ML20245C219
| ML20245C219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1989 |
| From: | Sieber J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904270052 | |
| Download: ML20245C219 (5) | |
Text
, _,. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
9,4
- l
%g Demt Valley Power Station
$hippingport PA 15077 0004 Pr a en Nuclear Group m2l W2%
April 20, 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Proposed Operating License Change Request N9. 22 Second Request for Additional Information Gentlemen:
Our letter dated January 30, 1989, submitted a proposed license
- change, which involved license conditions 2.C.(7),
2.C.(8) and 2.C(9).
These
- items, as revised, will be required to be completed prior to start-up following the second BV-2 refueling outage.
On February 22,
- 1989, DLC discussed with members of your staff the specific items associated with the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)
Condition 2.C.(8) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Condition 2.C.(9).
Our letter dated March 9, 1989 submitted a detailed description of specific items associated with the DCRDR and the SPDS which were requested by members of your staff during the February 22, 1989 conference call.
During an April 11, 1989 conference call, we discussed items associated with the
- DCRDR, emergency
- lighting, walkie-talkie communications
- systems, and the
- SPDS, Containment Isolation Phase A
(CIA) input signals.
In the March 9,
1989 submittal, we indicated that these three items could not be completed prior to start-up following the first refueling outage.
We agreed to further review the items and provide a summary of the results.
Attached is a
summary of the review of the items discussed on April 11, 1989 including our justifications to support startup.
. Included, as requested, is a
commitment to complete certain activities prior to start-up following the first BVPS-2 refueling j
outage.
{
8904270052 890420 DR ADOCK 05000412 0b 0
,I \\
v r
.Beavcr Valley Powar Station, Unit No. 2 1
' Docket-No. 50-412, License-No. NPF-73 1
l f!
Propos6d Operating License Change Request No. 22 l
.Second Request for Additional Information Page 2-L.
If you have. any questions, please feel free to contact me or members'of my staff.
Very truly yours,
/h N
/t J.
. Sieber Vice President Nuclear Group Attachments cc:
Mr. J. Beall, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. W. T. Russell, NRC Region I Administrator Mr.
P. Tam, Sr. Project Manager Director, Safety Evaluation & Control (VEPCO)
(.
ATTACHMENT r
z Proposed Operating License Change Request No. 22 Second Request for Additional Information Item 1 Walkie Talkie Communications System l
A review of the precautions and limitations on the use of walkie-talkies relative to potential interference with electronic plant. equipment indicates that the following areas may be sensitive o
to radio frequencies and the use of walkie-talkies in these areas is I
restricted:
1.
Control Building - all floors 2.
East and West Cable Vaults L
3.
Rod Control Building - all floors L
4.
Main Steam Valve Room 5.
Service Building - except the top floor 6.
Safeguards Building - all floors 7.
Service Water Valve Pit 8.
Turbine Operating Deck within 20 feet of the Main Feedwater Flow Transmitters 9.
Auxiliary Building - Elev. 735' 10.
Containment Penetration Areas - 718' Elev.
11.
ERF Diesel Generator Building Restricted areas are identified in the General Employee Refresher Training (GERT) program which is required training for all plant personnel.
Additionally, permanent yellow caution tags exist in the following areas:
1.
Main Steam Valve Room - West Door 2.
Service Building Elev. 735' both doors 3.
Normal Switchgear Room - Unidentified Leak (UIL) Monitor
.(2 signs) 4.
Control Building - Elevation 707' Process Racks and the Control Room We are currently evaluating the walkie-talkie restricted use areas to determine the need to upgrade postings.
The review and posting upgrade is scheduled to be complete by June 30, 1989.
Item 2 Emeraency Lichtina In discussion with NRC reviewers on April 11, 1989, we explained that the differences in the two sets of data taken at different times can be attributed to the illumination of different sets of emergency lighting systems.
The BVPS-2 control room is equipped with the following emergency lighting systems:
1.
Back-up AC 2.
Appendix R 3.
Back-up DC v
I Attechmsnt-
' Prop'osed Operating License Change Req 2est No. 22 Second Request for Additional Information Page 2 As agreed in the April 11, 1989 conference call, we have taken an additional set of illumination readings with all emergency lighting systems energized.
i We also agreed to identify any task areas where the emergency
)
illumination levels were less than 10-foot candles and to justify operation under those conditions.
The results are as follows:
1.
Emergency illumination levels at all main control board (verticals and benchboard) and building service panel locations were measured and are greater than, or equal to, 10-foot candles (most areas exceeded 20-foot candles).
2.
Emergency illumination levels in all other areas within the operator controls area were measured and are greater than, or equal to, 10-foot candles.
3.
Emergency illumination levels in the area of the shift-supervisor's office were measured and a few areas were found to be less than 10-foot candles.
Most of the area measured between 11 foot candles, except just inside the entrance door to the 7
NSS's
- office, which measured 4.2 foot candles.
The emergency lighting levels in these areas are considered adequate as no emergency actions are required to be performed in those areas.
4.
Emergency illumination levels behind the building service panel and the nuclear instrumentation panel and in the general area of the radiation monitor panels were measured to be less than 10-foot candles (between 1.0 and 2.2 foot candles).
No emergency actions are required to be performed in this area and the emergency lighting is therefore considered adequate.
- Finally, the emergency illumination levels at the alternate and emergency shutdown panels (ASP and ESP) have not yet been re-checked;
- however, the arrangement of the fixtures in those areas indicate that the illumination levels will exceed those measured in the main control room.
In the control room, the fixtures are placed above the benchboard and are spaced with approximately 6
feet between fixtures.
The three fixtures above the ESP are placed end to end and extend the length of the panel.
The two fixtures above the ASP are similarly arranged with a
slight overlap.
The illumination levels at the ESP and the ASP will be verified by measurement before start-up following the first BVPS-2 refueling outage.
We will advise members of
.your staff if the illumination levels in any areas are less than 10-foot candles.
V
7 s
Attachment 1
' Prop'osed Operating License Change Request No. 22 Second Request for Additional Information Page 3 l
Item 3 SPDS Field Input Deficiencies In the April 11, 1989 conference call, we discussed the five groups of deficient SPDS inputs identified in our letter dated March 9, 1989.
The NRC reviewers expressed concern regarding the fire protection valve position status (2FPW*AOV204,
- 205, 206 and 221) input to the Containment Isolation Phase A (CIA) calculation.
In response to this concern, we commit to the following:
1.
The input signals for these valves (which are normally closed) will be temporarily jumpered to provide a
constant " CLOSED" signal to the CIA calculation.
The CIA status will therefore remain valid for the remaining inputs.
This action will be completed prior to start-up following the first BVPS-2 refueling outage.
2.
An SPDS operation manual change will be issued to direct the SPDS user to obtain the valve position status of these valves,2FPW*AOV204, 205, 206 and 221 from the indication provided on the Building Service Panel.
The operating manual change will be implemented prior to start-up following the first BVPS-2 refueling outage.
3.
The SPDS users will receive appropriate training prior to start-up following the first BVPS-2 refueling outage.
4.
A design change to correct the fire protection valve position status inputs to provide the proper CLOSED /NOT CLOSED indication to the SPDS CIA calculation will be implemented prior to start-up following the second BVPS-2 refueling outage.
4 v