ML20246F905
| ML20246F905 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1989 |
| From: | Kowalski S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| L2-89-23, NUDOCS 8905150135 | |
| Download: ML20246F905 (4) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 r
PHILADELPHIA A. PA.19101 o
V (215) 841-4502 i
S. J. KOWALSKI VIC E-P R ESID E NT w e m.........
10CFR50.55(e) q Mr. W. T. Russell, Administrator Docke* No. 50-353 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission CPPR-107 Attn: Document Control Clerk Mall Station P1-137 Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Limerick Generating Station - Unit 2 Significant Deficiency Report - SDR No. L2-89-23 Essential Equipment Location in an Unanalyzed Environment
Reference:
Telecon, R. J. Lees to J. Gajzalla March 16, 1989 File:
QUAL 2-10-2 (SDR No. L2-89-23)
Dear Mr. Russell:
As conmitted to in the referenced telephone conversation, we are submitting the attached Significant Deficiency Report SDR No. L2-89-23 concerning Essential Equipment located in an unanalyzed environment.
This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10CFR Part 50.55(e).
Our corrective action being taken is the installation of conduit seals or the re-orientation of conduit runs to avoid noisture intrusion into electrical equipment prior to startup of Limerick Generating Station Unit 2.
In conclusion, we consider SDR No. L2-89-23 closed with the issuance of this report.
If yot.' have any further questions, please contact us.
Sinc rely,
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Attachment Copy to:
W. T. Russell, USNRC, Region 1 Administrator R. A. Grarrm, USNRC, LGS 2 Senior Resident Inspector R. J. Clark, USNRC, LGS 2 Project Manager f
WJC/kh/04188901 8905150135 890515 PDR ADOCK 05000353 g
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C. A. McNelli (S26-1)
S.:J. Kowalski (S25-1) j.
L E. J. Bradley (S23-1)
L. B. Pyrlh (N2-1)
E. P. Fogarty (S7-1)
D. R. Helwig (S7-1) l G. A. Hunger, Jr. (57-1)
A. J. Marie (N2-1)
H. D. Honan (N2-1) l D. P. Hel ker (57-1)
G. M. Leitch (LGS)
J. S. Kemper (S25-1)
P. J. Duca, Jr. (LGS)
C. R. Endriss (LGS)
J. M. Cor::oran (LGS)
R. M. Krich.(N7-1)
P. S. Thurman (N2-1)
R. J. Lees (N2-1)
D. B. Fetters (N4-1)
D. N. Sundt (N2-1)
W. J. Boyer (N2-1)
W. J. Mindick N2-1)
DAC (NG-8) f
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4 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING L
ENGINEERING DIVISION N2-1, 2301 MARKET STREET Significant Deficiency Report SDR No. L2-89-23 Essential Equipment Located in an Unanalyzed Environment DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:
As part of the start-up activitles for Linvarick Generating Statlon Unit 2, an engineering review of the overall Impinnvantation of the E0 program was conducted. To assure compilance with the program enhancermnts, i
detailed walkdowns of Unit 2 equipment items were performed. During these walkdowns it was identified that equipment associated with backpressure dampers, MSIV limit switches, and leak detection temperature elements lacked conduit seals or conduit low point drains, which are now required to support the qualification of the eaulpment. The NRC was notified on March 16, 1989, of this condition in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 50.55Ce).
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:
If a High Energy Line Breck (HELB) had occurred during reactor operation, noisture intrusion into the backpressure damper devices (solenoid valves, pressure switches, and limit switches) may have prevented closure of the backpressure dampers. This could have allowed steam to enter areas of the reactor building not analyzed for a HELB environment. The backpressure dmipers in question serve the following areas:
Peactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), EL. 201' Safeguard System Rocm, EL. 217' Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase, EL. 253' and 283' Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Recirculation Ptmp, FL. 283' RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger, EL. 283' RWCU ReneratIve Heat Exchanger, EL. 283' Steam Vent Tunnel, EL. 283' Each of the four outboard MSIV's have three limit switches. Two of the limit switches function to indicate open or closed valve position, the third limit switch provides a trip signal to the Reactor Protection System (RPS). Failure of en outboard MSIV limit switch would have initiated a half scram. Had all four limit switches to RPS been affected by moisture intrusion, the reactor would have scramed.
Failure of any of the eight position indication limit switches, vould not have had adverse effects on the plant.
Failure of the leak detection system temperature elements could have precluded timely steam Isolation for small steam line breaks up to the point where the flow sensing elements located in the system piping would initiate automatic system isolation valve closure upon a high flow situation. The temperature elements in cuestion are located in the following areas:
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High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Room RCIC Roan RWCU Room I'
Main Steam Tunnel Corrective Actlon:
Startup Change Requests (SCRs) have been issued to add conduit seals or low point drains to the Unit 2 equipment in questlon.
_ These changes will be carpleted prior to Unit 2 start-up.
Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
The EQ documentation revlw procedures have been revised to
. include a detailed evaluation : 4ecklist. This checklist includes. Items such as installation and orieni,ation limitations and required interfaces.
This information will be included as special instruction to the field in the' Engineering Work Letter for Installation and will be included in the EQ Report.
WJC/kh/04188902
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