ML20247K194
| ML20247K194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247K190 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909210104 | |
| Download: ML20247K194 (3) | |
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-c L'Nr/ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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_ SAFETY. EVALUATION.BY THE 0FFICE.0F. NUCLEAR REACTOR. REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDNENT.N0. 63....TO. FACILITY OPERATING. LICENSE NO. NPF-29 SYSTEM ENERGY.RESQURCES..INC.
GRAND. GULF. NUCLEAR. STATION, UNIT 1 00CKET.NO. 50-416 1.0 INTRODUCTIQW By letter dated May 8, 1989, System Energy Resources, Inc. (SERI or the licensee), requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (GGNS-1). The proposed amend-ment would change the Technical Specifications (TS) by changing a TS foctnote in Table 1.2, Operational Conditions, and the Applicability statement.of TS 3/4.9.1, Reactor Mode Switch. Both changes were requested to permit single control rod withdrawal in the Hot Shutdown or Cold Shutdown Operational Condition (Conditions 3 or 4, respectively) with the Mode Switch in the Refuel position, rather than the normal Shutdown position.
Currently a single control rod full withdrawal is permitted, while the rod is being recoupled, in the Hot or Cold Shutdown Condition. This is done by placing the mode switch in the Refuel position, provided the one-rod-out interlock (which limits withdrawal to one rod) is operable.
Permission for this withdrawal for recoupling is provided in a footnote to the Conditions 3 and 4 mode switch position requirement statements in TS Table 1.2.
SERI' proposes to change this by replacing the werd "recoupled" with " moved" 1ri the footnote. This would provide permission to move a single rod in those operational conditions for purposes other than recoupling, e.g., for post scram ventire, friction testing or scram testing.
Currently there is no TS required surveillance related to the rod withdrawal for recoupling permitted for Conditions 3 and 4 in Table 1.2.
SERI proposes to augment the Applicability statement of TS 3/4.9.1 to include " Operational Conditions 3 and 4 when the reactor mode switch is in the Refuel position."
This would provide, via (unchanged) surveillance specifications 4.9.1.2 and 4.9.1.3, requirements for testing and operability demonstration of the one-rod-cut interlock.
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l 1 2.0 EVALUATION The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal. The following factors are of primary importance in considering the acceptability of the proposed changes.
The proposed change to TS Table 1.2 is similar to existing approved TS Table 1.2 specifications in other BWR6 reactors (e.g., Clinton, Perry and River Bend). These were either in the initial TS or a result of an approved change similar to that proposed for GGNS-1.
Since the mode switch in the Shutdown position blocks rod movement, the movement of the switch to Refuel (or to Startup or Run) is necessary to move a rod for recoupling (e.g., after repairs on the drive) or any other purpose.
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Rod movement in the Refuel position is limited to one rod by the redundant logic of the one-roo-out interlock.
Because of the required shutdown margin (verified before or during startup) with one rod out, and the interlock, it is reasonably assured that the reactor will remain subcritical with the mode switch in the Refuel position.
The proposed change to TS Table 1.2 does not change the current permission to withdraw a single rod in Operational Conditions 3 and 4, but it does expand the permitted testing and maintenance activities for withdrawal (e.g., scram time testing). While this might increase the frequency of withdrawals in Operational Conditions 3 and 4, it does not increase the probability of withdrawal events since the withdrawals would occur in Operational Conditions 1, 2, or 5 if not 3 or 4.
Maintenance and Testing are currently allowed (in all BWRs) in Operational Conditions 1 and 2 (Startup and Power Operation, respectively), where they are not under the control of the one-rod-out interlock, as well as in Condition 5 (Refueling).
The change to TS 3/4.9.1 provides appropriate surveillance for the one-rod-out interlock for the Refuel mode switch position in Operational Conditions 3 and 4, as it does currently for Operational Condition 5.
The above factors indicate that the change to TS Table 1.2 to permit single rod withdrawal in Operational Conditions 3 and 4 for purposes in addition to recoupling is in accord with previous staff approvals and l
I existing TS in other BWR6 reactors, provides for needed operations of maintenance and testing of rods, is not significantly different from currently permitted operations of rod withdrawal and does not increase the probability of a rod withdrawal event.
The change to TS 3.4.9.1 provides additional and appropriate surveillance requirements for rod withdrawal in Operational Conditions 3 and 4 not currently required for permitted withdrawals. Therefore, the staff concludes these proposed i
changes to the GGNS-1 TS are acceptable.
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released off site; and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commis-sion has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibilit criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)y.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission made a proposed determination that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 29412) on July 12, 1989, and consulted with the State of Mississippi. No public comments or requests for hearing were received, and the State of Mississippi did not have any comments.
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the p(ublic will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and2) such regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the commcn defense and security, or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
Howard Richings Dated: September 15, 1989
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