ML20247Q405
| ML20247Q405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1989 |
| From: | Hairston W ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.108, RTR-REGGD-1.108 NUDOCS 8904070121 | |
| Download: ML20247Q405 (3) | |
Text
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t Alr.bama Power Company 40 inverness Center Parkway
/
Post Office Box'1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 866-5581 W. G. Hairston,111 h
Senior Vice President '
Nuclear Opeistions Alabama Power the sathem eIxttc system 10CFR50.36
~
March 29, 1989 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions ATTN:
Document Control Desk Vashington, D. C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Joseph H. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report Attached is the Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report which is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.
This report provides the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failr.:es for each diesel generator at Farley Nuclear Plant for 1988. Also prov4ded is the information identified in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, 1977 for each failure.
Respectfully submitted, hh V. G. Hairston, III VGH,III/ JAR:pr-1.48 Attachment cc:
Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. G. F. Maxwell i
'l N
,0 M
i 8904070121 890329 PDR ADOCK 05000348 R
a e,
t ANNUAL DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY DATA REPORT FOR 1988 This diesel generator (DG) reliability report for the year 1988 is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.
The table below shows the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failures for each of the five DGs at Farley Nuclear Plant.
l TABLE Diesel Generator 1-2A 1B 2B IC 2C TOTAL Valid Successful 42 37 38 40 36 193 Tests Invalid Tests 18 16 6
15 9
64 Valid Fcilures 2
0 0
0 0
2 Invalio ?ailures 0
0 0
0 0
0 i
The following paragraphs provide the information required by Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, 1977 for the. valid failures identified above.
l 1-2A DG Failure on 8-16-88 d
h
.-At 0525 on 8-16-88, while an operability test was being performe, t e on service lube oil strainer on the 1-2A DG indicated a high differential pressure of 16 psid. At this time, the Diesel Building System Operator (DBS0) attempted to switch to the off service strainer. The DBS0 did not fully move the strainer handle rapidly to the off service strainer due to resistance met during the transfer. The DG t' ripped due to lov lube oil i
pressure since the strainer handle was not properly positioned. A lock nut had not'been loosened which prevented repositioning of the handle.
I Instructions on loosening the lock nut were not in the applicable procedure at the time of the trip. The procedure has been corrected to include these instructions.
Follovir.g two successful lube oil strainer swaps and successful completion of surveillance, the DG was returned to service at 1630 on 8-16-88.
Colt Industries, the DG manufacturer, was contacted about this trip.
They issued a letter stating they did not believe any damage resulted due to the momentary loss of pressure as sensed by the shutdown pressure switch.
This was the first failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG, No change in the surveillance schedule was necessary. The surveillance schedule remained at 14 days in Lecordance with Technical Specifications.
I l
g
a t.
-r 1-2A DG Failure on 9-26-88 At 0759 on 9-26-88, while an operability test was being performed, the 1-2A DG's voltage failed to reach the Technical Specification minimum voltage of 3952 V.
The maximum voltage reached was approximately 3850 V.
Attempts to adjust the voltage using the control board handsvitch for the voltage regulator were unsuccessful. The DG was declared inoperable. A blown 15A fuse was replaced in the automatic voltage control circuit. The DG operated properly during subsequent testing and was returned to service at 1923 on 9-26-88.
There is no previous or subsequent history of this fuse failing.
This was the second failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG.
No change in the surveillance schedule was necessary. The surveillance schedule remained at 14 days in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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