ML20248A802
| ML20248A802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1989 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8910030011 | |
| Download: ML20248A802 (3) | |
Text
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'Dukelbuer Company IIst B Tscher J
m
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PO Bar33198 l' ice President
. Charlotte, N C 2R242 J NuclearPmduction (701)373 4531 L
' DUKE POWER,'
l September'20,.1989' V. S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission :
Document Control Desk Washington,'D.C. 20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket.Nos. 50-369,.370 Inspection Report Nos. 369, 370/89-21 Reply to a Notice of Violation
. Gentlemen:
' Pursuant to 10CFR.201, please find attached Duke Power Company's response to Violation.369,'370/89-21-01 for.the McGuire Nuclear Station.
Should there be any questions concerning this matter, contact W. T. Byers at
-(704) 373-6194.
Very truly yours, 4
Ha1.B.-Tucker
. TB104/lcs W
Attachment xc:.Mr..S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator,. Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
.101'Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta. Georgia 30323 Mr.'Darl Hood
-V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. P.'K. VanDoorn
~
f NRC' Resident Inspector g
McGuire Nuclear Station 1
'8910030011' 890920 PDR: ADOCK 05000369 Q
FDC c
-s ATTACIDENT 1 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION RESPONSE TO VIOLATION l
Violation 369(370)/89-21-01 l
License NPF-9, Paragraph 2.C.(1) limits core thermal power to 3411 thermal megawatts.
Contrary to the above, on July 5, 1989, the core was operated briefly in excess of 102 percent of this limit and was operated in excess of 101 percent of this limit for nearly three hours.
The computer input errors, which led to the overpower operation, could have been identified earlier in power ascension at about 80 percent core thermal power.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
Response
1)
Admission or denial of the alleged violation:
McGuire admits the violation occurred as stated in LER 369/89-13, dated August 4, 1989.
2)
The reason for the violation if admitted:
The violation occurred due to inappropriate actions and a defective procedure.
The technician performing the calibration on Main Steam Flow, Loop C, channel 1 did not properly complete the procedure.
The procedure was defective in that all the signoffs were performed on an enclosure to the procedure and did not lead the technician back to the final r.teps of the procedure.
The final steps would have restored the computer points to service.
Also, a Performance Section Engineer committed an inappropriate action in instructing the technician to use the Thermal Power Best Estimate figure for the calibration.
3)
The corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
Performance personnel identified OAC points critical to nuclear safety and provided this information to the Computer Section, Operations, and IAE.
Performance personnel reviewed Station Directive 3.1.36 and proposed upgrades to ensure adequate password control and adequate review of lockout summaries.
Performance personnel requested upgrade to Thermal Power Best Estimate (TOP) calculations to assure conservative calculation of Best Estimate at lower power levels.
2 IAE supervision has reviewed this event and decided to l
evaluate work practices to assure the best possible work control in emergency situations.
4)
The corrective steps which will be taken to avoid future violations:
1)
IAE supervision will reemphasize to IAE crews through structured training the importance of OAC points and of restoring OAC points that have been locked.
2)
IAE personnel will revise IP/0/A/3007/17 to ensure validation of TOP prior to NI Calibration while maintaining timely NI calibrations.
3)
Computer Information Services personnel will initiate an OAC program request to alarm OAC critical Points not in service or locked.
4)
IAE personnel will cover this event with all IAE personnel through structured training or communication.
5)
IAE personnel will discuss the importance of timeliness in NI calibrations with IAE crews.
6)
IAE personnel will change all Periodic Tests and l
Instrument Procedures to require independent I
verification or restoration of critical TOP points and evaluate the need to do so regarding other critical OAC points.
7)
IAE personnel will modify their procedure standards for new upgraded instrument procedures to assure completion of Section 10 steps and restoration to service has been completed.
8)
Operations personnel will provide training to Operations personnel during requalification regarding this event.
9)
Operations and Performance personnel will add TOP verification as a requirement to power escalation in 90-95% power level range.
10)
Computer Information Services personnel will review control and update of OAC manuals in the Computer Room and upgrade them as necessary.
11)
Performance personnel will evaluate and upgrade documentation for the OAC flow calculator.
5)
The date when full compliance will be achieved:
December 31, 1989.
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