ML20247J220
| ML20247J220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1989 |
| From: | Loflin L CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NLS-89-203, NUDOCS 8907310266 | |
| Download: ML20247J220 (2) | |
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C9&L Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-89-203 JUL 211989 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS, 50-325 & 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW
REFERENCES:
(1)
Control Room Design Review Final Summary Report; i
December 31, 1986; Serial:
(2) Control Room Design Review Final Summary Report -
{
Revision 1; June 23, 1987; Serial: NLS-87-123 Gentlemen:
Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) hereby informs the staff of necessary changes to the Control Room Design Keview (CRDR) corrective actions.
The corrective actions and implementation schedules for several Human Engineering Discrepancies (HED) have been reevaluated.
As discussed with the NRC audit team during the CRDR audit the week of May 15, 1989, the corrective actions for several HEDs covered by the Annunciator Project and the E0P Instrumentation Project have been determined to be unnecessary and have, therefore, been cancelled.
This submittal is in compliance with the commitment for notification of CRDR corrective action changes as stated in the referenced documents.
i i
The Annunciator Project described in Section 6.3.1 of the CRDR Final Summary Report (FSR) is scheduled for completion by F.e'ueling Outage (RO) 8 for Unit 1 and RO 9 for Unit 2.
The corrective action for HED No. 205X-2115 to functionally group the Control Room annunciator tiles has been cancelled because to fulfill this commitment, approximately 284 annunciator tiles per unit would require relocation.
Each tile move creates a complexity of procedural changes and training requirements. Due to limitations on available space, many of the annunciator tiles can be moved only after first moving other annunciator tiles.
This forces the annunciator moves to be integrated and the relocations made in one or two major moves. This would have a severe
. negative impact on Operator response resulting in a high potential for Operator confusion and error during the two to three years required for relocation of the BSEP-1 and BSEP-2 annunciator tiles.
The Company has taken steps to compensate for not functionally grouping annunciator tiles.
These steps include reengraving annunciators for Unit 2, raising the Control Room floor five inches, color coding the priority annunciator tiles, grid location aids on the annunciator panel and placement of annunciator procedures adjacent to the associated annunciator panel, and administrative increases in the number of licensed personnel on shift.
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Additional actions planned are reengraving the annunciators for Unit 1 and separation of the Control Room annunciators into discrete acknowledgment / reset zones.
In addition to the human factors specification implemented for future Control Room modifications, these steps are sufficient to adequately resolve HED No. 206X-2115.
The E0P Instrumentation Project described in Section 6.3.2 of the CRDR FSR is scheduled for completion by RO 7 for Unit 1 and RO 9 for Unit 2.
The corrective action for HED Nos. 206X-5096 and 206X-5097 to replace the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) pump with a model rated to 70 psig, the Primary Containment Pressure Limit (PCPL), has been determined to be unnecessary and, therefore, cancelled. The basis for this determination is that Revision 4 to the Emergency Procedures Guidelines (EPGs) does not require the PASS sampling pump to sample up to the PCPL of 70 psig because the venting criteria for PCPL are independent of the venting criteria for combustible gas control. The combustible gas mitigat. ion strategy includes venting at a lower pressure than PCPL to prevent deflagration.
This strategy calls for venting if the drywell or suppression chamber hydrogen concentration cannot be.
determined to be below 6 percent and oxyg.en concentration to be below 5 percent. Although combustible gas samples cannot be taken above 30 psig, combustible gas samples taken below 30 psig coupled with knowledge of plant conditions can be used as a basis for determining if unacceptable combustible gas levels are present above 30 psig. Therefore, the existing PASS pumps are adequate for meeting the intent of EPGs, Revision 4, and no system modifications are necessary to resolve HED Nns. 206X-5096 and 206X-5097.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. William R. Marray at (919) 546-4661.
Yours very truly, P
L. I.
o 11 Manager Nuclear Licensing Section DBB/crs (395CRS) cc:
Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. W. H. Ruland Mr. E. G. Tourigny l
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