ML20248G331
| ML20248G331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1989 |
| From: | Michael Ray TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 89-010, 89-10, NUDOCS 8910100199 | |
| Download: ML20248G331 (3) | |
Text
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i TENNESSEE' VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 5N 157B Lookout Place 00T 051988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 89-10 This special report provides details concernirg control building fire Door C-52 that remained nonfunctional for more than seven days. This report is being made in accordance with technical specification Action
' Statement 3.7.12.a. - contains the details of the event. contains TVA's commitment.
If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-6651.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY h'
,[t, Manager, Nuc af Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosures cc (Enclosures):
Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector f[
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road
[ l Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 8910100199 891o95
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ENCLOSURE 1 L
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Special Report 89-10
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. Description of Event On~ September 5,'1989, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, it was discovered while
- perfor_ ming Surveillance Instruction 701, " Visual Inspection of Fire Doors,
that a work request (WR) (WR 790777) had been written against control building f're Door C-52.
Further investigation revealed that the door was nonfunctional.and represented a potential. fire barrier breach problem. The door would close and latch, but not automatically. The WR was dated August 22, 1989,' and.the identification.of an improper breach was made September 5,1989.
Cause of Event The root cause of the door remaining nonfunctional and unidentified as a potential fire barrier breach was that the originator of the WR did not realize that the door must close and latch automatically without any manual effort by personnel accessing the area. Also, SQN personnel in the Work Control did not define a fire barrier door as being inoperable if the i
automatic closure mechanism was not operating perfectly.
In this specific instance, the interpretation that the fire barrier was functional was based on l
the fact that the door could be closed and latched.
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Corrective Action Immediately following the identification of an improper breach, the shift operations supervisor was notified, a breach permit (8316) was issued for 4
Door C-52, and Potential Reportable Occurrence 1-89-204 was initiated. Work l
Control was-also notified to upgrade the priority on the WR. The door was l
repaired, and the breach permit was cleared at 1355 Eastern caylight time on September 8, 1989. The area containing the breached fire barrier.is in an area covered by existing fire operations hourly roving firewatch; therefore, l
Action Statement a of Technical Specification 3.7.12 was met during the entire I
time the door was nonfunctional.
I lhe individual responsible for initiating the WR, his supervisor, and the Work l
Control senior reactor operator have been counseled on the correct i
interpretation of an inoperable fire door barrier and the responsibilities l
associated with the identification of a fire barrier breach.
To prevent recurrence, the Fire Protection Unit has discussed with Work Control the correct interpretation of an operable, functional fire barrier door. Greater emphasis will be placed on the identification of potential fire i
barrier breaches in the General Employee Training 10 class. An information 1
notice / dispatch will be issued by December 1, 1989, directing appropriate i
organizations to review and discuss this issue during safety meetings.
In i
addition, further control has been accomplished by procedura11 zing the fire i
protection. involvement in evaluating WRs.
Plant Manager's Standard Practice SQN-Pi4SP-6.2.1, " Maintenance Management System Initiation of Work Requests,"
has been written and approved and will be implemented November 1, 1989.
PMSP-6.2.1, Section 3.2.1, stipulates that when a WR is Industrial Safety / Fire
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Protection related, the Industrial Safety / Operations Fire Protection supervisors will evaluate and establish the priority of the WRs.
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'. ENCLOSURE 2..
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. Sequoyah, Nuclear P1 ant, 1
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Unit'.1:
-l Special Report 89-10.-
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An information notice / dispatch.will'be issued by December l', 1989, directing
. appropriate organizations to review and discuss this issue during safety
! meetings.
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