ML20249B131
| ML20249B131 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1998 |
| From: | William Reckley NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Hutchinson C ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| References | |
| TAC-MA1716, NUDOCS 9806220092 | |
| Download: ML20249B131 (5) | |
Text
Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson Juna 17,1998 Vice President, Operations ANO
- Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S. R. 333 Russellville, AR 72801
SUBJECT:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR '
ONE, UNIT 1 (ANO-1) PERTAINING TO ROTATION SCHEDULE FOR TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (TAC NO. MA1716)
Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
By letter dated April 28,1998. Entergy Operations, Inc., (EOl) submitted a change to Facility Operating License No. DPR-51, Appendix A - Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Section 4.1," Operational Safety items." The change consists of removing a detailed rotation schedule for the testing of the reactor protection system (i.e., Channel A one week after startup, Channel B two weeks after startup, and so on) and the addition of a narrative that explains that a rotation schedule will be established to satisfy the surveillance requirements of TS 4.1. An editorial change, the addition of a heading for the Bases section of TS 4.1, was also included in your letter. EOl performed an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and determined that the changes do not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. The staff has no objection to this Bases change. Enclosed are the affected TS pages,67e and 68.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
William Reckley, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects lil/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-313
Enclosure:
TS Pages 67e and 68 cc w/ encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File PUBLIC PD4-1 r/f C. Hawes T. Gwynn, RIV W. Reckley OGC ACRS E. Adensam (EGA1) i J.Hannon l
Document Name: AR1A1716.LTR
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 30eeH001 June 17, 1998 Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson Vice President, Operations ANO Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S. R. 333 Russellville, AR 72801 SUSJECT:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
(
ONE, UNIT 1 (ANO-1) PERTAINING TO ROTATION SCHEDULE FOR TESTING l
OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (TAC NO. MA1716)
Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
By letter dated April 28,1998, Entergy Operations, Inc., (EOI) submitted a change to Facility Operating Ucense No. DPR-51, Appendix A - Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Section 4.1, " Operational Safety items." The change consists of removing a detailed rotation schedule for the testing of the reactor protection system (i.e., Channel A one week after startup, Channel B two weeks after startup, and so on) and the addition of a narrative that explains that a l
rotation schedule will be established to satisfy the surveillance requirements of TS 4.1. An editorial change, the addition of a heading for the Bases section of TS 4.1, was also included in your letter. EOl performed an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and determined that the changes do not involvs an Unreviewed Safety Question. The staff has no objection to this Bases change. Enclosed are the affected TS pages,67e and 68.
i Sincerely, i
William Reckley, Project Mgr Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-313
Enclosure:
TS Pages 67e and 68 cc w/ encl: See next page
- - - _ _. _ _ ~. - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ -. - _ _ _ _ - -. _ _
3 Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson Entergy Operatens, Inc.
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 cc:
Executive Vice President
' Vice President, Operations Support
& Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
Entergy Operatens, Inc.
P. O. Box 31995 P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995
~ Jackson, MS 39286-199 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway Drector, Division of Radiation P. O. Box 651 Control and Emergency Management Jackson, MS 39205 Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street, Slot 30 Little Rock, AR 72205 3867 Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
- Manager, Rockville Nuclear Licensing Frematone Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, MD 20852 Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 310 London, AR 72847 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Reguictory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 County Judge of Pope County Pope County Courthouse Russellville, AR 72801 l
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BASES (continu d)
Under the terns of this specification, the more restrictive requirements of the Technical Specifications take precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. The requirements of Specification 4.0.4 to perform surveillance activities before entry into an operational mode or other specified condition takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows pumps and valves to be tested up to one week after return to normal operation. The Technical Specification definition of OPERABLE does not allow a grace period before a component, that is not capable of perforndng its specified function, is dec? si.ed inoperable and takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows a valve to be incapable of performing its specified function for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before being declared inoperable.
4.1 Bases l
Check Failures such as blown instrument fuses, defective indicators, faulted amplifiers which result in " upscale" or "downscale" indication can be I
easily recognized by simple observation of the functioning of an
' instrument or system, furthermore, such failures are, in many cases, revealed by alarm or annunciator Action.
Comparison of output and/or state of independent channels measuring the same variable supplements this type of built-in surveillance.
Based on experience in operation of both conventional and nuclear plant systens, when the plant is in operation, the minimum checking frequency stated is deemed adequate for reactor system instrumentation.
Calibration Calibration shall be performed to assure the presentation and acquisition of accurate information. The nuclear flux (power range) channels shall be l
calibrated at least twice weekly (during steady state operating conditions) against a heat balance standard to compensate for instrumentation drift.
During nonsteady state operation, the nuclear flux channels shall be calibrated daily to compensate for instrumentation drift and changing rod patterns and core physics parameters.
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Amendment No. 161 67e Revised by NRC Letter Dated 6/l7/90
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Othar chtnnals era cubject only to " drift" errors inducad within tha l
instrumentation itself and, consequently, can tolerate longer intervals between calibrations. Process system instrumentation errors induced by drift can be expected to remain within acceptable tolerances if recalibration is performed once every 18 months.
Substantial calibration shifts within a channel (essentially a channel failure) will be revealed during routine checking and testing procedures.
Thus, minimum calibration frequencies for the nuclear flux (power range) channels, and once every 18 months for the process system channels is considered acceptable.
Testing On-line testing of reactor protective channel and EFIC channels is required once every 4 weeks on a rotational or staggered basis. The rotation scheme is designed to reduce the probability of an undetected failure existing within the system and to minimize the likelihood of the same systematic test errors being introduced into each redundant channel.
All reactor protective channels will be tested before startup if the individual channel rotational frequency has been discontinued or if outage activities could potentially have affected the operability of one or more channels. A rotation will then be established to test the first Channel one week after startup, the second Channel two weeks after startup, the third Channel three weeks after startup, and the fourth Channel four weeks after startup.
The established reactor protective system instrumentation and EFIC test cycle is continued with one channel's instrumentation tested each week.
j Upon detection of a failure that prevents trip action, all instrumentation associated with the protective channels will be tested after which the rotational test cycle is started again.
If actuation of a safety channel occurs, assurance will be required that actuation was within the limiting safety system setting.
The protective channels coincidence logic and control rod drive trip breakers are trip tested every four weeks. The trip test checks all logic combinations and is to be performed on a rotational basis. The logic and breakers of the four protective channels shall be trip tested prior to startup and their individual channels trip tested on a cyclic basis.
I Discovery of a failure requires the testing of all channel logic and l
breakers, af ter which the trip test cycle is started again.
i Amendment No. G6,91 68
.>evised by NRC Letter Dated 6/17/98 l
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