ML20249B656
| ML20249B656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/08/1998 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-98-129, SECY-98-129-01, SECY-98-129-1, SECY-98-129-R, NUDOCS 9806240024 | |
| Download: ML20249B656 (11) | |
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....,.......e POLICY ISSUE (Information #
June 8.1998 SECY-98-129 EDE:
The Commissioners FROM L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
1MPACT STATEMENT REGARDING ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FUNDS FOR CRED!BILITY ASSESSMENT TEAM SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PURPOSE:
In response to a commitment made in a January 29,1998, Note to Commissioner Assistants, from James L. Blaha, the purpose of this paper is to inform the Commission of the impact on Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) threat assessment capabilities by the elimination of funding support for the jointly funded NRC and Department of Energy (GOE) Communicated Threat Credibility Assessment (CAT) program. NRC elimination of funds for tne joint NRC and DOE program will produce a number of results, including NRC's loss of access to the CAT working station and the staff placing reliance on the DOE and FBI evaluations of tiireats to NRC licensed facilities and materials, and specifically possibly delaying receipt of 1-hour and 4-hour threat assessment reports.
BACKGROUND:
In the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Congress enumerated responsibilities for NRC, including: 1he provision and maintenance of safeguards against threats, theft, and sabotage;"
I CONTACT: John J. Davidson, NMSS/FCSS NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE IN (301) 415-8130 5 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS PAPER EXCEPT FOR ATTACHMENT 2
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and the development "in consultation and coordination with the Administration, contingency plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage " In 1975, the staff began creating an NRC i
threat assessment program intended to comprise one component of a complementary set of safety and safeguards programs to assure public health and safety and protect the common defense and security. In the intervening years, staff efforts maturad into an effective program to provide: 1) a rapid response to threats to the public health and safety and common defense and security against power reactors, and other nuclear facilities, materials, and activities;
- 2) support to develop and maintain an NRC safeguards policy that complements NRC safety programs, and 3) along with DOE, technical support to U.S. law enforcement agencies, primarily the FBI and Intelligence Community, on a wide variety of matters, including theft or illegal trafficking of nuclear materials, and threatened use of, or sabotage involving, radioactive materiab that might endanger the public health and safety.
' As early as 1975, NRC, along with DOE and the FBI, identified the need for specialized and
, unique assessment tools that were unavailable, at that time, to be used for responding to communicated nuclear threats involvMg improvised nuclear devices, nuclear power reactors, or other nuclear facilities or activities. Development was begun and jointly funded by NRC i
and DOE on whas oecame the Credibility Assessment Team (CAT). Also, in 1979, the NRC Chairman and the FBI Director signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), in part, to assure "a timely, reliable, and effective response to a nuclear threat incident." In the MOU, NRC commits to assist the FBI in evaluating the nuclear aspects and the credibility of nuclear threats, as well as coordinating response activities. (Under Federal law, the FBI has lead responsibility for responding to acts of terrorism and acts involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., terrorism involving nuclear, chemical, or biological agents.) A copy of the MOU l
1 is provided in Attachment 1. The CAT became one of several key components of the NRC and DOE threat assessment programs and is a unique Federal asset in the assessment of nuclear-related threats that directly addresses the nuclear portion of weapons of mass destruction threat. Since 1978, the CAT has assessed the credibility of 57 nuclear extortion threats involving improvised nuclear devices; 23 extortion and other threats involving NRC licensed facilities; and approximately 400 cases involving the attempted illicit sale of alleged j
nuclear materials. Of the threats involving improvised nuclear devices or NRC licensed facilities, only one threat was assessed as credible, and in fact, tumed out to involve an actual theft of material as a basis for extorting money. That incident occurred at an NRC-licensed low-enriched facility in 1979.
When NRC funds to support the CAT were reduced in fiscal year (FY) 1998 and eliminated in FY 1999, staff initiated an effort to determine the impact of NRC losing the various assessment and informational tools that had.been provided by CAT and to identify, to the extent possible,
. planned actions to compensate for the loss of the CAT in the future.
DISCUSSION:
i The basis for a sound threat assessment program is threefold: 1) provision for effective, l
consistent, and timely responses to a wide range of threats to the safe and secure operation of licensed facilities and to the safe and secure uso of licensed materiata; 2) interaction with and support to other Federal agencies regarding threats against nuclear facilities and materials, and I
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' threats to the public involving nuclear an'd radioactive materials, including nucinr materials i smuggling and illicit trafficking; and 3) analytic support and recommendations to senior NRC decision-makers and licensees regarrfing potential threats to safe and secure operations and implemented programs, and other safeguards policy matters. These efforts also support L
Presidential Decision Directive-39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (PDD-39)," dead June 21,.
1995, which addresses thd Federal response to threats and acts involving nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.
Timeliness, consistency, and reliability in assessing threats to safe and secure ororations of i
- licensed facilities and to the unauthorized use of nuclear and radioactive material. are the z primary goal of the NRC threat assessment program. They have been achieved t.vough the
- NRC Information Assessment Team (IAT), the CAT, and the FBI Domestic Warning and
.- Advisory System. The NRC IAT is an on-call team comprising NRC staff who serve as the focal point for assessing all reported threats to NRC licensed facilities, materials, and activities. The
' IAT is chaired by the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) and includes i staff representation from NMSS, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and each Regional Office. The IAT, CAT, and the FBI Waming and Advisory System are on-call
' 24-hour-a-day resources that have a long-established record of effective and measured response to a wide range of threats and incidents. The NRC lAT and the FDI Waming and Advisory System remain of'ective componer.ts of the NRC threat assessment program and will not be discussed further. Details concoming the CAT's composition, operational capabilities, extensive databases, and past NRC and DOE funding are provided in Attachment 2. The CAT is a unique Federal asset comprising more than 50 assessors in six assessment teams that provide operational, technical, and behavioral assessments within one hour of receipt of the
-threat message. Assessment elements are managed by a Coordination Center at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which also maintains a number of one-of-a-kind databases for use in assessing threats and nuclear smuggling incidents. NRC, FBI, DOE, all
' assessor teams, and the Coordinating Center, are linked by a computer-based communications system that can process classified information.-
lMPACTASSESSMi2[I:
NRC's threat assessment program continues to provide timely support to the Commission in a variety of ways; however, the program is significantly affected by the loss of the CAT as a
.. real-time threat assessment resource. The impact of this loss will be felt in several areas. With the loss of the CAT secure communications wark station, NRC will no longer be able to directly
. participate in CAT assessments, or directly access the various threat-related databases maintained by LLNL.- NRC direct participation in the CAT has assured valuable timely information for NRC management and prompt response to NRC requests when timeliness was
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vitali. Because nuclear threats, smuggling and illicit sales activities, potentially involving material L from NRC licensed facilities, will probably continue in the future (that is, there is no new
- intelligence information; no changa in the threat from terrorists, disgruntled employees, or i
psychopathic behaviors; and no change in the threat environment that supports such a j
. reduction),: NRC will continue to respond to such threats.- However, the timeliness and
'l t responsiveness of NRC involvement, management, and information dissemination will be
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_ replaced by a dependence on FBI support and availability when NRC licensees and materials
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, are the target of a threat. Further, 1 be DOE, through the CAT, that provides technical support to the FBI, even when an NnC licensee is involved.- FBI priorities, as lead Federal agency for responding to criminal acts of terrorism, may not always reflect NRC's sensitivity to public health and safety responsibilities and issues, and reliance on the FBI to provide timely assessments to NRC and the licensee may not be comparable to NRC participation and in-sy., ment in tne CAT. Although responsibility for responding to threats against its licensees in a timely manner remains an NRC oversight responsibility, staff has determined that' resources within NRC are not available currently to replace lost CAT cape 5ilities used to assess -
. threats to NRC-licensed facilities and materials. The CAT provides timely independent analyses and assessments, as well as access to a variety of databases and timely expert analysis. In the future, NRC will not have the immediate and direct accessability to the CAT resources, but will have to communicate through the FBI or DOE; the time frame for response will be increat,ed. Timeliness is a factor in a variety of CAT suppori activities. For example, in
'. March 1998 when Italian authorities seized a TRIGA fuel element shipped to Zaire in the early 1970s, the first and most complete information provided to NRC came from the CAT nuclear smuggling and illicit sales database. This information guided and focused NRC's initial deliberations in a timely manner.
Finally,.the withdrawal of NRC from the CAT has prompted strong responses from FBI and DOE, and modification to the NRC and FBI MOU ma be required. Staff will revisit the NRC/ FBI MOU with FBI staff to ascertain if changes are warranted that would require renegotiation of the MOU. NRC staff will keep the Commission advised of the results of this j
- effort..
COORDINATION.
The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper and concurs.
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$ph Callan Executive Director for Operations Attachments:
- 2. Description of Credibility Assessment Team DISTRIBUTION:;
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MEMORANDUM 0F UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL SUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMIS$10N REGARDING NUCLEAR-THREAT INCIDENTS INVOLVING NRC LICENSED FACILITIES, l
MATERIALS, OR ACTIVITIES.
I.-
PURPOSE l
In recognition of the responsibilities and functions of the Federtl Sureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Nuclear Regulatory Connission (NRC) under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, this Memorandum of Understanding (M0U)delineatestheresponsibilitiesofeachagencyregardingnuclear threat incidents involving NRC-licensed facilit'es, materials, or activities.
(Thisagreementdoesnotaffnettheproceduresand Memorandum of responsibilities set forth in the November 23,1988, Justice (00J)
Understanding between the NRC and the Department of r6garding cooperation concerning NRC enforcement actions, criminal prosecutionby00J,andtheexchangeofpertinentinformation4)
Having closely related statutory responsibilities with regard to nuclear-materials, facilities, and activities in the United States, the FBI and NRC must cooperate fully in carrying out their respective responsibilities in the interest of achieving:
1.
Effactive cosaunication and exchange of relevant information, and E.
A timely, reliable, and effective response to a nuclear threat incident.
II. DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this agreement, nuclear threat incidents are defined as threats, or acts of theft or sabotage in the U.S. nuclear indust,ry, including the followingt o
Theft or attempted theft of NRC-licensed special nuclear material.
Sabotage or attempted sabotage of MRC-licensed nuclear o
facilities or NRC-licensed transportation activities.
's Attacks on NRC-licensed nuclear facilities or activities.
Credible threats involving NRC licensed facilities, sitterials, or o-activities.-
-ATTACHMENT 1 Q
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'III. RESPONSIBILITIES I
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.The FBI derives the authority to investigate criminal matters related to NRC licensed facilities, materials, or activities from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Title 18, Section 831
- prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials." and other Federal statutes as may be applicable. The F3I has been designated as the lead agency for coordinating the Federal response to acts of terrorism within the United States by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) Number 207 and the National System for Emergency Coordination (NSEC).
It is therefore understood that the FBI shells 1.
Provide to NRC intelligence information concerning possible criminal acts relative to the security of nuclear facilities, materials, or activities.
Notify NRC when allegations of a serious nature arise, or 2.
derogatory information is developed involvin; licensee personnel occupying positions considered critical to tw safety and security of nuclear facilities or activities.
3.
Investigate ongoing nuclear-related threat situations; advise NRC regarding the credibility and danger of such threats.
4.
Establish 11aison and develop contingency response plans with
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pertinent local law enforcement agencies to ensure effective and coordinated law enforcement response operations.
5.
In accordance with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, conduct identification and criminal history records checks on individuals with unescorted access to NRC-licensed nuclear power plants or access to Unclassified Safeguards Infomation.
~6.
Establish liaison with pertinent NRC Headquarters staff. NRC regional offices, and licensed facilities to ensure effective information exchange, threat evaluation, and contingency response planning.
In the event of a nuclear threat incident the FBI shall:
-7.
Coordinate the Federal response to a nuclear threat incident involving NRC-licensed faci 11 tina, materials, or activities. The FBI will. rely on the NRC on matters concerning public health and safety, as they relate to the nuclear facility, material, or activity.
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8.'
Manage the law enforcement and intelligence aspects of the response to a nuclear threat incident involving MRC-licensed facilities.
materials, or activities.
9.
Establish and maintain contacts and coordinate the incident response with other Federal and local law enforcement agencies and military authorities, as appropriate.
- 10. Ensure that all reasonable measures are provided to ensu're the physical safety and security of all NRC personnel and equipment to be used in support of the incident.
- 11. Promptly provide NRC with all information applicable to an assessment of a perpetrator's operational capability to carry out a threat.
- 12. At the scene of a nuclear threat incident, provide the necessary.
support, as may be needed by NRC personnel, in carrying out assigned operations and actions to protect the public from radiological hazards.
- 13. RequestDepartmentofDefense(000)/CivilExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal (E00) resources,asappropriate.
5.
The NRC NRC shall provide, to the extent compatible with its primary mission to protect the public's health and safety, as required by the Atomic Energy
. Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, scientific and technical support to the FBI upon notification of the existence of a nuclear threat incident.
It is therefore' understood that NRC shall:
1.
Review and correlate intelligence infonnation on possible crizinal acts received from the F81; evaluate potential adversary capabilities and trends 'as a basis for rulemaking, evaluations, and systems design.
2.
When informed of an FBI investigation involving an NRC-licensed nu' lear facility or activity, will promptly provide to the FBI e
investigating office a list of all positions considered critical to the. Safety and security of that facility or activity.
3.
Establish liaison with FBI Headquarters staff and field office personnel to ensure effective information exchange, threat
' evaluation, and contingency response planning.
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4 Support joint o$erational readiness planning between licensees andlaw 4.
associated loca l
response assistance when needed at licensed facilities or activities.
5.
Notify the FBI of threats involvin3 NRC-licensed nuclear facilities, materials, or activities; assist tie FBI in evaluating the nuclear aspects and the credibility of such threats, as appropriate.
5.
Disseminate, with the approval of the FBI. to the affected licensees, alert and warning information received from the F8! about specific nuclear-related threats.
In the event of a nuclear threat incident, NRC shall:
7.-
plan for and manage the public health snd safety aspects of the response to a nuclear threat incident involving NRC-licensed facilities, materials, or activities.
8.
Provide NRC field liaison and technical assistance to the FBI at the scene of an incident.
9.
Evaluate the radiological hazards of_ the particular incident and
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provide technical assessment of any potential or actual impact upon the public health and safety, Ensure that all reasonable measures are provided for the health and 10.
safety of all FBI personnel and equipment involved in the support of the incident.
- 11. Provide for the health and safety of the public from radiological hasards.
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C.
ystn1 The FBI and NRC shall:
1.
Coordinate all proposed press releases related to nuclear threat incidents involving NRC-licensed facilities, materials, or activities.
2.
Identify individuals assigned to fulfill the positions and responsibilities outlined in Section III of tiis agreement.
- 3..
Handle all threat incident information with adequate security and confidentiality commensurate with national security guidelines and the standards for the preservation of criminal evidence.
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Review and evaluate the events leading to and occurring during a nuclear threat incident for the purpose of improving upon future joint responses.
5.
Exercise and test nuclear threat incident management procedures, equipment, and personnel.
IV. STANDARD PRDCEDURES A.
!nitia1 Notification 1.
Nuclear threat incidents involving NRC licensed facilities, materiaI's, l
or activities may be reported to either the FBI, NRC, or others.
,Upon receipt of a reported threat, the agency informed shall immediately notify the other concerned agencies about the situation and exact infomation known.
2.
The FBI and NRC will notify appropriate individuals and offices of any nuclear emergency in accordance with current procedures and agreements.
g.
points of Contact 1.
The FBI Special Agent in Charge of the responding FBI field office will take command of the field operations in a nuclear threat incident involving NRC-licensed facilities, materials, or activities.
At the Headquarters level, a Special Agent may be designated to act asaliaisonofficerwiththeNRCExecutiveTeam(ET).
The NRC Headquarters ET will convene and during the initial stage of
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the response will direct NRC activities. The Director may transfer authority for managing the NRC emergency response to the Director of Site Operations.
3.
The FBI and'NRC field representatives will coordinate 'and cooperate with each other in carrying out their respectiva responsibilities.
.The FBI and NRC representatives will report on the situation and make recommendations to their respective agencies regarding the need for additional assistance at the scene.
4.
'The' FBI and NRC will maintain points of contact with the other Federal agencies involved in responding to a nuclear threat incident involving NRC-licensed facilities, materials, or activities.
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THRCAT ASSES $ LENT NRC will provide scientific and technical advice for detemining 1.
the credibility of specific nuclear threats and potential hazards associated with those threats.
.NRC will endeavor to verify. with the cooperation of the 2.
Department of Energy and/or the Department of Defense, whether any source material, special nuclear material, or radioactive by-products, are missing or unaccounted for.
VI. FUNDING RESPONS!81LITIES Interested parties will each fund for the cost incurred in providing the necessary assistance required to meet the responsibilities defined in this MOU.
VII. TERMS 0F AGREEMENT This Agreement will become effective immediately upon signature by 1.
all parties and'shall continue in effect unless terminated by any party upon 120 days notice in writing to all other parties.
2.
Amendments or modifications to this Agreement may be made upon written notice by all parties to the Agreement.
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For Federal Bureau of Investigation t
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ATTACHMENT 2 l
NOT RELEASED
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