ML20246G167
| ML20246G167 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/10/1989 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2613A, NUDOCS 8905150209 | |
| Download: ML20246G167 (6) | |
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_ April 10, 1989 p :-,
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING December 14, 1988 Room P 114, Bethesda, Maryland The Safeguards and Security Subcommittee met on December 14, 1988 to discuss safeguards at nuclear reactor facilities.
Dr. H. Lewis is the chairman of the subcommittee. The following ACRS member were in attendance:
Dr. Siess, Mr. Michelson, Mr. Ward and Dr. Shewmon. The meeting was convened at 8:30 a.m.
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Prior to the meeting, Mr. Dean Toms. Security Division, briefed the subcommittee on handling of foreign intelligence.
He noted that foreign intelligence information is based upon need to know, written authorization, and a "Q" clearance.
He discussed handling of foreign intelligence.
Mr. Burnett, MMSS, discussed the Nuclear Safeguards Program. NMSS develops threat assessment and NRR develops threat responses.
Mr. Burnett discussed Safeguards Responsibilities. NMSS develops the design basis threat and NRR develops the regulatory development and licensing.
The design basis threat for radiological sabotage for an external f501
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DESIGNATED ORIGINAL LUObb U
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i violence, deception, stealth several persons well trained, dedicated 7; active or passive assistance by an insider hand-carried weapons
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For theft or diversion, the design basis threat involves:
violence, deception, stealth small group well trained, dedicated active or passive assistance by an insider hand-carried weapons ability to operate as two or more teams.
For an internal threat, for radiological sabotage the design basis threat would involve an insider in any position.
For an internal threat for theft or diversion, the design basis threat, for radiological sabotage is an insider in any position.
For theft or diversion, the design basis threat is an insider in any position and/or a conspiracy between individuals in any position.
l Mr. Burnett noted that the threat assessment doesn't include a truck I
bomb. He also noted that a reactor is probably not a good target for terrorists.
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December 14, 1988 Subcom.Mtg.
Mr. Burnett noted that to evaluate continuing threat analysis they meet with intelligence agencies on a periodic basis.
Mr. Eric-Weinstein discussed the Incident Response Program.
This includes the safeguards assessment for the objectives:
advise response management about the security and safeguards developments and recommend appropriate actions provide safeguards information to appropriate law enforce-ment agencies (including the FBI) and coordinate efforts for evaluating appropriate remedial actions provide plant-specific information and analysis concerning the safeguards contingency plan to decision makers.
Mr. Weinstein listed reportable security related events:
credible bomb threat or extortion threat fire or explosion of suspicious or unknown origin mass demonstration or civil disturbance at or near site actual or potential sabotage or tampering with safety or security equipment assault made on site minimum security staffing requirements not met or actual / imminent strike by security or work force major safeguards system degradation which has not been
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1 compensated for by the time of the report actual / attempted theft, diversion or sabotage involving I
- other events which in the judgement of the operations offices should be reported due to compensatory measures not being fully in affect due to actual / potential serious l
l adverse consequences which resulted or could result at the j
plant.
1 Mr.'Barry Manelli discussed the Safeguards review process.
I The design basis' threat protection is based upon:
10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(1) establishment of a physical protection system protection against threat of radiological sabotage by:
an external assault an internal threat Mr. Manelli discussed:
l the security plan requirements the use of the Standard Review Plan regulatory guides j
NUREG documents the basis for the training and qualification plan guard training and qualification plan requirements l
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the basis for contingency plans revisions to security plans.
Acommitjeememberaskedhowdoyouprotectanuclearplantagainst i
insider threats?
l The response was: By several means. The staff relies on Human Quality Control, the access authorization rule, security requirements l
for personnel, and fitness for Duty.
There was a brief discussion on computer protection. The staff noted that Reactor Safety Systems are not dependent on computer software.
The staff noted a continual interest in the protection of software.
The Reactor Safeguards Branch listed some current projects:
Fitness for Duty program for power reactors contingency planning for vehicle bomb issue paper on waterborne bomb NRC staff contingency plan for vehicle bomb personnel access authorization bomb non-power reactor sabotage study vital equipment protection policy safeguards for Independent Spent Fuel Storage 1
Peach Bottom restart
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reviews of standard LWRs and advanced designs.
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1 The meeting was adjourned at 12:30 p.m.
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