ML20249C043
| ML20249C043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1998 |
| From: | Mckee P NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20249C044 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9806250223 | |
| Download: ML20249C043 (9) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
WASHINGTON, D.C. m =1
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NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY -
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-336 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 217 License No. DPR 65 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al.
(the licensee) dated April 13,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the I
Commission's regulations, D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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9006250223'990622 PDR ADOCK 05000336 p
PDR c.
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- 2.
Acce G gly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this !icense amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Sogcifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 217, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days ofissuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A
Phillip F. McKee Deputy Director for Licensing Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:
June 22, 1998
l.
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 217 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain verticallines indicating the areas of change.
Remove kuutd VI VI Xil Xil 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-9 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-3
1 1Mf1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
SECTION EME 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES.....................
3/4 4-2 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES.....................
3/4 4-3 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER......................
3/4 4-4 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS...................
3/4 4-5 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE............. 3/4 4-8 Leakage Detection Systems
............... 3/4 4-8 Reactor Coolant System Leakage............
3/4 4-9 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY.......................
3/4 4-10 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY...................
3/4 4-13 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS 3/4 4-17 Reactor Coolant System................
3/4 4-17 Pressurizer 3/4 4-21 Overpressure Protection Systems............
3/4 4-21a 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.................
3/4 4-22 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS 3/4 4-23 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS................
3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T.,,2 300*F 3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T.,,< 300*F 3/4 5-7 3/4 5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK.............
3/4 5-8 3/4 5.5 TRIS 0DIUM PHOSPHATE (TSP)...............
3/4 5-9 l
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 VI AmendmentNo.pp,71,Jpf,JJJ.217 0385
C INDEX BASES
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SECTION PAGE 3/4.4 REAc. TOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.........
B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.3
.ELIEF VALVES.....................
B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.4 PnESSI)RIZER B 3/4 4-2a 3/4.4.5 STLW GENERATORS B 3/4 4-2a 3/4.4.6 REAC.'OR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY...................
B *'4 4-4 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS..............
B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY B 3/4 4-7 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS B 3/4 4-8 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2and3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)
B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.5 TRIS 0DIUM PHOSPHATE (TSP)...............
B 3/4 5-3 l
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT..................
B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL................
B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.................
B 3/4 6-5 i
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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No. JJ, JJ. 77. JJJ. JJJ.
JJJ,217 om
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- 10. Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated position with power to the valve operator removed:
Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position 2-SI-306 Shutdown Cooling Open l
Flow Control 2-SI-659 SRAS Recirc.
Open*
2-SI-660 SRAS Recirc.
Open*
2-CH-434 Thermal Bypass Closed **
b.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
1.
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.
Of the arear affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
c.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system by ensuring that with a simulated reactor coolant system pressure signal greater than or equal to 300 psia the interlock prevents the shutdown cooling system suction valves from being opened.
2.
A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3.
DELETED l
4.
DELETED l
- To be closed prior to recirculation following LOCA.
- 2-CH-434, a manual valve, shall be locked closed.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 7, JJ, NJ, Jpf, om 191,217
ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS TRIS 0DIUN PH0SPHATE (TSP)
LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.5 The TSP baskets shall contain 1282 ft* of active TSP.
APPLICABILITY: MODES I, 2, and 3 ACTION:
With the quantity of TSP less than required, restore the TSP quantity within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the' fo11cwing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.5.1 Verify that the TSP baskets contain 1282 ft* of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate at least once per 18 months.
4.5.5.2 Verify that a sample from the TSP baskets provides adequate pH adjustment of borated water at least once per 18 months.
NILL 5 TONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-9 Amendment No. 217 esse i
x 3145_E!1ggEl!G1MilSTEMS"f ECCS)
BASE 3
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3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY ~ of each of the _ RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will ba immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection ~ tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.
The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable safety injection tank minimizes the time expo:;ure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
The ECCS leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system outside containment during the recirculation phase will not be exceeded.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component l
ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The purpose of the HPSI and LPSI pumps differential pressure test on recirculation ensures that the pump (s) have not degraded to a point where the accident analysis would be adversely. impacted. The actual inputs into the safety analysis for HPSI and LPSI pumps differential pressure (discharge-suction) when_ running on recirculation are 1209 and 150 psi, respectively. The acceptance criteria in the Technical Specifications were adjusted upward to account for instrument uncertainties and drift.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-1 AmendmentNo.JJ,7J,JJp,217 osee
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DEEENCY C0RE C00LUEEHDL1 i
BASES' 3/4.5.5' TP,ISODIUM PHOSPHATE NSP1' The trisodium phosphate (TSP) dodecahydrate stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA.
The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised 2 7.0.
This determination assumes the RCS, the SI tanks, and the RWST are at a maximum boron concentration of 2400 ppe and the BASTS are at a maximum boron concentration of 3.5 weight percent..
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of l
borated water provides assurance the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water I
at postulated post-LOCA temperatures.
This test is performed. by submerging a representative sample of 0.6662 1 0.0266 grams of TSP from one of the baskets
- in containment in 250 10 milliliters of water at a boron concentration of 2432 i 20 ppm, and a temperature of 77 i 5'F, Without agitation, the solution is a'ilowed to stand for four. hours.
The liquid is then decanted, mixed, and the pH measured.
The pH must be 1 7.0.
The representative TSP sampie weight is based on the minimum required TSP mass of 12,042 pounds, which at the manufactured density corresponds to the minimum volume of 223 ft* JThe minimum Techrical Specification requirement of 282 ft* is based on 223 ft of TSP for boric ' acid neutralization and 59 ft* of TSP for neutralization of hydrochloric and nitric acids.), and the maximum sump water volume (at 77'F) following.a
-LOCA of 2,046,441 liters, nomalized to buffer a 250 i 10 milliliter sample.
The-boron concentration of the test water is representative of the maximum possible concentration in the sump following a LOCA.
Agitation of the test solution is prohibited during TSP dissolution since an adequate standard for the-agitation intensity cannot be specified.
The dissolution time of four hours is necessary to allow time for the dissolved TSP to naturally diffuse through the sample solution.
In the containment sump following a LOCA, rapid mixing will occur, significantly decreasing the actual amount of time before the required pH is ach'.eved.
The solution is decanted after the four hour period to remove any undissolved TSP prior to mixing and pH measurement.
Mixing is necessary for proper operation of the pH instrument.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 217
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