ML20247C412
| ML20247C412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1989 |
| From: | Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Cottle W SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCES, INC. |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-89 NUDOCS 8903300187 | |
| Download: ML20247C412 (2) | |
Text
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4 March 23, 1989
, DISTRIBUTION 1 Docket,Filee NRC PDR Local PDR PD21 r/f SVarga Glainas EAdensam Docket No. 50 416 PAnderson LKintner Mr. W. T. Cottle OGC Vice President, Nuclear Operations Edordan Systems Energy Resources, Inc.
BGrimes l
P. O. Box 23054 FCantrell Jackson, Mississippi 39205 ACRS (10)
Dear Mr. Cottle:
SUBJECT:
DIKKERS SAFETY RELIEF VALVES - GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION (GGNS), UNIT 1
)
i The NRC staff has recently received a 10 CFR Part 21 notification from Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation regarding a potential defect in safety relief valves (SRVs) manufactured by Dikkers & Co.
General Electric Company furnished j
Dikkers SRVs for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2.
We are enclosing the 10 CFR Part 21 report on this potential defect. We i
request that you examine your safety relief valves during the third refueling outage to see whether this defect is applicable to Grand Gulf safety relief valves. Additional information regarding this problem may be obtained from your Gener'al Electric representative.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P. L.96-511.
Sincerely, 3
Lester L. Kintner, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate 11-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/Il
Enclosure:
Part 21 Report cc w/ enclosure:
See next page 8903300187 890323 h
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Mr. W. T. Cottle System Energy Resources, Inc.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) cc:
Mr. T. H. Cloninger Mr. C. R. Hutchinson Vice President, Nuclear Engineering GGNS General Manuger and Support System Energy Resources, Inc.
System Energy Resources, Inc.
Post Office Box 756 P. O. Box 23054 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Robert B. McGehee, Esquire The Honorable William J. Guste, Jr.
Wise, Carter, Child, Steen and Attorney General Caraway Department of Justice P. O. Box 651 State of Louisiana Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire Office of the Governor Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell State of Mississippi and Reynolds Jackson, Mississippi 39201 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005-3502 Attorney General
[
Gartin Building E
Mr. Ralph T. Lally Jackson, Mississippi 39205 L
Manager of Quality Assurance Middle South Utilities System Mr. Jack McMillan, Director Services, Inc.
Division of Solid Waste Management 633 Loyola Avenue, 3rd Floor Mississippi Department of Natural New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 Resources Post Office Box 10385 Mr. John G. Cesare Jackson, Mississippi 39209 Director, Nuclear Licensing System Energy Resources, Inc.
Alton B. Cobb, M.D.
P. O. Box 23054 State Health Officer Jackson, Mississippi 39205 State Board of Health P.O. Box 1700 Mr. C. B. Hogg, Project Manager Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Bechtel Power Corporation P. O. Box 2166 President Houston, Texas 77252-2166 Claiborne County Board of Supervisors Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Mr. H. O. Christensen Senior Resident Inspector Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 2. Box 399 101 Marietta Street Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Enclosure M Y NIAGARA FE910 1999 RuMOHAWK NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION 301 PLAINFIELD RoAo, SYRACUSE N Y 13212/ TELEPHONE (315)4741511 January 18. 1989 NMP2L 1187 i
Mr. W. T. Russell, Regional Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Re:
Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 l
Docket No. 50-410 NPF-69 Gentlemen:
On November 3, 1988, notification of a potential defect as defined by Part 21 of the Commission's regulations was made to Mr. R. Lauro by telephone. Our subsequent investigations have resulted in the conclusion that a defect in a basic component does not exist.
We informed the Commission of our subsequent l
findings by telephone on November 9, 1988.
We agreed to submit a written report describing the conditions found and the corrective actions taken.
The attached report provides the required information.
Very truly yours, NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION l
l C. D. Terry Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Licensing PEF /mjd 6104G xt: Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (3 copies Mr. W. Cook, Resident Inspector i
Mr. J. Johnson, Region I Records Management gml'j@T74N3hp ig y.
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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION I
J Report of Potential Deviation, Defect or Failure to Comply A' deficiency has been identified in the cleanliness controls applied to the G.
Dikkers & Co. Safety Relief Valves, model Gr 471.
These safety relief valves are used at Nine Mlle Point Unit 2.
The Dikkers Safety Relief Valves were supplied by General Electric Corporation, and were installed by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, j
During decertification testing prior to the mid-cycle outage, two (2) of the nine (9) spare safety relief valves failed the setpoint test.
The valve upper-bonnets were disassembled and a heavy black substance was found on the stem and upper bonnet assembly. This substance was determined to be Tectyle 890, in lieu of the vendor recommended Tectyle 846.
In addition the Tectyle 890 was applied to all kinematic parts.
The safety relief valves are designed to prevent overpressurization of the nuclear system that could lead to failure of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
The valves also provide automatic depressurization for small and intermediate breaks in the nuclear system occurring with maloperation of the high pressure core spray system. The valves are located on the main steam system piping.
The rated capacity of the valves is sufficient to prevent a rise in pressure within the protected vessel of more than 110 percent of the design pressure.
(1.10 x 1,250 psig - 1,375 psig.) More detail on the design of the valves can be found in FSAR Section 5.2.
If these valves had been installed and had failed to open at the required setpoint during a transient, an overpressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary could have occurred.
Since this failure could not have been detected without testing the valves, this condition was considered to be a potential significant safety hazard.
When the plant was shut down for a mid-cycle maintenance outage, a visual examination of the eighteen installed safety relief valves was performed. A black residue was observed on several of the valves. This residue was assumed to be Tectyle 890. Nine (9) of the valves were removed from the plant and sent out for testing.
The results of the testing showed that this residue was melted plastic from dust caps left in the discharge parts of the valves; no Tectyle 890 was present. An analysis by General Electric and testing by Wyle Labs, Inc. demonstrates that the dust caps would not have affected the valves' ability to operate if required. This conclusion is further reinforced by the results of functional testing of the safety relief valves performed during startup testing.
General Electric notified Niagara Mohawk of the cause of the valve setpoint test failure on October 3, 1988. The analysis of the dust caps' affect on valve operability was reported on November 23, 1988.
(6104G)
t
- F Eighteen (18) safety relief valves are installed at Nine Mile Point Unit 2.
An additional nine (9) valves are maintained as spares in the warehouse.
Every refueling outage nine of the installed valves are removed and sent out for testing. The nine spare valves are installed in their place. The nine valves sent out for testing are reconditioned and returned to the warehouse as spares for the next refueling outage.
The nine (9) spare valves have been cleaned and decertified for the designated setpoint pressure.
The storage procedure for coating spare safety relief valves will be corrected to specify Tectyle 846.
The preventive maintenance procedure will require that the protective coating be removed prior to installation.
Nine of the installed valves were sent out for testing in the "as found" condition. None of the valves' opening pressure exceeded the maximum allowable setpoint pressure. Thus, the dust cap residue did not affect the:
valve operability.
The failure to remove the dust caps was a housekeeping error by the Architect Engineer.
The Niagara Mohawk procedure for the installation of the safety relief valves requires a visual inspection to insure that the valves are clean and that all dust caps have been removed.
The remaining nine valves in service have been inspected and cleaned prior to startup.
We have not identified any other components at the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 subject to this failure. At this time, we know of no other facilities potentially having this defect.
(6104G)
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