ML20245D295
| ML20245D295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000734 |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1988 |
| From: | GENERAL ATOMICS (FORMERLY GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC./GENER |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245D280 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-880630, NUDOCS 8906270047 | |
| Download: ML20245D295 (82) | |
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O RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY PLAN O
I JUNE 1988 O
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RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY PLAN 1
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O JUNE 1988
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1 TABIE OF CONTENTS l
l INTRODUCTION.
vi DEFIh IONS vii 1.
GENERAL DESCRIPI' ION OF THE PIANT/ LICENSED ACTIVITY 1-1
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1.1 Licensed Ictivity Description 1-1 L
1.2 Site and Facility Description 1-2 1.2.1 Facility Descriptions 1-4 1.3 Process Description 1-9 1.3.1 HIGR Fuel Manufacturing.
1-9 1.3.2 Fuel Production Process Development.
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1.3.3 Nuclear Waste Processing 1-10
[3 1.3.4 Hot Cell.
1-10 1.3.5 TRIGA Fuel Manufacturing 1-10 1.3.6 TRIGA Reactor Operations 1-11 2.
ENGINEERED PROVISIONS FOR ABNORMAL OPERATIONS.
2-1 2.1 Criteria 2-1 3.
RADIOII)GICAL CONTINGENCIES.
3-1 3.1 Classification and Assessment of Radiological Contingencies 3-1 3.2 Emergency Classification Scheme 3-1 3.2.1 Class
" Notification of Unusual Event" 3-2 3.2.2 Class
" Alert" 3-2 3.2.3 Class
" Site Area Emergency".
3-4 3.2.4 Class
" General Emergency" 3-5 3.3 Range of Postulated Iccidents 3-6 3.4 Assessment Ictions 3-7 3.4-.1 Procedures for Estinating Off-Site Radiological Consequences of an Iccident 3-7 3.4.2 Emergency Procedure for Nuclear Criticality at the f)')
HIGR Fuel Fabrication Facility 3-11 ii
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(,E 3.4.3 TRIGA Reactor Assessment 3.
3.4.4 Assessment at Other Incations.
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ORGANIZATION EUR CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL CatfrINGENCIES.
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- GA Emergency Response Organization 4.1.1 Facility Staff Responsibilities 4-1 4.1.2 ' Edny::ucy Support Center 4-2
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g 4.1.3 Emergency Notification' 4-3 4.1.4 Emergency Response and Recovery Director (ERRD) 4-3 4.1.5. Emergency Coordinator 4-4 4.1.6 Prinary Support Group Emergency Response Organization 4-4 4.1.7 Secondary Support Group.
4-7 4.1.8 Employees and Other Persons with Special Qualification for Coping with Emergency Conditions.
4-9 4.1.9 Off-Site Support Groups.
4-9 4.2 Coordination with Participating Agencies 4-10 5.
PRum; RIVE ACTIONS.
5-1 5.1 Personnel Evacuation from Site and Accountability 5-1 5.1.1 On-Site Personnel.
5-1 5.1.2 Routes 2 5.1.3 Off-Site Personnel 5-2 5.2 Use of Protective Equipnent and Supplies 5-2 l
5.3 Contamination Control Measure 5-3 l
5.4-Radiological Exposure Control 5-3 l
l 5.4.1 Emergency Exposure Control Program 5-3 5.4.2 Decontamination of Personnel 5-3 5.4.3 Medical Transportation 5-4 5.4.4 Medical Treatment.
5-4 5.4.5 Facility for Assessment Teams.
5-5 6.
EQUIPMENT ANI) FACILITIES.
6-1 6.1 Health Physics Laboratory 6-1 6.2 Emergency Communications Network 6-2 6.2.1 Telephone 6-2 6.2.2 Radio.
6-2 6.2.3 Public Address System 6-2 iii
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6.2.4 Alarms 6-2 6.2.5 Meteorological System 6-3 6.2.6 Vehicles and Equipmnt 6-3 6.2.7 Personnel Decontamination Facilities 6-4 6.3 Facility for Assessment 'Ibams 6-5 7.
RECOVERY AND REEtTIRY 7-1 7.1 Procedure.
7-1 8.
BCNB THREATS.
8-1 8.1 Mail Bomb.
8-1 8.2 Direct Bomb Threats by Individuals 8-2 9.
TERRORISM.
9-1 9.1 During Normal Hbrking Hours 9-3 9.2 During Nonworking Hours 9-4
- 10. MAINTENANCE OF RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY.
10-1 10.1 Written Procedures 10-1 10.2 Training 10-1 r3 10.3 Tests and Drills.
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i 10.4 Reviewing and Updating of the Plan and Procedures.
10-2 10.5 Maintenance of Inventory of Radiation Emergency Equipent 10.2 11.
RECORDS AND REPORTS 11-1 11.1 Records of Incidents 11-1 11.2 Records of Preparedness Assurance 13-2 11.3 Reporting Arrangements.
11-2 FIGURES Fig. 1-1.
Imation of Nearby Industrial Parks and Comunity Facility Fig. 1-2.
Plan View of Sites j
Fig. 3-1.
Work Authorization Accident Consequence Evaluation Fig. 3-2.
Atmospheric Stability Condition A Fig. 3-3.
Atmospheric Stability Condition B Fig. 3-4.
Atmospheric Stability Condition C Fig. 3-5.
A.trospheric Stability Condition D g-Fig. 3-6.
Atmospheric Stability Condition E iv
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't Fig, 3-7.
Atmospheric Stability Condition F Fig. 3-8.
1-Hour Dose,12 Pulses, 3.0*E18 'Ibtal Fissions Fig. 3-9.
3-Hour Dose, 12 Pulses, 3.0*E18 Total Fissions Fig. 3-10. 8-Hour Dose, 12 Pulses, 3.0*E18 Total Fissions Fig. 4-1.
Emergency Response Organization Fig. 5-1.
Main Site Criticality Evacuation Procedures Fig. 5-1A. Criticality Evacuation Routo Fig. 5-2.
Sorrento Valley Facilities TABLES Table 1-1.
Distance / Pop tation of Surrounding Cannunities
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INTRODUCTION l
The licensed activities cover a large number of independent small research and development (R&D) laboratories, two TRIGA research i
reactors, two fuel fabrication facilities, a hot cell, a waste i
processing facility, and several more significant R&D laboratories involved in the use and handling of irradiated materials fran reactors.
The facilities are licensed pursuant to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 50 and 70, and also by the State of California, an Agreement State.
The administration and operating procedures in effect at General Atomics (GA) are designed to prevent the occurrence of accidents; however, a possibility always exists that accidents or natural disasters
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may occur despite the most effective safeguards.
Because of this possibility and the presence of a substantial inventory of fissionable /
radioactive materials, this contingency plan has been developed.
The purpose of the Radiological Contingency Plan is to establish an organization capable of coping with emergencies, to classify emergencies according to their severity, define and assign responsibilities, and to clearly outline the most effective neasures to mitigate the consequences of an emergency and to safeguard the employees of GA and the public.
Detailed emergency procedures required to implement this plan will be developed for each facility covered by this plan and will be avail-able for use by site operating personnel. The emergency procedures will be placed into effect whenever an emergency exists.
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DEFINITIONS Assessment M tions Those actions taken during or after an accident to obtain and process infontation which is necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency procedures.
Corrective Actions Those measures taken to correct and terminate an emergency.
Emergency An emergency is a condition which calls for immediate action beyond the scope of normal operating procedures to avoid an accident, an unusual disturbance, or to mitigate their consequences.
Emergency Action Iavels Specific instrument readings, or observa-y tions; radiological dose or dose rates; or specific contamination levels of airborne, waterborne, or surface deposited radioactive or other hazardous materials that may be used for establishing emergency classes and initiating appropriate emergency measures.
Report or observation of severe natural phenomenon or receipt of a bant threat or civil disturbance.
Emergency Classes Emergency classes of radiological accidents grouped by severity level for which pre-determii n emergency measures should be taken or considered.
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,n Emergency Coordinator The Emergency Coordinator is the person (EC) designated as being responsible for requesting and coordinating the activities of all' the various emergency support groups.
The EC reports to the Emergency Response and l'
Recovery Director at the scene and assists in controlling the situation.
Emergency Planning Zone Area for which emergency planning is (EPZ) perfoned to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect GA employees and the public in the event of a radiological accident.
l Emergency Procedures Emergency procedures are, documented instruc-tions that detail the implementation actions and methods required to achieve the objec-(m) tives of the emergency plan.
Emergency Response and The ERRD is a senior person designed by the Recovery Director (ERRD) facility / project management and is respons-ible during the first phases of an energency for the overall direction of all activities at the scene.
When the situation has been controlled, the ERRD is reponsible for directing the recovery effort.
Emergency Support Center Security Station No. 1, Building 1, Roam 103, (ESC) has been designated as the prircary Emergency Support Center.
This Center is the focal point fram which all emergency support and direction will be provided.
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GA General Atomics.
Off-site The geographical area that is beyond the site boundary.
On-site The geographical area that is within the site boundary.
Operations Boundary The area within the site boundary surrounding a reactor, hot cell, or fuel facility where the Emergency Director has direct authority over all activities.
The area within the boundary shall have prearranged evacuation j
procedures known to personnel frequenting the area.
Protective Actions Those measures taken before, during, or after
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an emergency has occurred to protect health and safety of individuals and to prevent damage to property.
Raelimdive Material Any material which emits ionizing radiation spontaneously, including special nuclear and source material.
Recovery Those actions taken after the emergency to restore the facility to its pre-emergency condition.
Research Reactor A device designed to support a self-sustaining neutron chain reaction for re-search, develognental, educational, training,
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radioisotopes.
. Site The General Atomics site includes approxi-mately 60 acres on the mesa and approximately 60 acres in Sorrento Valley.
Each are generally bounded by a chain-link steel fence I
which provides restriction of access to these sites.
Site Boundary The site boundary is that boundary, not necessarily having restrictive barriers, surrounding the operations boundary wherein the Emergency Coordinator may directly initiate emergency activities.
The area within the boundary may be frequented by I
f people unacquainted with the reactor or other radioactive material operations.
Source Material Natural or depleted uranium or natural thorium, or any combination thereof, in any physical or chwical form, or cres which contain 0.n5% by weight or more of uranium, thorium, or any combination thereof.
Source material does not include special nuclear material.
i Special Nuclear Material Plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235; or any material artificially enriched with any of the foregoing.
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GENERAL DESCRIPI' ION OF THE PLANT / LICENSED JCTIVITY 1.1.
LICENSED JCTIVITY DESCRIPTION The licensee at its San Diego site has been engaged for over'25
- years in both government-and privately-sponsored research and develop-ment operations, same involving use of Special Nuclear Material (SNM),
source material, and other radioactive material l
SNM activities cover the conduct of both pure and applied research and process development, as well as fabrication of fuel materials for the nuclear. energy-related fields.
The TRIGA reactors, Mark I (NRC License No. R-38) and Mark F (NRC
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License No. R-67), operate at power levels up to 250 kW and 1.5 MW, g.
respectively.
NRC License SNM-696. allows the possession and use of 994.5 kg U-235, 5 kg U-233, and 4.01 kg of plutonium. The plutonium is primarily' within encapsulated sealed sources, bred but unseparated fuels, or plated calibration sources; only 55 g may be in plated sources, solutions, precipitates, or solids.
Source and other radioactive materials outside the operating reactors are licensed by the State of California under a broad scope Type A Radioactive Material License.
This license authorizes individual sealed sources of up to 1,000 Ci, 400,000 lb. depleted uranium, 500,000 lb. natural thorium for fuel production, and among others 1.5 mmries of activity in i
individual irradiated fuel elements or reactor irradiated components and small,.normally sub-curie, quantities for laboratory. research and development work.-
L The main activity involving SNM pertains to the High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (H'IGR) system.
The H'IUR system involves engineering I
L and construction of an HIGR reactor, the applicable fuel research, 1-1
6 m) investigations of high-temperature materials, design and fabrication of nuclear reactor system camponents, and the development and fabrication of nuclear fuel elements.
The TRIGA research reactor systems involve the design, develognent, fabrication, and installation of research reactors and their fuel elements.
General Atomics (GA) also manufactures a complete line of TRIGA reactor fuels and camponents in support of its worldwide TRIGA marketing activity.
The production of H'IGR fuel ele:mnts involves (1) the nu.xing of uranium and thorium oxides with carbon and graphite, (2) converting the oxides to UTh carbides, (3) coating individual carbide kernels with pyrolytic carbon and silicon coatings, (4) the blending of particles together and injecting them into small rods, (5) graphitizing the rods, (v) and (6) assembling them into specially designed graphite blocks.
The manufacture of TRIGA fuels involves the mixing of uranium metal with zirconium metal using melting, casting and standard machining processes.
The alloyed uranium zirconium is machined and the machined meats are hydrided, ground to size and welded into metal tubes which serve as cladding for the fuels during their life in the reactor.
Other activities using StM include the operation of two TRIGA reactors providing the irradiation services for varying type activities involving physics research, activation analysis, and reactor research and develoguent.
1.2.
SITE AND FICILITY DESCRIPTION The main site is located at 10955 John Jay Hopkins Drive, approxi-mately 13 miles north of downtown San Diego.
The site occupies 1-2 1
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approximately 60 scres.
The Sorrento Valley site is located just north of the main site at 11220 Flintkote Avenue. This site also occupies approximately 60 acres.
The site;, vacant at the time of selection in 1956, was chosen from within a large industrial research park so our activities could be conducted in a modern university-lixe environment away from the residentially zoned areas of the city.
The distance from the main site to the closest single residence is presently about one mile with the other nearest housing approxunately 1.5 miles. This degree of isolation will probably continue indefinitely due to the naieme of the surrounding terrain and land use zoning regula-tions.
The facilities do not interfere with recreational activities in the area, nor do they pose a threat to cultural or historical sites.
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The population (1987) within a one mile radius of the main site is primarily of an industrial and university campus makeup, with an estimated daytime total of approximately 16,000 people (about 1,300 are GA employees).
The irrrwviinte vicinity surrounding Flintkote Avenue facilities is zoned for industrial activity.
Interstate Highway 5 is located about one-half mile to the east of the Fuel Manufacturing Building.
The location of nearby industrial parks and ccxumanity facilities are shown in Fig. 1-1.
The majority of the present population to the north is in a series of small towns extending to Oceanside, 25 niles north with a population of 101,000. Escondido, 18 miles northeast of the site, has a population of 91,500.
To the south is the metropolitan area of San Diego.
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distance and population of surrounding comunities is given in Table 1-1.
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TABLE 1-1 DISTANCE / POPULATION OF SURROUNDRG CCIMJNITIES Distance and Direction (a)
Community (air miles)
Population Del Mar-5 miles north 5,100 Los Penasquitos 8 miles northeast 33,000 Mira Mesa 6 miles east 49,800 University City 4 miles south 38,600 La Jolla 5 miles southwest 30,000 Clairemont 6.'iles south 87,700 North City West mile.s north 25,600 (a) Population data current as of 1987.
No significant fresh water recreation areas exist within the local
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hydrological area, nor is there significant agricultural activity. Los Penasquitos Creek flows into an area called Sorrento Slough which is part of Torrey Pines State Park.
The upper portion of the slough is near the licensee's site, (about one-half mile away).
The slough is a game refuge and an area of tidal mud flats.
All plants and animals in the area are protected and essentially no human use is made of this area.
1.2.1.
Facility Descriptions The following are descriptions of the major facilities at the site.
Fig. 1-2 is a plan view of the site and its major facilities.
1.2.1.1.
Sorrento Valley Facilities.
Iocated on the Sorrento Valley site are fuel manufacturing facilities, fuel production process develognent facilities, and nuclear waste processing facilities, p
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'(f HTGR Fuel Fabrication: SV-A (Bldq. No. 37) located at 11220 Flintkote Avenue in Sorrento Valley north of the main complex, the Fuel Manufacturing Building contains offices and an area used for fuel fabrication. Four hundred feet long and one hundred-twenty feet wide, about two-thirds of the building is of high-bay area construction.
The east side of the building adjoining the high bay is divided into two floors with offices, laboratories, and storeroams. The northern half of the building is devoted to fuel fabrication activities.
The fuel fabrication area is bounded by outside walls, a masonry wall, and a structural steel wall, which separate it front other areas and activities.
Access to the fuel fabrication area is restricted to limited access to authorized personnel, to control SIN, to maintain control and monitoring of personnel, and to prevent the spread of contamination.
Separate ventilation systems are maintained for facilities and areas involved in radioactive material processing.
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Fuel Production Process Development: SV-B (Bldg. No. 39)
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This facility is located in Sorrento Valley, north of SV-A (Building 37). The building is 136 feet in length and 133 feet in width and houses laboratories, pilot plant operations, storage roams, maintenance shops, and offices.
Nuclear Waste Processing Facility: (NWPF) (Bldg. No. 41)
The Nuclear Waste Processing Facility (NWPF) is located in Sorrento Valley, south of SV-A (Building 37). The facility consists of the main processing and campacting area (Building 41), various storage areas, and a high leve.'. storage facility. Building 41 has a total area of approxi-mately 14,364 ft. East of the building, at a grade level 15 feet lower than Building 41, is a service and storage yard used for processing and l
packaging low-level waste. Access to the facility is limited to author-2 ized personnel.
Northwest of Building 41 is a 7,000 ft fenced area t
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1 is also limited to authorized personnel.
j 1.2.1.2.
Main Site Facilities.
The main site is on 'IbIrey Pines Mesa l
about one mile east of the ocean at an elevation of 300 feet above sea level.
The site extends into the adjacent Sorrento Valley at an elevation of between 50 and 75 feet above sea level.
The main site contains office and engineering buildings, laboratories, TRIGA research reactors, the hot cells, a TRIGA fuel fabrication building, and a low-level liquid waste procescing facility.
Hot Cell (Bldg. No. 23)
The hot cell facility is equipped to perform a wide range of investigations of the physical, metallurgical and chemical properties of irradiated specimens, including examinations of full-size power reactor fuel elements.
The facility includes a high-level cell with three v) operating stations capable of handling activity levels of up to one million ci of 1 MeV gamma, an adjacent low-level cell that can be used separately or in conjunction with the high-level cell and a metallog-raphy cell equipped to provide complete metallurgical investigations including micro, macro-and stereo-photography. Supporting areas,
include a service gallery, physical test roam, machine shop, manipulator repair room, decontamination room, and an x-ray room.
This heavily shielded facility, equipped with flame arrestors and a dual high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtered ventilation system, is located approximately 275 feet fram the nearest site boundary.
The facility stacks can be closed with dampers to control adverse releases.
TRIGA Reactors (Bldg. No. 21)
Iocated north of the Laboratory Duilding, the TRIGA reactors provide an area for diversified experimental and irradiation studies using the inherently-safe TRIGA Mark I end Mark F reactors.
Included i /ch
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low-level counting room, a small shop, and administrative offices.
Specific uses of SNM in this area generally are governed by the terms of NRC Facility licenses R-38 and R-67.
The facility with its 120 ft emergency e.xclusion zone is located within the main site and approxistely 360 feet from the nearest site boundary.
TRIGA Fuel Fabrication (Bldg. No. 22)
The TRIGA reactor fuel manufacturing operation occupies approxi-mately 4,000 square feet in the northern section of Building 22.
Located within this space is a fuel fabrication area, a SNM storage vault, a drum storage area, an equipnent storage area, operation offices, lockers and a restroom.
The building is constructed of reinforced conert+o prefabricated panels and the floor is a reinforced concrete slab.
The building is divided by the vault, walls, and 3/8-inch thick steel plating.
The southern section of the building is
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used for non-TRIGA activities, such as storage of materials.
Chemistry Laboratories: EA-1 (Bldg. No. 27)
This building typically consists of radio-chemistry and analytical chemistry laboratories and offices.
There are about 1,100 square feet of area located in a nearby bunker.
The '.acility is used for general l
laboratory activities, including activities closely related to the TRIGA reactors and hot cell operations.
1.2.1.3.
Utilities.
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Water is supplied by the City of San Diego, Department of Utilities.
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Sewer service is provided by the City of San Diego, Department of i
Utilities.
Sewage released fram the licensee's facilities is processed at the 100 million gallons per day Point Ima Sewage Treatment Plant.
Hold-up tanks are provided for sampling of effluent liquids before release to the sewerage systen.
Gas and Electricity camercial quantities of gas and electricity are supplied by San Diego Gas and Electric C y ny.
Ede wency and Auxiliary Power Diergency and auxiliary power generators are available to assure e
continued operation of critical equipment, lighting, security, fire and other safety alarms, and required surveillance.
An auxiliary 25 kW(e) power system located near the Ministration Building automatically engages in case of a power failure. This system supplies power to the main site, fire, and security alam systems.
In the event of a power failure in the SV-A building (Bldg. No.
37), a standby electric generator automatically becomes energized.
It is capable of pmiacing 75 kWM) of rated electric power thereafter to designated camponents.
The auxilicry power unit supplies emergency power to the criticality, l. ire and security alarms, as well as to certain equipment cooling systems.
In addition, wet-cell battery or energency generator powered emergency lights are located strategically tatraughout the facility to illuminate evacuation routes and equiptent that may require *'. surveillance during power ourages.
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PROCESS DESCRIPTI M 1
1 The detailed description of the processes used in the various facilities are included in Section 3.0 of the Demonstration Volune of j
the SIN-696 license.
A brief description of the processes in the, major facilities is given here.
1.3.1.
H7GR Fuel Manufaguring The HIGR fuel production process begins with uranium and thorium oxide particulate materials.
These materials are mixed with graphite flour and ethylene binder to form a slurry which is subsequently dried and sized into sand-sized particles.
The oxides are converted to carbides in a vacuum heating step and the particles are spheroidized to form tiny microspheres.
In a fluidized oed furnace, the microspheres are coated with five layerc of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide which form the primary barrier to fission gas release in the reactor f
core.
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The coated particles are charged to a multi-cavity injection mold where a heated mixture of petroleum pitch and graphite powder are injected into the mold, filling the void space around the particles.
The mold is then cooled and the solidified 1/2 in, dianeter x 2 in.
long fuel rods are ejected from the mold.
The rods are packed in finely-ground alaninum oxide and heated to 800 C to carbonize the petroleum pitch.
The carbonized rods are then treated with hcl gas at an elevated temperature to leach e>. posed uranium and thorium from the rods. They are then heated to 1700 C to remove residual hcl and improve heat transfer characteristics of the rods.
The rods are loaded into fuel holes drilled into graphite fuel ele-ments and the fuel holes sealed with cemented graphite plugs.
Each element is then packaged in a sealed double barrel shipping container for transportation to the reactor.
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1.3.2 Fuel Production Process Develor2nent Process develognent, pilot scale operations, and specialized fabrication work related to fuel production are conducted in this building.
1.3.3 Nuclear Waste Processing low-level liquid and solid waste from various GA facilities are collected, processed, and packaged at the Nuclear Waste Process Facility (NVPF) (Building 41) for disposal at an approved burial facility.
A liquid waste facility (Building 25) is located on GA's main site.
Low-level liquid waste is filtered and, if the concentrations are below the applicable federal, state, and local regulatory limits, disposed of into the sanitary sewerage system.
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1.3.4 Hot Cell (J
The Hot Cell Facility is involved in research on irradiated' fuels, irradiated camponents, or other large sources of radioactive materials.
Such fuels, camponents, and materials are disassembled, dissected, and examined using remote manipulators.
i 1.3.5 TRIGA Fuel Manufacturing TRIGA fuel manufacturing consists of melting uranium and zirconium metalc along with various neutron burnable poisons into highly alloyed castings. The uranium zirconium metal alloys have melting points on the order of 1800 C.
These finished fueled alloys are machined, hydrided, I
finished and placed into metal tubes. End fittings are welded in place and the elements are leak tested. The finished fuel elements are stored or inserted into licensed shipping containers.
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k 1.3.6 TRIGA Reactor Operations The two research reactors pedorm a wide variety of irradiation experiments ranging from activation analysis, fission product release studies, neutron radiography, etc.
The TRIGA Mark I (R-38) is licensed to operate up to 250 kW(th) while the TRIGA Mark F (R-67) is licensed to operate up to 1.5 MW(th).
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- etz D;5 L Figure 1-3.
Location of nearby industrial parks and community facilitj
- NI ' FACILITY 41
~ ADMINISTRATION
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-9 ERIM NTAL Y ST' 11 -
SERVICE AND RECEPTION CENTER ggAB hRlGA
~ T1 E C ORS 2
TRIGA FUEL FAB ASTE ROCES$1NG-MS AC
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' h INDUSTRIAL 35 TEST TOWER 37 SV-A (FUEL MANUFACTURING) 6
/
AREA WUTE PROCESSING-SV 4,
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24 s
D Sorrento Valley Site
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a
/
ONTRO 31 STATION
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_0 250 500 750 1000 GENEssg 6/88 SCALE IN FEET s.
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== PROPERTY LINE Fig.
1-2.
Plan View of Sites o
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U) 2.
ENGINEERED PROVISIC'S FOR ABNORME OPERATIONS i
2.1.
CRITERIA Facilities and equipment are designed such that abnormal occurrences will not result in the uncontrolled release of significant quantities of radioactive materials. This is accomplished by the design of facilities to withstand anticipated earthquakes, fires, windstorms, or other such occurrences.
Facilities are located such that any significant adverse interaction between them is precluded. Further, any large tankage of compressed or flamnable gases are located outside of the facilities.
rN Facilities containing significant quantities of radioactive v) material are designed to protect the processes, process material, and
(
process equipnent fram adverse conditions caused by common environmental hazards.
The facilities are equipped with specialized shielding, fire suppression equipuent, specialized air control systems fitted in most cases with HEPA filtration or other cleaning systems.
Facilities are provided witn ventilation systems capable of maintaining a negative pressure if they contain processes where significant material can became airborne.
Facilities and laboratories which routinely generate radioactive liquid wastes are equipped with separate holdup tanks or piping to assure such liquids are disposed of under planned and controlled conditions.
Process equipuent or stations are limited to quantities of material and a specific geometric configuration which assure criticality safety in any credible situation.
In addition, such equipnent is limited to material inventories which also assure the radiological safety of workers in the area.
In same cases, access restrictions are imposed to b(N 2-1 l
l L,______
c I
(-O assure that individuals are not exposed to radiation or radioactive material.
1 Process equipnent and/or their enclosures are designed to contain I
the in-process material through normal, process upset, and safe shutdown i
conditions. The designs meet well-known applicable standards such as ASME, California Industrial Safety codes, etc.
Their designs do not allow individual camponents of process equignent to adversely affect the effluent conditioning or containment features of the respective laboratory or facility.
Certain equipmnt is fitted with prefilters, dampers, pressure relief tanks, etc., to provide localized containment and assure that facility containment facilities are not compranised.
Within the EMR Fuel Fabrication Facility, process equipnent is vented to a ventilation system fitted with prefilters, intermediate filters and HEPA filters to assure localized containment, as well as assure that facility containment is not compranised.
Any process (a) systems in which an explosive or similar upset is credible, are fitted with rupture discs which relieve to the facility internals.
The facility is maintained at a negative pressure relative to ambient pressure.
All ventilation fram the facility processing area is through HEPA filtration.
All HEDA filtration is protected by air flow alams and high temperature sensors, both of which alarm at a central panel and in the processing area.
The high temperature sensor when activated may also shut down the ventilation fan, close fire damper doors, and flood the cabinet with an inert gas.
The HTGR facility is equipped with a special liquid dump roan designed to mitigate the consequences of an xcidental criticality resulting fram dumping SNM bearing liquids uom nuclear " safe" geometries into "non-safe" geometries such as 55-gallon drums.
This dump room reduces exposures to employees and the public through attenuation of prampt neutrons and gamuas, as well as containing any uncontrolled releases of fission products resalting fram the criticality
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accident. -(The' dump' room has concrete walls and ceilings.(24"l thick and 16" thick,.respectively), :an air tight door; criticality alanns-and a
. specially danpered ventilation system.' The ventilation is closed'during-any dtnp operation.
Should an accident occur and after appropriate
. decay time, the dump room will be vented ~ to the building's HEPA' ventilation system.
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2-3
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3.
RADIOIDGICAL CONTD1GENCIES 3.1.
CLASSIFICATION AND ASSESSMENI OF RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCIES The classification scheme is described in Section 3.2.
In it, emergency situations are classified into the four categories specified in Section IV of Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50.
The rationale for the notification and alert classes is to provide early and prampt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equignent failure or might be indicative of more serious conditions which are not fully realized.
n Assessment of radiological contingencies is covered in Section 3.4.
U 3.2.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME There are four classes of emergency situations covering the spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the emergency organization.
In order of increasing severity, the classes are:
Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency These emergency classes are described in the following subsections:
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4 7-t 3.2.1.
Class'
" Notification of Unusual Event" Class Description. - Unusual events are in process or have occurred
'which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response
- or nonitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
An=" Unusual Event" would be one in which the actual or projected radiological effluents at the site boundary are greater than 10 times the maxinum permissible concentrations. (MPCs) listed in 10 CFR 20
, Appendix B, Table II, Column 1), or 15 mrem whole body accumulated in
(
' 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Purpose.
The purpose of off-site notification is to (1) assure that the first step in any response later.found to be necessary has been carried out, (2) bring the operating staff to a state of readiness,-and M-(3) provide systematic hanciling ~of unusual events information and i
decision making.
Licensee Actions.
1.
Pramptly inform state and/or local off-site authorities of nature of unusual condition as soon as discovered.
2.
Augment on-shift resources as needed.
3.
Assess and respond.
4.
Escalate to a more severe class, if appropriate; or, 5.
Close out with verbal sumary to off-site authorities, followed by written sumrary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- 3.2.2.
Class
" Alert" 1
Class Description. - Events are in process or have occurred which-
);
involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of 3-2
__7 4
b AJ safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
An " Alert" event would be one in which the actual or projected off-site concentrations, when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, are greater than 50 times the' MPC(s) listed in 10 CFR 20 (Appendix B, Table' II, Column 1), or 75 mrem whole body accumulated in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Purpose.: The purpose of off-site alert _is to (1) assure that emergency personnel-are readily available to respond if the situation becomes'more serious or'to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required and (2) provide off-site authorities current status-information.
Licensee Actions.
l '.
Pramptly inform NRC, other app upriate federal,. state and/or
\\
local authorities of alert status and reason for alert as soon as discovered.
2.
' Augment resources and activate on-site operational support emergency facilities and equipnent.
Bring key emergency personnel to standby status.
3.
Assess and respond.
4.
Dispatch on-site monitoring teams and associated communications.
5.
Provide periodic plant status updates to off-site authorities.
6.
Provide periodic meteorological assessments to off-site authorities and, if any releases are occurring, dose estimates for actual releases.
7.
Escalate to a more severe class, if appropriate; or, 8.
Close out or recamend reduction in emergency class by verbal sumnary to off-site authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
3-3
m.,
3.2.3.
Class
" Site Area Emercency" Class Description.
Events are in prccess or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels
- except near the site boundary.
A " Site Area Emergency" would be one in which the actual or projected off-site concentrations, when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, are greater than 250 times the MPC(s) listed in 10 CFR 20 (Appendix B, Table II, Column 1), or 375 mrem whole body accumulated in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Purpose.
The purpose of the site area emergency declaration is to (1) assure that response centers are manned, (2) assure that monitoring teams are dispatched, (3) assure that personnel required for evacuation of the unsafe areas are at duty stations, (4) provide consultation with b
off-site authorities, and (5) provide information for the public through off-site authorities.
Licensee Actions.
1.
Promptly inform NRC, other appropriate federal, state and/or local off-si'.a authorities of site area emergency status and reason for emergency as soon as discovered.
2.
Augment resources by activating on-site emergency response organization.
3.
Assess and respond.
4.
Dispatch on-site and off-site monitoring teams and associated communications.
,, EPA PAG's are 1 rem whole body, 5 rem thyroid, and 3 rem other
)
- J critical organ.
L 3-4
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10
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5.
Dedicate an individual for plant status updates te off-site r.
authorities.
6.
Make senior technical and management staff available on-site for consultation with NRC and state authorities on a periodic' basis.
7.
Provide meteorological and dose estimates to off-site.
authorities for actual releases via a dedicated individual or automated data transmission.
8.
Provide release and dose projections based on available plant
~
condition'information and foreseeable contingencies.
L 9.
Escalate to general emergency class, if appropriate;:or r<
10.
Close ' out or recmmend reduction in emergency class by-briefing of off-site authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.of closeout or class reduction.
3.2.4.
Class
" General Emergency" t: [
a Class Description.
Events are in process or have occurred which
. involve actual or inminent loss of confinement integrity.
A " General Emergency" would be one in which the sustained actual or
~
projected radiation levels at the site boundary of 500 mrem /hr. whole -
body can reasonably be expected.
A " General Diergency" is also one in which the actual or projected doses at the site boundary in the plume exposure pathway are 1 rem whole body or.5 rem thyroid.*
Purpose.
The purpose of the general emergency declaration is to (1) initiate predetermined protective actions for the public, (2) provide continuous assessment of information from licensee and off-site
[
critical organ.
3-3
rL e
(m V
organization measurements, (3) initiate additional measures as indicated by actual or potential releases, (4) provide consultation with off-site authorities, and (5) provide updates for the public through off-site authorities.
Licensee Actions.
1.
Promptly inform NRC, other appropriate federal, state and local off-site authorities of general emergency status and reason for emergency as soon as discovered (parallel notification of state / local).
2.
Augment resources by activating on-site emergency response organization.
3.
Assess and respond.
4.
Dispatch on-site and off-site nonitoring teams and associated connunications.
(
5.
Dedicate an individual for plant status updates to off-site C
authorities.
6.
Mrte senior technical and nanagement staff available on-site for consultation with NRC and state authorities on a periodic basis.
7.
Provide meteorological and dose estimates to off-site authorities for actual releases via a dedicated individual or automated data transmission.
8.
Provide release and dose projections based on available plant condition information and foreseeable contingencies, or 9.
Close out or recommend reduction of emergency class by briefing of off-site authorities followed by written sunmary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of closecut or class reduction.
3.3.
RANGE OF POSR11ATED ACCIDENTS A range of postulated accidents is analyzed in Section 7 of the O
i
/
Demonstration Volume of the SNM-696 license. The one with the greatest N
3-6 i
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C' potential off-site radiological consequences but lowest probability is a 1
' criticality in the Fuel Fabrication Facility in Sorrento Valley.
(Building 37) at the process' liquid dumping site.
The greatest potential; radiological consequences frcan this accident based on 50%
meteorology would be 0.27 Rem whole body, 0.26 Rem thyroid, 0.015. Rem
' bone, and 0.023 Rem lung dose. These doses to individuals working near the site boundary for. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> are well-within the PAG of the Environmental Protection Agency (1 Rem whole body, 5 Rem thyroid, and 3
' Rem other critical organ).
3.4.
ASSESSMENT ACTIONS For. each emergency, the radiological assessnent personnel will:
deternd.ne the extent of the problem assisted by the applicable facility personnel.
The following two subsections contain procedures for use in case of. two difference radiological emergency situations.
In -
/^g particular, JJ Section 3.4.1 addresses a general radiological emergency that does not involve a nuclear criticality, and Section 3.4.2 addresses the specific emergency involving a criti-cality at the HE R Fuel Fabrication Facility.
Assessment of events at the TRIGA Reactor Facility is discussed in Section 3.4.3, and assessment at other locations is discussed in Section
'3.4.4.
3.4.1.
Procedures for Estimating Off-Site Radiological Consequences of an Accident Indication. Fire, explosion, or conditions that have the potential for accidental release of radioactivity.
i j
l 3-7 1
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1.
Check the Work Authorization Accident Consequence Evaluation Form (Fig. 3-1).
This form contains a conservative evaluation of a potential accident involving radioactivity at that location.
Note:
If there is no accident consequence form, the following procedure should be followed.
2.
From the effluent survey form or the latest quarterly inventory, determine the kind, amount, and physical form of the radioactive material possibly involved.
Estimate the maximum quantity (curies) that might be released.
3.
For an initial estimate of the off-site concentration, the r3 following off-site dilution factors can be used:
V}
i SVA (Bldg. 37) 2 x 10-3 sec/m3 EA-1 (Bldg. 27) 1 x 10-2 sec/m3 TRIGA (Bldg. 21) 1 x 10-2 sec/m3 Hot Cell (Bldg. 23) 1 x 10-2 sec/m3 TRIGA F.tel Fabrication (Bldg. 22) 1 x 10-2 sec/Ir3 The dilution factor (sec/m3) is multiplied by the release in Ci to obtain Ci-sec/m3, 4.
Average the off-site concentration over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by dividing Ci-sec/m3 by 86,400 sec/ day and compare that concentration to the unrestricted area MPC in 10 CFR 20 (Appendix B, Table II, Column I).
3-8 L_--_--_--_---__-_
f%.
If the 24-hour averaged off-site concentration is greater than 10 thnes but less than 50 times the unrestricted area MFC, an unusual event
- is declared.
If the 24-hour averaged off-site concentration is greater than 50 times but less than 250 times the unrestricted area MPC, a notification of Alert
- should be declared.
If the 24-hour averaged off-site concentration is greater than 250 times the unrestricted area MPC, a Site Area Emergency
- should be declared.
If there are sustained actual or projected radiation levels at the site boundary of 500 mrem / hour whole body, or if the whole body or projected plume exposure pathway doses equal or exceed 1 rem whole body, 5 rem thyroid, or 3 rem other critical rS.
organ, a General Emergency
- should be declared.
i
)
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5.
'Ib update the off-site concentration calculation or to obtain a better estimate of the concentration, do the following:
Estimate the dilution factor using Figs. 3-2 through 3-7 and information from the meteorological station on atmospheric stability and wind speed.
Obtain the atmospheric stability condition using the azimuth sigma reading and the conversion table at the station.
Select one of Figs. 3-2 through 3-7 corresponding to the current or projected atnespheric stability condition (release height = 0).
Read the value of Xu/Q at the distance to the
- See Section 3.2 for the emergency classification scheme and j
l licensee actions.
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3-9 i
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N s
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' closest boundary based on the current or-projegted wind direction.
7N s 's.
The wind speed is obtained rom the meteorological station in N
miles / hour- (convert miles / hour to m/sec by multiplying by.
N 0.44).
Multiply Xu/Q (1/m2) fram the figure by 1/ wind speed (m/sec) to obtain'the dilution factor (sec/m3),.
Estimate the quantity (Ci) that could be released.
Multiply the release quantity (Ci) by the dilution factor (sec/m3);to get Ci-sec/m3, 6.
Average-the off-site concentration' over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by dividing L
Ci-sec/m3 by 86,'400 sec/ day and campare that concentration to the unrestricted area MPC in 10 CFR 20 (Appendix B, Table II, Column I).
b If the 24-hour averaged off-site concentration is greater than 10 times but less than 50 times the unrestricted area MPC. an unusual event
- is declared.
If the 24-hour averaged off-site concentration is greater than 50 times but less than 250 times the unrestricted area MPC, a notification of Alert
- should be declared.
-If the 24-hour averaged off-site concentration is greater than 250 times the unrestricted area MPC, a Site Area Emergency
- should be declared.
If there are sustained actual or projected radiation levels at the site boundary of 500 mrem / hour whole body, or if the whole
- see section 3.2 for the emergency classification scheme and licensee actions.
3-10
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body or projected plume exposure pathway doses equal or exceed 1 rem whole body, 5 rem thyroid, or 3 rem other critical organ, a General Emergency
- should be declared.
3.4.2.
Emergency Procedure for Nuclear Criticality at the HIGR Fuel Fabrication Facility i
s i
Emergency Condition. Criticality at SVA Buildir.g.
~
Indication. Criticality alarms at SVA.
's Emeroency Proc'edure.
N. N N
1.
Where a nuclear criticality has been verified, the Emergency x
s Coordinator will declare an Al'el
- with appropriate notifi-cation and evaluation of the potential the public.
,m.
!V) 2.
Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, a decision will be made on the necess?*v for evacuation based on Figs. 3-2 through 3-8 and the availau'e information.
N 3.
General Information.
During the day, from 1000 to 1600, the wind normally blows from the ocean to the east (sea breeze).
i The hours of 0930 to 1030 and 1530 to 1630 are usually periods of transition with the air flow changing from land breeze to I
sea breeze (9030 to 1030) and from sea breeze to land breeze j
(1530 to 1630).
- See Section 3.2 for the emergency classification scheme and licensee actions.
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The land breeze can result in' air flow to the west of the
.y cliff behind the Fuel Fabrication Facility or down the valley to the ocean at Torrey Pines Beach.
The' doses in Figs. 3-8 through 3-10 are based on a' dilution.
- factor of 12 x 10-4 sec/m3 which is more typical-of a sea.
breeze.- Land breeze dilution ' factors can be considerably.
reduced from the sea breeze condition and can be estimated by the use of Figs. 3-2 through 3-7.
1 The prmpt total dose may.be estimated from Fig.' 3-8 using the prompt total dose curve denoted by 5. That dose is applicable to line of sight locations only and is.not.affected by the
. meteorological situation. The cloud inmersion dose and inhalation doses are the result. of ' plume exposure which depends on.the wind direction.
In' general, the usual daytime air. flows in the valley are to the east (daytime sea breeze) and the nighttime air flows are down the valley to the west (nighttime land breeze).
The critical population for a criticality during a sea breeze is the office complex to the east of SVA.
The critical popula-tion for a land breeze condition will usually be anyone in the dwellings on the northwest side of the valley about 0.75-mile L
(1200 m) away fram SVA.
Under certain meteorological condi-t-
l tions, the population in the offices on the west rim of the valley above SVA could be the critical population.
- However, these conditions usually exist at night or early norning when few people are present in that location.
4.
In the event of a criticality, the line of sight prompt dose l:
can be determined from Fig. 3-8.
Any additional dose from airborne radioactivity will be determined by the wind direction and dilution of the resulting plume.
3-12 l
d**'m 5.
The plume pathway dose at 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the criticality is determined by using Fig. 3-8 and correcting for any difference in dilution factor. The dilution factor used for Fig. 3-8 was 2 x 10-4 sec/m3 The atmospheric stability condition and wind speed are determined from the meteorological station for the period of the accident.
The atmospheric stability condition is used to determine which of Figs. 3-2 through 3-7 is to be used for the dilution factor.
The wind speed from the meteorological station is in miles / hour and muC be converted to m/sec by multiplying by 0.44.
Read the value of %u/Q (1/m2) at the appropriate distance and multiply that by 1/ wind speed (m/sec) to get the 3
point source dilution factor, y/Q, in sec/m,
Based on a 5% meteorology dilution factor, the highest (worst)
(D dilution factor is 2 x 10-2 sec/m3 This worst dilution
?
U factor is only valid for a short time of the day (usually early morning) when the plume drifts up the bluff to the west of SVA into the industrial park.
For the daytime west wind (sea breeze) situation, the worst dilution factor is 1.2 x 10-3 sec/m3 This assumes a 1 m/sec west wind.
To determine the dilution factor for the specific situation, divide the west wind minimum dilution factor by the actual wind speed (m/sec) from the meteorologist.1 station.
The stability condition can be ignored for this calculation.
The projected dose is estimated by reading the applicable dose at the applicable distance and multiplying by the ratio of the current dilution factor (DFcurr.), as estimated above, to the dilution factor used for Fig. 3-8 (2 x 10-4 sec/m3).
The various doses are estimated as follows:
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Current cloud immersion dose =
(Cloud immersion dose from Fig. 3-8) x (2 x 10-4)
Current thyroid inhalation dose =
(DF * *)
(Thyroid inhalation dose from Fig. 3-8) x (2 x 10 )
The cloud immersion dose calculated above is added to the prompt total dose fram Fig. 3-8 to get the total body dose which is used to make emergency action decisions.
If the total body dose will equal or exceed 1 rem, or the thyroid dose will-equal or exceed 5 rem, a general emergency should be declared with the appropriate actions.
The off-site dose calculation should continue to be updated as conditions change using the appropriate figure.
_,r T 3.4.3.
TRIGA Reactor Assessment The TRIGA reactor facility has various instruments useful for identifying and assessing events. There are two continuous air monitors with alarms; one is above the Mark I pool and the other is above the Mark F pool.
In addition, the air out of the Mark F reactor roam is i
monitored for Ar-41 as well as having filter paper for particulate.
Four air monitors with charcoal filters for iodine, as well as particulate filter paper, are located around the outside of the facility to be utilized in the event of an emergency, and an air monitor is located on the roof.
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3.4.4 Assessment at Other Locations In addition to the meteorological system, the Health Physics laboratory, the Health Physics van, and certain facilities around the site have various instruments sdch as area nonitors, stack monitors, portable survey meters, and outside environmental air nonitors which can be utilized for assessment purposes.
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'J f E0R AUTHORIZATION ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE EVALUATION
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W.A.f B.
Bldg. & Room f C.** Radioactive Material Present Quelid, 191 Amount)
PhysicJ1 fporg 1.
- 2.
3.
4.
5.
D.-
Relesse Mogg' E.
Offsite Dilution Factor 3
F.
Maximum Off site Dgg Commitment n fi, Concentration (mres/vr g Ci/m-1 I
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Comments i
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- List the quantities which are separate from each other.
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Fig. 3-1.
Work Authorization Accident Co~ sequence Evaluation
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10-3 10-4 10-5 7
1 E
d 3
10-6 10-7 1
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I 10-8 I
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i ii 0.1 1
10 100 DISTANCE, KM I
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Fig. 3-2.
Atmospheric Stability Condition A
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- m. 4 x
10-6' l..
10-7 l
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10-8 I
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10 100 DISTANCE, km i
Fig. 3-3.
Atmospheric Stability Condition B I
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10 100 DISTANCE, km Fig. 3-4.
Atmospheric Stability Condition C i
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10-2' i
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10-5 10-6
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10 100 DISTANCE, km Fig. 3-5.
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Fig. 3-6.
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Fig. 3-7.
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.v O
TOTRL BODY LOSE O
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o CLOUD IMMERSION DOSE g
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l 4.
ORGANIZATICH FOR CONTROL OF RADICIfJGICAL EMERGENCIES The following is a description of the Eirca.pcy Response Organization to be activated for events resulting in abnormal radiological releases fran the licensed facilities or to control other emergencies.
Augmentation and support from off-site services and local agencies are also described (Fig. 4-1).
4.1 GA EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION 4.1.1.
Facility Staff Responsibilities Each facility at GA is staffed with experienced operating personnel, one of whan is designated as the Facility Em;.geney Response
(^]N and Recovery Director.
These individuals are well qualified to recognize conditions that may result in an emergency situation and are capable of instituting corrective actions to control the situation.
If these remedial actions should prove insufficient to deal with a situation, the employees have been trained to make emergency notifica-tions and to perform those planned emergency actions that provide for the immdiate control over most situations.
Senior operating employees present in a facility are responsible for action during normal operations and during any emergency condition at the facility.
Each operating organization designates its own responsible personnel and formulates their internal notification requirements.
The responsible employee present notifies Security Station No.1 (Ext. 2000) and his or her supervisor immediately, and directs appropriate remedial actions and/or evacuation until the responsibility is transferred to the Emergency Response and Recovery Director.
O
\\_
4-1
.+
1 y-
/
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! ' \\,j 4.1.2.
Emercency Supoort Center j
Security Station No. 1, Building 1, Room 103, has been designated
)
i the Emergency Support Center. This center is the focal point fram which j
all emergency support and direction is given.
f When Station No. I receives notification of an emergency, the station operator alerts the Primary Support Group and, if directed by the Emergency Cooniinator, the Secondary Support Group, thereby activating the Emergency Support Organization and the Emergency Suppert Center.
It is from this center that liaison is conducted with the appropriate federal, state, local and insurimee carrier authorities and from which requests for off-site assistance, if needed, is made.
Such i
requests will non? ally be made by the Emergency Coordinator, his alternates, or the Security Duty Captr.in.
The on-site support groups will convene and work in conference roam
/,T.
(
)
123 in Building 1, which is situated in the immediate vicinity of v
Security Station No. 1.
There is a telephone in the room and a portable radio receiver is moved into the roam wherever the center is activated.
Handi-Talkie FM radios are also available if needed and additional telephones are available in adjacent offices.
I The location of the Emergency Support Center is such that the probability of it being affected by any release of hazardous material is very low, and it should remain tenable during any emergency situation.
However, an alternate location is the conference room in Building 39.
The building contains adequate telephones and a portable radio receiver will be placed in the room should the center be activated. Handi-Talkie FM radios are available and the nearby central and secondary alarm stations have the necessary equipment for off-site communications.
D (V
4-2
u..
i l
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4.1.3.
Emeroency Notification I
1 Security Station No. 1 can receive notification of an emergency.by
. telephone, radio, electronics, and electromechanical alarm. All company employees are instructed to immediately dial ttension 2000 in the event of any emergency.
Upon being rade aware of the existence of an emergency situation, Security Station No. 1 immediately broadcasts all available information over the rafo network and ensures that Emergency Services and/or the Security Duty Captain are responding. Depending upon the seriousness of the situation, the responders may direct Security Station No. 1 to verify that the Emergency Coordinator is aware of the event.
If conditions warrant, the Emergency Coordinator may request members of the Primary Support Group to report to the scene or to the Emergency Support Center.
If the Secondary Support Group or outside support is requested, notification will be made through Security Station No. 1.
3\\s.
Notification of the NRC in case of any emergency classified as a site area emergency or general emergency will be by direct telephone line 1>cated in Security Station No. 1, or the office of Manager, Licensing Safety and Nuclear Compliance. Names and telephone numbers of other outside agencies which may be notified are included in Fig. 4.1.
4.1.4.
Emergency Response and Recovery Director (ERRD)
The Emergency Response and Recovery Director (ERRD) for a facility is a senior staff member of the operating organization managing that facility.
A minimum of two alternate directors are appointed to act in 1
the absence of the principal.
The ERRD is the basic decision raker and has authority and responsibility over the entire emergency.
The ERRD evaluates the scope and nature of the emergency and oversees implementa-tion of established emergency control procedures and directs the efforts of the Emergency Response Team to contain the situation with available b
4-3
f"
()
resources.
Utilizing information and advice from others, as appropri-4 ate, the'ERRD makes decisions on extent of shutdown, evacuation, search and rescue attspts, and determines when the facility or area may be reentered.
The ERRD is responsible for determining who within the organization will be tra' ed as emergency responders and, in coordination with the Supervisor of Ege wency Services, the subjects in which they should be trained.
Known hazards in the work place will, to a large measure, E
dictcte the training needs.
The ERRD will cmnunicate, in writing, the agreed upon training requirements to the Supervisor of Emergency Services, who will conduct the training and maintain the training records.
4.1.5.
Emeroency Coordinator The Emergency Coordinator is the Manager of Security.
Wo
,.)
?
(
j alternate coordinators, the Safety Engineer and the Supervisor of s-Emergency Services, have been designated.
The Emergency Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the activities of the various emergency response groups (Fig. 4-1).
When inforned that an emergency condition exists, the Emergency Coordinator reports to the ERRD at the scene of the emergency and assists the ERRD in controlling the situation.
When alerted, designated elments of the Primary and Secondary Support Groups report to the Emergency Support Center.
4.1.6.
Primary support Group Emeroency Response Organization I
Emercency Response Teams.
Emergency Response Teams are made up of select operating personnel in each facility. They are formed into tea:rs and given specialized training that will provide them with the knowledge and direction to react to various emergency conditions to save lives and property.
Dependent upon the facility, each has been given a specific area or functional assigment; however, if their services are not V
4-4
- - = _ - - -
p g.c p
[;'
.(,b required in their own area, they are available to assist others within their. facility...If utilized outside of their facility, they came under the' control of the Emergency Coordinator who will direct their
. deployment as needed.
E Members of the Emergency Response. Teams are trained in those subjects deemed appropriate by the ERRD'for their facility (such as basic first' aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, building familiarize-
' tion,. basic fire suppression, and the use of self-contained breathing
~ apparatus). Requests for training will be in writing to the Supervisor, Emeryncy Services, who will review the request for appropriateness.
,1 Any differences will be resolved by the Egna g ney Coordinator.
Health Physics.
The Health Physics personnel are a part of the Primary support Group during an me.rgncy.
The Manager or Health Physics, or designated alternate, will report to the Emergency A..
Coordinator at the scene of the emergency.
V),
The Health Physics organization consists of a manager, health physics technicians, a laboratory technician, and a records clerk.
L During routine operations, technicians are assigned to various facilities and, if available, will respond as needed in the event of an emergency. The Health Physics manager is also in charge of radiological assessments, both off-site and on-site.
In the manager's absence, the line of succession for this responsibility is indicated in Fig. 4-1.
The criteria for off-site and on-site dose assessments and permissive levels are outlined in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Contaminated personnel will be moved to either Building No. 23 or 37'where clean protective clothing is stored and showers and wash basins are available.
Selective decontamination can be performed at the on-site medical facility.
Emroency Services.
Emergency Services personnel include the l
1 4-5 i
b
e (J
medical technicians.
At least one is on-site 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, 7 days a week.
Emergency service technicians report to the ERRD or the Emergency coordinator at the scene with the fire fighting vehicles and equipment.
If no Health Physics personnel are present and entry into an area is necessary, the technicians shall detemine the extent of the radiation hazard with appropriate radiation detection equipment prior to entry.
If radiation levels exceed 5 R/hr at the entrance to a facility or area and no lifesaving actions are required, no entry shall be made until Health Physics personnel are present to evaluate hazards.
If radiation levels at any location within the facility exceed 5 R/hr and no lifesaving actions are required, all personnel shall innediately withdraw fram the facility until qualified personnel are present to evaluate the radiation hazards.
If lifesaving actions are required, personnel effecting the rescue shall limit their whole body external dose to less than 75 Rems planned whole body dose.
(D LJ Self-contained breathing devices will be worn on all entries until airborne radioactivity levels have been evaluated.
Hazard evaluation shall be relayed to the Emergency Support Center as soon as possible.
Security.
Security personnel includes a manager, captains, sergeants, and security officers.
Security is provided for the entire site 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, 7 days a week.
The Security Duty Captain reports to the scene as an alternate Emergency Coordinator.
During the initial phases of an emergency, the Security Duty Captain acts as the Emergency Coordinator until the designated Emergency Coordinator arrives at the scene.
The Security Duty Captain institutes the notification and emergency procedures required to cope with the situation until relieved.
If required, the Security Duty Captain initiates the establishment of road blocks at the entrance to the site and provides for traffic control on the site and at 4-6 l
l
[
i
(_,/
Security Duty Captain initiates the establishment of road blocks at the entrance to the site and provides for traffic control on the site and at I
the scene of the emergency. Members of the news media will be escorted by security to the " Press Roam," which will be a conference room in Building 7,
at which point the Media Coordinator will assume responsibility for them.
During non-working hours when the facility ERRD and alternates are absent, the Security Duty Capta.in is in charge; and in the event of an emergency, the Security Duty Captain reports to the scene and acts as the ERRD until such time as the facility ERRD arrives to take charge.
j The Security Duty Captain inplements established emergency control procedures to cope with the situation until Emergency Services arrive, at which time the Security Duty Captain assumes the role of Emergency Coordinator until the Emergency Coordinator arrives on the scene.
Medis Coordinator.
The Media Coordinator will nonnally report to (v) the Emergency Support Center.
During emergencies that may attract the media, a press and briefing roam will be established in a conference roam locating in Building 7.
All members of the media will be escorted there by Security, after which they became the responsibility of the Med.ta Coonii.nator.
(Media Coordinators are designated individuals; not positions.)
i Medical Departrrent.
This department is staffed with a part-time registered nurse, who is.ilso on call for emergencies. Medical supplies and equipnent for emergency treatment are stored at the on-site medical facilit.y.
l 4.1.7.
Secondary Support Group Other ele:mnts available within GA which augment the normal operations and which would be assigned to the emergency organization include, but are not limited to, those shown in Fig. 4-1.
f)
Y v
4-7
a.g
/
'v/
The - Secondary - Support Group is activated at the request of the
~ Emergency Coordinator. When responding, designated elements go directly to the scene and report to the Emergency Coordinator, while others are-on call at the Emergency Support Center.
4.1.7.1.
Elements Reporting to the Scene.
I Facilities Engineering (FE). The Director of Facilities _ reports to the Emergency Coordinator at the scene and directs all facility personnel who.are available for assignment to assist in the emergency, if they are needed.
These include electricians, plumbers, maintenance engineers, and laborers-.
Criticality and Radiation Safeguards Committee (CRSC).
The Chnimarl of the CRSC reports to the Emergency Coordinator at the scene of the emergency.
Other members of the CRSC report to the Emergency p
Support Center pending instructions frcan the Chairman.
i s.
.V Nuclear Safety.
The Manager of Nuclear Safety reports to the Emergency Coordinator at the scene of the emergency if the emergency involves special nuclear material.
Nuclear Materials Accountability. The Manager of Nuclear Materials Accountability reports to the Emergency Coordinator at the scene of the emergency and is responsible for giving support in special nuclear material accounting matters.
4.1.7.2.
Elements in the Support Center.
Industrial Safety.
The Safety Engineer reports to the Emergency Support Center as an alternate Emergency Coordinator to provide co-ordination between the Emergency Support Center and areas, departments, and personnel not directly involved with the emergency. He functions as the Emergency Coordinator in the absence of both the Manager of Security i O l
4-8
y-()
Other Support Center Elements.
Other. elements that have been directed to report directly to the Emergency Support Center and members of the Secondary Support Group are indicated in Fig. 4-1.
4.1.8.
Employees and Other Persons with Special Qualification for coping with Emergency Conditions A list of employees, other than those assigned to the emergency organization whose assistance may be needed and who have special qualifications for coping with an emrgency are maintained by the Emergency Coordinator.
4.1.9.
Off-site Support Groups The Emergency Coordinator will have either select agencies or all of the off-site support groups contacted.
1ctual notification or requests for assistance will be made to emergency response and medical ln' 'j agencies by the Em trgency Coordinator, his alternate, or the Security Duty Captain.
the Manager of Licensing, Safety and Nuclear Campliance, or alternate, will contact the appropriate federal, state and local authorities in the event of a radiological emergency.
Scripps Memorial Hospital. Scripps Memorial Hospital has agreed to accept ill or injured persons contaminated with radioactive material.
Scripps, however, relies on GA to provide the necessary health physics support and equipnent to assess and monitor radiation and contamination levels of their personnel, patients, and facilities.
San Diego Police Department.
The San Diego Police Department has agreed to provide assistance to GA in an emergency.
This assistance includes coordination with other law enforcement agencies as necessary, traffic control, evacuation off-site, and additional services if needed.
,\\v) 4-9 i
L______.
l 1
i
')
.(,/
San Dieoo Fire Department.
The San Diego Fire Department has agreed to provide assistance to GA in an emergency.
If the response is for fire involving radioactive material, Health Physics or Emergency Services provides the necessary monitoring to protect Fire Department personnel.
Other Off-site Support Grouos.
Other support groups that are available to be called upon to assist the Emergency Response Organization, if neaded, include:
San D.tego County Sheriffs Department California Highway Patrol Paramedics U.S. DOE Radiological Assistance Team Lifeflight Scripps Memorial Hospital San Diego Fire Department
(
)
San Diego Police Department
.v F.B.I., San Diego Office 4.2.
COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPAT.RG JGENCIES Training is provided to the participating agencies. This training is usually a simulated accident with simulated accident victims.
A scenario is prepared and the participating agencies are requested to take part as players or observers.
n 4-10
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.__ Parm aY nEoPa a a "0TirrCATiON
o NOTrnCATim, suPmT, a CmTRa.
EMERGENCY C@
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- - - - - -Cllllm= IN!TI AL A ID RESP 0r6C EflERGENCY RESJ
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- 2. RON DOT 561 23??
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Fig.4-1. Emergency Response Organization l
o LEGAL COUNSEL L e
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4 1
BAT:nEICS A.. EMERGENCY SERVICES IS IN CHARGE, AS MOC.IFIED BY SPECIFIC FACILITY PHOCEDURE, DUR[NG TE RGUCTION PHASE OF TE OPERATION.
I BNGENCY PLAN s..THE Dufv CAPTAIN ACTS AS ERRo uNTIt Ra.IEvED BY A n=INCIPAL EnRD.
A O DURING OFF-HOPS HAS OVER-ALL SITE AUTHORITY Ato RESPONSIBIL[TY.
3 ORGANIZATION C..TE SIA.1 OPERATOR AtO/OR THE DUTY CAPT. WILL FOTIFY TE EE RGEHCY COORDINATOR ( AS REGUIRQ ) AS PART OF TE INITIAL RESPONSE.
3""='=""====
= = = = = = = = =. - -
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SEcotOARY StPPORT G=0Up OUTSIDE SUPPORT GROUP 12
/
O D_ m T9 ON TE erFNF SAN DIEGO FIRE DEPARTMENT
/
230-1212 OR 911
! [/
SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTE NT DIRECTOR OF FACILITIES BGB UALRY
. 755-4295 531-2888 or 911 l
/
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL l
CRSC CHAIRMAN 3=== "==f
/
457-6158 DR. WHITTENCRE 4%-2188 SAN EgSHER[FF'SDEPT.
[
NUC1LAR SAFETY h
V. MALAKOF 453-5989
[
NUCLEAR MATERIALS ACCT, CALI[ g 6 HIGHWAY PATROL j
6 PARAtEDICS cu ms nm. niperec e
% 5-0498
""" """ j O ELE}ENTS IN SUPPORT CENTER i i DOE g I g ICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS ALTERNATE EtERGENCY COORD.S 18 LIFEFLIGHT su,ac myr. run pomeca RON 90TT..... %1-2399 268*8111 JON BROCK.. 271-6154 F.B.I. SAN DIEGO AREA VICE PRES. of HUMAN RESOURCES (619) 231-1122 R(X) RADEMACER 271-5786 CRSC EMBERS 11 OUTSIDE NOTIFICATION GROUP I2 0FFICE SERVICES State OHice of Emergency Services JEHRY DOLAN 3444 (888) 852-7558 TEEPHONE & TELETYPE Scri Dioos Co. Dept. of Emergency Services JERRY Dct AN 3444 2%-2222 National Rescene Center ( EPA )
(888) 424-8882 NRC, Region V (415) 943-3711 NRC, OPS CENTER, RED PHOE or-( 2 02 ) 451-8558 DOE Emergmcy Control Center (415) 273-4621/4237 l
NEDIA... TV, RADIO, PAPERS l
RADIOLOGICAL 1.
RESPON6IBLE TO NOTIFY AtO INITIATE TE RESPONSE OF TE PRIMARY SUPPORT GROUP.
0F SITE 2.
SECURITY STATION tb.1 BECOiES EERGENCY SUPPORT CENTER.
LTH PHYSICS g
UPERVISOR 9
MONITORING J.
ALTERNATE DIRECTORS ARE APPOINTED FROM TE FACILITY / PROJECT.
8 AMAN CRITICALITY 4
COORDINATES THE EFFORT OF TE FHINARY SUPPORT OR0tP At0 RADIATION SAFE 0VARD REGUESTS NOTIFICATION OF SEC0tOARY AND OUTSIDE GROUPS ON SITE AS EEDED. ALTUINATES REPORT To EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER, UttESS l
, NUCLEAR SAFETY g
MONITORIN3 DIRECTED OTEFiWISE.
WHITTEmnE... 456-219B N. 453-5989 5.
NLRSE STANDS BY IN TE PEDICAL DEPARTENT.
6.
ACT AS EE RDEN"Y RESPONSE APO RECOVERY DIRECTOR APO AB EER0ENCY C00R3INATOR UNIT RELIEVED.
j 7.
NOTIFIES THE SEC0tOARY AtO OUTSIDE SUPPORT OROJ38 I
IF 80 DIRECTED.
8.
TE PEDIA C00R'JINATOR AtO TE NUCLEAR ENGIEER ARE
' ' p' p" DES!0NATED INDIVIDUALS, NOT POSITIONS.
j; kA' 9
ALTERNATES ARE DESIGNATEI) EALTH PHYSICS TECH.S, CHAIRMAN
)
(] Q CRSC, & MGR N.) CLEAR SAFETY.
j i
- 18. ALTERNATES ARE MGR. SECURITY, MGR. IPOUSTRIAL SAFETY, &
StPERVISOR EE40ENCY SERVICES.
I I
- 11. PERS0P#EL HAVINO SPECI AL QUALIFICATIONS WILL BE USED IF iCEDED.
/kiSO AM.W J di.
i A WrldrO Ofd FEDERAL, STATE, & LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN EVENT OF RADIOLOGICAL EPERGENCY.
'l l
a
- 12. MOR. LICENSING AND NUCLEAR COMPLIENCE WILL CONTACT THE APPROPRIATE
- 13. REPORTS TO TE EMERGENCY SUPPORT CENTER UttESS DIRECTED OTHERWISE.
- 14. MEE ER OF PRIMARY SUPPORT GROUP FOR RADIOLOGICAL EtER0ENCIES ONLY.
)
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5.
PRulEA;nVE K. IONS T
The nature of protective actions and the criteria for implementing action are discussed in the following sections.
5.1.
PERSONNEL EVICUATION FRCH SITE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Where criticality warning alarms are involved, personnel evacuation routes and evacuation control points have been established (Figs. 5-1, 5-1A, and 5-2).
The supervisors of the areas being evacuated and the sponsors of any visitors will ascertain if all personnel have been accounted for.
Personnel are not required to sign or clock in; therefore, accountability nmst be achieved by polling those present.
If anyone is unaccounted for, the Emergency Response and Recovery Director
/~S should be notified-iWintely and an effort will be made by the t
i k/
Director to determine if the individual is in the area of the emergency.
Personnel qualified to make and evaluate radiation measurements will nonitor all evacuees, as required, at the control points to determine if any are contaminated.
If any evacuees need to be decontaminated, they will be immediately moved to either Bldg. 23 or 37, where clean protective clothing is stored and showers and wash basins are available.
Selective decontamination can be performed at the scene or at the on-site medical facility.
5.1.1.
On-Site Personnel In the event of an incident, the safety of personnel is the primary l
consideration of the emergency response staff.
Evacuation of all personnel not directly involved with emergency operations will, in nest cases, provide adequate protection. The site is sufficiently large that evacuation fram any facility can be accomplished by utilizing facilities 5-1
a I
j r
n Y
VL not affected.
- 5.1.2.
Routes The primary evacuation routes and control points have been established and posted as shown in Figs. 5-1, 5-1A, and 5-2.
Evacuation
. route signs are prominently displayed and,,in some areas, marked on the floors and walkways directing personnel to the nearest evacuation control points.
Signs at the control points contain further instructions, and a mobile emerc+<s:y public address system may be used to assist in informing and contibiling evacuees.
5.1.3.
Off-Site Personnel An event which would create radiation levels sufficient to became a health hazard to. individuals at an off-site location is improbable.
However, should an event occur which could possibly create any external
{O :.
j or internal. radzation hazard to the public, they would' be subject to evacuation as a precautionary neasure.
Any reconnendation for evacuation by.the Emergency Coordinator would be handled by the San Diego_' Police Department.
Actions are determined by the emergency class as defined in Section 3.2.
5.2. - USE OF PRulu;nVE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES i
i Health Physics has a van, maintained and inventoried with equipment I
such as radiation detection and measurement equipnent, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and protective clothing. This vehicle has a l
radio communications system and is kept at a central location.
The protective equipnent, such as SCBA and protective clothing, are for use by Health Physics or other appropriate personnel as needed.
I
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I i
5.3.
COtmHINATION CONTROL MEASURE Any unusual event involving radioactive materials is evaluated by
-Health Physics and a determination is made on isolation and area access control on the basis of the applicable NRC limits for controlled and q
uncontrolled areas.
5.4.
RADIOIDGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL 5.4.1.
Emergency Exposure Control Program Exposure Guidelines.
The EPA Emergency Wrker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Actions Guides (EPA 520/1-75/001) are the basic-guidelines for exposure control in emergency. situations.. Lifesaving dose is limited to less than 75 Rems planned whole body.
When it-is desirable to enter an. area in order to protect facilities, eliminate-further escape of effluents, or to control fires, the dose is limited to t
less than 25 Rems planned whole body.
The basic aim is to stay within the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.
Radiation Protection Program.
The Emergency Coordinator, with the advice of Health Physics, will authorize workers to receive emergency doses.
Monitoring.
GA has Health Physics and/or Emergency Services l!
. personnel on duty whenever work with radioactive material is in j.
progress.
Radiation detection and measuring equipnent is available whenever needed.
An in-vivo total body counter is also available on-site. Records are kept of any measurements made.
5.4.2.
Decontamination of Personnel Any contaminated individual is decontaminated to as near the natural background levels as possible.
Personnel and materials are 5-3
A f'w )
decontaminated according to the procedures in the " Radiological Health Handbook," January 1970 edition, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
A copy of the procedure is kept with the emergency supplies.
Radioactive wastes from decontamination are collected, tagged, and segregated for disposal after the situation has been evaluated.
Any seriously ill or injured contaminated personnel are transported to the hospital in the ccrapany of Health Physics or Emergency Services personnel. Lifesaving measures take precedence over decontamination.
5.4.3.
Medical Transportation Ill or injured personnel who may be contaminated will be transported by commercial ambulance service or paramedics.
73 i
)
The individual is decontaminated before leaving the site if the a
illness or injury is not life threatening. For life threatening illness or injury, Health Physics or Emergency Services personnel accompany the ambulance to Scripps Memorial Hospital to assist in decontamination consistent with medical requirements.
When an individual is to be transported, Security Station No. 1 will notify the hospital's Enm gerary Department or clinic of the hupending arrival and condition of the victim.
5.4.4.
Medical Treatment 1
1 Arrangements have been made with Scripps Memorial Hospital to treat ill or injured patients contaminated with radioactive material.
Periodic instructions are provided to the hospital on handling contaminated patients.
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5.4.5.
Facility for Assessment Teams Post-accident assessment and protective action functions will be perfonned in the Emergency Support Center. Engineering drawings of the affected facilities will be made immediately available by the Director of Facilities.
Jk:cident assessment data can be relayed to and from the Health Physics laboratory as needed.
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6.
EQUIPMENT AtO FACILITIES 6.1.
HEALTH PHYSICS LABORMORY The Health Physics laboratory is located in Building 2.
A nearby office is equipped with a radio / telephone systm for connunication with other activities on-site and a direct telephe;a line to the NRC to be used in the event of a site area emergency or a general emergency.
In addition to all of the mnitoring equignent located in each facility where radioactive materials are handled and in the Health Physics emergency vehicle, the following monitoring eqaignent is located in the Health Physics laborato y:
Ge(Li) detector (germanium-lithium) or high purity o
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gennanium detector system for gamma scans of soil, L'j water, wipe, etc., samples o Iow-level alpha-beta counting systems (2) o X-ray spectrometer system Geiger Mueller survey neter o
o Ionization chamber type survey instrument Portable equignent in the laboratory and/or nearby Health Physics offices includes:
o Alpha survey meters Geiger Mueller survey meters o
o Ionization chamber type survey instruments o NaI (Tl) scintillation detector o Alpha counter (wipe) l n.
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i 6-1
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6.2.
DERGEtCI COMJNICATIONS lE1WDRK Emergency communications at GA consist of the telephone, FM radio, and public address systems on selected emergency vehicles; portable
' loudspeakers are available on the fire engine and at the Emergency Support Center.
6.2.1.
Telephone Extension 2000 is the dedicated emergency number at GA.
6.2.2.
Radio GA maintains a private line, a frequency nodulated radio network for emergency communications.
This radio communications network has fixed station transmitter / receivers in the Emergency Support Center in the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations in Building 37 and in Health
()
Physics, Building 2.
Receivers are also located in the offices of the Manager, Licensing,. Safety and Nuclear Compliance, and the Manager, Security.
Mobile transmitter / receivers are available in emergency and I
security vehicles.
Additionally, all emergency and security personnel I
are provided "Handie-Talkie" EM radios.
L 6.2.3.
Public Address System q
l Public address systems are installed on the Emergency Services i
l emergency vehicle and fire engine.
Portable loudspeakers are available on the fire engine and at the Emergency Support Center.
I 6.2.4.
Alarms l
i
)
1 Criticality.
As required by 10 CFR 70.24, each facility that uses l
or has authorization to use fissionable material has radiation sensing l
devices that automatically alams at a preset level.
These monitors l
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activate. klaxon horns which are audible throughout the interior and exterior of the facility.
Fire.
All facilities at GA are equipped with fire alarm systems which code into the Security control Center.
These alarms may be activated nanually or by heat sensing devices, special detectors, or the activation of the sprinkler' system.
HER Fuel Manufacturing Alarms.
All process ventilation equipuent is protected by thermal rise sensors.
Activation of the sensors' shut off the applicable ventilation blower, closes its fire damper door, and alarms through a manufacturing central alann panel and in the supervisor's office.
Other manufacturing alarms are also provided'to systems such as:
o Environmental air o Gas pad water flow o Circulating water flow 6.2.5.
Meteorological System GA maintains a meteorological system to provide information on wind direction and velocity.
One weather tower is located on the main site and another is located in Sorrento Valley.
The information from these locations is recorded continuously in a Health Physics roam in Building 2 on the main site and is available to help determine cloud direction in the event of an accident that might release hazardous material.
6.2.6.. Vehicles and Ecuitrnent Three vehicles (a fire engine, an Emergency Services vehicle, and a Health Physics van) tre available in the event of an emergency.
All vehicles are eqaipped with a 50-watt transmitter / receiver.
The fire engine and Emergency Services vehicle are licensed to travel on public 6-3
- = _ - _ _ - _ _. _
i
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,/ m
-(j thoroughfares as emergency vehicles.
The fire engine is capable of delivering water at 750 gpn at 150 psi.
A 500-gallon water tank supplies water until a hydrant hookap can be made.
The truck also carries support equip:ent such as self-contained breathing apparatus, resuscitator, portable fire extinguish-ers, portable lights, chemical spill control material, protective clothing and equip:ent, and a loud speaker.
The Emergency Services vehicle is equipped with a public address system and support equignent such as chemical spill control material, self-contained breathing apparatus, portable fire extinguisher, portable lights, and various tools and small equipment.
The Health Physics van has a custom designed interior which carries all necessary items of equiptent, including a gasoline powered portable generator, for coping with a major radiological emergency.
Health (c)
Physics also maintains an environmental survey vehicle equipped with a transmitter / receiver.
See Section 6.4 for further discussion of monitoring and protective equip:ent.
6.2.7.
Personnel Decontamination Facilities Contaminated personnel shall be placed in clean protective clothing to cover the contamination and transferred to the decontamination areas to be decontaminated in accordance with established procedures.
Personnel decontamination will be accomplished in the change roams located in Buildings 23 or 37.
These areas are equipped with hot water, showers, and wash basins.
Select decontamination can be performed at the scene or in the Medical facility, Building 9.
6-4 l
_s
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(,/
6.3.
FACILITY EDR ASSESSMENI' TEAMS Post-accident assessment. and protective action functions will be performed in the Emergency Support Center. Engineering drawings of the affected facilities will be mad 1 iMately available tr; the Director of Facilities.
Accident assessment data can be relayed to and from the Health Physics laboratory as needed.
6.4.
EMERGENCY !ONI'IORI1K; EQUIPMENT The Health Physics van has a custom designed interior which cair'es all major.necessary items 'of equipent for coping.with a major radio-
~
logical emergency.
This equipent includes, but is. not limited to,
, self-contained breathing ' apparatus,. portable air samplers, ' portable radiation monitoring equipnent, a gasoline powered portable generator, and necessary protective clothing.
Health Physics also maintains an environmental survey vehicle equipped with a transmitter / receiver.
.V other monitoring equignent is available from on-site operations
.which can be shut down or are not critical to the operation. The use of this monitoring equipnent would depend on the extent of the emergency.
Maintenance and calibration of monitoring equipnent is done on a
- routine schedule determined by past experience and manufacturers' specifications.
The calibration of the monitoring equipnent is a license required activity.
6-5 i
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7.
RECOVERY AND REENTRY 7.1.
PROCEEURE l
The procedures for recovery and reentry in the event of an emergency situation are as follows:
1.
A complete analysis of the circumstance leading up to and resulting from the situation, together with recommendations to prevent a recurrence, shall be prepared by the Cr.ticality and Radiation Safeguards Committee.
2.
Although an emergency situation transcends the normal requirements of limiting exposure, there are suggested levels
('
for exposure to be accepted in emergencies.
However, every reasonable effort to minimize exposure must be made, even in emergencies.
a.
Four categories of risk versus benefit must be considered:
o Saving hunan life o Health and cafety of the public o Recovery cf the dead o Protection of prcperty b.
Ili order to avoid restricting actions that n:ay be necercarg tc sen '.ives, the amount of ergsure that will ba re mitted in or_ der to perform the emergency mission should be limited to less than 75 Rem planned whole bcdy 1
dose.
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7-1 L______---._______----_---.
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c.
In situations' where the bodies of accident victims'are in areas inaccessible because of high radiation fields,.
special planning and remote recovery devices should be used to retrieve the bodies.
Exposure of recovery.
personnel should not exceed 12 Rem planned whole body dose.
d.
When emergency on-site action is' necessary to reduce a hazard ' potential to acceptable levels or to prevent substantial' loss of property, an exposure up to 12 Rem planned whole body dose may be received by participating.
individuals.
However, volunteers, under special circum--
stances, may receive up to 25 Rem planned.whole body dose, subject to the approval of the Emergency Response and Recovery Director after consultation with the Chaiman, CRSC and/or Health Physics. When the risk of.a b
hazard is such that' life would be in jeopardy or there
.%d would be severe effects on the health of the public, volunteers should be limited to less than 75 Rem planned whole body dose, subject to the same approval as described in the preceding sentence, e.
Once the hazard potential has passed, steps shall be taken to recover frca the incident. All actions shall be pre-planned in order to limit exposures.
Areas will be roped off and posted with radiation levels and stay times based on results of surveys.
During any plant restora-tion operationo, personnel exposures to radiation will be L
maintained with 10 CER Part 70 limits and as low as reasonably achievable.
f.
The Criticality and Radiation Safeguards Committee snall be the designated technical group responsible for L) 7-2
4
+.
evaluating' reentry and advising the ERRD thereon.
L 1
g.
Current operating records and other essential infonnation
.necessary for' evaluating the emergency'shall be readily available.-
h.-
Site dev,=nts and plans which may be necessary for recovery / reentry may be obtained frcm Facilities.
i.
Vehicles or equiprent which may be 'needed to effect recovery / reentry will'be made available by Facilities, j.
Mequate laboratory and office' space exists on-site for -
use by staff assigned to post-accident ' and recovery.
assessment and protective action functions; r
TO 7-3
N k.)
8.
BCMB THREATS Bamb threats may be received by written message or by telephone.
Anyone receiving a written bamb threat nust immediately notify Security Station No.1, Ext. 2000 and then personally hand carry the written threat to Security Station No. 1.
Any employee receiving a telephone call stating that a bamb or other incendiary device has been or will be placed on campany premises should attempt to gain as much information as possible about the device and the caller using the check list found in the back of the campany
)
telephone directory. When the caller hangs up, the~ person receiving the f
call will innediately report all information obtained to security station No. 1, Ext. 2000.
The bamb threat check list in the campany
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telephone book will then be completed by the person who received the call and immediately hand delivered to security Station No.1.
The operator in Security Station No. 1 shall i W lately notify the Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Services, and they will report to the scene and determine what additional support or response actions are needed.
If the San Diego Fire Depart:uent Hazardous Materials Squad is needed, they shall be called by the station operator upon dilection from the Emergency coordinator or Emergency Services.
)
8.1. - MAIL BCHB Any suspicious package, letter, or other object received through the mail or other delivery means is to be reported to the Emergency l
Coordinator innediately.
Suspicious items are net to 'ce handled and l
uncer no circumstances are they to be opened or probed.
Use the telephone for any communications.
Do not use a radio.
The removal or
('
rendering safe of a suspicious item is to be left to professional bamb sL I
8-1 a
l i
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_- - __ A
tarhnie4ans, L
8.2.
DTRECT BCHB THRZATS BY INDIVIDUALS If a GA employee is confronted by a person (s) at'an entrance to, or already on, GA property, who claims to have a bamb on either his/her person or in their vehicle, the employee should attempt to take the fol-lowing actions:
1.
Do not antagonize or in other ways anger the person.
If your actions are such that they are perceived as a threat to the person's own safety, that person my well becom belligerent.and threatening.
2.
Be firm and try to delay the ir dividual as long as possible, as sometimes the. person may lose interest or their thought process f
changes and they leave.
.t 3.
No physical effort should be mde to restrain the individual even if it mans permitting them to enter the premises.
If the individ-ual insists on directions to, say the TRIGA Reactor, give direc-tions to some out-of-the-way parking area, but do it in a very convincing manner.
This is an effort to isolate the person, which will give security personnel and the police a chance to contain the
. orton in un area.
p l
4.
If the employee being confronted has a radio, those who are msponding rust never use their radio to ask what the trouble is as this could ca se the perpetrator to react adversely.
I
.5.
On the main rite, the primary concern is that employees do not
{
unnecessarily enaanger themselves,.
Their activities should be restricted to observing, reporting, and controlling any situatictn
{
to the extent possible without endangering themselves or others in O
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9.
TERRORISM Terrorism within the United States is typified by kidnapping, extortion demands, threats of death or injury to persons, and threats of damage or destruction to facilities.
As evidenced during the past few years, terrorism is on the increase world wide, posing a threat to both individuals and governments and will continue to do so for the foresee-able future.
The ease with which very large demands can be made and achieved, at least in part, encourages the continued employment of such tactics.
Terrorism is related to activism, criminal intent, and mental'or-emotional aberrations of the terrorist.
Terrorism is different from traditional crimes in that traditional crimes generally are cammitted for material gains.
For the most part, terrorists desire that their b
crime be given intense public attention.
They do not actually have to carry out the-threatened activity to be successful; they have only to demonstrate the viability of the threat to enjoy varying degrees of success.
The relative probability of terrorist attacks.being directed nyamst FA nuclear activities is very ser_11 but the likelihood can not I
be totally ignored. Extrene actions that could be taken by terroriat j
groapa appear, for the most part, unlikely as such actions could have l
lT political repercussions, alienating those fram wham they seek support for their cause.
l i -
The willingness to resort to indiscrimi.nate tactics that could q
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E cause widespread ce.sualties may cecline as the size of the terrorist
)
group and it constituency increases.
The more brutal schemes seem to fall.within the realm of individuals and tiny groups.
They, ho m er,
)
y have the least capability to carry them out successfully.
J
(
9-1
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(.,
4()
should a terrorist attack be directed against GA, the most probable target would be the seizure of a nuclear facility and/or 7 ning posses-4 sion of radioactive or special nuclear material to further their cause.
The taking of an executive as hostage is another possibility.
Potential action against our nuclear facilities might range fram well-publicized hoaxes (involving the threat of releasing nuclear material into the atmosphere unless same demand is met) to actually stealing material.
The various possibilities of terrorist actions is only limited by their imagination; this makes trying to secure against terrorist actions very difficult.
Primary responsibility for the containment and control of terrorist activity resides with local, state, and federal law enforcement agen-cies.
However, until such time as they have responded to the situation and taken control, the campany will take all actions possible to provide for the personal safety and welfare of the employees and of campany property.
The industrial security measures that are presently in place will slow down, but will not deter, a determined terrorist attack. The sys-tems will provide a limited amount of reaction time during which secur-ity will make every effort possible to isolate or contain the terrorists and give employees a chance to evacuate the area of immediate danger.
However, the probability is high that the terrorist would succeed in reaching and gaining contro) cf their target objective.
Campany response to terrorist attack will generally be defensive.
In such an event, every effort should be made to statilize the situation while awaiting outside help. Cantion must be exercistyi not to incite or antagonize the terrorist, especially if they are holding hostages. The use of firearms against adversary incursions by security officers is governed by California State law and campany policy. To the extent pos-sible, security will interpose themselves between the intruders and n
9-2
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materials or persons. being protected.
Firearms are not to be used f.
p
. unless the attendant circumstances are directly endangering life and they are not to be used to stop a fleeing suspect regardless of what that person may have stolen.
9.1.
DURING NORMAL hDRKI1G HOURS When it is recognized that a crime has or is about to be connitted, the Emergency Support Center.(Station No. 1) will, at the direction of the Energency Coordinator or Security Duty Captain, imwhtely notify the San Diego Police Department and local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
At the direction of the Emergency Coordinator, Station No. 1, will notify members of the Primary Support Group that an emergency exists and that an unlawful act has or is being conmitted and that they are to assemble at the Emergency Support Center.
The Coordinator will direct the operation until such time as the San Diego Police Department or local FBI. arrives to take charge.
No news release will be made by GA unless approved by the law enforcement agency in charge of the operation. Any demands made by the terrorists are not to be unconditionally rejected.
Demands are to be accepted and, if at all possible, not acted upon pending arrival of lccal or federal law enforcement agencies who have the necessary training and background in crisis negotiat. tons to better handle t.he situation.-
If t.he attack involves a nuclear activity, the local FBI and Depr!.rtment of Energy, San FraLcisco Operations Office, will be called.
The FBI has a hostage rescue team, tmd DOS provides a nuclear em?rgency search team.
'I'ho NRC Operations Center must be notified within one hour and, as a courtesy, the NRC Region V, will also be notified.
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If it is possible to evacuate employees from the immediate danger area without endangering their lives ( e.g., by possibly exposing them to hostile fire), it should be done innediately.
If this is not possible, they are to be directed to nove to offices on the far side of their building, to get behind furniture, to stay low and away from windows.
Basements provide a great deal of protection, however, they can be dangerous in the event of a fire.
Also, the location of emergency exists may be such that employees evacuating the building would be exposed to the terrorists.
9.2.
DURING NONIORKING HOURS The Security duty Captain is always notified of any suspicious i
activity and will alert all security officers by radio in the event of l
any suspected terrorist activity.
The Captain will also have the Emergency Operations Center call the San Diego Police Department.
The Center operator will insure that the main gate is closed and stand by to (q) admit GA and outside support personnel as requested.
The Emergency Coordinator will be notified immediately and may direct that others be called in.
If a particular facility is affected, those on its notification lists will be contacted.
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MAIN 1ENANCE OF RADIOIDGICAL CONTINGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY
.10.1.
NRITIEN PRCu:.uuxES Emergency procedures _ detailing the actions to be taken to implement this emergency plan ~will be prepared for, and by responsible personnel of, each facility covered by this plan.
These implementing procedures will be available to all members of the emergency organization.
10.2.
TRAINING Operating personnel. ' All individuals at GA who routinely work with radioactive material without direct supervision of a trained individual L
are required to attend a Radiological' Safety Course and pass an examination at the end of the course.
GA Emergency Organization. Personnel in the emergency organization receive on-the-job or additional specialized periodic training particular to their dia:ipline.
Non-GA support personnel.
Off-site support organizations or personnel are periodically briefed on site activities.
10.3.
'IESTS AND DFILLS Criticality evacuation drills ne co:vheted semiannually at each facil.ity that uses sp?cial nuclee material in quantities sufficient to require a criticality warning alar /n system.
This regairement may be satisfied by participation in unscheduled events that exercise the plan.
Approximately once each year, senior members of participating off-
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site response organizations are invited to GA for familiarization visits 10-1 i
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9(V and a program / facility update.
This activity is scheduled by the Emergency Coordinator.
Selected aspects of this contingency plan will be exercised annually, either as a result of responding to actual emergencies or by means of specifically designed scenarios. ' Exercises
- will, hen appropriate, include - preparation for transporting, w
notification of medical facility, delivery, and contamination controls.
tw,-ntation of such activities is retained by the Emergency Coordinator.
10.4.
REVIEWING AND UPDATING OF THE PIAN AND PROCEDURES The Emergency Coordinator is responsible for an annual review of the Radiological Contingency Plan.
The ERRD's are responsible for an annual review of their facility's implementing procedures.
7 If updating is required, 'the usual method will. be to I
.:.ish revisica pages for distribution to all holders of the Radio, ogical Contingency Plan and/or implementing procedures.
10.5.
MinNTENANCE OF INVENIORY OF RADIATION EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT The schedule for maintenance and inventory checks for equipuent and supplies required for responding to a radiological emergency will be:
l 1.
Radiation detection instrumen+.s will be checked quarterly for 1
intact inventory and calibrated semiannually.
2.
The emrgency generator will be checked quarterly.
l 3.
Protective breathing equipent and protecnive clothing will be checked quarterly for intact inventory.
4.
other supplies designated for emergency use will be checked 10-2 i
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quarterly for intact inventory.
5.
All equipmnt and supplies will be humediately replaced or repaired if found missing from the inventory or not functioning properly.
6.
Essential emergency equipmnt will be kept secured to prevent pilfering and misappropriation.
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RECORDS AND REPORTS 11.1.
RECORDS OF INCIDENTS 1
' Records of radiological incidents as def.ined by the classification _
system of Section 3.2 will be retained for five years if not otherwise covered by license condition or existing NRC regulations.
The records will include at least the following:
l'.
The cause of the event.
This record will include.both the direct cause as well as any indirect cause.
l' 2.
The extent of any injury and/or damage.
O 3.
Radiological data such as area surveys, effluent releases, calculated and measured doses, and contamination measured on surfaces And personnel.
4.
The number and type of personnel and/or equipment involved.
5.
The corrective action taken to tenninate the event and an identification.of personnel responsible for making those
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decisions.
l 6.
The off-site support assistance that was requested as well as actual assistance re:eived.
7.
The extent to which response equipment was used.
8.
The dates and times that any accident situation is reported off-site and the names of organizations' and individuals contacted.
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The personnel and their titles who are designated to be' responsible for maintaining records will be identified.
11.2.
RECORDS OF PREPAREDNESS ASSURANCE Records will be kept confirming that preparedness is maintained to respond to radiological contingencies.
The following records will be kept for at least three (3) years:
1.
Records of training (including the type and time spent during the training, and names of individuals trained).
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Records of drills and tests (including the results of l
critiques and any comitment to change the plans).
3.
Records of inventories and locations of emergency equipuent and supplies.
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Records on the maintenance, surveillance, and testing of equipment and supplies.
5.
Documentation of the reviews and updates of the radiological contingency plan.
11.3.
REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS I
During a? em rgency, the Emergency Coordinator is responsible for assuring 1
the repo). ting of accidents and updates to local, state, and federal agencies.
The Media Coordinator is responsible for assuring reports are nade to keep the.
public inforneA.
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i CENERAL ATOMICS RO. Box 85608 e San Diego, CA e 92138-5608 (619) 455-3000 N