorporated 5.7-2 WOG-67, Rev. Incorporated 5.6-5 1 WOG-72 Incorporated 5.5-13 WOG-85 Incorporated 5.5-14 Proposed incorporated 5.5-1 WOG min-group Action Traveler item 147 DCPP mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1
Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.5.16 Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Procram _ _ s 3 ,, h A' program shall bs~ established to implement the" leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(or and 10 CFR-50l ' Appendix J. 0ption B. as modified by approved exemptions. This program
~
1 shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide.l.163. " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program,' dated Septenber 1995." ~
#M'0 The" loss ofpeak' coolantcalculated'containmentinternalpkssure}forthe.;
accident. A.;is. 47.psig..
. ,a
~'
design _ basis The maximum allowable containment leak ge ra e. L.,latlPh;'shallbeLO;10 ELof containment air l weight (per day) ;. .-
. Leakage. rate acceptance criteria are: . , . .
~'
O/ p'. Containment?oveFalihleakage rate acce)tance crit'erton is $11.iO^' following'. testing;1nJ.
~
"Li. ;0uring.theffirstiunit:.startupleakage accordance with thistprogram. the rate. acceptance ED criterialare%:0.60 Lgiforithe2 Type B andjType Ca tests and3 OR5;Qfor Jype; A t.ests;.
.h Lair'.locE;testingyecsptahcbiriteriQrey .. .
~ " mdhm].Ve$1BaidscnisakfgnaMhs10d[Qwhenjest$d At3 m - ,,, , ,_ ,_ m m.m % _r-,
.4 },
_ ha !Fo6 MAddoorhJpakage$tMN.3101M:[whe$p[essuhiked t93!.10;ps19;
@The'pF691sf6nFbf"$RT3:0 2"d6^notiippif1t6?th'e^ test 7fredusiicies specified in,the: Containment (Leakage Rate; Testing. ProgramT ^
-f. The provisions ~of SR 3^0.31are applicable 7to the" Containment'Lsakage
~ ^ ' ~ "'~~ ' '~~~ " ' ~
Ratez Testing Program.; ~~~ 5.5.17/ Backbn Meth6d ^for"Detsminina subcoblino'Marairi 5.5-6
~
A' program'Which"isillisns0re'the capabilitfitFaccdratelffmonitor the Reactor-Coolant the;following; Jystemisubcooling margindhis program shall include CJE1)J 21 Training [of personnel,[and
, ~ 22M ^ T Proceduresifor.imonitoringl DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 5.0-30
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.1-8 NO: DC REQUEST: ITS B3.6.1 Bases - LCO The third paragraph of ITS B3.6.1-LCO for Diablo Canyon adds a reference to the Hy.frogen Purge valves. See Comment Number 3.6.8-1 for staff concems with regards to the acceptability of the Hydrogen Purge System. Retention of this reference to the Hydrogen Purge valves will depend on resolution of Comment Number 3.6.8-1. Comment: See Comment Number 3.6.8-1. FLOG RESPONSE: The reference to the hydrogen purge valves in the LCO Bases was included inadvertently, and thus will be removed. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B3.6-2 l l l . 12
Containment (^t c:pheric) B 3.6.1 BASES cjection ::cident '9Ef) (Ref. 2). In addition, release of significant fission product radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA 09 M or?alfuelihandlingTaccident. In the DBA analyses. it is assumed that the" containment'is'0PERABLE~ssch that, for the DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity, release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3). This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50. Appendix J the maximum allowable containment leakage at rate"M 0ption?Bpeak the calculated (Ref. 1), as L,: containment internal pressure (P,) resulting from the limiting DBA LOCA.
. The allowable leakage rate represented by 8., forms the basis for the~
acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing. L,is assumed to be Dfl0% ofAcontainmentiair: weight per day in the safety analysis at P,T47 psig~(Ref'.~3E' ~~ ' " l 1 Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the i establishment of containment OPERABILITY. I The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the '9C Policy St:tcment 10CfR50}36(c)J2M11). ) LC0 Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to s 1.0 L'. except prior to the first startu) after performing a required M-GFA-60; ) pendi" J. Containmentiteaka ram leakage test. At ftIiis time, th5~bb-bindd~Tfpd~f tateWesting fETC"h E5^c?O:Progfbe ' O.5 L,.:nd the i cuer:ll Type A le:k:ge must be ' O.75 M:licable"" ""-" MDUMC:MMjeahagsMjmityMdibefmet~.~~~~~ ~~"" ~ ^ i51-4 Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatch, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. pyg,f y Individual leakage rates specified for the containment _ air lock 9- - (LCO 3.6.2) andfcontainmentipergeMu~pp19?andiexhadstThydr pur@and containmentfpressure/ vacuum!reheflaives with"resihent sea ,s (LCO 3'.6^.3) em / IO 20t^C?051fiCd"2 ? It df^th I 2CCO?t nCO CIit0Fi2 Of 10 C P 50-Mrir.e cob \ ^??cndi" J Therefore. le:k:;c r:te: excceding Q cphm 8 93. 6./- G (Continued) DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-2 L______________
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lctt::r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.1-10 APPLICABILITY: DC,CP REQUEST: STS B3.d.1 Rases - SR 3.6.1.2 ITS B3.6.1 Bases - SR 3.6.1.2 Comment: See Comment Number 3.6.0-2. FLOG RESPONSE: See response to Q 3.6.0-2 ATTACHED PAGES: l l See attached pages for response Comment Number 3.6.0-2.
)
l l 13
l Enclosura 2 l PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-987 l l 3.6.2 Containment Airlocks ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.2-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: l DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) l DOC 1-01 LG l DOC 1-05 A CTS 1.7.c (1.8.c for Diablo Canyon) CTS 3/4.6.1.1 CTS 4.6.1.1.b ITS SR 3.6.2.1, SR 3.6.2.2 and Associated Bases CTS 1.7 (1.8 in Diablo Canyon) defines CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. A markup of CTS 1.7/1.8 is provided in the CTS markup of CTS 1.0. DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) states that the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted from the CTS /ITS. DOC 1-01 LG in CTS 3.6 states that the definition requirements have been relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.6.1. Both of these justifications are incorrect. CTS 1.7.c (1.8.c in Diablo Canyon) specifies that the airlocks shall be in compliance with the requirements of specification 3.6.1.3. This requirement has been relocated to the Bases of ITS 3.6.1, but it is also the Bases for ITS SR 3.6.2.1 and SR 3.6.2.2. No justification is provided for this Administrative change in CTG 1.0. A similar change made to CTS 4.6.1.1.b is designated DOC 1-05A which is acceptable. Comment: Provide a discussion and justification for this Administration change similar to DOC 1-05 A. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-36 A (CTS 1.0) has been added to read: i
" CTS 1.7.c (1.8.c for Diablo Canyon) specifies that the airlocks shall be in compliance with the requirements of CTS 3.6.1.3. This requirement from the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY would be included in the Bases of ITS 3.6.1. The detailed surveillance testing requirements for the airlocks are further specified in CTS 4.6.1.3. Because meeting containment airlock requirements would be retained as a direct condition of containment airlocks OPERABILITY through improved TS SR 3.6.2.1 and SR 3.6.2.2, this change would be classified as Administrative (A)."
Also, see the FLOG response to Comment 3.6.1-1 regarding the relocation of the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definition requirements. ATTACHED PAGES: 1.0 Enct 2 1-2 1.0 Enci 3A 5-1.0 Enci 3B 4 14
P 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION
- l. 1.01 DEFINITIONS l
} . . l CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST L, 1.7 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:
- a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated or'~ actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to" verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/en trip functions, or 01-01-A i -
.b.
B1 stable channels - the injection of a simulated or actdal signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/or--trip 01-01-A functions.;or
- c. Digital channels - the injection of a simulated or" actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor input to the process racks as l- practical to verify OPERABILITY including rgdired alarm and/or-trip 0101-A I
functions. I The Charinel!Funetianal" Test ~may2bele~rformedibi,[meins~ofTaF.yTserief6f. sequenti l'!.. l .in.g, or .t,ota..l. w:nc.h..a.m_neli . 0130-A
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l l , i L- i i { DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 ^ ^^"-^^* "^'
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l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 1.0 CHANGE NUMBER NSHC pjSCRIPTIOl4 01 26- A New Sections 1.2,1.3, and 1.4 would be incorporated into the iTS to oe consistent with NUREG-1431. Section 1.2 provides specific examples of the use of the logical connectors AND and Q.R. and the numbenng sequence associated with their usa in the ITS. Section 1.3 deals with the proper use and interpretation of Completion Times, and s.ecific examples are given thtt will aid the user in understanding Completion Times. Sechon 1.4 deals with the proper use and interpretation ci surveillance Fisquencies. Specific examples are given that winaid the I user in understanding surveillance Frequencies as they will appear in the ITS. The proposed changes are administrative in nature and by themselves are not technical changes, incorporating Travelers WOG-74, ( Rev.1, and WOG-go, Rev.1. 01 27 M Not applicable b DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 01-28 , LG Not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Companson Table (Enclosure 38). I 01 29 LS3 Not applicable b DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table t (Enclosure 3Bk i 01-30 A Consistent with TSTF-3g, Rev.1, the definitions of COT, [ CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST(CFT)] and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST (TADOT) are expanded to include the details of acceptable performance methodology. Performance of these tests in a senes of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps provides the necessary assurance of appropnate operation of the entire channel. This change also makes the COT, [CFT], and TADOT definitions consistent with me CTS and the NUREG-1431 definition of CHANNEL CALIBRATION which already contains similar wording. ; l 01-31 A Definitions of specific plant systems which are defined by the plant design are deleted consistent with NUREG-1431. The definitions contained in ITS 1.0 are intended for definitions that are necessary for , the understanding of the specifications and can be generically defined 3 for most plants. Definitions of systems that are not used in the ; specifications, or are specific to a particular plant (or only a few plants) are no longer defined in this section. Where necessary, such items are , defined in the Bases for the applicable specifications. ' 1-32 A The definitions of CHANNEL CALIBRATION, COT, [CFT]. and TADOT are reworded to be consistent with industry Traveler TSTF-64 to clanfy the phrase " entre channel," thus reducing the potential for inconsistent interpretation d the phrase as exponenced by a number of plants. 1 33 A This change revis.es the CTS definition of CORE ALTERATIONS to delete *or mangulation* and ' conservative" in accordance with NUREG-1431. The words as used in the definition were redundant and deleting the words does not alter the meaning of the definition. 1-35 A (oce ins,a fee 93.<,,,3-0
.I-36 A c3.u.s.i
/see inse,.J. p o 3.6.2.-0 o 3.(. 2.I I *b~1 A (see, Iristr4 [or Q3.b8~h
' DCPP Desenption of Changes to Current TS 5 q%g.3
o 4 e g a P - _ l y n . Y oST A nC o no S te y dt t W T A C L ima f w ec ve in L A ea oSm t dl, a l
,R o C sC sA4 s
n - s e eS6 o e o, s Yin YF1 N Y e e N Y Y K 6 1 E E on S dt e t R T C ec C F ve n L oS i Y mR t o T O sA , n I W s 0 L o eS o , s s I N e o e e 1 B YU N Y N Y Y S A T C I T L . 'e n N P E eA h t iyS E P H g5 - f gl T R A n0- o nnoC R CK a n ie U NA h1 C0 r o bsS AE tr i E C MP e e o o nd ph gP eS O eb s, m s E C , s fia nnC s L o ou s s s 1 1 B N e eh e e e e e - - A NN Y dct h Y Y Y Y 5 2 T c. 4 n N 3 3 o S O Y eA - q G I N g5 R A n0 a A C h1 P c0 M O er O L B e sbe C A ,m s s s s N I D N o Nn ou N o e e e e O Y Y Y Y I S R ea l E st e Tt Oen V is eo cn E N e h t e Rd ist i h r alet r al e r Ct ,sd On O o r C Em. Gl . i ei o w r t T bo f a ,un gsn h a Nse i ns C *a E Awn t mle Ot Denppciahe nsa ci Oove I i f n ooh Kloe b h d Tcerr t n a G Af m r o ar Ac apyc r we Ae Tcamla a er se R beh en ol ) ) N A d Emu c enpe r si t ti u' mp l l n ofro ve ee sn ed mle d r 8o - e L u o l t T *y - f t H N t e Ded t o on a , s e o c ld .b in f r eo S 2 C O I le Erdr ni )d ,ee t se Ae4t dm ,. N T d L Lt el e ee h r TaPlanh yr sa Cd6n r - a Sr G, f. O P I is l Oao r w so asr Fo t t yn ef t t n n LoFe g EwTm To 3 5 I T R O Rwtn Rl ec Cdgeho NeS s C *e Q A C l t [ eo u t n lai pes N rTi et m C SE D-F Tao Nec Pnt Tne Thloqeios e t lee h I A Ose Qa h d e Ot Cde osi deda t led Ar rtea r r F D Hal h fo vr l t sd e CPe o R e elaic n CTevw I gce hf C Cs fol ut oo r p so f oreicn nut o: E f f n r ce pp Oa s i t o r snme spo v f P o s e oDrTi e eS S L n o s n ohel s scw aew ni ooe n pl t ce ei a se f oh t nA ioTryira t r N *e eOv
+r e
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l Insert for 3.6.2-1 1.0 Enci 3A - page 5 01-36-A CTS 1.7.c (1.8.c for Diablo Canyon) specifies that the air locks shall be in compliance with the requirements of CTS 3.6.1.3. This requirement from the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY would be included in the Bases of ITS 3.6.1. The detailed surveillance testing requirements for the I air locks are further specified in CTS 4.6.1.3. Because meeting containment air lock requirements would be retained as a direct condition of containment air locks OPERABILITY through improved TS SR 3.6.2.1 and SR 3.6.2.2, this change would be classified as Administrative (A). 1 1.0 Enci 3B - page 4 01-36-A CTS 1.7.c (1.8.c for Diablo Canyon) specifies that the air locks shall be in compliance with the requirements of CTS 3.6.1.3. This requirement from the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY would be included in the Bases of ITS 3.6.1. Applicability: DC Yes CP Yes
- WC Yes CA Yes I
i i
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.2-3 APPLICABILITY: DC,CP REQUEST: DOC 2-02 A CTS 3.0.3 CTS 3.6.1.1 ACTIONS CTS 3.6.1.2 ACTIONS ITS 3.6.2 ACTIONS Comment: See Comment Number 3.6.1-5. FLOG RESPONSE: See response to Comment Number 3.6.1-5. ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages for response Comment Number 3.6.1-5. 15
, Enclosura 2 l PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL MC; RMATION NO: O 3.6.2-4 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 3-02 A CTS 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS ITS 3.6.2 ACTIONS Note 2 A Note is added to CTS 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS to permit separate Condition entry for each airlock. The justification DOC 3-02 A states that the change is an Administrative change that is consistent with NUREG-1431. Consistency with the NUREG is not a basis for acceptability of a change. The change must be juetified on its own merits based on its applicability to the unit. Comment: Provide additional discussion and justification for this Administrative change. FLOG RESPONSE: Section 3.6 DOC 3-02 A has been modified to include the following information: "lTS 3.6.2 Actions Note 2 provides clarification that, for the purpose of the associated LCO, ' Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.' This is acceptable because the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable air lock. Complying with the Required Actions will allow for continued operation; subsequent inoperable air locks are govemed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. This is an administrative change with no impact on safety because the clarification provided by Note 2 is consistent with current application of the CTS." ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 3A 3 1
)
l i l 16 l
DESCRIPTION OF CHANCES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Continued) gg c J CHANGE wc h.cwc mure+,hcep.
.s , .Stt dow. tam Compark NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION gg,g 02-06 A onsisten industry Traveler TSTF 2, the leakage rate ptancej i
criteria is vised to <0.60 La for T B and Type C tests r than s i l d.60 L . here is no significan't d' nce between the expressons.j 03-01 LG The descnptive information in the LCO regarding OPERABILITY of the air locks is moved to the Bases 3.6.2. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 and the approach of discussing OPERABILITY in the TS Bases 03-02 A This Note revises ACTIONS to permit separate Condition entry for each airlock consistent with NUREG-1431. The Note provides guidance and M=*d . for use of the TS and is considered administrative is nature. CrnserD G 3.4. 2 tf 03-03 LS3 Consistent with NUREG-1431, this Note allows entry and exit into containment via the air locks for up to ? days if both air locks are inoperable and administrative controls are provided. With both air locks inoperable containment entry may be required on a periodic basis to perform TS surveillance and Required Actons, as well as other activities on equipment inside containment. This Note provides allowance for these actmbes to be performed 03-04 M The CTS ACTIONS { ] are revised to be consistentwith NUREG-1431, LCO 3.6.2, ACTIONS A.1. and A.2. The NUREG-1431 ACTIONS establish a one hour time limit for vonfying the OPERABLE air lock door closed The current requirement does not specify a time for venfying an airlock door closed 03-05 LS4 The allowance to continue operaten with one air lock door inoperable has been modified to remove the restnchon which limits this Condition until the next required overall air lock leakage test. This restncton was removed because the air lock remains capable of performing its safety funcbons with the remaining OPERABLE door. Therefore, continued operations may proceed indefinitely subject to the other restrictions of the TS (contnuing to meet the ACTIONS and applicable surveillance). This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. 03-06 LS5 Consistent with NUREG-1431, this Note modifies the requirement to verify an air lock door locked closed every 31 days. The Note allows the verification of locked closed air lock doors located in high radiation areas to be performed by use of administrative means. This change is less restnchve in that the CTS does not require this exception due to current design and capability to verify inner door locked from outside of the containment airlock. Under CTS, if the area outside of the airlock and containment became a high radiation area, we would still be required to enter the area to verify the closed positions. The ITS would allow verificabon of all areas that are high radiation areas or become high radiation areas by administrative means once they have been verified to be in the proper posebon This is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is restnched for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignmerit of the air lock doors once they have been initially venfied in the proper position, is small. l DCPP Desenpbon of Changes to Current TS 3 l
Insert for 3.6.2-4 Enclosure 3A -(page 3) 03-02-A ITS 3.6.2 Actions Note 2 provides clarification that, for the purpose of the associated LCO, 'Senarate Condition entry is allowed for each airlock.' This is acceptable be ause the Required Actions for each Condition }
. provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable airlock. I Complying with the Required Actions will allow for continued operation; subsequent inoperable airlocks are governed by subsequent Condition s entry and application of associated Required Actions. This is an 3 administrative change with no impact on safety because the clarification provided by Note 2 is consistent with current application of the CTS."
I a i f
Enclosuro 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 l , ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.2-5 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: JFD 3.6-1 CTS 4.6.1.1.c (Wolf Creek) CTS 4.6.1.1.d (Callaway) CTS 3/4.6.1.2 (Diablo Canyon and Comanche Peak) CTS 4.6.1.3.a STS SR 3.6.2.1 ITS SR 3.6.2.1 and Associated Bases Comment: See Comment Number 3.6.1-6. FLOG RESPONSE: See response to Comment Number 3.6.1-6 ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages for response Comment Number 3.6.1-6. 17
- _ - - - _-_ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ = _ _ _ _ Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.2-6 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA
. REQUEST:
JFD 3.6-2 STS SR 3.6.2.2 ITS SR 3.6.2.2 and Associated Bases STS SR 3.6.2.2 requires verifying only one door in the airlock will open at a time at six month intervals. The interval is modified in ITS SR 3.6.2.2 from 6 months to 24 months. This modification is in accordance with TSTF-17; however, the Bases changes are not in accordance with TSTF-17. Comment: Revise the ITS Bases to be in accordance with TSTF-17 or justify the deviations. FLOG RESPONSE: The ITS Bases for SR 3.6.2.2 has been modified to conform to TSTF-17, Revision 1, and reads: "..used for entry and exit (procedures require strict adherence to single door opening), this test is only required to be performed every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for loss of containment OPERABILITY when the Surveillance is performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency for the interlock is justified based on generic operating experience. The Frequency is based on engineering judgement and is considered adequate given that the interlock is not challenged during the use of the air lock." ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B3.6-10 For Information Only Pages: Enct5B B3.6-9 7 18 i
l l Containment Air Locks Mtme:pherte. Substm0 pheric. Ice Condenser. :nd Dual) B 3.6.2 l l BASES (Continued) SURVEILLANCE The:. SR 2.0.2 (91ch :1 6 : Frc~;ency extencion:) dec: not :pply "the ~~ REQUIREMENTS Contilnment1.eakagelRategesti,ng[Rrpgramj (Continued) i The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air I lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of thelContainmentiteakage: Rate Tbsting?ProgrininWhichiistapplicablsit6 SR 3.6^.~1^.1. "This"enhures' that~ air lock ~1eakage~f s'properif ^ accounted ^for^in determining the everal' combined ~ ~ ~ ~ Ty@Bjand;Ccontainmentleakagerate. SR 3.6.2.2 l The air lock interlock is designed to 3revent simultaneous opening of both
- doors in a single air lock. Since bot 1 the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure. closure of either door will support containmer.t OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the (Continued) l DCPP Mark-uo of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-9 .
9
Containment . Air Locks Pt ::pheric. Sub:t c:pheric. Ice Condenter and Dual' B 3.6.2 BASES (Continued) SURVEILLANCE containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the Q3 4'2-G REQUIREMENTS interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of the pgg inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. fDue to the ure:y W r.e-ou+ g - .,_,-,, - ,.. ~ _ . ,,
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of; containment 0PERABILITYs_ifgtheisurvei.llance werelperfo .wltn 41e'~~ a reactor . w nats, c..p_..-eow - __,.; n . .u m __ u _ .. u _. + u--~- - - - 4,. ' n . . . .m n - s- ...r....._....~ a. m . _ . . . -
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' G" r+ 6 ) SunD REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50. Appendix Ji[0ptforgB.
- 2. FSAR, Sectioni3..,:8.7.e n .
6?.2.K.n. d,.a. :% . H5. DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-10
Insert for 3.6.2-6 Enci 5B - Bases SR 3.6.2.2 (page B3.6-10) 1 INSERT A the need to perform this Surveillance under conditions that apply during a plant outage, and the potential for INSERT B
. the 24 month frequency for the interlock is justified based on generic operating .
experience. INSERT C given that the interlock is not challenged during use of the airlock. l L_. _ _ J
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.2-7 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS ITS 3.6.2 Condition A-RA Note ilTS 3.6.2 Condition B-RA Note 1 and Associated Bases The Required Actions (RA) for ITS 3.6.2 Condition A and Condition B have a Note 1 whit.h states: " Required Actions X.1, X.2 and X.3 are not applicable if both doors in the same airlock are inoperable and Condition C is entered." CTS 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS do not contain such a Note, nor does the CTS markup of CTS 3.6.1.3 show the addition of this Note. This change would be an Administrative change for Condition A and a More Restrictive change for Condition B. Comment: Revise the CTS markup to show this Note, and provide a discussion and justification for the addition of this Note to the RA of Condition A and Condition B. FLOG RESPONSE: CTS LCO 3.6.1.3 has been revised to incorporate Required Action A.1, A.2, and A.3 Note 1 of ITS LCO 3.6.2. This Note states that " Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3 are not applicable if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is . entered." DOC 3-14 A was created for adding this Note to the CTS. DOC 3-08 LS-6 added a new Action to CTS LCO 3.6.1.3 which corresponds to ITS 3.6.2 Condition B. Note 1 of Required Action B.1, B.2, and B.3 was not included in the CTS markup. Therefore, Note 1 is being added to the new Action to CTS LCO 3.6.1.3 under DOC 3-08 LS-6 since the entire Action is considered a Less Restrictive Change. ATTACHED PAGES- { Er:ci2 3/4.6-5 ' Enct 3A 5 Enci 3B 3 i 19
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS cho-l CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS o / A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.3 EdditWts6 containment air lock % shall be OPERABLE! rith both derr: 0H24
- !=ed ed ;t^7h^?~the :f r !=k it brin; d:d for = 21 tr:=it =try ed uit 03-13.A thr=;h th: :=tri- nt, th^r :t !=:t =^ :1- 1^-t d=r th " 50 !=0d.
' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
03-09-LS7 WM ACTION *mazw*** -
+ 0%.1 ~1 -
03 03-LS3
- a. With one 6FTm6Fi containment air lockiIwith7~~~~ dbntilhisi~ n~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^
~ ~t'iiiWFT6EE door ogthelinterlediaschgfg inapspable- ;~" OM6-LS6
- 1. "eint:in :t 1:=t Viffff the OPERABLE air lock door closed litthins1Thour and hith~er restore the inoperable air lock door om to"0PERABLE~$tatus within 24 hours or lock the 1PERABLE air lock door closed. ind,
- 2. ^;er:tir 2; the :=,ti=
.-- m 4 .-a - m . . n .4. ~. o ,
"-ti' ;^rfe- 2n= Of the n=t u.-- +-,+ ---..u a +w.+ y,pg -
OM5-LS4 l UiOPE5ABiIair Iock door'Is FIE Eibiiockeiclof at # least once per 31 days. M -
- 3. Otherwise be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.-and
'h0 prri:1 =: -f Sp=f'i =t1 = 3.0.' :r^ =t ;;11 = b'^. 03-12-A
- b. With the Erie 36F~!ibFi containment air locki inoperable fii5F~Fssichi OM7-M otherd' thanialT:^"inttiste* Actis @oi~eiguateiibuerailkontainment ~
leek ' ^rste 5bEElfD 2 & 1 N xc t~as th6"F'sGit~~6f"ah~ s inoperable air lock ~ FNanM mahtak eiertff at least one air lock door closed ~ivithini . rest 6Fs' inoperabl6'Tir lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hoGFi~6F^ "in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within th: f^"='n; '" gi hours.
$[S$$.Entrf?and?egtijjdieMfspibliit6?)eWorm]MiifffjjhlthelaffectedIalflock 03-09-Ls7 wwWe .s.
OM24- )
$25epifktQofitlinMGl!D]lMTiiGfitfl@gj MMEntigiiiii1Ribleitenditf orii~ithd^11dijiHNiid"'AR16hiYdfl1.ID:3?6J1L_11 03-13-A Containment 7 when;airlockdeskag~etresultshenceeding~tthe Lovera
~~ ~ ~ ^~~
pontainmentileakagQatef ~~~~
~
****] Entry 2 and '#RitIiilpermissablelfoFT17dayg]MAdministiratije[Contr61Qi1 03 03-ts3 bothairlocksamainoperablel
*jl*jfj^Af rlockTdooFEjhihtgh3adBQonl((flejbyYierifiedQ0cked)j 03-06-LS5 Ad.m,inist.~
-. - rat.ive means-i EritFyTa"hdisi'itT6fic6ntarsiiiiiht OM6-LS6
$^3' dedicate.d. dndindua.lE~~~^~ Tisip~eraflihbTii?DideEthi~chiiti;61T6ffa ~ " ~ ~ ~ '~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
036.2-{
- _ . - . - ~ ~ ~ - -
l -F f~},ons a.1,0.G,ana a.3 are no+ aAcher-cre. y to,m ataca in +e .su,e. o,e Iacx aee onopeacte. ana. Ac+,an b. is wered. C' 4 * ^ 03.os i.ss l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1, 1996 l I
DFSCRPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Cantnued) CHANGE NUMBER H&tiG DESCRIPTION 03-12 A The statement that Si L insi 3.0.4 does not apply is no longer needed as suvised ACTIONS consistent with NUREG-1431 permit conbnued operabon for an unlimited penod of time. 03-13 A Consistentwith NUREG 1431, a Note is added to the ACTIONS to enter
$4.2-7 applicable Conditions and Required ACTIONS of the " Containment" LCO when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment lealunge 03-l4 4 : Dis ## rate. This is current operating pracbee per TS requirement CTS 3.6.1.1.
03-15' A Therof re,tiis hangeis nsidered an adm nistrabve change in format. Jme #3.t 2-f 05-01 LG The method for r=w g containment n average temperature and the locations where measurements are taken are moved to the Bases. This level of dels5 in the TS is not consstant with NUREG-1431. The improved STS Bases is hconsee controlled under the Bases Control
' Programin tie Administrative Controls sechon of the improved STS. ,
06-01 Not Used. TroM
--os.s.5-1 06-02 A rity req of contain are con m' fThe strucasal ITS 3.6.1. inspection req with ral integntyof exposed h intenor extenor ment surfaces, contamed in ixJ. B and in R latory Gude( )1.163. The irement to visualins ' s is i 1 ITS Requ' (SR) 3.6.1. ich refers the ment Leakage Testmg Prog as by ITS
- 5. 6.
06-03 TR2 onsistentwuh N EG-1431, the requ' tis being deleted 10 .72 and 10 CFR .73 establish reporting requiremands 06-04 M The AC is moved to ITS 3.6.' , Condebon A B. The IT requi are more severein ist only 1 hour time rAOT.T shorter (ACT)is while the CT a 24 AOTis ble because a 'nment wh' y not able to ac : as designed ed have a sign' nt impact on (asthe @ a m_ w of an t. I 07-01 A Consistentwith NUREG-1431, the LCO and SRs for containment ventilaten4: urge valves are now included in ITS 3.6.3 for Contamment isolation Vahes 07-02 LS9 { Consistentwith NUREG 1431, the Required Acton for a containment ventilaten41 urge valve with a leakage rate which exceeds the acceptance entens is revoed to allow continued operaten if the penetraten tow path is isolated within 24 hours. This acbon is in lieu of
. requiring a shutdown if the vahe leakage rate is not restored to an acceptable unlue within 24 hours This is consdered acceptable because wWi the assocated penetratens isolated per the proposed ACTION . _ %n.at, no accdont is credible as a result of the leaking valve. _
f@gacde. agim&, (Erct2wtJo 33),ity/2. See [cvsvraim 6mpudm
- 93. t. 1-5 i DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 5 l
l l t 1
,I i Y
2 A f 1 o A W
- 3 L ,
L e g A a- C s s P- e s s A s s s e e e / e e e Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y K E E R - C F L Y O T I L I W s e s e s e s e A
/
s e s e s e B Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y A C I L P E P A H CK S. NA M AE MP 3 S O T C s s s s s s s T e e e e A
/ e e e N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y E
R R N U O C Y
- N E A L C B O A L T B N A s s s s A s s s O
I D e e e e / e e e S Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y I R A n e ei s r W l gm e k e kcs i "t a nst o y ain r a e c o hoh l n s O i i srdll i sd s t
,lr t n p e el t n
ae ar l l ee l C eS b ia r 1.te o pd ae bmla a n r e e ahde hs o Nea vim n gm t N 1so her r t u cie ncuvt nOt p on lptavo ae i O aele onbc 1 l I gT n o i a p ek4 Rc2 nt i pn r r I S hm me earo n en e ,o se n a oe eu vs o oc . t R rkst hmts o eci iChi yawn r 7lrt o rCh t aae l 4 E hot ee ned fi d r,n a o 1 ias die t e* g t
~ .
V N oreentat t l eok oooo t it Ft h Tnt n 4. r imm t e nhin nm e 3 2 N u nls c moit xkc Se o et et d mer O stnml nie ac oao t dae t e Tm 0. p fo of e oe me h c C E O I io kir v e ega eu d n ke u r do r nl rm m 3 nSd t Ssc ah 3 s. TS G T P t i cu ahnn e aocr pd oe aa i ea6 oNo Noe nx t n w d otn N I R doqtot nlr e oirNerho Sidb l l ye tr l enm l t vocr o bOe aI i r Ot ici n oss cne C e r A p c Na ea a I C a y nb icTp T ghaos r C Ast e. u r H S CrsoeI wO eii sf Oeur e l e ar Tnd f icd f n iaB C C er nTt hr e T bmp I we yo e c eAe Aedl utr - r s a E a t c a oe CrTv Cr atno op - r t C D so n yd pde eie e Sem e t E soA Ae .o Aeoim pc s l o n scn une hur l aleth l P ed .kt e gO tt k . lai sh t qeg b a S H dc r dkcakaCic aol ol a Lmo t i l t eowis hniokn l ca i ton d n a det nu x iqe he u av t in t r n t d oega Rak ka nho t t r ddne T n ale fo avo hnl aloh hes ed n sa l r Niai mleY t C l r ea i t a ei t ri dn o _ wrhw ec ri i i f _ E Tmd d s w e s e aro dalet s T Oae d: t I
;eInLie t oic a dt ane t n cm ns mdf asnen de orum n e _
e^ t nf he m e e n I l . Tlbtc t d s ne ht ar e p _ Car e~ mBr nAuofce edwnk ins e an i e t do iohm t t se nc eo t l slia s t aeh eit s enrs t i wma mepn e ra m Aef f eiR a E hf a iddolo sie nv sr t p i seh nvc U odnOtn hmk e 4C
- o ispa ho n t
.nPn o
ee o odr e rdet omo n o ur e t o hop et e NoCo e k r r i n Tia;cOoh t Cpapi n Ar Csm N Tno ACLc Ttea t e e s; i ne v. ni R c. c, E B h1}o [' C M 7 6 9 0 7 0 1 2 3 1 0-l s iP U 0- 06 3S 3S 1 3S 8 1 3 1 1 3 5G P N 3 0M 3 0A 0A 3 3 C 0L 0L 0L 0 0L 0A 96 [ (t l ,l:j;1
l 1 insert for 3.6.2-7 Enclosure 3A, page 5 l 03-14-A CTS LCO 3.6.1.3 has been revised to incorporate Required Action A.1, A.2, and A.3 Note 1 of ITS LCO 3.6.2. This ITS Note states that
" Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3 are not applicable if both doors in the
'same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered." The Note provides explicit instructions for proper application of the actions for Technical Specification compliance. in conjunction with ITS 1.3,
" Completion Times," the Condit!cn A Required Actions provide direction consistent with the intent of the CTS actions for one inoperable air lock door in the air lock. ITS 3.6.2, Required Action A.1 Note 1 recognizes that if both doors in the air lock are inoperable (Condition C is entered),
then an " OPERABLE" door does not exist to be closed. Therefore, Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3 cannot be met. This change is an administrative change since it is consistent with the intent of the CTS and is only provided to ensure the Required Actions are correctly understood. The change is editorial in nature and does not involve a technical change to the TS. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431. Enclosure 3B, page 3 03-14 A CTS LCO 3.6.1.3 has been revised to incorporate Required Action A.1, A.2, and A.3 Note 1 of ITS LCO 3.6.2. This ITS Note states that
" Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3 are not applicable if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered."
APPLICABILITY: DC Yes CP Yes-
.WC Yes CA Yes l
l s c
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lsttnr DCL 98-087 l ) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.2-8 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.6.1.3 ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Note 1 and 2 and Associated Bases ITS SR 3.6.2.1 has two Notes associated with it. Note 1 states that an inoperable airlock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall airlock leakage test. Note 2 requires the results of the leakage test be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of ITS SR 3.6.1.1. CTS 4.6.1.3 does not contain such Notes nor does the CTS markup of CTS 4.6.1.3 show the addition of these Notes. Based on the l use of the CTS the addition of these Notes is considered as an Administrative change. Comment: Revise the CTS markup to show these Notes and provide a discussion and justification for these Administrative changes. FLOG RESPONSE: CTS SR 4.6.1.3 has been revised to incorporate ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Notes 1 and 2. DOC 3-15 A was created and states: " CTS SR 4.6.1.3 has been revised to incorporate ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Notes 1 and 2. This additionalinformation facilitates the use and understanding of the intent of the requirements. ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. Since the inoperability affects only one door, the air lock penetration barrel and the other operable door provides a sufficient containment barrier. Even though the overall test could not be satisfied, and SR 3.0.1. would normally require declaring the LCO not met and entering ITS 3.6.2 Condition C (CTS Action b), the Note clarifies the intent that the previous test not be considered 'not met.' ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Note 2 ensures that the overall containment leakage is evaluated against the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program acceptance criteria if an air lock is inope,able. This change is editorial in nature and does not involve a technical change to the TS. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431." ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 2 3/4.6-6 Enci 3A 5 Enci 3B 3 l I 20
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS G36.2-E 55 A __ 4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
-f H, HM
- a. By verifying leakage rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage ae Testing Program.
- b. At least once per 6 24 months by verifying that only one door in each 03-10-LS8 air lock can be opened at a time.
noperaole dir /ouc dwr den no+ W'd* % 'th !-- prenou.t sucnsfuI perhemco ee o; +c opratI ase fact - 3 IewfL 4es+.
++++ n,e. Jutwillence retu t4.s .rhall be. esalackd- 'f*'nN 0"!$^' t 65 if A c < N-e riA. App /, c e etc. -/o /4. 4. /./. c ,
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 3/4.6 (Conhnued) CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION 03-12 A The statement that Specification 3.0.4 does not apply is no longer needed as revised ACTIONS consistent with NUREG-1431 permit continued operation for an unkmited period of time. 03-13 A Consistentwith NUREG-1431, a Note is added to the ACTIONS to enter
$16.2-7 applicable Conditions and Required ACTIONS of the " Containment" LCO when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage 03-W A 25M rate. This is current operating practice per TS requirement CTS 3:6.1.1.
03 -15" A yn3, Therefore, cp34 2-f his change is considered an administrative change in format. 05-01 LG The method for calculating containment average temperature and the locations where measurements are taken are moved to the Bases. This level of detailin the TS is not consistent with NUREG-1431. The improved STS Bases is licensee controlled under the Bases Control Program in me Administrative Controls section of the improved STSj 06-01 Not Used. (.7'n. sed b3.c. 3-1 06-02 . A fThe structural 'tegnty require nts of containm nt are conta ec en' ITS 3.6.1. inspection req rements associ with stru ral ' integrityof exposed acce sibleinteriora exteriorcon inment surfaces. contained in pendix J, Optio B and in Re latory Guide ( 1.163. The uirement to pe rm visualins 'ons is i1 ITS S Requi nt(SR) 3.6.1. which refers the con nment Leakage te Testing Prog m as control byITS
- 5. 6.
06-03 TR2 onsistentwith N EG-1431, the re rting requireme tis being deleted.10 CF 0.72 and 10 CFR .73 establish reporting requirernents. 06-04 M The AC is moved to TS 3.6.' , Condition A an B. The IT require src more seare in 1st only 1 hour owed ou e time (AOT)is ovided while the CT rovides a 24 ho r AOT. T shorter AOT is ble because a ntainment whic y not able to ac: as a as designed co Id have a signifi nt adve impact on (the eq, sequences of an acci nt. 07-01 A Consistentwith NUREG-1431, the LCO and SRs for containment ventilation / purge valves are now included in ITS 3.6.3 for Containment isolation Valves 07-02 LS9 Consistent with NUREG-1431, the Required Action for a containment j { ventilation / purge valve with a leakage rate which exceeds the i acceptance enteria is revised to allow continued operation if the penetrabon fbw path is isolated within 24 hours. This action is in lieu of requiring a shutdown if the valve leakage rate is not restored to an acceptabie value within 24 hours. This is considered acceptable because witi the associated penetrations isolated per the proposed ACTION requirement, no accident is credible as a result of the leaking valve. _-_ yy ap jante +> Ny/). Se., Mer.se 6tnPnMm l %Ie.(Octmi313). 03.6.I-5 DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 5
l l il! il4[jjl .l ; Y 2 A 1 f o W A 3 L L e g A-a C s s s s s s s P e e e e A
/ e e e Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y K
E E R C F L Y O T I W s s s s A s s s L I e e e e / e e e B Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y A C I L P E P A H Cg
- s. N, M Ag 3 Mp S O T C s s s s A s s s T e e e e / e e e N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y E
R R U N. O C Y
- N E A L C B O A L T B N A s s s s A s s s O
I D e e e e / e e e S Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y I R A -n ei s e r P gm o ekcs a l e k i y f M O nst i i R ain sd r a l e c o hoh t
,dt n l
p le en R t s n bma l C snda aer ee sS e b i a r 1 . el o pd ae a n r e e N ahde hs t oNea r vim n t u cie gm O ncuvt ael c ont$l so c nOthep ir a ek4 on b av pt o ae gT en on I Rc2 nt i pn r r I S hmne ear o p e ,o se n a oe eu vs nChi o oc . t 8 hmts nedo 7l rto i R rkst eci i iyA w n r o 1 i
- as rCh t aa e 7- -
E hot ei aok f die t e "e g t . V or ntat t l d r,n a oooo t Ft h Tnt n t nhin nm e 2 2 N e e u nls c it xk Se o 4. r imm et d mer c O C N O nnmlac st o i ev ei oao i r d mdaeoitt r do ec Tmr nm
- 0. e ft 3po t ofoee ne G.
3 3. TS n kec pdu ahw i skwe Ssc E cu ega nr nSd I l i T ea6 O pt G h n n e aoioe aai oNo Nnx oe t n C c ne N P I doqtot nl r e ar Sl t db l ye enm l t voo tor i Oitcin oss cne A R C oirNeho C a p c y Na ea t r nb l a r crf aI e cTp T As . gha os n u H S r wO eii sf Oeurn e l e ar Tnd i icd f c C dl t e n iaB C C E soeTt er n I hr a e I T bip we yo e eAeit Ae ut s ar t c - C D so CrTv Cr atn on opo r yd t pd m eie r la oe e n scn soA Ae aleth E P ed egOt k
.o . Aeoim pc s l
lai une Sei sl n hure t q eg l b ona det av u oega eho a t S r dkcak kl aCic t eowis hniokn i inuqex i t t H dc aot oia t Lmo i l t l ca t d hes he t r n trak d ka r dd ne T n C Niai l i r unleYea l ir hnl ia t aloh c ein d s t ri i f s t n sa e aro dn ed alen fo avo o s E T Oa e /nLie t Tmd wrhw I oic l m ae dt an w em c mdf dalet asne dem or i r n ns a t t eI t e do e n iohm ht u I nf he s ne Cae cd :i mBr is e Tl bt t d e p nAu c e edwnk n e am e ar t t t se n co eo t sl el s aeb it eiwi a mepn n er a m spa eMa iRof Aef r f hf a iddol sie t p i i seh U t se nrs od t 4C
- o E nv sr nvc NnOt hmke 4
t nnPe e o odr en om n o o ur e t o et e oCo n Ttee e r r en i ho n n ,o n n C prdet Csm N hop e Tie;cOoh t a pi Ac Tno ACLc t s si o s on nre i R v E fh d B 4 C M 7 6 9 0 1 2 3 1 I 5 P 07 1 1 1 1 0-U. 0- 06 3S 3S 3S
- 8 3
3 3 5G 3 1
- P N. 3 3 C 0M 0L 0L 0L 0 0A 0A 0L QD
l insert for 3.6.2-8 Enci 3A - page 5 3-15 A CTS SR 4.6.1.3 has been revised to incorporate ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Notes 1 and 2. This additionalinformation facilitates the use and understanding of the intent of the requirements. ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall airlock leakage test. Since the inoperability affects only one door, the airlock penetration barrel and the other operable door provide a sufficient containment barrier. Even though the overall test could not be satisfied, and SR 3.0.1. would normally require declaring the LCO not met and entering ITS 3.6.2 Condition C (CTS Action b), the Note clarifies the intent that the previous test not be considered "not met." ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Note 2 ensures that the overall containment leakage is evaluated against the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program acceptance criteria if an airlock is inoperable. This change is editorial in nature and does not involve a technical change to the TS. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431. Enci 3B - page 3 03-15 A CTS SR 4.6.1.3 has been revised to incorporate ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Notes 1 and 2. This additionalinformation facilitates the use and understanding of the intent of the requirements. APPLICABILITY: DC Yes CP Yes WC Yes CA Yes l l l
\
l L__-____--_______ _A
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.2.-9 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: STS B3.6.2 Bases BACKGROUND ITS B3.6.2 Bases - BACKGROUND The second paragraph in STS B3.6.2 Bases - BACKGROUND states the following:
"During periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door interlock i mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an airlock to remain open for extended periods of time when frequent containment entry is necessary." ITS B3.6.2 Bases - BACKGROUND modifies this sentence by deleting the words "when frequent i containment entry is necessary." Since ITS changes to the STS Bases were made based on changes to the STS, on plant specific system design, or on current licensing basis as specified in the CTS, the deletion of these words does not seem to fallinto any of these categories. The Staff believes that the deletion changes the meaning of the statement when one considers the requirements of ITS 3.9.
Comment: Retain the STS wording. FLOG RESPONSE: ITS B3.6.2 Bases - Background have been revised to include the STS words "when frequent containment entry is necessary." ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B3.6-5 I i l i 21 1 j
Containment Air Locks (^.tme:pheric. S 2:tmospheric. !cc Cond^n:cr and Dual) B 3.6.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS { B 3.6.2 gtgingyntAirLocks(^.tmosphcr1c.Sub:tec:pheric.!ccCondencr BASrS BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all MODES of operation. Therf are'tWolcontaihmentiairlocksMash The personnel air lock is nominally a' right~ circular ^cylinderNapproximately 9' ft~in d Mmeter, with a door at each end. TheremergentyrairJ1ockj is: approximately 5 f t 941cside1 diameter withia?2fft(6 inLdooriatieachtend! 7he Dn;bothiairflocksfdoors are ' ' ~ interlocked to' prevent ~ simultaneous opening: ~During' periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE. the door interlock mechanism may be disabled.
@4.2 q allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periodg rec"er m t & e-t / 1: necc:: ry / tach air lock door nas Deen rte e d, g---[c+esigned and tested to certify its aDility to withstand a pressure in excess p ;ge g of the maximum expected pressure following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. As such closure of a single door supports containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. .To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e. an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).
Each personnel air lock is provided with limit switches on both doors that provide control room indication of door position. wu ,+ um o ., .- ~ , u a + m ,u + +s,, - --,+m- m,s em m ,--
?.dditionall"
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J.s.n. . i.- m., ~m. .t. .,7. ;;.. ~ 7.- ;. Z C. . . I_R ~"~ ~" " ~ ~ ' The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the m44 safety analyses. APPLI ABLE IrfM00E31I2? F i 7 the DBAs that results in a release of ra ioactive gAFETNALY IS material within^co c'cction accident ( inmentaseisalossofcoolantagcgent3"
- f. 2). In the analysis of cach c ...c:0 this accidents.
- red if is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of" fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage.
The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0:1% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2). This leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50. Appendix JJ 0ption'B (Ref. 1), as L = 0;1% of containment air weight per day the makim0m~aTiowable containm,ent leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure P = 48404720 psig following a DBA WGA. Thisallowableleakagerateformsthi= basis ^fortheacceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks. The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the "C Policy St:tement 10CFR50'J6(c)(2)O1) LC0 Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of containment presstireTboundar9. the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment ~ leakage ~ rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event. (Continued) DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-5
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.2-12 APPLICABILITY: DC REQUEST:
. STS 33.6.2 Bases - ACTIONS ITS B*i 6.2 Bases - ACTIONS ITS B3.6.2 Bases - ACTIONS in DCPP modifies the descriptive information on Note 3 in STS B3.6.2 Bases - ACTIONS. The following words have been added to the first sentence: " Limiting for the airlock then the leakage must be evaluated for its effect on the..." Since iTS changes to the STS Bases were made based on changes to the STS, on plant specific system design or on current licensing basis as specified in the CTS, this addition does not seem to fall into any of these categories. The additional wording does not seem to clarify the sentence and it basically repests what is already being stated in the first part of the sentence.
Comment: Delete this change. FLOG RESPONSE: The words " limit fcr the airlock then the leakage must be evaluated for its effect on the..." have been deleted from the Bases text. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 58- B3.6-6 l ls I (. 22 l
RA9r9 l Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered { OPERABLE. the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE. the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air '! lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. 1 Nevertheless:;. both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for { normal entry into or exit from containment. i APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material ! to containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these ! events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore. the containment air locks are not required in MODE 5 to { 1 prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements ) for the containment air locks during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.34. j
" Containment Penetrations."
l ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perform ) repairs on the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed for most repairs. It is preferred that the
. air lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering through the other OPERABLE air lock. However. if this is not practicable, or if repairs on either door must be performed from the barrel side of the door then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, which means there is a short time during which the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the OPERABLE door). The ability to open the OPERABLE l door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the ;
containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to ! be open. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be imediately closed. If ALARA conditions pemit. entry and exit should be via an OPERABLE air lock. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that. for this LCO. separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable air lock. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation. 6nd a subsequent inoperable air lock is governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. g3.6.2-s2. ' In the event the air lock leakage results in exceedin Mr
%d th;r, thCk3;gc .=tY r/&t-' fMticffCg W the tb Ht"ff overallt,.: ~"
into~the'ap i containment"leakagerate:" Note'3" Conditions and Recuired._ Actions directs of LCO ^entr.(Containment *'1 16.1. the overa 1 l'e - g o ,,. s A 1. A 2. an W With one air lock door 1r. one or more containment air locks inoperable. the OPERABLE door must be verified closed (Required Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock. This ensures that a leak tight containment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within I hour. This specified time period is cons 1 stent with the ACTION of LCO 3.6.1. which requires containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. In addition. the affected air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hwr Completion Time. The 24 hour Completion (Continued) DCPP Mad -up of NUREG-1431. Rev 1 Bases B 3 6-6 I l t ( _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Enclosura 2 l PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.2-14 APPLICABILITY: DC REQUEST: ITS B3.6.2 Bases - RA C.1, C.2 and C.3 ITS B3.6.2 Bases - RA C.1, C.2, and C.3 for DCPP adds a sentence to the first paragraph which states: "The airlock operability...under LCO 3.6.1." The addition of this sentence does not seem warranted based on the fact that this information is not relevant here and that it is specified in ITS 5.5.16. l Comment: Provide a discussion and justification for this addition. FLOG RESPONSE: The sentence which states: "The air lock operability . . under LCO 3.6.1." has been deleted from the Dases section for RA C.1, C.2, and C.3. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B3.6-8 l For information Only Pages: EnctSB B3.6-7 23
Containment Air Locks P.t-^:phert . E t tme:phert. He Condenter, r d N M ) B 3.6.2 BASFS Time is reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door, considering the OPERABLE door of the affected air lock is being maintained closed. Required Action A.3 verifies that an air lock with an inoperable door has been isolated by the use of a locked and closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintained. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the low likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls. Required Action A.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is t Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door,ypically restricted. once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small. The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial entry into Condition A: only the requirement to comply with the Reouired Actions. Note 2 allows use of the air lock for entry and exit for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks have an inoperable door. This 7 day restriction begins when the second air lock is discovered inoDerable. Containment entr Technical Specifications (TS)y Surveillance may be required on a periodic and Required basisas Actions, to well perform as other activities on equipment inside containment that are required by TS or activities on equipment that support TS required equipment. This Note is not intended to activities) preclude performing isother if the containment entered, activities using(1.e., non-TS-required the inoperable air lcck. to perform an allowed activity listed above. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. B.1. B.2. and B.3 i With an air lock interlock mechanism inoperable in one or more air locks, the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are consistent with those specified in Condition A. The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both docrs in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. j Note 2 allows entry into and exit from containment under the control of a i dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door I is opened at a time (i.e., the individual performs the function of the l interlock). ' Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by i administrative means is considered acceptable since access to these areas is i typically restricted. Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthe door, once it has been verified to be in the proper p1sition, is small. C.1. C.2. and C.3 With one or more air locks inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A or B Required Action C.1 requires action to be initiated imediately to (Continued) ; 4
'DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-7
Containment Air Locks Mtmc:pheric. Substrespheric. ke Conden cr :nd Du:1) B 3.6.2 BASES
$3. 6. bli-f evaluate previous combined leakage rates usig current air lock test results.
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An~evaluat' ion is acceptable, to "immediately decla since" inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g., only one seal per door has failed). containment remains OPERABLE. yet only 1 hour (per LC0 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE l status prior to requiring a plant shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits. l Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected containment air i lock must be verified to be closed within the 1 hour Com>1etion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of .C0 3.6.1 which , requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. 1 Additionally. the affected air lock (s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour Completion Time. The specified time Seriod is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERA 3LE status, assuming , that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock. l I D.1 and D.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the slant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 wit 11n 36 hours. The i allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience to i reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6 2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of 10.CFR 50,. ?p)cndix J _("^L 1) :: medf# icd
^ tion theiContainment?l.eakageMate: Testing" Program. This SR by :ppre/cd reflects the ex=lage lea r: ate ~testincJieciuirements"with' regard tO"alr" lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established within"the um+ mennroContainment {eakage1 Rate neww + s u .,.,w-wro n 7esting" Program m._w durM; i-iti:1 w o nm - "cir lock i'
~ ~ Tha periodiitesiiiig reduireinentUerify3at*UE5iP1'oW1edagE doEsloE exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Frequency is tisoirequired by /ppendi" J (Ref 1) :: modi'10d by :pproved ex=; tion . ~ ' ' "
(Continued) DCDP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-B
Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 3.6.3 Containment isolation Valves ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) DOC 1-01 LG CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a for Diablo Canyon) CTS 3/4.6.1.1 CTS 4.6.1.1.b iTS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2, SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4, SR 3.6.3.8 and Associated E.ases CTS 1.7 (1.8 in Diablo Canyon) defines CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. A markup of CTS 1.7/1.8 is provided in the CTS markup of CTS 1.0. DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) states that the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted from the CTS /lTS. DOC 1-01 LG in CTS 3.6 states that the definition requirements have been relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.6.1. Both of these justifications are incorrect. CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a in Diablo Canyon) specifies that all penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system or closed by manual valves, blind flanges or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions. This requirement has been relocated to the Bases of ITS 3.6.1, but it is also the basis for ITS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2, SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and SR 3.6.3.8. No justification is provided for this Administrative change in CTS 1.0. Comment: Revise the CTS markup and provide a discussion and justification for this Administrative change. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-35 A (CTS 1.0) has been added to read:
" CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a for Diablo Canyon) specifies that all penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either capable of being closed by an OPERA'dLE containment automatic isolation valve system or closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions. Consistent iuith NUREG-1431, this requirement from the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY would be included in the Bases of ITS 3.6.1 and would be addressed by the combination of surveillance requirements ITS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2 (not applicable to CPSES), SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and SR 3.6.3.8. This change would be classified as Administrative (A) because the requirements of CTS 1.7.a/1.8.a would be retained in the combined surveillance requirements of ITS 3.6.3, " Containment isolation Valves."
Also, see the FLOG response to Comment 3.6.1-1 regarding the relocation of the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definition requirements. 24
l l j Enclosura 2 l PG&E Lctt r DCL 98-087 ATTACHED PAGES: 1.0 Enct 2 1-2 1.0 Enci 3A 5 1.0 Enci 3B 4 l t 25
i 1.0 USE AND APPLICAT10N i 4 l 1.01 DEFINIT 10NS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1 l' 7 - A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be: l
- a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as.close.to the sensor as practicable to verify 0?ER*'31LITY ;
including rLquired alarm and/en trip functions or , 01-01 A i
- b. B1 stable channels - the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including required alarm and/sr--trip !
functions, o.r 0101-A
- c. Digital channels - the injection of a simulated orf actual signal into the' channel as close to the sensor input to the process racks as
. practical to verify 0PERABILITY including requir.ed alarm and/or-trip 0101-A functions. i The Channel! Functional' Test"may"be performed by meansTof~anylseriefof . !
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f DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 12 ^ n"Ont "0: ' ! '2 E' :"2 ?3 TAB 4.4A "" ~. ' ^ ~..,^ ' __ _ ___ ___ _ _m._ - _ . _-______.o.. _.m__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ s
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 1.0 l CHANGE: NUMBER !EiG DESCRIPTION 1 01-26 i A New Sections 1.2,1.3, and 1.4 would be incorporated into the ITS to be I consistent with NUREG-1431. Seebon 1.2 provides specific examples of the use of the logical connectors ANQ and QB and the numbenng sequence associated with their use in the iTS. Section 1.3 deals with the proper use and interpretation of Completion Times, and specific examples are given that will aid the user in understanding Completion Times. Section 1.4 deals with the proper use and interpretabon of - surveillance Frequencies Specific examples are given that will aid the user in understanding surveillance Frequencies as they will appear in the ITS. The psoposed changes are administrative in nature and by themselves are not technical changes, incorporating Travelers WOG-74. Rev.1, and WOG-90, Rev.1. 01-27 M Not applicable to DCPP.' See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 01-28 , LG Not applicable b DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 01-29 LS3 Not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 01 30 A - Consistent with TSTF-39, Rev.1, the definitions of COT, [ CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST (CFT)], and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE ~ OPERATIONAL TEST (TADOT) are expanded to include the details of acceptable C ,i cs methodology. Performance of these tests in a senes of sequenbal, overlapping, or total channel steps provides the necessary asswance of appropnate operabon of the entire channel. This change also makes the COT, [CFT}, and TADOT definitions consistent with tie CTS and the NUREG-1431 definition of CHANNEL l CALIBRATION which already contains similar wording.
- 01-31 A Definitions of specific plant systems which are defined by the plant design are deleted consistent with NUREG-1431. The definibons L
contained in ITS 1.0 are intended for definsbons that are necessary for ! the understarwing of the specificabons and can be generically defined i for most plants. Definitions of systems that are not used in the specifications, er are specific to a particular plant (or only a few plants)
- are no longer defined in this sechon Where necessary, such items are defined in the Bases for the applicable specifications.
( 1 32'. A The definitions of CHANNEL CALIBRATION, COT, [CFT). and TADOT i are reworded to be consistent with industry Traveler TSTF-64 to clanfy i the phrase " entre channel;* thus reducing the potential for inconsistent interpretation of the phrase as exponenced by a number of plants. 1-33' A This change reuses the CTS definition of CORE ALTERATIONS to delete "or mangsulation* and
- conservative
- in accordance with NUREG-1431. The words as used in the definition were redundant and deleting the words does not alter the meaning of the definition.
l-35 A. .(see % p 935,pq g3,5,3., I-36 A (sr.e loser 4. f ,- Q ~5.6.1 - 0 4 3.6 2-I j I ~ ~Il A (see. Insera for 91.6 I-3) DCPP Desenption of Changes to Current TS S qggg.3
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33 g
Insert for 3.6.3-1 1.0 Enci 3A - page 5 01-35-A CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a for Diablo Canyon) specifies that all penetrations I required to be closed during accident conditions are either capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve i system or closed by manual valves, blind flanges or deactivated j automatic valves secured in their closed positions. Consistent with i NUREG-1431, this requirement from the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY would be included in the Bases of ITS 3.6.1 and would be addressed by the combination of surveillance requirements ITS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2 (not applicaole to CPSES), SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and SR 3.6.3.8. This change would be classified as Administrative (A) because the requirements of CTS 1.7.a/1.8.a would be retained in the combined surveillance requirements of ITS 3.6.3, " Containment isolation Valves." 1.0 Enci 3B - page 4 01-35-A CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a for Diablo Canyon) specifies that all penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system or closed by manual valves, blind flanges or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions. Consistent with NUREG-1431, this requirement from the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY would be included in the Bases of ITS 3.6.1 and would be addressed by the combination of surveillance requirements ITS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2 (not applicable to CPSES), SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and SR 3.6.3.8. Applicability: DC Yes CP Yes WC Yes CA Yes l ____________ a
Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-4 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 7-03 A CTS 4.6.1.7.1 ITS SR 3.6.3.1 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.1.7.1 requires the purge valves to be verified locked closed or blank flanged at least once per 31 days. The CTS has been modified to provide an allowance for one purge valve in the flow path to be open to repair excessive leakage while in the ITS Action for an inoperable purge valve due to excessive leakage. This change designated DOC 7-03 A is characterized as an Administrative change. This is incorrect. The CTS does not currently have this allowance and the change cannot be characterized as Administrative because of consistency with another Less Restrictive change. The change is a Less Restrictive change. See Comment Number 3.6.3-5. Comment: Provide a discussion and justification for this Less Restrictive change. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 7-03 A has been revised to be DOC 7-03 LS-26 and the discussion and justification for this Less Restrictive change has been provided. This Comment is no longer applicable to DCPP based on response to Comment Number 3.6.3-5. ATTACHED PAGES: None. 26
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.3-5 APPLICABILITY: DC l l REQUEST: DOC 7-03 A CTS 4.6.1.7.1 CTS 4.6.1.7.2 STS SR 3.6.3.1 and Associated Bases DCPP CTS 4.6.1.7.1 verifies that the containment purge supply and exhaust valves and vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves are closed at least once per 31 days. The CTS has been modified to provide an allowance for one valve in the flow path to be open to i repair excessive leakage while in ITS ACTION D. This change is designated DOC 7-03 A. The proposed change is associated with STS SR 3.6.3.1 which deals with sealed closed purge valves. The DCPP ITS markup shows that STS SR 3.6.3.1 is not used. In .I addition, the CTS already allows the subject valves to be opened per CTS 4.6.1.7.2. Therefore, DOC 7-03 A is not applicable to DCPP. Comment: Revise the CTS markup to delete DOC 7-03 A. FLOG RESPONSE: DCPP CTS 4.6.1.7.1 markup is revised to remove DOC 7-03-A and the words "except for one valve in a penetration flow path while in the action for 3.6.1.7 for excessive leakage." This is appropriate since Note 1 in DCPP CTS 3.6.3 (DOC 11-01-LS13) states: " Penetration flow paths may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control." ATTACHED PAGES: Enclosure 2 3/4 6-10 Enclosure 3A 6 Enclosure 3B 4 For Information Only Pages: Enclosure 2 3/4 6-15 Enclosure 3A 9 Enclosure 4 LS13, pages 32 and 33 l I 27
1 CM-l l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ' c-on A i CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM 07-01-A l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.7 One purge supply line and/or one purge exhaust line of the Containment g y *, y g Purge System may be open or the vacuum / pressure relief line may be open ---The v:==!- 0= r r0li^' 11= =y bc Op- provided the vacuum / pressure relief 07-04-R LS isolation valves are blocked to prevent opening beyond 50' (90' is fully open). Operation
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= = r ! ?r^ = ure relief l,'n = ^^ = . Or ::1th the ":="-!pr==r^ relief .... 07-05-A l 1 =l:t1 = ='"5 = b^y=d 50' Withith containment'pUrgefsupplfior exhaustWaWicFlischacuisd froliefaalvesson;the;same penetfiffon 11-12 A I gaoperableM~opescuenst ether ~~ ~~eT6ss*ths"6~ d~holation~ '
vilve(5)~6r is615t'e~tfie'pihs fit' ion oi44th(ilwit n 1 hour: otherwise. be in at least HOT STANDBY withiri~the~next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. i
...s m ....m. m....._ i ew (n..-..,,.sE0ne. f oremore;peNiiGitio..,.,if16iFpitE6tthl n one,rar,,l,a_o..,. rescen ._,., tii.t.... ,nnen purgelog 07.o2-LS9 !
vacuum /pressurwareHefswalves;not# thin; ~ svalvedeakageaimitsa Within!24lhoursitselateitheiaffected;penet 16nifics: path W useioffat 01ms1 , leasttonefclosediandide? activated. automat 1CheWenclosed senualivaherof blindifiangestiertfy2the affected penetratten#1on;pathsistisolatedience ssforntiblationMevicestnutsidel-S - Mandprior torentering'tODEr4 perf317 from ftXE day $Mfsnetsperfbruisd istthtedthe!Praeleus?9FdaystforRisolation Aevic containmentdnd'perflorm Surve111ance?4;613.4tfonthe; resilient:seahpurgelvalves' closedjolco!qpMj!!g38!1gReggegetlog&i301Qanceipel92;dgs;
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~'o 7.,3. M SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS pu.3-as ,I JL-- l 4.6.1.7.1 The position of the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation e e m valves and the vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves shall be determined closed ( 07,03-A )
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I. 4.6.1.7.3 The INitich7 vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves shall be verified ED l r IS r^.ths. to be blocked to^ prevent opening beyond 50* at least ==coch p^EnIEDoM R 1Afr5GWAL. Dr-ML -00t >
*T"MIsolatidnTdL4. fte571dThfM_ adiatio.nTi. reafi_iiaP_TE_iie.._Eff_idd!b_y.M. .e?.o..{ 0104-LS1
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4 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-10 TAB 13.4A
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS C3 ' 0-I 3/4 6:3 ' CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES # "' #~ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.* # APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. W ACTIONm**am**m*W*a**n* With one or more ef-@e p"e"n~etratfori3:floEpaths%ithTone isolation valve +s4 11 12-A inoperable. maintain at lesst~one'isblation'iialWOPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:
- . 90:ter: tte dreper2h v&O'Q t OPEP.^SLE st:te: "ith4- ' heer:. Or 11-1&^
- b. ' Isolate each affected penetration flWhiith within 4 hours by use of 11-12-A at least one deactivated autonatic'~ valve ~ secured in the isolation position, or 11-12.A
- c. Isolate each affected penetration f1WFistH within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve oFblind" flange o_Fc_he._cl.Ma_h.~e._ _
wit _h 01 03.A
'd. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, r^?"PWatEijiplidableTt6~14sif675thimiR5afety'WiH?tMS$VDP14ainISteimili614ticij 11 11.A
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~~~ ~~~~~ c Q Valvesg M DYsjj NOTE " ~~ 7Cg* Leed Or :0md &:0d :&O: W tibW g1 W ipith7s may be 11-01-ts13 opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.
(newE W1thToneTorimoreTpenetrationificipaIEsiiirithiteincontainmenttisolatton
- ~~
11-04-A valves 11noperablenisolateithelaffected penetrati:r6 flowf path withinTh6u..r bymuselofoattleastionedclosedTandedent,tivated!aucJesticWalveh closed ~ " ~ manualsvalveRor:blindiflangenoribeWaiat31easttME' STANDBY withinJlieTnext?6? hours
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~ ~ ~j With7oneiTorim6rF~piineffatidATf1bfpublisFof!lthE3t9liieiroiifigured%ithich!i 11-05-Ls14 one ?containmenttisolationivalveland'aclosedssystem3with roue : containment A solation tval vetinoperableMsolateitties affected; penetration ? flow! path ^
within:72ehours;by>use!offatileastsame closediand:deactivatediautomaticNalve! closed manualtvalvedor>-blind;flangekor;bm3niat%1 east:HDTgSTANDBY1withinothe " ~ ~ ~ ' ~ " ~ ~ next,6: hours
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, ~ . l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
' 5.2.1 E:9 00ntricxt h&tien v&O dal' be dren:tr:ted OPEP.^3LE prier t0 11-06-TR3 etur-4n; the v & O t :Or"1:0 :fter : int = n:0. rep:i Or Opherent s:Ork it perf0m:0 On th0 v 've er it: :::00irted 222:ter. 00ntr0! Or pt:Or circuit by p0-#0 m r:0 Of : Cy"'4n; t00t. rd v0rd'ic:t10n Of 1:Chti0n tit 0. 11-09-A DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-15 Amendment Nos. 73 and 72 TAB 13.4A August 10. 1992 l
DESCRIPTION OF CHANTES TO TS SECTION 3/4.6 j (Continued) CHANGF! NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION yy g ,7 7 07-03 X /Kchange[ ] con tent with NUREG-14 1, SR 3.6.3.1, is ad L.S & I provide an al nce for one isolation Ive in a penetrabon path to be open who performing the Requi Actions forleakage t within limits. This actually a consisten changewhichgoes ' the f
. revised R uired Actions (see 07 2-LS9 above). The uired Action allows tenued operation with skage notin limits a this change to (the SR lows a valve to be to repair the ex ive leakage. J l TM cnenge $ not p,cphccolt.h R"AR Sre. Covemm Con r awcn 14pt(pri The time limit restrictions on opening the [ containment purge supply and 55),
07-04 )[LQ exhaust and pressure / vacuum relief flow paths) and the requirements to periodical accumulate the time that the valves have been open would be licensee controlled documents. ( p,y,fg-07-05 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, an ACTION is added for two valves moperable in one penetration flow path. The change is administrative since the CTS would have relied on LCO 3.0.3 which has essentially the same requirements. [cTJ LCo J.6./.7 Acmcwond] 07-06 LS11 This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Converson Compan Table (Enclosure 38). 07-07 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). j 07 08 M This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 07-09 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 07-10 LS9 A Note is added to clarify that leakage rate testing is not required for containment purge valves with resilient seals when the penetration flow path is isolated by a leak tested blank flange. The purpose of the leak testing requirement is to ensure containment leakage integrity during an accdont, and thereby limit accident consequences. Isolation of the flow path with a leak tested blind flange accomplishes this safety function and additionalleak testing of the valves in the flow path is redundant and unnecessary. 07-11 LS25 This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 08-01 LG Consistent with NUREG-1431, the LCO references to suction flowpath and manual transfer of suction to containment sump have been deleted. These details are included within the OPERABILITY requirements of the containment spray system (CSS) (as required by CTS 4.6.2.1 and as further described in the Bases). There is no technical change resulting from this deletion. p,g y 034 3-35 DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 6
DESCRIPTION OF CHANOES TO TS SECTION 3/4.6 (Continued) CHANGE NURABER N8HC DESCRIPTION 11-01 LS13 Consistent with NUREG-1431, LCO 3.6.3, a Note is added to the ACTIONS that apply to all containment isolation valves. The first Note allows containment isolation valves that are required to be closed [ ] to be opened under administrative controls. This is acceptable based on the administrable controls consisting of a dedicated operator at the valve in continuous communication with the control room. This control provides protechon equivalent to the automabc isolation system. [] Opening on an intermittent basis under administrative controls is i allowed for certein valves by references made from CTS 1.8 and 4.6.1.1 of the CTS. mM. 34 11-02 A fonsisten ' NUREG-1431 L O 3.5.3, a Note is added to l
' ACTION to allowseparate C dition entry for each pene' flow path. T Note provides gu' noe and clarificabon for the se of TS and is sider adminis inrinhwa. d Inter +]
11-03 A This Note is added to the ACTIONS to enter applicable Conditions and Required ACTIONR far =*=ms made inoperable by containment isolabon valves. @hserQ 0 3-(* 3 - 7 11-04 A NUREG-1431 adds a new Condition to the current Containment isolabon Valve TS to cover the case where two containment isolation valves in a penetrabon flow path are inoperable. The CTS addresses only the condition of one valve inoperable in a penetrabon flow path. If two valves were inoperable on the same penetration, LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. Consistent with NUREG-1431, a complebon time of 1 hour is provided to isolate the penetrabon flow path. This is the same amount of tirne allowed by LCO 3.0.3 before a power reducbon ACTION is specWied and is adminisu ;Oi similar to the existing requirements. l l' l i I l DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 9 l
in in in 6 Y to1 2 A t o t o t o r 1 W n n n deet f t p o A L 6 6 6 a c ha 4 L 1 1 1 oC e A 6 . l g 6 6 e a C 3 .
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ib l asr t sen l e c n wto nlvo b I S it ap vi re wro p u t o 1 o n ag eac a R r n _C ed o pa mve r e e eee t E diA r s y 1 . r t t a e it r ek p V een o nris la rea hrhs o t N t t i n t n e e v tg iut n qtaen f N and e g w3 mgrese ool i O ii c e e r. isf dofr s C E O I ole n sbe m m t n ou t n6 e3 na ss ekia a ee nn nrt ic mehl eeei o e v S T T o i h oe ns t l G P si a sst n t n l a m nS neiab r o ph ot m d a v t n N I se o o r1 ol cat eh wpi e _ A R t cc. c u o iT aI ia t o ot c ndt i oY t' t o r r H C n ce3 e ar r t ct t nin ahrcp l eA o nesV w u S o us t lab owew s ]a h ooC t C o ri t C md a6 r _ C E D e r e s,1 1 f t n t r r s uo cde r f s enf col ooed t t i r nf oete l e"! bl a4 i f o e fod E nlv oaplaon daq t ise uo e nh ul dhu ic relu e dh lb P cG md e4 sc et daet a S qpaR exf et r e e m2 Rn . iv= t c ee it a dpe R t r sm mb ud dp T _ n e un aw aw H r r mm i s eu r uc cu ao Swe l i l ue Agc r n C esi du=t r e isoe t co so o ho htnnd qd dov vy aw s E e e nf t r nnla epe n n fl th . i il f s T cf t ea r r od a eV ir/he o ngt s lima nt Nn i r a eo my c ga e Oan unt p bo ni ebi im
/ l erelaen Ooit p sty mB d p rs r qo sr cpe I e
s ini n in t t ri oa C o e L eta Rla ep si e6 de icraml mui isdom Ta r Ct m o r eoe r ao r f t r u gt og pe Tr c i e a a f i t sonu Aen C t o e enb ht no p et Oe ha evll etnc o hexn nfrh eet eeiec hr [p r eeopbd ne n Ri n Ad l i N TicO Tvlo Tveo Cppw T Ap o isr e v R s n E (e o B 2 C M 1 0-2 3 4 0-1 0 2 0g 3S 4G 0- L 5 0- P U 0- 02 - 0- L N 6 6 6R-6 7 7S 7 7 7 P 0 0A 0T 0M 0A 0L 0X 0g 0A C D - t
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l NSHC LS13 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION ! FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE i REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS j A Note is added to the ACTIONS in accordance with the NUREG-1431, LCO 3.6.3, Containment isolation Valves which provdes an allowance to open, under administrative controls, containment isolabon valves required to be , closed [). This is acceptable based on administmtive controls consisting of a dedicated operator at the valve in l conbnuous communication with the control room. These controls provide for the capability to manually close the isolabon valve should an automatic isolation be requuc1 ( l This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves NSHC. This l determmabon has been performed in accordance with tne criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below.- I "The Commisson may make a Rnaldetermination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license Ibr a facMity licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facHity involves no signincent hazards consideration, if operation of the facMity in accordance with the proposed , amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a signi6 cant increase in the probabHity or consequences of an accodentpreviously evaluated;or i
- . Create the possibety of a new or dNorent kind of accodent ham any accident previously evaluated; i or
- 3. Involve a signuicent reduchon in a margin of safety.*
The following evaluabon is provded for the three categories of the significant hazards considerate standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probablisty or consequences of an accdont previously l evaluated?
The proposed change involves changing the Containment isolaton Valve TS to more closely agree with the Westinghouse Standard TS (NUREG-1431). The change does not result in any hardware changes. The isolation valves act to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of a DBA and serve to limit the consequences of accdents. The proposed change continues to ensure that the isolaton valves will perform their required functon and limit the consequences of design basis events as described in the FSAR and that the results of the analyses in the FSAR remain bounding. The proposed change does not impose any . new safety analyses limits or alter the plant's ability to detect and mibgate events. Therefore, this enange does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a now or different kind of accdont from any accident previously evaluated? !
! The proposed change involves changing the Containment isolaton Valve TS to more closely agree with the
- Westinghouse Standard TS (NUREG-1431) and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no ,
L new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters goveming normal plant i operaten Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. i 4 DCPP No Significant Hazards Evaluations 32 l
.- - - . - . . . . . . . a
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS13 (continued)
- 3. Does this change mvolve a significant reduchon in a margin of safety?
The proposed change revises the Containment isolation Valve TS to be consistent with the Westinghouse Standard TS (NUREG-1431) and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequences of a design basis event and the concems for the plant's abihty to perform
' required operational support functions with necessary systems isolated. The proposed change allows for protechon commensurate with that provKlod by an automatic isolation system. Considering the probability of an event that would challenge the containment boundary, the altamative protection provided by this change and the operatonal requirements to occasionally open these valves, the proposed change is acceptkole and any reduchon in the margin of safety insignificant.
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluston, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC 'LS13' resulting from the converson to the iTS format satisfy the NSHC standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly a NSHC finding is jushfied l 1 l l I I I DCPP No Significant Haza.rds Evaluations 33 ; I
Enclosuro 2 . l PG&E Lett::r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-6 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: 1 DOC 11-02 A CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS ITS 3.6.3 ACTIONS Note 2 A Note is added to CTS 3.6.1.7 and CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS to permit separate Condition entry for each penetration flow path. The justification DOC 11-02 A states that the change is an Administrative change that is consistent with NUREG-1431. Consistency with the NUREG is not a basis for acceptability of a change. The change must be justified on its own merits based on its applicability to the unit. In addition, this change in CTS markup for Callaway is labeled in " Insert C for page 3/4 6-11" as 11-02 LS: it should be 11-02A. Comment: Provide additional discussion and justification for this Administrative change, and correct the discrepancy in the CTS markup for Callaway. l FLOG RESPONSE: In response to this comment, revise DOC 11-02-A to read: I CTS LCOs 3.6.1.7 and 3.6.3 have been revised to incorporate ITS LCO 3.6.3 Note 2 to clarify the Required Actions. Note 2 provides clarification that for the purpose of the { associated LCO, " Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path." This is acceptable because the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable Containment isolation Valve. Complying with the Required Actions will allow for continued operation. Subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions govern subsequent inoperable Containment isolation Valves. This is an administrative change with no impact on safety because the clarifications provided by ITS LCO 3.6.3 Note 2 are consistent with the existing practices of the CTS. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, in addition, the mark-up of CTS 3.6.1.7 for Callaway, labeled " Insert C for pages 3/4.6-11" as 11-02LS has been changed to 11-02A. ATTACHED PAGES.
)
Enci 3A 9 l 28 l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ __ _ . _ _ . _J
DESCRIPTION OF CHANIES TO TS SECTiON 3/4.6 (Conbnued) CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DERGRIP_ TION 11-01 LS13 Consistentwith NUREG-1431, LCO 3.6.3, a Note is added to the ACTIONS Wiat apply to all containment isolation valves. The first Note allows containment isolation valves that are required to be closed [ ] to be opened under administrative controls. This is acceptable based on the admsustrabve controls consistmg of a dedicated operator at the valve in conbnuous communication with the control room. This control provides protechon equivalent to the auiomatic isolation system. [] Opening <.m an intermrant basis under administrative controls is allowed w cartain vabes by references made from CTS 1.8 and 4.6.1.1 of the CTS. . c.,:..w, . s, -to 11-02 A $onsis NUREG-1431 L 0 3.5.3, a Note is added to l ACTIO to allow separate C dition entry for each pene n flow i path. T Note provides gu' nce and clarification for the se of TS and is Mr adminis .;.. in nature Zhfen) 11-03 A The Note is added to the ACTIONS to enter applicable Conditions and RequiredACTION agalems made inoperable by containment isolationialves ~ZhserQ C3 4 3~7 11-04 A NUREG-1431 adds a new Condition to the current Containment isolation Valve TS to cover the case where two containment isolation valves in a penetration flow path are inoperable. The CTS addresses only the condition of one valva inoperable in a penetration flow path. If two valves were inoperable on the same penetration, LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. Consistent with NUREG-1431, a completion time of 1 hour is provided to isolate the penetration flow path. This is the same aneount of time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 before a power reduchon ACTION is specified and is admir istratively similar to the existing requirements. l I l DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 9 i
1 Insert for 3.6.3-6 Enclosure 3A page 9 11-02-A:
- I
- CTS LCOs 3.6.1.7 and 3.6.3 have been revised to incorporate ITS LCO 3.6.3 Note 2 to .l clarify the Required Actions. Note 2 provides clarification that for the purpose of the
' . associated LCO, ." Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path." 4 This is acceptable because the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable Containment isolation Valve. Complying with
- the Required Actions will allow for continued operation. Subsequent Condition entry and I application of associated Required Actions govern subsequent inoperable Containment Isolation Valves. This is an administrative change with no impact on safety because the clarifications provided by ITS LCO 3.6.3 Note 2 are consistent with the existing practices of the CTS. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
l l L t t
r-Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett::r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-7 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 11-03 A CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS ITS 3.6.3 ACTIONS Note 3 A Note is added to CTS 3.6.1.7 and CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS to entail Applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves. The justification DOC 11-03 A just states that the Note is added without providing any additionaljustification as to why it can be added. Comment: Provide additional discussion and justification for this Administrative change. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 11-03 A is revised to add the following justification: "The requirement to enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions is current operating practice, as all applicable LCOs must be met. The Note specifically states what is already required by CTS, and therefore its addition is consicered to be an administrative change. This administrative change is consistent with NUREG-1431." ATTACHED PAGES: EncI3A 9
)
i I , l 4 29
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 3/4.6 (Conbnued) CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION 11-01 LS13 Consistent with NUREG-1431, LCO 3.6.3, a Note is added to the ACTIONS that apply to all containment isolation valves. The first Note allows containment isolation valves that are required to be closed [ ] to be opened under administrative controls. This is acceptable based on the administrative controls consisting of a dedicated operator at the valve in continuous communication with the control room. This control provides protection equivalent to the automatic isolation system. [] Opening on an intermittent basis under administrative controls is allowed for certain valves by references made from CTS 1.8 and 4.6.1.1 of the CTS. c r.w.>- 11-02 A fons NUREG-1431 0 3.5.3, a Note is added to l ACTI to allow separate dition entry for each pene on flow f path. Note provides gu nce and clanfication for the se of TS and is ider administrate in nature b Tntert_) 11-03 A This Note is added to the ACTIONS to enter applicable Conditions and Required ACTIONR faf ems made inoperable by containment isolation volves. (TrorrQ 034 3~7 11-04 A NUREG-1431 adds a new Condition to the current Containment isolation Valve TS to cover the case where two containment isolation valves in a penetrabon flow path are inoperable. The CTS addresses only the candition of one valve inoperable in a penetration flow path. If two valves were inoperable on the same penetration, LCO 3.0.3 would be entered Consistent with NUREG-1431, a completion time of 1 hour is provided to isolate the penetrabon flow path. This is the same amount of bme allowed by LCO 3.0.3 before a power reducbon ACTION is specified and is administratively similar to the existing requirements. l l DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 9
insert for 3.6.3-7 Enclosure 3A page 9 11-03-A - The requirement to enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions is current operating practice, as all applicable LCOs must be met. The Note specifically states what is already required by CTS, and therefore its addition is considered to be an administrative change. This administrative change is consistent with NUREG-1431, i
Enclosuro 2 ; PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-8 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA ' REQUEST: DOC 11-09 A JFD 3.6-7 CTS 4.6.3.3 ITS SR 3.6.3.5 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.3.3 verifies that the isolation time of each power-operated or automatic valve l beluding check valves is within limits. The CTS is modified to be consistent with TSTF- 1 46 Rev 1 by deleting the reference to "each power operated" valve, and to limit the I required verification to each automatic isolation valve, including check valves. Even , though TSTF-46 Rev 1 has been implemented properly in ITS SR 3.6.3.5 (See i Comment Number 3.6.3-9), the changes made to CTS 4.6.3.3 are not in conformance with TSTF-46 and the justifications DOC 11-09 A and JFD 3.6-7 discuss the actual changes made to CTS 4.6.3.3 and not the TSTF-46 change. The actual change described above and in DOC 11-09 A would require isolation time testing of all automatic isolation valves including check valves. TSTF-46 limits isolation time testing to only automatic power operated isolation valves which excludes check valves. Thus the change is a combination of Administrative (deletion of power-operated valves) and Less Restrictive (deletion of check valves). Comment: Revise the CTS markup of CTS 4.6.3.3 to be consistent with the changes associated with TSTF-46. Provide additional discussion and justification for these Administrative and Less Restrictive changes. FLOG RESPONSE: The markup of CTS 4.6.3.3; the justification of DOC 11-09-A, mark-up of ITS SR 3.6.3.5 Bases (DCPP only); and the justification of JFD 3.6-7 have been revised to be consistent with TSTF-46, Rev.1, in using the term " Automatic Power Operated Containment isolation Valve." The FLOG believes that this change is an " Administrative" change. The deletion of check valves from testing under " automatic valves" has always been a part of the licensing basis. This is specified under "... pursuant to Specification 4.0.5." This Specification , refers to ASME Section XI (now ASME OM-1987, Part 10). The section on testing of check valves refers to stroke testing but not to time testing. DOC 11-09-A struck this reference to make the transition to ITS and TSTF-46, Rev.1, which will specifically call out this exception by its choice of words. l ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 2 3/4 6-16 Enci3A 11 Enci 3B 9 EnctSB B3.6-24
)
Enci6A 2 Encl 6B 1 l l f 30 u__________________. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l O3.G.3-9 l SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) G3 6 3-8 l fpwee opetwcQ 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each testable "e.rr cr:ted er automatic d . . . , . _ I containment isolation valve tQtiiffretilockdifsealedBodotherwise3ec6Fid shall -- i be determined to be within its^Tiinit"whiri"testpd h0Fsuant~'t6~5^ddi'M:tMn.0.5 13m
- t. hiflM_kjjcesTei.
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l1-t4 A 4.6.3.4 Each containment ventilation isolation valve. except the air sample 936'3-4 supplyandreturnvalves,shallbedemonstratedOPERABLEeverijl841daydnd 11-13-LS22 within 2' 50er: 92? s after ::Ch Okcing Of o .. n the
'/: ke 1: bein utedy" cf multiph cy:Png then"pedip::the"WlvsT~Stept
. :tl t On 0 ^0r 72 heurs, by 07-10-LS9 verifying lea [ age rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing P ram. JhisisurVeil15hchkiffriotRrequ g-sq 4
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l l l I DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 TAB 13.4A March 1. 1996
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 \ (Continued) @S.G S-9 CHANGE c3.G.9-r NUMBF,8 NSHC DESCRIPTION pcwer496/Md M '"'4t-11-09 A Consistunt with NUREG-1431 and indu Traveler TSTF-46, Rev.1, the isolation time surveillance is revi to delete the reference to verifying *each power operated" contai ment isolation valve and only require verification of each " automatic sotation valve." Containment isolation valves which are power operated but do not receive a containment isolation signal (i.e. can be remotely operated), do not have an isolation time assumed in the accident analysis since they require operator action. Therefore, deleting the reference to power operated isolation valve time testing is a clanfication that reduces the potential for misinterpreting the requirements of this SR while maintaining the assumptions of the ccrident analysis. 11-10 A This change is not applicable tc OCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 11-11 A nw VFlh Q.14.3-IO A Noteis added to the tainmentisolation specifica on that the LCO is not applicable to main team safety valves (MSSVs , main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), feedwater isolation valves ), [ ] and atmospheric dump valve (ADVs)f_Me- A.'- nd - nt (L^,) 73."2 (LAR o s _nn cmmo n room- m. i.s-,. a ,m-w:----+ i-a-u-- ' b d -Urbs 3* f)OddbuS-5bcd hide [Ef5 eat $U d bd b 5 55fths Administraba eartinn nf the TS: (a n , unA.r 10 r'FD SO,5g) 9?n; er e cu~--dy aat :^^9-d **. 5:;; ; = .5 .:nt he':ta in Sn This note is consistent with current licensing bases.- 11-12 A The phase " flow path" is added for clarification and constancy with NUREG-1431. This specification is based on GDC 55,56, and 57 which address the proper isolation for each *line* that penetrates containment. Licensees have always been required to assure that proper protection is provided for each line or flow path that passes through containment even if multiple flow paths share the same penetration. In this specification, the term " penetration" has always meant each flow path that penetrates containment. Adding# the
- flow path
- to the s ' wp'rds
' ratinn clarifies this manninn ara e seu+ ence eveaf 7z ruiar:rsu.duty mm,'3-Id'
, pdc. J 11-13 LS22 This change re ases the DCPP containment ventilation isolation vmve leak rate su .llance frequency St . 20 ent.; to ;se.,1"A da,; and from 24 hou to 92 days after opening a valve. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 and NRC resolution of Multi-Plant Action No. B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration.' These valves have a good service record and have consistently met leakage rate requirements. The revised 92 day frequency still reflects conservative margin to compensate for degradation of the resilient seats in these valves.
DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 11
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_ uu. . 4+ a..+ 2. 4 ..___ j ' g",'"] , {" %fub1LZ.;M.Q.T .it.","~a".L "" JL1 -' "" M "* '".~ " L3 ". '.AT."T.'.L,."1.7 l 'J ".FJ l aa.=._. r Au SR 3.6 3.5 'PC[g Verifying that the isolation time of each ?== Opr:ted =d automatic , containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate .gy.f,,3.g OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in ap3.4 3 7 l time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. 4 l The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. = 92 day: 0 SR 3.6.3 6 Not]Used SURVEILLANCE ? :2:t-^:ph^-1 :=t:"m=t:. th0 ch=E I've th:t crec : =nt:inm=t REQUIREMENTS i nl:ti r functie w ci ;ht r :p-"; 10:d^d to provide p=itive !=re (Continued) in the dirrtir ^f 'm T'1: =: r n th:t th= 0 ch=k val = ""=i^ cl0=d 90r th0 M id^ :=tri-^nt :t 00ph= 0 r0 turn: t: : Itm=ph^-ic
- =diti = f^"=4 n; : DU " 2. 5.2. 5 r^;urz v^-d 'i nt1= Of th^ Op=:ti=
Of the ch=k v:len th:t re t= tele d="; rit Op=:t1= Th^ cr :;; = y Of 92 d:y: 1: :=1:t=t . tit' th^ !=rvic '^: tin; o-^grr -^;i ==t <^- v:'= t= ting = : 92 d:y c- ;=y. l SR 3.6.3.7
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For Containment Purge'su"ppMaiiWexhaustMd ;= "9 O'~and: Containment , Pressure / Vacuum' Relief valvesiith" resilient ~ seals"additionalleakage rate testing'beyond 'the~ test requirements of 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B 1s required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining 4Ms these) penetrations leak tight (due to the direct path between containment ^and the environment), a Frequency of 1B4 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20. " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. 3 4). Additionally. this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is ) a prudent measure after a valve has been opened. Thelleak~rateTicceptance"cHtiHFfor7theicontainment purge 5uppifTand exhaust; bt = 0-^0.Pandatainment pressure / vacuum? relief valves are in accordance widthkContainestjj.eakaget Rate;Testingfrogram,' ~ ~ ~ (Continued) I l ! D0C0 "a4-up o' W4EG-!a31 Rev 1 Baser B 3 6-?4 I
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NURE3-1431 NUREG-1431 Secton 3.6 CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3.6-5 This change is in accordance with TSTF"-45, Rev.1 and revises SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 to specsfy that only containment isolaten valves that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured are required to be venfied closed The position of the locked, sealed, or othenuse secured valves was venfied before the valves were locked, sealed, or otherwise secured.
-3.6-6 Not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comp @ar=an TW- (Erela-a 074.3-8* ewer 3.6-7 This change is in accordance with TSTF-46 ev.1 ana revises SR 3.6.3.5 so delete the **# 1 reference to vonfying the isolaton time of
- power operated" containment isolaten valve and only require venfication of each "automabe valve." Valves credited as containment isolation valves which are power operated (i.e., can be remotely operated) that do not receive a contamment isolabon signal do not have as isolaten time as assumed in the accident analyses since they require operator schon Therefore, deletmg reference to power operated isoleton valve time testing reduces the potenbal for misinterprobng the requirements of this SR while maintammg the assumptons of the accident analyses 3.6-8 Revnes the Completon Time for the restoraton of containment pressure from i hour to [4]
hours. The [4] hour Completon Time is consstent with the CTS. The [4] hours [) allows the adequate bme to take all Required Actons in a controlled manner. 3.6-g Not apphcable to DCPP. See Conversion Compenson Table (Enclosure 68).
@ 3 6. 3-//
3.6-10 Replaces the chemical additwo tank volume limits in gallons with a tank level limits in percent [ ]. E5 TA 26ei 3.6-11 A new Note is added to ITS 3.6.3, Condebon A.2 [ and C.2] in accordance with ([rsdeler W6G-@. The additions! Note apphes to isolaten devices that are locked, sealed or otherwee secured m l posebon and allows these devices to be vonfied closed by use of administratwo means. It is sufficient to assume that initial estabhshment of component status (e.g., isolaton valves closed) l was performed correctly. Subsequently, verificaten is intended to ensure the component has not l been inadvertently reposiboned Given that the functon of locking, sealmg, or securing components is to ensuos the same avoidance of inadvertent reposeboning, the penodic revenficaton should only be a verification of the adminstratwo control that ensures that the component romans in the requined state. It would be inappropnote to remove the lock, seal, or
. other means of secunng the component solely to perform an actwe verification of the required statn.
3.6-12 Consstent with SR 3.6.3.8, which provides that actuaton posebon testing is not required for valves locked, sealed, or othenuse secured in their required possten under administrable control, this change would provide that isolabon time testing is not required for automatic contamment isolaton valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwee secured in their required positen under admmetra$ve control This change is consstent with WOG-gi. l I
-3.6 13 A clarifymg note is added to SR 3.6.3.7 that would allow that leakage rate testing for containment I purge valves with resikont semis is not required when the penetrabon flow path is isolated by a ! < leak tested blind flange l 3.6-14 This change would incorporate plant specific operability cntens for containment fan cooler units j j required to meet desegn funcbonal requirements These roouirements are contained in the CTS. !
Med C3 6.G - F ! 3.6-15 Not apphcable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison (Enclosure 6B). 3.6-16 Not apphcable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.6 The ACTIONS and SRs of ITS 3.6.3 are modified to reflect DCPP current license bases allowance to open at one time any 2 of 3 the DBA qualified 48 inch purge supply and/or exhaust flow paths and 12 inch vacuum / pressure relief flow paths. DCPP Description of Changes to improved TS 2
s s Y a1 1 e7 3 A o5 d 1 d f o W e y C 1 A vn o t e aD wG L r e J L pm l a e ( A pd l a v h i C a,en C,h ev as - s s s s s - em e e otoa l e o e YA Y Y Nnv Y N Y K t o E n E s7 R e5 C o d C 8, Y F L CD Gs 3 N T I L O W s s s Wee ,vv s s O I B Y e e Y Y e o aa Nhv l e Y o N e Y I T A C C I E L S, P P E 1 3 A H 4 CK S 1
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Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-9 APPLICABILITY: DC REQUEST: DOC 11-09 A JFD 3.6-7 l CTS 4.6.3.3 STS SR 3.6.3.5 and Associated Bases ITS SR 3.6.3.5 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.3.3 requires the isolation time of each power operated or automatic containment isolation valve be determined to be within limits. STS SR 3.6.3.5 states basically the same thing but the "or"is changed to "and". STS SR 3.6.3.5 has been modified by TSTF-46 Rev 1 which clarifies that the SR only applies to automatic power operated valves. ITS SR 3.6.3.5 and the Associated Bases have been modified to reflect TSTF-46 Rev 1 as justified by DOC 11-09 A and JFD 3.6-7. The changes made to DCPP ITS SR 3.6.3.5 are in accordance with TSTF-46 Rev 1, however, the Associated Bases changes are not in accordance with TSTF-46 Rev 1. Comment: Revise the ITS Base markup to conform to the approved TSTF-46 Rev 1 or provide additional discussion and justification for the deviations. ; I FLOG RESPONSE: Consistent with TSTF-46, Rev.1, the term " automatic containment ! isolation valve" has been revised to read " automatic power operated containment isolation l valve." This change was made to CTS SR 4.6.3.3 and the Bases for ITS SR 3.6.3.5. The term
" automatic isolation valve" was revised in the remaining locations to read " automatic power operated containment isolation valve." This change was also made to the Enclosures 3A and 3B and Enclosures 6A and 6B discussions of DOC 11-09-A and JFD 3.6-7.
ATTACHED PAGES: ' Enct 2 3/4 6-16 i Enci 3A 11 Enci 3B 9 Enci58 B3.6-24 i Encl 6A 2 Encl 6B 1 l l I i 31
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS O3.G.3-9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) G3 6.3-8 (p~ovee operauc)L 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each testable ^01: r 0 Or:ted Or automatic / N containment isolation valve that::is' notilock'e'dssealiedkoriotherwise-secured shall be determined to be within its'"Timit~'wheri tested ^ pursuant ~to~ Sped #k:tich ' 0.5 . 33.o 9 the. ! !.ns_er. vi.c..eWesti
- - - - - rig? P.ro. -
gri. im . ;;.i4 ; 4.6.3.4 Each containment ventilation isolation valve. except the air sample Q 3 4 ~3 -'A v supplyandreturnvalves.shallbedemonstratedOPERABLEeverff184;daysand 11-13-LS22 s after 0 :h :M:in; Of ~ opening the~Valvb7~0=0pt ..On the within
'/ & O M 2' bein; hour:ut^d 92fy" . Or multiple tydn;. then :tlb:t 0=0 "Or 72 502's, by
~
07-10-LS9 verifying leakage rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. ThisTsuWeillincelisitsotfrequired[When ? thel ~ " " ' ~ ~ ~ ^ ' ~ ' " ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ f/-/q-m is..o. l ate.d.. Eb. y M1...e.ak...st. e.. s.t. e.d. ib..l.a...n..k...s.fla.n..,ge.f~~~~~~~
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4 l f i 01ABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 &~2 3/4 6-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 ' TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996 i i 1
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Conhnugd) OS.G.5-9 C3.G.9 4 CHANGE NUMBER ffA!EE DESCRIPTION peWQNd M"*Y 11-Og A Consistent with NUREG-1431 and indu , Traveler TSTF-46. Rev.1, 1- the isolabon time surveillance is revised'to delete the reference to l verifying *each power operated
- contaifmant isolation valve and only l
require venecation of each "automabcisolabon valve." Containment isolation vehes which are power operated but do not receive a containment isolation signal (i.e. can be remotely operated), do not have an isolaban time assumed in the accident analysis since they require 1 operator adion Therefore, deleting the reference to power operated l l isolation value time testing is a clanfication that reduces the potential for ) l misinterpreeng the requirements of this SR while maintaining the assumphons of the accident analysis. 11-10 A This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Companson Table (Endosure 3B). rren Q.% .3-10 j 11-11 A A Note is added to the tainmentisolabon spec;Tc.jlWd5 n that the LCO is not appbcable to main l team safety valves (MSSV , main steam isolabon valves (MSIVs),'feedwater isolabon valves ),[ ] and atmoschanc dump valve (ADVsjf_'-:: .x .^- n .;.:(L^.; 73/'2 (L^R- _ um vmamy -- g -- 3 -s ;;_m;m Nd ('r'.:;_2.= ';=:_--. ";.-: A.>.e _ nr eh.: vm f :;f-
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. efx N Mr - 1- z^^-; M ::::'f:cf 5 52. : x /.-:: sc.;'::':^t-ic M-~ This note is consistent with current licensing bases.
11-12 A The phase
- flow path" is added for clarificabon and constancy with NUREG-1431. This specificabon is based on GDC 55,56, and 57 which address the proper isolabon for each *line* that penetrates containment. Licensees have always been required to assure that proper protecbon is provided for each line or flow path that passes through costninment even if multiple flow paths share the same penetraban. In this specificabon, the term
- penetration" has always .
meant each flow path that penetrates containment. Adding the # wp'rds
~Y
" flow path" to the s r *-7 -l-..T.x this mamaiaa am a+ tar + once event 72. hian A'^n* mmpQ 11-13 LS22 This change ises the DCPP containment ventilabon isolabio vsN I leak rate llance frequency 5-. ?? mz% t; .;c,104 0;,; er.d {
from 24 to 92 days after opening a valve. This change is l consistentwith NUREG-1431 and NRC resolution of Multi-Plant Action 1 No. B-20," Containment Leakago Due to Seal Detenorsbon " These valves have a good service record and have consistently met leakage rate requsements. The revised 92 day frequency still reflects conservable margin to compensate for degradabon of the resilient seats in these valves. l l DCPP Dem.fipt,0n of Changes to Current TS 11
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,t e s e
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,e o o7 s
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- N s o E A eN L C os di h B O St A L Tn T B i N A s s s s Ca ,t s s e e o on I
O D e e e e S Y Y Y Y Y Y Nc I R A n d hg r S a P kr e n M io t .2t e cn ai o w T s a e o et n ym7a ecyo w op l C b n O sr a l i hl h a t e nesc f e t l t o C ie N ec en nat m n ots wo h yo ss oct Ya lve t en ,o r h t ww t e e fic n is n ia e r t O r ee n it sl l aa d n ns le e e I uhp ct t noawd ne Tf I L o veramlo ei r s ea d" v t x M S a e e iu tsl de e es q la t R h sn Cro end i r e solv ob a Bc e ca n I n ia . snn to tei r la E t ei ee ulcdv i Anhl Ra ge pco t e g ngo da q r u v e pr ee r t V s nhlb ig ri oiist aoonn r N t ode dv ewaf Emnr r, o e s c l a is d e.W t N n r r ri r h n da u n d O o ala rcae e ondCb naiosl a Pomoa voly te t t o euc t e C O it ov uspc o Of u ,u r et rt gita n st i c a r r n eo "e. i t sle E TI i d nSn t c ne eth is e per aic i u vay is wdlv eed p G P he eipvr pa e ni fr oTb o h dt t N e t y r c a r eo cp an va e s ebto ed g a I t h s ylt A R Cela afol ist ae mi > H CS wlais vo ot t r devh ieev n ea b t a r lvoea er r
,t e
e r ve s e ao v nh e n la c v o it e o af ome r e l C e vl t t sopnircd ci lia las cht l sl it eb E nVt le i nv oe t n yd i e aa n c vobaTpo . r va d v "e vl o C D ao n nb o t a st nsn see o E P S H simrea danp t a stoao dl i i d eS s ao a t pi nTlownlepe nhl nn bot tasin o oim t eas e t moe et i dleeinsd sy o omain t t eal t t e onB ab e mlah e t o o laf e lins eau vlce r uob r ug ns smig oi ef ytati milo r a a' i r d e it e sm st y C E 1 I 3 t o e n n ni cr o es t f l 4vio m mtad Rt eimr t l t nr oe e v's t it t d n1 a n vio ie on vg dlan n oloe pne o3 m ot otnt r o oVe niCss Sn eit oel eb T 4 e o a n v s r ev i 4 u ea pl i t oa b on a nc ,saolc Tnoe vh semmtcua cmo l 1 t f a1 e Gnt i m wh t a Cnmbt r ot e ht i o S mlaaaa Ggn laonnh cm" t o eon EaeP Rt new r wieat iat t e r Ciocei al ih t d as aEiRs iseicr a a ns i nne o uh endrvt t ucr en t i e t ee ne t et Uoho NCwf l n l AicpoAho s oenl s oi t w Tcasoc TcS tnt honeni hor hUs e hf Tr ecoof hah Tt R E B M 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 U 0- 0 4 1 03-0- 01 0- 1 N 1 1 S 1 R 1 G 1 R 1 1 1 A 1 L 1 T 1 L 1 T 1 A 1 A l ll'
Containment Isolation Valves (Atmc:pheric. Sub:t =:pheric. !:0 Condenter. and Dual) B3.6.3 BASES ww ~. arm ucaxw maum<;amam _m w <m wm
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-.~ _. _ a SR 3.6.3.5 %,,9 Verifying that the isolation time of each pce:cr Oper:ted 2nd automatic pg.g.3.g containment isolation valve is within limits is requiret to demonstrate p.4,3_7 OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve i ll isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. 4 The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Or 92 d:ys.]
SR 3.6.3.6 Not[1Jsid SURVEILLANCE Ir substa":pheric cent i = nts. the check valve that serve : contain= nt REQUIREMENTS i:01: tion function Orc ;;cight or p-ing loaded to provide p0:itive cl0:u c (Continued) in the direction Of ' bc: "'i : ensure: th:t the c check V:lve vi" r=21-closed "her the incide Ont:in= nt :tme:phere retur.: t: cub:t=:pheric condition: fc1 M;;4ng : DBA SR 2.5.3.5 r^ quire: ver"ic: tion of the Oper: tic" Of the check V:1ve: th:t :rc tc:t:b!c during unit Operation The c rcquency of 92 day: it concirtent with the In:cr" ice Tc: ting orogra-' requirc=nt for c valve tc ting On : 92 day rcquency. SR 3.6.3 7 For Containment PurgeisupplV;andiexhaustM"ydf ;MUrWandTContainment Pressure /VacuumlRelief'vaTveslith~ resilient ~sealCadditiorial" leakage rate testingbe~ yond"the" test requirements of 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option 5B is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated'that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining tMs the5dspenetrations leak tight (due to the direct path between containme'nt^and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20. " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. 3 4). ) Additionally. this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is , a prudent measure after a valve has been opened. ' The31eakTFateIddceptindeViteriaif66theRonthinment phrg6Isupplyfand exhaustRtydrc = -" ;cXandicontainment! pressure /vacuumtrelief6 valves *are71n
~'~
accordance witk;theIContainmentlleak' a gelRate;Testingfrogramf ~^ ' (Continued) l l DCPP Mark-uo of NUREG-1431 Rev 1 Bases B 3.6-24
NUREG-1431 Secten 3.6 CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3.6-5 This change is in accordance with TSTN45, Rev.1 and revises SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 to specify that only containment isolshon valves that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured are required to be venfied closed. The posibon of the locked, sealed, or otherwise secured salves was verified before the valves were locked, sealed, or otherwise secured. 3.6-6 Not applicable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison Table (Enciames an? fpower operant emwei+) 0 3 O'#
- 4. M 3.6-7 This change is in accordance with TSTF-46 ev.1 ano revises sR 3.6.3.5 to delete the reference to venfying the isolabon time of
- power operated" containment isolation valve and only require venfication of each "automabc tion valve." Valves credited as containment isolaton valves which are power operated (i.e., can be remotely operated) that do not receive a containment isolabon signal do not have as isolation time as assumed in the accident analyses since they require operator acton. Therefore, deleting reference to power operated isolation valve time testing reduces the potenbal for misinterpreting the requirements of this SR while maintaining the assumphons of the accident analyses.
3.6-8 Revises the Complebon Time for tie restorsbon of containment pressure from 1 hour to [4] hours. The [4] hour Cornpisten Time is consistent with the CTS. The [4] hours [ jallows the
, adequate time to take all Required Actons in a controlled manner.
3.6-9 Not applicable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). cp 3.G. 7-l/ 3.6-10 Replaces the chemmal additive tank volume limits in gallons with a tank level limits in percent [ ].
-'TrT 26a; 3.6-11 A new Note is added to ITS 3.6.3, Condsten A.2 [ and C.2] in accordance with 6pdeler W6@.
The additional Note applies to isalmbon devces that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in positen and allows these devices to be venfied closed by use of administrable means. It is sufficient to assume that initial estubbshment of w .pei id status (e.g., isolation valves closed) l was performed wii.cui. Subsequently, verification is intended to ensure the component has not
- been inadvertently reposiboned Given that the functon of lociong, sealing, or securing components is to ensure the same avoidance of inadvertent repositening, the penodic revenficaten should only be a verScaten of the adminstrabve control that ensures that the component remams in the required state. It would be inappropnate to remove the lock, seat, or l
' other means of securing the component solely to perform an achve verification of the required state.
3.6-12 Consistent with SR 3.6.3.8, which provides that actuaton positen testing is not required for valves locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in their required position under administrative control, this change would provice that isolaton time testmg is not required for automatic
- containment isolation valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in their required
!- position under administrable contet. This change is consistant with WOG-91. l l 3.6-13 A clarifying note is added to SR 3.6.3.7 that would allow that leakage rate testing for containment purge valves with resilient seals is not required when the penetraton flow path is isolated by a leak tested blind flange 3.6-14 This change would incorporate plant specific operability criteria for containment fan cooler units required to meet design funcbonai requirements. hese roouirements are contained in the CTS. eM C3G.6-g 3.6-15 Not apphcable to DCPP. See Converson Compenson (Enclosure 68). 3.6-16 Not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).
'3.6-17 The ACTIONS and SRs of ITS 3.6.3 are modified to reflect DCPP current license bases allowance to open at one time any 2 of 3 the DBA qualified 48 inch purge supply and/or exhaust flow paths and 12 inch vacuum / pressure relief flow paths.
I DCPP Description of Changes to improved TS 2
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- 3. T O N
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- NA AE S T
G MP Cn E R O i - U C s, s s s s s s N e e e e e e e M Y Y Y Y Y Y Y O R N F O S Y N _ E A C N C _ E O R L T B A s s s s s s I e e e e e o e D Y Y Y Y Y N Y R O t t n s y d e r e , - o F n e y - f a t E e t s . aF i r a t ee s v03 o o net F t la- d _ L B m i2 s 5 d T 4S lc 3. aichse e v a vF t 4 re oT bS e d l te r r e 5 ah e n-0, m rnT A 5 9t oF f 8T t o
- 6. oT s la ooS 3 at def a w o
T R9 nt cT o1 h v f t dt h auf t epe d3 sate s ealbTh F1 onsS ymi t e a reiw s p h N c ow dOdetnhe ieeh ce h t O crc i dei T n r ee not r i 6. 3 t h iue dCnmd ecls is 0b eeegr Tiw R sqc t t t ef e x S e u s n c aLa ni h S ve ren o no ne eeo mthbnl _ t l I R 1 nae qma e n nsivt eir a rone l bc a dn laed a a,gs e de e" don f r n _ f o visca ehehv A sd edtotnpv Li e e vr r _ r t a a n aoc to e f i P nro r beao Sno N nowe sT g a s sr c ta e ed M boN 5. im e di c 4pr 3 odc Tal O E O anc h h mhc se ec a a sef he io o 3 barea Sf d l c ina sTi w hrenot h t in 3. t vic c n I t _ C G T t edges e t
- 6. loci un Ed e 6. o N P nda Cn a Sifni e min e edmn t dOin ao ce 3b n N t d 3 ises O A R I
mvr ks o amisCs e an R tn si Pbn e l Rl ob a I S H C le r ocgc ori an t h t c i oe Nt a o ei anLn o hhi is t t S e s n ege Cev t h l Ssl R C S ppcoe mpar sd r dl g n enr ,ntsmtei dwei e nt ea e io s mewa C E ea c t n et bn s e n P soc Se r et rA ehg E D ia et a n nr h r r at a i h et ah ec V E t xinh Tah sa t t ivi uh oc vt Bdnri t o c xaph a s ,igl e P r g - C t ypd e ct n N S t r et sn a ek c eed zds ese e r nt is e O H on pomeoin dcs luloh i htsh wu dwc luos d o oh lu crT efydh h net dmm y C oly ,o - ~ C pb r upoTCs ort wia s h l b eeq t i u sv e s oa of h l i t laefo hc ln e lufi oret E wmT w oeendd sOr f eevdi t wvevaote ch R t w v gJ.petRaa iesl i wtoag T e ain t et gnh . tn lal ee gt sr s e gtala o s . t na e gt o c n etn1 e vaslsa le nyu nh el sc 1 n 4. cam ne" r amo . n x is ets S a ai gi T hnme v s p ar h aso . h y ,dv. acd i e hs va egsan o eb t e 3. r a r _ hc dn gnanC t cde2h 1 cf de e s t
- 6. fed hntcea eik spsamh t i cia st 4R st nt e mvp er p is s7v. s i
c eiR f i s3sh n nc s e r i h peedi t iho n2
- 7. Ch Tpvain TctoR Tslo e hpc e5 oah pl iapo ho i ek n , oRaa ihf TATLAw Tct 1o l
t v4 cst e r Tr o R E B - M 1 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- 7-U 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.3-10 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 11-11 A JFD 3.6-3 CTS 3.6.3 STS LCO 3.6.3 ITS LCO 3.6.3 Note and Associated Bases ITS LCO 3.6.3 contains a Note not contained in CTS 3.6.3 or STS LCO 3.6.3. This Note states that ITS LCO 3.6.3 is not applicable to the Main Steam Safety. Valves (MSSVs), Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs), their associated bypass valves, and
. Atmospheric Steam Dump, Relief or Dump Valves. The justifications for adding this Note (DOC 11-11 A and JFD 3.6-3) state that it is consistent with current licensing basis, the valves are not considered containment isolation valves, and that they have separate ITS LCOs that provide appropriate required actions in the event these valves are inoperable. Nothing in the CTS states or implies that these valves are exempt from this LCO. Furthermore, the staff considers these valves to be containment isolation valves, in addition, the proposed change was submitted to the staff as a generic change to the STS (TSTF-44) and was rejected. The staff considers this change to be a generic change that is beyond the scope of review for this conversion. See Comment
- l. Number 3.6.3-24.
Comment: Delete this generic change. FLOG RESPONSE: Diablo Canyon, Callaway, and Wolf Creek desire to continue to pursue this change. The justification in DOC 11-11-A and JFD 3.6-3 have been modified to state: "A
~ Note is added to the containment isolation specification that the LCO is not applicable to main steam safety valves (MSSVs), main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs), and [ atmospheric dump valves (ADVs)). The current licensing basis for these valves exempts them from playing a role in establishing or maintaining containment integrity.
This is based upon 10 CFR 50.36.c.2 and 3 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. There are no surveillance associated with LCO 3.6.1.1 or LCO 3.6.3 which are applicable to these valves.[] This Note is consistent with current licensing basis." The application of LCO 3.6.3 to these [ valves (MSSVs, MFIVs, ADVs (DCPP), ASDVs (CA), ARVs (WC), etc.) would result in two similar LCOs being applicable to the same equipment yet having different ACTION times. The l role of ITS LCOs 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3 are to establish containment leak tight integrity through the Containment Leak Rate Program and then maintain it during plant operation. These valves are more complex and have safety functions which require them to be open while containment integrity is established. The isolation function would be required as a result of conditions different from those generally requiring containment isolation. The applicable ITS 3.7 LCOs recognize these conditions and provide appropriate actions. These LCOs require valve operability and provide ACTIONS similar to containment isolation but more conservative for an inoperable valve. An inoperable MSSV (normal operable condition is closed) under ITS LCO 3.7.1 would require restoration or a power reduction within 4 hours (valve fails to open). An ls 32
Enclosuro 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 inoperable MSIV under ITS 3.7.2 would require restoration.within 8 hours for DCPP and 72 hours for WC and CA or close the valve (in Mede 2) and then proceed to Mode 4. An inoperable MFIV under ITS 3.7.3 would reo,wre closure within 72 hours for DCPP and 4 hours for WC and CA and verificatbn every 7 r'ays or the plant w)uld proceed to Mode 4. An
' inoperable ADV (DCPP), ASDV (CA), or ARV (WC) (normal operable condition is closed) under ITS 3.7.4 would require restoration within 7 days (failure to open). The most conservative applicable operational requirements are found in the associated ITS 3.7 LCO.
DCPP Specific Discussion: The only CIV requirements that are applicable relate to their design and installation such that they are closed or capab)e of being closed es required by GDC 57. The ITS LCO 3.6.3 Bases is revised under the discussion concerning the Note to state: "The Containment isolation - function of these valves is associated with their design and installation under GDC 57 as a second boundary in a closed system (passive) when the containment environment has potential direct access to the outside environment. The containment isolation valves have no role in establishing or maintaining containment integrity unless the closed system boundary has been breached.", The containment isolation function is assured as long as the CIVs are OPERABLE. OPERABILITY is required (both opening and closing) under their respective ITS 3.7 LCOs in Modes 1,2, and 3. In Mode 4, these valves are normal _ly closed. The STS 3.7 applicable Bases Sections cite low energy levels and the general lack of credible transients that may challenge this boundary which is, at that point, operating well below its design capabilities. While a release of radioactive material to containment is possible in Mode 4, the passive type A leak tested boundary of the closed system is adequate. Mode 4 releases of radioactive materials are more applicable to maintenance of containment integrity for systems with direct
-contact with the RCS or containment environment. The added Note provides this clarification to aid Operations personnel in understanding the licensing requirements. This discussion is consistent with the following: (1) SER 0,10/16/74 (states design is consistent with GDC-57),
(2) LA 73/72 (relocates containment isolation valve list outside of the TS), (3) FSAR Table 6.2-. 39 (Notes that these valves have a safety function to be open in a DBA and that they are
. exempt from Type C leak Testing), (4) Containment Leak Rate Program: Type A, B, and C testing, and (5) IST Plan. The Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs) and associated . bypass valves should not be included in the Note added to ITS LCO 3.6.3. They are not under GDC-57 and are not associated with containment isolation.
- Enclosed is the following plant specific documentation to support the above discussion
FSAR Table 6.2-39
' SER 0,10/16/74 1.A 73/72 ATTACHED PAGES:
Encl 2 3/4 6-15 Enci 3A . -11 EnciSA 3.6-8 Enci5B B3.6-15
)
33 J
I Enclosura 2 ) PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 i Encl 6A 1 i l 1 I l 1 i i l i I I l l l i 34 i u-
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS C3'0-' 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES @ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
'3.6.3 EachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbeOPERABLE.*J APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4.
N cT .%N. ** e m*R****
.A.A.E w&
~
With 'one or more e44he penetP&tf6Ef1Mpathsisithione isolation valve 44 11-12-A inoperable.. maintain at leist'~'6hi~f5blatioh~WTiF^0PERABLE in each affected penetration that/is open'and: 11 -1 *^
- . "^:t r 0 th0 'n0pr :b k V:50( ) t CPEP.^?LE :tztu: "ith4" ' h02 : . r
- b. Isolate each affected penetration tidiijiitil within 4 hours by use of 11-12-A
- at least one deactivated automatic 7alve~sscured in the isolation position, or 11-12 4
- c. Isolate each affected penetration lbilBpith within 4 hours bv' use of at least Djliijsecu.one ned; or closed manual valve o(f blindos.o3.A ^ flange
- d. . Be in at least~ HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
EZGNotiijiplitibliit6lNiWStuidifityIVi196iRIMSSViWlaW5teiimil561htWi 11 11.A Val m ve.m sRMBIVs..pMatn'TeedusterH_
- mm solation 1..ValvesMMFIVshy-N.
mm ata-Eceeenes.- o s.c,. 3 ,t o i
= 1 a_C, W, )y$ww wyn_m. amu..x au a _xwudu_dlL_
9EAMA NOTE"l~"""~~*
" ^ ' ~ ~ ' ^ ~ ^ '"
Lected Or 00: hd c h:Od v:50 PehitHitT6FRfidiiRpat. hs may be 11-01-LS13 opened on an intermittent basis"OddeF~admihistratid~ control. (-
.. newTJ W1 th?oneloWaofsipenetritT6(ilflWipathFsithits6? containment 31 slation .
. 11 04.A
- byhuseinfiatsleastioneiclosediandsdeactivatediautomaticWalve# closed ~ ~
annua 1 Walweshoriblind ! flange EceAbeliniatAleistiHDTJSTANDBYJ Within :the"nexti61 hours anddgCOLDjslM00gl3!1gg@egfMledaggh ~~~~~~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ [^neii@^ ith7oridicMuoriThenetFitf6HlfibiiFpathsidfithil ~Idrifigsred?iilithic61j 1105-LS14
~ oneEcontainment%1solattenisolveiahdtatclosedisys - neitht:enescontainment itsolationWalveiinoperabisMsolateithelaffected;penetratientflowipath ~ ~
irithins723 hours?lbylusetoffaQ1eistione slosed tand pdeactivatediautomaticWnWe7 closed manua16valvesorib11ndifiangeWorabenin3atsleasttHOTj'STANDBYNithiry"theinexti6thours - ~ ~ ~ ~ -~~~~ ~ ~^~ ~ andd_n?C.O..L. D/S_HU.T00WNiwith.
-- in.it. h.e.
~ ifo.llo..--wing;30;h.
--o_ursT '~~ ~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
' 5.3.1 E: h'00ntii rent ih0hti r v: he ch:P be dren:tr:ted OPEP.^SLE prior t0
. 11-06-TR3 retur dn; tb v:he to cervice ft0- einter:0, rep:1 Or reph ==t work 1 perf0 med On the V: h ^ Or it: 25001:t0d Ste t0r. 00ntrt! Or p0rr circuit by perf0- en00 Of : cy:Pn; tect, rd vr"k:tir Of inhtien ti-'O. 11-09-A DIABLO' CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-15 Amendment Nos. 73 and 72 f ' TAB 13.4A August 10. 1992 I
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Continued) 03f,S-9 CHANGE NUMBER NEHQ DESCRIPTION poweQ/Nd 6teum'1B 11-Og A Consistentwith NUREG-1431 and indu Traveler TSTF-46. Rev.1, the isolation #me surveillance is to delete the reference to verifying *esch power operated" contai ment isolation valve and only require venecation of each " automatic solation valve." Containment isolation values which are power operated but do not receive a containment isolation signal (i.e. can be remotely operated), do not have an isolation tme assumed in the accident analysis since they require operator acton Therefore, deleting the reference to power operated isolation value time tesbng is a clarification that reduces the potential for misinterpreeng the requirements of this SR while maintaining the assumphons of the accident analysis. 10 A This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Endosure 38). Wnis Q34.5-to 11-11 A A Note isadded to the chpinmentisolabon spinJTn yp that the LCO is not apptcable to main steam safety valves (MSSv , main steam isolation valves (MSIVs),'feedwater solabon valves ),[ ] and atmoschanc dump valve (ADVs)f -- '- - ;; .^r; .dz.c.:(L^.) 70!'2 ('.^"I e4_nn n-- M4 "-i 2
- onamn ') --[d -__--_-_
";.1:f i: m _ $_ .g ;;;;;; - n
- '?.;lW;..d;Oa _..A C a e..H. .:_. =s=. nr m. Te i. , .=_f-- 4 n <-co an an). t::
-rtr: r r--- -l M c - " ;d 5 b. : cf :--;./~::.-- -
M.i.. This note is consistent with current licensing bases. 11-12 A . The phase " Row path" is added for clarification and constancy with NUREG-1431. This specificabon is based on GDC 55,56, and 57 which address the proper solabon for each *line* that penetrates containment. Licensees have always been required to assure that proper protechon is provided for each line or flow path that passes through containment even if multiple flow paths share the same penetrabon. In this sp.cJ ^.un, the term
- penetration
- has always meant each flow path that penetrates containment. Adding the # wgrds,d
" flow path"to the s=2' =R-. clanfies this manninn am a+iee+ ence eveaf 7Z hivt;r 42pRt) '
11-13 LS22 This change ses the DCPP containment ventilation isolabon vaive leak rate llance frequency '. ;- ?^ n /'.; O ;.er, O d;, ; c.: l from 24 to 92 days after opening a valve. This change is i consistentwith NUREG-1431 and NRC resolution of Multi-Plant Action l No. B-20," Containment Leakage Due to Seal Detenoration." These valves have a good service record and have consistently met leakage ; rate requsements. The revised 92 day frequency still reflects l conservague margin to compensate for degradabon of the resilient seats i in these valves. DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 11
Containment Isolation Valves (^.t = :pheric. Ps 5 2:t= phe-ic. !ce Condenter. :nd Dual} 3.6.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves (^.t=:pheric. Ed:te:pheric. Ice Condenser Ps
- nd Du:??
QS.L 3-Io en========.==2..c=====; NOTE ==%=---Arn: C:Crs:W=? = NotDpplidsbleftoL. Main 5tsimiSafets: Valves 4(MSSVs)nMainiSteamCIsolation?Va14es'"~*' XMSIVs).nFeedwatertIsolationlValvesF(MFIVs); ".=Teci: tert.c;2 tic" "me 3 3 3 . pgjg :p:yd pq t====xu==- ==p@4 .andfAtmospheric) Dump (Valves;(ADVsE ^{ l f
=== =- -? u= m- == = ---- : -- = == - r- -
LC0 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2., 3 and 4. ACTIONS
....................................-NOTES-----------------------------------------
- 1. Penetration, flow path (s) ( c=cptjer [j2] imb pur.gc.y@/cf]~-!_ p:th:
, . 3.6-17 .-
-} excepteno moretthanttwo;of?threetflow pathsiforicontainment? purge supplyf andlexhaust rand tContainmentivacuum/pressureTel i efJ p~athsiatione
$1me msTbe^~0hisol5tEd"fntermittentif~under^admihiitratise control 57~
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
- 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves
- 4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1 " Containment."
when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours Daly applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths use of at least one closed with two containment and de-activated automatic isolation valves. valve, closed manual valve.
...................... blind flange. or check valve with flow through the One or more penetration valve secured.
flow paths with one containment isolation M valve inoperable except B-PS forQ M ontainmentipurge supply and exhaustavalve or_,6 Z1 A k di A 4 no
- bypass g. .- . /. vacuum
.. pressure
_ ,= _~_""". '" reliefzvalve.d.eakage._inot. _ ~ ~
~~
(continued) DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 3.6-8
l 1 Containment Isolation Values ("--"^* Se:t = pherte. !:0 Conde scr :nd Du:1) B3.6.3 BASES (Continued) ! LC0 Containment isolation valves form a part of the containment boundary. The l containment isolation valves' safety function is related to minimizing the ! loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the conta1 Ment boundary I during a DBA. The automatic power operated isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and to actuate on an automatic isolation signal._The 48 inch CdntairmentiPsrgeIsupplyiandlexhaust?dTITid
.";drf;r- " urge ~ valves'and theFPressure/ Vacuum Relief 3 valves;most be ~
- i-t:ined =hd M cfTb? hase~ blocks ~ instilled to^ prevent full
! 4 These blocked -pwge valves also actuate on an automatic isolat. ion opening--}. signal.
-} The" valves covered by this-LC0 are listed along with theiF^ associated stroke times-in th^ E^? E i-;i::T7-- --
$D13;DC{.G;g.JJy(Ref T7SE"M " M "MfDPlantiProcedure
'~~~ ~ W J6-rb he Normally closed passiWMontainment! isolation valves 7 devices are considered OPERABLE when'manuallalVes 'are closed, automatic ~9alves are q de-activated and secured in their closed nosition. blind flanges are in place. and clnwd svstam are intact -- Ah::e =:1 e = := = = : =f eemeG
(*r th::: Mt~^ * ~ R !:ren:c f3f rerrw' strw-out CsitainmentiPurgeMupM)jkhdieithaustWalies?C5N%TahdIContainment Presssre/ Vacuum Aelief vaTves with7EsiTient^ seals DET=5MrT bfpf tI9fT9ffT^mdst~ meet additional leakage rate shrweillance%freq#ent;i uency rec uirements. The other containment isolation valvEldakage rates are ' adc ressed by LCO 3.6.1. " Containment." :: Type C testin;. T.his LC0,p,rovides_a_ssuran,c,e my m; t.h..at mm t._he c,o.n,tainme.nt
=_y isol..ation.,.mvalves m _:nd
, _ the "r:::"-!"rM3MhMET9ef0iTDiRoFdei F" desi gned ~sa fety function't6 minimife the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the containment boundary during accidents.
ThiRO)NiihddiffiedWeldtFifitiiiifthititWNiiiii*StiiinisifetFIVi1%iENain Steam;IsolattomvalvesiFeeenster Isolation Val vesEtand rAtmospheri c? Dunp~~ ~^ ~ ValveskareinotW1dressedstn#thisitC0&These penetration)ficw pathslicredit theisteam; generators tand sptping ensidsEcontainment#asiaj containmenttisolation barriert(iieM closed : system)M1hese rvalvesi are" addressed ? byACO :39 MMain ' Steam sSafetyS Val ves s(MSSVsM RLCD;39 f27 Main ESteam Usolati on; Valves ~~ (MSIVs )1RLC0 ?3 W31? Main sfeedwaterdsol ationiVal ves t (MFIVs ) * - ' "=^ =
" r'9 ."M '""":Cf:M tM ";9:1:'"::E and10013m4' " ~ '
Atmospheric Dump 1Valvest(A0vs)Michsprovide the anoropriateJequired Wonsf.igheventjthesejal,yesieredpapetablegn 3, g #p/o 1 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. (Continued) DCPP Mark-uo of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-15
NUREG-1431 Secten 3.6 Thh Enclosure contains c brief discussion /ustificaton J for each marked-up technical change to NUREG-1431, to make them plant-specific or to incorporate generic changes resulting from the industry /NRC generic change I process The change numbers are referenced directly from the NUREG-1431 mark-ups (Enclosure SA). For Enclosures 3A, SB,4,6A, and 88 text in brackets "[ ]* indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the JLS plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific informaton in that locaten l CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3,6-1 This change supports implementation of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, for performance based leakage rate testing Option B by referencing the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program described in the Administrate Controls secton. This 4 change is consistent with the CTS and Traveler TSTF-52. l l 3.6-2 Consistent with Traveler TSTF-17, Rev.1, this change would extend the testmg frequency of containment air lock interlock mechanisms from 184 days to 24 months and i delete the SR note per implementation of Appendix J, Opbon B. SR 3.6.2.2 would be revised to require testing of the air lock door interlocks at an interval of 24 months. Typically, the interlock is installed after each refueling outage, venfied OPERABLE with this surveillance and not disturbed until the next refueling outage if the need for maintenance arises when the interlock is required, the performance of the interlock surveillance would be required followmg the mamtenance in addition, when an air lock is opened during times the interlock is required, the operator first verifies that one door is completely shut and the door seals pressurized before attemptmg to open the other door. Therefore, the interlock is not challenged except during actual testing of the interlock. Consequently, it should be sufficent to ensure proper operaton of the mterlock by testing the interlock on a 24 month interval. 3.6-3 Consistent with the CTS, a Note has been added to clarify that the valves listed are not addressed in LCO 3.6.3. These valves utikze the steam generators and assocated popmg as a closed system insde of contamment. These valves have separate LCOs that provide the appropnate Required Actons in event these valves are inoperable.
+] Q 3,6. 5-10 3.6-4 Consistent with traveler TSTF-30 Rev.1, this change -- ver,it for a closed system for isolatmg a failed containment isolaton valve. The change would extend the Completon Time for a closed system flow path with an inoperable isolation valve to 72 hours. General Design Critona 57 allows the use of a closed system in combinaten with a containment isolaton valve to provde two containment barriers against the release of radioactwo material following an accdont. Currently, LCO 3.6J does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolaton valve e;en though the closed system is subjected to Type A containment leakage testing, is missile protected, and is seisme Category I piping. A closed system also typically has flow through it during normal operaton such that any loss of integrity could be continually observed through a leakage detachon system within containment and during routine system walkdowns for closed systems outside contamment. As such, the use of a closed system is no different from isolating a failed containment isolation valve by use of a single valve as specified in Required ACTION A.1. Thorsfore, LCO 3.6.3, Required ACTION C.1 is revised to allow 72 hours to isolate a failed valve assocated with a closed system. This 72 hour period provdes the necessary time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolaton valve when relymg on an intact closed system A Complebon Time of 72 hours is consdered appropnate given that certain valves may be located inside containment, the reliability of the closso ystem, and that 72 hours is typically provded for losing one train of redundancy throughout the NUREG-1431. If the closed system and associated containment isolation valve were both inoperable, the plant would be in LCO 3.0.3 since there is no specific Condition specified DCPP Description of Changes to improved TS 1
Insert for 3.6.3-10 Enci 3A - page 11, insert for DOC 11-11-A: A Note is added to the containment isolation specification that the LCO is not applicable to main steam safety valves (MSSVs), main steam isolailon valves (MSIVs), main feedwater isolatiors valves (MFIVs), and [ atmospheric dump valves (ADVs)]. _ This is based upon 10CFR50.36.c.2 and 3 and 10CFR50, Appendix J. There are no surveillance associated with LCO 3.6.1.1 or LCO 3.6.3 which are applicable to these valves. [] This Note is consistent with current licensing basis. Enci 58, page B3.6-15 insert: The Containment isolation function of these valves are associated with their design and installation under GDC 57 as a second boundary in a closed system (passive) when the containment environment has potential direct access to the outside environment. They have no role in establishing or maintaining containment integrity unless the closed system boundary has been breached. Enci 6A - page 1, insert JFD 3.6-3: The current license bases exempts these valves from containment integrity
' requirements. This is based upon 10CFR50.36.c.2 and 3 and 10CFR50, Appendix J.
There are no surveillance associated with LCO 3.6.1.1 or LCO 3.6.3 which are applicable to these valves. [] ; 1 l l
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- 1. Trip on feedwater isolation. (See Table 6.2-40, item 4.)
- 2. Steam generator secondary side is missde protected closed system.
- 3. Reverse check (ma' m steam isolation).
- 4. Trip on steam line i.aolation. (See Table 6.2 40, item 3.)
- 5. Safety-related fLtion. Valve trip is related to systems safety function.
- 6. PG&E considers the five relief valves to be isolation valves.
- 7. Safety-related function demands that this valve not isolate.
- 8. Valve does not meet 1971 GDC but does meet the 1968 GDC which was applicable at time of construction commitment.
- 9. This valve is not considered as the automatic isolation barrier. The barrier is provided by the closed mystem. The valve does have provision for remote manual isolatim should the situation require it.
- 10. PG&E considers the closed system outside contamment as an automatic isolation barrier.
- 11. Provision for remote manual isolation exists should the situation require it. Safety-related function demands that this valve not isolate, it conforms with the intent of the GDC as it affects maintenance of the containment boundary.
12.- 1he protective chamber is considered outside conta' ament. The motor-operated valves are the isolation - valves outside containment.
- 13. Valve opens on containsnent spray signal.
l ! 14. Valve opens on SIS signal.
- 15. This valve is redundant in that for a closed system inside containment, no inside isolation valves are required. It is not tested.
- 16. Containment isolation effected by completely sealedm' strument system. This penetration is not leak I sessed.
- 17. Multiple penetration number usage results from several small pipes romed through single penetrations.
i l 18. Cone =iament vent isolation trip. (See Table 6.2-40.) l'
.O Revision 11 November 1996 t i
3.6.3 -10 DCPP UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDATE i Shan 10 0f 11 l TABLE 6.2-39 l q 'V Notes (Cantinued)
- 19. The lhel transfer tube is not considered to be a piping penetration, but rather a Type B test penetration.
'Ibe quick opening batch is double gasketed with a test connection allowing pressurization between the gasists for Type B testing. The portion of the transfer tube faside the containment is considered to be part of the cantninsnent liner; the portion of the transfer tube outside the containment is not considered to l be part of the cantainsnear boundary.
I
- 20. "Ihe relief valves are considered as normally closed containment isolation valves.
- 21. Deleted.
- 22. Adsninistratively controlled valve with main control board indacation which is treated in the same snanner as a sealed closed valve.
- 23. W - Water; G - Gas
- 24. Hot - over 200*F; Cold - 200*F or less
- 25. R-M - Remote Manual; S = Safety lajection; T = Conta' ament isolation Signal, Phase A; P =
('antainsnant Isolation Signal, Phase B.
- 26. Testability not required by /gpendix J to 10 CFR 50.
' 27. Air testing of this valve is not practical.
- 28. This device is used for postaccident monitoring or control and anst not be isolated by a conta'ament isolation signal.
- 29. This penetration has multiple tubes running though the guard pipe (see Note 17).
- 30. The following abbreviations are used:
Gee = Gate Cis = Closed system Sbl - Scaled bellows Spf = Spectacle flange Gib = Globe Chk = Check . Bif = Blind flange l Rif = Relief. Dia - Diaphragm Sin = Scaledinstruments But = Butterfly Bal - Ball- Hys = Hydraulic isolators
- 31. The following abbreviations are used:
Man - Manual Mtr = Motor
- Air = Air FJH = Electrohydraulic Spr. - Spring so - saienaid l
- 32. *1* is used for inside and *O' for outside.
l O Revision 11 November 1996
3.G.3-10 DCPP UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDATE Sheet 11 of 11 TABLE 6.2-39
- O Noes (Continued)
- 33. Safety-reland priority designation for each penetration per Section 6.2.4.2.1 is as follows:
ES ^ = Fanparial SA = Safety NE = Na=*=ma=ri=1
- 34. Penetration 36 is not used by a safety synem for accident mitigation. However, flow through this Penetration may be required to achieve safe shutdown following a Hosgri carthquake or an Appendtx R are.
- 35. "Nonnal Position" column:
(A) C = Closed, O = Open (B) For check valves, position is always stated as open. (C) " Normal" connguration applies to the following plant conditions: (a) Modes 14, applicable T.S. 3/4.6.1 and 3/4.6.3. (b) Mode 6, applicable T.S. 3/4.9.4 (D) If valve is nonnally open or periodically opened for fulfillment ofits function during the "Nonnal" plant conAgurations, then an "Open" designator is used. (E) If valve is nonnally closed and opened only in support of testing, under administrative control per T.S. 3.6.3, or fbr smoke testing of the valve itself, then a " Closed" designator is used. (F) Relief valves are assigned a " Closed" designator. 36.' "Used AfterIDCA" column:- (A) N = NO. Y = Yes (B) For check valves, if valve passes now at any peint following the accident, then a "YES" designator is used.
-(C) For valves that change position on a safeguards signal, this change is not considered a use,
< that is, the tiene the safeguards signal is received is not considered after the accident.
(D) - Use is principally an indicasar of a valve passing flow at any point aftet the accident.
- 37. " Post-IDCA Position" column:
(A) C = Closed. O = Open (B) 'Ibe column pertains to a post accident condition, long term core cooling. (C) The assumed accident is a primary system IDCA with Containment isolation Phase A and B signals generated, system ,; r. h.dce below 150 PSIG, cui%--%g to a RHR pump injection flow of greater than 200 GPM. 'the acc*ulent is assumed to progress through injection, cold leg recirculation, and to hot leg recirculation for the long term. (D) 'Ibe hot leg injection flowpath is injection to RHR hot legs 1 & 2. SI pump hot legs 1,2,3, & 4, and Charging coki legs 1,2,3, & 4; the condition established by EOP E-1.4, (no RNOs essered). (E) Containment temperature has been reduced to near ambient conditions. (F) Containment pressure has been reduced to near atmospheric conditions. (G) Primary system / containment recirculation sump temperature has been reduced to below 200F. (H) Although used periodically, PASS valves are considered to be normally closed. l 38. Valve may be used following a IDCA only in the event of a failure of both internal hydrogen I recasahiners. Lo Revision 11 November 1996
349-W bCPP - seg o (;o ja(74)
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0Y1 solution by the spray additive system to enhance the iodine scrubbing function of the system. The spray additive system consists of the spray additive tank, eductors, valves and connecting piping.
- l. A sufficient quantity of NaOH will be injected to' raise the equilibrium pH in the containment sung to a minimum value of 8.5. We have evaluated the containment spray and spray additive systems and found them effective for removal of elemental' iodine, and iodine' absorbed on airborne particulate matter.
The first order removal coefficients for elemental and particulate iodine are 10 and 0.45 (hrs-1), respectively, in an estimated effective volume of 2.16 x'106 gg3 The minimum sump pH of 8.5 is considered ade-quate to achieve and maintain a decontamination factor (DF) of 100 for
/ the elemental iodine.
(%]) . , We have reviewed the containment air purification and cleanup systems for'conformance with AEC General Design Criteria Nos. 41, 42, 43, and 46, and have found them to be acceptable.
- 6. 2. 4 ' containment Isolation Systems The containment isolation systems are designed to isolate the contain-i ment atmosphere from the outside environment under accident conditions, Double barrier protection, in the form of closed systems and isolation valves, is provided so that no single valve.or piping failure results in loss of containment integrity. Reactor building penetration piping up' to and including the external isolation valve is designed to Seismic i.
1 Category I requirements, and is protected against missiles that could I< be generated under accident conditions. (: N
3 y 3.6.3 - 10
+
1 6-12 3 O
^
Reactor building isolation will occur automatically upon receipt of' a containment isolation signal. All fluid penetrations not required for operation of the engineered safety features equipment will be isolated. Remotely operated isolation valves will have position indication in the control room. We have reviewed the containment isolation systems for conformance with AEC General Design Criteria Nos. 55, 56 and 57, and have found them to be acceptable, s 6.2.5 Combustible Gas Control Systems Following a LOCI., hydrogen may accumulate inside the containment. The major sources of hydrogen generation includes (1) a chemical reaction.
- between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and water; (2) corrosion of mater-
, ials of construction; and (3) radiolysis of aqueous solutions in the reactor core and the containment sump. The applicant's analysis of post-IDCA hydrogen generation, which is consistent with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.7 " Control. of Combustible Gas Concentration in g
. Containment Following a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident," indicates that the hydrogen concentration in the containment would not reach the lower flanunability limit of 4 volume percent (v/o) until about 40 days after the. postulated LOCA. We have' performed a similar analysis of hydrogen i
generation in the containneent following a LOCA and our results are ist agreement with the applicant's. ' W The containment fan cooler system will provide mixing of the con-tainment atmosphere following a LOCA so as to prevent possible problems ______n______________..._____ _
- 3. <s. 5 -10
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6-13 associated with hydrogen stratification. The containment hydrogen purge system, consisting of two redundant purge supply routes, is provided to limit the hydrogen concentrations to below the guideline values given in j Regulatory Guide.1.7. The system incorporates several design features that are intended to assure the capability of the system to be operable-in the unlikely event of an accident. These features include Seismic Category I design, and redundance to the extent that no single component failure disables the system. Redundant monitoring systems are provided I to allow periodic scmpling and analysis of the hydrogen concentration in the containment. Based on our review of the systems provided for combustible gas control following a postulated LOCA, we conclude that these systems will meet the reconsnendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, . are in conformancew' ith (' AEC Ceneral Design Criteria Nos. 41, 42 and 43, and are, therefore, - acceptable. 6.2.6 Containment Leakage Testina Program The proposed containment design includes provisions and features to permit leakage testing in accordance with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50. The design of containment penetrations and isolation valves permits individual periodic leakage rate testing at the pressure ! specified in Appendix J. Included are those penetrations that have resil-ient seals and expansion bellows, i.e., airlocks, emergency hatches, re-I fueling tube blind flanges, hot process line penetrations, and electrical penetrations. O V i i L ]
"; --se.- 3. (, . 3 - 10 6-14 LO
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The proposed reactor containment leakage testing program complies with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50. Such compliance provides adequate assurance that containment leaktight integrity can be verified periodically throughout service lifetime on a timely basis to maintain such leakages within the limits of the technical specifications. Maintaining containment leakage rates within such limits provides reasonable assurancei t hat, in the event of any radioactivity releases within the containment, the loss of the containment atmosphere through leak paths will not be in excess of acceptable limits specified for the. i i site. ' Compliance with the requirements of Appendix J constitutes an I acceptable basis for satisfying the requirements of AEC General Design .y. 1 Criteria Nos. 52, 53, and 54. 6.3- Emersency Core Cooling System (ECCS) - 6.3.1' Design Bases, . l The Diablo Canyon ECCS has been' designed to provide emergency core cooling during those postulated accident conditions where it is assumed that mechanical failures occur in the reactor coolant piping resulting in loss of coolant from the reactor vessel greater than the available coolant makeup capacity using normal operating equipment. The ECCS is also designed to provide cooling in the event of a main steam line break. L The design bases are to prevent fuel cladding damage that woul'd i interfere with adequate emergency core cooling and to mitigate the amount of clad-water reaction for any size break up to and including a double i ended rupture of the largest primary coolant line. These requirements l
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l Enclorura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-11 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 11-14 A DOC 1-06 LS-19 DOC 11-07 LG JFD 3.6-11 JFD 3.6-12 CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS CTS 4.6.3.3 ITS 3.6.3 RA A.2 Note 2, RA C.2 Note 2, RA D.2 Note 2, SR 3.6.3.5 and Associated Bases CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS, CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS, ITS 3.6.3 RA A.2, ITS 3.6.3 RA C.2 and ITS 3.6.3 RA D.2 have been modified by a Note that states the following: " Isolation devices that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means" CTS 4.6.3.3 and ITS SR 3.6.3.5 have been modified by the phrase "that is not j locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position" to clarify which valves require isolation j time testing. These changes are characterized in JFD 3.6-11 and JFD 3.6-12 as a j generic change designated WOG-91. The staff has not received this change through { the STS generic change process (TSTF) and therefore considers this change to be I beyond the scope of review for this conversion. See Comment Number 3.6.3-12. Comment: Delete this generic change. See Comment Number 3.6.3-12. FLOG RESPONSE: WOG-91 has recently been designated TSTF-269. While we recognize that this is a generic change to the STS, the change was approved by the Westinghouse Owners Group over 18 months ago and was expected to have been approved by this time. We expect the TSTF committee to fonvard TSTF-269 to the NRC in the very near future. We believe the technical merits of the change which supports NRC approved TSTF-45, Rev.1, by providing additional clarification should justify rapid approval by the NRC. This TSTF is of sufficient value in precluding confusion, LERs, and inspection findings that should we be required to remove it from our submittal, an LAR woufd be submitted upon NRC approval of the TSTF. We believe that it would be cost effective for all concerned to retain this change within the submittal pending NRC review of TSTF-269. ATTACHED PAGES: l Enci5A Traveler Status Page,3.6-13 l Encl 6A 2 I 35 l l l C
industry TCvelers Applicable to Section 3.4 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-17, Rev.1 16ccrcn W NRC approved e 3.6 2 TSTF-30 Rev.y 2. Incorporated 3.6-4 Not applicable to Wolf Tle. 3. r. -co2 Creek and Callaway TSTF 45, Rev.1 incorporated 3.6-5 NRC approved. TSTF 46, Rev.1 incorporated 3.6-7 NRC approved TSTF-51 Not in-pc __ j N/A Not NRC approved as of traveler cut-off date. TSTF-52 W./-6 incor,c, _- f 3.6-1 Y((,.$3,C(( TSTF-145 Notincorporated. N/A NRC approved as of traveler cut off date. MNMb9t ~137*' 269 10cciycn.;.d 3.6-11,3.6-12 03.G. 3 -// DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431, Rev.1 1
Containment Isolation Valves 'tmc pheric, pS Substmospheric. Ice Condenter 2nd Dual) 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.4 -----.------.------NOTE-------------------- Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. 3.6 5 Verify each containment isolation manual valve Prior to and blind flange that is located inside entering MODE 4 containment and not? lock 6dl?sealedLoriotherWise
~ from MODE 5 if secured and required' to~be closed"duri'n g ' ' ' not performed accident conditions is closed, except for within the containment isolation valves that are open previous 92 days under administrative controls.
SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of cach pacecr In accordance Operated and each automatic imeF-AtM with the tainment isolation valve #,.F.:t *: ret '^c t d' Inservice
--9 ^d Or :== ;ccM* p'?4+ W Testing Program w unin ilmi;s. Or 92 day; Q3.6. 3 -ll 3.6-7 3.6-12 B-PS SR 3.6.3.6 NOTWSED 92 day:
Cicle c:ct ;;cight Or spr4n; loaded check ':!' 0 testable during Operation through one complete cycle of ful' trat'cl. and '/cr*fy cach check B-PS t'al'/c rem:in cic:cd "her the di#ferential precturc 49 the direction Of flec: i: [1.2] p;id :nd Open: "h0n thc di#ferenti:1 prc ure da the direction of flec! 1:
? [1.2] p;id and ' [5.0] psid.
(continued) DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 3.6-13
NUREG-1431 Seebon 3.6 CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3.6-5 This change is in accordance with TSTF'-45, Rev.1 and revises SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 to specify that only containment isolabon valves that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured are required to be venfied closed. The position of the locked, sealed, or otherwise secured valves was venfied before the valves were locked, sealed, or otherwise secured. 3.6-6 Not applicable to DCPP. See Converson Compannan Table (Erda=nem
- Qewer opere.u em+ime,*s+) 0143-8 3.6-7 This change is in accordance with TSTF-46, ev. i ano revises sR 3.6.3.5 to delete the #8"#~9 reference to venfying the isolation eme of
- power operated" containment isolation valve and only require venfication of each
- automatic lation valve." Valves credited as containment isolation valves which are power operated (i.e., can be remotely operated) that do not receive a containment isolabon signal do not have as isolabon time as assumed in the accident analyses since they require operator acbon. Therefore, deletmg reference to power operated isolabon valve time teshng reduces the potenbal for misinterpnetmg the requirements of this SR while maintaining the assumphons of the acesdent analyses.
3.6-8 Revises the Complebon Twne for See restoration of containment pressure from 1 hour to [4] hours. The [4] hour Complebon Tsne is consistent with the CTS. The [4] hours [ ] allows the adequate time to take all Required Achons in a controlled manner. 3.6-9 Not apphcable to DCPP. See Converson Compenson Table (Enclosure 68). c3 6 3-Il 3.6-10 Replaces the chemical additive task volume limits in gallons with a tank level limits in percent ( ).
-5 W-2hai 3.6-11 . A new Note is added to ITS 3.6.3. Condition A.2 [ and C.2]in accordance with (todeler W6G-9).
The additional Note apphes to lecimbon devees that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured m positen and allows these devices to be venfied closed by use of admmistrahve means it is sufficient to assume that initial estubbshment of component status (e.g., isolabon valves closed)
' was performed correctly. Subsequently, venficaten is intended to ensure the i,v ..yvi r4 has not been inadvertently repositioned Wuen that the functon of loclung, sealmg, or securing components is to ensure the same avoidance of inadvertent .W-7,ing, the penodic revenficahon should only be a vertcaten of the admmistrabwe control that ensures that the component remams in the requwed state. It would be inappropnate to remove the lock, seal, or other means of securing the component solely to perform an achve venfication of the required state.
3.6-12 Consistent with SR 3.6.3.8, which prowdes that actuabon position testmg is not required for valves locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in their required positen under administrative control, this change would provide tiet isolabon time testmg is not required for automate containment isolaton valves that ase locked, sealed, or othenuse secured in their required position underadmmistrabve conbel. This change is consistentwith WOG-g1. 3.6-13 A clarifying note is added to SR 3J6.3.7 that would allow that leakage rate testing for containment purge valves with resilient seals is not required when the penetraton flow path is isolated by a leak tested blind flange This change would irc,vrpoi.te plant specific operabihty entena for containment fan cooler units 3.6-14 required to meet design functionalrequirements These requirements are contained in the CTS. rised C34 6-y l 3.6-15 Not apphcable to DCPP. See Converson Compenson (Enclosure 68). 3.6-16 Not applicable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.6-17 The ACTIONS and SRs of ITS 3.6.3 are modified to reflect DCPP current license bases allowance to open at one bme any 2 of 3 the DBA qualified 48 inch purge supply and/or exhaust flow paths and 12 inch vacuum /psessure relief flow paths. DCPP Description of Changes to improved TS 2 1
)
Enclosuro 2 PG&E Lettnr DCL 98-087 i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.3-12 APPLICABILITY: DC REQUEST: l-DOC 11-14 A DOC 11-07 LG CTS 4.6.3.3
)
DCPP CTS 4.6.3.3 has been modified by the phrase "that is not locked, sealed or ( otherwise secured in position" to clarify which valves require isolation time testing. The { change seems to be labeled DOC 11-07 LG. DOC 11-07 LG has nothing to do with this j particular change. The change should be labeled DOC 11-14 A. { l Comment: Correct this discrepancy. See Comment Number 3.6.3-11. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 11-07-LG has been removed from the CTS SR 4.6.3.3 markup and replaced with DOC 11-14-A. ATTACHED PAGES: Enct2 3/4 6-16 i l ( i l l 36 l l j
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 03.6.3-9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) G3 6 3-8 (popee operaucf). I 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each testable " Or0^0r:tedorautomatici . ,._ containment isolation valve thatris'inot;10tieb:sealedsor?otherwisessecured shall - - - be determined to be within its"Timit*When~ tested" pursuantto~'Speci#ic: tion '.0.5 11-09-A t_hel:InseWic..e3Teit.
- - - ~ ~ - - ir#.. .? Pro..gEa...m.
. - .- ,p.;q p 4.6.3.4 Each containment ventilation isolation valve, except the air sample O 6 'd-'A supply and return valves. shall be demonstrated OPERABLE everfi184fdays1and 11-13-Ls22 within 2' heur: 92Tdays after 0:ch cle:in; 0' opening the"i/a'lve.~bRdpt ..cn the udd^fer multip'^ cycling. *20n :t'Td::t On 0 per 72 50ert. by 07-10-LS9 v:50 M Min verifying lea^kage rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing u-/q '
Program. ThistsuWe111ascetiskhot? required When;the , T.i..o. ! a..ted.)yl.a._1e.a. k..5.t. .e...s...t.e. .d.~;b. lank. die...n. gef"^-~~~~~"
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9g.s, 3. , g ) I J i 1 t DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 TAB 13.4A March 1. 1996
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-15 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA REQUEST: ! DOC 7-04 R CTS 3.6.1.7 (DCPP) CTS 3.6.1.7.b (Callaway and WCGS) ; CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS (DCPP) I CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION b (Callaway and WCGS) CTS 4.6.1.7.2 (DCPP) CTS 4.6.1.7.3 (Callaway and WCGS) CTS 3.6.1.7, CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS and CTS 4.6.1.7.2 for DCPP and CTS 3.6.1.7.b, CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION b, and CTS 4.6.1.7.3 for Callaway and WCGS specify the cumulative time purge valves, vacuum / pressure relief valves and mini-purge valves may be opened per calendar year. The CTS markup shows these items as being relocated , and just fies the relocation in DOC 7-04 R. The "R" designation is for technical speci'ications which do not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) which applies to { entire specifications, not individual LCO, ACTIONS or SRs. Based on Enclosure 3B
" Conversion Comparison Table - Current TS 3/4.6," the change for Callaway and WCGS ,
would be a Less Restrictive - Generic (LG) change since the information is relocated to the Safety Analyses Report; for DCPP the change would be either Less Restrictive - Generic (LG) or Less Restrictive - Specific (LS) depending on whether the "ECG" is controlled by 10 CFR 50.59 or not controlled by 10 CFR 50.59 respectively. The DCPP document "ECG" is not defined in the submittal. In addition, no justification is provided as to why this information can be relocated. Comment: Revise the CTS markup to show this change as a Less Restrictive change and provide additional discussions and justification for this Less Restrictive change. The justification should include the reasons the individualitems can be relocated. For DCPP l describe the document "ECG" and the document change control process. I FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 7-04-R is revised to 7-04-LG since this information is being mnved j to a licensee-controlled document (Callaway to FSAR, Wolf Creek to USAR, and Diablo Canyon to ECG). DOC 7-04-LG has been modified to further clarify why containment purge supply and exhaust flow paths and for DCPP pressure / vacuum relief flow paths and the requirements to periodically accumulate the time the valves have been open can be moved to a licensee-controlled document. This is possible since DBA calculations assume the purge function may be in service at the start of the accident. Closure is assured by the redundance of these valves and that they are designed to close against DBA conditions. This combined with the low probability of a DBA while this flow path is in service makes the total risk very small. Diablo Canyon has Equipment Control Guidelines (ECGS) that are controlled by DCPP Department-Level Administrative Procedure (DLAP) OP1.DC16, " Control of Plant Equipment Not Required by the Technical Specifications." DCPP ECGS are similar to other plants' Technical Requirement Manual (TRM). Changes to ECGS are made under the provisions of j 10 CFR 50.59, as required by DLAP OP1.DC16 and FSAR Chapter 16. The NRC has 37 w_-- -_ .
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 accepted ECGS as a licensee-controlled document. This is confirmed most recently in License Amendment 120/118 dated 2/3/98, page 2 of the NRCs safety evaluation report. ATTACHED PAGES: Enct 2 3/4 6-10 Enci 3A 6 Enci 38 4 l-38
c 34.c - I CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l O - O~l* A i CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM 07-01-A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.7 One purge supply line and/or one purge exhaust line of the Containment gyg,y.g l Purge System may be open or the vacuum / pressure relief line may be open -.he j v=u -'pr==r0 re"-f li-^ -"y 50 ^;0F provided the vacuum / pressure relief 07-04-R 4 G 1 isolation valves are blocked to prevent opening beyond 50' (90* is fully open). Operation with any two of these three lines open is permitted. "p0r:t1 = 31th th: ;;r;0 i cu
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snoperable1% i l Vilvbis)~or tso it' s'the"penb ritTonisT il within 1 hour: otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY with M"the~next n 6 hours and in COLD SHU within the following 30 hours.
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[ 64WH0 nit 6iFiniEM16hifliiif . jikiiiFETc~intiTheentTpGigeLdd 07-02-LS9 steliefcselvesanatswt saalved slimitsa Within: i solatejthe;affected.
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.. per4311 days . Idevices' and'ipriorsto:enterin7g 100E~4 from: NODE;5. fperformedNithtsstsse: ;90dersttor1 solation containmentedead @erforn 4urvettlanceA iresilientiseali urge; p! devices valves 9nsjde ploseditofcaggg!&tMsj 2enceing!21dysi ~ o 7.,3. M
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . N'". JL-- 4.6.1.7.1 The position of the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation e e m valves and the vacuum / pressure "" relief-isolation valves shall be determined closed
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at,l, east.r,n,ce.. o . ,_ per,31 days _ _ m_ ec' "=e --- mr#w_-- w- mm m'= Q 3 6 3 -5 D . U .R W .* Y22 24 . L Y % -ez.. n L'n % az ; = w.W
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l' p g,y.,y ci^^tr ycr :h:1' b^ it^-'-^d t '^=t == ;^ ' ty: . I' 4.6.1.7.3 The 12?iiich? vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves shall be verified ED to be blocked to~ prevent opening beyond 50* at least ecc.h == p^EnGlWG r 12 -^rths. iMT&b/AL. R DC-NL -Ool
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01-04-ts1 wa n .. administrative;meansa
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i- DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-10 l TAB 13.4A l l
DESCRIPTION OF CHAIGGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Conhnued) CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION gy, g,f 07-03 )$ /A change [ ] con tent with NUREG-14 1, SR 3.6.3.1, is add (o l LS& I provide an nce for one isolabon Ive in a penetrabon fl path to be open rforming the Requir Actions forleakage t within limits. This ' actually a consisten change which goes w' the
. revised R Achons (see 07 2-LS9 above). The quired Action i allows operation with akage notin limits an this change to peSR tous a valve to be o to repair the exce ive leakage. J q u c.ncngs 45 rw a gucsolc w .'rM Ste Cavemm caparn ;fgueg,u. 3 07-04 gLG The time liniit restrictions on opening the [ containment purge supply and $d), )
exhaust and pressure / vacuum relief flow paths] and the requirements to period accumulate the time that the valves have been open would , be licensee controlled documents. g g ,y, g 07-05 A Consistedwiti NUREG-1431, an ACTION is added for two valves inoperable in one penetration flow path. The change is administrative since the CTS would have relied on LCO 3.0.3 which has essenbally the f same reqtarements. l [cTJ LCo J.6./.7 AcTcwced] 07-06 - LS11 This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion CompaNoN t Table (Endoeure 38). l LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison / 07-07 Table (Endoeure 3B). 07-08 M This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Companson TatAe (Encheure 3B). 07-09 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Companson Table (Enclosure 3B). 07-10 LS9 A Note is added to clarify that leakage rate testing is not required for containment purge valves with resilient seals when the penetration flow path is isolated by a leak tested blank flange. The purpose of the leak testing requsement is to ensure containment leakage integrity dunng an accident, and thereby limit accident consequences. Isolation of the flow I path with a leek tested blind flange accomplishes this safety function and addiennelleak tesbng of the valves in the flow path is redundant and unnecessary. 07-11 LS25 This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Endosure 38). 08-01 LG Consistemwith NUREG-1431, the LCO references to suction flowpath and marmeltransfer of sucbon to containment sump have been deleted. These details are included within the OPERABILITY requirements of the containment spray system (CSS) (as required by CTS 4.6.2.1 and as further desenbed in the Bases). There is no tecnnical change resulting from this deletion. M C3 6 ?-35 07-I3 DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 6 J
l-l I' Insert for 3.6.3-15 l l Enci 3A - page 6 ~ l' Insert for 07-04-LG: This is possible since DBA calculations assume the purge function may be in service at the start of the accident. Closure is assured by the redundancy of these valves and that , they are designed to close against DBA conditions. This combined with the low probability of a DBA while this flow path is in service makes the total risk very small. l l l l l' I I i k l l [ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _ . _ _
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Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-16 APPLICABILITY: DC REQUEST: DOC 7-04 R CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS ITS 3.6.3 ACTIONS A and B DCPP CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS requires that with a containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve open or with the vacuum pressure relief isolation valves open beyond 50, the open isolation valve (s) be closed or the penetration be isolated within 1 hour. The CTS markup shows that the conditions for valves open have been relocated and the ACTION modified to conform to ITS ACTION B (two valves in a penetration inoperable). This is incorrect. The correct change is that the above two conditions are retained as ITS 3.6.3 ACTION A and the allowed outage time is increased from 1 hour to 4 hours. This is a Less Restrictive change. ITS 3.6.3 ACTION B is a new condition, which it, considered as an Administrative change. The CTS does not have a provision for two valves in the same penetration inoperable, thus, CTS 3.0.3 is entered. Comment: Revise the CTS markup to reflect the actual changes made and provide the appropriate discussions and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: The DCPP CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION requires two things. First,if the penetration flow paths have accumulated more than 200 hours open (two valves must be open to accumulate hours against the flow path), then declare all of the containment purge isolation valves inoperable (the flow paths are inoperable) and isolate the flow paths within 1 hour. This item has been relocated to an ECG under DOC 7-04-LG (revised from DOC 7-04-LG, see 3.6.3-15 Response). Second, If the vmuum/ pressure relief flow path is open and the vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves (two valves) are open more then 50', the valves are to be declared inoperable and the flow path isolated within 1 hour. ITS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION B (two valves inoperable), was written as an administrative change reflecting the action of LCO 3.0.3. This item was retained and moved to ITS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION B (valves not meeting ITS SR 3.6.3.10) under DOC 7-05-A. DOC 7-05-A has been revised to reflect this DCPP specific information. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 3A 6 l l For Information Only Pages: Enci 2 3/4 6-10 l [ l 39 i
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 , (Conbnued) CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION g , 07-03 )$ /A change [ ] con tent with NUREG-14 1. SR 3.6.3.1, is add ) ! l.S & l provide an nee for one isolation Ive in a penetration path to be open performing the Requir Actons for leakage twithin , limits. This' actually a consisten change which goes ' the i
. revised R ired Actions (see 07 2-LS9 above). The quired Action allows ed operation with akage notin limits an this change to (the SR laws a valve to be o ed to repair the exce ive leakage. J M c.htnge is w:0,cpacwt.v X?s; Set Cove's m Grofracn 74' tf(aj. 1 The time limit restricbons on opening the [ containment purge supply and 58).
07-04 YLQ l exhaust and pressure / vacuum relief flow paths) and the requirements to j pen accumulate the time that the valves have been open would be licensee controlled documents. ( g,y,, g 07-05 A Consistentwith NUREG-1431, an ACTION is added for two valves inoperable in one penetration flow path. The change is administrative since the CTS would have relied on LCO 3.0.3 which has essentially the same requnements- [c7.5 Lco 3.6.t.7 AcncyJcoq] 07-06 . LS11 This change is not applicable to DCPP, See Conversion CompanfoN Table (Endosure 38). 07-07 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Endosure 38). 07-08 M This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Companson Table (Endosure 38). 07-09 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Companson Table (Endosure 38). 07-10 LS9 A Note is added to clanfy that leakage rate testing is not required for containment purge valves with resilient seats when the penetrabon flow path is isolated by a leak tested blank flange. The purpose of the leak testing requwement is to ensure containment leakage integnty dunng an accident, and thereby hmit accident consequences. Isolaton of the flow patn with a leak tested blind flange accomplishes this safety functon and additonalleak testing of the valves in the flow path is redundant and unnecessary. 07-11 LS25 This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Endosure 3B). 08-01 LG Consistentwith NUREG-1431, the LCO references to suction flowpa;h , and manuel transfer of sucton to containment sump have been deleted. These deleils are included within the OPERABILITY requirements of the containment spray system (CSS) (as required by CTS 4.6.2.1 and as further desenbed in the Bases). There is no te .hnical change resultng from this deletion. l g,g g 03.c5-35 DCPP Desenption of Changes to Current TS 6 1
1 e n.c-1 l l CONTAINMENT SVSTEMS a-o :- A CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SVSTEM 07-01-A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.7 One purge supply line and/or one purge exhaust line of the Containment gy.my Purge System may be open or the vacuum / pressure relief line m>iy be open --The vxur!Prc=ure relief 14ne ny be Oper provided the vacuum / pressure relief 07-04-R w l 1 solation valves are blocked to prevent opening beyond 50' (90* is fully open). Operation with any two of these three lines open is permitted.-Oper: tion ..ith the pu ;0 cupply =d!cr M:=t M0btion v:ler Opr er 1th the vr u r!?r0Z ure rel t ? :O bt10n v hn Op0^ up to 50* th:!' be """tod to kn th 0 Ogu:' t0 200 hourt durin; a C knd - We&*- APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3, and 4. 11-o2-A ACTION: **E*** "" 03-13-A "4th : =nt:innt per;0 supply d! r =h:=t Schten v:he Open er the ex cu-!?r0Zure reitef i = b*10n v:500 cp r up t 50* 'Or "'^re thr 200 07-04-R w hours dur4.; : cknd:r y= Or +2^ rent: inn + " urge !;;te"' Open rd the C3 6 3-T vruu"'!Pr0Zure re!Mf 14nn Opr. er "tth the vreu-!p-^Zure relkf 07-oS-A 20htien v:hr 0^ beyond 50* InthitioMontainment purge ^ supply or
~ haust'41ves or h=ofvacuum/ ressere reitersvalves on.the same penetration 11-12-A ex inoperable fordreasonsiother: Beakage~~ Elose~thb~open~Tsolation-^~~^^
Valve (s)~oF~is6 late ~the~ penet"rsti^onIs) flaispith(i) within 1 hour; otherwise. be in at least HOT ST40BY within'the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUIDOWN within the following 30 hours. (new);0ne"oFeore~piirietFatibCflos~pithiwitF6hiiF5NFe~contaiheent piirge~or 07-02-LS9
'" ~ vacuum / ressure; relief; valves notwithin;purgesvalvecleatage limits.J ~
Within: 4. hours (tsolate;the affectatpenetration:flospath by use of*at 1ms1 least'oneiclosed and:de-activated:mtmaticivalveAclosed manual valveFor affected penetration; flow path is: isolated once blind flange 4VerifyJthe; devices:cutsidef. containment *and: prior;to enterin(M0 per 31ddaysdornisolation from H00EtS?1f;not: performed withen:ther containment *f and perfonn Surve111ani:e/4. 63:4:for previous 192. daystformisolation the: resilient: seal: purge valvesdevices cl osed;to: comp]yJ4th_this;RequiggetionBOXoncel perJ2idays f o 7.,3, M
~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS R. 4.6.1.7.1 The position of the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation e e ~ valves and the vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves shall be determined closed (07,03-A t at leas,t ,onc,e,pe,_r
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4.6.1.7.3 The 12-inchTvacuum/ pressure relief isolation valves shall be verified ED 1 to be blocked to prevent opening beyond 50* at least On= - 10 entht ex:chp^EniElMG E turEb/At D;-ML - Oct
* ~ . ? Isolation de' vices'in high~ radiatio 6~ areas maf"belerified " ' ~ ~ ~ ~ bf~uset of
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**J 7 Separate ~ Condition ~entri]s" allowed ~foGa~chjpenetrati.ohlfloW~ path- 11-02-A
*** 7 Enter applicable ~Conditioniand Reiiuired Mtf6nrof'the~* Containment":1.C0 03-13-A
~ ~^'when leak. age r.esul.t..s:1n exceed.ing the.overal..l c.on. tainment ..l.e. a.k. age rate.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-10 TAB 13.4A 1 l w---._-_____ -_
( l ) Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-17 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: l l DOC 7-06 LS-11 DOC 11-13 LS-22 . JFD 3.6-18 I JFD 3.6-19 CTS 4.6.1.7.2 i CTS 4.6.1.7.3 CTS 4.S.1.7.4 CTS 4.6.3.4 ITS SR 3.6.3.6, SR 3.6.3.7 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.1.7.2,4.6.1.7.3,4.6.1.7.4 and 4.6.3.4 require a leak rate test for the various types of containment purge valves with resilient seals at various specified frequencies. In converting to the ITS these frequencies have been modified. In some cases, the frequency change is a Less Restrictive change (i.e.,24 hours to 92 days), while in others the change is More Restrictive (i.e.,24 months to 184 days), or Administrative (92 days to 92 days of opening valve). Considering the whole change, the staff cannot conclude that the preponderance of the changes would result in the change being classified as Less Restrictive as specified in DOCS 7-06 LS-11 and 11-13 LS-22, rather than More Restrictive or Administrative. The converse is also true. In order to more accurately reflect the changes made, each individual CTS should be reevaluated with regard to the changes and marked accordingly (Administrative, less Restrictive or More Restrictive). See Comment Numbers 3.6.3-17, 3.6.3-18, 3.6.3-19, 3.6.3-20 and 3.6.3-21 for additional specific concems with regards to this change. Comment: Revise the CTS as specified and provide the appropriate discussions and justifications for the Administrative, Less Restrictive and More Restrictive changes. See Comment Numbers 3.6.3-18, 3.6.3-19, .3.6.3-20, 3.6.3-21 and 3.6.3-22. FLOG RESPONSE: This comment deals with current surveillance requirements 4.6.1.7.2, 4.6.1.7.3,4.6.1.7.4, and 4.6.3.4. The proposed changes associated with these surveillance, which deal with testing of valves with resilient seals, are addressed and justified as follows: 4.6.1.7.2 - For DCPP, this item is not applicable because it is not a leak test surveillance. For CPSES, the proposed changes delete STAGGERED TEST BASIS for the 184-day surveillance and add a new requirement to test within 92 days of opening the valve. The DOCS that support these changes are discussed in the response to Comment Number 3.6.3-19. In this response, CPSES has developed additional DOCS 7-14-M and 7-15-A and
. modified DOC 7-06 LS-11. For Callaway and Wolf Creek, the proposed changes involve allowing testing of the containment shutdown purge isolation valves with or without blank flanges installed. The DOC supporting the proposed changes (DOC 7-11 LS-25)is discussed in the response to Comment Number 3.6.3-21 and 3.6.3-24. To further support the Callaway and Wolf Creek changes, DOC 7-11 LS-25 has been modified to employ the 40 l
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 l-NUREG-1431 test frequencies of 184-day and within 92 days of opening as mitigating l- factors in the overall relaxation of test requirements for the containment shutdown purge isolation valves. 4.6.1.7.3 - For DCPP, this item is not applicable because it is not a leak test surveillance. For CPSES, the proposed changes revise the testing frequency for pressure relief valves from 92 days to 184 days and within 92 days of opening a valve. The DOCS that justify these changes are discussed in the response to Comment Number 3.6.3-20. In responding to Comment Number 3.6.3-20, DOC 7-06 LS-11 was used and new DOC 7-16-A was prepared. For Callaway and Wolf Creek, this item is not applicable because it is not a leak test surveillance. 4.6.1.7.4 - For DCPP and CPSES, this is not applicable because this surveillance is not used. For Callaway and Wolf Creek, the proposed changes revise the testing frequency for the mini-purge valves from 92 days to 184 days and within 92 days of opening a valve. The same DOCS (7-06 LS-11 and 7-16A) discussed in the response to Comment Number 3.6.3-20 also are applicable to the proposed changes for Callaway and Wolf Creek. 4.6.3.4 - For all the FLOG plants except DCPP, this surveillance is not used. For DCPP, the proposed changes revise the frequency of testing ventilation isolation valves from every 72 hours and within 24 hours of cycling a valve to every 184 days and within 92 days of opening a valve. The DOC supporting the proposed changes is addressed in the response to Comment Number 3.6.3-18. ATTACHED PAGES: None 41
Enclosure 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-18 APPLICABILITY: DC REQUEST: 1 DOC 11-13 LS-22 CTS 4.6.3.4 ITS SR 3.6.3.7 and Associated Bases 1 DCPP CTS 4.6.3.4 leak rate tests the containment ventilation isolation valves within 24 l hours after each closing of the valve except when the valve is being used for multiple l cycling then the frequency is at least once per 72 hours. DCPP ITS SR 3.6.3.7 changes the CTS frequencies to 184 days and within 92 days after opening the valve. DOC 11-13 LS-22 states that the leakage rate tests go from 30 months to 184 days (a More Restrictive change) and 24 hours to 92 days (a Less Restrictive change). DOC 11-13 LS-22 does not address the change or deletion of the 72 hour frequency. The CTS does not specify a frequency of 30 months. Comment: Revise the CTS markup accordingly and provide additional discussion and justification on where the 30 month frequency is located in the CTS and on the change / deletion of the 72 hour frequency. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 11-19-M has been issued to address the more restrictive change of containment ventilation isolation valve leak testing frequency every 30 months to every 184 days. This change has been added to the CTS markup of CTS SR 4.6.3.4. The CTS 30 month testing frequency is provided under the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program (CTS SR 4.6.1.2 changed by LA 120/118 to CTS SR 4.6.1.1.c) which is committed under 10 CFR 50, App J, Option B to Reg. Guide 1.163 (see para. C.2 for guidance of the containment ventilation isolation valves which are good performing valves). This allows for a maximum 30-month frequency. The DCPP license for the containment ventilation isolation testing was based upon a plant specific resolution of the valve reliability issue addressed by Generic issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration." The CTS addresses seal deterioration by requiring testing within 24 hours if the valve has been opened and at least once every 72 hours upon multiple cycling. This more restrictive change adopts the resolution
. of Generic issue B-20 as reflected in NUREG-1431.
DOC 11-13-LS22 has been revised to remove the "every 30 months to every 184 days" information. The phrase " .and at least once every 72 hours during multiple cycling..." has been added to the description of DOC 11-13-LS22 and LS-22. The justification is based upon the good performance record of these valves. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 2 3/4 6-16 Encl. 3A 11,12 Enct 3B 10 Enci 4 46,47 42
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Q3.6.3-9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) G3 6 3-8 fposee operwcQ 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each testable ^0./cr 0^0r ted Or automatic d ..m, . , , containment isolation valve that;is not;1ockedtsealEd.i.or otherwise-secured shall - -- be determined to_be within .its' limit"when' tested' pursuant"to Sp00i#icatich ' 0,5 . 11-09-A thel Inservice;T,esting]rogram. 4.6.3.4 Each containment ventilation isolation valve. except the air sample 9 3 G ~3 -'I suplyandreturnvalves,shallbedemonstrated0PERABLEevery;;;18_41daisqgi 3 3 33.Ls22 wit in 2' hour: 92l days after cae 010:ing of opening thelalve.~ h 00pt .cr the vahc is being u:Od'for multiplc Oy014n;. ther atld:st On:0 per 72 hour 0, by 07-10-LS9 verifying leakage rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Pr ram. ThisfsurveillinceEis?not1 required whenithe' enetration
~~~~~~~^'~~"~^p^^~ " ~ ~ ~ flow
" ' ' ~ p~ath is
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a-/q-m 1sp atedlbsa leak;. tested lblankflangei 9 3, ,, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 110 TAB 13.4A Unit 2 - Amendment No. 109 March 1. 1996
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Continued) OS.(.S-9 CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION powf/ Q/8d M "W 5 11-Og A Consistentwith NUREG-1431 and indu Traveler TSTF-46, Rev.1, the isolaten time surveillance is revi to delete the reference to verifying *each power operated
- contai ment isolation valve and only require venhcation of each " automatic 4 solation valve." Containment isolation velves which are power operated but do not receive a containment isolation signal (i.e. can be remotely operated), do not have an isolation time assumed in the accident ar,alysis since they require operator action. Therefore, deleting the reference to power operated isolabon valve time testing is a clarification that reduces the potential for misinterprobng the requirements of this SR while maintaining the assumphons of the accident analysis.
11-10 A This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Compuison Table (Enciosure 3B). gym HM3 Q.M, .3-t o 11-11 A A Note is added to the tainmentisolation specifica n that the LCO is not appicable to main, team safety valves (MS , main steam isolabon volves (MSIVs),'feedwater isolabon valves ),[ ] and atmoschane
, _n, , - u dump
_ _ _ _valve _ (ADVs)f. ' _':a: _ : .^zud.cx',(L^.) .m_
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L:: This note is consistent with current licensing bases. 11-12 A The phase " flow path" is added for clarificabon and constancy with NUREG-1431. This specificabon is based on GDC 55,56, and 57 which address the proper isolabon for each *line" that penetrates containment Licensees have always been required to assure that proper protechon is provided for each line or flow path that passes through containment even if multiple flow paths share the same penetrabon in this Win M the term
- penetration" has always meant each flow path that penetrates containment. Adding the@wprgds,-T
- flow path"to the = d :- elanfies this m.mninn am a+iers+ once enq 7z naa r
;r W2 mwQ 11-13 LS22 This change s the DCPP containment ventilabon isolatMN leak rate su llance frequency 2z 20 -- nr.; t: ;.;.i O 0;,; ...d from 24 hou to 92 days after opening a valve. This change is consistentwith NUREG-1431 and NRC resolution of Multi-Plant Action No. B-20,* Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deteriorshon." These valves have a good service record and have consistently met leakage rate requsements. The revised g2 day frequency sbil reflects conservahve margin to compensate for degradabon of the resilient seats in these volves.
l DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 11 1 L___________________.____
1 h ( DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Continued) CHANGE NUARBER HRtiG DESCRIPTION 11-14 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, the phrase "that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position
- is added for clarification in regard to which valves require isolation time testing. Valves that are secured in place, are secured in the position required to meet their safety function.
The isolation time testing ensures that valves can respond to the position that meets their safety function in the bme assumed in the . safety analysis. If the valvec are secured in the position that meets their safety function, no testing is necessary. 11-15 A This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 11-16 A Even though it is not specified in ITS 3.6.3 Required Actons, the ACTION to restore the inoperable valve stated in CTS 3.6.3.a is understood as always the primary objecbve and a continuous option to be performed during any Completion Time. 11-17 Not Used. 11-18 LG This change is not appleable to DCPP. See Converson Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). Il-19 M &nsed7 @ 3. c. . .iir- I V 12-01 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, the hydrogen monitonng specification is moved to improved STS Secten 3.3.3 concoming Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)instrumentaten 12-02 M Consistent with the MODE of Apphcability for PAM instrumentaten in NUREG-1431, the MODE of Apphcabality for the hydrogen monitors is extended to MODE 3. 12-03 LS15 Consistent with NUREG-1431 the ACTION is revised to require a special report be submitted within 14 days in lieu of being in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours, if one train of hydrogen monitoring cannot be restored to operable within 30 days. This is acceptable because the report is required to identify sitemative methods for monitoring and plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation before a loss of functonal capability occurs. (See ITS LCO 3.3.3 and 5.6.8) 12-04 M Adds the requirement to be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours if both trains of hydrogen monitoring are inoperable and one train was not restored within 72 hours. This is a more restnchve requirement than is currently applied and is being done to be consistent with the PAM requirements in NUREG-1431. DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 12
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insert for 3.6.3-18 Enci 3A- page 12 11-19-M This DCPP plant specific change addresses the more restrictive change of containment ventilation isolation valve leak testing frequency every 30 months revised to every 184 days. The DCPP license for the containment ventilation isolation testing was based upon a plant specific resolution of the valve reliability issue addressed by Generic issue B-20, Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration." This provided for a testing frequency no different from any other valve as provided for in the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program (CTS SR 4.6.1.2 changed by LA 120/118 to CTS SR 4.6.1.1.c) which is committed under 10 CFR50, App J, Option 8 to Reg. Guide 1.163 (see Par C.2 for guidance of the containment ventilation isolation valves which are good performing valves). The Containment Leak Rate Testing Program provides for a maximum 30 month frequency. The CTS addresses seal deterioration by - requiring testing within 24 hour if the valve has been opened (at least once every 72 hour upon multiple cycling). This more restrictive change adopts the resolution of Generic issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" as reflected in NUREG-1431. Enci 3B - page 10. 11-19-M This DCPP plant specific change addresses the more restrictive change of containment ventilation isolation valve leak testing frequency every 30 months revised to every 184 days. Applicability: DC YES CP- NO-WC NO CA NO 1 c ------ --_ - _ _ A
I i N. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS22 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Ond t2L /M.St mce A %f 12 hourt durmf nw/&Je ynf Q3gy pf I This change the containment ventilation isolabon valve leakage surveillance frequency after opening a valve from 24 hou 92 days. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. These valves have a good service record and have consistently met leakage rate requirements The revised 92 day frequency still reflects conservative margin to compensate for degradsbon of the resilient seats in these valves. T2 2;re; c':: :f f: 0; . ;;.
- Z: C; 4; 0;;"oW. : 5: ::i ::::: f :=ri "'1 d:',; (CTS _ - : 1" r; .r;) := " Tas b.: ;M::-
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This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determmed that it involves NSHC. This determinabon has been performed in accordance with the enteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.g2 (c) as quoted below-
'The Commossen may make a ifnel determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operahng license for a facMitylicensed under 50.2f (b) or 50.22 or for a teshing faceity
- involves NSHC, if operation of the fackty in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a signHicant increase in the probabHity or consequences of an accdontpreviously evaluated;or )
i
- 2. Create the possbHty of a new or dHilerent kind of accdont kom any accdont pronously evaluated; k or
- 3. Invoke a signHicant reduchon in a mergin of safety."
The following evaluabon is provided for the three categones of the significant hazards considersbon standards:
- 1. . Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
These valves fully meet the requirement of the Branch Technical Posibon CSB 6-4 (except for their larger size). The ten year servme records for these vahms show that they consistently meet their leakage rate limits. The revised surveillance frequency slill retains the NRC recommended adequate margin to compensate for the fact that these valves are resehent seated valves Therefore, the proposed change to surveillance frequency does not effect the probability or consequences of an accident provously evaluated.
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
. evaluated?
The proposed change to the surveillance frequency does not involve a physical altersbon to any plant equipment, causes no change in the method by which any safety related system performs its funcbon, and does not alter the manner in which any safety system is operated. Therefore, the proposed change would not create the possabihty of a new or different kind of accident.
- 3. Does this change inwohe a significant reduchon in a margin of safety?
These valves fully meet the requirement of the Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 (except for their larger size). The [nine] year service records for these vehes show that they consistently meet their leakage rate limits. The revised surveillance frequency still retains the NRC recommended adequate margin to compensate for the fact that these valves are resilent seated valves. Therefore, there is no significant reducbon in the margin of safety DCPP No Significant Hazards Evalustons 46 m
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS22 (Continued) l NO SIGNFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION l Based upon the preceding informabon, it has been determined that the proposed changes associated with NSHC l *LS22" do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, create the possibility of a new or different kind of accdent from any accident previously evaluated, or involve a
. significant reduction in a margin of safety Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 (c), and does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
1 1 e i l l DCPP No Significant Hazards Evalumbons 47
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.3-23 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA
' REQUEST:
DOC 7-10 LS-9 JFD 3.6-13 CTS 4.6.1.7.2 l CTS 4.6.1.7.3 CTS 4.6.1.7.4 CTS 4.6.3.4 STS SR 3.6.3.7 and Associated Bases ITS SR 3.6.3.7 and Associated Bases A Note has been added to CTS 4.6.1.7.2,4.6.1.7.3,4.6.1.7.4,4.6.3.4 and STS SR 3.6.3.7 to clarify that leakage rate testing is not required for containment purge valves with resilient seals when the penetration flow path is isolated by a leak tested blank flange. The staff position is that the valve would still need to be leak tested since the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requires both isolation devices in the containment penetration to be
-tested except for GDC 57 penetrations. In addition, because the CTS does not currently contain this exception, the staff considers this change to be a beyond scope of review item for this conversion, as well as a generic change to the STS.
Comment: Delete this generic change. FLOG RESPONSE: While we recognize that this is a generic change to the STS, the change was sent to the Westinghouse Owners Group for consideration during their June 1998 meeting. We believe the technical merits of the change should justify rapid approval by the WOG, TSTF, and the NRC. We request that the NRC keep this as an open item under the assumption that it will be approved prior to issuance of the SER. This change is of sufficient value in precluding confusion, LERs, and inspection findings that should we be required to remove it from our submittal, an LAR would be submitted upon NRC approval of the TSTF version of the change. We believe that it would be cost effective for all concemed to retain this change within the submittal pending NRC review of this proposed TSTF. ATTACHED PAGES: None l t
~
43
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lcttar DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-27 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 11-08 TR-1 CTS 4.6.3.2 ITS SR 3.6.3.8 and Associated Bases. CTS 4.6.3.2 requires that each automatic containment isolation valve actuates to its isolation position on a specified test signal. In converting the CTS requirements to ITS SR 3.6.3.8 the CTS is modified to allow credit to be taken for an actual as well as a simulated (test) signal. DOC 11-08 TR-1 does not provide sufficient information to l justify allowing the use of an actual signal. ' Comment: Provide additional discussion and justification to allow the use of an actual signal to meet this surveillance requirement. 1 FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS requires the use of a test signal for initiation of valid tests. The unintentional result was to require the reperformance of the verification even if an actual signal l had already verified proper operation of the equipment. TR1 allows either an actual or test signal. DOC 11-08 TR-1 has been revised to provide additional discussion and justification to allow the use of an actual signal to meet this surveillance requirement. < ATTACHED PAGES. Enci 3A 10 44 l l 2
DESCRIPTION OF CHAN2ES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Continued) CHANGE NUMBER M8tiG DESCRIPTION 11-05 LS14 A new Condition is added to the current Containment isolabon Valve TS to cover the case where one containment isolabon valve is li. operable in a penetrabon flow path of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. General Design Criteria (GDC) 57 allows the use of a closed system in combination with a containment isolabon valve to provide the two containment barriers against the release of radioactive material following an accdont. Traveler TSTF-30, Rev.1, provides the basis for extending the Complebon Time for this Condition to allow 72 hours to isolate an inoperable isolabon valve associated with a closed system. The CTS, LCO 3.6.3, does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolabon valve even though the closed system is subjected to a Type A containment leakage test, is missile protected, and is seisme Category I piping. Also, a closed system typically has flow through it during normal operabon such that any loss of integrity could be observed through leakage detochon systems within containment and system walkdowns for closed systems outside containment. As such, the use of a closed system is equivalent to isolating a failed containment isolation valve by use of a single valve as specified in NUREG-1431, Required ACTION A.1. The 72 houm provides the necessary time to perform repairs on a , failed containment isolabon valve when relying on an intact closed system. A Completion Time of 72 hours is considered appropnate given the reliability of the closed system and that 72 hours is typically provided for losing one train of redundancy throughout the NUREG. If the closed system and associated containment isolabon valve were both { inoperable, the plant would be in LCO 3.0.3 since there is no specsfic Condition specified 11-06 TR3 Consistent with NUREG-1431, the CTS SR to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of each containment isolabon valve by performance of a cycling and isolabon time test prior to retuming the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit has been deleted Any time repairs, maintenance or modificabons have affected the OPERABILITY of a system or component, post-maintenance testing is required to demonstrate operability of the system or component. Particular SRs needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the system must be evaluated for each maintenance or modificabon performed Explicit post-maintenance and modificabon TS SRs have therefore been deleted from the ITS because these requirements are inherent in the LCO OPERABILITY requirements. 11-07 LG Consistent with the NUREG-1431 level of detail, the descriptive material regarding the required containment isolabon valve actuaton signals in the CTS surveillance requirement is moved to the revised expanded l Bases. This is acceptable as the requirement to verify actuaton of the valves is retained in the TSs while the identification of the applicable actuation signalis moved to the Bases. 11-08 TR1 The actuaton surveillance is revised consistent with NUREG-1431 to clarify that an actual signal as well as a test signal may to verify actuation. The actuabon signalis moved to the Bases Ir$M ! 0363 47 DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 10 L.
Insert for 3.6.3-27 Enci 3A - page 10 l Insert for 11-08-TR1: In several specifications throughout the TS, OPERABILITY of certain equipment is demonstrated by ensuring that the equipment performs it safety function upon receipt of a simulated test signal. The intent of a ' simulated' signal was to be able to perform the required testing without the occurrence (or without causing) an actual signal generating event. However, the unintended effect was to require the performance of the surveillance (using a test signal) even if an actual signal had previously verified the operation of the equipment. This change allows credit to be taken for actual events when the required equipment actuates successfully. While the occurrence of events that cause actuation of accident mitigation equipment is undesirable, the actuation of mitigation equipment on an actual signalis a better demonstration of its OPERABILITY than an actuation using a test signal. Thus the change does not reduce the reliability of the equipment tested. The change also improves plant safety by reducing the amount of time the equipment is taken out of service for testing and thereby increasing its availability during an actual event and by reducing the wear of the equipment caused by unnecessary testing.
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lettsr DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.3-28 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 1-01 LG CTS 3.6.1,1 ACTIONS CTS 4.6.1.1.a ITS 3.6.3 ACTIONS ITS SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.1.1.a verifies that all penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are
' closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions. The corresponding ITS SRs for this CTS surveillance are ITS SR 3.6.3.3 for valves outside containment and ITS SR 3.6.3.4 for valves inside containment. IF CTS 4.6.1.1.a cannot be met, the ACTIONS of CTS 3.6.1.1 are entered which require restoration of valve OPERABILITY within 1 hour or shutdown within the following 36 hours. If ITS SR 3.6.3.3 or ITS SR 3.6.3.4 cannot be met, the ACTIONS of ITS 3.6.3 are entered which allows for one valve inoperable between 4 hours and 72 hours depending on the type of penetration to restore valve OPERABILITY before shutdown commences. This Less Restrictive change to the CTS is not justified.
Comment: Revise the CTS markup to show this Less Restrictive change and provide the appropriate discussions and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: Diablo Canyon, Comanche Peak, Wolf Creek, and Callaway have
. evaluated this issue and have concluded that no change in requirements occurred.- The content of CTS SR 4.6.1.1a. was moved to ITS SR 3.6.3.3 and ITS SR 3.6.3.4 with the Required Action time being moved to ITS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION B (see DOC 01-02-A). Additionally, implicit valve OPERABILITY aspects of CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a were combined with CTS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION and are now shown as ITS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION A, B, and C for DCPP. CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a was written to provide assurance that "all penetrations not capable of being closed . . are L ... secured." Containment OPERABILITY is associated with penetration flow paths per the CTS l Bases 3/4.6.1.1 which states " CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that releases . .' will be restricted to those leakage paths ... assumed in the safety analysis." The flow path j (penetration) must be unsecured for the condition of CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a to not be met. Under CTS LCO 3.6.3 - ACTION, one inoperable containment isolation valve (a valve unsecured /out ji - of position for a penetration "not capable of being closed during an accident") would provide 4 L hours to restore the valve or secure the flow path. This was not changed under ITS 3.6.3
? ACTION A. One " penetration" not meeting the conditions of CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a (two valves unsecured /out of position in the same flow path) would provide 1 hour to secure one valve
- closed in order to restore containment OPERABILITY. This was also retained under ITS 3.6.3 ACTIONS B.
DOC 01-02-A will be revised to read " ... Conditions A, B, and C and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4." 45 1
._______ _ _ _ - - Q
Enclosura 2 PG&E Lett:r DCL 98-087 l ATTACHED PAGES: l Encl 3A 1 l 46 u________________________ _ _
l DESCRIPTION OF CHAN3ES TO TS SECTION 314.6 This Enclosure contains a brief descripbonfjustificaton for each marked-up change to existing current plant Technical Specifications (CTS). The changes are keyed to those identifed in Enclosure 2 (mark-up of the CTS). The referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHC) are contained in Enclosure 4. All proposed technical changes to the CTS are discussed below; however, some administrative changes (i.e., format, presentabon, and editorial changes made to conform to the improved Technical Spec" etions (ITS)) may not be discussed. For Enclosures 3A, 3B,4,6A, and 6B, text in brackets *[]* indicates the infor,nabon is specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) Plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location. CHANGE NUMBER HRHQ DESCRIPTION 01-01 -te-' A 6 c b;;; c2;'..ed 2. .b!?UCCO-9 '" S : :: g z ; z t '^' :ZE T.z: OPT.'"".'"', M M ; L
- ::xca .: p:;O::'; tre b = OON~ta=:::T :t.i On:n' i'Z:- , --- f:: :::f 5 5: :77-tf ":::: -' 5: xnti T;;;
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gns@ Q 3.h l* I 01-02 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, this requirement to verify the penetration flow path is isolated is now addressed by improved Technical (3,and.) Specification (ITS) 3.6.3, Containment isolation Valves, Condition A/qg,
.aad49} and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4.
Q34. 3 -28 01-03 A The ACTION statements are revoed to inco po ete the NUREG-1431 allemabve isolaten method of a " check valve with the flow through the valve secured." This isolation method is provided in NUREG-1431 and is considered an acceptable varimbon of a de-achvated automatic valve. 01-04 LS1 A Note is added to valve and blind flange SRs consistent with NUREG-1431. The Note allows verification of valves, flanges, and isolation devees located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrable means. This change is less restnchve in that the CTS SR 4.6.1.1 has an excepton to valves, blind flanges, and deactnrated automabc valves which are located inside containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These valves shall be venfied closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN. However, under CTS, if an area outside of containment becomes a high radiation area, we would still be required to enter the area to verify the closed positions. The ITS would allow verificabon of all areas that are high radiation areas or become high radiation areas to be verified by administrative means once they have been venfied to be in the proper position. This is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is restncted for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been initially verifed in the proper position, is small. 01-05 A Consistent with n!UREG-1431, this requirement is addressed by SR 3.6.2.1 in ITS 3.6.2, Containment Air Locks Required Actions. DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 1
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-29 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: DOC 2-05 LG JFD 3.6-1 CTS 4.6.1.2c and 4.6.1.2.d (CPSES) CTS 4.6.1.7.2 CTS 4.6.1.7.3 CTS 4.6.1.7.4 CTS 4.6.3.4 ITS SR 3.6.3.6, SR 3.6.3.7 and Associated Bases. Comment: See Comment Number 3.6.1-6. FLOG RESPONSE: See response for Comment Number 3.6.1-6. ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages for response Comment Number Q 3.6.1-6. l 47
1 Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-34 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, CA REQUEST: JFD 3.6.3-5 STS SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and Associated Bases ITS SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and Associated Bases STS SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 have been modified by TSTF-45 Rev.1. While ITS SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 have incorporated the changes associated with TSTF-45 Rev.1, the Bases for ITS SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 do not fully incorporate all of the Bases changes associated with TSTF-45 Rev.1. Comment: Revise the Bases for ITS GR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3 6.3.4 to incorporate the Bases changes associated with TSTF-45 Rev.1 or provide additional discussion and justification for the deviations. FLOG RESPONSE: ITS Bases SR 3.6.3.3 and Bases SR 3.6.3.4 have been revised to be consistent with TSTF-45, Rev.1. The following statement has been added to both Bases sections:
"This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed positions, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing."
This question is not applicable to Callaway since the ITS Bases for SR 3.6.3.3 and 3.6.3.4 already contain this statement. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B3.6-23 For Information Only Pages: Enci5B B3.6-22 and 24 l 48
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SR 3.6.3.2 u c 1NFfME.~_ZSTf948 This SR frich' Containment?Purgetsupply ensures that Pressure /VacuualReliefMahes'sre^ closed ^~arFEQUtr6d"br7if~opsnTopen for the -1&[anIEexhsust@nditheU2%tnchtC 5 Fall 6wable ressonT'If a purge bMpressardir611efi valve is open in violation of this SR. the valve is~torisTdeF6d'^ihoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is not required to be met when the -".1;'urg^ ContainmsntiPdrielssppif'fahdiihaUsti&2 Containment Presshrs /Rillef valves ir#'^opsn'foFthe~rbasons ststed: '~ThET/shis"maf'be opened for pressure control. ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry,"or for Surveillance that require the valves to be open. 4 u- Cbnthihnent The -"dVac;c Cont"ainmentJPurgij'shppif?indiekhasstio@isthe^envi'ronment uum;R.elieDaMs are capable ~6f' closing" Pre.ssur g . .g. . periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.6.3.3. SR 3.6.3.3 This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located outside containment hnd7notYlocked otherwiseisecured and required.to be closed duri6g"adcidentl,9Ealed3W onditioris~1s closed ~The~SR^ helps to ensure (Continued) DCPP Mark-up of NUREG-1431. Rev 1 Bases B 3.6-22
Containment Isolation Valves (^.tec pheric. Sdtme:pheric. Mc Condenser :nd Dd B3.6.3 reeme. sw:ue.oA BASES- N that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not recuire an r y*dg 25 testino or valve manipulation. Rather. it involves verification *- ' w t that those containment isolation valves outside containment
;::"tc.^2eing mispositioned are in the correct position.Since ano_capacieol verification of valve position for containment isolation valves outside
( containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency is based on engineering M '" W # " judgment and was chosen to provide added assurance of the correct positions.
#c. uit 4 lacd 1 The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under
,e evenau ,nAca, administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the valves are open.jt
$3 <,,3 5g, he Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during 1
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been se,3 y verified toW.sA& be in the proper position.1sh--_Id b ble ,%e-cre lacr .wAted er Mt!*r#st. .rreur in e Cisltdpwh on , .rince &se twrg SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.4 verMe4+o 6e me corscepashvon %n foes., , .sme,<y , orsecun , REQUIREMENTS _
-- - ~ -
(continued) This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located inside containment addinbtilockedMMledW6f otherWise 34cQred and required to be closed ddPing~sccident~conditibns is clos 6d:~The~5R' helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the containment boundary is within design limits. For containment isolation valves inside containment, the Frequency of " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these containment isolation valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time they are op pe This Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1. 2, 3. and 4. for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is i small. i g~ w g% g 7,_g g ,wmg, g_u 7m ._= s _ ,, .,,y. :-ys qmy. sg u q umy,-n_m _ m _ , y+g7g _m ,, _aa m j a...w u. _u 2.~i 'l-~il2 Till 'vE.'Ji._~ ~ L ' .3"~Z_'.'.!ii;;;. ' I"i' I b,. vb.. k_ U_. 5bMbbk L mh h b [ N . a ,. a m a m - m . n a m[ b hab. - b b. . k M_ e . mbb
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l DCPP Mark-uo of NUREG-1431. Rev 1 Bases B 3.6-23
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=uzuu=: ua SR 3.6.3.5 78 h Verifying that the isolation time of each po'.; Operated :nd automatic gy, containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate p.7,.3 4,3 77 OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. -E.
The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Or 92 d:y .] SR 3.6.3.6 @t[tised SURVEILLANCE ! O d:tm0:pheric cont:1 ments, the check V:1ve th:t :Orve : containment REQUIREMENTS 1:01st10n function Or0 '.-Oight Or :prdng lord ^d to provide p0:it4v0 10 ur^ (Continued) in th0 direct 10r Of flo'; hi: Oncurcs that th0:0 check V:lve: "ill rem:1-c'^ 0d ""On th,e,
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- n. . ,., r . ~y. .... .~. ,. ~j Of 92 d:y: 1: c0n:1 stent ':ith th0 In:Or"1:0 T0: tin; r^grr rc';uirr^nt for valve testing On : 92 d:y c ^quency. r SR 3.6.3.7 i eE 9"; "M3hnd? Containment For PressureContainment
/ Vacuum?Rel Pur!efDlyssndishadst5""t~
veilith Fesi'liin seals 7adIlifi' o nal" leak 5ge~ rate 1 testing beyond~the^ test requirements of 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option?B is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated ~that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining t# 6 the5E? penetrations leak tight (due to the direct path between containment ^and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20. " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. 3 3). Additionally. this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened. TheileaEratPicdeptindeMHteMMfof?the%tainment piiF550pplV4hd exhaustO;dr accorda.nceWikt r@- ;0lSandicontainmentipressure/ vacuum;reliefsvalvess '~ ~ ^" (Continued) l l l l l l l l DCPP Mark-uo of NUREG-1431. Rev. 1 Bases B 3.6-24 L 1
Enclosura 2 PG&E Letter DCL 98-087 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.3-35 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION a and b ITS 3.6.3 ACTION A CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION a and CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION b (CPSES) specifies that with a containment purge valve inoperable for reasons other than leakage, the valve shall be closed or the penetration isolated within 4 hours. ITS 3.6.3 ACTION A in addition to isolating the penetration within 4 hours requires verifying that the penetration is isolated on a specified frequency. This is not reflected in the CTS markup of CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS a and b. Comment: Revise the CTS markup to reflect the actual changes to be made and provide the appropriate discussion and justification for this Less Restrictive change. FLOG RESPONSE: This comment also applies to ACTION c for Wolf Creek, Callaway and Comanche Peak. Diablo Canyon has determined that this comment is applicable to them. The ITS requirements to verify penetration isolation have been added as necessary to the appropriate CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS. The addition of this wording to the CTS is considered a more restrictive change. DOC (07 M) justifies the wording changes to the CTS. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 3/4 6-10 Encl.3A 6 i Encl. 3B 5 I I i l i I f' I 49
t l c u.c-I CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS O - O~l A CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM l o7.o3 4 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION J 3.6.1.7 One purge supply line and/or one purge exhaust line of the Containment ey;'y fy Purge System may be open or the vacuum / pressure relief line may be open ---The I r u u r'; rec u = r^1i^f 11 = =y 50 0;r provided the vacuum / pressure relief 07-04-R 4.0 isolation valves are blocked to prevent opening beyond 50' (90* is fully open). Operation with any two of these three lines open is permitted. ^per:ti r ith the per;0 2^;!y r d/ r r h:::t i c hti r elv = ^^r Or 2:1'2 the =0er'?r=:Ur0 r^1Mf 1=htir l Chr Opr up t 50* th:l' 50 '4-ited to 10= thr r ^';u:1 t0 200 her dur4n; : cl =d r yeaF-AP. PLACABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. l ACTION
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pxhaustValWisiciMise!secuia/ h-Mreigvalves!onsthe:tsamelpenetfiffon
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$noperableij isivs(W6r < so~ ite~ths )Ehe Fiti35tir ti) within 1 hour:
otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY with ^the~next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. (hiiaB0niidFiibifflMmetfiUd6?fliW~pitliflitth " ~766Filiontiihnentipifl dd 07-02-LS9
~ vacuum / 2re11efdialvestnotMeithin: ' ivalveslaat 91mitst Within? thoursMsolateftheta N ontflowipath tylusefofSat 01mst Isasttone? closed!and!# activated ' 1%selvenclosedimenuel? valve?MF blind!fi - '
4thetaffacted en! flow ' dsitsolated?cnce* per#31 Mays' .
. ~ jdevicesL 3 ute . ' t or;totenterinip00E74 from fGEdiL l1mettperfonnedNithteithedendous192/dayst _solationidevicesvinside sontainuntotand: perform Surve111ance14!60 uttforithelrestilentisaal closedsto!coupMthtMsiaegged3ctjen] 50giongiiper292sdaysi;purgeivalves^
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ou3- M N' SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.6.1.7.1 The position of the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation e < w valves and the vacuum / pressure relief isolation valves shall be determined closed ( 07,03-A ) a ,t 1 east 9nce, peg 31 days ,'__^u"' "="_",,~~_',"=' ,'=,-, *',73,", ," m , 6 , _5
=-1"c M m dAh2. h .m.; = a.m x '.5.1.'.2 Th^ Orhtin tir th:t the "r;0 r 'y rd! r rh0=t ichtir 07-04 g cc n = r the err!;-^=re =lM' ichtir ch: 5:= b=r Opr dr4r; : pu,3,,y ) ='rdr y=r :h l' M d^M-'-^d it k=t == ^^r ' day: . 4 4.6.1.7.3 The 12?ihidsvacuum/ pressure relief isolation valves shall be verified ED-to be blocked to~pfevent opening beyond 50* at least == p^ Ente r 19 >Mrntht IWYDiWAl-eCLb R DC*ML
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DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-10 TAB 13.4A j
DESCRIPTION OF CHAleGES TO TS SECTION 314.6 (Canonued) CHANGE NUMBER lif.tiG DESCRIPTION SS.M f l 07-03 )$ /A change [ ] con tent with NUREG-14 1, SR 3.6.3.1, is ad ) l LS & I provide an nce for one isolation Ive in a penetration path to be open performing the Requi Actions for leakage within l limits. This' actually a consisten change which goes ~ the f revised R d Achons (see 07 2-LS9 above). The uired Action allows operation with kage notin limits an this change to (the SR .lous a valve to be o to repair the ex ive leakage J vs cxngs os wr mncedL% o X??. Sr& Cowresan Gmpscn #>t(fret. , 07-04 %,LG The time limit restricbons on opening the [ containment purge supply and 58). ' exhaust and pressure / vacuum relief fkw paths] and the requirements to periodica accumulate the time that the valves have been open would be licensee controlled documents. g p ,y, g Consistentwith NUREG-1431, an ACTION is added for two valves I 07-05 A inoperable in one penetration flow path. The change is administrative l since the CTS would have relied on LCO 3.0.3 which has essenbally the same requsements. {cra tco y,f,,f. 7 Ac71m/ cod] ; 07-06 . LS11 This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion CompbNi Table (Endosure 38). 07-07 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Endosure 3B). 07-08 M This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Comparison Table (Endosure 3B). 07-09 LG This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Compenson Table (Endosure 38). 07-10 LS9 A Note is added to clarify that leakage rate testing is not required for containment purge valves with resilient seals when the penetration flow path is isalmend by a leak tested blank flange The purpose of the leak testing regierement is to ensure containment leakage integrity dunng an accident. and thereby limit accident consequences. Isolation of the flow path with aleak tested blind flange accomplishes this safety funcbon and additionalleak testing of the valves in the flow path is redundant and unnecessary. 07-11 LS25 This change is not applicable to DCPP. See Conversion Companson Table (Endosure 38). 08-01 LG Consistentwith NUREG-1431, the LCO references to sucbon flowpath and manuel transfer of sucbon to containment sump have been deleted. These deleils are included within the OPERABILITY requirements of the containment spray system (CSS) (as required by CTS 4.6.2.1 and as further descnbod in the Bases). There is no technical change resulting from this delebon. l g C3 6 ?-35 4 l i DCPP Description of Changes to Current TS 6 l I
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