ML20247C411
| ML20247C411 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/29/1989 |
| From: | Carr K NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Markey E HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325C171 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 8909130352 | |
| Download: ML20247C411 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES N
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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August 29, 1989 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Edward J. Markey United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
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Dear Congressman Markey:
I am responding to your letter of July 21, 1989, concerning tritium shipper-receiver discrepancies. Our responses to the questions posed in ycur letter are enclosed.
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for licensing the export of nuclear materials, including tritium.
In carrying out this responsibility, NRC consults with other departments and agencies of the Federal government, including the Departments of Energy and State. For exports other than those that are covered by a general license pursuant to 10 CFR Parts 110.20 and 110.23, the Executive Branch typically approves requests for exports of tritium if they are not inimical to the U.S. common defense and security, provided that (1) the shipments are limited in size, (2) the tritium cannot be re-exported without U.S. authorization, and (3) limits are placed on subsequent shipments to certain countries of the ultimate product containing the U.S. supplied tritium.
Based on these findings and its own findings under 10 CFR Part 110, NRC issues an export license that adopts the above provisions as conditions. Although the Department of Energy (DOE) is still conducting its investigation into the tritium shipper-receiver discrepancies between the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Surelite, Ltd., there are no current indications that the i
tritium exports to Surelite were in violation of NRC's export license.
With respect to the ongoing investigation of these discrepancies, DOE, with NRC staff assistance, recently completed a preliminary investigation of this matter.
1 Sincc: this inquiry did not resolve all of the discrepancies under investigation, i
the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy,' DOE, commissioned a special team with more extensive experience with tritium to continue the 1
investigation. We understano that DOE will advise you of the team's findings from this ongoing investigation. We will keep you infomed of any additional significant infomation pertinent to NRC activities.
Sincerely, i
o>wAk %. b Kenneth M. Carr
Enclosure:
l Responses to Questions Of4 g,0s29 y;
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QUESTION 1:~
When and how did the NRC learn of the tritium shipper-receiver differences referred to in the July 10, 1989 staff memorandum? What responsibilities will the NRC have in investigating these discrepancies?
ANSWER:
The Department of Energy-(DOE) advised the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the referenced discrepancies in a May 31, 1989 telephone conversation between a member of DOE's legal staff and a staff member of URC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Information obtained during that conversation and a subsequent discussion on June 1, 1989, was communicated orally and in writing to NRC management in the Offices of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards and Governmental and Public Affairs during the period May 31-June 2, 1989. This information was also communicated to the Office of the Executive Director for Operations. The first formal Commission notification was on June 16, 1989.
During discussions between DOE and NRC, it was agreed that NRC would provide technical support in conducting a preliminary investigation of the tritium shipper-receiver differences between Oak Ridge and two finns in the United Kingdom. NRC agreed to participate in a support role on the DOE investigative team because NRC is responsible under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to assure that its licensees do not engage in unauthorized activities which would be inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S.
NRC participation is specifically justified because:
- 1) the transactions involved a-______
c 4 - NRC export licenses, 2) the reported differences could have been the result of leakage or diversion, and 3) similar differences might have been occurring at NRC or Agreement State licensees. The initial investigation did not result in indications of unauthorized activities, nor did it identify the reasons for all of the differences with one of the firms, Surelite, Ltd. Therefore, the Office Lof the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, DOE, formed a special investigative team with more extensiva experience with tritium to further review this matter and to determine whether the alleoed discrepancies were real and if so, where any missing tritium may have gone. NRC is following this further investigation closely to determine if additional NRC actions are required.
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- 6-QUESTION 2:
It is my' understanding that both Self-Powered Lighting, Inc. and Surelite, Ltd., have outstanding tritium orders with DOE. Will further st.ipments to those fims be suspended pending completion of the NRC's investigation? If not, please explain why the NRC would permit such shipments to coatinue and what specific measures are being taken to avoid further discrepancies.
ANSWER:
In a press release dixod July 25, 1989 DOE announced that all shipments of tritium to commercial customers from the DOE facility in Oak Ridge were suspended pending a review of the measurement and loading operations at Oak Ridge. DOE ordered this suspension so that current DOE contractor practices and procedures could be reviewed and evaluated and measures could be implemented to avoid further discrepancies. The investigation has progressed to the point where DOE made a determination on August 16, 1989 that tritium shipments could be resumed to all customers, except those overseas with unresolved discrepancies.
Resumption is contingent upon compliance with specified conditions established by DOE, which include improvements in measurement, packaging, shipping procedures and formalization of administrative matters with commercial customers. These conditions were established to avoid further accounting discrepancies between shippers and receivers.
It is our understanding that, under this approach, DOE would be in a position to resume shipments to Self-Powered Lighting, Inc. (a domestic licensee) for domestic use but not to l
Surelite, Ltd.
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2-Based on the information available from the ongoing evaluation there is no indication that the discrepancies have resulted from' unauthorized activities.
Although NRC does not plen to suspend or revoke current export licenses, NRC will evaluate the findings and reconmiendations of the special investigative team and detennine what actions are appropriate to ensure compliance with requirements under 10 CFR Part 110.
With respect to possible outstanding tritium orders for Self-Powered Lighting, Inc. and Surelite, i.td., detailed information on the status of outstanding orders should be obtained from DOE.
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t 00ESTION 3s' Does the NRC have.any' proof that the missing 25,000 curies-
.of tritium have not-been retransferred without proper authorization or diverted or that this tritium is not currently posing a risk to public health?
ANSWER,:
The NRC has no prnof that the claimed shortfall.of tritium in the referenced
. exports'has not been retransferred without U.S. authorization or possibly diverted. As noted in our response to Question 1, the cause of the shipper-receiver discrepancies has not.as yet been determineo but remains the subject of. an ongoing investigation by a special team formed by DOE. Based on the information available' to date, improvements in measurements, packaging, and shipping procedures have been identified as areas needing improvement for future shipments.
Because of the in!)erent properties of tritium and packaging of the material, it is unlikely that this tritium is currently posing a risk to public health.
Tritium is a gas which emits only low energy radiation. The small but tight shipping and storage containers completely surround and shield this radiation so there is no significant external radiation level.
Furthermore, in the unlikely event that it were released, it would tend to dissipate in the air. The facilities in which it is used have ventilation systems that further dissipate the tritium gas. Therefore, except under some unusual circumstance where ventilation systems were not working, no significant personnel exposure would result.
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QllESTION 4:
The NRC staff memo indicates.that "there are no present NRC requirements for safeguarding tritium." If this is'the case, how could NRC be confident that " existing U.S.
Government export control measures are adequate"--as NRC-told me earlier this year?
ANSWER:
There are no domestic safeguards requirements applicable to tritium. NRC does require that tritium exports be controlled in accordance with conditions in the licenses. Control measures for tritium exports include review of proposed destination and end use, stipulations that material only be used for stated purposes, restrictions on the quantity of tritium per shipment and total quantity shipped per year, and requirements for retransfer approval. Taken in con, junction with control requirements imposed in recipient countries principally for health and safety reasons, we believe these measures are adequate to ensure that tritium is appropriately controlled.
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N-OllESTION 5:
Does NRC believe there may be a need for a'.HRC requirement for safeguards on tritium, given the fact that it is a key component of modern nuclear weapons?' If not, why not? ~ 1f.
so, what form should these safeguards ttke?
. ANSWER:.
In 1981, the NRC assessed the need for routine reporting requirements for tritium and concluded that' they were not necessary. These reporting requirements a-were then eliminated after a formal rulemaking action. More recently, an assessment was made relative to whether tritium should be considered special nuclear material and safeguarded accordingly. As noted in our Mac:i 30, 1989 response.
to the Honorable Philip Sharp, NRC has determined that no specific safeguards
~ measures are necessary since tritium can only undergo fusion under very extreme-
- temperatures and pressuras such as those created in the detonation of a fission.
bomb. Reliable safeguards 'on special nuclear materials that could be utilized to construct a fission device make the safeguarding of tritium unnecessary.
The staff, however, will review the DOE findings upon completion of-their investigation as they may relate to NRC responsibilities regarding tritium.
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OUESTION 6:
It is my understanding that licenses issued by the NRC for d.mestic sales of tritium include provisions for:
(1) records of receipt, transfer, and disposal of the material; (2) repcrts of theft or unlawful diversion; (3) inspection of records kept pursuant to the license; and (4) tests of the material, facilities, monitoring instrument, etc.
Do NRC licenses for exports of tritium include the same requirements? If not, how can the NRC be sure that exported tritium is not improperly transferred or diverted from peaceful uses?
ANSWER:
Domestic licenses issued by the NRC for possession of tritium include the cited provisions for health and safety purposes. Export licenses issued to domestic firms, on the other hand, impose only requirements to maintain records of all shipments pursuhnt to a license and to make those records available to NRC for inspection at any time, thus giving NRC the ability to conduct shipping record audits.
Additionally, the Executive Branch performs a review independent of the NRC which focuses on the country to which the export is being made to determine that the export is riot inimical to the common defense and security.
In making
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this decennination, the factors considered include the proposed end use and
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whether the export is in accordance with U.S. policy. This gives NRC I
additional assurance that exported tritium would not be improperly transferred J
l cr diverted from peaceful uses, j
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3 QUESTION 7:
The NRC staff memo also states that "the possibility exists that there may be shipper-receiver differences between ORNL and domestic licensees that purchase tritium from DOE."
What is the basis for this statement and which domestic licensees are being investigated?
ANSWER:
In view of the fact that shipper-receiver differences had occurred in connection with exports, it was reasonable to suspect that differences might also have' occurrca with domestic transactions. A sampling of licensees indicated that although there were small differences, the receivers have not pursued their resolution. For the purpose of obtaining a clearer understanding of Surelite's measurement and handling procedures in the United Kingdom, the I
initial DOE investigative team visited Self-Powered Lighting, Inc., a domestic licensee, whose procedures are understood to be comparable to Surelite's.
DOE recently requested NRC assistance in reviewing the processing and handling procedures at Self-Powered Lighting, Inc. and Safety Light Corporation, another domestic licensee.
In response to this request, on August 23, 1989, NRC conducted a special inspection of Safety Light Corporation with DOE participating in an observer capacity. The State of New York is scheduling an inspection of Self-Powered Lighting with representatives of NRC and DOE present since the facility is an Agreement State licensee.
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'00ESTION 8:
Has the NRC assisted in investigating any other tritium shipper-receiver discrepancies during the last five years?
If.so, please provide a list of the parties involved, the amount of tritium, and.the results of NRC's investigation into each discrepancy.
3 ANSWER:
The NRC has not 3ssisted in investigating any other tritium shipper-receiver discrepancies during the last five years, I
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