ML20247A895
| ML20247A895 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1989 |
| From: | Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-89-103 VPNPD-89-471, NUDOCS 8909120241 | |
| Download: ML20247A895 (3) | |
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l VPNPD-89-471 NRC-89-103 August 30, 1989 Mr. A. Bere Davis, Regional Administrator U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Dear Mr. Davis:
DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 59-301 DISCUSSION OF OPEN ITEMS NOS. 266/89008-06 AND 266/89008-07 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 On August 28, 1989, a telephone conference call was held between Messrs. DeFayette, Gill, and Greger of the NRC Region III staff and members of our stuff concerning our activities related to Open Items 266/89008-06 and 266/89008-07 as most recently identified in the NRC Inspection Reports 50-266/89023 and 50-301/89022 dated August 14, 1989.
This letter responds to the NRC request made in the course of the call to document certain Wisconsin Electric commitments.
The first item of discussion concerned Open Item 266/89008-07 regarding our emergency response procedures for obtaining and analyzing a plant air sample having postulated elevated levels of radioactive iodine in the event of an emergency.
In early May 1989, a review of our methodology and current procedures for the determination of in-plant radiciodine air concentrations was performed.
During this review, it was determined that (1) the Radiological Engineering Staff has the knowledge and required engineering tools to complete the necessary calculations on a case-by-case basis, and (2) an additional Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) to allow for a rapid estimation of in-plant airborne radiciodine concentrations would enhance our current capabilities.
Additional discussions between the Wisconsin Electric Radiological Engineering Staff and the Emergency Planning Staff were conducted to determine the best method of presenting the data for use by Chemistry and Health Physics personnel.
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Bert Davis August 30, 1989 LPage 2 On June 13, 1989, the Radiological Engineering Staff began the technical analysis and calculations necessary to develop the tabular data for the new EPIP.
The results were contained in a
-memorandum to the plant manager dated August 7, 1989.
This 1
transmittal contained tabular data relating filter cartridge
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contact dose rate readings to I-130,LI-131, 1-132, I-133, I-134 and I-135-air concentrations at various times after shutdown following a design basis accident.
These tables are the basis for development of the above identified Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure.
This Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure is currently being developed.
We expect-the procedure will be completed in draft form by September 1, 1989.
It will include the guidance necessary to utilize the data tables and ; worksheet to assist in completing calculations to determine iodine air concentration levels.
Anticipating a review and approval process of approximately two weeks, this procedure will be ready for issuance by September 15, 1989.
This is'well within the i-three-month time line delineated in the referenced Inspection Reports.
1 The second item of discussion concerned Open Item 266/89008-06 regarding the capability to obtain and analyze a post-accident containment atmosphere sample.
As discussed in the conference call, Wisconsin Electric initiated a document review in early May to identify the design basis, requirements, and commitments made regarding the sampling system pressure capabilities.
Our progress and anticipated actions were discussed with Mr. Foster of the Region III staff during his inspection July 10-14, 1989.
By that time,'we had determined that the sampling system pump seals were not the limiting factor for sample system operation above 5 psig as stated in the sampling procedure.
We had, in fact, been informed by the pump supplier that the sample pump was rated up to 15 psig at continuous duty and up to 20 psig for intermittent use.
At that time, our investigations were continuing to identify pressure limitations for the other components of the sampling system.
By late July we had determined that the containment post-accident sampling system (PASS) was limited to operation at pressures below 5 psig only because of a glass bowl in a moisture drain trap located upstream of the sample pump.
On July 28, 1989, a project plan was developed to upgrade the containment PASS.
The project plan addressed procurement and installation of materials, system testing, and revision of applicable procedures.
Project completion is expected by the end of October 1989. to our response to Inspection Reports 50-266/89013 and 50-301/89012 dated August 3, 1989, discussed our progress on this issue.
1 Mr. A. Bert Davis August 30, 1989 Page 3 As discussed on August 28, we intend to upgrade the containment PASS to a 15 psig system by replacement of the glass drain trap bowl with a metal bowl capable of withstanding pressures to 30 psig.
The metal drain trap has been ordered with a requested delivery date of September 1, 1989.
The metal drain trap bowl will be bench-tested at pressures up to 35 psig.
In addition, the metal bowl will be lab-tested to determine its suitability for use with sodium hydroxide which could be present in containment atmosphere as a result of containment spray.
We anticipate completion of these activities by mid-September 1989.
Upon completion of the testing noted above, we would expect to approve and proceed with the modification design package.
The modification to the Unit 1 containment PASS should be completed and tested by early October 1989.
The Unit 2 modification will be made during the fall 1989 outage and is expected to be completed prior to startup.
Revision of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will proceed concurrently with these modifications.
Procedure issue will follow post-modification acceptance testing.
We anticipate issuance of procedures in October for Unit 1 and again just prior to Unit 2 post-refueling testing.
In the event that the metal drain trap bowls fail either the pressure test or the sodium hydroxide exposure test, an alternate design, presently under review, will be considered.
Use of an alternate design will require adjustment of the implementation schedule.
We will promptly notify you if any such changes become necessary.
Very trul
- ours, C. p. Fay Vice President Nuclear Power Copies to NRC Resident Inspector NRC Document Control Desk i
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