ML20248M152
| ML20248M152 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1998 |
| From: | Curry D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUM2-PPNR-1546, NUDOCS 9806150090 | |
| Download: ML20248M152 (36) | |
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PARSONS Daniel L. Curry, Vee President, Nuclear Services Parsons Energy & Chernicals Group inc.
2075 Morgantown Road + Reading. Pennsylvania 19607 + (610) 855-2366 + Far (610) 855-2602 June 8,1998 Docket No. 50-336 Parsons NUM2-PPNR-1546-MM U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 2 Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP)
Gentlemen:
This letter transmits summaries of telephone conferences between Parsons Power Group Inc., the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NNECo and NEAC on May 5, May 7, May 12, May 14, May 19, May 21, May 26 and May 28,1998.
Please call me at (610) 855-2366 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
-WY Daniel L. Curry Parsons ICAVP Project Director DLC:djv Attachments 1.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 5,1998 2.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 7,1998 3.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 12,1998 4.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 14,1998 5.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 19,1998 6.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 21,1998
-vvvv7 7.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 26,1998 h
i 8.
Telephone Conference Notes from May 28,1998 j
l cc:
E. Imbro (2)- USNRC J. Fougere - NNECo R. Laudenat - NNECo Rep. Terry Concannon - NEAC Project Files l
l 9906150090 990609 PPNR1546. doc OE PDR ADOCK 05000336 p
PDR 1
i
4 CONFERENCE NOTES May 5,1998 DATE:
5/5/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
1.
ESAS Sequencer Logic 2.
MSLB Analysis 3.
Radiological Consequences Calculations l
l LIST OF ATTENDEES:
.NNEco NRC NEAC Parsons Fred Mattioli Bryan llughes Wayne Dobson David Bajumpaa Don Marks Dan Lowell Rich Glaviano Keith DesLandes Michael Otw Cris Cristallo Ken Mayers Paul Shipper Juan Cajigas Dick Cronk 1.
Topic: ESAS Sequencer Logic (Ken Mayers)
Background:
As a follow up to our 4/23/98 conference with respect to Topic #10 concerning the ESAS sequencer logic shown on 25203-28150 Sh3 Rev 3:
Questions:
a) If the under-voltage signal to start the sequencer timers is " latched", why does the circuit use a " seal-in" to maintain a " logic 1" output?
b) What is the Millstone Unit 2 test and/or procedure that demonstrates a SIAS signal that occurs at any time afler the Sequencer has begun to operate, due to a loss of power only (under-voltage), will reset the sequencer to zero and begin to sequence equipment actuated by the B modules in accordance with Specification 7604-M-480 Section 6.67
Response
a) Drawing 23203-28130 sht 3 Rev 3 with respect to the seal-ir: logic is incorrect and NNECo has initiated CR-A12-98-1247 (CR number wasprovided to Parsons after the call).
b) NNECo indicated that currently, the diesels and associated logic is procedural checkedfor concurrent SILNP only which is in conformance uith the current Tech Spec. Testing is conducted in accordance with procedures SP-2613 G & H During NNEco review of 96-01, Blackout followed by SIAS, was identJied as not being tested but was identtfied as a potential concern by NNECo (CR-A12-97-0822, trackedby AR-97-011-960 Assign 4) requiring further review.
2.
Tcpic: MSLB Analysis (Juan Cajigas)
Background:
ABB vesiculation no. 006-ST97-C-024 documents the most recent version of the MP2 Containment Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) analysis. This version is being used in the Tier 2 resiew of this postulated accident. We would like to make sure we understand the analysis inputs, assumptions, and methodology before we begin final validation of critical characteristics.
PAGE 1
a f
CONFERENCE NOTES May 5,1998 Questions:
a) The SGNill feedwater flow model assumes FW flow as two times normal from time zero to isolation. The time to FW isolation takes into account the time to CHPS and thus requires a preliminary run to determine the time to CHPS. The time to CHPS is not directly documented in the 006-ST97-C-024 calculation but is provided in pp 84 for Cases 6, i1. and 16. It appears that the FW inputs for FVLTBL(3), as listed on pp 54, are not consistent with the Cases 6,11, and 16 time to CHPS data. Please document the basis for the FW model FVLTBL(3) data used in all the non-zero power cases.
b) Is the feedwater flow defined by card 105 for the un-affected SG and that in card 106 for the affected SG? If so, what is the basis for the assumed feedwater flows for the un-affected SG7 c) is the AFW flow specified on card 160 applicable to both SGs? If so, what is the basis for its applicability to the non-affected SG7 d) The CAR performance data used in 006-ST97-C-024 is based on PROTO-POWER calculation 97-120 Rev, B. Calculation 97-120 models the CAR performance assuming that each CAR can remove 80 MBTUH (per the CAR data sheet) plus a PROTO-POWER calculated condensation rate. The calculated condensation rate, when added to the design heat removal rate, results in a CAR total heat removal rate of about 100 MBTUH.
The new CAR total heat removal rate (heat removed from containment vapor) is 25% higher than the design rate used in previous containment MSLB analyses. How is the new CAR total heat removal rate justified?
e) The RBCCW HX performance used in 006-ST97-C-024 is based on the HX design data as provided by NU in NE-97-SAB-226 Rev.l. From this data, an overall heat transfer coefficient (U) for the RBCCW HX is calculated. The calculation of the RBCCW HX's U in 006-ST97-C-024 uses a Senice Water inlet temperature of 77'F but the design data'used in the calculation is based on 75'F. This results in what appears to be a non-conservative value for U. What is the justification for using 77 F Senice Water temperature in
. the calculation of the RBCCW HX design U?
f) The 8 SG safety valves are modeled in the SGNill code as a single valve with an equivalent area to account for the 8 valves. In addition, the model's valve opening is set with an opening setpoint pressure and a dP to
- achieve full valve opening. Is the equivalent area opened linearly based on the on-set opening and the full opening dP? Based on the objective on the MSLB containment analysis is it consen'ative to minimize the j
valves relief flow rate and maximize its opening setpoints?
- g) The NU design input for this parameter indicates a full open rated flow for all 8 valves of 6,099,344 lbm/hr at 1098 psia.. This value is based on 762,418 lbm/hr/ valve flow rate and accounts for valve inlet piping losses.
It appears that SGNIll does not model the valve inlet piping. Is the rated flow based on 1098 psia at the valve inlet or at the SG dome? Where in the SGNill model is the safety valve "lacated"? What is the basis for the valve area calculation on page 81 of 006-ST97-C-024, i.e, why is the 1098 psia rated flow basis pressure not used?
1 m
l -
' h) One of the single failures evaluated in this analysis is stated as " failure of VA10(20)", Please define which i
components are assumed to be failed under this condition. A list of ramps, valves, instruments, etc. not available for accident mitigation is desired.
.l
Response
a) Deferredto 50/98.
j b) ' Yes. Assumedflow to un-apectedSG is conservative, i.e. maximi:es energy to qfected SG.
{
c) No, onlyto afectedSG.
d) Deferred to 50/98.
i e) Deferredto 50/98.
PAGE 2
= _ - __-__ __ _ _ ______ ____ - _ -_
__-___ _ _--_ _ - ______-_ ____ _ ___- _ - - - - _ ______ _ _ - __ a
CONFERENCE NOTES May 5,1998 Response Continued:
f) SG modeled with a % ear opening. Afinimizing the rehefflow rate and maximaing the opening setpoints is conservative.
g) Deferred to 3/7/98.
b) List will be providedper RAI request. In addition, it was explained that the Fast Transfer Failure " fails" the fast transfer ofthe 24C and 24D buses.
3.
Topic: Radiological Consequences Calculations (Juan Cajigas)
Background:
The calculation trail for the Radiological Consequences of Design Basis Accident appears to be complex. Before Parsons starts validating Tier 2 critical characteristics, we would like to discuss our understanding of what are the calculations of record for each of the accidents. The following summaries were developed from the calculations we believe to be the calculations of record for the Radiological Consequences of the DBA described in FSAR Chapter 14.8.4. The summary also indicates areas where we have not found information.
SUMMARY
OF CALCULATED POST-ACCIDENT DOSES TO UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS Accident Source Of Thyroid Whole Body Beta Skin Calculation Exposure Dose Gamma Dose Dose Reference (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
MPI-LOO
- Irmersion 22.7 0.0161 0.245 81-115-50RA, Rev 3 (TB Purge t%s)
Shine n/a 0.0910 n/a xx-xxx-38RA, Rev 0 TOTAL 0.107 MPI-MSLB Immersion 25.2 0.390 6.50 M2CRMSLB.Oll78 R2, Rev 0 Shine n/a not found n/a Not Found TOTAL
???
MP2-LOCA Immersion 11.1 0.0206 0.266 M2CRM2-Oll56-R2, Rev o (LWS)
Shine n/a 0.941 n/a xx-xxx-38RA, Rev o (1 Filter Train)
TOTAL 0.962 MP2-LOCA Immersion 25.2 0.0155 0.260 M2CRM211W.0ll64-R2, Rev 0 (HWS)
Shine n/a 0.941 n/a xx-xxx-38RA, Rev 0 (1 Filter Train)
TOTAL 0.957 MP3-LOCA Immersion + Shine 10.3 2.39 8.21 M2CRM3-Ol l46-R2, Rev o NOTE: The above MP2 control room dose results were obtained from the MP2 calculations of record and do
.not necessarily agree with the results given in Table 14.8.4-8 of the MNPS-2 FSAR.
PAGE 3
i e
CONFERENCE NOTES May 5,1998
SUMMARY
OF CALCULATED MP2 POST-ACCIDENT OFFSITE DOSES CASE A - LOW WIND SPEED SITE BOUNDARY LOW POPULATION ZONE CONDITIONS Accident Source Of Activity Thyroid Whole Body Calculation Thyroid Whole Body Calculation Release Dose Gamma Dose Reference Dose Gamma Dose Reference (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage 150.95 3.84 xx-xxx-10RA 56.32 1.43 xx-xu-10RA, Rev 1
,,,,",',} gg, (Hydrogen ESF Leakage 0.80 0.0023
- *** 27RA Rn D 0.78 0.0017 Purge Not TOTAL 151.8 3.84 Rev0 57.I 1.43 Included)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage 150.95 3.84 n xu 10RA 35.53 0.0599 78-77217RA Rev 3
,,,,"',"2 RA (7000 cfm ESF Leakage 0.80 0.0023
- ***-27RA Rev 0 0.78 0.0017 liydrogen TOTAL 151.8 3.84 Rev0 36.3 0.062 Purge included)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage 150.95 3.84 n-xn-10RA 11.05 0.0144 78-772-17RA Rev 3
..,,",'j g (50 cfm ESF Leakage 0.80 0.0023
- ***-27RA Rn 0 0.78 0.0017 Hydrogen TOTAL 151.8 3.84 Rev0 11.8 0.016 Purge included)
CASE B -IIIGII WIND SPEED SITE BOUNDARY LOW POPULATION ZONE CONDITIONS Accident Source Of Activity Thyroid Whole Body ' Calculation Thyroid Whole Body Calculation Release Dose Gamma Dose Reference Dose Gamma Dose Reference (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage Not Not Not Not Not Not (Hydrogen ESF Leakage Found Found Found Found Found Found Purge Not TOTAL Included)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage Not Not Not Not Not Not (Hydrogen ESF Leakage Found Found Found Found Found Found Purge TOTAL Included)
NOTE: The above MP2 off-site dose results were obtained from the MP2 calculations of record and do not necessarily agree with the results given in MNPS-2 FSAR Table 14.8.4-2.
Questions:
a) Please confirm if the information summarized above reflects the " calculations of record" for the identified accidents.
b) The MPI-MSLB calculation corresponding to the direct shine component of the whole body dose was not found. Is this calculation available or is this term documented as negligible?
c) Which calculation (s) supports the Site Boundary Dose for High Wind conditions as reported in the FSAR?
Response: Deferredto 5'7/98.
PAGE 4
CONFERENCE NOTES M y 7,1998 DATE-5/7/98 l
PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
L 1.
PDCR 2-100-86 2.
PDCR 2-100-86 3.
Licensing Basis for Check Valve Single Active Failure l
4.
Maintenance Procedure MP 2702E l
5.
MSLB Analysis 6.
Use of NF-3231.l(C),1977 Code 7.
Failed Snubber - Piping System Operability Determinatiort
)
8.
DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES 9.
Engineered Safety Features Room (ESF) Fire Dampers LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Bob Skwirz Steve Reynolds Wayne Dobson Dave Bajumpa Don Marks Gary Komosky Dan Wooddell John Lockaby Rich Glaviano Steve Stadnick Dom Ramos Jim Nicholson Jack Lawton Clark Maxson Ken Gabel Bo Pokora Gordon Collier Mike Akins Bill Clemenson 1.
Topic: PDCR 2-100-86 (Jack Lawton) l
Background:
This PDCR replaced the existing diesel generator type CFD differential current relays, which were determined to be not seismically qualified, with seismically qualified type IJD relays. In the DESIGN INPUTS j-section of the PDCR a Bypass Jumper [2-86-107(1-3)] was indicated. The JUMPER-LIFTED LEAD-BYPASS CONTROL SHEET in the mod package shows the bypassjumper as lifted leads at the phase A, B and C terminals l.
of the relay case in the "A" diesel generator breaker A312. There does not appear to be a similar control sheet for i
the "B" diesel generator breaker (A401) relays. The ceavol sheet indicates the temporary wiring modifications l
were made, but there is no sign-offindicating restorrhon of the relay circuitry to original configuration. There is nothing in the PDCR detailing the installation of thejumpers (or lifted leads), or their purpose. The l
IMPLEMENTATION section of the PDCR states,"Once the replacement relay are installed, and the diesel generator test nm, Bypass Jumper #2-86-107(1-3) shall be removed and closed".
Questions:
a) Werejumpers installed or leads lifted as part of the implementation of this modification 7 l
L b) If so, what, specifically, was done?
c) If temporary wiring modifications were made, why were they indicated to be removed after the diesel generator test run, and were they actually removed and the relay circuits restored to original configuration upon completion of the mod?
d) If so, does signed-off documentation of restoration exist?
PAGE 1
e CONFERENCE NOTES May 7,1998
Response
a) No.
b) 7he CFD relays were physically removedfrom their cases at the switchgear.
c) 7here were no physical wiring modifications done, and original circuit configuration was restored when the new relays were installed, which was before test runs were made.
d) Yes, and should be available upon request.
2.
Topic: PDCR 2-100-86 (Jack Lawton)
Background:
The mod package contains drawings 32041, sheets 1&2,30005 and 30006. The drawings are ES illegible, but have circled areas pertaining to the differential relays.
Questions:
a) Do the circled areas indicate drawing revisions?
b) If so, what document accomplished this?
Response
a) No. The circled a eas identth the areas afected by the modfor information only, b) There were no changes; therefore, there is no document.
3.
Topic: Licensing Basis for Check Valve Single Active Failure (Wayne Dobson / Larry Collier)
Background:
We would like to discuss w hat is the Millstone Unit 2 licensing basis for single active failure as it relates to check valves. During recent interna' discussions, we vaguely recall that during an on-site meeting Mike Ahern indicated Millstone Unit 2 has unique licensing requirements regarding the need to postulate a check valve failure.
- In particular we are concerned about Charging System check valves 2-CH-432 and 2-CH-433. These valves must change from the open to the closed position during a HELB out side containment in order to prevent a large amount, (i.e. everal hundreds of gallons) of reactor coolant release outside containment. During the 4/30/98 ccnference, NNECo stated that the HELB analysis is not required to assume these check valves fail. We were surprised at this response as this is not consistent with other nuclear power plants Parsons is familiar with. (other plants use double or triple check valves in this situation).
In a May 10,1974 Millstone Unit 2 SER, Section 3.10.4 (page 3-18)it gives an example of a ASME Class 1,2, or 3 valve " active" function as value closure or opening to safely shutdown the plant or mitigate the consequences of an accident. Since check valves 2-CH 432 and 2-CH-433 must change from the open to the closed position to mitigate the consequences of a HELB, we would have thought it should be subject to single active failure criteria.
Questions:
a) Please explain the Millstone Unit 2 licensing basis for single active failure as it relates to check valves and please provide the identification of the written design and licensing basis ifit is different from SER 3.10.4,1974.
PAGE 2
e CONFERENCE NOTES Mry 7,1998 Respense: MP2 has a position that all check valves are passive devices. FS1R section 6.3Al was referenced as supporting evidence. Note: 7he reference (FStR 6.3A1) only applies to the safety injection system.
4.
Topic: Maintenance Procedure MP 2702E (Dan Wooddell)
Background:
Maintenance Procedure MP 2702E2, Steps 4.1.7, 4.1.10, 4.8.2, and 4.8.4 direct the user to perform a " Level E Inspection" when removing or reinstalling a purge isolation valve. The phrase " Level E Inspection" is not defined in the procedure and was not found in other procedures.
Questions:
a) What prerequisites must be met and what inspection criteria are utilized during the performance of a " Level E Inspection.7 Response: A " Level Reinspection"is a cleanliness inspection. Procedure MP 2702E2, Rev. 5, was issued on.I.
29-98. The revisedprocedure dropped the " Level E" requirements and directs the user to perform an inspection os specifiedin the A WO.
5.
Topic: MSLB Analysis (hsan Cajigas)(Continued from 5/5/98)
Background:
ABB calculation no. 006-ST97-C-024 documents the most recent version of the MP2 Containment Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) analysis. This version is being used in the Tier 2 review of this postulated accident. We would like to make sure we understand the analysis inputs, assumptions, and methodology before we begin final validation of critical characteristics.
Questions:
a) The SGNill feedwater flow model assumes FW flow as two times normal from time zero to isolation. The time to FW isolation takes into account the time to CHPS and thus requires a preliminary run to determine the time to CHPS. The time to CHPS is not directly documented in the 006-ST97-C-024 calculation but is provided in pp 84 for Cases 6,11, and 16. It appears that the FW inputs for FVLTBL(3), as listed on pp 54, are not consistent with the Cases 6,11, and 16 time to CHPS data. Please document the basis for the FW model FVLTBL(3) data used in all the non-zero power cases.
b) N/A. Answered on 5/5/98.
c) N/A. Answered on 5/5/98.
d) The CAR performance data used in 006-ST97-C-024 is based on PROTO-POWER calculation 97-120 Rev.
B. Calculation 97-120 models the CAR performance assuming that each CAR can remove 80 MBTUH (per the CAR data sheet) plus a PROTO-POWER calculated condensation rate. The calculated condensation rate, when added to the design heat removal rate, results in a CAR total heat removal rate of about 100 MBTUH.
The new CAR total heat removal rate (heat removed from containment vapor) is 25% higher than the design rate used in presious containment MSLB analyses. How is the new CAR total heat removal ratejustified?
I e) The RBCCW IIX performance used in 006-ST97-C-024 is based on the HX design data as prosided by NU in NE-97-SAB-226 Rev.l. From this data, an overall heat transfer coefficient (U) for the RBCCW HX is calculated. The calculation of the RBCCW HX's U in 006-ST97-C-024 uses a Senice Water inlet temperature of 77'F but the design data used in the calculation is based on 75 F. This results in what appears to be a non-conservative value for U. What is the justification for using 77 F Senice Water temperature in the calculation of the RBCCW HX design U7 l
f) N/A. Answered on 5/5/98.
PAGE 3 E_____-------_-_
o
i CONFERENCE NOTES May 7,1998 g) The NU design input for this parameter indicates a full open rated flow for all 8 valves of 6,099,344 lbmihr at 1098 psia. This value is based on 762,418 lbm/hr/ valve flow rate and accounts for valve inlet piping losses.
It appears that SGNill does not model the valve inlet piping. Is the rated flow based on 1098 psia at the valve inlet or at the SG dome? Where in the SGNill model is the safety valve " located"? What is the basis for the valve area calculation on page 81 of 006-ST97-C-024, i.e, why is the 1098 psia rated flow basis pressure not used?
h) N/A. Answered on 5/5/98.
Response
a) Inputs based on previous AfSLB analyses. NU to provide Table oftime CHPS data per Parsons RAI.
b) N/A.
c) A%f.
d) NU bel.s ves new CAR input of about 100 AIBTUH is consistent with previous analyses. Parsons will submit RAIto get a writtenjustylcation.
e) Calculation is in error, input shouldhave been 75F. Impact deemedminor,
- 1) N/A.
g) SGNill model assumes valve at SG dome. Pressure drop calcu!ation assumes 1098 psia at SG dome. 1998 pressure correction was omitted by error. Impact deemed minor.
h) N/A.
6.
Topic: Use of NF-3231.l(C),1977 Code (Ken Gabel)
(;
Background:
Documentation within issue 14 of Piping Stress Problem #25 (7914 reanalysis), dated 2/81, referenced paragraph NF-3231.l(C) of the 1977 ASME Section 111 Code in defining pipe support design load l
l combination equations for Faulted and Normal plus Upset design conditions. Licensing basis for this piping system is USAS B31.1.0 - 1967. The 1.E.Bulletin 79-14 Procedures P-001 (As-Built Implementation Procedure),
P-002 (Pipe Support Design) and P-003 (Pipe Stress Analysis) do not address the implementation of NF-3231.l(C),1977 for the Millstone Unit 2 facility.
Question:
a) What is the basis for using paragraph NF-3231.l(C) of the 1977 ASME Section III Code?
Response: LER 97-029, dated 8/26/97, was issued to document discovery ofthe application ofparagraph NF-3231.l(C) 1977 Code. Corrective actions are being tracked by CR 's Af2-97-1791 (Alain Steam) and A12-97-1979 (Feedwater). Code reconciliation was notperformed and application was not appropriate.
7.-
Topic: Failed Snubber - Piping System Operability Determination (Ken Gabel) i
Background:
UIR-2948 discussion focused on. "the fact that a postulated event has not occurred is not a valid I
reason for concluding that the piping is operable". Reference is made to calculation #78-721-125GM as representing valid methodology for making operability assessments. This calc addresses snubber functional j
acceptance criteria, specifically redefining applicable operating ranges.
l PAGE 4
CONFERENCE NOTES May 7,1998 Questions:
a) If the smycillance test lockup acceleration values fall outside the procedural acceptance ranges, is the piping system deemed inoperable?
b) How were personnel informed and what was communicated to them with respect to valid reasons for operability determinations?
Response: Deferredto 5/14/98.
8.
Topic: DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES (Bill Clemenson)
Background:
One of the Purposes for this cale is determine the cooling requirements for the DGV system during the summer with the EDG's on line. It is concluded that a minimum of 23,300 cfm of outside air at 86 F is required with a 20% recirculation rate. Review of section 8.6 indicates that this 23,300 cfm is not of outside air that could be measured at the intake or in the ductwork, but is that hypothetical ponion of the intake that has not been short circuited from the adjacent exhaust louver. The calc includes a value for 30% recirculation rate and the states that total flow rate will need to be 33,285 cfm. Recent measurements of Train B indicate that the for summer mode of operation the total flow is 31,744 cfm.
Questions:
S a) Conclusion 3.4.1 states that the minimum outside air flow rate is 23,300 cfm. What is the definition of outside air as it is used her and how is this measured?
b) What is the assumed volume of short circuited exhaust air for each train?
c) Has the short circuited volume been measured since the system was modified by DCR 970057 Response: Deferredto 5/14/98.
9 Topic: Engineered Safety Features Room (ESP) Fire Dampers (Dom Ramos)
Background:
References:
1.
Fire Hazard Analysis, Rev 3 Dec.1992 2.
Dwg. 25203-26028 sht 4, Rev 8 3.
Dwg. 25203-29126 sht 48, Rev 2 4.
Dwg. 25203-29126 sht 60 Rev 4 According to Reference 1, the enclosure for ESF Room C and the Wall @ Col.18.1 between ESF Room A and B are 3 hr-fire rated barriers. The EBFS exhaust duct penetrates the ceiling of ESF Room C and the wall @ Col.
18.1 (Reference 3). The ESF Room A Recirculation Unit supply & return ducts penetrate the wall of ESF Room C and wall @ Col.18.1 (Reference 4). The ESF Room B Recirculation Unit supply & return ducts penetrate the wall of ESF Room C (Reference 4).
The aforementioned penetrations do not have 3 hr-fire dampers. Note that the Auxiliary Bldg. Ventilation System supply and exhaust ducts penetrating the same barriers have fire dampers.
PAGE5
CONFERENCE NOTES Mry 7,1998 Questions:
a) Please explain why fire dampers are not provided.
b) is there a document that justifies the absence of fire dampers in the subject fire barriers?
Response: UIR 1082 (AR 97008038) identified the problem with missingfire dampers in the ESFroomfire barriers. According to NU, the ongoing Appendix R boundary review and the 86-10 Evaluation will address the needforfire dampers. Initial 86-10 Evaluation indicated thatfire dampers are not required due to lowfire loading in the ESFrooms.
l l
l I-I~
PAGE 6 l
i CONFERENCE NOTES May 12,1998 DATE:
5/12/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
1.
Calculations 97-DES-1537-M2 and 97-DES-1536-M2
- 2. Structural Acceptability and Documentation ofIndividual and Cumulative Effects of Cut Reinforcing in Concrete Structures 3.
PDCR 2-046-90 4.
IIELB Program 5.
IIELB Status LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Panons Bob Skwitz Rich McIntyre Wayne Dobson Roy Terry Don Marks Steve Wainio Dom Ramos Gregg Tardif Jim Giova Chris Scully Rich Freeman Mark Suprenant I,arry Wigley 1.
Topic: Calculations 97-DES-1537-M2 and 97-DES-1536-M2 (Dom Ramos)
Background:
During the 4/16/98 Telephone Conference, NU stated that the subject calculations are active and were inadvertently annotated as being " VOID" by the EWR#96-0105 Status Report.
RAI-1425 requested copies of the calculations. NU's response, M2-IRF-01641, noted that the calculations have been canceled.
Questions:
a) Please resolve the conflicting information.
Response: The subject calculations will be voided. Information containedin these calculations will be included in revision 1 ofcalculation 97-ENG-1805-M2.
2.
Topic: Structural Acceptability and Documentation ofIndividual and Cumulative EfTects of Cut Reinforcing in Concrete Structures (Jim Giova)
Background:
NCR 2-95-79 documented a "Usc-As-Is" disposition for cut concrete reinforcing bar in steam generator # l's enclosure wall. The conc te reinforcing bars were cut while installing base plates for pipe support 25203-312017. The NCR does not rekrence any technical evaluation to assess the impact on the original design basis calculation.
UIR # 3291 addresses the fact that DCN 638-83 does not address the scismic adequacy of allowing up to 5 concrete reinforcing bars to be cut.
Neither of these two cut rebar instances reference a cut rebar program.
Questions:
a) How does NNECo document the location of cut reinforcing and assess the cumulative effects on the design margin of concrete structures when reinforcing bars are cut?
PAGE 1
O CONFERENCE NOTES May 12,1998 o
1 Response: NNECo does not have a formalprogram to document the location and assess the accumulative efects ofcut concrete reinforcing bars. However, NNECo has two common maintenance procedures that are in place to prevent the cutting of concrete reinforcing bars. The frst is O(P 718E Core Boring or Drilling Penetrations and the second is OfP 713B, Installation of Concrete Anchors. Both of these procedures require the use ofgroundfault interrupters on the concrete drills that would stop the drill when embedded metal is contacted.
Procedure OiP 718Efor core bores requires maintenance to stop work and obtain engineering approval to cut rcbar. De cut rebar approval would be documented on an DCN accompanied by a technical evaluation or calculation. The basisfor the calculation or evaluation wouldbe work historiesfor drilling in that area.
Procedure aIP 7.'3E requires that, upon contact with embedded metal, the pilot hole is moved to avoid rebar, if maintenance can n atfnd a location to avoid rebar, engineering is contacted. In this case, the base plate would I
be redesigned to miss the embedded reinforcing bar.
1 Steve stated that he has not authorized the cutting of reinforcing bar since he became in charge of his group, I
approximately 1994.
3.
Topic: PDCR 2-046-90 (Rich Freeman)
Background:
This PDCR replaced 2-DG-64 with a relief valve manufactured by a different company than the original valve. The new valve is manufactured by the Kunkle company. 2-DG-64 is a QA Category I application.
The Kunkle valve was purchased as a commercial grade item then dedicated for safety-related ser ice by CGDF
- MP2-0171. M2-RAl-01421 requested a copy of CGDF #MP2-0171 and was received under M2-IRF-01620.
After a quick review, it became apparent that CGDF #MP2-0171 did not apply to Kunkle valves but to Hilti bolts.
Questions:
a) What is the CGDF number for the Kunkle safety relief valve used to replace 2-DG-647 Resporse: The CGDFnumber referencedin the PDCRfor the Knuckle valves is corrected. Inat happened was
- that two CGDFs were given the same number. De Knuckle valve CGDF has been located and a copy will be provided as an addendum to A12-RAI-01421.
4.
Topic: HELB Program (Gary Jackson)
]
Background:
N/A Questions:
a) CR 97-0933 is currently open. What is the status and scheduled completion date for closure of the CR7 l
b) Will LER 98-005 be rolled into this CR7 If not, what is the scheduled completion date for the corrective action of the LER?
Response: CR-97-0933 is scheduled to be closed aper restart. The walkdown portion of the CR should be done by the end ofJune. LER 98-005 will not be rolled into this CR.. Walkdowns associated with the LER are done.
Currently NNECo is completing the walkdown documentation and technical evaluations which should be complete this week. Results ofwalkdowns: The steam generator blowdown line and the steam generator sample line have problems. A LER supplement will be issued to address this. NNECo expects either hardware or analysis changes Possible hardware change is addition ofisolation valves. Possible analysis change is leak before break, which would require a change in the licensing basis. A plan of action should befinalized within a few weeks.
PAGE 2
t CONFERENCE NOTES M:y 12,1998
' 5.
. Topic: HELB Status (Gary Jackson)
Background:
N/A Questions: What is the status and scheduled completion date of the following:
' a) HELB interactions outside containment?
b) ~ Compartment pressurization analysis of the Enclosure Building as it relates to a HELB Main Steam Line
- Break?
c) - Flooding analyses as it relates to HELB7.
Response
a) Approximately 5% ofinteractions are still open. A majority ofthese are expected to be acceptable, butfinal piping reanalyzes needs to be completed. Review ofHELB interactions outside containment is expected to be
- complete by 6/15/98.
b) Completed last week. NNECo did not have the anaysis nu&r available. Parsons should reference this conference call when preparing an RAIfor the analysis. The results are provided as temperature and pressures by area. Parsons should also askfor Information to correlate these areas to actualplant locations.
c) Not much has changedsince the last update. As indicated to Parsonspreviously, flooding calculations have been completed and modifications are in progress. A review ofimpacts to plant equipment as a result of the ffoodhas notstarted..
l' I
I I
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i PAGE 3 i
a-__=_____-______'
___ 2_-_
CONFERENCE NOTES May 14,1998 DATE:
f/14/98 PURPOSE:
Te'ephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
1.
Vendor Manuals 2.
Digital Comparator Setpoints 3.
F39A/B Fan Assemblies 4.
Failed Snubber - Piping System Operability Determination 5.
DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNEco NRC NEAC Parsons Bob Skwirz Ralph Architzel Wayne Dobson Marcel Ranieri Don Marks Jim Petrosky Claude Didier Jim Nicholson Ken Gabel Cris Cristallo Tom larris Andre Lassonde Billi lemenson Dan Von Duvne Gregg Tardif Wadie Girgis 1.
Topic: Vendor Manuals (Claude Didier)
Background:
RAI response number M2-IRF-01543 provided a list of Millstone Unit 2 vendor manuals for items on the Key Safety Related Equipment List. Prior to selecting a sample of manuals for the ICAVP resiew, we would like to confirm the following information:
Questions:
a) Does the list of vendor manuals address all of the equipment in the Key Safety Related Equipment List?
b) To date, which updated Unit 2 manuals have been approved for use?
c) Item 3 in the RAI response states that " Equipment which may have been provided by CE as part of the original purchase specification is included within the KSREL where applicable." However, the KSREL, (Technical Evaluation M2-EV-98-0038) states in the BACKGOUND section that the KSREL covers non-NSSS vendor supplied equipment. This appears to be inconsistent, please explain.
d) We would like NNECo to explain how VETIP addresses NSSS supplied equipment which was not manufactured by CE. Was this equipment part of the population reviewed to develop the KSREL, or is it part of the VETIP NSSS interface? What does NNECo consider as the NSSS scope of supply for VETIP7 (equipment provided by CE, or just the equipment manufactured by CE, or some combination?)
Response
a) Yes, it does.
b) Jim Petroski willfax this information to ll'avne Dobson.
c) The statement is not completely accurate. The selection wasfunctional and includes some original NSSS vendor scope ofsupply equipment that CE no longer provides supportfor vendor information.
d) In general terms the reply was through PEG 6.05 (the l'cndor Re-contact Program) and through the CE site representative.
PAGE 1
s 9
CONFERENCE NOTES M:y 14,1998
- 1. Topic: Digital Comparator Setpoints (Tom Harris)
References:
1.
Containment Nrticulate Process Radiation Monitor RM 8123 A Calibration (SP 2404 AMI)
Background:
At step 4.7.6 of bos references the step reads " Refer to digital comparator setpoint sticker and RECORD "Hi Rad" alarm setting on Attachment 2." The procedure then goes on to ~'ibrate this setpoint.
Questions:
a) How is this setpoint determined?
b) When is the sticker updated?
-i Response: DeferredtoS/19/98
- 3. Topic: F39A/B Fan Assemblies (Tom Harris)
References:
1.
MEPL Determination MP2-CD-1512 2.
MEPL Determination MP2-CD-0152 3.
Containment Particulate Process Radiation Monitor RM 8123 A Calibration (SP 2404AMI) 4.
Containment Particulate Process Radiation Monitor RM 8262A Calibration (SP 2404AM2)
Background:
MEPL Determination MP2-CD-1512 2.01 downgraded sample fan assemblies F39A/B to Non-QA.
Justification was a presious determination in CD-0152 that stated " if fans fail, rad monitors loose {sp) sample
- but the ESAS actuation will be initiated due to low flow."
In section 4.3 in the calibration procedures the flow setpoints are calibrated for flow desices FIS-8262 and FIS-8123 but do not check for an ESAS trip function on low flow. I cannot find any input from the flow desices to the associated RIT that would generate an internal fail alarm which would cause an ESAS actuation.
1 Questions:
a) How does the " low flow" condition mentioned in MP2-CD-1512 2.01 initiate a ESAS actuation?
Response: CD-1512 was in errorin assuming a " low" flow condition wouldinitiate an ESAS actuation, because "lowflow" does not cause an actuation.
4.
Topic: Failed Snubber - Piping System Operability Determination (Ken Gabel)
(Topic #7 Continued from 5/7/98)
Background:
UIR-2948 discussion focused on."the fact that a postulated event has not occurred is not a valid reason for concluding that the piping is operable" Reference is made to calculation #78-721-125GM as representing valid methodology for making operability assessments. This cale addresses snubber functional acceptance criteria, specifically redefining applicable operating ranges.
PAGE 2
CONFERENCE NOTES M y 14,1998 Questions:
' a) If the surveillance test lockup acceleration values fall outside the procedural acceptance ranges, is the piping J
system deemedinoperable?
b). How were personnel informed and what was communicated to them with respect to valid reasons for operability determinations?
]
l
Response
a) No, ifa seismic (lockup) event had not occurred and the results ofthe bleed (thermal) rate portion ofthe functional testing program are within the procedural acceptance ranges.
b) Previous communications have been verbal. Actions are being taken to re-communicate the applicable information anddocument the efort.
5.
Topic: DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES (Bill Clemenson) (Topic #8 Continued from 5/7/98)
Background:
One of the Purposes for this cale is determine the cooling requirements for the DGV system during the summer with the EDG's on line. It is concluded that a minimum of 23,300 cfm of outside air at 86 'F is required with a 20% recirculation rate. Review of section 8.6 indicates that this 23,300 cfm is not of outside air that could be measured at the intake or in the ductwork, but is that hypothetical portion of the intake that has not been short circuited from the adjacent exhaust louver. The cale includes a value for 30% recirculation rate and the states that total flow rate will need to be 33,285 cfm. Recent measurements of Train B indicate that the for summer mode of operation the total flow is 31,744 cfm.
Questions:
a) Conclusion 3.4.1 states that the minimum outside air flow rate is 23,300 cfm. What is the definition of outside air as it is used her and how is this measured?
b) What is the assumed volume of short circuited exhaust air for each train?
c) Has the short circuited volume been measured since the system was modified by DCR 970057
Response
a) The outside air statedin Conclusion 3.4.1 is not the measuredflow but the calculatedportion ofair that is
. not short circuited.
i l
- b) ' NNECo didnot state the volume ofairfow is. Needto review Reference 4.40.
. c) ' No.
I 2
PAGE 3 '
CONFERENCE NOTES Mty 19,1998 DATE:
5/19/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
1.
DR -0126 - IIPSI/LPSI Shutoff Head Surveillance j
2.
DR -0070 - Refueling Water Storage Tank Foundation Design 3.
Spare Parts Associated With Changes Made by PDCR 2-100-86 j
4.
1995 SEWS Report 5.
Digital Comparator Setpoints 6.
Radiological Consequences Calculations LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNEco NRC NEAC Parsons Bob Skwirz John Nakoski Wayne Dobson j
Ken Fox Don Marks Gary Komosky Jack Lawton Bill Eakin Tom IIarris Bob Crittenden Richard Boyd Pete Talbot Juan Cajigas Mark Suprenant Jon Winterhalter Ken Lanham Joe Groncki Rich Ewing i
Jim Wheeler j
1.
Topic: DR -0126 - HPSI/LPSI Shutoff Head Surveillance (NNECo Requested Topic) j NNECo would like to discuss this DR to ensure they understand the potential discrepancy. Dick Boyd 4
from Parsons to participate in the discussion.
i l
Response: NNEco requested c!ar:Jication ofthe error in Calculation 90RPS710GMident:Jiedin the DR.. It i
was agreed that the stated error was not identifiable in the calculation.
2.
Topic: DR -0070 - Refueling Water Storage TanF Foundation Design (NNECo Requested Topic)
NNECo would like to discuss this DR. Jon Winterhalter from Parsons to participate in the discussion.
Response: NNECo presentedits revisedposition with regards to items 2 and 3 ofthe DR.,
3.
Topic: Spare Parts Associated With Changes Made by PDCR 2-100-86 (Jack Lawton)
Background:
This PDCR replaced the diesel generator type CFD differential current relays, which were determined to be not seismically qualified, with seismically qualified type IJD relays. The PDCR documentation indicates that a MEPL change was not required.
Questions:
a) If a change to the Master Equipment Parts List, (MEPL) was not required, how did NNECo identify that any CFD type relays in stock were no longer to be used in this application, and that the proper spare part is the IJD type relay?
PAGE 1
CONFERENCE NOTES Mry 19,1998 I
b) Does the parts list today correctly identify type IJD relays for this application?
l
Response
l a) The design change documents andpurchase order were the documents that determined the quahfication and use ofthe relaysfor this application. Future application and use of the relays is determined and evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
b) Application is not identified on the parts list.
4.
Topic: 1995 SEWS Report (Joe Groncki)
Background:
Parsons presently has the Screening Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS) for the Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Ventilation Damper 2-11V-255A. This SEWS walkdown was done in 1995. In 1997. DCR #M2-97005 was generated and implemented to replace 2-liv-255A. The DCR makes no mention of the SEWS report.
Questions:
a) In view of this component replacement, what is the current status of the 1995 SEWS report?
l Response: Deferredto 5/21/98.
5.
Topic: Digital Comparator Setpoints (Tom liarris) (Continuation of Topic #2 from 5/14/98) l
References:
l
-1.
Containment Particulate Process Radiation Monitor RM 8123 A Calibration (SP 2404 AM1)
Background:
- At step 4.7.6 of both references the step reads " Refer to digital comparaior setpoint sticker and RECORD "lii Rad" alarm setting on Attachment 2." The procedure then goes on to calibrate this setpoint.
Questions:
. a) liow is this setpoint determined?
l l
b) When is the sticker updated?
l
Response
a) The MFGR l'endor manual allows setting the alarm pointfrom 0-9999. In the event of an alarm, operators t
wouldgo the Alarm Response Procedure ARP2590E,for direction. 7 hey indicatedthat the setpoint couldbe h
changed by the operators with this procedure. Ilowever, there is no procedure, calculation, or methodfor determining what the setpoint should be. This equipment is safety related but this setpoint provides a non-safety alarm. Current DC setpointfor 10-8123A is 3500 andfor RJ-8262A is 200 but no sourcefor these setpoints could be provided. No reason could be providedfor the difference.
b) From the conversation it is not updated very often since procedures are not availablefor doing so.
i PAGE 2
CONFERENCE NOTES Mry 19,1998
+
6.
Topic: Radiological Consequence-Calculations (Juan Cajigas) (Continuation of Topic #3, from 5/5/98)
Background:
The calculation trail for the Radiological Consequences of Design Basis Accident appears to be complex. Before Parsons starts validating Tier 2 critical characteristics, we would like to discuss our understanding of what are the calculations of record for each of the accidents. The following summaries were developed from the calculations we believe to be the calculations of record for the Radiological Consequences of the DBA described in FSAR Chapter 14.8.4. The summary also indicates areas where we have not found information.
SUMMARY
OF CALCULATED POST-ACCIDENT DOSES TO UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS Accident Source Of Thyroid Whole Body Beta Skin Calculation Exposure Dose Gamma Dose Dese Reference (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
MPI-LOCA Inunersion 22.7 0.0161 0.245 81-115-50P hv3 (TB Purge 8 hrs)
Shine n/a 0.0910 n/a xx-xxx-38R.., Rev 0 TOTAL 0.107 MPI-MSLB Immersion 25.2 0.390 6.50 M2CRMsLIMll78-R2. Rev 0 Shine n/a not found n/a Not Found TOTAL
???
MP2-LOCA (LWS)
Immersion 11.1 0.0206 0.266 M2CRM2 01156-R2. Rev 0 (1 Filter Train)
Shine n/a 0.941 n/a xx-xxx-38RA, Rev 0 TOTAL 0.962 MP2-LOCA (HWS)
Immersion 25.2 0.0155 0.260 M2CRM211W-01164-R2. Rev 0 (1 Filter Train)
Shine n/a 0.941 n/a xx-xxx-38RA, Rev 0
- TOTAL, 0.957 MP3-LOCA Immersion + Shine 10.3 2.39 8.21 M2CRM3-Oll46-R2. Rev 0 NOTE: The above MP2 control room dose results were obtained from the M."2 calculations of record and do not necessarily agree with the results given in Table 14.8.4-8 of the MNPS-2 FSAR.
SUMMARY
OF CALCULATED MP2 POST-ACCIDENT OFFSITE DOSES CASE A - LOW WIND SPEED SITE BOUNDARY LOW POPULATION Z,0NE CONDITIONS Accident Source Of Activity Thyroid Whole Body Calculation Thyroid Whole Body Calculation Release Dose Gamma Dose Reference Dose Gamma Dose Reference (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage 150.95 3.84 n-nx-10RA 56.32 1.43 xx-xxx-10RA Rev 1 R
a.*"-27RA Rev 0 (Hydrogen ESF Leakage 0.80 0.0023 0.78 0.0017
,,,, - RA Purge Not TOTAL 151.8 3.84 Rev0 57.1 1.43 Included)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage 150.95 3.84 n-xxx-10RA 35.53 0.0599 78 772-17kr Rev 3 R
" *" 27RA Rn 0 (7000 cfm ESF Leakage 0.80 0.0023 0.78 0.0017
,,,, - RA Hydrogen TOTAL 151.8 3.84 Rev0 36.3 0.062 Purge included)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage 150.95 3.84 xx-xxx 10RA 11.05 0.0144 78-77217RA Rev 3 Re
" "*-27RA Rev 0 (50 cfm ESF Leakage 0.80 0.0023 0.78 0.0017
,,,, - RA I!ydrogen TOTAL 151.8 3.84 Revo 11.8 0.016 Purge included)
PAGE 3 i
C______
i l
e I
CONFERENCE NOTES May 19,1998 i
I l
CASE B - HIGH WIND SPEED SITE BOUNDARY LOW POPULATION ZONE CONDITIONS Accident Source Of Activity Thyroid Whole Body Calculation Thyroid Whole Body Calculation Release Dose Gamma Dose Reference Dose Gamma Dose Reference (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage Not Not Not Not Not Not (Hydrogen ESF Leakage Found Found Found Found Found Found Purge Not TOTAL Included)
MP2-LOCA Containment Leakage Not Not Not Not Not Not
)
(Hydrogen ESF Leakage Found Found Found Found Found Found Purge TOTAL Included)
NOTE: The above MP2 off-site dose results were obtained from the MP2 calculations of record and do not necessarily agree with the results given in MNPS-2 FSAR Table 14.8.4-2.
Questions:
a) Please confirm if the information summarized above reflects the " calculations of record" for the identified accidents.
b) The MPI-MSLB calculation corresponding to the direct shine component of the whole body dose was t
I not found. Is this calculation available or is this term documented as negligible?
c) Which calculation (s) supports the Site Boundary Dose for High Wind conditions as reported in the FSAR?
Response
a) No response provided since it was indicated that these calculations will be re-donefrom scratch.
b) Unit 1 dose contributions will not be considered in new MP-2 control room dose calculations pending Unit i restart.
c) No response providedsince it was indicated that these caktaations will be re-donefrom scratch.
l PAGE 4
. _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ ~
CONFERENCE NOTES MAY 21,1998 DATE:
5/21/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
1.
EBFS Damper Motor Operators
- 2. Annubar Flow Instrumentation in EBFS Piping on Unit 1 Stack 3.
Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components
- 4. Thermal Margin / Low Pressure (TM/LP) Uncertainty Calculation 5.
DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES 6.
Millstone Unit 2 Snubber Population / Program 7.
Pipe Whip Restraints 8.
1995 SEWS Report LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNEco NRC NEAC Parsons Bob Skwirz Ralph Architzel Wayne Lbbson Fred Mattioli Don Marks Ken Fox Bob Moyer Cindy Howard Ken Gabel Harvey Beeman Ken Mayers Farid Elsabee John Strange Roy Terry Rich Glaviano Joe Groncki Irwin Zmnes 1.
Topic: EBFS Damper Motor Operators (Frank Cobb)
Backgrcund: Mechanical specification 7604-M-506 contains the requirements for EBFS damper motor operators. Vendor drawing 25203-29126 Sht 33 indicates a Modutrol Mod M644B was provided for the indicated dampers.
25203-29126 Sht 15 shows this operator to be a 120vac motor that produces a nominal rotational torque of 37 in/lbs. These motors are used on the TYPE CD35 and CDR92 Ruskin dampers and vendor drawing 25203-29126 Sht 13 indicates the torque requirements of the TYPE CD35. Vendor drawing 25203-29126 Sht 9 are for the TYPE CDR92 but does not indicate the required torque for the dampers.
Process drawing 25203-26059 was used to determine the system pressure exposure for the dampers which was in the range of-2.3" to -5.0" H:0.
Per telecon with Ruskin Mfg the torque for the TYPE CDR92 under these system pressures would be in a range from 102 in/lbs to 154 in/lbs to close the dampers These values far exceed the 37 in/lbs provided by the M644B Modutrol operator.
Based on the above information there appears to be a discrepant condition.
Questions: Please provide infonnation resohing the following questions: (For the EBFS dampers listed on 25203-29126 Sht 33):
a) What is the physical arrangement between damper shaft and operator i.e.; 'tlirect coupled" or linkage" connection.?
b) If a linkage type connection was used please provide reference to documentation that calculates the required torque for thelinkage milized c) For a) and b) please provide references to the drawings / documentation that show as-installed conditions.
Response: Deferredto Sc6/9&
PAGE1
O O
CONFERENCE NOTES MAY 21,1998 i
2.
Topic: Annubar Flow Instrumentation in EBFS Piping on Unit 1 Stack, (Amrit Kaptish / Ken Mayers)
Background:
PDCR 2-083-79 installed Stack Gas Flow Monitor Equipment to measure the total gas flow of MP-1 and MP-2.
Per System Scope & Boundary Defmition, the review of Unit 1 Stack Monitoring System is limited to the Nozzle and impulse lines from the nozzle to the first isolation valve.
The current drawings (P&lD 25203-26028, Sheet 2, etc.) de not reflect the details and number of nozzles j
shownin PDCR 2-083-79.
Questions:
a) Was PDCR 2-083-79 canceled or superseded by another modification?
b) If so, please furnish detailed information.
Response
a) Annubars in the Unit 1 stack were installed in accordance with modspcation PDCR 2-083-79. Unit I has recently issued a DCN DM 100-0058-98 to repair drawing 25203-26028 sht 5 to reflect the work performed in the modspcation.
b) N/A.
3.
Topic: Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components. (Claude Didier)
Background:
M2-RAI 01294 response. Item 3 in the response states 'MP2 does not currently maintain a separate listing of NSSS vendor components covered by requirements of GL83-28 and GL90-03.
Generie Letter 90-03 requires 'a program with the NSSS vendor as described in the VETIP, which covers all safety related components within the NSSS scope of supply. This program should include provisions for assuring receipt by the licensee / applicant of all technical information provided by the NSSS vendor.. "
GL 90-03 also states 'The programs in (a) above (safety related components within the NSSS scope of supply) should provide for the licensee or applicant to receive all updates to instruction and maintenance manuals, technical information bulletins, revised test procedures, and updated replacement parts information. The programs should include provisions which ensure the licensee receives all such vendor issued information pertinent to its safety-related equipment."
Question:
a) How does MP2 define NSSS scope of supply?
b) If MP2 does not maintain an identification of NSSS components covered by GL83-28 and GL90-03, how does MP2 determine that in fact it has all the vendor information pertinent to its NSSS safety related equipment.
I Response: Deferredto 5/2W98.
PAGE 2
o CONFERENCE NOTES MAY 21,1998 4.
Topic: Thermal Margin / Low Pressure (TM/LP) Uncertainty Calculation (John Strange)
Background:
Several accident analyses use the Thermal Margin / Low Pressure (TM/LP) RPS trip to trip the reactor. In our va'lidation of these TM/LP setpoints, we are confirming that the curves used in the accident l
analyses match those used in the plant TM/LP calculator. The accident analyses show that the curves are valid i
under the following conditions:
AGI measurement uncenainty is less than 0.06 asiu, Tcold uncenainty is less than 2 degF, and l
the thermal power uncertainty is less than 2%.
l In order to validate that the plant system will calculate the same setpoint as used in the analysis, these uncertainties must be validated. We have found appropriate validation documentation for the thermal power and Tcold uncertainties.
l Questions:
a) What is the latest calculation showing the ASI uncertainty is less than 0.067 b) Are there any supporting calculations which provide input to this calculation?
c) Is there an uncertainty calculation covering the TM/LP setpoint which combines the various component uncertainties?
l d) Is there a document showing that a Tcold uncertainty of 2.25 degF, instead of the 2 degF, has negligible effect on the accident analysis results?
Response
The latest uncertainty calculationfor Axial Shape Index is currently in review and not available. NU could not tell us the calculation numberpreceding the one in review. Parsons' will write a IL41 requesting the calculation j
under review.
1 11 was also stated that the TMLP setpoint was not sensitive to small changes in Tcold.
l S. Topic: DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES (Bill Clemenson) l
Reference:
- 1. HVAC Calculation 92-FFP-849ES, Rev 2
- 2. Drawing 25203-24024
Background:
HVAC Calculation 92-FFP-849ES, Rev 2 was revised to analyze the affect that a severed non-seismic duct would have to the Emergency DGV. The following are questions associated with this portion of the calculation, Section 8.7.
Section 8.7.1 calculates DP from Outside Air to main plenum. This calculation does not provide a figure as to w here each DP is calculated, making it diflicult to follow how the DPs were calculated.
Questions:
a) Step 8.7.1.3 calculates a loss of 0.27" w.g. for grating. Where is this grating?
b) Where are the DP losses associated with the abmpt exit into the plenum caln lated?
c) What is the basis for the coefficients (e.g., C2 & liv) used to calculate individual DPs?
PAGE 3
CONFERENCE NOTES MAY 21,1998 d) - What damper is associated with the DP calculated in Step 8.7.2.17 c) What DP is being calculated in step 8.7.2.27 Section 8.7.3 entitled " Analysis" reads as follows: "Two parallel flow paths, pressure drops at a given air flow rate are equal. Therefore, from the chart at a given pressure drop for each system, the sum of the flows must be 34,000 CFM."
f) What " chart" is being reference here?
g) What is the basis for stating that the sum of the flows must be 34,000 CFM7 The Table that follows the first paragraph of 8.7.3 contains DPs and associated flows for the non-seismic duct and
)
the seismic duct, h) How were these flows and DPs calculated?
j Section 8.7.3 ends with two statements that seem to be in conflict. The first is the statement, "Use 4.25" w.g."
Per the presions table this would equal 31,400 cfm. Then there is a " Note" that states the required DP is based on 4.48" w.g. which would equal a fan operating point of slightly greater than 31,000 cfm (Per Table it would equal 3L400 cfm). These statements disagree with each other and the previous statement on how the sum of the flows must be 34,000 cfm i) What is the DP that was used by this calculation to determine system flow with a severed seismic duct and how was it selected?
The second Section 8.7.3 is entitled " Maximum Room Temperature".
J) What is the Maximum Room Temperature?
k) How are the affects of the short circuited exhaust described in 8.6 incorporated into this calculation of maximum room temperature?
l) Please provide background information on how the figures on Page 24 and 24A were calculated and how they are used in this calcula: ion.
Response: Deferred to 5/26/98.
6.
Topic: Millstone Unit 2 Snubber Population / Program (Ken Gabel)
Background:
Tech Spec Section 3/4.7.8 addresses snubber operability. Snubber inspection is performed in accordance with surveillance procedure SP-21149. Snubber functional testing is performed under the ISI program using acceptance criteria in accordance with surveillance procedure SP-21174. Snubber support listings are included in these surveillance procedures. PMMS contains snubber data.
Questions:
l a) When the snubber listing was removed from the Tech Specs, what commitment was made for maintaining a l
complete snubberlisting?
b) What snubber listing source does ISI use to select their testing population?
c) Are small pipe and non-safety related snubbers to be included in all documents and databases where snubber identification exists?
d) is there a procedure that specifies a requirement to update all snubber listing documents when component additions or removals are made and what is the time frame requirements for doing so?
PAGE 4
CONFERENCE NOTES MAY 21,1998
Response
a) Snubber list removedfrom Tech Spec under Amendment #118 to OL. List include and controlled within station procedure SP-21149.
b) SP-21149 c) Small bore included. Some non-safety included, i.e., at seismic to non-seismic class breaks.
d) Deletions'additionsperformed under design modifications. SP-21149 would be changedin conjunction with use ofDCM checklists completion reminders.
7.
Topic: Pipe Whip Restraints (Bob Moyer)
References:
- 1. Calc PR N, Rev 0
- 2. Dwg 25203-51124, rev 0 -
- 3. Amendment 17 to License Application, 7-2-73
Background:
Pipe whip restraints on the 4" Main Steam to Aux. Feedwater Turbine line were designed and installed per references I and 2 based on the postulated break !ocations identified in reference 3.
Per reference 3, both circumferential and longitudinal breaks are postulated at the specified locations, however it
{
doesn't appear that the restraints were designed for, nor are they capable of carrying loads from the longitudinal breaks.
Questions:
a) What philosophy was used to mitigate the effects of the longitudinal breaks?
Based on the HELB Program Upgrade:
b) At what locations are breaks currently postulated in this line and what type of breaks are postulated?
c) Are any of the existing restraints considered active in mitigating the effects of pipe whip due to these breaks?
d) Have any new restraints been designed, and if so n hat are the calc reference numbers?
Response
a) Restraint system is required only to control movement ofthe pipe in the direction awayfrom the wall. No targets above, below or behind the pipe.
b) Currently breaks are onlypostulated at terminal ends. Intermediate breaks eliminated via stress criteria.
c) All restraints are now consideredinactive. (Possible exception is SAFR-9 identifiedin calc PR-N, NU will investigate and respond 5-26-98.)
d) No.
~8 Topic: 1995 SEWS Report (loc Groncki) (Continuation of Topic # 4 from 5/19/98)
Background:
Parsons presently has the Screening Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS) for the Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Ventilation Damper 2-HV-255A. This SEWS walkdown was done in 1995. In 1997, DCR #M2-97005 was generated and implemented to replace 2-HV-255A. The DCR makes no mention of the SEWS report.
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CONFERENCE NOTES MAY 21,1998 Questions:
a) In view of this component replacement, what is the current status of the 1995 SEWS report?
. Response:
The SEHS reportfor 2-HV-255A will not be changed in any way to reflect the replacement of the damper. The SEHS report is considered a " snap shot in time " that gives the seismic status at a particular point in time. There are no procedural requirements to maintain the SEHS reports in a manner that reflects the current conditions in the field. This position may change depending on NNECo's final commitments to the NRC in regard to the SQUGprogram.
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PAGE 6 1
CONFERENCE NOTES Mry 25,1998 DATE:
5/26/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
1.
PDCR 2-013-83 2.
EBFS Damper Motor Operators 3.
Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components 4.
DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES
- 5. Snubber Populaticn
- 6. Status of Support SAFR-9 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNEco NRC NEAC Panons Fred Mattioli Ralph Architzel Irwin Zmnes Cindy Howard Don Marks Marcel Ranieri Roger Mauchline Harvey Beeman Claude Didier Chris Scully Frank Cobb Roy Terry Larry Wigley
- 1. Topic: PDCR 2-013-83 (Irwin Zinnes)
Reference:
PDCR No.: 2-13-83, MP2 - Containment Air Recirculation Damper Repla;ement
Background:
This modification involves the direct replacement of four dampers in the Enclosure Building Ventilation System with dampers of similar function, but of much heavier duty construction. The codes and standards governing manufacture and design of these dampers equal or exceed those invoked during original plant construction. The dampers replaced were 2-AC-1, -3, -57 and -58.
Inter Office Memo dated 3/28/84, contained within Reference 1, stated as follows: " Presently 2-AC-58 has not been praved operable and is bypassjumpered open. During the next available cold shutdown the damper will be tested and any tmresolved deficiencies rectified via another PDCR. The bypass / jumper tag number is 109,"
Note:
DCN DM2-00-612-97 (8/1/97) deleted the LO. designation for this backdraft damper.
Questions:
a) Was this memo implemented? (The Reply was blank.)
b) Are post modification testing results available for verification. of system flow rates and damper resetting for 2-AC-58 as well as the other dampers replaced, 2-AC-1, -3 and -577 Background Continued: Reference I referred to" Calculation 81-102-186 GP for determination of the seismic adequacy of the present damper dc. sign and requirement of a seismic support on 2-AC-1."
l c) Were calculations done for the dampers 2-AC-3 and the combination of 2-AC-57 and -58, since all the replacement dampers were much heavier duty?
Response: NNECo gave a partial response and asked that the Topic be continued on S/28/98.
PAGE1
s CONFERENCE NOTES Mry 26,1998 2.
Topic: EBFS Damper Motor Operators (Frank Cobb) (Continuation of Topic #1 from 5/21/98)
Background:
Mechanical specification 7604-M-506 contains the requirements for EBFS damper motor operators. Vendor drawing 25203-29126 Sht 33 indicates a Modm.al Mod M644B was provided for the indicated dampers.
25203-29126 Sht 15 shows this operator to be a 120vac motor that produces a nominal rotational torque of 37 in/lbs. These motors are used on the TYPE CD35 and CDR92 Ruskin dampers and vendor drawing 25203-29126
)
Sht l'4 indicates the torque requirements of the TYPE CD35. Vendor drawing 25203-29126 Sht 9 are for the TYPE CDR92 but does not indicate the required torque for the dampers.
Process drawing 25203-26059 was used to determine the system pressure exposure for the dampers which was in the range of-2.3" to -5.0" H 0.
2 Per telecon with Ruskia Mfg the torque for the TYPE CDR92 under these system pressures would be in a range from 102 in/lbs to 154 in/lbs to close the damp'rs.
Questions: Please provide information resohing the following questions: (For the EBFS dampers listed on j
25203-29126 Sht 33):
a) What is the physical arrangement between damper shaft and operator i.e.; " direct coupled", or " linkage" connection.7 b) If a linkage type connection was used plean proside reference to documentation that calculates the required torque for the linkage utilized.
For a) and b) please provide references to the drawings / documentation that show as-installed conditions.
Response: NNECo indicated that the damper motors in question were replaced with stronger models under DCN's developedin DCR M2-96067. A review ofthis document specifies a much higher torquefor the new l
motors and references calculations utilized to size the motors.
3.
Topic: Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components (Claude Didier) (Continuation of Topic #3 from 5/21/98)
Background:
M2-RAI 01294 response. Item 3 in the response states "MP2 does not currently maintain a separate listing of NSSS vendor components covered by req.irements of GL83-28 and GL90-03.
Generic Letter 90-03 requires 'a program with the NSSS vendor as described in the VETIP, which covers all safety related components within the NSSS scope of supply. This program should include prosisions for assuring receipt by the licensee / applicant of all technical information provided by the NSSS vendor.. "
GL 90-03 also states "1ne programs in (a) above (safety related components within the NSSS scope of supply) should provide for the licensee or applicant to receive all updates to instruction and maintenance j
' manuals, technical information bulletins, revised test procedures, and updated replacement parts information. The programs should include provisions which ensure the licensee receives all such vendor issued information pertinent to its safety-related equipment."
l Question:
a) How does MP2 define NSSS scope of supply?
b) If MP2 des not maintain an identification of NSSS components covered by GL83-28 and GL90-03, how does MP2 detci ine that in fact it has all the vendor information pertinent to its NSSS safety related equipment.
Respoase: Deferred 1o5/28/98.
PAGE 2 l
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CONFERENCE NOTES M y 26,1998 4,
Topic: DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES (Bill Clemenson) (Continuation of Topic #5 from 5/21/98)
Reference:
- 1. HVAC Calculation 92 FFP-849ES, Rev 2
- 2. Drawing 25203 24024 I
Background:
HVAC Calculation 92-FFP-849ES, Rev 2 was revised to analyze the affect that a severed non-seismic duct would have to the Emergency DGV The followiny, are questions associated with this portion of the calculation, Section 8.7.
Section 8.7.1 calculates DP from Outside Air to main plenum. This calculation does not provide a figure as to where each DP is calculated, making it diflicult to follow how the DPs were calculated.
Questions:
a) Step 8.7.1.3 calculates a loss of 0.27" w.g. for grating. Where is this grating?
b) Where are the DP losses associated with the abrupt exit into the plenum calculated?
c) What is the basis for the coefficients (e.g., C2 & Hv) used to calculate indisidual DPs?
d) What damper is associated with the DP calculated in Step 8.7.2.17 e) What DP is being calculated in step 8.7.2.27 Section 8.7.3 entitled " Analysis" reads as follows: "Two parallel flow paths, pressure drops at a given air flow rate are equal. Therefore, from the chart at a given pressure drop for each system, the sum of the flows must bc 34,000 CFM."
f) What " chart" is being reference here?
)
g) What is the basis for stating that the sum of the flows must be 34,000 CFM?
1 The Table that follows the first paragraph of 8.7.3 contains DPs and associated flows for the non-seismic duct and the scismic duct.
3 h) How were these flows and DPs calculated?
Section 8.7.3 ends with two statements that seem to be in conflict. The first is the statement, "Use 4.25" w.g."
i Per the previous table this would equal 31,400 cfm. Then there is a " Note" that states the required DP is based cn i
4.48" w.g. which would equal a fan operating point of slightly greater than 31,000 cfm (Per Table it would equal 32,400 cfm). These statements disagree with each other and the previous statement on how the sum of the flows must be 34,000 cfm i) What is the DP that was used by this calculation to determine system flow with a severed seismic duct and how was it selected?
The second Section 8.7.3 is entitled " Maximum Room Temperature".
j) What is the Maximum Room Temperature?
k) liow are the aficcts of the short circuited exhaust described in 8.6 incorporated into this calculation of maximum rcom temperature?
!) Please provide background information on how the fig ms on Page 24 and 24A were calculated and how they are used in this calculation.
Response: Deferred 1o3/28/98 PAGE 3
l e
CONFERENCE NOTES
^
M:y 26,1998 5.
Topic: Snubber Population (Ken Gabel)
Background:
Continuation of Topic #6 from 5/21.
I Questions:
I.
l a) Are the six (6) snubbers associated with hangers 490010,490018 and 490019 safety related components?
1.
l Respense: Allreferencedsnubbers are non-safety components.
6.
Topic: Status of Support SAFR-9 (Bob Moyer) l
Background:
Continuation of Topic #7 from 5/21/98.
t Questions:
a) NNECo to investigate status of support SAFR-9 identified in calc PR-N.
Response: Restraint S4FR-9 was deemed not required due to lack of targets in the area and never installed.
This is in agreement with current HELB program review ofthe area.
l PAGE 4 l
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CONFERENCE NOTES M:y 28,1998 DATE:
5/28/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
- 1.. PDCR 2-013-83 2.
Engineering Evaluation M2-EV-97016 Rev 0,"Effect on EDG Room Temperature due to Exhaust air Reentering Fan F-38A/B Inlet Airstream" 1
3.
Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components
'l 4.
DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES
~
- 5. Snubber Population
PDCR 2-015-87 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Gary Komosky Ralph Architzel Jack Lawton Keith Deslandes Don Marks Don Becker Irwin Zinnes Harvey Bceman Ken Gabel Cindy Howard Michael Ober Jim Nicholson Dom Ramos Marcel Ranieri Bill Clemenson Claude Didier
- 1.. Topic: PDCR 2-013-83 (Irwin Zinnes) (Continuation of Topic #1 from 5/26/98)
Reference:
PDCR No.: 2-13-83, MP2 - Contaimnent Air Recirculation Damper Replacement
Background:
This modification involves the direct replacement of four dampers in the Enclosure Duilding Ventilation System with dampers of similar function, but of much heavier duty construction. The codes and i
standards governing manufacture and design of these dampers equal or exceed those invoked during original plant constmetion. The dampers replaced were 2-AC-1, -3, -57 and -58.
Inter Office Memo dated 3/28/84, contained within Reference 1, stated as follows: " Presently 2-AC-58 has not been proved operable and is bypassjumpered open. During the next available cold shutdown the damper will be tested and any unresolved deficiencies rectified via another PDCR. The bypass / jumper tag number is 109."
Note:
DCN DM2-00-612-97 (8/1/97) delet :d the L.O. designation for this backdraft damper.
Questions:
a) Was this memo implemented? (The Reply was blank.)
b) Are post modification testing results available C.,r verification of system flow rates and damper resetting for 2-AC-58 as well as the other dampers replaced, 2-AC-1, -3 and -577 Background Continued: Reference i referred to " Calculation 81 102-186 GP for determination of the seismic adequacy of the present damper design and requirement of a seismic support on 2-AC-1."
c) Were calculations done for the dampers 2-AC-3 and the combination of 2-AC-57 and -58, since all the replacement dampers were much heavier duty?
PAGE 1 l
_. - _ _ -. ~. - - - - -
I CONFERENCE NOTES i
Miy 28.1998
)
Response
l a) and b) NNECo stated that post modspcation test data was notfound However. recentpow data of 28,379 cfmfc>r 2-A C-1 and-3 was iaentifiedfrom Johnson Yokogawa Drawing No. 25203-29644. Also ll'ork Order No. M29412367 was identifiedfor 2-AC-57 and-58. Backdrap damper 2-AC-58 was reported to have some blades securedin the closedposition in 1995, but currently it is not locked in any position.
Note: Backdrap damper 2-AC-58 adjustment and operability was not provided, unless coveredin Il'ork Order No. M29412367 (RAI-1677).
)
i c) Deferredto 6/2/98.
i l
2.
Topic: Engineering Evaluation M2-EV-97016 Rev 0, Sffect on EDG Room Temperature due to Exhaust air Reentering Fan F-38A/B Inlet Airstream" (Bill Clemenson)
Background:
M2-EV-97016 was issued to determine the impact of short circuited exhaust ventilation into the supply louvers of the emergency DG Ventilation System. T te following questions are associated with this EV.
Questions:
a) Re: Section 1, pg. 4. Is "Q-motor" based on nameplate or measured current?
b) Re: Section I, pg. 4. It is stated that "TD" for the EDG rooms are calculated based on the average of " supply air temperature" and "outside air" The referenced attachments do not contain parameters identified as such.
c) How were the TDs of 5.98 and 8.26 calculated? Please provide references to Attachment 1 & 2 data, the type of instrumentation used and the accuracy of the instruments.
d) Re: Section 1, pg. 3. Air flow values are based on RcBrsnces d and c. When were these measurements made?
c) Re: Section 11, pg. 5. The following statement is made, "The final room temperature (FT) is, FT = DB +
l DTD + NAST." What is the basis for this equation?
l f) What were the general wind conditions during data acquisition?
g) Re: Section IV, pg. 7. The terms Q-in Q-out, are introduced bist are not defined. Please define these terms and the basis for equation 1 and equation 2.
h) Re: Justification, 3rd paragraph, pg. 8.
What is the basis for stating that the percentage of in-leakage is unaffected by total airflow? Please explain the relationship of the referenced fan law to the amount of non-l ducted short circuited air flow that can be captured in the supply air louver.
i) Re: 5.0 Conclusion, pg. 8. This cfrort to quantify and evaluate the effect of short circuited air would bc greatly simplified if NNECo would simply quantify the amount of short circuited air for each train and use l
that value in the other HVAC calculations. For instance tha '"d calculation of record for the DGV,92FFP-849ES, provides an acceptable percentage of re-cir
.nr, yet this EV seems to purposefully avoid making this simple calculation.
j) Why doesn't this EV calculate the percentage recirculation for cach train?
Respouse: Dejkrredto 6/2/98.
1 PAGE 2 w_-___-______
s CONFERENCE NOTES Mry 28,1998 3.
Topic: Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components (Claude Didier) (Continuation of Topic #3 from 5/26/98)
Background:
M2-RAI 01294 response. Item 3 in the response states "MP2 does not currently maintain a separate listing of NSSS vendor components covered by requirements of GL83-28 and GL90-03.
Generic Letter 90-03 requires 'a program with the NSSS vendor as described in the VETIP, which covers all safety related components within the NSSS scope of supply. This program should include provisions for assuring receipt by the licensee / applicant of all technical information provided by the NSSS vendor.. "
GL 90-03 also states "The programs in (a) above (safety related components within the NSSS scope of supply) should provide for the licensee or applicant to receive all updates to instruction and maintenance i
manuals, technical information bulletins, revised test procedures, and updated replacement parts information. The programs should include provisions which ensure the licensee receives all such vendor issued information pertinent to its safety-related equipment."
Question:
a) How does MP2 define NSSS scope of supply?
b) - If MP2 does not maintain an identification of NSSS components covered by GL83-28 and GL90-03, how does MP2 determine that in fact it has all the vendor information pertinent to its NSSS safety related equipment.
Response: As related to l'ETIP MP2 includes equipment that CE has design and manufacturing responsibility for or design input and maintains responsibility for and provides the vendor information for. (A list of approximately 500 components.) Of the equipment originally supplied by CE, it does not include equipment manufactured by other vendors where the vendor has to be contacted directly to obtain vendor information. This segregation was made by reviewing TbBiS and MIMS, specifically in PASIS where the manufacturerJIeld and modelfield had information that identijled the component as ABB'CE. Inere the equipment originally supplied by CE was no longer supported by CE it was included in the KSREL selection.
4.
Topic: DGV Calculation 92FFP-849ES (Bill Clemenson)(Continuation of Topic #4 from 5/26/98)
Reference:
- 1. IIVAC Calculation 92-FFP-849ES, Rev 2
- 2. Drawing 25203-24024 i
Background:
HVAC Calculation 92-FFP-849ES, Rev 2 was resised to analyze the affect that a severed non-j scismic duct would have to the Emergency DGV. The following are questions associated with this portion of the calculation, Section 8.7.
I Section 8.7.1 calculates DP from Outside Air to main plenum. This calculation does not provide a figure as to l
where cach DP is calculated, making it difficult to follow how the DPs were calculated.
l Questions:
i a) Step 8.7.1.3 calculates a loss of 0.27" w.g. for grating. Where is this grating?
b) Where are the DP losses associated with the abrupt exit into the plenum calculated?
c) What is the basis for the cocilicients (c g., C2 & Hv) used to calculate individual DPs?
d) What damper is associated with the DP calculated in Step 8.7.2.17 PAGE 3
f ne f
CONFERENCE NOTES M:y 28,1998 c) What DP is being calculated in step 8.7.2.27 Section 8.7.3 entitled "Analy sis" reads as follows: "Two parallel flow paths, pressure drops at a giun air flow rate are equal. Therefore, from the chart at a given pressure drop for each system, the sum of the flows must be 34,000 CFM."
f) What " chart" is being reference herc7 g) What is the basis for stating that the sum of the flows must bc 34,000 CFM7 The Table that follows the first paragraph of 8.7.3 contains DPs and associated flows for the non-scismic duct and the seismic duct.
h) How were these flows and DPs calculated?
Section 8.7.3 ends with two statements that seem to be in conflict. The first is the statement, "Use 4.25" w.g."
Per the previous table this would equal 31,400 cfm. Then there is a " Note" that states the required DP is based on 4.48" w.g. which would equal a fan operating point of slightly greater than 31,000 cfm (Per Table it would equal 32,400 cfm). These statements disagree with each other and the previous statement on how the sum of the flows must be 34,000 cfm i) What is the DP that uas used by this calculation to determine system flow with a severed seismic duct and how was it selected?
The second Section 8.7.3 is entitled " Maximum Room Temperature" j) What is the Maximum Room Temperature?
k) How are the alTects of the short circuited exhaust described in 8.6 incorporated into this calculation of maximum room temperature?
l} Please provide background information on how the figures on Page 24 and 24 A were calculated and how they are used in this calculation.
Response: The NNECo responses to the 10 + questions that I had wer varied and indeterminate. Per our discussion it was agreed that I wouldgenerate a DR to address the issues and thatfurther discussion was not required.
5.
Topic: Snubber Population (Ken Gabel) (Continuation of Topic #5 from 5/26/98.)
Background:
N/A Questions:
a) Are the five (5) snubbers associated with SNUB (PMMS ID) numbers: 11702; 12246; 12763; 12893; and i
22496 safety related components?
Response: Only SNUB unit i1702 is currently installed in a safity related application.
6.
Topic: Amendment 16 to FOL No. DPR-65 (Michael Ober)
Background:
Due to the incidents described in the SER to the referenced amendment, it was determined that a second level of under-voltage (UV) logic was needed to preclude the incidents from happening again and to improve the (,verall reliability of the onsite emergency power systems. It was also determined that in order to prevent the re-initiation of UV load shedding the load shed legic needed to be bypassed or blocked once the dicscis were started and were powering the cic:rgency busses. In the NRC's SEi (Ref enclosure to NRC letter of PAGE 4 L________________
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CONFERENCE NOTES
,0 Mcy 28a 1998 August 23,1976 to NNECo from E. H. Verdery) to the referenced amendment the NRC indicated that the licensee had committed in item 5.c [on page 6] to " Verify that the under-voltage load shed feature is bypassed once the diesel sequencer starts by simulating a bus under-voltage signal verifying correct operation. The diesel voltage will be lowered to verify no shedding and the reset function will be verified by tripping the diesel circuit breaker and verifying correct operation."
I was able to verify that tests have been run for the case where the UV load shedding logic resets when the dicsci is tripped off-line, but I have not been able to verify that a test has been run which verifies that the under-voltage load shed feature is bypassed once the dicsci sequencer starts. According to the SER, this is supposed to be done by lowering the voltage on the bus to simulate a bus under-voltage signal and verify that it does not trip as long as the diesel is still supplying power to the bus.
Questions:
a) What test was done, in regard to this commitment, that proved that that the under-voltage load shed feature is bypassed once the diesel sequencer starts and does not trip on a new under-voltage condition as long as the diesel is still supplying power to the bus? Please provide a reference to the test and associated work.
Response: The bypassing or blocking ofthe under-voltage load shedfeature was installedper PDCR 2-241-76.
A test was subsequently run per Job Order R60185 to test that the under-voltage load shedfeature was bypassed while the dieselg:nerator was supplying power to the emergency 4.16kVbusses.
An RAI will be issued to request these documents.
I Follow-up Question:
b) Do you currently test this feature?
Response: NNECo indicated that they do not currently test thisfeature and that the Job Order R60185 test was a one time only test.
7.
Topic: PDCR 2-015-87 (Jack Lawton)
Background:
This PDCR installed selector switches at breaker cubicle A505 to enable powering Unit I from Unit 2 through the cross-tie. The PDCR states that an FSAR change is not required. FSAR Change Request 95-MP2-36 was later generated to revise the FS AR to indicate this capability.
l Questions:
a) Why was an FSAR change not required as a result of this modification?
Response: The FS4R changes were implemented by generic change documents not associated with the mod l.
package. RAl-1671 was initiated to obtain these documents.
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