ML20247J047
| ML20247J047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247J045 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906010021 | |
| Download: ML20247J047 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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L SAFETY EVALUATION EY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT 'NO. u 4
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-49 NORTHEAST NGCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY. ET AL.
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO.'3 DOCKET NO. 50-423 INTRODUCTION By application for license amendment dated taarch 14,1989, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), requested changes to Millstone Unit'3 Technical Specifications.(TS).
The proposed amendant would change the Hi11 stone Unit 3 TS to replace the Surveillance Requirements of TS 4.3.4, " Turbine Overspeed Protection," as follows:
(1) TS 4.3.4.2 would be deleted and replaced with a reference to the requirements of the " Turbine Overspeed Protection Maintenance and Testing Program," and (2) TS 6.5.1.6, " Responsibilities," would be supplemented by adding item (j) which would require that the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) provide for " Review of Unit Turbine Overspeed Protection Maintenance and Testing Program and revisions thereto." In addition, a footnote would be added to the applicability for TS 3.3.4 to state that the Turbine Overspeed Protection System need not be operable "... in MODE 2 or 3 with all main steam line isola-tien valves and associated bypass valves in the closed position and all other steam flow paths to the turbine isolated."
DISCUSS 10fl AND EVALUATION During review of the licensee's operating license application for Millstone Unit 3, the NRC requested information concerning main turbine missile generation.
The request for additional information (DSER 3.5.1.3), dated December 20, 1983, generation at, or below,10~grovide infomation on maintenance of turbine missil requested that the licensee per reactor year for the life of the facility.
The following two options were suggested by the.NRC staff:
1.
Submit for NRC approval, within 3 years of obtaining an operation license, a turbine system maintenance program based on the manufacturer's calculations of missile generation probabilities, or 2.
Volumetrically inspect all low-pressure turbine rotors at the second refueling outage and at every other (alternate) refueling outage thereafter until a maintenance program is approved by the staff and to conduct turbine steam valve maintenance (following initiation of power output) in accordance with present NRC recommendations as stated in SRP Section 10.2.
8906010021 890523 DR p
ADOCK 0500o423 PDC
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. l By letter dated June 15, 1984, the licensee responded to DSER 3.5.1.3 by stating the following:
- NNECO agrees to submit for NRC approval, within three years of.
f obtaining an operating license, a turbine system maintenance program based on the manufacturer's calculations of missile generation probabilities with the option of conducting an independent review and analysis if so desired."
Subsequently, on November 7,1988, the licensee submitted the Turbine Overspeed Protection Maintenance and Testing Program (TOPMTP). The TOPMTP contains the surveillance requirements presently incorporated in TS 4.3.4.2 for turbine stop,
. control and intercept valves, and for turbine overspeed trip circuitry. In addition.the.TOPMTP prescribes inservice inspection requirements based on projected missile generation probabilities for the low pressure turbine wheels.
The TOPMTP encompasses the surveillance requimments of Section 4.3.4.2.
In addition, the TOPMPT provides for other turbine overspeed system related tests and for high and low pressure turbine rotor inspections, thereby assuring an acceptably low probability of a rotor burst at or near design overspeed.
Avoiding destructive overspeed and rotor failures is essential to minimizing the probability of the generation of turbine missiles which could impact and damage safety-related components, structures, and equipment. The more comprehensive TOPMPT provides the necessary assurance that the probability 50I turbine generated missiles will remain at or below the criteria of 1 x 10 per year in accordance with Standard Review Plan, Section 3.5.1.3, " Turbine Missiles." The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's turbine system maintenance program and concludes that the low-pressure turbine wheel inspection interval of 6 years is supported by the missile generation probabilities derived from the GE report, " Probability of Missile Generation in General Electric Nuclear Turbines,"
l January 1984 The inspection intervals for the high pressure turbine are based mostly upon the manufacturer's recommendations in SE TIL 1008-3, " Inservice Inspection of 1500 and 1800 RPM Turbine Rotors," and are acceptable.
We conclude that the TOPHPT is acceptable and acceptabiy replaces +.he Surveillance Requirements of TS 4.3.4.2.
The proposed change to T1 6.5.1.6(f) would provide for acceptable administrative and technical oversight, by the licensee, for-the TOPMPT.
I With regard to the proposed footnote to TS 3.3.4, the provision would allow the L
inoperability of the Turbine Overspeed Protection System, during operational MODES 2 and 3 (hot standby and low power generation) only under specified conditions which prevent the turbine, itself, from operating.
Based upon the above, we conclude that the proposed changes to the TS are l
acceptable.
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' ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a
. facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The staff has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public connent on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility. criteria for' categorical exclusion set forth in '10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
This amendment also involves changes in recordkeeping, reporting and/or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, with respect to these items, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the arrendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations. discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Connission's regulations, and (3) the issuance-of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security ~or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
May 23, 1989 Principal Contributor:
D. Jaffe i
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